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
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

United States Dept of the Army.
Africa, problems and prospects.

"DA Pamphlet 550-17-1."
1. Africa—Bibliography. I. Title.
Z3501.U47 1977 [DT3] 016.96 77-90347

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". . . The vast African continent warrants attention not only for its strategic geographical position and sheer size, but as an increasingly important source of raw materials for industrialized nations. In a world where resources are finite and competition for markets is keen, the industrial nations will increasingly depend on Africa for raw materials. . . ."

General George S. Brown, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1977

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FOREWORD

This bibliographic survey of literature on Africa's problems and prospects has been prepared by research analysts of the US Army Library. It updates the bibliographic survey on Africa published in November 1973. Since that date, many significant events have occurred which have heightened worldwide interest in this vast continent with its diversity of peoples, languages, and contrasting cultures. Some knowledge of the forces--political, economic, social, and military--that are shaping the future of Africa will be helpful in understanding the nature of developing events as well as the potential of this vast region. Toward this end, both students and observers of international and African affairs should find this publication useful in identifying recent sources of literature concerning this ~~immense~~ region often referred to as both the cradle of mankind and the continent of the future.

E. C. MEYER
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans

ANALYSTS' NOTE

This analytical survey of literature was prepared at the request of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army.

It is based on unclassified publications (friendly and unfriendly) located for the most part on the open shelves of The Army Library, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pentagon.*

Africa's future is of direct concern to the United States. The desire of Africans to shape their own destiny continues to find the natural and logical response in America, where freedom, human rights, and self-determination for all mankind, are considered to be the inevitable and just course of human progress.

Like the previous volume on Africa (DA Pam 550-17) which was issued in 1973, this new edition endeavors to assess Africa's problems and prospects from both - regional approach, as well as from country-by-country point of view.

The analysts of The Army Library, Pentagon, screened a vast quantity of materials in order to serve the needs of wide readership in the military and civilian communities. The main body of this document is supported by appendixes and maps.

The work includes data ranging from the strategic importance of Africa as a continent, to facts and figures on the political, economic, sociological, and military aspects of individual African states.

In the screening of documents no effort was made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent an official endorsement of the views expressed.

The analysts of the Army Library gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the various specialists in the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Special acknowledgment is extended to T. N. Dupuy Associates, Dunn Loring, Virginia, for permission to reprint extracts from their 1974 edition of The Almanac of World Military Power.

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PART I
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A. Whither Africa: An Assessment

AFRICA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, by Toni Folami, in *Contemporary Review,* v.227, no. 1317 (October 1975) 198-200.

"Most of Africa, once unflatteringly referred to as the Dark Continent, is now free and sovereign. But most of these countries are plagued by political instability. Independence produced a number of political systems—the multi-party system, the unitary system and the monarchical system. These have been tried with some degree of failure, hence coups and counter-coups (Ethiopia, Malagasy, Nigeria and China are examples). The reversal of the systems from monocephalous executive presidency to bichephalous executive or vice versa compelled most of the states to face a stark reality. Should not a balance be struck between the two which would be ideal for Africa, taking into consideration conditions in the precolonial era?"

AFRICA EMERGENT: AFRICA'S PROBLEMS SINCE INDEPENDENCE, by John Hatch. Chicago, Regnery, 1974. 233 p.

"Hatch's work. . . is knit together by a central preoccupation with the need to bridge the gap between rural and urban, 'traditional' and 'modern,' life in Africa."

AFRICA STRATEGY, by Gregory Copley, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest,* no. 3 (1976) 6-9 plus.

"Geopolitically speaking, it is the scramble for Africa — the whole of it — which is underway now. The second scramble. And perhaps the most overwhelming for a continent which was picked at and contained for more than a century; at least as far as the sub-Saharan states are concerned. It is now one of the focal points of the Sino-Soviet dispute, one of the key regions in the Soviet-US conflict. It represents to the big powers far more than a region for economic subjugation or a possible market-place; it is the epitomy of the distant gate which nonetheless keeps in the flock, and it is the region wherein the great powers are flanking and outflanking each other."

AFRICA: FROM MYSTERY TO MAZE, ed. by Helen Kitchen. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976. 412 p.

Changing Connections to Multiple Worlds — The African as Individual Tribesman, Nationalist, Muslim, Christian, Traditionalist, Transformer, and as a World Neighbor, Especially with Israel and the Arabs; The Anatomy of Violence in Contemporary Black Africa; Southern Africa after The Collapse of Portuguese Rule; Lessons to be Learned from the Sahel Drought; Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s — An Economic Profile; The Organization of African Unity; Through a Glass Darkly — The Media and Africa; Who Will Rule Africa by the Year 2000?; How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa; An American Bankers Looks at Africa; and The Search for an Aid Policy. With chart, tables, and maps.

THE AFRICAN BRAIN DRAIN, By Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v. 25, no. 9 (December 1975) 11.

"The loss of domestic intellectuals and academically trained individuals is becoming a serious problem for a number of African governments. Despite the often catastrophic shortage of skilled personnel in their homelands, a large number of African students studying at West European and American universities choose to remain abroad after graduation. The number of Nigerian university graduates who have remained in the USA, for example, is estimated at 8,000, with several thousand more deciding to stay in Europe. Some 300 African physicians are practicing in Britain alone, most of them from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone, countries where doctors are urgently needed."

AFTER ANGOLA: THE WAR OVER SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Colin Legum and Tony Hodges. New York, Africana, 1976. 85 p.

"Two essays on the MPLA victory in Angola; each is based on fine insight and well-sifted evidence."

CAN AFRICA SURVIVE? ARGUMENTS AGAINST GROWTH WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT, by Basil Davidson. Boston, Atlantic — Little, Brown and Co., 1974. 207 p.

"'Can Africa Survive?' based on lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh during 1972, is essentially an update of his earlier book, Which Way Africa? The book is a discussion of Africa's current anomalies and

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problems, which according to Davidson arise from structures and relationships which bar the way to true development."

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS IN BLACK AFRICA, by Oskas Splett, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.25, no.3 (June 1975) 17-18.

"The phrase 'cultural revolution' was imported into Africa from the People's Republic of China. First used by Libya's Colonel Quaddhafi, it has since become an integral part of Africa's political vocabulary. The Dark Continent's cultural revolutions, however, are not movements arising from the masses but rather are planned and directed by various governments as deliberate and radical campaigns emphasizing African self-determination and independence. Only then are mass movements harnessed as a means to that end. As Togo's President Eyadema has stated: 'Political liberation has meaning only when we can also speak of cultural and economic liberation.' The justifications usually given for these 'revolutions from above' are the general acceleration of the pace of world events and the need to awaken and stimulate the masses of the population by action. Divergent examples of African cultural revolutions are provided by Zaire, with the personalistic political ideology of President Mobutu, Tanzania with its emphasis on cooperatives, and the small groups of states that link the striving for "national authenticity" with Marxism-Leninism (Guinea, Dahomey, People's Republic of Congo) or with a capitalist economic order (Ivory Coast, Kenya). In contrast to 'negritude,' a cultural ideology which flourished following World War II thanks to the efforts of black intellectuals from Africa and the Caribbean, the concept of 'authenticity' means not only a primarily philosophical and literary self-awareness but is understood as a renaissance reaching into all aspects of life. This in turn calls for uniquely African approaches to state, society and environment."

FOOD AND POPULATION IN AFRICA, by Donald Heisel, in *Current History,* v.68, no.406 (June 1975) 258-261 plus.

"Across the African continent, increased attention to agriculture is absolutely essential if levels of nutrition are to be raised above their current very low levels and if the increased population is to be fed. Discusses: Mortality; Fertility; Migration; and Food Consumption."

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W.F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study by the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT OF NATION-BUILDING, by Robert S. Jordan and John P. Renninger, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.2 (1975) 187-207.

"What is Africa doing wrong? Africans as well as others are increasingly asking this question. We are, in effect, invited to consider that there are, perhaps, negative as well as positive aspects to the nation-building process in post-colonial Africa. To the layman, indeed, the image of Africa has tended to accentuate the negative."

THE ONLY AFRICAN UNITY WORTH A SECOND GLANCE, in *Worldview,* v.18, no.10 (October 1975) 9-12.

"Up to now the great, unifying goal has been eviction of colonial overlords. As the wave of independence has washed southward, at last sweeping aside the Portuguese and lapping at Rhodesia, black Africans have ridden it like surfers with a common euphoria. The conclusion. . .is that unity still depends on the issue at stake; that, for all the redolent rhetoric, self-interest rather than ideology is the clincher. And will self-interest foster unity between Africa's affluent and *indigent?*"

WAR OR PEACE IN AFRICA? HOW THE EXPERTS SEE IT, in *U.S. News & World Report,* v.81, no. 15 (11 October 1976) 36 plus.

"Rhodesia. . . Namibia. . . South Africa—all seem to be heading for an explosive black-white showdown. The US has moved in to try to stave off disaster, but still worries that it may be too late."

B. The Strategic Import of Africa

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE NEED FOR AN AFRICAN STRATEGY, by Yassin El Eyouti, in *Africa Report,* v.20, no.6 (November-December 1975) 15-18.

"The Mediterranean and the Red Sea are African waters regarding which the continent has not yet developed a common strategy, either for commercial or defense purposes. This lack of geopolitical perception of the importance of these seas to Africa became more apparent with the reopening of the Suez Canal on June 5, 1975 after eight years of closure. No discussion of the Mediterranean and Red Sea to Africa could be complete or comprehensible without regarding these two seas along

with the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean as integral components of one theater of action."

2. *The Strategic Indian Ocean: Superpower Competition for Control*

THE BIG THREE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by R.M. Paone, in *Sea Power*, v.18, no.8 (August 1975) 29-34.

"PRC, USSR Fight for Supremacy While US Seeks 'Reasonable Balance' . . . The objectives and the nature of the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC in the Indian Ocean Heartland, as well as the interaction of their policies, are of particular interest in today's shrinking world, and are likely to thoroughly test the probability of the old adage that neither the 'West' wind nor the 'East' wind (China) shall prevail over the East African peripheral."

BRIEFINGS ON DIEGO GARCIA AND PATROL FRIGATE. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION WITH ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, APRIL 11, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 74 p.

Includes information on Soviet personnel in Somalia and Berbera, Soviet projects in Berbera area, Soviet facilities in Yemen, Iraq, and Umm Qasr, Soviet personnel in Aden, at Umm Qasr and at Mauritius, Soviet facility in India, etc.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by K.P. Misra, in *Orbis*. (Winter 1975) 1088-1105.

Military activities in the Indian Ocean by both the US and the Soviet Union, have created an atmosphere of international rivalry. As these 'superpowers' engage in such competition, the region states have pursued a policy of nonalignment publicly promoting the 'peace zone' concept. The Indian Ocean area became 'a victim of superpower strategies' as long ago as 1970. . . US actions have focused on establishing a military base on Diego Garcia, obtained through agreements with the British. By 1973, however, opposition from within the DoD and the Congress had allowed only the creation of a naval communications base on that site, the first foreign base in the region. For the US it provided a central communications link between bases in Ethiopia and Australia. The USSR was also active in the area, but it did not move to establish bases and criticized the US for doing so. It did, however, surpass the US in naval activities in the Indian Ocean (as measured by numbers of ship-days and port-calls), and formed important ties with some of the region states. The US has claimed a security need for the Diego Garcia base in the face of these actions, as well as the added potential for Russian access to the Indian Ocean as a result of reopening the Suez Canal. However, . . . The danger of the Soviet presence has been exaggerated, and improved American diplomatic relations in the area have made the reasons for Diego Garcia obsolete. According to the 'power vacuum' theory advanced by Western thinkers, the new Asian and African states bordering the Indian Ocean have neither the economic nor the political power to defend themselves. Accordingly, the presence of the superpowers would presumably protect the interests of these littoral nations, as well as preserve the international balance of power and the power and influence of both the US and the USSR. From the perspective of the Indian Ocean states, however, the power vacuum notion and the motives behind it negate their nonalignment policies and threaten their independence. Their response to US and Soviet actions, therefore, has maintained their commitment to nonalignment through the proposal of an unsanctioned peace zone, in which status the Indian Ocean would be free of military bases and nuclear weapons. Leading the way for this UN action were the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the UN Permanent Resident there. Although the latter succeeded in placing the proposal on the United Nations' agenda, it remains there for the fifth consecutive year without action. . ."

SOVIET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PRE—LIMINARY SURVEY. Washington. Government Printing Office, 30 April 1975. 81 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print).

Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce and the National Ocean Policy Study Pursuant to S. Res. 222. Contents: Soviet Policy for the Seven Seas; Soviet Fisheries Policy; Soviet Merchant Marine; Soviet Oceanography; Soviet Undersea Research Activities; "Soviet Study—Offshore Oil and Gas; Soviet Marine Pollution Programs; Implications of Soviet Ocean Policy on US Policy. With 23 tables.

SOVIET-US NAVAL COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Hurrell, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.4 (Winter 1975) 1109-1128.

"The danger in the Indian Ocean is that the USSR could achieve a position of dominance in an area where the lessons of naval power are still deeply imprinted on the diplomacy of the littoral states. . . The essential question is whether or not the West can allow the USSR—whose interests in so many instances lie in altering the status quo—to achieve a position of potential naval hegemony in an area where conflicts abound and where air and maritime power can be decisive. If the USSR does achieve such a position, Admiral Zumwalt's view that the Indian Ocean is the area with the greatest potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade may prove to be disastrously accurate. It is highly desirable that the US presence in the Indian Ocean be adequate to support, politically and psychologically, our diplomacy in the region."

3. *Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Ambitions in Africa* (See also Africa and the USSR below)

CHINESE AND SOVIET AID TO AFRICA, ed. by Warren Weinstein. New York, Praeger Publishers. 1975. 290 p.

Soviet Economic Aid to Africa—1959-72; Soviet Bloc-Ghanaian Relations Since the Downfall of Nkrumah; Soviet Aid to Guinea and Nigeria; Naval Strategy and Aid Policy—A Study of Soviet-Somali Relations; Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa—An African View. With tables, figures, and map.

REDS ON THE DARK CONTINENT, by Richard Egan, in National Observer, (23 April 1977) 3 plus.

"What are the Russians up to in Africa? One. . . assessment envisions the Soviets as parlaying their influence in some key African countries into eventual domination of Africa's mineral wealth and the busy sea lanes around the continent, and then exploiting this power to disrupt the West's economy. Another assessment pooh-poohs the prospect of any Red tide sweeping the Dark Continent, holding that even pro-Soviet, avowedly Marxist regimes in Africa eventually will turn to the West for aid and trade rather than join in some Moscow-masterminded plot. The views of top African specialists in the Carter Administration seem to fall somewhere in between. 'Taken in constellation, the Soviet activity in Africa is significant, a cause for concern,' says one key Government policy maker, 'It's not so much a question of communism spreading through Africa, but of the destabilizing situations' arising from stepped-up Soviet activity in Africa. 'We're studying it and trying to get some idea of the implications.' "

RUSSIAN AMBITIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTAINMENT IN AFRICA, by Peter Jankl, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.2 (October 1976) 81-86.

RUSSIAN AMBITIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTAINMENT IN AFRICA, by Peter Jankl, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.2. (October 1976) 81-86.

"Dr. Janke, senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, puts into perspective the Soviet's response to the fluctuations of political phases in Africa."

SOVIET SEA POWER, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND WORLD EQUILIBRIUM, by Gunter Roser, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.2 (October 1976) 73-80.

"The author, retired Rear Admiral and former NATO Head of Intelligence, International Military Staff in Brussels, discusses the influence of Soviet sea power particularly in relation to South Africa."

SOVIET STRATEGIC PENETRATION OF AFRICA, by David Rees, in *Conflict Studies*, no.77 (November 1976) 20 p.

Marxism through 'Liberation'; Threat to Mineral Supplies; Coming Struggle for Rhodesia; Cape Lifeline at Risk; and S. African Integrity Vital to West.

THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA, by Christopher Stevens. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976. 236 p.

"Written before the Soviet role in Angola became clear, this work concentrates on Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Kenya, as well as the Horn; the author's analysis of military relationships and strategic possibilities is necessarily somewhat dated, but the discussion of the complexities of Soviet economic and political relations with left-leaning regimes is a low-key to alarmist warnings about Soviet beachheads in Africa."

THE SOVIETS IN AFRICA, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.14 (4 April 1977) 43 plus.

"Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny followed Cuba's Fidel Castro across Africa last week. The Africans gave Castro a hero's welcome, and then demonstrated with quieter receptions for Podgorny that they knew exactly why he had come. The Soviets wanted to extend their considerable influence in Africa (map). They were arming black guerrillas in Rhodesia and cementing their ties with the 'front line' states nearby. By courting Ethiopia, they sought to get a grip on the Red Sea. In Zaire, Katangan rebels armed with Soviet-made weapons had invaded their homeland from Angola, and Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko charged that they were led by Cuban advisers. On the face of it, Russia was threatening to establish a 'red belt' across Africa."

TURMOIL IN AFRICA — HOW MOSCOW CAPITALIZES ON STRIFE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.82, no. 13 (4 April 1977) 29-30.

"There's far more at stake than a skein of local wars. The Kremlin's goal: control of strategic sea lanes and the continent's vital resources."

WHY AFRICA IS SUCH AN INVITING TARGET FOR RUSSIA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.14 (4 October 1976) 43-44.

"Joseph Fromm, a Deputy Editor of the magazine, attending a meeting in Europe of strategic planners from key nations. Following is his cabled report of how these experts assesss the impact that Russia's mushrooming military strength is having on the rest of the world."

C. Africa and the World (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

DIFFICULTIES OF CULTURAL EMANCIPATION IN AFRICA, by Gerhard Grohs, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.1 (1976) 65-78.

"For a long time 'emancipation' in Africa meant solely liberation from European rule. But when 17 African states became independent in 1960 and when from 1956 to 1966 32 countries finally attained national sovereignty, the continent, in part, emancipated itself from this type of colonial rule. Only in Southern Africa is it impossible to speak of emancipation in international legal terms. This state of affairs has engendered a strong sense of solidarity among independent African nations vis-a-vis the 'unresolved' area of the continent, as reflected in every conference of the Organization of African Unity, as well as in many United Nations resolutions. However, it soon became clear to those who equated emancipation with legal sovereignty, with governments run by Africans with national flags and national anthems, that true emancipation must mean something else. If one analyzes the conceptual history of this term, it is evident that emancipation comprises much more than freedom from foreign rule. . . We can distinguish three main types of cultural emancipation: (i) without economic and social emancipation from foreign domination, as in Senegal; (ii) as a means to create the preconditions to overcome economic and social dependence, as in South Africa; and (iii) as part of economic and social emancipation, as in Tanzania. To these could be added a fourth type, as in Algeria or Mozambique, where economic, social, and cultural emancipation were combined in one violent act of revolution."

DISCONTINUITIES AND INEQUALITIES IN AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, by Timothy M. Shaw, in *International Journal,* v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 369-390.

"The development of international politics in Africa displays both continuities and discontinuities. This article questions two assumptions or myths about the African international system which involve continuities and discontinuities of both history and structure. Firstly, I suggest that Africa does have a tradition of inter-state relations dating back to pre-colonial interaction and that analysis of contemporary statecraft should therefore be supplemented with an understanding of the established norms of African diplomacy. Secondly, I propose that the myth of the equality of African states should be replaced by a recognition of the growth of international stratification on the continent. These related propositions indicate that Africa is neither a new nor an egalitarian international subsystem, but rather that it has always been characterized by inequalities. So this essay is both retrospective and prospective: focusing on the origins and impact of international inequalities in Africa, and analyzing the new diversity of actors, coalitions, and interests on the continent. Inequality among African states is a function of both their own resources and their international relations. Although we do not deal with the issue here, interstate inequality on the continent is also related to the growth of inequalities within African states."

THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN EAST AFRICA: ASIANS AND EUROPEANS IN TANZANIA, UGANDA, AND KENYA, by Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira. New York, Praeger, 1976. 230 p.

"A concerned Kenyan analyzes the human rights issues involved in the expulsion of Asians from the area; his argument is buttressed by a fund of information on each nation's laws affecting the status of aliens."

2. *Africa and the Conflicting Interests of Western and Communist Powers (See by country)*

3. *Africa and Canada*

CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA: A REPLY TO CRANFORD PRATT, in *International Perspectives,* (July/August 1975) 50-55.

"Cranford Pratt's article 'Canadian Attitudes towards Southern Africa: A Commentary' (International Perspectives, November-December 1974) is a good summary of the views held by left-liberal ideologues. The reality perceived by the ideologue, 'through his peculiar set of distorting lenses, bears little resemblance to the reality perceived by the realist'. . . To promote trade with South and South West Africa, to increase our investments there, and to oppose all forms of external assistance to 'liberation' (terrorist) factions — here is the basis for a 'wise' Canadian policy. These proposals are the reverse of Cranford Pratt's."

CANADA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA, by Robert O. Matthews, in *International Journal,* v.30, no.3. (Summer 1975) 536-568.

"Despite Canada's expanded involvement in Africa and the resulting visibility of the maple leaf and Canadian citizens on the continent, indeed perhaps because of these very things, Canadian policies towards Africa have had to face mounting criticism. . . Is this criticism well-founded? Are its policies narrowly based in Canada's self-interest? Or, alternatively, is Canada's role in Africa constructive? Are its motives untainted with greed, and its policies impartial and benevolent? In the pages that follow, an attempt is made to uncover the basic character of Canadian-African relations. This will involve in the first place an examination of Canada's various interests in Africa and, then, an analysis of the policies Ottawa has formulated in the fields of decolonization, trade, and immigration to serve those interests."

CANADIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA: A COMMENTARY, by Cranford Pratt, in *International Perspectives,* (November/December 1974) 38-42.

"In recent years a significant number of Canadian academics, churchmen and volunteers who have worked in Africa have been outspoken in their criticism of Canadian policies towards southern Africa. . . These . . . Are the very groups in Canadian society that ask that

Canada's foreign policy operate within the moral constraints of Western liberal tradition. . . The 'constituency of informed Canadians,' is now, as the resolutions of many national organizations illustrate, profoundly critical of Canadian policy towards southern Africa."

4. *Africa and Communist China (See also by country)*

ALONG THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.26, no. 1 (April 1976) 20-21.

"When the current test period is over and the railroad begins fullscale operations, 19 trains each day are scheduled to pass along the route in both directions. The project has linked huge, previously undeveloped regions in both Tanzania and Zambia with the centers of those countries, making it possible for their inhabitants to get their produce to market and stimulating agriculture and trade. . . The price of the ambitious railroad project is high. Tanzania and Zambia have incurred debts to the Chinese that will run well over into the coming century."

CHINA'S AFRICAN REVOLUTION, by Alan Hutchinson. London, Hutchinson, 1975. 313 p.

An "account of the stages of Chinese involvement in Africa from the independence era to present, with parallel information on Soviet activities in the area."

CHINA'S ECONOMIC AID, by Wolfgang Bartke. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1975. 215 p.

"A monograph which lists all of China's foreign aid projects and briefly analyzes their impact. Most favored projects: textile mills, medical groups. Most favored recipients: Pakistan, Tanzania. General effectiveness: high."

CHINA'S FOREIGN AID; AN INSTRUMENT OF PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY, by John Franklin Copper. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976. 197 p.

The Roots of China's Foreign Aid Diplomacy; China's Aid to Communist Bloc Nations, Asian Nations, Middle Eastern Nations, and African Nations. With tables and bibliographic note.

CHINA'S POLICY IN AFRICA, 1958-1971, by Alaba Ogunsanwo. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1974. 310 p.

"Ogunsanwo, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria, follows the course of China's African policy between 1958 and 1971 and shows how the continent's place in China's overall foreign policy changed from one of peripheral to central importance. 'China's policy in Africa rapidly achieved a self-propelling and compulsive momentum [which] led to the undertaking to construct and finance the Tanzania-Zambia railroad—the largest single Chinese and indeed Communist aid project in Africa.' Professor Ogunsanwo points out, and China's desire to compete with the Soviet Union and the United States had much to do with this metamorphosis. China's strategy and tactics, her successes and failures, and the ways in which international events affected Peking's policies toward the African nations are described in detail. Appendixes feature treaties signed with the Republic of Guinea, Ghana, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania."

DEVELOPMENT PATHS IN AFRICA AND CHINA, ED. by Ukandi G. Damachi and others. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1976. 251 p.

"Developing countries have some advantages and disadvantages that are unique, but there are many problems that are common to them all. These problems they have tackled in various ways and with varying degrees of success. In this book, the development paths of six African countries and of China are traced and their experiences compared, the comparison leading to a deeper understanding of all seven. The seven countries with which this book is concerned are each grappling with the profoundly difficult problems of development. There is a race between population, food, housing, jobs. Life-styles must be transformed to cope with new demands and opportunities, industrialism pursued without pollution, affluence without corruption. These are features common to all the countries. To some extent they have aroused similar internal responses; but they have also been the subject of contrasting political, social and economic patterns, sometimes arising from unique historical or geographical conditions, and in other cases fashioned by emulation. Among the African countries, one, Nigeria, is party to the OPEC power circle; the Sudan (cotton), Ghana (cocoa), Zambia (copper) are heavily dependent on one primary product; Kenya and Tanzania, members of the East African Community, produce a variety of primary products but differ markedly in political orientation and economic organization; Ghana, Nigeria and the Sudan have experimented with contrasting forms of government, interspersed, on occasion, by violent upheaval. The differences between these six and China seem more pronounced than the similarities; but about the Chinese path there is both mystery and fascination. 'The best way to cross a river', says a Chinese proverb, 'is to cross it.' How far can other countries apply this directness and refusal to recognize the impossible?" With references and tables.

THE TANZAM RAIL LINK: CHINA'S "LOSS-LEADER": IN AFRICA, by Rosalyn J. Rettman, in *World Affairs,* v.13, no.3 (Winter 1973-1974) 232-258.

"The Tanzam Railway is the third largest foreign aid project ever undertaken — after the Aswan Dam and the Upper Volta Project. While these two larger projects received multilateral support, the Tanzam link is the largest aid project ever financed by a single nation. The railway represents a huge investment by the People's Republic of China — an investment of money, manpower, materiel, and national prestige. The hope-for

return on this investment is a position of Third World leadership, and influence for China throughout Black Africa. For Tanzania and Zambia, the significance of the project is as much ideological as economic, for the completed railway will free Zambia from dependence on the white regimes of southern Africa. The economic and symbolic ramifications of the project thus extend beyond the boundaries of Africa and into the international sphere. Without minimizing the above statement, any analysis of the Tanzam Railway must be tentative and open-ended: first, because the project is presently in progress; secondly, because a great deal of information has not been revealed; and finally, because the financial success and ultimately the viability of the line is in large part dependent upon the price of copper in a fluctuating world market. For these reasons, judgments and conclusions must be considered subject to modification by future events and the availability of pertinent information."

5. *Africa and Cuba (See also under Angola and Ethiopia)*

CUBANS IN AFRICA; WHAT ARE THEY UP TO? in *The New Republic*, (2 April 1977) 14 plus.

"Despite Premier Fidel Castro's promises of troop withdrawals, virtually none have been withdrawn; and Cuban influence in Africa is gaining as never before. Now. . . we have what appears to be the next step — the odd mercenary invasion of the old Katanga province of Zaire. Suddenly, 1500 or 2000 or 5000 (nobody really knows) of the old Katangan troops of Moishe Tshombe have crept out of the highlands of Angola. . . Are the Cubans indeed behind this weird and undocumented 'invasion' of Zaire? Are the Angolans? Or is it simply another of those border and tribal wars which are endemic all over Africa? Most important, what are the real Cuban intentions in Africa?"

6. *Africa and Europe*

AFRICA AND EUROPE FROM ROMAN TIMES TO THE PRESENT, by Norman R. Bennett. New York, Africana Publishing Co., 1975. 246 p.

"An introductory survey of almost 2000 years of history, this book is meant 'to provide a succinct account of the relationships of Africa and Europe. . .' While 'the focus of analysis is upon the indigenous peoples of Africa.' The author, an. . . historian of (mostly Eastern) Africa, and editor of the journal, African Historical Studies. . . confines his 'tour d'horizon' largely to political events."

AFRICAN UNITY — IN EUROPE, by David Fouguet, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.4 (July-August 1974) 7-9.

"Association with the European Economic Community was once an issue that divided Africa. But in the negotiations now hammering out a new relationship in the African states have forged a new common approach."

EUROPE AND AFRICA: DECOLONIZATION OR DEPENDENCY? by I. William Zartman, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.2 (January 1976) 325-343.

"Fifteen years after most of Africa received its independence, Europe is still present and influential in the continent. The European presence has, however, shifted from overt and direct to more subtle forms. While military occupation and sovereign control over African territories have all but been eliminated, political influence, economic preponderance, and cultural conditioning remain. Britain and France, and with them the rest of the European Community, maintain a relatively high level of aid and investment, trade dominance, and a sizable flow of teachers, businessmen, statesmen, tourists and technical assistants. Perhaps most symbolically significant of all, the long-nurtured dream of an institutionalized Eur-African community was finally inaugurated on February 28, 1975, when the convention of trade and cooperation was signed at Lome between the European Nine and the then—37 independent Black African states (plus nine islands and enclaves in the Caribbean and the Pacific). Thus, Eur-African relations are a matter of continuity and change, but judgments of them vary considerably, according to the importance given to one or the other of these two elements. To some, the successor of colonialism is neocolonialism and dependency; for others, what is taking place is gradual disengagement, and the multilateralization of ties to the developed nations. The first look askance at the continuing presence, comparing it with an ideal of total mastery of one's destiny; to them the change seems trival, or worse, insidious. The second emphasize actual changes, the moves toward independence, and see them as part of a continuing process. The best perspective obviously is the one that can encompass and provide an explanation for the largest number of facts."

THE MAGHREB, by Michael Wall, in *World Survey*, no.64 (April 1974) 1-17.

"Michael Wall, the author of this Survey, has been a frequent visitor to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and is a member of the foreign staff of The Economist dealing with Mediterranean and Arab affairs. The Survey, after tracing the historical background of this western extension of the Arab world, describes the different effects of French colonial rule and the growth of the nationalist movements in each of the three countries, and their political and economic development since independence." Discusses: French Rule in the Maghreb; and Independent Maghreb.

7. *Africa and France*

FORMER FRENCH BLACK AFRICA AND FRANCE, by Victor D. DuBois. Hanover, N.H.,

American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1975. 2 pts. (West Africa Series, v.16, nos.2 and 3.)

Part I — The Continuing Ties; Part II — Toward Disengagement.

8. *Africa and Israel*

ISRAEL, THE ARABS AND AFRICA, by Yaacov Shimoni, in *Africa Report,* v.21, no.4 (July-August 1976) 51-55.

A discussion and description of the current state of Israel's relations with Africa.

9. *Africa and Japan*

JAPAN'S ALLIANCE WITH APARTHEID, by Yoko Kitazawa, in *Africa Report,* v.19, no.6 (November-December 1974) 37-41.

"Many governments condemn apartheid while continuing to maintain close relations with the South African regime. Japan is one such country, which until recently succeeded in avoiding publicity for its co-operation. This document is the result of the most exhaustive research so far carried out into the commercial ties between the two countries."

10. *Africa and Portugal*

END OF AN EMPIRE: PORTUGAL'S COLLAPSE IN AFRICA, by Thomas H. Henriksen, in *Current History,* v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 211-215.

"Can the revolutionary leadership [of Portugal's former colonies] escape the inefficiency, corruption and elitism of the colonial rulers and the governments of some of the former French and British territories? Will the new governments succeed in hammering out an authentic national culture?. . . The 'winds of change' that swept Africa in the early 1960's, transforming European colonial empires into a mosaic of politically independent states, have now overwhelmed Portuguese resistance to decolonization. First in and last out of Africa as a colonial power, Portugal finally has been forced to relinquish her hold on Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Guinea). Lisbon's withdrawal was accomplished by the force of African arms."

THE FATE OF PORTUGUESE AFRICA, by John Eppstein, *World Survey,* no.83 (November 1975) 1-17.

"In this Survey, the Editor makes his personal contribution to discussion of the political transformation of Portuguese Africa, taking account of his own observations in Angola and Mozambique before the Revolution and upon weekly intelligence received since then from Luanda. It studies the impact upon the populations and upon the balance of power in the world of the transfer of authority by Portugal to Marxist rulers, ending with the final abdication from Angola."

PORTUGAL, AFRICA AND THE FUTURE, by L.H. Gann, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.1. (1975) 1-18.

"Portuguese did manage to carry on a protracted conflict in their colonies. And for the moment, at least, they remain in Africa. In fact, the critics, both domestic and foreign, have commonly failed to allow for the recuperative powers of Portuguese society, and during the late 1950s and the 1960s they were once again proved wrong. . . Since the foregoing article was written in 1974, the pace of decolonization further accelerated in Portuguese-speaking Africa. In Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, the new Prime Minister, apparently managed to consolidate his position, and his country was due to obtain formal independence in June 1975."

PORTUGUESE AFRICA: LIBERATION MOVEMENT PROVIDE STRUCTURE FOR EMERGING STATES, by John S. Saul, in *International Perspectives,* (November/December 1974) 34-38.

"The liberation movements in Portugal's African colonies have now come close to destroying Portugal's brutal and outdated colonial presence in Africa. The coup in Portugal of April 25 and its aftermath have been the immediate triggers for decolonization, of course, but no one can seriously doubt that the coup itself was first and foremost the achievement of the freedom-fighters of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. For the observer, there are. . . Clear and important lessons to be learned from the study of these movements and of their achievements."

A SOLDIER DISSENTS: PORTUGAL CANNOT WIN IN AFRICA, in *Africa Report,* v.19, no.2 (March-April 1974) 37-39.

"Publication of Portuguese General Antonio de Spinola's book 'Portugal and the Future' in February sent 'broad shock waves' through a war-weary Portugal. Spinola, a key figure in the Portuguese military establishment, was formerly governor and commander-in-chief of Guinea-Bissau. Thus, it is particularly significant that he should attack the Portuguese war effort in Africa, asserting essentially that military activities in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau are bound to result in the loss of Portugal's African presence. Although most pessimistic about a continued war effort, Spinola does not advocate abandonment of the Portuguese colonies. Rather he suggests that a federation be formed in which Portugal and her territories would be on an equal footing. The Spinola book, which has been widely read in Portugal, is thought to represent a variety of heretofore suppressed opinion. Evidently, the Spinola position is one that is influential in all quarters of Portuguese society — the army, business, the Catholic Church, the universities, the professions and even the government. After the publication of the book, the 63-year-old general was dismissed from his post. Subsequently an army junta—Spinola at its head—toppled

the Caetano regime. The Spinola book has already come to symbolize for many the first big public crack in the Portuguese armor of determination to continue the African wars. . . .AFRICA REPORT publishes here the fullest extracts."

11. *Africa and Scandinavia*

SCANDINAVIA: A FRIEND INDEED FOR AFRICA?, by Zdenek Cervenka, in *Africa Report,* v.20, no.3 (May-June 1974) 39-42.

"Generosity and widespread acceptance place Scandinavian development assistance programs far ahead of these of the rest of the world."

12. *Africa and the US*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Washington, Government Printing Office, January 1977. 27 p. (95th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Updated monthly edition of a CRS-prepared series of chronologies of significant international events in selected areas, listing notable occurrences for Jan. 1977 in the following fields: arms control, energy, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Panama Canal, and US relations with the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Western Europe."

(LI) — THE TANZAM RAILROAD: THE PRC IN AFRICA VERSUS UNITED STATES INTERESTS, by Maj. John G. Nettleton. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 109 p. (N4751t Research Paper.)

"This paper investigates the effects of the Chinese supported Tanzam railway to determine the impact on US interests. The study describes US interests in Africa, analyzes China's African goals, discusses the development and progress of the railway and finally investigates the relationship of US interests in Africa to the influence China has won as a result of the Tanzam railway. The paper concludes that, although the benefits of the Tanzam will increase the prestige and influence of the PRC, no threat to the security of the free world is posed by China's support of the Tanzam railway."

TILTING TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA, by Maxine Isaacs Burns, in *Africa Report,* v.21, no. 2 (March-April 1976) 7-8 plus.

"There are indications that the Ford Administration may be moving towards a closer identification with white South Africa. It has long been South Africa's diplomatic strategy to maneuver the US into a position from which the interests of the two nations are perceived to be identical in the black-white confrontation in southern Africa."

US NEOCOLONIALISM IN AFRICA, by Stewart Smith. New York, International Publishers, 1974. 270 p.

"The author of this Marxist analysis (an American research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences) has amassed a large amount of data '(most of it, at a glance, fairly accurate, though not very new)' in support of his thesis about US economic imperialism in Africa and collusion with the white minority regimes."

[THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND AFRICA], in *Africa Report,* v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1976) 2-47.

Most of this issue of Africa Report is devoted to the Presidential Campaign in relation to Africa. All major declared candidates in the Primaries were requested to respond to a standard list of questions resulting in the following articles: Africa in The Campaign; An African Perspective; The Economic Issues; and Africa's Challenge to US Policy. See also the May-June 1976 issue of Africa Report.

WHERE DO THE US CHURCHES STAND ON AFRICA, by Maxine Isaacs Burns, in *Africa Report, v.21, no. 1 (January-February 1976) 18-20.*

"While the world council of churches, meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, tried to determine positions on liberation movements, southern Africa and other burning issues, Washington's church lobbyists for Africa looked toward 1976 and tried to identify the issues that would claim their time, energy and money in the coming year. Buffeted from left to right like the Nairobi delegates, the churches' Washington lobbyists on Africa are in the unenviable position of having to square their denominations' conservative or nonviolent traditions with the uncomfortable notion that violent, armed liberation struggles may be inevitable in this last quarter of the Twentieth Century."

b. *Congressional Materials*

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part 1: Report of Nov. 14-Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebanon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits

with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5-158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7-14, 1973 (p. 159-166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10-Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167-233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x-xv and throughout)."

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND. WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 15 July 1975. 259 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing before the Subcom on International Development Institutions and Finance on H.R. 4264 and four related bills (texts, p. 2-28), all titled the African Development Fund Act, to provide for US participation in the African Development Fund (AFDF), an affiliate of the African Development Bank (AFDB). Includes submitted statements (p.64-69) and background material (p. 115-259) on the AFDP and AFDB, including Williams, Maurice J., 'The Tragedy in the Sahel' excerpt from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, Nov. 1974 (p. 247-259)."

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY — 1975. Washington Government Printing Office, August 1976. 186 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Second annual CRS report, describing actions taken by Congress affecting American foreign policy. This volume highlights congressional activities relative to significant international events during 1975 in the following functional and geographic areas: a. Defense budgets, and intelligence activities oversight (p. 5-28). b. Congressional role in foreign policy, including war powers, and oversight of executive agreements (p. 29-63). c. Arms control and disarmament; foreign assistance; international trade and economic policy; UN participation; global energy and natural resources management; human rights (p. 67-154). d. Soviet Union; People's Republic of China; Middle East; Latin America; Africa; and Asia (p. 157-186)."

MIDDLE EAST: 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, April 1976. 25 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill), on Feb. 10-25, 1976, study mission to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Israel. Contains political and economic evaluations of and information on each country and the area as a whole. Includes partial list of persons visited (p. 22)."

PROPOSED FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES — 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 100 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on International Political and Military Affairs to consider Administration notifications of proposed arms sales to Iran, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Discussion considers impact of proposed sale on US national security interests and the military balance of power in the Middle East, focusing on $4.4 billion in foreign military sales (FMS) request of Saudi government for FY 76."

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate).

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill) on Apr. 13-25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana. Assesses US' interests in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21-33)."

US POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 336 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on African Affairs and the Subcom on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements to consider recommendations for US policy in Africa, including US role in southern Africa liberation movements and economic development, and US nuclear reactor sales to South Africa. Includes views on Secretary of State Kissinger's statement in Lusaka, Zambia, recommending US support for majority rule in southern Africa."

c. *U.S. Aid Programs*

AMENDMENTS TO THE FY77 BUDGET FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE; COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 June 1976. 3 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 94-212.)

"Request for increase in FY77 appropriations for foreign assistance to Zaire, Zambia and other countries in southern Africa."

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUDGET AMENDMENTS: COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 30 October 1975. 8 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Doc. 94-292.)

"Proposed amendments to FY76 and transition quarter funds appropriated to the President: deletion of

requested funds for military and reconstruction assistance to Indochina; increases for Middle East grant military assistance, US contributions to OAS and the Indus Basin Development Fund, and Indonesia development assistance; decreases in developmental assistance programs, including Zaire aid; and addition of funds for Middle East special requirements fund."

US AID: HOW AFRICA IS SHORT-CHANGED, by William R. Cotter, in *Africa Report*, v.19, no.6 (November-December 1974) 2-8 plus.

This discussion on US aid to Africa concludes that: "As Africa's importance to the United States increases and as Africa's development needs grow, so US assistance decreases. [Furthermore], we are now more dependent upon Africa than vice-versa."

US DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAMS IN WEST AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 22 March 1976. 56 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Report prepared by committee staff members John H. Sullivan and John C. Chester evaluating US development assistance programs in West Africa based on findings from Nov. 28-Dec. 18, 1976 study mission to Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Assesses: Population planning activities, including criticism of International Planned Parenthood Federation operations which receive US grant support (p. 1-32) Senegal River Basin irrigation and water resources project, including reservations about providing funds to the Sahel Development Investment Fund (p. 33-48). Reimbursable technical services programs in Nigeria, including recommendations for its funding and administration (p. 49-56)."

d. *Foreign Policy*

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION OF INDIAN OCEAN POLICY, by Chester A. Crocker, in *Orbis*, v.20, no.3 (Fall 1976) 637-667.

"This essay analyzes the evolution of European and superpower strategic roles in Africa and the western Indian Ocean since the early 1960's. It first traces the gradual recognition in London and Paris that their African strategic presence was inescapably limited by the nature of the colonial legacy and by a growing divergence of interest between Africa and Europe. By the 1970s, both European powers found themselves obliged to accommodate resource constraints as well as the constraint posed by a changing African political context. European military roles and relationships were adjusted or terminated, thereby dissolving a security buffer that had long shaped Africa's international affairs. It next demonstrates that the Soviet Union has been the more willing of the two superpowers to pay the price and take the risks of fostering military client relationships in Africa. This is explained in terms of Moscow's Indian Ocean strategic aims, the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and Soviet perceptions of potential gains to be derived from support of various African causes. The United States, it is maintained, has perceived fewer advantages and greater liabilities in African military ties, and has until recently given the impression of seeking to disengage militarily from Africa's principal conflict zones — the Horn and Southern Africa. Washington's caution has reduced its potential liabilities while also reducing its influence with littoral states by creating both the fact and the image of ambivalence. The essay concludes that the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 has set in motion the most profound rethinking of America's Africa policy since the outset of the 1960s."

CLASH OF TITANS; AFRICA AND US FOREIGN POLICY, by Edward W. Chester. Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis Books. 1974.

(LI) A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, by Maj. John M. Spencer. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1975. 54 p. (S7455s Research Study.)

"The basic problem that generated this research study was a belief by the author that the United States' policy toward Africa is passive and does not reflect the reality of the current international and strategic situation. The situational analysis in this study revealed certain conclusions and generated a recommendation concerning the United States' foreign policy based on these conclusions. The conclusions reflect the strategic advantage the Soviets have in the African/Indian Ocean/Middle East area and the lack of a dynamic foreign policy which will increase the United States' strategic posture in that area. The recommendation of the study involves generating an active United States policy which reflects the reality of the current international and strategic environment in the Africa/Indian Ocean/Middle East area."

TRIAL IN AFRICA; THE FAILURE OF US POLICY, by Wm. P. Yarborough. Washington, The Heritage Foundation, 1976. 86 p.

The African Information Jungle; Africa's Colonial Heritage — All Bad?; Soviet Strategists at Work; The Namibian Imbroglio; Who Built Zimbabwe; Boers — Not Yet at Bay; The US Department of State versus Von Clausewitz; Identifying America's African Interests; An American National Strategy for Africa — Beginner's Outline; The African Context of Liberty and Economic Development.

US POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, ed. by Frederick S. Arkhurst. New York, Praeger, 1975.

WHY US IS MOVING INTO AFRICAN POWDER KEG, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.1 (5 July 1976) 23-24.

"Alarm about Soviet imperialism and imminent race war is forcing Washington into a dramatic change of course: from 'benign neglect' to deep involvement in one of world's most volatile danger spots."

e. *Kissinger's Mission in Africa*

AFRICA AFTER KISSINGER, by Daniel I. Fine, in *Worldview,* v.20, no.4 (April 1977) 22-27.

"The new 'initiative' in Africa may have locked America into opposing 'African destiny'. . . Henry Kissinger's main contribution in Southern Africa appears to have been more in the realm of technique than of principle. Critics of the Kissinger era of American foreign policy will find little reason in Africa to stop their criticism. This is not to say there was no achievement. Perhaps that technique, which was refined in the Middle East before its export to Africa, will eventually prepare the way for principle in the Carter Administration. And perhaps not. Much depends on whether Kissinger's fast-moving diplomacy somehow preempted policy based on principle. That may be the price he had to pay South Africa's Vorster for making the 'Kissinger Agreement' an immediate reality. . . Henry Kissinger leaves to his successor inescapably hard choices of both principle and strategy. There is now far less opportunity for trouble-shooting and technique. The most explosive question is whether the United States has committed itself to majority rule in Africa as a universal principle or as a solution for just one country—Rhodesia. Although Secretary Kissinger carefully avoided the subject of majority rule in South Africa itself, and although there is considerable suspicion among Africans that this is the price Vorster exacted for his part in "converting" Smith, the moral position of majority rule in black Africa is viewed by Africans as absolute."

KISSINGER IN AFRICA: A BID TO STAVE OFF RACE WAR, in *U.S. News & World Report,* v.8, no.18 (3 May 1976) 28-30.

"It's a continent loaded with arms and black-white antagonisms that worries US, challenges The Secretary of State. What can America do?" Discusses: Africa's vast storehouse of natural wealth; and the US stake in Africa.

REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ON HIS VISITS TO LATIN AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 17 June 1976. 31 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Sesion, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing to consider Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's report on his visits during 1976 to Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa."

SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES AFRICA WITH AFRICAN AND BRITISH OFFICIALS, in *The Department of State Bulletin,* v.75, no.1948 (25 October 1976) 511-527.

"Secretary Kissinger visited Tanzania September 14-15 and 21, Zambia September 15-17 and 20-21, South Africa September 17-20, Zaire September 21-22, Kenya September 22-23, and the United Kingdom September 23-24. He met with the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Kenya; at Pretoria he met with South African Prime Minister Bathazar Johannes Vorster and with a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian D. Smith; he met with British Prime Minister James Callaghan and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Crosland at London. Following are statements and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and a news conference held by the Secretary and Foreign Secretary Crosland."

STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA, in *The Department of State Bulletin,* v.75, no.1949 (1 November 1976) 559-562.

"A toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on October 8 in honor of African Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations."

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA; A STATEMENT, by Henry Kissinger, in *The Department of State Bulletin,* v.74, no.1928 (7 June 1976) 713-719.

"I am pleased to have this opportunity to report to you on my visit to Africa and on the state of our relations with this increasingly important continent. A sound relationship between America and Africa is crucial to an international structure of relations that promotes peace, widening prosperity, and human dignity."

US POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 5 May 1976. 13 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report 94-780.)

"Recommends passage with amendment of S. Res. 436, to express Senate approval of US policy of support for majority rule in southern Africa as outlined by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his visit to Zambia on Apr. 27, 1976."

f. *Portuguese Dilemmas in Africa and the US*

COMPLEX OF US PORTUGUESE RELATIONS: BEFORE AND AFTER THE COUP. Washington, Government Printing Office, March, October 1974. 574 p. (93rd Congress, Second Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on Africa, held before and after the Apr. 25, 1974 coup, to consider developments pertaining to Portugal's African territories and Guinea-Bissau, renegotiation of Azores agreement, implications of the coup for US political policy, and status of American corporate interests in Portugal and its former colonies. Appendices (p. 181-574) contain correspondence, articles, UN speeches, resolutions of church bodies, committee press releases, statement."

IN THE WAKE OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR, by Bruce Oudes, in *Africa Report,* v.19, no.1 (January-February 1974) 11-13 plus.

Discusses how "US Africa policy is more and more being influenced by a complicated series of developments in US-Portuguese relations."

PORTUGUESE AFRICA AND THE WEST, by William Minter. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974. 200 p.

"This book. . . depicts an extensive network of interests linking Western nations — and particularly the United States — with Portuguese colonialism in Africa."

g. *Ambassador Young's mission in Africa*

ARMED STRUGGLE IS A NO-WIN SITUATION, in *Africa,* no.67 (March 1977) 16-18.

"Before starting out on his recent visit to Africa, Andrew Young gave an exclusive interview to AFRICA magazine's Assistant Editor and US representative Chukwuemeka Lee, in Washington. . . [He started in part —] We're not dealing with Portugal anymore. We're dealing with South Africa, and that's the strongest military power in Africa. . . South Africa and Rhodesia can't hope to win militarily either, and. . . armed struggle is a no-win situation for all concerned."

13. *Africa and the U.N.*

AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, ed. by Yassin Elayouty and Hugh C. Brooks. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974. 250 p.

"This collection is distinguished by several analyses of African influence on the developing shape of the U.N. and of the forces which have dictated the form and function of the O.A.U."

AFRICAN GOALS AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS, by Moses E. Akpan, North Quincy, Mass., Christopher, 1976. 165 p.

"Assemblage of information on U.N. deliberations and resolutions on southern Africa between 1960 and 1974."

AFTER THE SEVENTH SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION: AFRICA AND THE NEW EMERGING WORLD ORDER, by John P. Renninger, in *The African Studies Review,* v.19, no.2 (September 1976) 35-48.

"The Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Development and International Co-operation, which ended on September 16, 1975, after round-the-clock negotiations between developing and developed nations, succeeded in producing a resolution which was adopted unanimously. The preamble of the resolution reaffirmed the General Assembly's intention 'to eliminate injustice and inequality which afflict vast sections of humanity and to accelerate the development of developing countries' (U.N. General Assembly, 1975: 1). The resolution identified measures the international community could take to accelerate the pace of development. The Seventh Special Session is another indication of the developing world's determination to create a 'New International Economic Order.' This article will discuss what is meant by this increasingly invoked phrase and examine the changing political realities which account for international economic issues becoming the dominant concern of bodies such as the United Nations. We will then analyze the decisions taken at the Seventh Special Session and discuss some of their possible implications for development in Africa."

APARTHEID AND THE UN: A CASE IN "SELECTIVE MORALITY," by Patrick K. Cameron, in *SAIS Review,* v.19, no.2 (1975) 28-31.

"With the incorporation of newly independent African and Asian states into the United Nations, new pressures have been exerted upon the Organization. Since the early 1960's, the Afro-Asian bloc has postulated a variety of new objectives and approaches for the United Nations to pursue — the most important being the eradication of social injustices and European colonialism. In a similar vain, increased pressure has mounted to secure the outlawing of all forms of racial discrimination and to define the interpretation of human rights almost exclusively in terms of the right to national self-determination. . . Minority groups who have sought the recognition of Security Council members have faced mixed reactions."

COLLECTIVE DECOLONIZATION AND THE U.N. COMMITTEE OF 24, by James H. Mittelman, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.14, no.1 (1976) 41-64.

"Decolonization is the great revolution of the twentieth century. Since the opening of the first U.N. General Assembly in 1946, over one billion people inhabiting 76 new states — nearly one-third of the human race — have attained political independence as of 1974. But until the final demise of external domination is achieved, the tasks of decolonization are not yet complete. There remain the intractable problems of Southern Africa, as well as a variety of small territories still under alien rule. Given recent indications of the politicization of blacks in the white redoubt, as well as the independence of Mozambique and Angola, it is a particularly appropriate time to take stock of the decolonization movement."

INTERNATIONAL AID AND NATIONAL DECISIONS: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI, TANZANIA, AND ZAMBIA, by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 190 p.

"Observing the operation of U.N. aid programs from their beginnings through their growth into an international industry, the author describes the complex interactions between national governments and U.N. personnel, focusing on the potential for development aid to foster the U.N. goals of international integration and cooperation."

THE OAU AND THE UN; RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, by Berhanykun Andemicael. New York, published for the United Nations Institute for training and research by Africana Publishing Co., 1976. 331 p.

SOME RECENT LITERATURES ON THE UNITED NATIONS, by A.F. Ewing, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.4 (1975) 677-695.

"If books and articles about the United Nations can hardly compete in sheer volume with the words produced by the Organization itself, the literature is abundant. A review has therefore to be selective, and in this article attention is concentrated on what has been written about, but not by, the Secretariat in the last decade. The scope is further narrowed by focusing mainly on what has been published about the activities of the U.N. in Africa. Even so the range remains very wide, and no claim is made that all the relevant literature has been assessed."

14. *Africa as Reflected in the Soviet Press*

AFRICA: TENDENCIES OF NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, by V. SOLODOVNIKOV AND N. GAVRILOV, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.3 (1976) 31-39. In English.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES: ANTI-IMPERIALIST FOREIGN POLICIES, by Y. Etinger, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.8 (1973) 75-81. In English.

"The independent foreign policy of the newly free countries constitutes a major achievement of the National Liberation Movement in Africa. Young African states have become an active factor in world affairs. . ." Identifies some of these policies and notes that the interconnection between the socio-economic orientation of states and their foreign policies evolves as "anti-imperialist struggle in the sphere of economic relations with the West. . ." On the one hand and cooperation with the USSR and other Socialist countries, on the other.

AFRO-ASIAN MOVEMENT, in *Current Digest in the Soviet Press,* v.26, no.17 (22 May 1974) 16-17.

Condensed text of a report in Pravda, 26 April 1974, page 4, on the results of the 11th Session of the Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, held in Baghdad. "The session examined the most important and urgent problems of the anti-imperialist struggle, such as solidarity with the peoples of the Arab countries and Indochina, support for the Liberation Movement in Africa, solidarity with the patriots in Chile and other countries of Latin America, ensuring peace and security in Asia and problems related to the Socioeconomic development of the Afro-Asian countries. . ." States that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, "were highly appraised" by the emissaries at the session, for the aid given to the Afro-Asian states and the national liberation states.

ANGOLA SENTENCES FOREIGN MERCENARIES, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.26 (28 July 1976) 27.

Condensed text from Pravda, June 28, p. 5. Details of sentences handed down to 13 mercenaries during the trial at Luanda which began on June 11. Four were sentenced to death and the remaining eleven to prison terms of 16 to 30 years.

ANGOLA'S FRIENDS AND FOES, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no. 52 (28 June 1976) 13.

Condensed text of an article in Izvestia of Dec. 26, p. 2 on the preparations for a session of the council of ministers and then of the Assembly Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. The Angolan situation is on the agenda.

ANGOLA'S NETO IN USSR, SIGNS PACTS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.41 (10 Nov 1976) 9.

Excerpts from Neto's and Brezhnev's speeches. Also complete text of treaty of friendship and cooperation between the union of Soviet Republics and the People's Republic of Angola. (Pravda Oct. 8, P. 2; Pravda, Oct. 9, pp. 1-2; Izvestia Oct. 10).

CHANGES ON THE AFRICAN POLITICAL MAP AND THE RACISTS' MANOEUVRES, by A. Klimov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.6 (1975) 136-138. In English.

CMEA COUNTRIES' COOPERATION WITH AFRICA, by S. Borisov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.5 (1975) 137-138.

Credits advanced by Moscow, as well as the Communist countries of Eastern Europe to the countries of Africa.

CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON NAMIBIA'S LIBERATION STRUGGLE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.2 (11 Feb. 1976) 19.

Condensed text. In Pravda 12 Jan. 1976, p. 5. Comments on conference on Human Rights in Namibia which took place in Dakar, Senegal, with participation of representatives from more than 50 States. "The purpose of the conference was once more to draw the attention of

the world to the occupation of Namibia by the racist regime of the republic of South Africa and to outline effective measures to liberate the country. . ."

CONFLICTS IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND IMPERALIST POLICY, by V. Kremenyuk, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.1 (1974) 61-65. In English.

According to the writer the real causes of conflicts in the "third world" are distorted in the west, where justification is then found for taking "police action" against these conflicts which are "conflicts only in geographical terms, for essentially these were imperialist wars against the National Liberation Movement and an expression of interventionism as a form of colonial policy. . ." Examines various such conflicts in the "third world" (including Africa) and concludes that ". . . the 20th century imperialism is the main initiator. . . and bears chief responsibility. . ."

DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLES OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 28, no.22 (30 June 1976) 2d.

Complete text of the Declaration in Pravda, June 1, pp.1,4.

DETENTE, ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS SEEN SPEEDING LIBERATION, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v.26, no.21 (19 June 1974)* 23.

Condensed text of comment in Izvestia, 25 May 1974, p. 4. On the events taking place in various countries of Africa, which speed "the revolutionary process of the transformation of the African continent. . ."

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, by N. Volkov, in *International Relations* (Moscow), no. 9. 1976. 57-67. In English.

"An important aspect of the world revolutionary process at the present stage is the fact that many peoples, having won their national independence, are stepping up the anti-imperialist struggle for their economic independence and its consolidation. The frontline is now running in the drive for a radical restructuring of the existing unequal economic relations in the economic system of the capitalist world, and for cooperation based on the principles of equality, no-interference in the domestic affairs of states, e.g., Africa and mutual advantages. . ." In this connection, the author delves into activities of United Nations conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) which was set up in 1964 as the Chief UN Agency for International Cooperation, as well as activities and plans of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries in the matter of "establishing a new international economic order [in Africa]. . ."

18 MILLION 'FOREIGNERS;' in *Current Digest of the Foreign Press,* v.28, no.21 (28 June 1976) 17 plus.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda 28 May, p. 5 on Pretoria's declarations that Africans are "foreigners" and the creation of the state of Transkei which is to receive the status of a "foreign state." Three million Africans of the XHOSA tribe live in Transkei.

FIRST TASS REPORT ON ISRAEL'S ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.27 (4 August 1976) 14.

Complete Text. Pravda, July 5, p. 3. Some details of damages suffered by Uganda.

GAMBIA'S JAWARA VISITS THE SOVIET UNION, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.12 (16 April 1975) 15 plus.

Condensed text of Joint Soviet-Gambian Communique (*Pravda,* 26 March, 1975, pp.1,4) following the visit of Davda Kairaba Jawara, President of the Republic of The Gambia, in the Soviet Union March 17 to 25, 1975. The two sides discussed, among others, the state of relations between the two countries, the state of affairs in Africa, the state of Affairs in Near East, events in Cyprus, and questions relating to the international conference on the Law of the sea. At the conclusion of the visit Mr. Jawara invited N.V. Podgorny to pay an official visit to Gambia.

HANDS OFF ANGOLA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.47 (17 Dec. 1975) 13.

Comments in pravda, 21, Nov. 1975, p.5 (Condensed Text) in which China's and South Africa are decried for their policies and actions toward Angola.

IMPORTANT DECREE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.6 (5 March 1975) 19-20.

Condensed text of comment in Izvestia, 8 Feb. 1975, p.4 on the announcement of the Provisional Military Administrative Committee (P.M.A.E.) of Ethiopia regarding a decree on the nationalization of 72 private companies and the establishment of state control — by acquisition of controlling interest — over 29 firms. The decree took effect on Feb. 3, 1975. The P.M.A.C. points out that the measures were taken in the interests of the workers and in order to eradicate feudalism and liquidate capitalist, imperialist, and neocolonialist exploitation. Izvestia notes that these and other measures "are creating a firm foundation for a new order in Ethiopia."

INTERNATIONAL LECTURE HALL, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.5 (26 Feb 1975) 22-23.

Condensed text from Pravda's (5 Feb 1975, p.6) comment on the 15th anniversary of the P. Lumumba Friendship of Peoples University. The university was founded by ALL-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee

and the Union of Soviet Societies for friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries... At present the university's students number more than 7,500 from 89 countries.

IZVESTIA SURVEY: STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.18 (2 June 1976) 17 plus.

Excerpts from Izvestia, May 6, p. 4. Scores US policies on Rhodesia and South Africa and challenges the intentions of Henry Kissinger, particularly his speech at Lusaka Zambia in which he spelled out the United States' 10-point African policy. States that the African masses ". . .made it their goal to purge the continent as swiftly as possible of the last vestiges of colonialism and racism..."

JOINT SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN COMMUNIQUE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.28 (11 Aug 1976) 15.

Excerpts from *Pravda*, July 14, p.4, on the visit of an Ethiopian State Delegation to the Soviet Union during July 6-18. The communique issued at the end of the visit says: "The talks. . . included an exchange of opinions both on: Questions of the further development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations and on a number of important international problems of mutual interest. . . peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem. . . Soviet readiness to send a group of experts to Ethiopia...for the purpose of studying... mutually advantageous economic and technical cooperation. . . admission of Ethiopian students to Soviet educational institutions. . . and sending of Soviet instructions to Ethiopia. . ."

JOINT SOVIET-LIBYAN COMMUNIQUE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* vol.28, no.49, (5 Jan 1977) 14-15.

Condensed text of a Joint Soviet-Libyan Communique in Pravda Dec. 10 pp. 1,4 and Izvestia pp.1,3. The Communique reflects on the talks between Qaddafi and Soviet officials regarding relations between the two countries, and further development of cooperation between them, as well as the situation in the Middle East and on the African Continent. Col. Quaddafi was in the Soviet Union from Dec. 6 to 9 1976 at the invitation of Soviet Government.

JOINT SOVIET MOZAMBIQUE STATEMENT, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.21 (23 June 1976) 17.

Excerpts from Pravda May 24, pp. 1,3. On the joint statement following the visit by Mozambique party and state delegation in the Soviet Union May 17-22, 1976. ". . . In addition to previous. . . agreements on economic and technical cooperation, trade, air communications, the merchant marine and cooperation in fishing, an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation. . . was signed. . ." On behalf of Frelimo, Breznew was invited to pay an official visit to the people's republic of Mozambique.

JOINT SOVIET-SOMALI COMMUNIQUE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* vol.28, no.32 (8 Sept. 1976) 17.

Excerpts from an article in Pravda of 10 August pp.1,4 commenting on the visit in Moscow of the party and Government delegation of the Somali Democratic Republic, from Aug. 2 through Aug. 7. The article reports on the various subjects that was under discussion: "The two sides exchanged opinions on the situation on the African Continent. . . [and] confirmed their support for the struggle of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Djibouti and South Africa.

JUNGLE'S VIRGIN LAND, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.32 (8 Dept. 1976) 17.

Excerpts from Pravda Aug. 13, p.4. . . "For several years Soviet geologists have been prospecting for minerals with Nigerians. They have found large deposits of iron ore and coking coal. The raw material base for metallurgical enterprise has virtually been determined. Two years ago Soviet specialists prepared preliminary engineering plans for this enterprise. Recently a Nigerian delegation. . . came to Moscow and signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction of a metallurgical plant. . . The enterprise will be the largest plant in tropical Africa. . . The plant will be built in the state of Kwara on the banks of the great African river Niger."

KISSINGER TOUR PROVOKES CRITICISM, TOUGH QUESTIONING, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.17 (26 May 1976) 22.

Excerpts from Pravda, 25 April, p. 4 on US policy in Africa and the aims of Henry Kissinger's Tour. ". . . in commenting on the US position... General Secretary of the Organization of African Unity, stated: 'I do not understand why the US and Kissinger in particular, should interfere in our affairs. We now that US supports the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. Our duty as Africans is to do everything possible to help the people struggling against these regimes. I have already stated and am prepared to repeat that we cannot be intimidated."

LEANING TOWARD THE RACISTS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.39 (22 October 1975) 14.

Condensed text in Izvestia, 26 Sept. 1975, p.2., in which Communist China is scored for its policies toward Rhodesia and South Africa. States that China is motivated, among others, by trade considerations which allow her to import strategic materials, such as diamonds, copper, lead and gold from South Africa and chrome and graphite from Rhodesia.

MEETING IN LUSAKA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.39 (27 Oct 1976) 15.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, Sept. 28, p. 5 on communique issued in Lusaka following the

meeting of five presidents of five states — Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana and Zambia. The communique authors "reaffirmed their devotion to the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe and armed struggle."

THE MONETARY CRISIS AND THE DEVELOPED WORLD, by A. Atroshenko and A. Chuntulov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.2 (1974) 53-59. In English.

"Economic dependence and its foreign trade consequences; financial grip of the monetary crisis; a search for effective measures. . ." The authors conclude: "The monetary labyrinth in which the developing world finds itself and the grave consequences in capitalisms's financial system are the inevitable results of the fact that Asian, African and Latin American countries are still tied up to imperialist centers. . . the solution to the economic problems of developing states. . . can be found along the lines of radical progressive socio-economic transformations."

MOZAMBIQUE, by A. Silanin, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.4 (1975) 132-134. In English.

An overview.

MOZAMBIQUE — RHODESIA BORDER CLOSED, in *The Current Digest of The Soviet Press,* v.28, no.10 (7 April 1976) 24.

Condensed text of comments in Izvestia, 11 March, p.4 on the reasons why Mozambique — Rhodesia border was closed on 3 March 1976 as announced by Machel Samora — President of Mozambique.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT TODAY, by E. Tarabrin, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.5, 1976. 21-31. In English.

A Soviet view of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who have achieved or are in the process of achieving independence. Notes that ". . . The Socialist orientation will inevitably become, and is already becoming the highroad of development. . ." For these countries. Concludes with the words of Leonid Brezhnev at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: "We are doing and will continue to do everything to extend and strengthen friendship with those who really want it. We are brought together with the vast majority of the states that arose on the ruins of the colonial system by our deep common allegiance to peace and freedom, and aversion to all forms of aggression and domination, and to exploitation of the country by another. This community of basic aspirations is rich and fruitful soil on which our friendship will continue to grow and flourish!"

A NEW PHASE OF STRUGGLE IN AFRICA, by V. Solodovnikov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.5, 1976. 119-121. In English.

A review of the book: "In the vanguard of the Revolutionary Liberation Struggle in Africa, by P.I. Manchikha. Moscow, Political Literature Publishers", 1975, 254 p. In this book the author "offers an analysis of the present, qualitatively new phase of the African Liberation movement. He examines the complex political situation in the new African states, the activity of the African Communists and Revolutionary Democrats, who lead the forces of the revolutionary struggle for the liberation and social progress of the peoples on the continent. Having analyzed the situation in the independent African states he draws the conclusion that today the class and political struggle in these states hinges on the question of which load of the socio-economic development to take. In the African countries non-capitalist development and broad cooperation with the socialist states are the alternative to neocolonialist and imperalist domination." The author writes "The forces of progress in Africa have set themselves the important task of completing the national liberation revolution. In the present situation this signifies the adoption of non-capitalist development by the countries of the African continent." The reviewer states that "The book closes with a survey of Soviet cooperation with African countries, of the CPSU's links with progressive political organisations in these countries and also of Soviet Economic, Scientific and Technical Assistance which is facilitating their economic and social advancement." The reviewer finds among the shortcomings of the book the failure of the author to give adequate attention to the extent of alliance between the Communists and the revolutionary democrats.

NIGERIA BERATES US FOR 'DIKTAT' policy, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.1 (4 Feb 1976) 5.

Condensed text in Pravda, 8 Jan 1976 on Soviet view regarding Nigerian response to US circular to various African countries on the situation in Angola. ". . . the Nigerian Government categorically rejects the faulty logic that equates the presence in Angola of Cuban advisers, on the one hand, with that of South African regular troops. . . and motley bands of mercenaries on the other. . ."

THE NINE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, by Z. Kuzina, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.12 (1973) 65-72. In English.

States that the purpose of the Summit Meeting of the nine common market member countries held in Paris in October 1972 was to establish in the next decade, a "privileged partnership" with young African states, which would accrue economic advantages to the west at the expense of African nations. Describes how the African countries show their unwillingness to enter into such "special relationships" with the nine common market member countries.

O.A.U. SESSION ON ANGOLA ILLUSTRATES AFRICAN DIVISIONS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.2. (11 Feb 1976) 19 plus.

Commentary in Pravda 15 Jan. 1976, (complete text). On the conference of organization of African unity in Addis Ababa ". . . Two resolutions were proposed at the meeting. . . one of them, which was introduced by Nigeria, called for acceptance of the People's Republic of Angola as a member of the O.A.U. . . The second resolution was introduced by Senegal. It proposed the unification of the three movements in Angola and the formation of a coalition Government. Each resolution was supported by 22 delegates from the 46 O.A.U. member countries, Uganda, whose President, Idi Amin, is the current chairman of the O.A.U., and Ethiopia. . . abstained. Consequently the discussion failed to produce any sort of decision. . ." Blames the influence of western powers on the number of African states that the O.A.U. session ended without results.

OAU: TEN YEARS OF EXISTENCE, by V. Alimov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.7 (1973) 59-64. In English.

An overview of the achievements and growing influence of the Organization of African Unity during its first decade. [The OAU was established at a conference of heads of state and Government of Independent African countries at Addis Ababa in 1963.] Notes that OAU's first decade "undoubtedly confirms that the African unity movement has much in common with the world anti-imperalist movement which unites the progressive forces of all continents. . ." and that the Soviet Union speedily extends "Allround cooperation with the young African states by helping them to overcome the burden of their colonial legacy as soon as possible. . ." and that ". . . . It has also backed the OAU. . ."

THE PATRON SAINTS OF APARTHEID, by A. Butlitsky, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.5, 1974. 116-118. In English.

A review of the book: "The South African Connection. Western Investment in Apartheid", by Ruth First and others. London, Temple Smith, 1972. 352 p. states that the authors "have undertaken to examine the following questions. What is the role played by western, specifically British capital investments in the Republic of South Africa (RSA)? Do these investments help accelerate the 'modernisation' of South African Society? Does the industrialisation process in RSA really undermine apartheid, as is claimed in the headquarters of the biggest international monopolies, or, on the contrary, does Western participation in apartheid affairs reinforce the regime and help to prevent its collapse? Can the Bantustans be regarded as prototypes of genuinely independent national centers for Africans? How innocuous are Pretoria's insistent attempts to start a 'Dialogue' with its African neighbors?" The reviewer states that the authors reject nonviolent means for the solution of "struggle for the rights of the African population," because "they did not and could not bring the wanted results. . ."

PODGORNY IN SOMALIA, SIGNS TREATY, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.26, no.28 (2 August 1974) 13-14.

Condensed text of an article in Pravda, 13 July 1974, pp.1,4, detailing the visit of N.V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in Somalia from 8 to 12 July 1974. Describes the highlights of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, signed in Mogadishu on 11 July 1974.

PRAVDA ACCUSES IMPERIALISTS OF INCITING UGANDAN-KENYAN CONFLICT, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.30 (25 Aug. 1976) 25.

Condensed text of an article in Pravda, July 29, p. 5 in which the case of Israeli Raid on Uganda's Entebbe Airport [to free Israeli hostages held there] is used as an example of how "at the headquarters of imperialist forces far-reaching plans are afoot. . . at sowing the seeds of distrust and dissension among the independent African countries. . ." Notes that the use by Israelis of a Kenyan Airport in the course of the operation, worsened the relations between Uganda and Kenya.

QADDAFFI OF LIBYA VISITS MOSCOW, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.49, (5 Jan 1977) 14.

Excerpts from Pravda of Dec. 7, p. 4, and from Izvestia of Dec. 8, p. 3 of speeches by N.V. Podgorny and Col. Muammar Quaddafi of Libya during the dinner given in the Kremlin in honor of Qaddafi on Dec. 6. Both speeches emphasized the strengthening of Soviet-Libyan relations on the one hand, and the existence of problems in the Middle East, on the other.

REBELS CAPITULATE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.7 (12 Feb 1978) 23.

Complete text of Comments in Izvestia, 15 Feb. 1975, p.4, on the recent ambush and killing of Richard Ratsimandrava, Head of State and Government of Madagascar (Malagasy Republic).

RHODESIA EXPANDS CABINET WITH 'QUISLING' AFRICAN MINISTERS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.17 (26 May 1976) 22.

Comment in Pravda April 29, p. 5 on the appointment of four Africans by prime minister Smith for the purpose of expanding his cabinet. Notes that "Radio Mozambique stated that all African 'ministers' appointed to the Rhodesian cabinet are African quislings who have forsaken the interests of the people of Zimbabwe in order to line their pockets."

RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON MOZAMBIQUE CONDEMNED, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no. 44 (1 Dec 1976) 23.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda of Nov. 5, p. 5, 1976 which accuse Rhodesia of aggression against Mozambique.

SINISTER ALLIANCE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v. 28, no.33 (15 September 1976) 3 plus.

Pravda's comment (17 August p. 5) on the growing cooperation in the military field between Pretoria and Tel-Aviv. Also accuses US of "giving aid to the Borster regime through Tel-Aviv."

SOUTHERN AFRICA: LIBERATION APPROACHES, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.35 (29 Sept. 1976) 20-21.

Condensed text of an article in Izvestia of Aug. 28, p. 4 which comments on "tragic events" in June 1976 in Soweto and other cities in the Republic of South Africa, with the conclusion that the democratic forces are inevitably growing and the liberation draws nearer.

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IN TANZANIA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.36 (6 Oct. 1976) 19.

Excerpt from ZA RUBEZHOM no.36, Sept. 3-9 page 13 which comments on work performed by Soviet Geologists in prospecting for minerals in Southwestern Tanzania and compiling a geological map of a territory of 42,000 square kilometers in the western part of the country. A state company 'Lupa Gold Mines' has been formed to mine the gold fields they have discovered on the River Zira.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, by I. Kulev, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.11 (1976) 16-23. In English.

SPECIFICITIES OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES, by Y. Rosaliyev, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.2 (1976) 64-73. In English.

Evolution under colonialism; multistructural economy; its contradictions; specific features of the new stage of development; problems of socialist orientation.

STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.32 (8 Sept. 1976) 16.

Complete text of statements made at a press conference by the president of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). The statements by Sam Nujoma as reported in Pravda 13 Aug. p. 4, were made at the Soviet Afro Asian Solidarity committee on Aug. 12. Mr. Nujoma concluded his remarks by thanking CPSU central committee and the Soviet Government organizations for assistance rendered to SWAPO by the Soviet Union in its struggle for ". . . free and flourishing Namibia."

TASS STATEMENT OF SOWETO VIOLENCE, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.25 (21 July 1976) 22.

Complete Text. Pravda June 24, p. 4. Scores the South African Government for its policy of racial discrimination and the repression and oppression of the African population. States that during demonstrations at Soweto approximately 150 Africans were killed and over 1,000 wounded.

US CAPITAL IN AFRICA, by S. Smith, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.4, 1974. 52-56 in English.

Scores the US for its economic interests in Africa and concludes that ". . .foreign capital (US capital in particular) will sooner or later be called to a halt by African peoples defending their national interests."

U.S.S.R. PAID AN AFRICAN LEADER? — A 'FANTASY', in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.1 (4 Feb 1976) 5 plus.

Condensed text in Sovetskaya Rossia, 8 January 1976. Scores Jeremy Thorpe, the leader of the British Liberal party who announced that he had finally learned . . ."Why African states are supporting the patriotic forces in Angola. Why? according to him, the party at fault is the Soviet Union, which paid 25,000,000 pounds sterling to A 'certain African leader' for his support. This absurd fantasy was picked up by Sourgeois propaganda agencies, who proceeded to spread it far and wide . . ."

WORKING PEOPLE'S VICTORY, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.26, no.10 (3 April 1974) condensed text of comments in Pravda, 12 March 1974, p.5 on the first General strike of working people in Ethiopia's history, called on March 7 by the confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (C.E.L.U.) while calling for more reforms notes that in the meantime the strike was "successful" and that "the country's young proletariat made an important contribution to this progressive course of events. . ."

15. *Africa as viewed in the West*

SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS: VOLUME III, SOVIET-AFRICAN RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. 190 p.

"This data bank on relations between the Soviet Union and African states provides a comprehensive set of tables covering the period through 1972. In large part derived from materials published in Mizan, the book examines the ties between the Soviet Union and each country and contains comments on each African country by the Soviet press along with succinct editorial notes by Professor McLane."

16. *Africa and Yugoslavia*

YUGOSLAVIA AND WEST AFRICA, by Mirko Ostojic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.27, no.627 (20 May 1976) 6-9.

"The visit to Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea by the President of the Federal Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic was made at an opportune time and brought good results. Yugoslavia's cooperation with these countries dates back to the first few days of their independence, which coincided with the beginnings of the policy of nonalignment. Then came years of stagnation with no significant breakthroughs or high points in our relations with this region of West Africa. The young independent states went through trials and tribulations that were the aftermath of their long colonial past and the by-product of the highly organized neocolonial policies of the big powers."

D. The Political Spectrum

1. *Pan Africanism*

AFRICA AND THE BLACK DIASPORA: THE FUTURE IN HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE, by Ali A. Mazrui, in *International Journal,* v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 569-586.

"One out of every five black men lives outside Africa, most of them in the western hemisphere. . . The slave trade played a critical role in dispersing Africans to other parts of the world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But it was not until late in the nineteenth century and early in that twentieth century that Pan-Africanism as a movement of black solidarity came into being. It is possible to distinguish five levels of Pan-Africanism — sub-Saharan, trans-Saharan, trans-Atlantic, West Hemispheric, and global." How Real is Black Independence?; Towards a Black Commonwealth of Nations.

PAN-AFRICANISM: EVOLUTION, PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS, by Adekunle Ajala. London, Andre Deutsch, 1973. 442 p.

"'Pan-Africanism' here includes almost all positive political movements on that continent, as well as specific progress toward African unity. While short on analysis, the book contains a sizeable stock of facts about African political interrelationships."

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THOUGHT IN AFRICA: AN INTRODUCTION, by E. Olisa Awogu. New York, Vantage Press, 1975. 297 p.

"A summary of the total picture of the African political setting, emphasizing both continuity and change, and demonstrating that much that is thought to be 'new' in African politics is, in fact, a development from the traditional past. It describes the political structures of pre-colonial Africa, and shows how, with colonialism as a catalyst, Africa entered the modern phase of her politics. The final section of the book examines some of the major issues in present-day African politics-democracy and the single-party, communalism and socialism, law and custom, the military coups, etc. — revealing their direct links to political institutions and ideologies of the precolonial past." With bibliography.

THEORIES OF POLITICAL POWER WITHIN AFRICA, by Maj. William G. Hanne, in *Military Review,* v.54, no.10 (October 1974) 52-57.

"In a recently published work on the theory of nonalignment, Yugoslav author Leo Mates strongly defended the thesis that the economic and the political activities of nonaligned nations are closely linked. . . theory of nonalignment is reflected in several different forms — the four major ones being African personality. Negritude, Pan-Africanism, and African unity. Elements of each of these theories of political action are essentially reactions to the colonial policies of the European powers. All of them emphasize the desire — and the awareness of the need — to achieve a bond of unity among all African nations. The colonial powers established their African holdings with little or no regard for tribal or ethnic boundaries — witness the Caprivi Strip extending eastward from 'Namibia' to the Zambezi River — resulting in a 'Balkanization' of Africa. These four approaches to unity are a clear indication that there is a desire on the part of most African leaders to at least resist further fragmentation, if not actually to increase unification."

2. *Afro-Arab Relations*

BLACK AFRICA AND THE ARABS, by Ali A. Mazrui, in *Foreign Affairs,* v.53, no.4 (July 1975) 725-742.

"Black Africa and the Arab world have been linked by a fluctuating pattern of economic and cultural connections for at least 12 centuries. In the secular field the Arabs have up to this time played two major roles in black Africa: first as accomplices in African enslavement, and then in the twentieth century as allies in African liberation. In the past several years they have built this alliance into a comprehensive political partnership, aimed at maintaining a solid front, particularly with regard to the Middle East and Southern Africa. The critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become partners in African development."

THE ILLUSION OF AFRO-ARAB SOLIDARITY, by Sammy Kum Buo, in *Africa Report,* v.20, no.5 (September-October 1975) 45-48.

"Since the November, 1973 Middle East war, when most African states hurriedly and dramatically severed ties with Israel and rallied to the diplomatic support of their Arab 'brothers,' the world has heard claims of 'Afro-Arab brotherhood' as part of a larger myth of 'Third World solidarity.' Many Westerners who

erroneously and flatteringly regarded the Third World as a monolithic bloc, united against the industrialized world, were taken in by some of the sensational declarations of Afro-Arab friendship and cooperation. This friendship, if it exists at all, is a paper one which thrives mainly during diplomatic encounters. The Black African refusal to support the Arabs in their proposals to expel Israel from the United Nations is not based upon any Black African love for Israel, which extensively trades and cooperates militarily with Black Africa's enemy South Africa. Rather it is a demonstration of Black Africa's dissatisfaction with the manner in which she has generally been treated or mistreated by the Arabs. Even more important is Black Africa's realization that she would be the greater loser should Israel be expelled from the UN."

3. *Regionalism (See also by region) (See also appendixes)*

PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA, by Jurg Gabriel, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.1 (April 1976) 22-23.

"It is almost a truism to point out that the Balkanization of Africa is one of the major obstacles to the successful development of this continent. Regional groupings will therefore be necessary in the future. But Africa also needs political, social and economic development, and right now this tends to promote national rather than regional integration. In almost all countries to Black Africa sacrifices are being made in order to forge a national government, a national society and a national economy — and among those things being sacrificed are often regional interests. The conflict between the drive for integration and the serving of national interests is a far-reaching one, and its issue is regularly to the advantage of the latter."

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA, by Timonthy M. Shaw, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.4 (Autumn 1975) 671-688.

"The growth of both cooperation and conflict among the states of Africa is illustrative of the trend towards regionalism in world politics. The current international system contains a large number and rich diversity of actors. Most new countries are essentially regional states; although they are dependent on international exchange, their primary foreign policy concerns are concentrated at the regional level. The immediate issues which African states face are security and development within their region. The problems of strategic vulnerability and the possibilities for economic growth are both located at this level. The states of Africa have increased their military expenditures and development plans to incorporate regional threats and opportunities. Their tenuous independence has been protected and advanced through regional conflict and co-operation as well as through participation in the non-aligned coalition in international organizations and at world conferences. In an era characterized by colonial and superpower withdrawal, the new states of Africa have rapidly developed their own subordinate state system and continental organizations."

4. *Organization for African Unity (OAU)*

AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, ed. by Yassin Elayouty and Hugh C. Brooks. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974. 250 p.

"This collection is distinguished by several analyses of African influence on the developing shape of the U.N. and of the forces which have dictated the form and function of the O.A.U."

AFRICAN UNITY TWELVE YEARS LATER, by Richard E. Bissell, in *Current History*, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 193-196 plus.

"Article points out, the Organization of African Unity, established twelve years ago, 'produces a consensus usually supported by a majority of its members. Thus the OAU has not failed some part of African expectations'." Discusses: The OAU Charter; Structure of the OAU, the Diplomatic Role; the US and the OAU: etc.

THE INTEGRATION OF THE COMMISSION FOR TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: THE PROCESS OF THE MERGER AND THE PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRY AND COMPLEMENTARITY, by Dike Nworah, in *The African Review*, v.6, no.1 (1976) 55-67.

"At its inception the Organization of African Unity was confronted with structural problems which it attempted to solve through the establishment of specialized commissions. By apparent degrees, however, these commissions and their committees had proliferated to such an extent that the efficiency of the organization was threatened. For instance, its subcommittees, and other ad hoc committees, developed a rather awkward tendency of creating more committees, other sub-committees, and yet other small ad hoc committees which became so enormous that functions overlapped. With this background of structural rivalries, the decision by African States to take over the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa, an imperial hangover, and integrate it with one of the existing commissions was the right one, and the procedure adopted should serve as a model of thoroughness for future mergers. By analysing the background, the process and problems of this particular integration, it is also possible to highlight other problems of institutional rivalry and complementarity which would enable Africa not merely to discriminate between priorities but to demand concentration in view of the inadequacy of available resources."

INTRAREGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN

UNITY, by David Meyers, in *International Organization,* v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 345-373.

"This article examines the intraregional conflict management activities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Three traditional regionalist claims are tested and suggestions concerning the future role of such organizations are provided. The findings indicate that in a number of cases the OAU was not an effective agent for conflict management; its limitations were clearest in internal disputes and those international conflicts involving allegations of subversion. Evidence from this study does not convincingly support the proposition that similarities of interests, problems, and loyalties found at the regional level make it more likely that attempts at settlement will be forthcoming and successful. Other findings indicate that the organization was able to isolate intraregional conflicts from entanglement in more complex global disputes; this ability was, however, highly dependent on the desire of the great powers to remain uninvolved. The OAU was able to relieve the UN of the potential burden of numerous local conflicts, but this too sometimes proved dependent on policy decisions made by the United States or the Soviet Union. It is suggested that regional organizations may assist the superpowers in avoiding unwanted involvement in local disputes, but that unless the conflict management capacity of such organizations is increased, the result may be that many conflicts will remain unsettled."

OIL, ISRAEL AND THE OAU: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Timothy M. Shaw, in *Africa Today,* V.23, no.1 (January-March 1976) 15-26.

"In November 1975 the United Nations General Assembly declared Zionism to be a form of racism, thus in effect equating it with apartheid in South Africa. That his resolution was adopted with the support of most black African states has dramatically highlighted the shift in attitude of these states toward Israel, whose relationship with them in trade, aid, and diplomacy prior to 1967, and in most cases prior to 1973, had been cordial or at least amicable. The vote reflects the fact that the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 with its concurrent injection of the politics of oil into international relations has brought about permanent changes in the global economy and a realignment of the international order. The impact on the African continent has been profound. It is this impact, the new realpolitik of Africa, in which oil reserves and other strategic resources are an important determinant of power, which will be examined in this essay, with special emphasis on Southern Africa and Israel."

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY — SUCCESS OR FAILURE?, by Colin Legum, in *International Affairs,* v.51, no.2 (April 1975) 208-219.

"Although pan-continental aspirations have inspired movements down the centuries, Africa is the first continent in which this idea has become anything like a reality. But how effective a reality? This kind of question has been asked about The Organization of African Unity (OAU) from its inception. . . Its record, as I have tried to show [writes the author], is not faultless; but its achievements are not inconsiderable."

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER TEN YEARS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, ed, by Yassin El-Ayouty. New York, Praeger, 1975. 262 p.

"An. . . assembled group of essays explores the legal precedents and the admittedly somewhat tenuous political accomplishments of this organization, in which 'unity' is maintained vis-a-vis the outside world by a decidedly muted emphasis on cohesiveness within."

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND APARTHEID: CONSTRAINTS ON RESOLUTION, by Julius Emeka Okolo and Winston E. Langley, in *World Affairs,* v.137, no.3 (Winter 1974-1975) 206-232.

"The ability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to deal successfully with the problem of apartheid in South Africa is often grossly misunderstood and sometimes seriously overestimated. In May 1963 the Summit Conference of Independent African States which met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to establish the Organization resolved that it was 'convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity. . .to put an end to the South African Government's criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out racial discrimination in all its forms.' The OAU has now celebrated its tenth anniversary but seems no nearer to the solution of that problem than it was in 1963. . .This article, therefore, argues that the reasons why the OAU has not been able to deal effectively with the problem of apartheid can be sought in both its regional and extraregional environments. More specifically, it points that regional and extraregional constraints have frustrated the efforts of the Organization to realize its declared objectives with reference to apartheid."

REFLECTIONS ON THE PREOCCUPATION AND CONDUCT OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY, by R.A. Akindele, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.14, no.4 (1976) 557-576.

"International organizations provide an analytically distinct arena for monitoring types of political exchanges between individual states or groups of states seeking to influence the formation of community values in the image of their own preferences. Hence a study of relations between the O.A.U. and foreign-power dominated international agencies operating in political and economic fields offers a broad, albeit supplementary, perspective to an overall understanding of relations between individual African states and the major foreign powers."

5. *The Role of Mass Media*

THE MASS MEDIA IN AFRICA, by Israel Wamala, in *Africa*, no.67 (March 1977) 34 plus.

"The last nonaligned summit meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, took a decision that could profoundly affect the present relationship between the international mass-media and the Third World. The non-aligned leaders meeting in Colombo approved a plan for the setting up of a press agencies, 'news pool' to which all nonaligned countries could contribute and also draw from. The significance of a non-aligned news pool lies in the fact that at the moment nearly two-thirds of all news from and about the Third World is gathered and disseminated by Western news agencies and newspapers. Most of what the Third World hears about itself as reflected by the international mass-media is decided on and presented by Western-financed and Western-oriented newsgathering agencies. It was in an attempt to correct this imbalance and many of the disadvantages that go with it, that the news-pool was approved in Colombo."

E. Military Aspects: Including Military Coups (See also appendixes)

AFRICAN ARMIES IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES: THE SEARCH FOR CONNECTIONS, by Rene Lemarchand, in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, v.4, no.2 (Fall 1976) 261-275.

"In their treatment of the military in Africa historians and political scientists proceed from different perspectives and make widely divergent assumptions about the relationships of the military to society. This article seeks to clarify a number of epistemological issues which stand in the way of a more fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue. It focuses on problems of conceptualization and explanation, and goes on to explore the levels at which a cross-disciplinary investigation of the military is likely to generate the most promising theoretical breakthroughs. An attempt is made to identify those areas of research which lend themselves most readily to a sustained collaborative effort between historians and political scientists."

CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN AFRICAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION, by Claude E. Welch, Jr., in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 229-248.

"This article argues three major points: (1) Pre-colonial African societies varied dramatically in their forms of military organization. . . (2) The colonial intrusion broke the organic ties that existed between military and social organizations. . . (3) African governments must carry out a significant revision of the patterns of civil-military relations inherited from colonial rule, lest the political power exercised by the armed forces continue to grow unabated."

COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE, by Samuel Decalo. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976. 284 p.

"In Decalo's view, current theory about military intervention in African politics does not sufficiently emphasize the internal structure of each country's military and the idiosyncrasies of their leaders. From studies of Togo, Dahomey, the Congo and Uganda, he concludes that the most significant factor in military regime stability is consistency and equity in army promotions and benefits.

THE MILITARY IN BLACK AFRICAN POLITICS, by S.J. Baynham, in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.105, no.3 (July 1975) 304-312.

"Early predictions about the African armies tended to minimize their potential role in the political sphere, but the rash of military interventions in politics from about the mid-1960s has focused attention on the armed forces as major actors in the political environment. The rapid Africanization of these armies following the departure of the metropolitan powers at independence; the weakness of the embryonic civilian institutions relative to the military establishments; the fact that army 'professionalism' has (paradoxically) promoted rather than inhibited military involvement in politics; and the susceptibility of the soldiers to the wider sources of factional conflict pervading African society, in particular to primordial cleavages; help to explain the penetration of politics into the barracks, and the emergence of modern-day praetorian states where the military exercises independent political power."

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W.F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study of the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

THE RESURRECTION OF THE WARRIOR TRADITION IN AFRICAN POLITICAL CULTURE, by Ali A. Mazrui, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 67-84.

"The warrior tradition in Africa was not born on the day the white man landed. It was not a technique invented on the spur of the moment to meet a foreign challenge. On the contrary, it was deeply interlinked with the totality of the cultures of most African societies before the white man came. . . Let us first explore more fully the

key elements of the warrior tradition, and then relate the whole issue to the significance of both Shaka and Amin in African history."

SOLDIERS AS TRADITIONALIZERS: MILITARY RULE AND THE RE-AFRICANIZATION OF AFRICA, by Ali A. Mazrui, in *World Politics,* v.28, no.2 (January 1976) 246-272.

"On the basis of evidence mainly from West Africa, many scholars in the 1960's made predictions about likely tends in Africa as a whole on such issues as one-party states. On the basis of data from Eastern Africa, can we now risk predictions about likely performance of military regimes in Africa as a whole? There is evidence from Eastern Africa that African soldiers may be agents of retraditionalization. The bulk of the army in most countries is recruited from some of the most rural and least acculturated sectors of society. Contemporary African soldiers may be traditionalists in charge of modern armies with modern technology. What happens when a modern organization is manned mainly by rural recruits? It may be that both modernization and retraditionalization are taking place under military leadership in Africa. The cultural revivalist role of sub-westernized or non-westernized African soldiers is beginning to manifest itself in places like Uganda under Idi Amin and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko. The political decline of westernized intellectuals and the rise of soldiers may herald a partial re-Africanization of Africa, but with some painful costs."

WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1966-1975. Washington, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976. 85 p.

Includes statistical data on various countries of Africa, among others.

F. Economic Aspects

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AFRICA'S CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EEC, by Nicholas Hutton, in *The World Today,* v.30, no.10 (October 1974) 426-435.

"Although the present state of negotiations between the Community and the ACP states points to a speedy conclusion of an agreement, recent economic trends indicate that Africa's growing trade diversification could result in a looser relationship with the EEC in the years ahead."

AMERICAN BANKS AND BLACK AFRICA, by Carlos M. Canal, in *Africa Report,* v.20, no.5 (September-October 1975) 15-16.

"Ever since colonial times, banks have played a role in Africa's economic development. Until recently, though, most lending was either restricted to relatively short terms or was guaranteed, first by the colonial powers and later by governmental export credit agencies. It was not until the nineteen sixties, when the Eurodollar market developed, that lending to African countries became popular among the major international banks."

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND AFRICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT, by Ernest J. Wilson III, in *Africa Today,* v.22, no.4 (October-December 1975) 11-37.

"What are the implications of the current international 'energy crisis' for Africa? How is it related to the current crisis of the world capitalist system? What strategies — economic, political, and technical — will both strengthen and improve the autonomy of African nations and increase the welfare of the masses of the African population? In dealing with these questions we assume the ultimate goal of African political action to be to reduce and eliminate African underdevelopment."

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AFRICAN MANUFACTURING, by Leslie L. Rood, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.1 (1975) 19-34.

"The multinational corporations see in the developing countries of black Africa a potentially large market where they would like to have a foothold. The host governments, while welcoming foreign investment, are concerned about outside exploitation. The tension between this quest for markets and the move for greater control by Africans is but one more version of the old love-hate relationship between foreign investors and underdeveloped countries. This article, taking advantage of the first comprehensive figures on private foreign direct investment in the developing world, looks at its nature and amount in black Africa, the influence of the size of the market, and the risks of take-over by nationalization, Africanization, and indigenization. It concludes that investment in manufacturing by multinational corporations is relatively safe."

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN REGIONAL INTERGRATION: THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE, by Bingu W.T. Mutharika, in *The African Review,* v.5, no.4 (1975) 365-390.

"The purpose of this paper is to prove that notwithstanding the withdrawal of the European powers from their African territories, new and more subtle forms of economic domination have been devised and that multinational corporations are the forebearers of a new era in neocolonialism."

2. *Economic Development and Planning*

COMMODITY EXPORTS AND AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, by Scott R. Pearson and John Cownie. Lexington, Mass, Lexington Books, 1974. 285 p.

"This. . . study is more useful for the specific information it offers on eight African economies than for

its. . .generalizations about such developmental desiderata as generation of employment, construction of infrastructure, diversification of exports."

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND AFRICAN ROADS TO SOCIALISM, by Jokica Hadzi Vasileva, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.26, nos.608-609 (5-20 August 1975) 22-24.

"This was the theme which brought together delegations of thirty African political parties and movements in Tunis from July 1 to 6, 1975. The leaders of African political parties had met before to exchange opinions on the conceptions and programes of development (a symposium 'On African Roads to Socialism' was held in Dakar in 1962 and a seminar was held in Cairo to discuss 'National Liberation and Socialism'), but the meeting in Tunis was the first of its kind. It assembled for a discussion of this theme the largest number ever of African political parties (ruling opposition ones) and liberation movements still fighting for independence; the participants did not merely exchange ideas about ways of development but reviewed the results achieved, and it ended with the unanimous approval of the final Declaration in which that which is common to all, irrespective of the differences manifested in ideologies and practical policies, found expression."

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN BLACK AFRICA, by Patrick J. McGowan, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.14, no.1 (1976) 25-40.

"The evident failure of most Third World countries to develop during the post-World War II era is explained by dependency theorists as a consequence of the operation of this international capitalist political economy, which entails that the development of the metropolitan countries is based upon the progressive underdevelopment of the satellite-dependent states — in other words, that economic dependence is associated with economic underdevelopment. This brief and exploratory article attempts to present some evidence on the truth of this core proposition as it applies to black Africa."

EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, by Claude Ake, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.14, no.1 (1976) 1-23.

"I want to indicate how the political economy of contemporary Africa is to be explained, and what might reasonably be conjected about its development. I am mainly interested in the salient features, namely: intense ethnic conflict, the single-party system, the high incidence of efficiency norms in political competition, the recurrence of military coups, political repression, and the poor performance at economic development."

LRPING IN THE ARAB WORLD, by John Waterbury, Hanover, N.H., Ameican Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 18 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.1.)

"The economically disparate Arab states must choose between autonomous national development, favored by the oil-rich, and integrated regional development, the only hope for the majority states. The Cairo Joint Symposium on Long-range Planning in January 1976 was a tentative and inconclusive step toward increased economic cooperation among Arab states."

POLITICS, PERCEPTION, AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN TROPICAL AFRICA, by William J. Davies, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.1 (1975) 35-53.

"In order to depict adequately the significance of political and economic interaction in tropical Africa, it is necessary to sketch the background of recent changes in that area lying south of the Sahara and north of Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Here are some 30 states ranging in size from over 2.5 million sq. km. in the Sudan to less than 0.01 million sq. km. in the Gambia; in population from almost 80 million in Nigeria to about 400,000 in the Gambia; in density from over 120 per sq. km. in Burundi to less than one per sq. km. in Mauritania; in income per capita from over $400 in Gabon to less than $50 in Burundi, Somalia, and Upper Volta; and in G.N.P. from over $4.5 billion in Nigeria to less than $30 million in Gambia. Despite such wide differences, the process of political transition experienced in tropical Africa has followed a pattern which provides a basis for some degree of generalization. Specifically, there has been a shift from a tribal political structure, through a period of colonial rule, eventually to an independent status. The argument presented in this article is based largely upon inequality, and the perception of inequality, as influenced by changes in political power, economic discontinuity, and spatial organization."

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, by Novica Blagojevic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.27, no.618 (5 January 1976) 26-24.

"Proceeding from the generally accepted and familiar theoretical classification of countries into developed and underdeveloped according to the level of their development, one would have to say that African countries bear all the hallmarks of underdevelopment. . . A broad array of indicators permits adequate definition of the degree of socio-economic development of countries, in this case African. It is thought, however, that average national income per capital is sufficiently reliable as an indicator of economic development. . . This brief review of factors of production, level of development and conditions for intensive activation of those factors shows that in the underdeveloped African countries only the state, as the personification of organized social forces, can initiate solution of the

problems of accelerated development and economic transformation. This is particularly understandable as Africa is beginning to develop in a period of rapid upsurge of science and technology and in conditions marked by the existence of an underdeveloped and very thin layer of capitalist enterpreneurs who, in the West European developed countries, were the vehicle of primary capital formation and development of productive forces."

3. *Mineral Industries (See also appendix on Mineral Industries)*

MINERAL INDUSTRIES OF AFRICA. Washington, United States Department of The Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1976. 115 p.

"A concise country-by-country summary of the mineral industry of Africa is presented. Reserves, resources, role of the country in the world mineral supply, and developments in the mineral industries are reviewed. The data on each country are accompanied by a map showing mineral location and transportation facilities."

4. *Petroleum*

AFRICA: OIL AND DEVELOPMENT, by G.E. Emembolu and S.S. Pannu, in *Africa Today,* v.22, no.4 (October-December 1975) 39-47.

"No other single action in our generation has occasioned as much rethinking of the issues of world economy as the 1973 oil price increases by the OPEC countries. The developed nations complain about the inflationary effects of the new price of energy. If this claim is correct for the developed nations of the West, it is no less so for the developing nations of the world in general and Africa in particular. The oil situation in Africa essentially has two interrelated patterns: the effects of the high oil prices on the developing countries lacking oil reserves and the position of the Mid-East and Africa's oil-producing nations. The relationship between these patterns is self-evident. In what follows we shall therefore examine the impact of the world oil situation after the price hike on these developing nations. We shall also examine the role of the oil-rich Mid-East/African countries in any efforts to establish economic stability in most of these poor nations."

ENERGY AND SCARCE WORLD RESOURCES, in *Current History,* (July/August 1975) 1-64.

"This second of a two-part symposium on world resources contains nine articles which examine the world's energy needs and resources and evaluate the prospects for meeting world energy requirements in the late twentieth century. Individual subjects covered include: America's future in energy; oil and the OPEC members; energy self-sufficiency in the Soviet Union; the energy needs of West Europe, Japan and Australia; the oil-dependent developing countries; China's energy resources and prospects; mineral resources in the new international order; development of alternative energy sources; and the question of international controls on scarce resources."

OIL AND POLITICS, by Henri Madelin. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975. 241 p.

"Here is a. . .documented examination of the development, in recent years, of North African countries (mainly Algeria and Libya) as oil producing states, their relationships with customer countries and their impact on the infrastructure of the international oil companies. The USA and the Middle East are used as examples to point differences or to reinforce an argument. Identifying the interests and motives which dictate policy in both consumer and producer countries, the author sees the emergent public national corporations as the channel for increasing government involvement and control both of production and consumption. He examines the shift in the balance of power away from the consumers in favor of oil producers. The conclusion is reached that this should lead to a reappraisal of the role played by oil in the economies of the consumer countries and may mark its decline as the major energy source." With tables; figures and bibliography.

PETROLEUM PRICES AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: RETRENCHMENT OR REASSESSMENT?, by Reginald Herbold Green, in *International Journal,* v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 340-405.

An examination of the impact of changes are 1973-4 in the real purchasing power (or purchase cost from the buyers' perspective) of oil, and the problems this poses.

WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '76, v.22 (1976) 126 p.

An annual review of international oil operations.

5. *Labor*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFRICAN WORKING CLASS: STUDIES IN CLASS FORMATION AND ACTION, ed. by Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1976. 330 p.

"Do African unions work for the workers? Will African workers work for the revolution? A qualified yes to both questions emerges from this collection, whose unifying theme is the African wage-laborer's community of interests with those outside the modern sector—not with the bourgeoisie."

6. *Transportation*

FACING THE CHALLENGES OF CIVIL AVIATION, by Rexford Owusu, in *Africa,* no.67 (March 1977) 95 plus.

"Air transport is one of the growth industries throughout the world. But in Africa its rate of expansion has been almost phenomenal, although it must be stated

that in absolute terms, the actual volume of African air traffic accounts for only a small proportion of world traffic volume. Everywhere in Africa, governments are implementing civil aviation development plans involving large sums of capital expenditure. The main emphasis in aviation development has been on civil aviation — i.e. national airlines, international and regional airport facilities. The extent of African interest in air transport development is indicated by the fact that nearly all major African airlines are wholly government-owned, and almost every major international airport in Africa is state-operated and entirely dependent upon public funds."

HOPEFUL FUTURE FOR THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Gerd Meurer, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.25, no.7 (October 1975) 19-20.

"Eighteen months ahead of the originally scheduled date, Chinese and African construction crews reached the Zambian town of Kapiri-Mposhi, to link the new Tanzan Railway to the existing Zambian rail network... Passenger and freight service along the entire run is scheduled to begin this autumn. By that time thousands of tons of freight and thousands of people will have already been transported along stretches of the railway, which is the largest Chinese development aid project in Africa. By the end of last year the rail line had already reached Tunduma, near the frontier between the two countries, and since then more than 200 persons daily have traveled along various stretches of the line on a non-commercial basis and more than 30,000 tons of freight destined for landlocked Zambia have been shipped by rail and then loaded onto trucks to continue the journey."

7. *Health*

HEALTH PLANNING AND POPULATION POLICY IN AFRICA, by Nancy Birdsall, in *The African Studies Review,* v.19, no.2 (September 1976) 19-33.

"Despite common interests, health planners and population planners have apparently different objectives: respectively to improve health and reduce mortality, and to reduce rapid rates of population growth. To the extent that reductions in mortality increase population growth, the objectives appear contradictory... The premise of this essay is that, despite the apparent contradiction, those in the population field should give priority to improving health standards and reducing mortality in Africa."

8. *Water Resources*

WATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD; SELECTED STATISTICS, comp. and ed. by Frits van der Leeden. Port Washington, N.Y., Water Information Center, Inc., 1975. 568 p.

G. The Land and the People (See also appendixes)

1. Miscellaneous Information

MAN IN AFRICA, by Colin M. Turnbull. Garden City, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976. 313 p.

"Turnbull... takes on the culture of all Africa. The result... affords the lay reader a melange of detail about African societies of the grasslands, river valleys, forests, woodlands, and deserts; the whole is unified by reiteration of African man's communality and harmony with his natural environment."

MAN IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICAMENT, by D. F. Owen. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973. 214 p.

"This biological overview of life and death, produce and pestilence, economic development and environmental devastation in Africa conveys the ecological dilemmas of a continent which has been shorn of its 'natural' ecosystem but has not yet acquired the economic or technological resources to control its partially modernized environment."

THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA, by Jean Hiernaux. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974. 217 p.

"How people got where they are and how they coped with and were moulded by their environment. This means examination of migrations, invasions, conquests, trade, the material culture of preliterate societies, the tracing of origins through skeletal material."

2. Population Pressures

AFRICA'S NEED FOR PLANNING: CONSPIRACY OR MYTH?, by Takawira Shumba Mafukidze, in *Africa Report,* v.20, no.4 (July-August 1974) 38-41.

"It is unlikely that the White man has a Machiavellian motive in supporting family planning in independent Black Africa. But in southern Africa birth control projects could be seen as a conspiracy to halt Black population growth relative to White."

WORLD BANK ATLAS; POPULATION PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975. 30 p.

A series of tables providing this information for the various countries of the world.

3. Africa and the Overseas Blacks

BLACK ZION: AFRICA, IMAGINED AND REAL, AS SEEN BY TODAY'S BLACKS, by David Jenkins. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 284 p.

"According to this... work on the black return to Africa, from the 18th century to the present, it seems at best difficult to go home again."

THE CAUSES OF DROUGHT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by Horst Mensching, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 8-10.

"The year 1973 suddenly recalled to the minds of people in the Western industrial lands the fact that countless inhabitants of the peripheral zone of the greatest desert on earth, a region which forms a transition to the moister savannah belt of the African tropics, still live under constant threat of thirst and loss of their entire livestock. Several successive dry years resulted in a catastrophic drought in this climatically unstable zone. As a consequence there has been a rising spate of challenging questions, a search for sins of omission or even for the guilty parties who should have been in a position to prevent or at least foresee such calamitous personal and economic developments. The spectrum of unobjective and ideologically motivated interpretations of these events even ranges to attempts at placing the blame for the catastrophe on the former colonial powers or on present development aid."

CRISIS OF THE AFRICAN DROUGHT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 19 November 1974. 143 p. (93rd Congress, Second Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing before the Subcom on Africa to: examine the current status and extent of the drought in Africa; investigate international relief efforts with emphasis on the US role; and to determine the US role in further cooperative relief programs and long-term solutions to the drought problems. Appendix (p. 47-143) contains correspondence, articles, and an AID report to Congress on famine in Sub-Sahara Africa, Sept. 1974 (p. 47-106.)"

THE DROUGHT IN NIGER, by Victor D. DuBois. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 4 pts. (West Africa Series, v.15, nos. 4,5,6, and 7.)

Part I — The Physical and Economic Consequences: Part II — The Overthrow of President Hamani Diori; Part III — The Flight of the Malien Tuareg (Nomads); Part IV — The New Refugee Camp at Lazaret.

THE DROUGHT IN WEST AFRICA, by Victor D. DuBois. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 3 pts. (West Africa Series, v.15, nos. 1,2, and 3.)

Part I — Evolution, Causes, and Physical Consequences; Part II — Perception, Evaluation, and Response; Part III — The Logistics of Relief Operations.

FAMINE IN THE SAHEL: A DILEMMA FOR UNITED STATES AID, by Thomas E. Dow, Jr., in *Current History,* v.68, no. 405 (May 1975) 197-201.

"It seems clear that any effort that treats the Sahel food shortage as simply an emergency. . . will only result in a still larger population sharing in current levels of misery. Because the current United States approach defines the food shortage in this way, it will serve only to maintain the problem and, in a quantitative sense, to make it worse." Discusses: Population Growth; Triage; Lifeboat Ethics; United States Action in The Sahel; Prospects and Conclusions; A Long-Term Solution; etc.

FOOD AND POPULATION IN AFRICA, by Donald Heisel, in *Current History,* v.68, no.406 (June 1975) 258-261 plus.

"Across the African continent, increased attention to agriculture is absolutely essential if levels of nutrition are to be raised above their current very low levels and if the increased population is to be fed. Discusses: Mortality; Fertility; Migration; and Food Consumption."

THE FOOD OUTLOOK FOR THE SAHEL: REGAINING SELF-SUFFICIENCY OR CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL AID?, by John D. Esseks, in *Africa Today,* v.22, no.2 (April-June 1975) 45-56.

"After six years of drought can the Sahel regain and maintain the capability to feed itself? Historically, five of the region's six states-Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad, but not Senegal—were largely self-sufficient in the basic foods consumed by their people: principally millet and sorghum, plus the animal products eaten by the pastoral communities. However, the multi-year drought which began in 1968 so reduced harvests, depleted grain reserves, and decimated livestock herds that, by 1973, the Sahel required massive food aid from abroad to prevent starvation on a large scale. Heavy dependence on international food relief continued into 1974, but good rains in the summer of 1974 led to near-normal harvests that fall and to much lower requirements of foreign food aid in 1975. While the crisis is over at least through the next harvest, the Sahelian governments must confront long-run problems which the 1968-73 drought brought to the surface."

FOOD SUPPLY IN MALI, by Victor D. DuBois. Hanover, N.H., 1975. 14 p. (West Africa Series, v.16, no. 1.)

"Since 1968 severe drought has devastated Mali's agricultural and livestock production, bringing the nation's finances and food supply to the brink of disaster. Of critical importance are government programs aimed at improving infrastructure, promoting rational use of land and water resources, and controlling herd size. Success depends on Mali's ability to rally national and international support for bold measures of reconstruction and development."

A NOTE ON THE SAHEL, by Victor D. DuBois. Hanover, N.H., 1975. 9 p. (West Africa Series, v.16, no.4.)

"Rain returned in 1974-75 to drought-stricken West Africa, but serious problems remain, hindering the Sahel's recovery. In this fragile environment, an integrated program for economic development must include population planning if life itself is to be sustained."

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF AFRICAN HUNGER, by Michael F. Lofchie, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.4 (1975) 551–567.

"Drought and famine have become so inextricably linked in both popular and academic analyses of Africa's food problems in the 1970s that the relationship between the two is now taken almost axiomatically as cause and effect. The logic is simple and persuasive. Drought produces crop failure and crop failure, just as inevitably, leads to human starvation. This reasoning and the colour photography of starving children in the world press have proven so irresistible that social scientists have had surprisingly little role in scholarly discussions of the causes of the recent African famine. The subject has been left almost entirely to climatologists, physical geographers, water experts, and agronomists. Social scientists have so taken it for granted that the causes of African famine are natural and climatic that most of their literature on the subject falls into the genre of 'impact' studies which omit the issue of causality and deal almost entirely with the social and political after-effects. . . The purpose of this article is not to criticise any of these approaches, but to call attention to one area of analysis in which all, to some extent, overlook. Despite their wide range of disciplinary and ideological viewpoints, the preceding perspectives on African hunger share one basic premise. They treat the issue of diminishing food supply primarily in terms of natural calamity. In so doing, they have foregone an opportunity to broaden their understanding of the causes of the current predicament to include political and economic factors."

THE SAHELIAN DROUGHT: NO VICTORY FOR ANYONE, by Michael H. Glantz, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.2 (April-June 1975) 57–61.

"In a recent article 'The Sahelian drought: No Victory for Western Aid,' Nicholas Wade suggests that the current crisis in the Sahel may prove to be a preview of events to come in other parts of the world. In these times of climactic upheaval, population expansion, and economic dislocation this is all too likely to prove true. Wade's article raises important and timely questions. Because critical choices with respect to the drought region must be made now, the comments which follow give a historical perspective to the current drought so that past experiences, successes and failures, will not go unheeded. Such discussion is intended to create a dialogue on important questions, the answers to which are a matter of life and death to those who inhabit desert border areas throughout the world as well as the sub-Saharan Africa."

THE SAHELIAN DROUGHT: PROBLEMS OF LAND USE, by Theodore Cohn, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 428–444.

"In the late 1960s rainfall decreased sharply in many countries south of the Sahara. The drought severely affected people in an immense area stretching from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia in the east; and from the lower edge of the Sahara southward to farmlands in Upper Volta and Nigeria. One of the most afflicted regions was the Sahel, a sparsely populated semi-arid belt lying between the Sahara Desert and the more densely populated savannah to the south. . . This article will thus focus upon basic long-range problems of the human use of land, problems which can be more readily regulated and altered and whose solution might contribute to greater independence for Sabelian Africa. Five aspects of land use will be examined: overpopulation, water resources, food production, nomad customs, and transportation."

WORLD HUNGER, HEALTH, AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS. PART 5 — HUMAN DISASTERS IN CYPRUS, BANGLADESH AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 20 August 1974. 208 p. (93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Continuation of joint hearings before the Subcom on Refugees and Escapees and the Labor and Public Welfare Committee Subcom on Health on the relationship between world hunger and health problems. This volume examines continuing drought and famine in the Sahel region of Africa and Ethiopia, the plight of civilians in Cyprus, and suffering caused by floods in Bangladesh. Appendixes (p. 59–208) contain reports, and articles, including: AID, background information on relief and rehabilitation programs in the African Sahel, with tables on food shipments. (p. 61–69), and a report on famine in Sub-Sahara Africa (p. 59–120)."

WORLD HUNGER, HEALTH, AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS. PART 6 — SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 617 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Continuation of joint hearings before the Subcom on Refugees and Escapees and the Labor and Public Welfare Committee Subcom on Health on the relationship between world hunger and health problems. This volume focuses on preliminary findings and recommendations of a special study mission to selected countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Appendix contains: AID, Special Report to the Congress on the Drought Situation in Sub-Sahara Africa, with tables, June 1975 (p. 125–149). Cahill, Kevin M. (Dr.) (spec asst for health aff to NY Gov), 'Report on Somalia' including program reports on the United Children's Fund, League of Red Cross Societies, and the UN, with tables (p. 151–166)."

WORLD HUNGER, HEALTH, AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS; SUMMARY OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Washington, Government Printing Office, January 1976. 118 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report on Feb. 8-Mar. 8, 1975 special study mission, jointly sponsored by the Subcom on Health and the Judiciary Committee Subcom on Refugees and Escapees, untertaken by noted nutrition experts and subcom staff members and consultants (list, p.iii) to assess food production, distribution, and consumption patterns in Egypt, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Considers population characteristics, refugee movements if any, nutrition, and health in each of the visited countries with a view toward determining levels of international assistance, including agricultural shipments from US, needed to support nations' anticipated food requirements."

5. *Refugees*

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND AFRICAN REFUGEES: A PROGRESS REPORT, by Philip E. Chartrand, in *World Affairs*, v.137, no.4 (Spring 1975) 265-285.

"The primary responsibility for coping with the problems of refugees remains, as it always has, with the several governments who grant such refugees asylum. This is as true in Africa as it is elsewhere in the world: all other concerned bodies — public or private, local or international work in cooperation with governments or not at all. The first and foremost contribution of African governments has been the generosity with which they have accorded asylum to refugees."

REFUGEES — AFRICA'S PERSISTENT PROBLEM, by Christian Potholom, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 12-14 plus.

"Despite the return of well over 100,000 refugees to Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau during the past year, Africa's refugee population continues to exceed one million. This gives Africa the unpleasant distinction of having the highest ratio of refugees to total population of any continent in the world. Moreover, the current fighting and repression in Angola, Eritrea, and Namibia appears certain to increase, not decrease, the numbers of refugees during 1976. Over sixty international, governmental, and private agencies are currently working with most African governments to alleviate the considerable burden these refugees represent to the host country."

6. *Cultural and Sociological Aspects (including ethnics)*

AFRICA SINCE 1875: A MODERN HISTORY, by Robin Hallett. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1974. 866 p.

Recent modern history of the continent and practically all modern African states. With bibliographical essay.

CONFLICT IN AFRICA: CONCEPTS AND REALITIES, *by Adda B. Bozeman. Princeton, N.J.*, Princeton University Press, 1976. 429 p.

"Bozeman builds on her past work in comparative cultures to produce here a. . . study of the social factors underlying domestic and international conflict in Africa. Past efforts to create dispute-settlement mechanisms — of a political, legal or social nature — are also analyzed, and their limitations are made evident through copious documentation."

PRECURSORS OF MODERN SOCIAL SECURITY IN INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS, by Victor Gerdes, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 209-228.

"Some of the long standing self-help arrangements used by peoples of all strata of African society as their response to the social risks which afflict them and others around the world."

THE RECOURSE TO AUTHENTICITY AND NEGRITUDE IN ZAIRE, by Kenneth Lee Adelman, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 134-139.

"Chad should follow a genuine policy of authenticity and should unite behind this national movement for its cultural and social revolution.' This suggestion was not made by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, the founder and chief proponent of authenticity, but by President Mouammar El Kadhafi of Libya in an address to the party leaders of Chad. It illustrates the increasing influence of authenticity as a guiding ideology in Africa, and perhaps in other continents as well. Not only are a number of nations using the phrase, but they are taking steps to make it a reality. Before describing these measures, let us examine the recourse to authenticity and compare it to its predecessor, negritude."

ROOTS; THE SAGA OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY, by Alex Haley. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1976. 688 p.

"When he was a boy in Henning, Tennessee, Alex Haley's grandmother used to tell him stories about their family — stories that went back to her grandparents, and their grandparents, down through the generations all the way to a man she called 'the African.' She said he had lived across the ocean near what he called the 'Kamby Bolongo' and had been out in the forest one day chopping wood to make a drum when he was set upon by four men, beaten, chained and dragged aboard a slave ship bound for Colonial America. Still vividly remembering the stories after he grew up and became a writer, Haley began to search for documentation that might authenticate the narrative. It took ten years and a half a million miles of travel across three continents to find it, but finally, in an astonishing feat of genealogical detective work, he discovered not only the name of 'the African' — Kunta Kinte — but the precise location of Juffure, the very village in The Gambia, West Africa,

from which he was abducted in 1767 at the age of sixteen and taken on the Lord Ligonier to Maryland and sold to a Virginia planter. Haley has talked in Juffure with his own African sixth cousins. On September 29, 1967, he stood on the dock in Annapolis where his great-great-great-great-grandfather was taken ashore on September 29, 1767. Now he has written the monumental two-century drama of Kunta Kinte and the six generations who came after him — slaves and freedmen, farmers and blacksmiths, lumber mill workers and Pullman porters, lawyers and architects — and one author. But Haley has done more than recapture the history of his own family. As the first black American writer to trace his origins back to their roots, he has told the story of 25,000,000 Americans of African descent. He has rediscovered for an entire people a rich cultural heritage that slavery took away from them, along with their names and their identities. But Roots speaks, finally, not just to blacks, or to whites, but to all peoples and all races everywhere, for the story it tells is one of the most eloquent testimonials ever written to the indomitability of the human spirit."

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICA, by Okwudiba Nnoli, in *The African Review*, v.4 no.1 (1974) 1–23.

"The stimulus for this paper is the apparent increase in interethnic hostility in African politics during the past few years. . . In the light of these experiences the claim that ethnicity decreases, or is bound to decrease, with increased modernization cannot be successfully substantiated, at least as far as the African continent is concerned. . . There is, therefore, an even greater need to find solutions to the problems which ethnicity poses for national order and stability in Africa. This paper seeks to contribute to the search for such a solution. It rejects the contention that ethnicity is an inherent aspect of social change in all culturally heterogeneous societies, and that neither the disappearance nor a significant amelioration of ethnic conflict is possible."

7. *Linquistic Fragmentation*

THE BANTU CIVILIZATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, by E. Jefferson Murphy. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1974. 273 p.

"An. . . Account of the history of the Bantu-speaking tribes of southern Africa. Almost the whole African continent below the equator is peopled by Bantu-speaking people, who have common ties of language, culture, and history. Their past is rich in memories of highly organized kingdoms and empires, great achievements in the arts and in agriculture, and skill in the mining, working, and fashioning of implements made from a large variety of metals." With biblography.

LANGUAGE AS A COLONIAL LEGACY, by Edmund C. Schwarzenbach, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 23–25.

"Africa south of the Sahara, Black Africa, is linguistically so fragmented that a lingua franca is essential for communication even among its own diverse peoples. The occupation of this vast land mass by the European colonial powers resulted in this function being taken over by English, French, and Portuguese, but in a geographically impractical, random pattern which resulted from competitive penetration by the conquerors from the coastal regions to the interior. It was only on the eastern side of the continent, radiating outward from the Arabized coastal peoples and systematically promoted until 1918 throughout the region of present-day Tanzania by the German colonial masters, that a more or less African language — Swahili — assumed the function of a lingua franca. But although Swahili managed to carve an important place for itself as far as the interior of the Congo (present-day Zaire), at least as a refined language of trade and commerce, compared to the languages of the colonialists it has the serious disadvantage of lacking the vocabulary which would facilitate access to the modern world of technology, that world which is the goal of the developing countries' burning ambition. Today the attitudes which the Africans take toward the language of their ex-rulers are still largely determined by the colonial philosophy of the former masters."

8. *Human Rights*

AFRICA'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS: MILLIONS OF PEOPLE ON THE RUN, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.19 (8 November 1976) 38–40.

"Revolutions or tribal wars are costly in lives and human misery. Even those who flee to nearby lands find *their problems are far from over.*"

AFRICA'S SLAVES TODAY, by Jonathan Derrick. New York, Schocken Books, 1975. 245 p.

"More a report of slavery's end than an indictment of contemporary situations; vestiges — and attitudes — reportedly still linger, particularly around the Sahara where the nomadic life-style has depended on it."

PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, by Osita C. Eye, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.1 (1974) 79–90.

"Africa, perhaps more than any other continent, needs to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The past experiences of almost total negation of human rights and dignity must certainly create an incentive for the eradication of any obstacle to the fulfillment of hopes born from independence. Yet because there exists a world order or disorder which maintains one part of the world in poverty and the other in riches, it has proven difficult to achieve even a modest success in the field of protection of human rights in Africa. It is not surprising that in some States the need for economic development is given a premium while human rights may be relegated to the

background. We hold that economic development is compatible with the protection of human rights and human rights should only be abrogated where it is intended to achieve a greater protection of those rights. We are, however, aware that in some cases the emphasis on faster economic development may produce undesirable consequences which cannot be justified on the basis that such emphasis is intended to promote, in the long run, greater protection of human rights. The weaknesses inherent in the State structure resulting from underdevelopment, and the need to create Nation States would mean that in any attempt to foster the protection of human rights on a regional level or even subregional basis, that approach which least encroaches on national sovereignty must be adopted. Only an advisory or recommendatory and perhaps an investigatory international body will be acceptable in the present context of Africa. In the meantime the war against illiteracy, disease and want should be relentlessly waged because victory over these represents the backbone to a meaningful protection of human rights both at national and international levels."

9. *The Status of Women*

AFRICAN TOWNSWOMEN IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE, by Ellen Hellman, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.1 (July 1974) 14–22.

"Dr. Hellmann is a noted South African social anthropologist and holder of a Royal African Society medal for 'dedicated service to Africa.' Her article deals with the processes of adjustment and adaptation of South Africa's black women in an urban context which itself is rapidly changing."

AFRICAN WOMEN IN TOWNS: AN ASPECT OF AFRICA'S SOCIAL REVOLUTION, by Kenneth Little. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973. 242 p.

"An. . . account of women's social, economic, and political roles (emphasizing the first category) in a variety of African urban settings. West Africa is generally more progressive than East, and educated women more equal than others. But, as in the rest of the world, they've still got a long way to go."

WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL WEST AFRICA: A STUDY OF THEIR ECONOMIC POSITION AND ROLE, by Christine Fry, in *SAIS Review*, v.19, no.3 (1975) 6–15.

"For the reader who pictures the woman of traditional West Africa as a beast of burden, a chattel slave, or, at best, a subservient being, the above proverb is likely to be incomprehensible since it subtly implies that within a traditional setting authority cannot be freely and carelessly wielded by one sex over the other. From this perspective alone the study of traditional West African women becomes a compelling topic, enabling the writer to confront invidious generalizations and to slay stereotypes of feminine oppression and subservience. Yet there is a far more urgent reason for examining the role of women in traditional West African societies, namely: the need to establish historical and cultural frameworks by which to assess the impact modernity has had upon the lives of West African women and to understand the problems which have arisen as a result of this historical phenomenon."

10. *Religious Aspects: Islam*

ISLAM AND STATE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFRICA, by Gabriel Abdelsayed, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 42–45.

Islam and the State of Egypt; Islam and the Libyan Arab Republic; Islam and The Islamic Arab Republic; Islam between The Socialist Experimental in Algeria and the Monarchial System in Morroco; and Islamic Law and Secularization.

ISLAM'S ADVANCE IN TROPICAL AFRICA, by Lansine Kaba, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 37–41.

"The qualitative differences in the forms of religiosity among people who practice the same creed relate to the level of education rather than cultural differences. If one does not take this point into account, one may draw the wrong conclusion that the dar al-Islam (the countries of Islam) is divided between the area of "great Islamic traditions" and the one of 'small traditions.' Within any Muslim community in Black Africa or in the Middle East, there are strong differences between the religious understanding of the elite and that of the masses. The fact that most Muslims in Africa do not speak Arabic does not imply a low form of religiosity. Those who have observed Muslims in Africa know how sincere is their faith; and how seriously in general they cleave to their belief. Indeed it is not an exaggeration to speak of Islam as an African religion and a value system totally adapted to the African milieu."

11. *Education*

AFRICAN INDEPENDENT CHURCHES AND EDUCATION, by Harold W. Turner, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 295–308.

"To think of the planting of Christianity in Africa and the work of missions and churches is to think of schools, of these agencies 'throwing across tropical Africa their gigantic fishing net of primary and secondary schools.' And to think of the African peoples themselves over the past century is to recall the swelling demand for education above almost everything else. . . The school has undoubtedly been the most universally appreciated Christian contribution to Black Africa over the past century and more."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies. . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays

which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of a political conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

12. *History*

THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two — The Arab World Today (Sudan — The Loose — Limbed Giant; Egypt — The Center of Gravity; Libya — The Radical Right; Tunisia — The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria — Austere Revolutionary; and Morocco — Kingdom of the Far West).

LION BY THE TAIL; THE STORY OF THE ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR, by Thomas M Coffey. New York, Viking, 1974.

THE NORTH AFRICAN WAR, by Warren Tute. New York, two continents, 1976. 223 p.

World War II in North Africa, a photo history.

THE WEST AND THE REST OF US, by Chinweizu. New York, Random House, 1975. 520 p.

"An initial historical account of Western imperialism in Africa forms the background for the projection of a far-reaching indictment of contemporary neo-imperialism particularly of. . . the US."

13. *Governments*

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHANGE IN AFRICA: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA, ed. by E. Philip Morgan. New York, Dunellen, 1974. 420 p.

"Sponsored by the Program of Eastern African Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, this study features three essays on development and administration theory, four essays presenting African perspectives on the changes sweeping over the continent, four participant-observer case studies on African development administration, and a concluding paper that synthesizes the above through development of a behavioral model illustrating administration politics."

ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF INTEGRATION IN AFRICA STATES, by Dov Ronen, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 577-596.

"The question I pose in this article is whether there is a useful and acceptable alternative to the type of integration — whatever the exact term used — that implies or at least connotes a national oneness, a sentiment of loyalty to a central government."

INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN POLITICS; A CONTINENTAL APPROACH, by Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein. New York, Praeger, 1974.

Political systems in Africa; Colonialism and African Politics, The end of Colonialism; Independence; Southern Africa; "modernization" in Independent Africa; Attempted Solutions; Adaptation of Institutions. Cooperation Among The Independent African States; Africa in The World Contest.

14. *The Status of Aliens*

THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN EAST AFRICA: ASIANS AND EUROPEANS IN TANZANIA, UGANDA, AND KENYA, by Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira. New York, Praeger, 1976. 230 p.

"A concerned Kenyan analyzes the human rights issues involved in the expulsion of Asians from the area; his argument is buttressed by a fund of information on each nation's laws affecting the status of aliens."

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PART II
THE REGIONS OF THE CONTINENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A. East Africa

THE EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, by Vuai Mansour Ali, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.27, no.628 (5 June 1976) 12 plus.

"The need for regional economic integration in developing countries has appeared to be the result of both external and internal problems. As a result of that we have witnessed the emergence of a number of integrational arrangements in almost all parts of the Third World. Indeed, the unsatisfactory outcome of the first development decade has given a rise to an awareness that most of the underdeveloped countries are too small to be able to create modern, viable-industrial structures within their national frameworks. The high costs of modern industrial establishments can hardly be justified where markets are much too small. Hence the need for such countries to follow the example of the European Economic Community and attempts to pool their resources and to coordinate their developing plans towards regional solidarity. The question is, however, who enjoys the benefits of these integration programs. The experience gained by the East African Economic Cooperation can provide us with some specific and interesting answers to this question."

THE FLYING DOCTORS OF EAST AFRICA, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.24, no.2 (May 1974) 23-24.

"In 1957 Dr. Wood, a Tanzanian citizen of British origin, created the 'African Foundation for Medicine and Research' in Nairobi. It now has branches functioning in London, New York, and Munich. The organization has at its disposal eight aircraft, three full-time surgeons, a pediatrician, nurses and a number of volunteer physicians and other personnel. In recent years it has carried out 11,000 operations and given ambulatory treatment to tens of thousands of patients. Two aircraft and a Land Rover were contributed to the Flying Doctors in East Africa by the 'Aid Campaign of Swiss Federal Personnel for the Benefit of Lepers' in Berne, which collects funds from Swiss federal employees. The Flying Doctor project also receives funding from East African governments as well as Denmark, England, and West Germany. The nerve center of the operation is situated in a tin hut at Nairobi's Wilson Airport, from where a nurse maintains constant radio contact with 80 mission hospitals in the bush and steppes of East Africa."

MANAGING RURAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS AND EXPERIENCES FROM EAST AFRICA, by Robert Chambers. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 215 p.

"Moving swiftly beyond the now commonplace analysis of administrative constraints shared by most LDC bureaucracies, this study draws on numerous examples in propounding a 'how-to' approach to improving the implementation of rural development programs."

PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP IN EAST AFRICA, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.24, no.6 (September 1974) 17-18.

"It will need a great deal of statesmanlike skill to keep the East African Community (EAC) alive and move it closer to its ultimate goal, the creation of a political federation in this historically, geographically, and ethnically linked region. Founded as a joint economic and administrative organization, the EAC embraces Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Like the older EEC in Europe, with which the East Africans are associated, nationalist-oriented thinking and ruthlessly selfish policies have destroyed much of the initiative which prompted the creation of the EAC by Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Milton Obote. The institution has been weakened by idealogical and political differences of opinion, the military coup of General Idi Amin in Uganda and the subsequent flight of Obote to Tanzania, as well as the apparently permanent and costly difficulties with the administration of community authorities. But despite the complications which have appeared in their collaboration and in decentralizing formerly important joint institutions, the East African governments continue to support the EAC, at least verbally."

(LI) — SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN EAST AFRICA, by Lt. Col. Richard W. Cross. Maxwell AFB, Air War College, 1976. 83 p. (C9513s Professional Study.)

"Preliminary discussion highlights the early Soviet and Chinese self-perception of their leadership role in the Third World. Fundamental to this self-perception is which ideological concept will prevail in the Communists continuing struggle for world influence, notably in the more progressive states of Africa. The study focuses on two East African countries — Somalia and Tanzania — by examining the

competitive political, economic, and military activities of both the Soviet and Chinese. The research summarizes the significant gains made by the Sino-Soviet forces at the expense of United States influence. This eroding American influence and the lack of an integrated American policy or strategy in Africa are seen as serious obstacles to the future access to the important mineral and human resources of the continent and its adjacent Indian Ocean area. The study makes recommendations on how the United States can more effectively compete with Soviet and Chinese efforts in East Africa."

B. North Africa (See by country and also appendixes)

C. Southern Africa (See also by country and appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ALIGNMENTS AND COALITIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Margaret Doxey, in *International Journal,* v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 518–535.

"It would be a bold prophet who would make confident predictions about the immediate political future of southern Africa. Nevertheless, there may be virtue in putting together a collage which gives a general picture of the region at the time of writing (March 1975) and focusses specifically on intra- and extra-regional alignments and coalitions which may be significant for policy formulation and policy outcomes. Southern Africa, for purposes of this paper, comprises six independent states (Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia and the three ex-high commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), two on the brink of independence (Mozambique and Angola due to become independent on 25 June and 11 November respectively), and two territories whose political status is the subject of international controversy (Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia)."

CONFRONTATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LIMITS OF INDEPENDENCE, by Kenneth W. Grundy. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. 360 p.

"The conclusions of this. . . survey will unsettle few preconceptions about southern Africa; it does, however, offer considerable information on the extent of political and economic interaction among the 13 territories of the area (which includes Tanzania and Zaire on its northern edge)."

DETENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by John Barratt, in *The World Today,* v.31, no.3 (March 1975) 120–130.

"Not enough is yet known about the course of events during the past ten months, or about all the factors involved, for one to be able to analyze satisfactorily the changes now taking place, least of all to predict accurately the likely outcome even in the relatively short term. But clearly the general thrust in the region at present is towards detente and meaningful negotiations about the real political differences which exist. It is worth looking at the factors in the new situation which have brought about this unexpected new mood, as well as at the main actors in this unfolding drama and some of the motivating forces and constraints operating on them."

SOUTHERN AFRICA: NEW HORIZONS, by Peter Junke, in *Conflict Studies,* no.73 (July 1976) 20 p.

Logjam Begins to Break; Western Response to Angola; Rhodesia's Survival Fight; S-W Africa Constitutional Moves; and Afrikaner Search for Security.

THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND THE WEST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Colin Legum, in *Foreign Affairs,* v.54, no.4 (July 1976) 745–762.

"Most American commentators have interpreted the Soviet intervention in Angola almost solely as an extension of Soviet cold war competition with the West into Africa. In this perspective the outcome in Angola has been viewed as a major gain for the Soviet Union against the West, with the Russians capitalizing on the American disadvantage in its years of support for Portugal. With the South African intervention against the Soviet-backed liberation movement, the Russians also scored an important 'diplomatic triumph,' as the Organization of African Unity swung around to overwhelming support for the Soviet protege, against the Angolan leaders who had called in the South Africans. In all this the United States and the West were the big losers. While this interpretation contains some elements of truth, it is an inadequate framework for analysis of what actually happened in Angola and what may now be in immediate prospect for Rhodesia and Namibia. For it leaves out an extremely important element — the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China for influence in Africa. Only if this rivalry is given the emphasis it deserves can one understand the true nature of the struggle that is now taking place in Rhodesia, and, prospectively, future conflicts in Namibia and South Africa."

2. *National Liberation and Racial Problems*

(LI) — CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A WARNING TO THE US, by Maj. Alton B. Winkelman. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 65 p. (W7741c Research Study.)

"Conflict in Southern Africa is the focus of this paper. The conflict is between the ruling white minorities of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Mozambique, and Black Africans demanding majority rule. The level of conflict is armed guerrilla activities and the potential for escalation has increased with recent communist support of the African cause. US policies and interests in Southern Africa support continuation of the white

governments. This paper warns the US that it is contributing to the conflict between whites and blacks, and suggests an immediate change to its present policies."

DRIVE TO TOPPLE WHITE RULE IN AFRICA: US TALKS TOUGH, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.80, no.19 (10 May 1976) 31–32 plus.

"It won't be easy, erasing tensions between blacks and whites while keeping Russia at bay. White House fears the alternative is a near-certain race war in southern Africa."

GROWING PERIL OF RACE WAR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.82, no.5 (7 February 1977) 22 plus.

"Rhodesia is a battleground already. Will its neighbors, ruled by blacks or whites, join the struggle? Some appear ready to make their move."

IN THE FACE OF A RACE WAR; STRUGGLING FOR A SOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Russell Warren Howe, in *The New Leader*, v.59, no.15 (19 July 1976) 12–13.

"United States policy toward South Africa is comparable to its attitude toward France when that country was resisting independence in the Maghreb and Black Africa. Washington favored decolonization at the time, but it did not push the point. . . Nothing dramatic can be expected in the way of racial progress. Not only does Vorster face pressure from his all-white electorate not to go too 'fast' in this area; he also has his own 'principles.' "

MOMENTS OF DECISION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Mustafa Resulovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v.27, no.640 (5 December 1976) 30–33.

"Up until recently the two countries with different white-minority regimes lying on the southern tip of the African continent, the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, formed not only a geographical but a political ensemble with the former Portuguese colonies (the close bonds between colonialism and racism). Since the people of Angola and Mozambique won independence, the white-minority regimes have found themselves face to face with the countries of free Africa from which they had previously been separated by the one-time Portuguese colonies, as a tampon zone. The struggle against the racist regimes, the struggle of the people of southern Africa has reached a turning point and has entered the 'final and decisive phase,' as it is phrased in the Political Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Colombo."

"NATIONAL LIBERATION" IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Colin Legum, in *Problems of Communism*, v.24, no.1 (January-February 1975) 1–20.

"The struggle of the black liberation movements challenging the status quo in Southern Africa and its white defenders took a major turn as a result of the April 1974 army coup in Lisbon and the ensuing decision by Portugal to abandon five centuries of colonialism. The overthrow of Marcello Caetano's regime knocked away one of the three props on which white supremacy in the region had rested, and led to the establishment of an independent government under the control of a former armed liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, to the installation in power of a triumphant armed liberation movement in Mozambique, and to negotiations to determine the role that the three liberation movements in Angola will play in that land's transition to independence. These developments, in turn, left more exposed the remaining two props of the white status quo — Rhodesia and South Africa. Elimination of Portugal as a military factor in Africa has clearly introduced a fluid new political situation, one that affects not only those liberation movements which have formed or are about to form postcolonial governments but also those which will continue to carry on the liberation struggle south of the Cunene, Zambesi, and Limpopo rivers (that is, in Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa). The purpose of the present study is to examine the orientations of the various groups and the factors that bear on their policies. Before we proceed to a country-by-country analysis, however, it would be useful to consider the broader political context in which these movements operate."

RACE AND CLASS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Phyllis MacRae, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.2 (1974) 237–257.

"Much of what has been written about the white supremacist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia has discussed race as an independent variable, largely ignoring the economic base of racism. The liberal argument holds that apartheid itself is the source of the 'problem' and that the free market mechanism of capitalism will eventually solve it. I would like to argue from the contrasting viewpoint of Oliver C. Cox that racial attitudes develop secondarily out of situations of economic class exploitation for which racist ideologies provide a rationalization."

A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Nathan M. Shamuyarira, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.2 (1974) 159–179.

"Has a revolutionary situation been created in Southern Africa? To answer this question, we need to define the revolutionary situation in the manner in which the colonial situation has been defined by Georges Balandier; analyse the critical in-puts of a revolutionary situtation; and then apply them to the specific cases of the dependent States of Southern Africa. In the context of Southern Africa today a revolution entails the complete overthrow of the existing system of colonialism and neo-colonialism."

THE ZAMBESI SALIENT: CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Al J. Venter. Old Greenwich, Conn., Devin-Adair, 1974. 395 p.

"A veteran African newspaper correspondent reports on the various insurgencies operating

throughout southern Africa. The training, motives, and capabilities of the competing revolutionary movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia are described. Of particular interest is the author's discussion of the role of outside parties in the conflicts: the support provided by the Black African states for guerrillas, and the competition between China and the Soviet Union for clients among the revolutionary movements. The book also attempts to project the possible implications of the Portuguese coup of April 1974 for the future of the area, but events have overtaken some of the analysis."

3. *Relations of Republic of South Africa with Countries of Southern Africa*

DETENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by P.E. Rousseau, in *South Africa International,* v.6, no.3 (January 1976) 117–123.

"The South African Government regards the internal situation in South Africa as part of the detente operation. The black peoples of South Africa have developed greatly over the last twenty years and discriminatory customs which have been part of the country's tradition over many generations are being modified. . . What is really meant by detente? In the Southern African context it certainly does not mean that the countries concerned will sacrifice their own individuality and traditions for one another. Each country will look after its own interests but will find peaceful ways of settling differences and joining complementary activities for mutual benefit. . . If political detente succeeds — and it must — this part of the world offers opportunities in all fields of human and economic development. With their relatively unlimited natural resources the countries of Southern Africa could become a giant economic bloc and a source of raw materials and processed minerals for the more highly industrialized nations of the world."

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by G.M.E. Leistner, in *South Africa International,* v.6, no.1 (July 1975) 35–44.

"The author, who is Deputy Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa and an acknowledged expert in the field of area studies related to Southern Africa, suggests that economic 'cooperation for development' is what States in the region should seek, rather than a common market situation."

SOUTH AFRICA SEVENTY-FIVE; A NEW LOOK AT EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Anson Lloyd, in *South Africa International,* v.6, no.1 (July 1975) 9–20.

"How the tumultous events of these past four years have not only raised and uplifted the standards of living and the quality of life of our population of an estimated 25 million, but also have had a profound effect on our industrial life and consequentially trade relations with other countries."

SOUTH AFRICAN IMPERIALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by V.M. Nyathi, in *The African Review,* v.5, no.4 (1975) 451–471.

"In. . . [the] examination of the development of South African imperialism. . . [the author concentrates] on its dynamics and mechanisms as well as its effects on the imperialized countries and in South Africa itself."

SOUTHERN AFRICA: A CATACLYSM AVERTED?, by Ross K. Baker, in *Worldview,* v.18, no.11 (November 1975) 11–16.

"Vorster's success is linked to the decline of Black Africa's moral credibility."

SOUTHERN AFRICA: DETENTE?, by David Hirschmann, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.14, no.1 (1976) 107–126.

"In a speech to the South African Senate on 23 October 1974, Prince Minister Vorster declared that the situation in Southern Africa had reached a point at which a choice had to be made between peaceful negotiation on the one hand, or escalating strife on the other. He offered Africa 'the way of peace.' Within three days President Kaunda responded favorably. In a graduation day speech at the University of Zambia, he described Vorster's overture as 'the voice of reason for which Africa and the world have been waiting for many years.' Without hesitation, policymakers and the press in South Africa fastened upon the term detente, hoisted it from another context, and applied it to describe both the atmosphere and substance of ensuring interstate relations in Southern Africa. While those African leaders who have supported the current strategy of negotiation would acknowledge that those speeches, the substantial preparatory groundwork involved, and the subsequent interchanges, amount to developments of some significance, the term detente would not accord with their evaluation of the situation. At the ninth extraordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers held in Dar es Salaam in April 1975, Zambia's then Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, stated that 'the term detente is not in our vocabulary.' The Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, derived from that session, affirmed his view."

SOUTHERN AFRICA: A SOUTHERN VIEW, by John Barratt, in *Foreign Affairs,* v.55, no.1 (October 1976) 147–168.

"South Africa's external relations since World War II have developed on the basis of an interaction between external and internal factors. The external factors have included the heightened consciousness, particularly in the Western world (and reflected in the United Nations Charter), of human rights as an issue affecting international relations; and anticolonial movement, particularly as expressed in the achievement of independence throughout Africa; and the cold war conflict between the Western and Communist powers. The inability of South Africa's internal political system to adapt adequately to these far-reaching changes in the

postwar world caused a progressive deterioration in its external relations, resulting in increasing international deterioration in its external relations, resulting in increasing international isolation on a political level (though not economically). The intimate link in South Africa's case between external relations and internal domestic policies is obvious, but what is not always appreciated is the important role of external factors in a rapidly changing world in bringing the internal racial situation into the international arena. The basic internal racial features of the country, including discrimination in policy and social custom, denial of political rights to blacks, and economic exploitation, date back to colonial times. Even the political, economic, and social discrimination embodied in legislation (which provides the ground for the most serious criticism of the South African system) did not begin with the advent to power of the National Party government in 1948, although it has been greatly deepened since then. Rather, the basic internal political problems, as well as the moral issues involved, have existed since the South African Union was founded in 1910, but external factors have increasingly impinged in recent decades, affecting the attitudes and policies of other countries toward South Africa, as well as the attitudes of blacks and whites within the country."

4. *Southern Africa and US Policies and Dilemmas*

A FRESH LOOK AT AFRICA; EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.19 (8 November 1976) 41–42.

"*Will southern Africa's racial time bomb explode* in a bloodbath? Do the black-ruled nation's believe U.S. can stave off disaster? Ms. Black gives a diplomat's size-up of what is really happening on a continent in ferment."

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by William D. Rogers, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.75, no.1948 (25 October 1976) 532–537.

"This is a critical moment in our relations with Africa. The Secretary of State has just returned from two weeks in Africa. The purpose of his trip was to explore whether the United States could play a constructive role in the search for peaceful solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia."

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-ILL) on Apr. 13–25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana. Assesses US' interests in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21–33)."

THE US DILEMMA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Anthony Hughes, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 9–11.

"Difficult choices and decisions face the United States in southern Africa. The victory of MPLA forces in Angola, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, was one incident in a chain of historic events. The focus of attention will soon move to Zimbabwe, to Namibia, and to South Africa itself. United States' policy in Angola, thwarted by congressional opposition, was based on the thesis that soviet military adventures thousands of miles from home, and outside traditional soviet areas of interest, require an American reaction. Refusal to stand up to communist expansionism, Secretary Kissinger argued, would undermine America's credibility. The Angolan debacle may be seen either to demonstrate the validity of the thesis or, alternatively, to accentuate its dangers. . . In a world dominated by hostility between the US and the Communist powers, the real crux lies in the strategic and economic importance to the US of South Africa and the need to maintain the friendship, or at least to avoid the hostility, or whoever governs that region."

US POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 527 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Senate).

"Hearings before the Subcom on African Affairs to review US role in political changes occurring in Southern Africa, and in providing future economic aid to new independent black nations. Investigates possible peaceful solutions to the internal problems of Rhodesia and Republic of South Africa. Also consider the impact on other African nations of Angola and Mozambique's independence from Portugal, particularly the new nations' potential efforts to achieve self-determination for majority black populations in Rhodesia and South Africa and the independence of Namibia from South Africa. Appendix contains 'Southern Africa Self-rule or or Self-destruction,' study mission rept, Apr. 12-May 5, 1975, by Robert Barton, professional staff associate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (p. 503–527)."

5. *Economic Aspects*

INTERDEPENDENCE IN COMMERCE AND TRADE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by A. Hammond-Tooke, in *South Africa International*, v.6, no.2 (October 1975) 70–87.

"A structural analysis of Southern Africa's trade and economic relationships as they exist and as they have developed over the recent past. By comparing this picture with the development needs and aspirations of the countries in the subcontinent, it should be possible to develop one or two scenarios. South Africa can then be projected into the picture. From this I hope it will be within our power to extract some guidelines for the trade relationships of South Africa within the Southern African bloc."

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, September 1976. 52 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Staff report, prepared for the Subcom on Foreign Assistance by Frank Ballance and Constance Freeman, following their May 1976 trip to Zambia, Mozambique, Republic of South Africa, Tanzania, and Zaire to study the political and economic crisis in southern Africa. Examines implications of the Rhodesian guerrilla war for surrounding nations' political stability. Also reviews those southern African countries' economic development, losses associated with the Rhodesian conflict and economic sanctions, and foreign aid requirements."

D. West Africa

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF FAMILY SIZE IN WEST AFRICA, by Donald W. Snyder, in *Demography*, v.11, no.4 (November 1974) 613-627.

"The economic theory of fertility postulates that income and prices, broadly defined, are important determinants of family size. What follows is an attempt to test this theory against the behavior of 717 predominantly urban households in Sierra Leone. Husband's education is used as a proxy for income; the 'price' of a child is accounted for by wife's education and wife's wage rate. Other important variables are wife's age, a measure of child 'quality,' wife's age at first birth, and child mortality. The findings of the study tend to lend support to the economic theory of fertility but contain certain peculiarities which indicate a need for further research."

A ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA, by A.G. Hopkins. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. 337 p.

"This. . . survey emphasizes the indigenous economic contribution within the colonial context."

HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA. VOLUME II, ed. by J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. 764 p.

"In this volume, the editors continue their history of West Africa after 1800. The essays describe the history of West African countries from the days of the slave trade, through the establishment of colonial rule, to the creation of the new independent states of West Africa. Volume I dealt with West Africa before 1800."

NEO-COLONIALISM IN WEST AFRICA, by Samir Amin. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975. 298 p.

"Amin surveys the economics of eight West African states, whose development, he says, has virtually halted, because of the area's colonial fragmentation."

PEACE CORPS IN WEST AFRICA, 1975. Washington, Government Printing Office, 23 February 1976. 28 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Report of Nov. 28-Dec. 18, 1975, staff study mission undertaken by John C. Chester and John H. Sullivan to evaluate Peace Corps management and operational problems in West Africa. Itinerary included visits to Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal."

E. Africa's New Island Republics (See also by country)

AFRICA'S NEW ISLAND REPUBLICS AND US FOREIGN POLICY, by Laurie S. Wiseberg and Gary F. Nelson, in *Africa Today*, v.24, no.1 (January-March 1977) 7-30.

"In July 1975, three African archipelago dependencies became independent republics. The Republic of Cape Verde (July 5) and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe saw the end of five hundred years of colonialism as a serendipitous consequence of the April 1974 revolution in Portugal and their association with the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Guine'. The Comoro Islands seized its independence on July 6 of that year by a unilateral declaration, though one of the four islands (Mayotte) remains under French colonial control. And, on June 28, 1976, a fourth African archipelago republic became a sovereign state: the Indian Ocean Seychelles. Comprising ninety-five islands, with an estimated population of 57,000, the Republic of the Seychelles is slated to become the smallest United Nations member. . . The poverty and development needs of these mini-republics set rigid constraints on their national leaderships. The need to strengthen trade and communications patterns, the need for aid, as well as the desire (in some cases) to attract foreign investment, will be paramount in determining the republics' relations with the Continent of Africa and the great powers. This notwithstanding, the choices being made by the leaders of these new states range dramatically, from the Cape Verdian commitment to socialism and eventual union with Guine', to the promise of the Seychellian Head of Government that he will turn his country into a 'mini-Switzerland' — a financial and trading center without foreign exchange controls — and a tourist paradise. These choices will be examined. . .

PART III
THE COUNTRIES OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT NATIONAL PROFILES (SEE ALSO PARTS I AND II, AND APPENDIXES)

A. Algeria (See also appendixes)

ALGERIA'S OIL STRATEGY, by Cherif Guellal, in *Africa Report*, v. 20, no. 5 (September-October 1975) 41–44.

"In the last ten years Algeria has emerged as one of the world's leading producers and exporters of crude oil and is on its way to becoming the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. While in 1965 Algeria controlled only 11.5 percent of its own national production and in 1971, 56 percent, today it controls almost all of the crude oil exploitation (77%) and all exploration, transportation activities, and production planning."

ALGERIA'S SPREADING LAND REFORM, by Arnold Hottinger, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 25, no. 3 (June 1975) 15–16.

"Since 1971 the lands of Algerian landowners who do not work themselves have been subjected to the "land revolution." This revolution is intended as more than just a common land reform program. Not only are the field hands to receive their own land, they are also to be taken out of the gourbis and settled in houses. The elimination of the gourbis is supposed to improve living standards and, as President Houari Boumedienne has often said, get rid of the 'gourbi mentality' as well."

THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two — The Arab World Today (Sudan — The Loose-Limbed Giant; Egypt — The Center of Gravity; Libya — The Radical Right; Tunisia — The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria — Austere Revoluntionary; and Morocco — Kingdom of the Far West).

AREA HANDBOOK FOR ALGERIA, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 401 p. (DA Pam 550–44.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

1. Soviet Views on Algeria

ALGERIA'S HORIZONS, by A. Zlatorunsky, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 11 (1973) 80–85. In English.

A Soviet journalist takes a look at Industrial, Agrarian, and Cultural Revolution in Algeria. "Dynamism can be felt in politics, the economy, culture, and even in the views of people about current events."

B. Angola (See also appendixes)

1. Miscellaneous Information

ANGOLA, in *Africa Report*, v. 21, no. 1 (January-February 1976) 2–17.

This review of modern Angola is composed of the following: Angola Interview—Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA; Luanda Notebook; Angola — The Soviet Viewpoint; The View from China; South Africa's Stand; The Kissinger Thesis; and An Alternative U.S. Policy.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, by Mohamed A. El-Khawas, in *The African Review*, v. 4, no. 2 (1974) 299–314.

"Because of the importance of the issue, some impartial assessment seems warranted. This paper represents an attempt to contribute to that assessment. First, the full dimensions of foreign economic investment in the territories are examined, with special emphasis of Mozambique and Angola during the decade following the outbreak of the wars of liberation. Second, some comment is offered on the influence of such economic activity on the efforts to attain independence within Portuguese Africa."

THE MAN IN THE MIDDLE; TALKING WITH ANGOLA'S JONAS SAVIMBI, by Robin Wright, in *The New Leader*, v. 59, no. 3 (2 February 1976) 6–7.

"Of the three Angolan liberation leaders—Agostinho Neto, head of the Marxist-controlled People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Savimbi-this . . . 41-year-old chief of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is clearly the most popular among his people . . . When journalists need answers to questions on military of political matters, they still seek out Savimbi." An interview.

REPORT FROM ANGOLA, by Kenneth L. Adelman, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 53, no. 3 (April 1975) 558–574.

"The first European power to arrive in Black Africa is now the last to depart. The April 1974 coup in Lisbon, one of those rare instances in history when a change in government reverses a vital national policy,

has led to the end of centuries of Portuguese colonization. Such a rapid shift in policy, resulting in the promise of independence for Mozambique on June 25 and Angola on November 11 of this year, was bound to fundamentally change the character of African politics. This decolonization in the south, together with the Ethiopian revolution, the new power of the oil-producing states, and the tragedy of the Sahel drought in the north, have made 1974–75, a historic time for Africa. Angola is the last and certainly the most difficult territory for Portugal to leave. Since 1483, when Diogo Cao first came to the mouth of the gigantic river he called 'Zaire,' Portugal has prided itself on maintaining this valuable territory, 14 times the size of the metropole itself and nearly twice as large as Texas. Besides these strong historical ties to Portugal, there are several factors which make Angola's transition to independence important, difficult, and as we shall see, potentially explosive."

2. *Angolan Civil War*

ANGOLA: A LONG AND BITTER CIVIL WAR, by John Howe, in *African Development*, v. 9, no. 11 (November 1975) 15 plus.

An examination of the situation in October of this three-sided war.

ANGOLA: BEHIND THE LINES, by Kim Willenson with Lloyd H. Norman in Washington, in *Newsweek*, v. 90, no. 8 (22 August 1977) 38–43.

. . . ."Last week. . . The Washington Post printed a vivid series of eyewitness stories by correspondent Leon Dash" . . . who had spent more than seven months in the field with one guerrilla faction. — "Dash, who is fluent in Swahili, crossed the Zambian border into Angola last October with an escort of 100 UNITA troops. He had previously spent ten weeks with them in 1973 when they were fighting the Portuguese. He reports that President Neto's enemies now dominate most of Southern Angola.

ANGOLA: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WASHINGTON'S WAR, by Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, New York, Pathfinder Press, 1976. 157 p.

ANGOLA'S MADE-IN-MOSCOW WAR, by David Reed, in *Reader's Digest*, v. 108, no. 650 (June 1976) 83–88.

"With its most brazen overseas military adventure, the Soviet Union has put the world on notice that it now fully intends to use its superior muscle to control the direction of international politics . . . The Angolan operation was one of the biggest and boldest overseas military ventures that the Russians have ever undertaken. Its purpose: to ensure that a Marxist-led Angolan faction, backed by only a quarter of the population, could crush two rival movements that together were supported by the three-fourths majority. . Angola was more than just a random, one-shot effort by Moscow to establish a client state in another part of the world. The Russian operation sprang from a distressing new reality in world affairs. Russia has surpassed the United States in many aspects of military strength, and fully intends to use that muscle to shape world events, at the expense of American and other Western influence."

UNRAVELING A CIVIL WAR; THE STAKES IN ANGOLA, by Russell Warren Howe, in *The New Leader*, v. 59, no. 1 (5 January 1976) 6–9.

"Notwithstanding the assistance from a remarkable collection of bedfellows, FNLA leader Roberto has accurately said: 'This is a war of men against weapons. We have the men and they the weapons.' The FNLA-UNITA's 30,000 soldiers outnumber the MPLA'S troops by three to one, yet the alliance cannot match the MPLA in arms. Although President Ford has ruled out US military intervention, he is prepared to go on sending aid . . . Still, a more responsible, if arduous, policy would be to try to get a UN peace force into the country—preferably limited to volunteers from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean—that could maintain order until elections were held."

3. *External Intervention in Angolan Civil War*

ANGOLA: THE RUSSIANS HAVE COME, in *Newsweek*, v. 86, no. 22 (1 December 1975) 56 plus.

"In the two weeks since Angola became independent, hundreds of Soviet military 'technicians' have poured into the former Portuguese colony. . . They have brought along vast quantities of munitions and have been joined by thousands of Cuban soldiers to bolster their client . . . In the past, the Soviets have generally stamped 'Top Secret' on their support of Third World Communist movements. But the operation in Luanda is wide open."

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, by Charles K. Ebinger, In Orbis, v. 20, no. 3 (Fall 1976) 669–699.

"On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese armed forces overthrew the dictatorship that had dominated the Lusitanian world for almost half a century, and the myth of Lusotropicalismo was shattered. Although most commentators saw in those initial events hope for a new era in southern African race relations, less sanguine analysts realized that Lusitanian civilization was in a process not of adjustment but of sharp transformation. Nowhere in the former Portuguese empire was this radical change in the status quo more evident than in Angola and Cabinda, where the coup intensified preexisting ethnic, racial, and ideological animosity into what had by early 1976 become a fratricidal political struggle involving the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Portugal, the Republic of South Africa, Cuba, rival Angolan and Cabindan nationalist groups, almost all the nations of Africa (but

particularly Ziare, the People's Republic of the Congo and Zambia), the Organization of African Unity, and varied international financial interests. In the aftermath of the April 25 coup, it became clear that the political evolution of Angola and Cabinda would be directly affected by the outcome of the political competition unleashed in Lisbon. . . In order to analyze properly the relative geographic and political configurations of nationalism in Angola and Cabinda at the time of the coup, one should begin with the fact that the major guerrilla fighting force confronting the Portuguese at the time belonged to the FNLA."

LESSONS OF ANGOLA, by John A. Marcum, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 54, no. 3 (April 1976) 407–425.

"It was an improbable locus for a superpower collision. But the shape and location, if not the history and social reality, of Angola were being firmly impressed upon the minds of millions of American television viewers. At issue, they learned from the Secretary of State, testifying before a Senate subcommittee on African affairs, was this basic principle: 'The Soviet Union must not be given any opportunity to use military forces for aggressive purposes without running the risk of conflict with us.' Angola was to be the post-Vietnam testing ground of American will and power in the face of the global expansion of a bullish rival whose recently realized military outreach was seen to be leading it toward dangerous adventures. But why Angola?. . . The debacle of our subsequent involvement in Angola flows from the same propensity to view what is happening there through the distorting lens of a larger strategic concern-this time a global shoving match with the Soviet Union."

4. *Mercenaries in the Angolan Civil War*

MERCENARIES IN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 9 August 1976. 75 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing before the Special Subcom on Investigations to inquire into US citizens' mercenary activities in Africa, methods of mercenary recruitment, and Government actions to curtail recruitment. Appendixes (p. 29–75) include correspondence, articles, and: Lowenthal, Mark M. (CRS). 'Foreign Assistance in the Angola Civil War: Chronology of Reported Events, 1957–76' (p. 36–69)."

5. *US Policy on the Angolan Civil War*

ABANDON ANGOLA TO RUSSIA?, in *US News & World Report*, v. 80, no. 8 (23 February 1976) 35–36.

A pro and con interview with two US Congressmen: Senator Clark: "Soviets are not apt to gain a tremendous amount." Representative Alphonzo Bell: "If Moscow Wins, 'we're going to lose our allies.' "

ANGOLA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 212 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on African Affairs to examine the extent, nature, and objectives of US involvement in civil war in Angolan; strategic importance of Angola; and the impact of the Angolan conflict on US-Soviet relations and on US dealings with other countries in Africa. Also considers the history and alignments of three Angolan liberation movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)."

ANGOLA: WHAT AMERICA SHOULD DO, by Edward Kennedy, in *Africa Report*, v. 20, no. 6 (November-December 1975 46–48.

"The complex situation in Angola today clearly has the potential for leading the United States into a damaging involvement in Southern Africa which could further erode our interests in Africa and creditability in the world at a time when we need to reassert America's leadership. On the other hand, a showing of American restraint may help to resolve the conflict in that country and heighten our image as a responsible world power."

DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN ANGOLA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 207 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on International Resources, Food, and Energy to examine the issue of US and foreign disaster relief and military involvement in the Angolan civil war. Classified material has been deleted. Appendix (p. 141–207) includes submitted statement, correspondence, press releases, articles, and: a. Gervasi, Sen, 'Tacit Alliance: The US and South Africa in Angola' prepared statement (p. 145–154), and State Dept submitted rebuttal to Mr. Gervasi's testimony (p. 156–159). b. Perry, Moses L., Jr. (CRS), 'International Law Analysis of Certain Questions Relating to South Africa and Angola' Feb. 24, 1976 (p. 162–171). c. Reports on seminar between group of invited Americans and People's Republic of Angola, held in Havana, Cuba, Feb. 26–29, 1976 (p. 190–203)."

RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 18 December 1975. 6 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Senate.)

"Recommends passage of S.J. Res. 156, to prohibit military or related assistance to or for Angolan interests without specific authorization under the Foreign Assistance Act S.J. Res. 156 is identical to S. 2662."

US POLICY ON ANGOLA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 26 January 1976. 45 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing to consider issues involved in the Angolan civil war and implications of US and Soviet involvement. Also discusses activities and objectives of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Appendix (p. 37–45) contains 'Chronology of

Events Relating to Angola: Apr. 25, 1974-Jan. 29, 1976' by Brenda Branaman (CRS), Feb 13, 1976."

6. *Soviet Press and The Angolan Civil War*

ANGOLA: REITERATING THE SOVIET POSITION, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.28, no.1 (4 Feb 1976) 4–5 plus.

Editorial in Pravda 3 January 1976 in which it is brought out that ". . . true to its international duty, the Soviet Union has given and is continuing to give — and it makes no secret of this — moral and material support to the patriotic forces of Angola and to the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A) in their struggle against colonialism. . ."

ANGOLA: U.S.S.R. BACKS NETO REGIME, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.45 (3 Dec 1975) 16.

Complete text of a congratulatory communication from N. Podgorny of the Soviet Union to Agostino Neto of the People's Republic of Angola (*Pravda* 12 Nov. 1975; Izvestia 13 Nov. 1975) "On Behalf of the presidium at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, The Soviet people and myself personally [N. Podgorny] please accept heartfelt congratulations on the occasion of the proclamation of the independence of Angola. . ."

HANDS OFF ANGOLA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27. no.47 (17 Dec. 1975) 13.

Comments in Pravda, 21, Nov. 1975, p. 5 (condensed text) in which China's and South Africa are decried for their policies and actions toward Angola.

INCURSION INTO ANGOLA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.34 (17 September 1975) 17.

Comment in *Pravda,* 23 August, 1975, p. 5 (condensed text) on "Report in Johannesburg newspapers that troops from the South African Republic have penetrated the territory of Angola and established control over the northern bank of the Cunene River." Scores South African Republic for "Direct Aggression" against Angola.

NEW ADVANCES IN ANGOLA, by K. Uralov, in *International Relations,* (Moscow), no.8, 1976. 76–80. In English.

An overview of events in Angola and the state of political and economic affairs in the country. The help given by the Soviet Union and Cuba, as well as the moves to consolidate Soviet-Angola relations. Concludes: "The Soviet Union will do all it can to strengthen its relations with the People's Republic of Angola, and increase the effectiveness of Soviet-Angolan cooperation for the benefit of both countries concerned and in the interest of peace and progress. . ."

OF LAW AND NATIONS; BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HOPES, by Julius Stone. Buffalo, William S. Hein & Co., 1974. 484 p.

The author emphasizes South West African cases; also Afro-Asian Nations and International law. Chapter XIII — Reflections on the South West Africa cases concludes that, "Both supporters and critics of the South West Africa cases 1966 decision, have seen it as 'a turning point.' The former see the turning point in the court's refusal to yield to political pressures: critics have seen it as a warning that unless judges become 'functional and sociological' the court would split and the rule of law collapse." In Chapter XIV — Afro-Asian Nations and International Law the author states that. . . "The main purpose here is not to offer new theses concerning Afro-Asian nations and the international legal order, but rather to introduce the main stances of the newer states as seen by themselves, and interpreted by the older states and by competent international lawyers. In an area as affected by political passion we must expect to find new truths replacing old myths; but we should also perhaps be alert for the intrusion of new myths among new truths. . ."

"ON THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA," in *The Current Digest of The Soviet Press,* v.28, no.6 (10 March 1976) 19–20.

Pravda of 11 February 1976 scores the western press for "misinformation." . . . "Peking, always eager at times like this to snatch what it can from the International Reactionaries, has done its bit as well. . ."

'PROGRESSIVES' VIEW M.P.L.A. AS ONLY LEGITIMATE ANGOLAN MOVEMENT, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.44 (26 November 1975) 23.

Condensed text of a report in Pravda, 5 Nov. 1975, p. 4, on the moves and countermoves by the various functions in Angola in their attempt to seize control of the country.

THREAT TO ANGOLA'S FREEDOM, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.27, no.30 (20 August 1975) 20.

Complete text of report in Izvestia, 24 July 1975, p. 2 on the problems of M.P.L.A — Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola — is having with other factions in Angola in the struggle for independence.

USSR-ANGOLA: FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY, by V. Fyoaorov, in *International Affairs,* (Moscow), no.12 (1976) 75–78. In English.

7. *Yugoslavia's Views on Events in Angola*

ANGOLA AND AFRICA, by Mirko Ostojic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.27, no.620 (5 February 1976) 11–12 plus.

"It is almost three months since a new and major crisis broke out in Angola, soon to turn into an armed invasion of that young African Republic. It was clear very early in the proceedings that a new hotbed of tension was being formed on African soil, over which the sparks would fly in Africa itself, and outside it.

Thus, overnight a country just freed of centuries of colonial subjugation, entered the orbit of conflicting relations among the superpowers, which gave the entire cash a new dimension. The war in this former Portuguese colony quickly intensified and lent additional dynamism to all the political processes on the 'black continent.' Differences became more marked, divisions broader, but a unity also emerged of. . . forces such as has never existed to date. In such a situation it was illusory to expect that the OAU summit, however significant it may have been for the further development of the crisis, could bring a political formula for the settlement of this complex problem."

ANGOLA ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, by S. Mihailovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.26, no.596 (5 February 1975) 22-24.

"On November 11, 1975, Angola is to attain the independence for which the Angolan people have been fighting for a full thirteen years. Until that time, a caretaker government will be formed of representatives from all three Angolan liberation movements — the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) — and representatives of the Portuguese government. The agreement on the independence of Angola has for all practical purposes set the date when all the Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa will be independent."

ANGOLA: RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE FUTURE, by Ivan Ivekovic, in *Review of International Affairs,* Yugoslavia, v.26, nos. 606-607 (5-20 July 1975) 9-11.

"On the 21st of June, in the town of Nakuru in Kenya, an agreement was signed between the leaders of the three Angolan liberation movements — the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) — which paved the way for a pacification of the situation in Angola. However, only three days later fresh clashes broke out in Luanda. According to the Portuguese news reports, 'intervals of quiet are from time to time interrupted by gunfire and explosions.' Therefore, despite the obligations assumed by Dr. Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Roberto Holden (FNLA) and Jones Savimbi (UNITA), everything seems to suggest that it will be extremely difficult to carry out in practice the provisions of the agreement."

THE ROAD TO LIBERTATION -- EVENTS IN ANGOLA AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES, by Ivan Ivekovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.27, no.625 (20 April 1976) 23-26.

"The victory won by the People's Republic of Angola marks a meaningful turning point not only in the development of this former Portuguese colony, but also in the whole African continent. The differentiation which the Angolan crisis precipitated between independent African nations, the aggravation of the Rhodesian problem and the new situation in Namibia, together with the crisis that shook the Republic of South Africa after its military and political defeat in Angola — indicate far-reaching changes in the entire region, in the framework of the so-called white triangle, and wider. These changes are potentiated by the strong affirmation of progressive regimes resulting from the battle for independence in Angola and Mozambique and the discrediting of the collaborationist line assumed by some other African countries. It might be said that the war in Angola was a test of the ability of progressive Africa to demand more of independence than mere formalities decked out in national emblems and anthems."

C. Botswana (See also appendixes)

BOTSWANA: A SHORT POLITICAL HISTORY, by Anthony Sillery. London, Methuen, 1974. 219 p.

"This. . . account, from the early nineteenth century to the present-day democratic republic of Sir Seretse Khama, emphasizes the eventually availing struggle of the Tswana people—aided by a handful of British missionaries and administrators—to retain control of their tribal lands."

D. Burundi (See also appendixes)

BURUNDI: THE TRAGIC YEARS, by Thomas Patrick Melady. Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis Books, 1974. 110 p.

"The man who served as US Ambassador to the young African nation of Burundi from November 1969 to June 1972 presents an eyewitness account of the civil strife begun on April 1972 when the Hutus rebelled against the dominant Tutsis. After several thousand Tutsis had been killed in the initial uprising, it is estimated that from 80,000 to 150,000 Hutus were slain in reprisal, and another half million made homeless. The author provides historical, political, and socio-economic background on a country little known to Americans. He also recounts the efforts to conduct diplomatic relations with a country in upheaval, and traces the impact the tragedy had upon himself, his family, and his personal acquaintances. He reflects upon the Burundi horror in the light of other twentieth-century ethnic conflicts in Armenia, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Belgium, and concludes by wondering what intergroup fears and hatreds portend for the future of man."

E. Cameroon (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of Army, 1974. 335 p. (DA Pam 550-159.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

CAMEROON: AFRICA IN MINIATURE, By Wolfgang Hag, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.1 (April 1975) 16–17.

"With a population of six million, Cameroon likes to call itself 'Africa in miniature,' a place where the great ethnic groups of the Dark Continent come together. The situation is dictated by the country's history and geographical position. Cameroon's area of 183,500 square miles is nearly twice that of West Germany. Its triangular-shaped northern segment, extending up to Lake Chad not far from the Sahara, embraces savannah and steppe; in the south it borders the Atlantic Ocean, and between the two extremes are tropical forests and, in the west, high plateau country. Historically, this location on the transit routes between the Sahara and the Atlantic brought many outside influences into the land and many peoples: Arabs, Berbers, Ethiopians, Haussa, and Fulbe. In their migrations, these groups encountered the Bantu tribes of the south."

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill) on Apr. 13–25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswanna. Assesses US' interests in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21–33)."

F. Cape Verde Islands (See Part II, Section E; also appendixes)

G. Central African Republic (See appendixes)

H. Chad (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR CHAD, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 261 p. (DA Pam 550-159.)

Country Summary; General Character of the Society; Physical Environment and Population; Historical Setting; Ethnic Groups and Languages; Social Systems; Education, the Arts and Sciences and Mass Communications; Government and Politics; Character and Structure of the Economy; Agriculture and Industry; National Security; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

I. Congo — Brazzaville (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (CONGO BRAZZAVILLE), by Gordon C. McDonald and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 255 p. (DA Pam 550-91.)

Country Summary; Historical Aspects; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Illustrations; and Tables.

CONGOLESE LABOR PARTY DELEGATION VISITS MOSCOW, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.26, no.31 (28 August 1974) 19–20.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, 3 August 1974, p. 4, on the 2 August meeting of the Congolese Delegation with Soviet officials and the subjects that were discussed. Among the subjects: ". . . Further development of coooperation between the C.P.S.U. and C.L.P. . ."

THE POLITICS OF CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE, by René Guaze. Trans. and ed. by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 283 p.

"The first segment of this study, by a former head of security in Congo-Brazzaville and friend of Abbé Fulbert Youlou, its first head of state, amasses considerable detail about day-to-day Congolese politics. The introduction and supplement by the editors cover the period after 1963 (the end of Youlou's regime) and pull together the confusing strands of an often chaotic political situation."

J. Dahomey (See also appendixes)

DAHOMEY: BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY, by Dov Ronen, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1975. 272 p.

"Professor Ronen of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, describes the political evolution of this small West African nation and former Frency colony. In the context of political modernization analysis, he concludes that Dohomey has shown no substantive progress through the pre- and post-independence eras because politics has become the realm of military jousters. His . . . research also sheds light on the pervasive influence of France in her former colonies, a fact of African international relations that remains important to the present day."

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W. F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study of the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda, and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but

he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

K. Egypt (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. 3rd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. 454 p. (DA Pam 550-43.)

Country Summmary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

THE BALANCE OF PEOPLE, LAND, AND WATER IN MODERN EGYPT, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 27 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, no.1.)

"Egypt has undertaken ambitious programs of land and water management to make maximum use of the country's agricultural resources. Ultimately, the solution to intensifying pressure in the land/man/water relationship may depend on the success of the industrialization effort which is currently dependent on improvements in the agricultural sector."

EGYPT'S FELLAHIN. PART I: BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS OF KAF, by Richard Critchfield. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 17 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.6.)

"Nowhere do the past and present collide so emphatically as in Upper Egypt, along the Nile between Cairo and Aswan. There Egyptians feel subject, not master, to fate. The scientific and material power represented by the Aswan Dam has introduced a psychological and social turbulence new to village life."

EGYPT'S FELLAHIN. PART II: THE ANT AND THE GRASSHOPPER, by Richard Critchfield. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 18 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21,no.7.)

"Upper Egyptian and Delta villages exhibit strikingly different ways of life, as illustrated by Shahhat (the grasshopper) and Faith (the ant). While there are many reasons for the differences, none is more convincing than the century's gap in development, the 100 years that separated the two regions shifts from flood to perennial irrigation."

TAKE THE BUS, AND LEAVE THE DRIVING TO US, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 15 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.2.)

"Conceptualizing, developing, and operating an efficient public transportation system are major problems for Cairo. The solutions proposed tend to favor the well-to-do who drive private automobiles. Plans for an extensive subway system, combined with more intensive development of river transport, hold more promise for mass transport than does expanding the bus fleet. Action in any quarter is hindered by a shortage of funds."

2. *Economic Aspects*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ECONOMIC SURVEY — EGYPT, in *African Development*, v.9, no.10 (October 1975) E-1 plus.

Economic Roundup; Political Review; Investment; Suez Canal; Oil Industry; Egypt's Airline; Agriculture; Tourism; Irrigation; and Reconstruction.

EGYPT 1976, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 11 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.3.)

"More than any other Arab country Egypt's regional and international policies have been determined by the state of her economy, in crisis for at least the last 15 years. A momentous turning point occurred in spring 1976, as Egypt casts its economic, diplomatic, and to some extent military lot with the 'West'."

EGYPT: CHANGE COMES TO A CHANGELESS LAND, by Thomas J. Abercrombie, in *National Geographic*, v.151, no.3 (March 1977) 312-343.

"Looking back to an age of glory that produced the. . . Pyramids of Giza, Egypt now seeks renewal in the promise of a new era. Celebrating 25 years of independence, the still largely agricultural nation turns to industry for a higher standard of living."

THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY, 1952-1972, by Robert Mabro. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974. 254 p.

"A. . . survey, covering the efforts of the revolutionary regime in land reform, construction of the High Dam, and industrialization. The author expresses pessimism as to Egypt's future, largely because of population pressure."

THE OPENING [IN EGYPT], by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 4 pts. (Northeast Africa Series, v.20, nos. 2,3,4, and 5.)

PART I — Egypt's Economic New Look; Part II — Luring Foreign Capital; Part III — De-Nasserization?; Part IV — The Suez Canal.

PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 26 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.5.)

"Egyptians are debating major policy shifts in the economy. Critics of the Nasserist system want to back away from the public enterprise system; defenders want to move forward, intensifying the socialist experiment. The reality is that the public sector still dominates—unchallenged by foreign competition—while the private sector is sharpening its teeth."

WHY PEACE DOESN'T BUY PROSPERITY FOR EGYPT, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.8 (23 August 1976) 58-59.

President Sadat needs an 'economic revolution' — but that's easier said than done. Dennis Mullin of [the magazines'] International Staff sizes up what's bright, what's dismal inside Egypt."

WILL SADAT SURVIVE EGYPT'S MOUNTING WOES?, by Dennis Mullin, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.82, no.8 (28 February 1977) 21–22.

This report of a "nation in distress" concludes that "Western aid and Arab oil money might bail out Cairo's economy, but revolution is still a possibility."

b. *Food Problems*

'AISH: EGYPT'S GROWING FOOD CRISIS, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 13 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, no.3.)

"For Egyptians, bread is 'aish, life, the gift of the Nile. Traditionally, Egyptians have relied upon grain as their major food source, but despite introduction of high yield varieties, improved irrigation techniques, and more systematic use of fertilizer, per capita food grain production is declining. The nation's future strategy involves regional agricultural integration, increased sale of manufactured goods to finance food imports, and continued attention to domestic production."

SADAT'S DARKEST HOUR, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.5 (31 January 1977) 51–52.

"Egypt's worst riots in a quarter-century were touched off last week when Sadat's government raised the price of such staples as rice, sugar, and cooking gas as part of a general belt-tightening. Even before the price increases were announced, ordinary Egyptians were fuming over their country's chronic poverty, the swelling corruption of its managerial class, and the flaunted wealth of the foreigners who have poured into Cairo recently. Quickly, the government backed down, rescinding the increases and thereby deepening its economic quandry. But the riots posed a serious challenge to Sadat's six-year-old government, weakening him gravely just as he was leading the campaign by moderate Arabs for an overall peace settlement in the Middle East. And although the armed forces stood firm this time, some observers wondered whether the army's ranks contained another young Nasser, poised to overthrow Egypt's current ruler."

c. *Aswan Dam*

EGYPT TURNS TO US FOR HELP AT TROUBLED ASWAN, A RUSSIAN-BUILT DAM, in *US News and World Report*, v.81, no.10 (6 September 1976) 37–38.

"A grandiose project that was to power industries and give millions a better diet is in disarray. Solving the problems will test American skills."

d. *Industrialization and Technology*

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF EGYPT 1939–1973, by Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1976. 279 pp.

"Based on extensive primary data this is above all a book for economists; but the historical evolution of industrial policy against a setting of changing political-economic systems provides a case study in development of more than local significance."

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE MIDDLE EAST O.P.E.C. NATIONS AND EGYPT, 1970–1975. Washington, Government Printing Office, September 1976. 174 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Committee Serial UU. Background study, prepared by Wendy H. Schacht (CRS) for the Subcom on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis, reviewing technology transfer to Middle East OPEC nations and Egypt by the US and other developed countries. Presents analytical overview of nature and degree of transfers, with decriptive tables (p. 5–11); six-year and year-by-year narrative analyses of technology transfers to Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (p. 13–53); and categorical listings of individual technology transfer transactions, by year, recipient country, supplier nation, and type of transfer (p. 55-155). Appendixes (p. 159–171) contain chronological lists of agreements and protocols relating to and committees and commissions dealing with Middle East technology transfer activities."

3. *Socialism in Egypt*

ARAB SOCIALISM IN EGYPT, by Bent Hansen, in *World Development*, v.3, no.4, (April 1975) 201–211.

"The characteristic feature of 'Arab socialism,' as practiced in Egypt, is public ownership of the modern sectors, including finance and trade. Efficiency, in these sectors, and perhaps in agriculture, however, has suffered. Despite some improvement in distribution, following confiscation of larger businesses and rural estates, Egyptian society cannot be considered egalitarian. Egypt's system of agrarian co-operatives is perhaps the only feature of Arab socialism worth imitating."

EGYPT'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, by Robert Mabro, in *World Development*, v.3, no.5 (May 1975) 299–313.

"The economic relations between Egypt and the socialist countries (1948–73) are discussed and appraised in the context of the political, economic, and historical factors which brought them about and maintained them. It is argued that, because of special circumstances, Egypt had little choice but to develop close economic ties with the Soviet block. Bilateral trade has known disadvantages; the USSR, however, links trade with generous credit—an attractive feature for LDCs suffering from chronic balance-of-payments deficits. Other advantages and costs of bilateral trade are also discussed. The paper includes comments on Soviet

development assistance. A main theme is that Egypt, considering the restrictions imposed on her options by the polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, fared well in the relationship. Export and import prices in bilateral agreements seem to have corresponded to world prices, often with a premium in Egypt's favour. Egypt also benefited from a large inflow of resources and from a signficant contribution to domestic capital formation."

4. *Nasser and Nasserism*

THE DECLINE OF NASSERISM IN SADAT'S EGYPT, by Najib E. Saliba, in *World Affairs*, v.138, no.1 (Summer 1975) 51-59.

"Although President Anwar al-Sadat solemnly promised to follow Nasser's footsteps at his assumption of power in October 1970, considerable departures from Nasser's policies have since occurred. A few months after assuming the presidency it became clear that Sadat was unwilling to be merely a follower or a figurehead president. Rather, he wanted to be his own man, the maker and initiator of policy. This necessitted changes in Egypt's domestic and foreign policies alike. This article therefore, aims to discuss some of the salient changes in Sadat's Egypt."

THE 'NASSERIZATION' OF EGYPT AND ITS REVERSAL UNDER SADAT, by Irene Beeson, in *International Perspectives*, (July/August 1975) 23-28.

"When the late Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers came to power on July 23, 1952, one of the trickiest among the many tasks facing them was that of dealing with Egypt's political structure. . . Ten days after Nasser's death, the ASU unanimously approved the selection of Sadat as its nominee for the Presidency, and on November 12 he was unanimously elected President of the ASU."

NASSER'S EGYPT: THE FAILURE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP, by John P. Entelis, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.2 (Summer 1974) 451-464.

"This article seeks to evaluate the attempt of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the Third World's most charismatic leaders, to institutionalize and legitimize, via both personal and party charisma, Egypt's post-revolutionary system of rule. The assessment will be made at two levels corresponding to the levels of analysis presented in each of two books under review: local-national and national-international."

5. *Population Explosion*

CHICKENS AND EGGS: EGYPT'S POPULATION EXPLOSION REVISITED, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., 1975. 17 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.20, no.1)

"Egyptians concerned with the rate of population increase have decided that both conventional family planning programs and concerted programs of economic development must take priority. Policy implementation, however, has recently tended to favor the latter. Bureaucratic indifference and lack of funds may jeopardize family planning programs just when ordinary Egyptians are indicating a general willingness to control fertility."

6. *Foreign Relations*

a. *Egyptian-Sudanese Relations*

FROM THE DELTA TO THE WHITE NILE, by Heinz Gstrein, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.5 (August 1974) 18-19.

"During the last reorganization of the Cairo cabinet Osman Badran was appointed minister of state for Sudanese affairs; at the same time, in Khartoum, Lieutenant Colonel Salah Abdel Mabruk was named head of an 'Egyptian department.' These steps represent a new phase in the integration effort first proposed last February during a long meeting in Alexandria between the presidents of the two Nile nations. The deterioration in the relations between Egypt and Libya has lent political signficance to the plans as well, though they were originally conceived as a purely economic measure to create an 'integrated Nile region' stretching from the Delta to the White Nile."

b. *Egypt and the US*

AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN RAPPROCHEMENT, by Shlomo Slonim, in *The World Today*, v.31, no.2 (February 1975) 47-57.

"The real turning point in US-Egyptian relations was the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt in July 1972. The Yom Kippur war simply accelerated a process already underway and the worldwide alert of US forces in October 1973 was not so much to rescue Israel as to save Egypt from a Soviet occupation that would have radically upset the balance of power."

MIDDLE EAST: 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, April 1976. 25 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill), on Feb. 10-25, 1976, study mission to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Israel. Contains political and economic evaluations of and information on each country and the area as a whole. Includes partial list of persons visited (p. 22)."

c. *US Military Sales to Egypt*

MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE; COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 April 1976. 2 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Document 94-444.)

"Expresses objections to Senate-approved additional transition quarter funding for foreign military sales and security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria."

PROPOSED SALE TO EGYPT OF C-130

AIRCRAFT. Washington, Government Printing Office, April 1976. 76 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session.)

"Hearing before the Subcom on International Political and Military Affairs on Administration proposed offer to sell Egypt six C-130 aircraft and to train Egyptian officers in US service schools. Focuses on H. Con. Res. 595, and similar H. Con. Res. 597, H. Con. Res. 599, H. Con. Res. 602, and H. Con. Res. 603 (texts, p. 76), all disapproving the sale. Includes transcript (p. 69-70) of Apr. 12 subcom markup session at the conclusion of which the resolutions were reported to the full Committee. Appendix (p. 71-76) includes submitted statement and correspondence."

d. *Egyptian-Soviet Relations*

EGYPT CANCELS FRIENDSHIP TREATY, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.28, no.11 (14 April 1976) 7.

Complete text of Tass statement in Pravda 16, March p. 4. ". . . this action by the President of Egypt is a new manifestation of a policy unfriendly to the Soviet Union, a policy he has been pursuing in practice for a long time, . . ." Responsibility for which "rests with Egyptian side. . ."

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974: NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, APRIL 9, MAY 7, 14, 23, AND JUNE 27, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 202 p.

With statements on: Soviet-Egyptian Relations and Soviet Involvement in the Middle East.

MOSCOW AND CAIRO: CURRENTS OF INFLUENCE, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Problems of Communism*, v.23, no.4 (July-August 1974) 17-28.

"Egypt has been one of the two central targets (with India) of Soviet efforts to cultivate influence in the Third World. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has persistently supported Egypt for a changing combination of strategic, diplomatic, ideological, and Soviet domestic political reasons. By the late 1950's, the USSR had already become Egypt's mainstay among the great powers, and Egypt's dependence on Soviet help was only accentuated by Cairo's crushing defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 against Israel. Even Anwar Sadat's precipitate and humiliating expulsion of the bulk of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 did not cause Moscow to terminate the relationship. Soviet military aid programs continued, and from early 1973 on, Egypt —apparently with the financial backing, Saudi Arabia— was able to purchase all the weaponry it needed from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in October 1973 the USSR went along with Sadat's decision to go to war again against Israel and resupplied Egypt and Syria with massive quantities of arms at considerable jeopardy to other major Soviet policy pursuits. Finally, even though Cairo has since improved its relations with the United States dramatically, there are still no indications that Moscow is prepared to cut off the flow of arms supplies to Egypt despite its irritation over Cairo's shift. In light of this history, it is reasonable to presume that a consensus exists in the Kremlin concerning the desirability of the Soviet Union's Egyptian connection. But, one may ask, has the game been worth the candle? We have no way of knowing how the Soviet leaders feel about this matter—they are not saying. What we can investigate, however, is the extent to which Soviet inputs into Egypt have, in fact, brought tangible returns. What have the last seven years of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship—the period of greatest soviet investment—brought the Kremlin in terms of influence?"

RED STAR ON THE NILE; THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE JUNE WAR, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 383 p.

"The Soviet-Egyptian relationship after the June War of 1967 was a new one for both centuries, and its consequences were of global importance. Drawing on all available Soviet and Arab materials, Alvin Rubinstein develops the concept of influence as an analytical tool and explores in comprehensive fashion the diplomatic, military, political, and economic aspects of the influence relationship between the two nations in recent years. The author's approach is chronological, analytical, and oriented toward the issues. He finds the relationship has been fundamentally asymmetrical in aims and accomplishments. Egypt's remarkable comeback after the June War would not have been possible without Soviet aid, but Moscow benefited primarily in the context of the Soviet-American strategic rivalry in the Middle East, and only peripherally in terms of influence over Egypt. Considering broader Soviet-Third World relationships, the author shows that there is no demonstrable correlation between intensified interactions and influence, that an extensive presence is no assurance of influence, and that Soviet influence can seldom be exercised at will in the absence of an ability to project Soviet military power directly." With selected bibliography.

SOVIET ARMS AND EGYPT, by Roger F. Pajak, in *Survival*. (July-August 1975) 165-173.

"Between 1955 and 1973. . . . Egypt received $3.1 billion worth of military aid from the Soviet Union, either as outright grants or at very low prices. During the 1960s, this aid included advanced equipment (e.g., MIG-21 fighters, TU-16 medium bombers, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, and T-54 tanks), and 1,300 instructors and technicians sent to train the Egyptians and to help reorganize their Army. During the 1967 war with Israel, Egypt's arsenal was decimated, but by mid-1968, Soviet aid had returned it to prewar levels. When

Nasser asked for more aid, Moscow declined because it believed the Egyptians could not absorb it, and it did not favor initiation of another war. Moscow concentrated its efforts on training Egyptian forces until January 1970, when the Soviet-manned SAM defense system was constructed to halt Israeli deep penetration raids. Other new equipment was added to the Egyptian arsenal at this time, including the SA-2 (SAM) system, the FROG tactical ground rocket, the ZSU-23-4 mobile radar-controlled antiaircraft gun, and the FOXBAT aircraft, capable of Mach 3 speed. In return, the Soviet Union received noneconomic payment such as base rights and support facilities for its Mediterranean fleet and reconnaissance aircraft based in Egypt. To secure these agreements, the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed on May 26, 1971. . . The expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt in July 1972 resulted from Egypt's concern over Soviet 'infringement' on Egyptian national sovereignty, Sadat's inability to procure all of the advanced weapons he wanted, and the Soviet 'no war' policy. During the 1973 war, however, Moscow reinstated its arms aid with the largest resupply effort in Soviet history, but again irritated Sadat by insisting on cash payment while the war was in progress. Sadat, therefore, turned to France and Britain for arms supplies. Moscow discontinued its arms shipments until February 3, 1975, when Gromyko visited Sadat to discuss the supply of spare parts to Egypt. . . Its presence in the Middle East will continue as the Soviet Union seeks to expand its influence and increase its naval power in the area. . . ."

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SADAT'S EGYPT, FROM THE DEATH OF NASSER TO THE FALL OF GENERAL SADEK, by Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v.26, no.3 (November-December 1973) 63-79.

"With the death of Abdul Gamel Nasser, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East received a severe blow. Begun in the early 1960's, the program had been predicated on the sale and finance of arms to a volatile leader in a hostile environment. Indeed, shortly after the succession of Anwar Sadat to power, this expensive attempt at influencing Arab politics became something of a nightmare for the Soviets. Internal Arab power struggles, an increasingly hostile Arab press, and ever more demanding requests on the part of Sadat culminated in the expulsion of Soviet forces from the U.A.R. in July of 1972. The lessons of this long-term fiasco are apparent, for when a state seeks to 'purchase' allies the question of mutual exploitation is bound to lead to enmity."

L. Ethiopia (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR ETHIOPIA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 543 p. (DA Pam 550-28.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

GREATER ETHIOPIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY, by Donald N. Levine. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974. 229 p.

"In this sociological analysis of Ethiopia, a country notable for its cultural diversity, each ethnic element has contributed something vital to the creation of one of the few African societies capable of resisting colonialism. Levine attempts to synthesize a historical treatment of each major ethnic group with an analysis of the important interactions of those groups and concludes that knowledge of the evolution of Ethiopia can be helpful in understanding the future directions of other multiethnic cultural areas."

JOURNEY IN A FORGOTTEN LAND, by Norman N. Miller. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 2 pts. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, nos. 4 and 5.)

Part I — Food and Drought in the Ethiopia-Kenya Border Lands. Part II — Food and Drought; The Broader Picture in Ethiopia and Kenya.

2. *Ethiopian Revolution: Prelude and Aftermath*

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR ETHIOPIA, by Patrick Gilkes, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.3 (May-June 1974) 33-35 plus.

"The events of 'the last months' in Ethiopia have ended the total identification of Emperor Haile Selassie with the central powers of the empire. . . The most prominent traditional Ethiopian groups with idependent authority are the church and the aristocracy, both of which base their power on extensive landholdings. . . Ultimately, . . . the military holds the key to political powers. . . Although they may pledge loyalty to the Emperor, as they have done, a substantial section of the army wants changes that will destroy the old system of authority."

A DESPOT AT WAR ON ALL FRONTS, in *Time*, v.109, no.21 (23 May 1977) 45-46.

. . . "While trying to cope with rebellion in Addis Ababa, Mengistu has had to deploy nearly half his 50,000-man Army in a losing struggle against three different forces in Eritrea." . . . "Just south of Eritrea, 1,500 guerrillas of the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) control about one-third of Tigre province. In the western Provinces of Gojjam and Gondan, 2,000 men of the right-wing Ethiopian Democratic Union (E.D.U.) are fighting for a non-Marxist civilian government. . . about 1,000 shiftas. . . mount hit-and-run attacks along the Somali frontier. . ."

THE DYING LION: FEUDALISM AND MODERNIZATION IN ETHIOPIA, by Patrick Gilkes, New York, St. Martin, 1975. 307 p.

"This description of the feudal and bureaucratic structure of the Emperor's realm preserves. . . the moment just before the November 1974 storm and the

subsequent accelerated dissolution of those. . . structures."

ETHIOPIA — THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE?, by Patrick Gilkes, in *Contemporary Review*, v.225, no.1302 (July 1974) 1–6.

"Ethiopia's popularly accepted image of changelessness took a severe dent in February and March this year. In the country's most serious political crisis since the attempted coup of 1960, the council of ministers under Ato Aklilu Habtewold (Prime Minister since 1960) was forced to resign and most of its members have since been arrested. Strikes and demonstrations by workers, students and soldiers enforced higher wages, price controls and the setting up of a constitutional conference—due to report in September, and likely to recommend a constitutional monarchy with political parties and ministers responsible to parliament. A commission of enquiry has also been set up to investigate the alleged corruption of arrested ministers, and parliament has also been pressing for investigations to be carried out into other allegations against the provincial administration as well. . . The new administration will have to actually carry out widespread and real reforms, not just promise them as in the past, in order to satisfy the majority of the population, as well as checking those whose privileges will suffer. With army support the latter will be quite possible, but the former will be the harder, especially with the drought, inflation, and peasant unrest. The future indeed remains precarious."

ETHIOPIA: THE COUNTRY THAT CUT OFF ITS HEAD. A DIARY OF THE REVOLUTION, by Blair Thomson. London, Robson Books, 1975. 159 p.

"A British journalist reports from the thick of it on Addis' successive coups of 1974; what might have been a revolution, he feels, became mindless chaos with the November assassination of virtually the entire elite of the country."

ETHIOPIA — A REAL REVOLUTION?, by Patrick Gilkes, in *The World Today*, v.31, no.1 (January 1975) 15–23.

"With her 3,000-year old monarchy, her tradition of independence from colonial influence, and the feudal nature of the society, Ethiopia has always had the deserved reputation of being unique in Africa. At first even the changes over the last year did not conform to the pattern of military takeovers elsewhere on the continent. It took the armed forces seven months from the outbreak of the crisis in February 1974 to get to the point of deposing Haile Selassie on 12 September. Since then the impetus appears to be failing and the aims of the revolution are in danger of being lost in a power struggle, the violence of which has shocked the world."

ETHIOPIA: WHITHER THE REVOLUTION?, by John W. Harbeson, in *African Report*, v.21, no.4 (July-August 1976) 48–50.

"Ethiopia is in the midst of perhaps the most comprehensive political and socio-economic transformation to occur on the African Continent in recent times. An ancient monarchy has been ended, the long entrenched landed aristocracy has been decapitated and substantially expropriated, sweeping rural and urban land reforms have been initiated, thousands of high school and university students and their teachers have spent months in the countryside attempting to mobilize the peasantry for major social and economic changes centering around land reform, the country's military rulers have promised to erect a scientifically socialist society out of the ruins of the old order, and the outlines of a new political order may be emerging. The revolution occurred when it did because the widespread drought and famine conditions combined with strong inflationary pressures to place unmanageable stress upon a regime long criticized for the social inequalities and lack of modernization it sustained."

ETHIOPIAN POLITICS: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER CHANGE, by Peter Koehn, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.2 (April-June 1975) 7–21.

"On September 12, 1974, the oldest of the few remaining ruling monarchies in the contemporary world was terminated by coup d' etat. A provisional military government was declared in its place. Emperor Haile Selassie I, autocratic ruler of Ethiopia for 58 years, was placed under arrest. The formal assumption of political power by members of the armed forces and the events which preceded this move have demonstrated the fragility of several of the most common and basic assumptions about Ethiopian politics that were tenaciously defended by many students in this field until September of 1974. The purpose of this article is to analyze recent political actions in Ethiopia from the perspectives of the myths which have been dispelled, the changes which have been introduced, and implications for the future."

HUMAN RIGHTS IN ETHIOPIA, by Peter Schwab, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.1 (1976) 155–160.

"It is the hypothesis of this article if the Provisional Military Administrative Committee, which took power in Ethiopia on 12 September 1974, is really intent on uprooting the feudal social system that has flourished for so long, then a revolution by violent means is necessary."

REVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA, by W. A. E. Skurnik, in *Current History*, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 206–210 plus.

"The new civilian and military forces in Ethiopia have an opportunity to lay the foundations of a more democratic and less friable regime. . . Forces set in motion by the French and American revolutions are still challenging rule by divine right and substituting peoples as the basis for legitimate government. In 1974, these revolutionary forces moved into Ethiopia and liquidated the old empire. The end of the ancient regime was punctuated by profound convulsions, which the armed

forces did their best to contain. The military takeover in Ethiopia was gradual, stretching from February to September, 1974."

3. *Land Reform*

ETHIOPIA: MORE DECENTRALIZATION AS LAND REFORM PROGRESSES, by Patrick Gilkes, in *African Development*, v.10, no.7 (July 1976) 661–662.

This report concludes that "Decentralisation, as spelt out in the Ethiopian Military Council's new Democratic Revolutionary Programme seems to be the revolution's way forward."

LAND REFORM IN REVOLUTIONARY EITHIOPIA, by Paul Brietzke, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 637–660.

"Although an analysis of law-in-the-books is never as fruitful as one of law-in-action, the demands of development do not permit a leisurely verification of hypotheses as the interrelation of revolution, long-term political change, and the position of the peasants unfolds. A description and tentative evaluation of the 1975 Proclamation will therefore follow a brief analysis of traditional tenures and reforms carried out by Haile Selassie's regime, providing the background for an appreciation of the immense changes that have occurred."

4. *Haile Selassie*

HAILE SELASSIE: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY, by John H. Spencer, in Orbis, v.18, no.4 (Winter 1975) 1129-1152.

"In its perverse way, history is more comfortable with tragedy than with triumph. Emperor Haile Selassie's place in history as a protagonist on the world scene is assured despite the humiliation of his final hours in power. The forty-seven years of his reign gave time to the fates to unfold a tragedy of Sophoclean dimension in three acts. Africa has produced many leaders in the struggle against colonialism—Abd el Krim (Morocco), Samori (former French West Africa), Witbooi (Southwest Africa), Abushiri (Tanzania), Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Bourguiba, Banda, Nyerere, Kaunda, Kenyatta—but none who, like Haile Selassie, succeeded in translating that struggle into the stark and prophetic imperatives of collective security. Through the first two acts of the tragedy, his personal drives and contradictions took command to mold the course of events in Ethiopia and to call in question the Tolstoyan thesis that forces rather than personalities determine history. In the third act, fate intervened with exogenous forces to redeem that theory."

5. *Problems with Eritrea and Ogaden Province*

BLOOD AND BULLETS, by Elizabeth Peer, in *Newsweek*, v.90, no.10 (5 September 1977) 40–45.

"There was a lull in the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia last week, and during the interlude foreign correspondents were given their first look at the Ogaden, the large swatch of arid scrubland that Russia's two client states on the Horn of Africa are fighting over. Somalia claims its own troops are not involved in Ogaden; ostensibly, all of the recent victories over Ethiopian forces have been won by the homegrown guerrillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front. But when Newsweek's Elizabeth Peer toured the area controlled by the front, she found ample evidence that Somalia itself was playing a major role there. . ."

ERITREA'S SILENT WAR OF SECESSION, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.12 (March 1976) 22–24.

"The world hears little of Eritrea these days. All news about this province, which was annexed by Haile Selassie in 1962, is subjected to strict censorship by the Ethiopian government, which allows no journalists to enter the area. But a visitor to the region soon discovers that the apparent quiet is deceptive and that the partisans of the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and the PLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Forces) are more than just a handful of bandits as claimed by the regime in Addis Ababa."

A RAGING WAR ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, in *Time*, v.110, no.4 (25 July 1977) 34–36.

The war in Eritrea, where Ethiopia's military rulers are fighting the four million people of Eritrea, for control of Ethiopia's northern province. ". . . But also involved in the drama are the Soviet Union, Cuba, most of the Arab states, and the US—and at stake is who will eventually control the strategic oil routes of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. . ." ". . . Says Ahmed Mohammed Nasser, 32, chairman of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) largest of the three Eritrean Nationalist movements: 'I cannot tell you what day or what year we will be independent. But I am sure Eritrea will become an independent state. That is why our people are fighting'. . ." Chairman Nasser told Time's Brelis, "Socialism will be dominate but we will have to define it as we go along." Text includes a commentary by Time correspondent Dean Brelis on his 600-mile journey through Eritrean-held territory. He reports that the Eritrean's consist of. . . "at least 25,000 men. . ." and . . . "They control at least 85 percent of the province and all but 300,000 of its people. . ." Includes color photos.

6. *Ethiopian-Somali Dispute*

MOUNTING TENSION ON "THE HORN OF AFRICA," by Slobodan Rankic, in *Review of Internal Affairs. Yugoslavia*, v.28, no.645 (20 February 1977) 24–26.

"The dramatic showdown in the top echelon of the Ethiopian Revolution has aroused the attention of watchers of the African scene and broader factors of world politics too. Ethiopia is faced with numerous internal contradictions and difficulties which are first of all the result of the conditions of extreme backwardness in which the imperial regime had kept the people. However, the fateful developments in this nonaligned country are organically linked to developments in neighboring countries and may strongly influence

further trends throughout the region of North-East Africa, an area of great strategic importance. They also effect nonaligned policy very much so because the countries in this area are active members of the non-aligned movement."

THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE, by O. Mirkovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v.27, no.662 (5 March 1976) 8-10.

"Somalia and Ethiopia are both nonaligned African countries. They both have progressive internal systems and are engaged in the building of socialism, but they have fallen out in a dispute over three different places. These are Ogaden, Eritrea, and more recently Djibouti. Since this is a strategical area, where many other interests are competing, this already complicated and delicate dispute between neighbors is liable to have much wider repercussions."

THE US-SOVIET STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE HORN OF AFRICA, by Dennis Mullin, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.9 (29 August 1977) 43-45.

"Russia's gamble to turn the Red Sea into a Soviet Lake started backfiring when its allies, Ethiopia and Somalia, went to War. Does the US Stand to Gain. . .?"

WAR ON THE HORN, by James Pringle and Elizabeth Peer, in *Newsweek*, v.90, no.9 (29 August 1977) 36-38.

"Only a few months ago, the Soviet Union pulled off a major coup on the Horn of Africa. Already established in one client state, Somalia, Moscow suddenly extended its influence into neighboring Ethiopia, which cut its long-standing ties to the US. But now the Soviet allies are fighting. . . over the arid Ethiopian territory of Ogaden, which has long been claimed by the Somalis. . . Russia tilted toward Ethiopia last week calling it 'the victim of an armed aggressive invasion.' But the war went on. . ." The text includes excerpts from an interview with Abdallah Hassan Muhammad, leader of the Western Somali Liberation Front, in which he claims to have pictures of Cubans digging trenches in Western Somalia.

7. *Ethiopian - Sudanese Relations*

THE 1972 ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND THE SUNDAN'S AFRO-ARAB POLICY, by Richard P. Stevens, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v. 14, no. 2 (1976) 247-274.

"In February 1975, following a major cabinet reshuffle, General Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri reaffirmed his Government's basic commitment to the pursuit of an Afro-Arab foreign policy, and noted that this was not tied to particular personalities. For just as the appointment of the distinguished diplomat, Mansour Khalid, as Foreign Minister in August 1971, had prompted charges that the Sudan's Arab ties were to be sacrificed to African interests, so his departure from office to become Minister of Education aroused speculation that greater Arab involvement, if not actual African disengagement, would now follow. As if to refute such rumors, President Nimeiri set forth the domestic basis of his Government's policy on the third anniversary of the Regional Self-Government Act, in the presence of the President of Libya, Muumar El Khadafi."

STILL KEEPING THE PEACE, by Nelson Kasfir. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 15 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v. 21, no. 4.)

"In 1972 the Addis Ababa Agreement stopped the long civil war in the Sudan. Four years of experience bring a sobering perspective to the South's intractable problems of politics and development. Still, commitment to make the agreement work appears firm both in Khartoum and Juba."

8. *Ethiopian-US Relations*

FAREWELL TO AMERICAN ARMS, in *Time*, v. 109, no. 19 (9 May 1977) 36-37.

"Last week. . . The junta expelled all American military advisers, communications experts and information officials. . . All that was left of a US presence. . . were 76 staffers and five Marine guards at the US Embassy and the Agency for International Development in Addis Ababa. . ." "President Carter's emphasis on human rights clearly played a role in the American's expulsion. . ."

US POLICY AND REQUEST FOR SALE OF ARMS TO ETHIOPIA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 5 March 1975. 94 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearing before the Subcom on International Political and Military Affairs to review conditions in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian government's request to purchase arms from the US to combat Eritrean Liberation Front and Popular Liberation Front forces in the province of Eritrea. Includes submitted statement (p. 27-28). Rep. Edward G. Biester, Jr. (R-Pa) of the Full Committee participates in the hearing. Appendix (p. 29-94) contains: UN resolution on the status of Eritrea, 1950, text (p. 29-31). Clapham, Christoper, 'Ethiopia and Somalia' from Adelphi Papers, Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1972 (p. 32-53). Bell, J. Bowyer, 'Endemic Insurgency and International Order: The Eritrean Experience' from Orbis, Summer 1974 (p. 54-77). Mekbib, Ghebeyehou (Charge d' Affairs, Embassy of Ethiopia.) 'Historical Background and Issues Concerning the Red Sea Region of Ethiopia' May 14, 1975 (p. 78-92). AID charts on economic assistance to Ethiopia, FY 73-75 (p. 93-94)."

9. *Soviet View of Events in Ethiopia*

ETHIOPIA UNDERGOING TRANSFORMATION, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 27, no. 13 (23 April 1975) 19.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, 29 March, 1975, p. 5 on the passing of one of the oldest monarchies in history as announced by the Provisional Military Administrative Committee (P.M.A.C.) that

"The Post of Emperor and all Fedual Titles" are abolished. Also notes that "a number of reforms of vital importance to the country's progress have been recently implemented. All private banks and insurance companies owned by both foreign and local capital have been nationalized". . . Also that "All land in rural areas is being nationalized by the state and becoming collective property. . ."

ETHIOPIA'S NEW RULERS. MODERNIZE STATE INSTITUTIONS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 26, no. 35 (25 Sept 1974) 20-21.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, 16 August 1975, p. 5, on Nationalization of land in Ethiopia. States that ". . . municipal land is now state property. The nationalization of land, first in rural regions and, as of Aug. 7 in the cities as well, is seen. . . As the year's most important reform. It is aimed at undermining feudalism and depriving parasitic and exploitative elements of important sources of income — landholdings and homes in the cities, particularly in such large centers as Addis Ababa and Asmara. . ."

PATRIARCH'S PIMEN'S VISIT STRENGTHENS SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN TIES, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 26, no. 4 (20 Feb 2974) p. 6.

Complete text of comments in Izvestia, 26 Jan 1974, p. 6, on the seven-day visit of Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russia's, in Ethiopia, at the invitation of Emperor Haile Selassie. A Joint Communique signed in Ethiopia, on the results of the visit "notes in particular, that its goal was to strengthen the traditional fraternal relations between the Ethiopian and Russian Orthodox churches. . ."

PRAVDA NOTES POSSIBLE THREATS TO NEW GOVERNMENTS IN ETHIOPIA, MOZAMBIQUE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 26, no. 37 (9 October 1974) 17.18.

Sees the threat in Ethiopia from resistance to internal changes, while the threat in Mozambique comes from "South Africa and Rhodesia, which are relying on support from international monopolies and NATO. . ."

WINDS OF CHANGE OVER ETHIOPIA, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. 26, no. 10 (3 April 1974) 21.

Complete text of comments in Pravda, 10 March 1974, p. 5 on the crisis of the political system in Ethiopia as "all the signs point to the fact that the time has come for profound reforms. . ." points to the "first general strike in the country's history" as the evidence that the "struggle for political, economic, and social reforms is only beginning. . ."

M. French Territory of Afars and the Issas (Now Djibouti) (See also appendixes)

DJIBOUTI: FRANCE — THE RELUCTANT COLONIALIST?, BY ANTHONY HUGHES, IN *Africa Report*, v. 20, no. 6 (November-December 1975) 10-14.

"This. . . undeveloped territory was once viewed as a punishment post by French colonial administrators. Today it is an anomolous vestige of a once-great empire, one of half a dozen small territories, departments, and islands scattered round the world; where the Foreign Legion still operates from distant forts and where the Fourteenth of July is still an occasion for the celebration of French military strength and national pride. Except for a small local middle class, there is little contact between the French and the ordinary people, except as masters and servants. The 'native quarter' is geographically separate from the foreigners' area and is subdivided into Afar, Issa, and other sections. . . Apart from the Pacific possessions, this is one of the few French territories where there exists an indigenous majority who were there before colonial rule. In fact, it is one of the last classic colonies left in the world. Fifteen years after France granted independence to the rest of her African Empire, Djibouti is her sole colony on the soil of the Continent."

INDEPENDENCE FOR THE AFARS AND ISSAS: COMPLEX BACKGROUND; UNCERTAIN FUTURE, by Said Yusuf Abdi, in *Africa Today*, v.24, no. 1 (January-March 1977) 61-67.

"The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (TFAI, formerly French Somaliland), an arid patch of coastal land, a little smaller than Maryland, provides a vital outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, furnishes a staging post and base for the French, is claimed by the Somalis, whose fervent desire for Pan-Somali unity is symbolized by their five-starred flag, and is inhabited by rival ethnic groups of near equal size. This volatile mix could produce a major conflict involving the whole Horn of Africa in a costly armed confrontation. As France's last possession on the African mainland, the territory is a place where ethnic and ideological rivalries, big power influence, and territorial ambition provide all the ingredients of an explosive situation. This short review will examine the political dynamics of the internal and external situation of the territory as independence draws near."

N. Gabon (See also appendixes)

OPENING UP AFRICA'S RICHEST COUNTRY, by Alan Rake, in *African Development*, v. 10, no. 2 (February 1976) 145-146.

Gabon has timber, iron ore, manganese, and uranium, but increased production depends on better communications. President Bongo's answer is to build two new ports and The Trans-Gabonais railway."

SOME COMMENTS ON FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF GABON, by Yves Sabolo, in *The African Review*, v. 5, no. 4 (1975) 499-517.

"The Gabonese economy is highly dependent on foreign relations, and that is. . . what this paper will try to show in the first instance. Subsequently, it will attempt to analyze the impact of foreign private investment on the

Gabonese economy and, in particular, on employment, which may perhaps make it possible to determine what share of responsibility for Gabon's economic dependence can be attributed to these investments."

O. The Gambia (See appendixes)

P. Ghana (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR GHANA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 449 p. (DA PAM 550-153.)

Country Summary; General Character of the Society; Physical Environment and Population; Historical Setting; Ethnic Groups and Languages; Social System; Living Conditions; Education, Information, and the Arts and Sciences; The Governmental System; Political Dynamics and Values; Foreign Political and Economic Relations; Character and Structure of the Economy; National Security; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

GHANA'S STATUS SYSTEMS: REFLECTIONS ON UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY, by R.E. McKown and David J. Finlay, in *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, v.11, nos. 3-4 (July and October 1976) 166-179.

"Two basic sources of societal tension in developing nations are those deriving from socio-economic disparities and those based on communal group affiliations, whether ethnic, linguistic, religious, or racial. The two overlap or coincide, of course, but for analytic purposes are usually considered as distinct. In this paper we investigate whether or not these two potential sources of tension in an African state, Ghana, were reflected in the higher levels of education at the end of the Nkrumah era."

LEVELS AND PATTERNS OF INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY IN GHANA, by S.K. Gaisie, in *Demography*, v.12, no.1 (February 1975) 21-34.

"This paper attempts to measure infant and child mortality levels and also to determine their structure by utilizing the results of the 1968-1969 National Demographic Sample Survey which was conducted under the directorship of the author. Among the major problems encountered in the exercise are the adjustment of the current raw mortality data and the estimation of infant and child mortality from independent source material. The estimated infant mortality rates range from 56 per 1,000 live births in the Accra Capital District to 192 in the Upper Region during the late 1960's. The urban rate is lower than the rural rate, 98 as against 161 per 1,000 live births. A large proportion of the deaths among children aged 0-4 occur in the second year of life, and deaths in this age group account for the bulk of the deaths within the age group 1-4 years."

2. *Economic Aspects (Including Agriculture)*

AGRICULTURAL MODERNISATION STRATEGIES AMONG GHANIAN FARMERS, by Andrew J. Sofranko and others, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 706-712.

"The purpose of this. . . article is to examine certain aspects of two development strategies for smallholders. First, we shall describe the work of the Ghana Tobacco Company (G.T.C.), which represents a significant departure from the laissez-faire position and a move towards an integrated and supervised agricultural operation. Secondly, we shall look at the more or less 'normal' situation of the neighboring smallholders who grow a variety of different crops. Our aim is to compare the responses by the tobacco growers and the general farmers to the various developmental options made available by both governments and private agencies."

DECENTRALIZATION IN PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING IN GHANA, by Leslie E. Grayson, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 126-133.

"I shall examine the attempts to decentralize planning and economic decisionmaking in Ghana, analyze the rationale for such moves away from centralization, and evaluate the Ghanaian experience against the existing body of knowledge on this subject and the special local conditions that are relevant."

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM, PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE MILITARY: GHANA'S NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL, by Maxwell Owusu, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.1 (January-March 1975) 31-50.

"In early 1974 the Head of State inaugurated a 36-member Consultative Advisory Committee, made up of civilians, members of the professions, farmers, chiefs, servicemen, and others from various walks of life in Ghana, to advise the NRC on matters affecting the national interest. A 33-member National Economic Planning Council was also formed with the Head of State as Chairman and the Commissioner for Economic Planning as Vice-Chairman. It was charged among other things with evolving a system that would guide the NRC and with drawing up a five-year development plan. Also important was the allocation of 22 milion cedis to the agricultural sector in the 1974-75 budget; to develop food crops and produce industrial raw materials and other exportable crops and to increase meat and poultry production, under the third phase of the famous "Operation Feed Yourself" programme. Finally, the same budget allocated for development projects 256 million cedis (allowing for the effects of inflation) compared with 140 million cedis in the previous fiscal year. These four major new developments are all basically consistent with the overall style and objectives of the NRC leadership as described here, and in keeping with the tenor of my basic arguments."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, ed. by Richard Harris. Cambridge, Schenkman, 1974. 270 p.

"These essays on Kenya and Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are unified by the common perspective of their authors, part of a growing group of social scientists basing their analyses of African development on a critique of African dependency and Western neocolonialism."

3. *Political Aspects: Domestic Currents*

A CALL TO SELF-RELIANCE IN GHANA, by Peter Hess, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.10 (January 1975) 20–21.

"Recently Colonel Ignatius K. Achempong, who came to power to Ghana through a military coup in January 1972, has been issuing renewed calls to his people to increase their efforts at making the country more independent. "Unity and Self-Reliance" is the frequently repeated slogan of the National Redemption Council headed by Acheampong, which took over from the civilian government of K. A. Busia three years ago. . It is still too early to judge whether the National Redemption Council fulfills this self-imposed requirement. Among other things, worldwide economic factors will confront Ghana with new difficulties in the time ahead. The country still boasts one of the highest per capita incomes in Black Africa — higher even than that of "wealthy" Nigeria — and has a relatively good school system. But the slight decline in its real per capita income, which has been going on for a decade, is continuing even under Acheampong's rule and 1974 brought a substantial deterioration in its foreign exchange picture, which had been very favorable for the prior two years."

GHANA OBSERVED: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF A WEST AFRICAN REPUBLIC, by Dennis Austin. New York, Africana, 1976. 199 p.

"A collection of articles (mostly reprints) that is rich with the perceptive observations of one of the most capable Africanists to study West Africa in recent years."

NATIONAL-LOCAL LINKAGES IN GHANA, by Barbara Callaway, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.3 (1974) 407–421.

"In this essay political linkage is viewed as a dual process of structural relationships between a national capital, Accra, and its constituent localities. Structural relationships are seen as institutionalized roles and organizations through which demands and supports are transmitted between Accra and Ghana's local units. Penetration and participation are instrumental aspects of linkage. The flow of demands and supports from Accra to its localities through administrative structures is termed penetration, and the flow of demands and supports from the constituent divisions to the centre is termed participation. Participation represents the political aspect of linkage. Effective administrative and political linkage are crucial to successful national integrational and political development. The linkage problem in Africa appears when the national Government is strong in a decisionmaking sense, but devoid of structural relationships to the society that makes it possible to extend the meaning of development. Linkages are also established in various administrative and political procedures and various other forms such as ritual-symbolic, economic, legal-judicial, educative and coercive. Here we will focus on administrative and political linkages."

SOCIETY AND BUREAUCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY GHANA, by Robert M. Price. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 261 p.

"This analysis of modernization in Ghana investigates many useful themes in the political development of Africa. The social milieu in which bureaucrats operate is the primary theme, and the author's survey demonstrates the problems of African civil servants affected by the contrary pulls of Western institutions inherited from colonial powers and the conventions of African society. The resulting behavior of Ghana's civil servants offers many lessons about African politics in general."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies. . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of apolitical conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

4. *Kwame Nkrumah*

BLACK STAR: A VIEW OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF KWAME NKRUMAH, by Basil Davidson, New York, Praeger, 1974. 225 p.

"In this. . . assessment of the controversial Ghanaian leader, his sympathetic biographer attempts to recreate the. . . Nkrumah of the early independence era, emphasizing the vision and strength which earned him a place of. . . prominence in African history. He also paints a. . . picture of the labyrinthine tangle of Ghanaian politics by the time of Nkrumah's overthrow; his subject's shortcomings are given their due here, but he nonetheless comes to seem a rather passive victim of circumstances."

5. *Ghanian-Nigerian Relations*

GHANA AND NIGERIA 1957–70; A STUDY IN INTER-AFRICAN DISCORD, by Olajide Aluko. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1976. 275 p.

"Relations between Ghana and Nigeria are rooted in their history as colonies of the same Imperial Power. In March 1957 when Ghana became

independent the two countries shared many institutions and other interests in common. They inherited from the United Kingdom a common official language, and common legal, administrative, and educational systems. In addition, they both joined the Commonwealth on their independence. It was assumed that they would continue to strengthen their links. Over ninety-five per cent of the total population of the former British West Africa in 1965 were living in the two countries; representing then over twenty-six per cent of the total population of Africa. In natural and mineral resources the two countries put together are a giant in Africa. . . In spite of the declarations, very little cooperation did really take place between the two countries between March 1957 and 1970. Instead of cooperation, the two countries actually began progressively from the time of Ghana's independence, and even a little earlier, to move apart. By the end of 1970 both had virtually dimissed the hope of cooperating with each other. Why was this so? What were the main sources of disharmony in the Ghanaian-Nigerian relationships? Were they cause by 'the dark forces of imperalism'? Or were they merely due to the activities of mischief makers? Or were the sources of discord more fundamental? And if so what are they? How could they be explained? What are the future prospects of their relations now that the Busia government has been overthrown? These are the main questions that form the subject of this book." With select bibliography.

Q. The Guineas

1. *Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni; formerly Spanish) (See also appendixes)*

REIGN OF TERROR IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA, by Ulrich Meister, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.4 (July 1975) 23–24.

"Lists of hundreds murdered, more than 100,000 people fled abroad (estimated total population 300,000), reports of denunciations, arbitrary arrests, torture, censorship of the mail, poverty, economic and hygienic chaos. . . Statements by refugees and accounts by international organizations provide the pieces of a sad puzzle of despotism in obscure Equatorial Guinea. The country is cut off from the rest of the world; with the exception of a few secretive businessmen, foreigners are barred and Guineans themselves may not leave. . . The dictatorial rule of Macias Nguema was made possible by a history of colonial backwardness and isolation, by rivalry among political leaders and the silent acquiescence of Spain. Faced with secessionist tendencies on Fernando Po and territorial claims of neighboring countries to slices of Rio Muni, this marginal state is now involved in a life-and-death struggle for existence."

2. *Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) (See also appendixes)*

GUINEA-BISSAU, by E. Titorenko, in *International Affairs*, (Moscow), no.1 (1975) 141–143. In English.

An overview of the republic, including relations with the Soviet Union.

GUINEA-BISSAU DELEGATION VISITS U.S.S.R, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.27, no.8 (19 March, 1975) 21–22.

Condensed text on the visit; in Pravda, Feb 26, 1975, p. 1,4. The visit continued from 19 to 25 February, during which "questions concerning the further development of bilateral relations as well as urgent international problems were discussed. . . The. . . delegation from the republic of Guinea-Bissau expressed gratitude to the Soviet people and to the leaders of C.P.S.U and the Soviet Government for the comprehensive support they gave the people of Guinea-Bissau in their heroic struggle. . . the Soviet side spoke highly of the efforts by the African party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (P.A.I.G.C.) and by the Government and people of Guinea-Bissau armed at strenghtening national independence. . ."

GUINEA-BISSAU'S STRUGGLE: PAST AND PRESENT, BY RONALD H. CHILCOTE, IN *Africa Today*, v.24, no.1 (January-March 1977) 31–39.

"On September 24, 1973 African liberation fighters announced the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, a triangular enclave on the west coast of Africa between Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. A year later, on September 10, Portugal officially recognized the new country, which is about two-fifths the size of Portugal and contains less than a million inhabitants. Independence represented an end to centuries of African resistance to Portuguese rule and a guerrilla war which since 1963 had inflicted serious losses on Portuguese colonial forces. However, independence also signified an ongoing struggle to consolidate the new nation. I intend in the present article, first, to review the three phases of this struggle: resistance, liberation, and consolidation. Second, I integrate portions of an interview whith Luiz Cabral, President of Guinea-Bissau; the interview allows for a glimpse of internal past and present developments."

PORTUGUESE GUINEA: A CRUCIAL STRUGGLE, by Richard Pattee, in *South Africa International*, v.4, no.3 (January 1974) 132–148.

A review favoring the Portuguese position of the struggle going on in Guinea by the Portuguese, on the one hand to retain control, and by Guineans to achieve self-determination.

3. *Republic of Guinea (See also appendixes)*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR GUINEA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. 2nd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. 386 p. (DA Pam 550–174.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

R. Ivory Coast (See also appendixes)

AFRICAN PROSPERITY IN ABIDJAN, by Wolfgan Hag, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.4 (July 1975) 21–22.

"The capital of the Republic of Ivory Coast is a recurrent surprise. . . .The city exudes prosperity. . . Looking at Abidjan, one cannot help thinking that here the future of the Third World has been realized in the present."

AREA HANDBOOK FOR IVORY COAST, by T. D. Roberts and others. 2nd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. 449 p. (DA Pam 550–69.

Country Summary: Country Summary; Sociological Background; Political Background; Economic Background; National Security; Section Bibliographies; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

URBAN POLICY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE IVORY COAST, by Michael A. Cohen. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974. 262 p.

"The author's observations about Ivorian politics. . . indicate. . . that significant political pressures are being generated in urban Ivory Coast by Interest groups cutting across tribal lines."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICIAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies. . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of apolitical conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

S. Kenya (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR KENYA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976, 472 p. (DA Pam 550–56).

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

DIVERGING PATHS IN EAST AFRICA, by Jay E. Hakes, in Current History, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 202–205 plus.

"Domestic differences within the East African Community have inhibited the international cooperation among its members necessary for its success. . . In 1964, the political union of the East African states of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda was widely regarded as a strong possibility. Today, plans for increasing regional integration are only a dim memory. Economic ties continue through the operations of the East African Community (EAC), but cooperation even at this level has been badly damaged by recent events."

WOMEN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA, by Gayleatha B. Cobb, in *SAIS Review*, v.19, no.3 (1975) 16–22.

"Relatively little progress has been made in the integration of African women into nontraditional sectors in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda since independence in the early sixties. Moreover, the progress in industry and services that has been made tends to center in activities traditionally viewed as "women's work." This is true in each country notwithstanding divergent political and economic policies. Old values and customs pose a trememdous obstacle to equal opportunities for women in education and employment in the modern sector. Until women as a valuable human resource are more productivity utilized — in agriculture as well as in the modern sector — these three countries will no doubt remain severely handicapped in their development efforts."

2. *Government and Politics*

BUREAUCRACY AND INCUMBENT VIOLENCE: COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 'MAU MAU' EMERGENCY IN KENYA, by Bruce J. Berman, in *British Journal of Political Science*, v.6, pt.2 (April 1976) 143–175.

"In the twenty-odd years since the declaration of a state of emergency in Kenya in October 1952, the analysis of the phenomenon known as 'Mau Mau' has undergone a fundamental revision. The initial interpretation, advanced by the colonial authorities and their apologists and by a few (mostly British) scholars, explained 'Mau Mau' as a fanatic, atavistic, savage religious cult consciously created and manipulated by a group of unscrupulous, power-hungry leaders. . . Starting in the early 1960s, the official explanation began to be challenged — in memoirs by Kikuyu political figures active in pre-Emergency politics, in books by such non-Kikuyu political figures as Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, and in carefully researched historical and anthropological studies by Rosberg and Nottingham, Sorrenson, Barnett and Buijtenhuijs. These accounts question the official version with regard to both the form of the 'Mau Mau' organization and the factors lying behind it. An important effect of the recent accounts and analyses has been to remove the qualities of strangeness and pathology that made 'Mau Mau,' in the official explanation, a singular phenomenon in a tribe incapable of adjusting to change because of idiosyncratic psychological and cultural characteristics. Instead, Kikuyu unrest is now seen in conjunction with patterns of deprivation characteristic of widespread processes of socio-economic growth. Stripped of its

status as a historical aberration, Kikuyu political activity becomes explicable within the terms of contemporary theories of revolution and collective violence."

KENYA: THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL, by Henry Bienen. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974. 215 p.

"Qualifying the current typologies about African political institutions, Bienen delineates the weakness of the KANU party, the effectiveness of the civil service, the complexity of ethnic links and divisions, and the political importance of the rural peasants in one of the 'most important and enduring' of the African 'one-party' states."

PEASANT POLITICS: CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT IN MURANG'A, by Geoff Lamb. New York, St. Martin, 1974. 160 p.

"Lamb's work analyzes the consolidation of control by a 'rural elite' of 'rich peasants' in a district in Kenya and their ability to frustrate the broader developmental plans of the central government-where it interfered with their economic interests."

POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION: KENYA EUROPEANS AND THE LAND ISSUE 1960–1965, by Gary Wasserman. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 225 p.

"Wasserman's account of the 'cooptation' of the Kenyan nationalist elite into the capitalist agricultural economy of the whites offer a. . . basis for understanding the various reinforcing layers of European influence in Kenya today."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies. . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays which suggest a group of essays which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of apolitical conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

3. *Economic Aspects*

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE KENYAN INDUSTRIAL COURT, by John L. Brown and J. Douglas Muir, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 700–705.

"In 1964, in response to a growing number of strikes, the recently formed independent Government of Kenya established a new method of resolving industrial conflict. The purpose of this. . . article is to describe the operation and effects of the Kenyan Industrial Court, and to draw attention to some features that have affected its efficient operation."

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KENYA (1963–72), by Michael Hodd, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.12, no.3 (April 1976) 221–228.

"This paper computes two measures of income distribution for Kenya, compares the Kenyan distribution with those of other countries, seeks possible causes for changes in the Kenyan distribution and explores the effect of changes in income distribution on the Kenyan economy."

KENYA: INTO THE SECOND DECADE, by John Burrows. Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1975. 533 p.

"Latest addition to the World Bank's Country Economic Reports. The task taken on by the World Bank, analyzing Kenya's development options and her progress in pursuing those options, is both comprehensive and useful for comparative development studies. This book will serve as the definitive study of the Kenyan economy for some years."

KENYAN ECONOMIC SURVEYS, DECEMBER 1975, in *African Development*, v.9, no.12 December 1975) 41–70.

Kenya Economy Gets the Squeeze; Agriculture; Cash Crops; Tourist Industry Looking Up; Investment in Hydro-Power Poultry and Expanding Industry; Airways' Smart Recovery; Education Policy; Kenya's Exports Industry; and Recession Gives New Lease to Tourism.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INDIGENIZATION OF THE KENYAN ECONOMY, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.4 (1975) 429–450.

"Kenya became structurally integrated into the world economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Initially, during the colonial period, the economy became geared for the production of agricultural products for export, and import of consumer goods and machinery under a white settler regime within the vertical international division of labour. During this initial phase of deindigenization, multinational firms in the form of banks, plantations and trading companies acquiesced in the subjugation of the African population to a subservient role as labourers for European and Asian enterprises. By viewing the problem of indigenization from three levels, it can be seen that the process of political decolonization, begun in 1952, culminating in independence in 1963, has led to increased Africanization of ownership of units of production in agriculture, units of commerce, especially retail trade, but markedly less progress in manufacturing import-export trade, and finance. Also, Kenya is catching up with other independent States in the field of Africanization within firms. However, the basic structure of the economy remains externally oriented, in part through the continued influence and control of

strategic sectors of the economy by multinational corporations. Moreover, there are indications that the political and commercial urban African elite has little motivation to transform the structure of the economy to make it more responsive to domestic human needs, and less dependent on foreign firms."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, ed. by Richard Harris. Cambridge, Schenkman, 1975. 270 pp.

"These essays on Kenya and Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are unified by the common perspective of their authors, part of a growing group of social scientists basing their analyses of African development on a critique of African dependency and Western neocolonialism."

PROLETARIANS AND AFRICAN CAPITALISM: THE KENYAN CASE, 1960-1972, by Richard Sandbrook. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975. 222 pp.

"In this. . . analysis of the interrelationship between trade-union leaders and the government on one hand, and the rank and file on the other, Sandbrook both agrees and disagrees with Frantz Fanon: the unionized workers do constitute a small, self-interested class vis-a-vis the majority of the Kenyan population, but because their interests will inevitably conflict with those of the governing elite, they are a potentially explosive element."

SKILL ACQUISITION IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR OF AN AFRICAN ECONOMY: THE KENYA CASE, by Kenneth J. King, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.11, no.2 (January 1975) 108-122.

"This article explores the acquisition of a wide variety of skills by low income Kenya Africans, outside the scope of government and voluntary agency programes. Many thousands of such (mostly young) Africans arrange types of unofficial fee-paying apprenticeships for themselves at the feel of older, often illiterate craftsmen. The process represents an indigenization in Kenya of important elements of East African Indian craft training — not least in the product types and the innovative reuse of scrap materials. It appears to have importnt implications for the success of the government's official formal sector apprenticeship schemes, but indicates considerable difficulties for any attempt to identify this informal world as an autonomous sector of Kenya's larger economy."

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA, by Colin Leys. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. 284 p.

"Leys demonstrates the links between foreign investment and the consolidation of an indigenous nonproductive and government-protected bourgeoisie. In his view, the growing inequities and severe restrictions on popular participation should result in serious upheavals in 'stable Kenya' after Kenyatta's passing."

4. *Sociological Aspects*

SECONDARY EDUCATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND CRIME IN KENYA, by Emmitt B. Evans, Jr., in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 55-66.

"While conducting research on the occupational and educational aspirations, and expectations of secondary-school students in Kenya during 1972, I obtained quantitative and qualitative data from a sample of 699 African students indicating that the problem of crime among unemployed school leavers is likely to substantially worsen in the coming years. The purpose of this article is to present that data within the context of a discussion of secondary education, unemployment, and crime in Kenya."

5. *Urban Aspects (Nairobi)*

GOVERNING AN AFRICAN CITY: A STUDY OF NAIROBI, by Herbert H. Werlin. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1974. 308 p.

"Nairobi serves as the focus here for a history of Kenya's transition to independence as well as an analysis of the city's basic administrative problems. Along the way the author elucidates his. . . conclusion — that the effectiveness of a city's government depends on the overall political strengths and aptitudes of its nation."

GRASS ROOTS IN AN AFRICAN CITY: POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN NAIROBI, by Marc Howard Ross, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1975. 169 p.

"Ross combines sociology and political science in this study of Nairobi. Throughout the book, he shows that Nairobi and its citizens have been experiencing a letdown from postindependence euphoria in facing up to the practical and often intractable problems of governing a Third World city. The data gathered in successive visits to the city are used primarily to examine the degree and bases of citizen participation in Nairobi politics. An important study of Kenya, this survey discerns patterns that are repeated elsewhere in the urbanizing world."

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN KENYA AND TANZANIA, by Richard Stren, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 267-294.

"Over the past ten years, African governments have wrestled with the problems of designing and implementing comprehensive rural development policies. In an overwhelmingly rural continent with, for most areas, only a recent history of urbanization, such an emphasis is understandable. But if African cities are for the most part young, and small by world standards, they are also growing faster than cities in any other major world region. This rapid growth, superimposed on a meagre resource base, will put increasing pressure on planners to devise solutions for the adequate and equitable distribution of urban services. The solutions that emerge, however, will be heavily conditioned by

two sets of factors: the immediate demands of urban growth, and the wider political/administrative and social context within which policymaking takes place. In an effort to explain more clearly how these factors operate in contemporary Africa, this article will compare the formulation and implementation of key urban policies in Kenya and Tanzania from independence until the end of 1973. Because of their importance for lower-income groups, three policy areas — land allocation, housing, and planning — are singled out for more intensive examination in this analysis."

6. *Education*

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AS A RESPONSE TO INEQUALITY IN TANZANIA AND KENYA, by David Court, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 661-690.

"This article examines the attempt of Kenya and Tanzania to deal with the universal problem of how to reconcile inequalities in the distribution of rewards with a concern for equality. It argues that in both countries the mainspring of educational policy is a desire to alleviate the potentially disruptive consequences of inequality, although for different purposes and by different means. The broad purpose of the article is to compare contrasting educational practice in Kenya and Tanzania from this perspective as a way of illuminating two distinctive modes of development. More specifically, it attempts to identify some of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in their particular use of education. Finally, it uses this analysis to make a speculative assessment of how each is faring in the task of building a relatively integrated polity."

7. *Drought*

JOURNEY IN A FORGOTTEN LAND, by Norman N. Miller. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 2 pts. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, nos. 4 and 5.)

Part I — Food and Drought in the Ethiopia-Kenya Border Lands. Part II — Food and Drought; the Broader Picture in Ethiopia and Kenya.

8. *Tourism*

THE RELATION BETWEEN TOURISM AND EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA AND TANZANIA, by Walter Elkan, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.11, no.2 (January 1975) 123-130.

"The unqualified enthusiasm of some for the development of tourism as a strategy for the development of low income countries is only matched by the equally unqualified scepticism of others. Few have felt neutral or considered the possibility that its effects might depend on the country concerned or the type of tourist development to be undertaken. This paper, based on a survey of employment in the hotel and tourist industries of Kenya and Tanzania, begins with an exposition of the general case for and against tourism as a way of promoting the development of low income countries, and then presents some of the findings of the East African survey. It pleads the case for less generalization and a more eclectic approach to an assessment of the costs and benefits of tourism and points out that, as is so often the case, the balance of advantage is greatly dependent upon the policies pursued with regard to the particular form of hotel and tourist development."

9. *Population Explosion*

POPULATION GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT: MEXICO'S PAST AND KENYA'S FUTURE, by William E. Cole and Richard D. Sanders, in *The African Studies Review*, v.19, no.1 (April 1976) 151-163.

"In the coming decades, the broad outline of Kenyan development is quite likely to duplicate the Mexican experience of industrial and commercial progress for a minority combined with economic stagnation for the majority. While there are obvious differences in culture, history, and geography, there are basic similarities in industrialization strategy, agricultural structure, urban expansion, and population growth rate. A continuation of the current industrial, financial, and agricultural strategies, and an extrapolation of other variables along certain key paths, will almost surely lead Kenya to the same form of dualistic transformation that has gradually engulfed Mexico over the course of three decades. A rather important point which emerges from the. . . analysis is that only by a significant reduction in the population growth rate can that result be avoided."

10. *Internal Racial Balance*

RACIAL BARGAINING IN INDEPENDENT KENYA, by Donald Rothchild. New York, Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1973. 476 p.

"According to this account, 'bargaining' between Kenya's Asians and Africans has been minimal; 'Africanization,' moderated chiefly by a prudent concern for the country's economic growth, is the name of the game. This. . . analysis. . . is. . . useful for it description of the complicated configurations within the Asian community."

T. Lesotho (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part I: Report of Nov.

14–Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebanon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5–158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7–14, 1973 (p. 159–166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10–Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Vola, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167–233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x–xv and throughout)."

LESOTHO, AN ISLAND COUNTRY: THE PROBLEMS OF BEING LAND-LOCKED, by T. Thahane, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.2 (1974) 279–290.

"For convenience, this discussion of the problems of Lesotho as a land-locked State will be divided into three parts. In Part One a brief review of the development within the international community of an awareness of the prolems of land-locked States will be made. This should place in perspective the present world interest in the problems of land-locked countries and the search for internationally accepted solutions to these problems. In Part Two some general and theoretical considerations which may go a long way to explain some of Lesotho's unique problems will be raised. Part Three will focus exclusively on Lesotho, its controversial past and the subsequent political and economic problems which it now faces. There are no specific criteria for ordering the discussion in this manner. However, the writer feels that Lesotho's problems will be better appreciated against the points raised in Parts One and Two."

LESOTHO TRANSKEI: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP?, by Roger J. Southall, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.5 (September-October 1976) 41–42.

"When the Transkei receives its 'independence' from Pretoria on October 26, neighboring Lesotho will be faced with a number of pressing problems. Given that the Transkei has a larger population, a larger land area and a larger budget (albeit mainly provided by South Africa) than Lesotho, the Government of Chief Leabua Jonathan will have to strive hard to differentiate itself from the showpiece bantustan, and to demonstrate anew the reality of its independence despite the country's encirclement by the Republic."

2. *Economic Aspects*

THE INFLUENCE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON LESOTHO'S POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, by Gabriele Winai-Stom, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.4 (1975) 473–497.

"What influence do the multinational corporations have on Lesotho? This is, of course, not an easy question to answer and this paper will not attempt to do so, but the mere suspicion that the multinational companies have an interest in the economics and politics of the Southern African region, which in turn obviously influences Lesotho's politics and economics, makes it worth an explorative study. The focus in this paper is on the Lesotho Government's relations with the multinational corporations and their subsidiaries both in Lesotho and South Africa, which might have an influence on the Lesotho Government's development policy. This influence might be exerted either directly on the Government or on the economic, political and social situation in Lesotho, so that the planning strategy is difficult to implement."

LESOTHO ECONOMIC SURVEY, February 1976, in *African Development*, v.10, no.2 (February 1976) 151 plus.

Lesotho's Difficult Path; Progress with the Development Corporation; Agriculture — Lesotho's Backbone; Non-Industrial Development; Diamonds — Hope for the Future.

MARKETING IN LESOTHO, by Elize Moody, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.1 (1976) 144–154.

"This article deals with one aspect of development in Lesotho, i.e., the role of marketing. Attention is focused upon the general marketing patterns, on the spatial organization of the system, and on the central importance of a selected number of markets."

U. Liberia (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR LIBERIA, by Thomas D. Roberts and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 387 p. (DA Pam 550–38.)

Country Summary; Social Background; Political Background; Economic Background; National Security; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS, by Christopher Clapham. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 156 p.

"An important study, both for Africanists and for students of methodology; examines two countries of similar origins but different fates."

2. *Economic Aspects*

ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LIBERIA, by Ozay Mehmet, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.3 (1975) 510–518.

"A study of recent Liberian economic growth is . . . very revealing in that it demonstrates a fundamental truism regarding development planning and policy; that efficient administrative machinery is an essential precondition for successful economic 'take-off.' Without a properly trained cadre of honest and dedicated public officials and executive leadership, even the most carefully designed plans can be expected to fail dismally in raising the living standards of the population. The post-war developments in Liberia illustrate the fact that economic expansion without an egalitarian orientation is growth without equity or social justice."

LIBERIA: ECONOMIC SURVEY — JULY 1976, in *African Development*, v.10 no.7 (July 1976) 715 plus.

Liberian Economy Set Fair for Year Ahead; Iron Ore — Liberia Needs Investment Now; Liberia Sets Out on Its First Development Plan; Careful Plans to Improve Communications; Are Co-operatives The Solution?; Plan to Expand Liberia's Skilled Labour Force; Rubber — A Great Future for a Big Earner; Banking in a Country Where The Dollar Reigns, Supreme.

V. Libya (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two — The Arab World Today (Sudan — The Loose-Limbed, Giant; Egypt — The Center of Gravity; Libya — The Radical Right; Tunisia — The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria — Austere Revolutionary; and Morocco — Kingdom of the Far West).

LIBYA, by J.G. Farley, in *World Survey*, no.79 (July 1975) 1–17.

This survey is devoted to the analysis of how the republic has developed since 1969 politically, economically, and internationally. Discusses: Qadhafi early background; the importance of Islam, the political vehicle, the cultural revolution, the international dimension, as well as the economic dimension.

2. *Revolution*

LIBYA: THE ELUSIVE REVOLUTION, by Ruth First. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1974. 294 p.

"Study of the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the contradictions, in the Qadhafi regime's domestic and foreign policies."

LIBYA'S PROSPEROUS REVOLUTION, by Ferdinand Humi, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.8 (November 1976) 18–22.

"Libya, with its approximately 2.4 million people, has sufficient revenues from oil (about $6 billion in 1975) so that, despite hugh expenditures for agrarian and industrial projects, for the infrastructure, schools, universities, hospitals and the military establishment, its people can still directly enjoy this wealth. Wages here are much higher (in many cases several times higher) than in the neighboring states. The effects of inflation are counterbalanced by subsidized prices on basic foodstuffs. Around the cities and in some rural locales as well, low-cost housing projects are springing up like mushrooms. There are no Bidonvilles. The aged, widows and invalids receive adequate pensions. Education at all levels is free and university students receive wages. Numberless private automobiles in endless columns wind their way through the streets of the two major cities, and the surrounding countryside is dotted with vast auto junkyards. Pedestrians are cleanly dressed. Beggars and hordes of children pleading for baksheesh, such a common sight in the rest of North Africa, are completely absent here. Apparently no one suffers material deprivation."

3. *Muammar Qadhafi*

QADHAFI'S NEW LOOK, in *Newsweek*, v.88, no. 12 (20 September 1976) 59–60.

"Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi is the bad boy of the Arab world. Hardly a week goes by without someone's accusing him of sponsoring an act of terrorism — often one aimed at another Arab government. Tension between Egypt and Libya has risen to such a point that recently Egypt pulled army units from the Israeli front and moved them to the Libyan border. Last week, Qadhafi granted an exclusive interview to NEWSWEEK Senior Editor Arnaud de Borchgrave. When he entered the 34-year-old colonel's office at the Bab Azzia Army Barracks in Tripoli, de Borchgrave found Qadhafi relaxed in a salmon-pink jump suit. He was reading an article by de Borchgrave entitled "Qadhafi Must Go," which reported that the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan were trying to undermine the Libyan regime (NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2). Excerpts from their three-hour interview."

LIBYA-EGYPT CLASH — LATEST THREAT TO MIDEAST PEACE, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.6 (8 Aug. 1977) 36–38.

. . . "How the fighting began or who started it is obscured by mutual charges of aggression. What is clear is that a series of incidents culminated on July 19 in full-scale battles, with both sides using tanks, heavy artillery and jet fighters. A cease-fire was negotiated by Algerian President Hourari Boumedienne and Yassir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization. . . "The text includes an interview with Col. Qadhafi shortly before the outbreak of fighting.

MAXI-PLOTS BEHIND A STRANGE MINI-WAR, in *Time*, v.110, no.6 (8 August 1977) 33–34.

"Publicly Egypt insisted that its bitter four-day mini-war with Libya had been nothing more than a minor Border skirmish. . . . . Privately, Egyptian spokesman conceded that there was a serious political purpose behind the armored assaults. . . The Egyptian's hit Libyan airfields at Al Adem, near Tobruk, Al Kufra

and Umm Alayan, as well as a training camp for African 'volunteers' near Al Jaqhbub. . . According to Egyptian intelligence, reports time Cairo Bureau Chief Wilton Wynn, Qadhafi — in cooperation with Ethiopia and with Soviet support — planned to launch attacks on moderate governments all across northeast Africa. . ."

QADHAFI: USING OIL RICHES TO FUEL MIDEAST FLAMES, in *U.S. News & World Report,* v.81, no.8 (23 August 1976) 57.

"To terrorists the world over, Libya's President Muammar Qadhafi is a generous patron who gives them money, arms and, when necessary, a safe refuge. To most of his fellow rulers in the Arab world, however, Qadhafi is a dangerous, erratic troublemaker who uses Libya's vast oil wealth to keep the Middle East in turmoil."

4. *Foreign Policy*

WHY LIBYA EXPORTS CHAOS, by Charles Holley, in *Atlas World Press Review,* v.23, no.11 (November 1976) 14–16.

"The anatomy of an international terror network . . . The peace of Libyan foreign policy has accelerated dramatically in the past year. Libya has ceased to rely primarily on Palestinian guerrillas for its covert operations abroad, and has begun to deploy squads of trained Libyan operatives belonging to the new Special Intelligence Service. Since the abortive coup in Tripoli in August 1975, there are no longer any moderate advisers to curb Qadhafi. He is free to pursue his foreign policy objectives at full-speed."

5. *Libyan–Soviet Relations*

GROWING ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN LIBYA, U.S.S.R., in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v.26, no.35 (25 Sept 1974) 18. Condensed text.

Sept. 1, marks the fifth anniversary of the Libyan Arab Republic; on it's occasion Izvestia, 31 August 1974, p. 3, Reviews "The dynamics of the development of the Libyan Revolution. . ." Notes that "Libyans today are becoming increasingly convinced of the indispensible fact that strengthening of friendly relations with the Soviet Union is in keeping with the basic interests of the people themselves and with the interests of restoring a just peace in the near east. . ."

LIBYA'S PREMIER JALLOUD VISITS MOSCOW, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.26, no.20 (12 June 1974) 17–18.

Condensed text (Pravda 15 May 1974, pp. 1,4) of speeches by A.N. Kosygin of the USSR and Abdul Salam Jalloud of Libya, during a dinner in the Kremlin on 14 May 1974. The speeches are reflective of the relations between the two countries.

ON THE STAY IN THE U.S.S.R. OF A.S. JALLOUD, MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* v.26, no.20 (12 June 1974) 18 plus.

Condensed text of a report in Pravda, 22 May 1974, pp.1,5, on the agreement reached between the two countries during the visit of Libya's Jalloud in Moscow. "The two sides agreed to set up a Soviet-Libyan intergovernmental commission to deal with the development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, as well as with questions of trade between the two countries. . ." States that the Palestinian question was also discussed.

SOVIET ARMS AID TO LIBYA, by Roger F. Pajak, in *Military Review,* v.56, no.7 (July 1976) 82–87.

"In the Soviet drive to gain influence and weaken the position of the West in the Middle East, arms aid has clearly emerged as the most durable instrument in Moscow's diplomatic repertoire. . . While recent Soviet policy in the Middle East countries, particularly Egypt, has drawn substantial public interest, relatively little has appeared in the professional and public press to date on the intensifying Soviet involvement in Libya. . . While the full implications of the current Soviet-Libyan relationship are still being debated, it appears that the Soviets are trying to solidify their new foothold in Libya, thus putting new pressure on Sadat to repair his unraveling ties with Moscow."

W. Malagasy (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. 327 p. (DA Pam 550–163.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

X. Malawi (Formerly Nyasaland) (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. 353 p. (DA Pam 550–172.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Defense Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

MALAWI: BRIDGE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 13 plus.

"At the start of the tenth year of Malawi's independence, President Kamuzu Banda announced his country's financial independence from Great Britain in the course of his New Year's address. Britain continues to be far and away Malawi's most important trading partner. . . In contrast to its Black African neighbors in East and Central Africa, since gaining its independence Malawi has not tried to cut its relations to the white-dominated lands of Southern Africa. Rather, in a skillful

political balancing act it has striven to retain its links to Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. In choosing this course Banda has taken realistic account of his country's geographic and economic position."

1. *Religious Aspects*

CATHOLICS, PEASANTS AND CHEWA RESISTANCE IN NYASALAND, by Ian Linden. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. 233 p.

"The British Protectorate of Nyasaland, now Malawi, was the scene of intense missionary rivalry between Catholic and Protestant denominations. Linden has written an extended case study of Catholicism as an aspect of colonialism in Central Africa. In particular, he writes of the three-quarters of a million Catholics among Malawi's four million population who are largely subsistence farmers and have always been of a conservative bent, politically and intellectually."

2. *Economic Aspects.*

INTERNATIONAL AID AND NATIONAL DECISIONS: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI, TANZANIA, AND ZAMBIA, by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 190 p.

"Observing the operation of U.N. aid programs from their beginnings through their growth into an international industry, the author describes the complex interactions betwen national governments and U.N. personnel, focusing on the potential for development aid to foster the U.N. goals of international integration and cooperation."

MALAWI: ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND DESPOTIC RULE, by Julian Burgess, in *African Development*, v.10, no.7 (July 1976) 675 plus.

"Focuses on a country into which foreign journalists are not admitted [and states that] in a year of economic troubles Malawi's economy has done well."

Y. Mali (See also appendixes)

DEPENDENCY AND CONSERVATIVE MALI, by Miles D. Wolpin, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.4 (1975) 585-620.

"Because Mali was in 1968 at the threshold of socialist revolutionary victory — even closer than Indonesia in 1965 or Chile in 1973 — it is imperative that Modibo Keita's environment and downfall be assessed. . . The objective of this article is to draw upon the experience of Mali and, less explicitly, socialist failures in Hungary, Indonesia, and Chile, to derive a series of tentative suggestions for a revolutionary prince."

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN MALI, by Valerie Plave Bennett, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 249-266.

"A notable imbalance exists in the literature on the role of soldiers in politics — far less attention is given to their rule than to their intervention. This is particularly true for the African Continent, where scant effort has been made to relate patterns of military rule to patterns of demilitarization. The policy objectives of officers are often dealt with as two opposing ideal types: broadly ideological, leaning towards 'anticommunism,' 'modernisation,' or 'Arab socialism;' or fundamentally apolitical and unable to formulate reasonable policy objectives because of their narrow corporate perspectives. The logic of these two ideal positions leads to the alleged dichotomy that juntas with broad political ambitions will tend to stay in power indefinitely, while those with limited corporate interests will find it easy to turn power over to civilians who will 'grant autonomy to the armed forces.' The case of Mali contradicts the 'logic' of the opposing ideal types. There the military leaders have not professed any broad political ambitions, and their own personal aspirations appear modest; nevertheless, they have made known their desire to hold the reigns of power for more than a decade. One reason for this may be their inability to solve the economic problems inherited from the civilian regime."

THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA, by Christopher Stevens. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976. 236 p.

"Traces the evolution of contacts between the Soviet Union and Black Africa from 1953 to 1972, focusing on seven African countries: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. No attempt is made to set forth a grand theory of Afro-Soviet relations, but instead it is argued that all parties acted on an ad hoc basis."

Z. Mauritania (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR MAURITANIA, by Brian Dean Curran and Joann Schrock. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 185 p. (DA Pam 550-161.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Historical Aspects; Government and Politics; Economic Aspects; National and Internal Security; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

AA. Mauritius (See also appendixes)

MAURITIUS: HOST TO THE OAU; SURVEY, in *African Development*, v.10, no.7 (July 1976) 693 plus.

The Swiftly Changing Face of Mauritius; Mauritius — Host To The OAU; and Industrial Development in Mauritius.

TENSION IN MAURITIUS, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.7 (October 1976) 12-13.

"This island in the Indian Ocean could become a new Hong Kong or Singapore. It has already established a free port. Its industry can count on government and Commonwealth subsidies. . . Mauritian politics are determined by the island's racial structure. The various

ethnic groups coexist, but they hardly mix. . . There are many nuances to Mauritian political life. Despite close cultural ties to India, at present the main orientation is toward Black Africa. . . Today Mauritius again finds itself drawn into the field of tension of the great powers seeking bases in the Indian Ocean."

BB. Morocco (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR MOROCCO, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 403 p. (DA Pam 550-49.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

MOROCCO: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, by John Domis, in *The World Today*, v.31, no.1 (January 1975) 36-46.

"The king has tried to shore up his authoritarian regime with some rudimentary reforms. Its chances of survival will depend largely on the success in attracting foreign investors, who stayed away after 1971 owing to the uncertain political outlook."

MOROCCO SEEKS SAHARA TREASURE, by Ron Elmer, in *African Development*, v.9, no.12 (December 1975) 32-33.

"Morocco accounts for 34 percent of a flagging world phosphate trade, Western Sahara has another 19 percent. Between them the two countries' sources form a virtual phosphate monopoly. This was the key to 'last month's' sabre rattling." The author provides here an on-the-spot report.

CC. Mozambique (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

EDUCATION POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.2 (June 1976) 331-339.

"The People's Republic of Mozambique is a very new member of the international community of independent and sovereign states, having gained its independence. . . on 25 June 1975. We have much to learn, which is what we hope to do at this Conference, and have many new challenges to face. But at the same time the benefit of ten years of armed liberation struggle, wide experience of organizing and administering vast areas of our country which were gradually freed from Portuguese colonial domination. During these years we forged a tool, moulded through months and years of hard people's fight for the construction of a new society: we have a solid political line and a vanguard movement with the organization and discipline to ensure the implementation of this line. When we speak of educational policy we are then talking Frelimo's political line as it is manifested in this sector. The commitment to build a new society, based on equality and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man, and the definition of the enemy as being capitalism and imperialism, indicate immediately the kind of education we do not want in our country and the kind of educational system we must introduce."

MOZAMBIQUE'S PREDICAMENT, by Joan Brickhill, in *African Development*, v.10, no.2 (February 1976) 131 plus.

"Mozambique is trying to build its new rural based socialist state while remaining highly dependent on South Africa for 25 percent of its currency earnings for wages for 150,000 workers and sales of electricity. This has led to problems."

2. *Government and Politics*

FROM COLONY TO POLICE STATE; MOZAMBIQUE'S STALLED REVOLUTION, by Roger Mann, in *The New Leader*, v. 59, no. 17 (16 August 1976) 5-6.

"Mozambicans celebrated their first year of independence from Portugal last June 25 hoping the second year would be a happier and more prosperous one. Unfortunately, the country's vast array of interrelated political and economic problems are unlikely to be resolved soon. The national economy, never developed by Lisbon, has virtually collapsed. The victorious Front for the National Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) has been raked by purges and dissention. And President Samora Machel, fearful of domestic uprisings as well as possible interference from South Africa, Rhodesia and the thousands of unhappy Portuguese they have given refuge, has expended much of his new nation's meager resources on establishing one of the most rigid police states in Africa."

MOZAMBIQUE EN ROUTE TO INDEPENDENCE, by Peter Hess, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 24, no. 12 (March 1975) 20-21.

"Since the coup in Portugal on April 25, 1974, there has been a fundamental change in the situation in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique. After years during which the Lisbon government fought against the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo), government troops and Frelimo soldiers are now working together and sometimes even form joint patrols. The transitional government established last September 20 by agreement between Portugal and the Frelimo is headed by Frelimo official Joaquim Chissano and consists of six ministers named by the Liberation Front and three appointed by Portugal. This cabinet is to remain in office until the official declaration of Mozambique's independence, scheduled for this June 25 . . . It remains to be seen whether a certain degree of democratic development will be possible within the Frelimo as the country's only party."

MOZAMBIQUE: WHAT FUTURE FOR WHITES?, by Roger Mann, in *Africa Report*, v. 20, no. 6 (November-December 1975) 41-45.

An assessment of the future of the white population following the independence of Mozambique.

3. *Soviet Penetration into Mozambique*

MOZAMBIQUE: A NEW SOVIET OPPORTUNITY, by Peter Vanneman, in *Strategic Review*, (Fall 1975) 45–53.

". . . Cites Portugal's demise in Africa as a factor providing new opportunities for Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets seek to implement two immediate goals in Mozambique: 1) containment of Chinese global expansion on the African Continent and 2) access to harbor facilities for the expanding Soviet Indian Ocean fleet. The Soviet Union has temporarily encouraged stability in Mozambique to gain time in countering Chinese influence. Most of the cadres in the 1974 coup, including Frelimo, were trained by the Chinese. However, Vanneman notes, Mozambique's new president, Samora Machel, was trained in Moscow, and his vice-president is also pro-Russian. In order to consolidate his power base, Machel needs the Soviets' sophisticated weaponry for conventional defenses and economic aid provided by the Eastern European Common Market (CMEA). He is also wary of the Chinese, who supported the guerrilla war and were allegedly involved in the assassinations of Frelimo's founder, Eduardo Mondlane, and Guinea-Bissau's pro-Moscow insurgent leader, Amilcar Cabral. Vanneman states that with Mozambique's harbor facilities, Moscow can threaten the security of NATO's Cape oil route, service Soviet submarines equipped with missiles capable of reaching China, and generally affect the strategic nuclear balance with the U.S. Mozambique is also a 'doorway' to Southern Africa's abundant raw materials. Conserving its own resources for emergencies, the Soviet Union buys raw materials from South African nations, thus hampering access to these materials by the U.S. and China."

DD. Namibia (See also Part II under Regions) (See also appendixes)

CUNENE SCHEME: A FOCUS FOR CONFRONTATION, by Roger Murray, in *African Development*, v. 9, no. 11 (November 1975) 31 plus.

"The Cunene hydroelectric scheme is on the border between Namibia and Angola, an area of acute political tension. Roger Murray examines what the prospects for the scheme are."

NAMIBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, by Motee Persaud, in *Current History*, v. 68, no. 405 (May 1975) 220–225.

"Barring a commitment by the major Western powers, as well as by the Security Council of the United Nations, a nonviolent transition in Namibia is not now conceivable . . . Nambia, formerly known as South West Africa, covers an area of approximately 318,000 square miles along the South Atlantic coast and has a population of about 610,000. About two-thirds the size of South Africa, larger than France and Great Britain combined, the country is fringed by desert and shares a boundary line almost coterminous with that of South Africa."

NAMIBIA'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM, by A. Galybin, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 12 (1976) 59–64. In English.

NAMIBIA'S URANIUM RICHES — DEBATE ON FUTURE CONTROL, by Martin Bailey, in *African Development*, v. 10, no. 7 (July 1976) 679.

"Under the soil of Namibia lies extensive mineral wealth, in particular uranium. On the surface the majority live in poverty. As Namibia is moved to the fore of the liberation struggle, the question of control of its resources becomes more crucial."

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: A RACE AGAINST TIME, by Christoph Muhlemann, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 26, no. 11 (February 1977) 6–11.

"The German influence in the land of the Ovambo, Herero and Nama (Hottentots) began in 1814 with penetration by the London Mission Society, which sent primarily German missionaries to the territory . . . The South African Southwesterners are politically organized. The National Party, the local branch of South Africa's ruling party, had a complete monopoly of seats in the territory's legislature and, until the currently running conference on independence led to an inner split, was totally committed to complete integration with the Republic of South Africa; the United National Southwest Party, on the other hand, would have preferred a federative union governed by a statute of autonomy . . . As these lines were being written, the conference on the independence of South-West Africa, which has been going on since September 1975, had entered a decisive phase. Optimistic participants in the talks reckoned that agreement on a constitution could be reached very soon . . . Even if one accepts the conclusion that the independence conference is well on the way to developing a viable alternative to the extremist concepts of Swapo, the chances of a peaceful settlement in South-West Africa remain uncertain."

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM, by Solomon Mifima, in *Review of International Affairs*, Yugoslavia, v. 26, no. 602 (5 May 1975) 27–28.

"Of late, scholars and politicians have been describing Southern Africa as a political hotbed. Southern Africa is certainly facing sweeping political changes which Africa and the world have been waiting for. For a better understanding of the political situation in Namibia, we have to review the political developments in Southern Africa as a whole."

US REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.76, no.1960 (17 January 1977) 43–48.

"Statements made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly on December 2 by US Representative William W. Scranton and on December 10 by US Representative Stephen Hess, together with the texts of two resolutions adopted by the committee on December 10 and by the Assembly on December 20."

EE. Niger (See also appendixes)

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part 1: Report of Nov. 14-Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebanon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5–158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialsim and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7–14, 1973 (p. 159–166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10-Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167–233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x-xv and throughout)."

THE 1974 COUP D'ETAT IN NIGER: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION, by Richrd Higgott and Finn Fuglestad, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.3 (1975) 383–398.

"This article will attempt to outline the major casual elements of a coup d'e'tat which secured the downfall of one of black Africa's supposedly more stable regimes."

FF. Nigeria (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR NIGERIA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 485 p. (DA Pam 550–157.)

Country Summary; General Character of the Society; Physical Environment; Historical Setting; Population and Labor; Ethnic Groups and Languages; Social Systems; Living Conditions; Education, Public Information, and the Arts and Sciences; Government and Political Dynamics; Foreign Relations; Value Systems; Characters and Structure of the Economy; Agriculture and Mining; Industry and Trade; National Security; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

THE BOOM IN AFRICAN PUBLISHING, by W. F. Feuser, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 22.

"Today there are more than 1,000 publishers in Nigeria alone (although most of them are simply owners of a printing press who give themselves the grandiose title of 'publisher'). Thirty of them are joined together in the Nigerian Publishers' Association. The situation is similar in the other countries of Black Africa, although the francophone nations, apparently in keeping with their weaker infrastructures, lag far behind the anglophone countries. These and similar facts came to light during the first Conference on Publishing in Africa recently held by the Ife University Press under its director Hans M. Zell."

TRANSITION IN AFRICA: FROM DIRECT RULE TO INDEPENDENCE. A MEMOIR, by James Robertson. New York, Barnes & Noble, 1974. 272 p.

"Nigeria's last Governor General prior to independence, who for most of his career was a high colonial official in the Sudan, explains the rationale behind Britian's mode of administering the devolution of sovereignty in each of these colonies. Despite the fact that both nations erupted into . . . civil war a few years later, Sir James is a . . . defender of the reasonableness of British policy and of her colonial administrators."

2. *Whither Nigeria*

EIGHTY MILLION NIGERIANS AND THEIR FUTURE: A COMMENTARY ON THE 1973 CENSUS, by Isaiah O. Adegbile, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.1 (January-March 1975) 63–65.

"Nigerian leaders outdid themselves in orienting our people regarding (1) a switch from the left to the right on the nation's highways (2) a change into decimal system or from Sterling to Naira and (3) vigorous preparation for a crucial census which was taken in 1973. In the first and second instances the results have amazed most Nigerians and many foreign observers. However, the census of 1973, unlike 'yielding the right of way' and the 'decimal system,' may lead to undesirable developments in the future . . . Before the census figures are analyzed, it is necessary to indicate them in tabular form, including, for comparative purposes, census figures for 1952–3 and 1963."

NIGERIA: AFRICA'S NEW POWER, by Jean Herskovits, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.53, no.2 (January 1975) 314–333.

"At least one African in four is a Nigerian; there are more Nigerians than Germans or Frenchmen or Britishers. Nigeria is now America's second-largest supplier of crude oil. Yet most Americans know nothing of this vast country, or if anything, only that there was a bloody civil war a few years back . . . The British have long known of Nigeria's economic and diplomatic

potential, and so have the French and Portuguese. Other African countries also waited for its continent-wide leadership, though some feared it. Nigeria's conservatism was not what stood in its way. Internal instability blocked its wider role, and left its economic base only the promise of what it might become. The enduring key to Nigeria's influence in Africa and the world is that very economic base. The nation's economy now rests on oil, which produces 85 percent of its earnings. Nigerians have known about their oil for over a decade, but they could not have predicted the asset recent events would make it."

NIGERIA AND THE WORLD: A GROWING INTERNAL STABILITY, WEALTH, AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE, by Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, in *Journal of International Affairs*, v.29, no.2 (Fall 1975) 155–169.

"A half decade after the end of its Civil War, Nigeria evokes considerable and largely positive interest within Africa, among Western countries, and in the diplomatic community in general . . . Nigeria was not always peaceful and prosperous. Hence, it is perhaps useful to begin with an analysis of Nigeria's economic and political situation in the early years of its independence in order to see what has survived and what has changed. There are a number of other important questions to be raised and, hopefully, answered in this article. What are the internal and external factors responsible for the economic and political transformation of Nigeria within fourteen years of the country's independence? What are the likely political and diplomatic manifestations of Nigeria's new economic standing in Africa and the world?"

ONE NIGERIA? A REGIONAL VIEW FROM WESTERN STATE, by C. Gregory Knight, in *The African Studies Review*, v.19, no.2 (September 1976) 111–128.

"The consequences of diversity in Nigeria need little introduction . . . Although none of the states coincides perfectly with ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural boundaries in Nigeria, each state nevertheless offers greater local autonomy and recognition, especially to some of the less populous Nigerian ethnic groups. Although threatened by antagonisms such as the Biafran cessation of 1967–1970, a unified twelve-state federation of Nigeria survived through 1976 and became the national configuration with which Nigerians identify. Additional state designations may be realized in 1976. The eventual stability of Nigeria depends on a number of questions. These include the nature of continuing regional feeling and — most critically — the nature and implications of regionalism in Nigeria as a nation. Clearly questions of this kind are only superficially addressed by general discussion of Nigeria or by any single academic discipline. However, some insight into these questions may be gained by examining the nature of regional cognition from one part of Nigeria."

3. *Government and Politics*

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES, by B. O. Nwabueze. Rutherford, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973. 316 p.

"Examination of the role of Western law and the importance of popular attitudes toward it in the recently independent nations. Focusing chiefly on Nigeria, Nwabueze discusses precedents regarding coups d'etat, cessation and the assumption of emergency powers."

NIGERIA: NEW PLANS FOR OIL, CEMENT — AND CORRUPTION, by Guy Arnold, in *African Development*, v.9, no.12 (December 1975) 26–27.

A report on how "Nigeria's new regime is coming to grips with main factors in its political equation."

NIGERIA: AFRICAN SUPER-STATE, by Leigh Johnson, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, nos.8–9 (1976) 44–45 plus.

"Farmers and merchants continue to ply their centuries-old trades in graceful robes and steaming heat while the military government of Africa's most populous state attempts to restructure Nigerian society to realize its industrial and political potential. There is a new feeling of confidence in the federal administration since Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo came to power in February 1976, but the men in uniform face odds more numerous and complex than did their predecessors before the bloody and contentious civil war put the country on the international map of conflict. The problems awaiting solution are, however, not unique to Nigeria. Rather they are the ones which confront all bureaucracies: illiteracy (75 percent), unemployment, ethnic differences which gnaw away at government goals of nationalism, minorities clamoring for more power, dominant groups loathe to relinquish their positions, ineffective systems of produciton. Put more simply, Nigeria faces the dichotomous dilemma of all Third World countries: how to take a rigidly traditional people into a modern era of new demands, loyalties and rewards without discarding the proven values and balances of the past." See also pages 52–55: Supportive data taken from the book, "Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1976/77," — general geographic and population data, as well as political, economic, and defense data, including Army, Navy, and Air Force Battle Orders.

THE PLACE OF IDEOLOGY IN NIGERIAN POLITICS, by Eme O. Awa, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.3 (1974) 359–380.

"Are there any important political ideas which have served as a guide to Nigeria in the course of her political development or has she merely muddled along, following the whims of the colonial Government and the indigenous political leaders? If some political ideas have been used, have these been expressed as 'orbita dicta' by the leaders and other articulate groups or have they been stated systematically? Do any such statements contain any fundamental formulations which can pass muster as political ideologies? Or have the ideas not been stated at

all but are implicit in the behaviour of the principal actors in the Nigerian political scene? I believe that in Nigeria's political development extensive use has been made of political ideologies directly or indirectly, and this paper will examine the nature and form of these ideologies and appraise their influence on the political system. My view is that as from now Nigeria must use an ideology deliberately to guide and direct her political conduct."

THE PROBLEM AND PROSPECT OF NATIONAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA, by R.A. Akindele and S.N. Varna, in *The African Report*, v.4, no.3 (1974) 381–406.

"The purpose of this paper is to examine critically the problems, prospects, and mechanics of building national political parties in a polyethnic society such as that of Nigeria. In the first section, we call attention to the necessity and desirability of genuine, nationally oriented, political parties by linking the existence of permanent crisis, which characterized civilian rule and brought the First Republic to a catastrophic end, to the excessively ethnic-oriented and inadequately transregional political party system. The second section focuses on the role of political parties in any polity, especially federal societies. In the third section, we discuss the various dimensions of the national character of party systems. The fourth section deals with the problems posed for political parties by a federal polity seeking a stable equilibrium between centripetal and centrifugal forces, both of which are deemed essential for a vital federalism. Throughout this section, we recognize that the problem of national parties and the organization of elections, as related matters, call for joint investigations. In the fifth section, we examine models of national party sytems, and suggest the one we consider most desirable for Nigeria."

4. *Yakuba Gowon*

NIGERIA: WHY GOWON FELL, by Levi A. Nwachuku, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.5 (September-October 1975) 8–11.

"The murder of General Aguyi Ironsi on July 29, 1966 brought Yakubu Gowon into political prominence. He became Nigeria's military leader and head of state. Nine years later on July 29, 1975, Gowon at the height of his power was overthrown. He was ousted while attending the OAU Summit Conference in Kampala, Uganda."

5. *Military Aspects*

A CIVILIAN APPRAISAL OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA, by Margaret Peil, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v.2, no.1 (November 1975) 34–35.

"This paper focuses on Nigeria, where the military government has in October 1974 again put off the long-promised return to civilian rule. After the January 1966 coup, it was assumed that only a few months would be necessary to 'clean up the mess.' The program to retire in 1969 was voided by the civil war, but the 1970 promise of elections in 1976 was adhered to as late as the summer of 1974 . . . The paper focuses on the meaning Nigerians attach to peace and violence, efficiency and corruption, as these appear to be basic to their assessment of military government. As will be shown, the apparent dichotomies are not seen as necessarily mutually exclusive. Military rule is not as different from civilian rule as it might be because military socialization is only a thin veneer over the primary socialization of army personnel. While emphasis in the discussion is on what people find objectionable in military rule, it is important to point out that most people found something good to say about it and in no part of the country is it totally rejected; in some areas, the majority favor it. But as the direction of change seems to be toward increasing dissatisfaction, the causes of this discontent should be the most fruitful area of analysis."

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W.F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study of the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

NIGERIA: THE EXPERIENCE OF MILITARY RULE, by David J. Murray, in *Current History*, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 216–219 plus.

"Regardless of the direction of the political order in Nigeria, the federal and state governments seem likely to face more difficult conditions in the immediate future than they faced in the recent past. Intractable problems have accumulated, and they must be handled by military governments with declining support, and with a revenue from oil which . . . is no longer increasing in amount at the rate that it increased each year since 1970."

POWER AND SUCCESSION IN A MILITARY REGIME: THE CASE OF NIGERIA, by James O'Connell, in *Contemporary Review*, v.228, no.1324 (May 1976) 232–238.

"The coup that last July overthrew General Gowon had its origins in a set of cumulative grievances: military governors among the twelve states were notoriously corrupt and General Gowon seemed to be procrastinating indefinitely in removing them; inflation raged through the economy, aggravated by sharp salary

increases in both public and private sectors, increases in the cost of imported goods, and shortages of goods as a result of the congestion at Lagos port; the national census had been bungled, leaving the country without accepted demographic data on which to base a return to civilian rule; and Gowon had in any case gone back on his pledge to introduce civilian rule in 1976 and had put it off indefinitely. The army commanders were angry and embarrassed by indecisive and corrupt government that was being carried on in the name of the military. The decision to remove Gowon was implemented by the army high command — it is less sure that the actual coup was initiated by them — and the change of government took place without bloodshed."

TRANSITION FROM MILITARY RULE; THE CASE OF WESTERN STATE NIGERIA, by Henry Bienen, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v.1, no.3 (May 1975) 328–343.

"From the time of military takeover in January 1966, Nigerian military governments on many occasions had asserted their commitment to a return to civilian rule. These assertions were hardly atypical of military regimes in Africa. However, the Nigerian military leaders were frequent in their announcements, spelled out their plans for a return to civilian rule, and took important steps to bring civilians into both state military governments and the federal military government . . . What follows is a report on politicians under a military regime. It is a field report on deposed leaders, some of whom reentered politics under military auspices, but who did so very much for their own purposes. It was possible to carry out interviews with these politicians precisely because Nigeria is not a police state. Individuals talked freely about their attitudes and roles once guaranteed anonymity, and many people did not even care about being identified."

6. *Tribal Aspects*

ETHNIC IDENTITY, POLITICAL INTEGRATION, AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE IGBO DIASPORA IN NIGERIA, by Chukwuemeka Onwubu, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.3 (1975) 399–413.

"My primary task here will be to outline and underscore the distinct cultural — more specifically political — traits of the Igbo people, as well as the circumstances that merited their disapproval in Nigeria, and then attempt to show how these have conspired to thwart attempts at forging an integrated Nigerian nation with other Nigerian peoples."

NIGERIA, by David Taylor, in *World Survey*, no.94 (October 1976) 17–32.

"Describes the tribal structure, which is the key to all the turbulent events since the British departure, the succession of military governments since 1966, the Civil War and the swift expansion of the Nigerian economy since the reconciliation which followed it."

RECONCILIATION IN NIGERIA, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.5 (August 1974) 20–21.

"It will probably never be known just how many lives were lost during the Ibo massacre seven years ago. At any rate the bloodshed was enough to convince the 12 million members of the Ibo tribe that they were doomed in the federated state of Nigeria. The results were the cessation of Biafra and the Nigerian civil war, which ended four and a half years ago. A few days after the flight of Biafran chief of state General Ojukwu, a certain Major General Effiong declared Biafra's surrender, thus ending the two and a half year war which, it was estimated, had cost more than a million lives among the civilian population. It was an unconditional surrender. Victorious Nigeria could have called the Ibo sharply to account and instituted severe repressive measures. But this did not happen. During the surrender ceremony the two opposing leaders and former comrades in arms, General Gowon and General Effiong, embraced warmly. As it turned out, this was a sign of genuine reconciliation. Nigeria has proven itelf to be a generous victor and is trying by means of clever and humane politics to solve the Ibo problem."

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7. *Economic Development*

NIGERIA: OPTIONS FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT. Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 256 p.

"This volume, the fifth in a series of country economic reports, examines the basic trends and policies of Nigerian economic development and offers a 'longer term outlook' of the economy through the early 1980's. The . . . analysis in the study provides . . . information on the 'giant' of Africa, even though recent events (e.g., the quadrupling of the price of petroleum) have already dated many of its 'future' projections."

NIGERIAN MODERNIZATION, THE COLONIAL LEGACY, by Ukandi G. Damachi. New York, The Third Press, 1974. 145 p.

"Nigeria is now undergoing increasingly rapid industrialization and urbanization. Damachi analyzes the effects of colonialism on Nigeria's past and the manner in which the past is affecting the future of the 66 million people of Nigeria, the largest black population in the world. This is a much easier source of material for the student than the World Bank report and gives additional historical and sociological information as well." With bibliography.

PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA: 1962–1966, by Edwin Dean. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974. 294 p.

"Explains the shortfalls in the implementation of the Nigerian National Development Plan, particularly in terms of a failure to proportion the plan to the strengths and weaknesses of executive capability in

various areas. The author notes, however, that many of the plan's general economic goals were achieved as a result of the performance of the private sector."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, ed. by Richard Harris. Cambridge, Schenkman, 1975. 270 p.

"These essays on Kenya and Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are unified by the common perspective of their authors, part of a growing group of social scientists basing their analyses of African development on a critique of African dependency and Western necolonialism."

THE SKY'S THE LIMIT FOR NIGERIA, by Karl Lawrencic, in *Contemporary Review*, v.227, no.1316 (September 1975) 146–151.

"Despite the upheaval of the civil war, the claim made by Nigerian Radio that the five-year National Development Plan launched by the recently deposed President Yakubu Gowon last March is 'the biggest, boldest and most promising development plan ever started in Black Africa' is no empty boast. With the great wealth coming from sales of oil, amounting to 5.3 billion naira, or over £3.7 billion, in 1974 Nigeria can disregard the matter of money. The plan envisages an investment totaling 30 billion naira, with two-thirds coming from the government sources and one-third from the private sector. The investment is more than ten times as large as in the previous five-year period and is designed to turn what is still largely a backward country of some 80 million into a community with a fair chance of prosperity even when oil wells dry up. Not surprisingly, education is a priority in a country where more than half the population is aged less than 20. One of the plan targets is to achieve compulsory universal primary education, meaning a fourfold increase of the present schooling capacities."

TAX EVASIONS IN NIGERIA, by M.N. Ogbonna, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.1 (January-March 1975) 53–61.

"Since World War II, Nigeria has been in a transitional period aimed toward modern statehood. This involves industrialization, the tapping of dormant resources and increasing agricultural production. As development proceeds, capacity for taxation increases. Improved technique and better machinery for tax collection make it possible to harness many untapped sources of finance. For a developing economy moving away from the shackles of stagnation to an era of progress, there is a continuous opening up of new sources for taxation owing to the greater monetization of the economy. The tax structure and its machinery of collection should be organized to ensure an increase in government tax revenue. But available statistics often reveal that under-developed economies have low tax revenue figures relative to those of the more advanced countries."

8. *Petroleum*

NIGERIA, AFRICAN OIL GIANT, by Peter Hess, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.6 (September 1975) 14–15.

"Nigeria offers almost unlimited possibilities both to its indigenous businessmen and to the foreign investors who are welcomed within the limits of strict regulations. The needs of this heavily-populated but underdeveloped country are enormous, and money is available to pay for the goods and services required. Nigeria's problem is not so much how to finance development but how to spend the money it has, in view of the limited number of experts and lack of equipment available. Immense quantities of consumer and capital goods are imported and a domestic industry with a broad spectrum of production is developing rapidly. There is already a very broad indigenous stratum of modern private businessmen such as exists in practically no other African developing country. The disadvantages of the Nigerian boom can however be found all too easily in Lagos itself . . . At the present rate of exploitation, Nigeria's currently known oil reserves will last for 30 years. In the new five-year plan, about 3 billion Swiss francs have been earmarked for exploration work to find new reserves. There are also ambitious programmes for building up industries associated with petroleum, such as refineries, fertilizer factories and gas liquefaction installations, and for setting up a national fleet of tankers to handle part of the transportation volume."

9. *Urban Aspects (Lagos)*

URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE, THE POLITICS OF LAGOS, 1917-1967, by Pauline H. Baker. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 384 p.

"Baker, a resident of Lagos for nine years, analyzes the impact of urbanization on Lagos, Nigeria, during the period when it grew from a colonial town of 100,000 people to a city of more than one and one-quarter million inhabitants. Lagos is tropical Africa's largest city." With bibliography.

10. *Foreign Trade*

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF NIGERIAN-JAPANESE TRADE, by Olufeni Fajana, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.1 (1976) 127–136.

"Nigeria has for long had an open economy exporting mainly primary commodities to industrial countries and importing their manufactured products. Exports are the main source of the foreign exchange needed to purchase the machinery and capital equipment that are indispensable for the growth of the economy, while the bulk of government revenue is derived from the taxation of imports and exports. There is little doubt that the dynamism and growth of the Nigerian economy will continue to depend largely on

international trade — hence the vigorous pursuit of policies aimed at expanding traditional and opening-up new trade links. In this article, we shall look closely at the changing relationship with Japan, a country whose survival depends on international trade as much as Nigeria."

11. *Nigerian-Israeli Relations*

ISRAEL AND NIGERIA AND CHANGE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP, by Olajide Aluko, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.1 (1974) 43–59.

"When Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Israel on 25 October 1973 a new dimension to the relationship between the two countries was introduced . . . These recent developments may be seen as further evidence of the change that has been evolving in the pattern of relationships between Lagos and Tel Aviv since Nigeria's independence in 1960. Yet some elements of continuity in their relationships remain."

12. *Nigerian-Soviet Relations*

THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA, by Christopher Stevens. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976. 236 p.

"Traces the evolution of contacts between the Soviet Union and black Africa from 1953 to 1972, focusing on seven African countries: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. No attempt is made to set forth a grand theory of Afro-Soviet relations, but instead it is argued that all parties acted on an ad hoc basis."

GG. Rhodesia (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR SOUTHERN RHODESIA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. 393 p. (DA Pam 550–171.)

Area Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

END OF A CHAPTER: IAN SMITH WINS BIG, BUT A NEW SETTLEMENT PLAN IS IN TROUBLE, in *Time*, v.110, no.11 (12 September 1977) 24–25.

"In what may be the last election under Rhodesia's present constitution, Smith's ruling Rhodesian Front Party won all 50 parliamentary seats reserved for the country's 268,000 whites (the 6.4 million blacks have 16) and 86% of the popular vote. The right-wing Rhodesian Action Party . . . drew only 9% of the vote, while the moderate National Unifying Force received 4.5%."

THE PEACE-PLAN SAFARI, in *Newsweek*, v.90, no.10 (5 September 1977) 35–36.

US Ambassador Andrew Young and British Foreign Secretary David Owen visit Nigeria, South Africa and Rhodesia to present a new British-American proposal . . . " for a phased transition to majority rule in Rhodesia . . . " The proposal included a call for . . ."Smith's resignation, the installation of a British commission and a United Nations peace-keeping force in Rhodesia, . . . elections on the basis of universal sufferge after a six-month transition period . . . partial dismantling of Smith's white-led Army."

TWO SIDES OF A STALEMATE, in *Time*, v.110, no.6 (8 August 1977) 35–36.

Time Nairobi bureau chief David Wood interviews . . . "Two of the black leaders most concerned with achieving a Rhodesian settlement: Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda . . . and Joshua Nkomo, perhaps the best known of the Rhodesian nationalists and co-leader (with Robert Mugabe) of the Patriotic Front. "Asked about the chance for peace, President Kaunda said . . ."I can see no peacefull settlement at all. It is finished . . . A violent situation cannot be solved by the nonviolent method." Joshua Nkomo stated that . . . "We have our forces; we have both military and police trained and ready. We shall have a constitution only when we know the power base won't break."

VOTING FOR THE GUN BARREL, in *Time*, v.110, no.3 (18 July 1977) 30–31.

At its Annual Meeting held this year in Libreville, Gabon, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) agreed on a resolution proposed by Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda designating The Patriotic Front of Rhodesia as the only legitimate recipient of OAU financial aid. "Declared Kaunda: 'A new Zimbabwe [Rhodesia] can only be born out of the barrel of a gun.' "

2. *Whither Rhodesia-Racial Conflict or Coexistence*

AN ANGOLA — OR A KENYA? WHITE RHODESIANS WONDER ABOUT THEIR FUTURE UNDER BLACK RULE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.24 (13 December 1976) 64–66.

"You find no one pattern of how blacks deal with whites in Africa after they've taken power. The record turns up some big surprises."

RHODESIA TALKS PEACE BUT GIRDS FOR WAR, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.23 (6 December 1976) 33–34 plus.

"The alternatives: political power for blacks or racial conflict. David B. Richardson of the magazine's staff talked with Rhodesian leaders in Geneva and Salisbury, then cabled the reports that follow."

RHODESIA UNDER PRESSURE, by Guy Arnold, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.4 (July-August 1974) 16–20.

"Developments in Africa arising from the changes in Portugal represent a decisive shift in the politico-military situation in southern Africa. The Rhodesian authorities do not appear to have appreciated the significance for their own position in what is happening."

RHODESIA: RACIAL CONFLICT OR CO-EXISTENCE?, by Patrick O'Meara. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1975. 217 p.

"A . . . description of the overt political actors in Rhodesia up to now; . . . informative about Africans working within the system."

RHODESIA: THE CHALLENGE TO DETENTE, by Elaine Windrich, in *The World Today*, v.31, no.9 (September 1975) 358–367.

" . . . The prospects for a Rhodesian settlement remain as remote as ever."

RHODESIA: THE RISKS OF WAR. WILL IT BE ANOTHER ANGOLA? by Colin Legum, in *Current*, no.183 (May/June 1976) 52–55.

"One last chance still remains of stopping the war which has already started in Rhodesia from engulfing Southern Africa. It is for Mr. Ian Smith's regime to agree — even at this late hour — to return to British authority . . . The balance of power in Southern Africa — which began to alter with the defeat of Portuguese colonialsim in 1974 — is tilting decisively against Rhodesia . . . The real danger of the present situation in Rhodesia is obscured by those who see it as primarily 'a Communist challenge.' The main threat to Rhodesia and its neighbors does not come primarily from the Communists, but from the mistaken policy of the Rhodesian Front in denying majority rule to 90 percent of the country's inhabitants. Even the South African Government recognizes this as unrealistic and unwise."

WHITE RHODESIA 1974, by I.R. Hancock and J.M. Lee, in *Australian Outlook*, v.29, no.1 (April 1975) 83–96.

"Rhodesia's present and future difficulties stem from a confluence of several factors, some of which originated in the early and mid-1960's. The process of isolation has been a long and slow one, no less successful for the absence of notable and spectacular victories. Indeed some future historian might well conclude that the year 1974 was crucial, not only because of the direct effects of the Portuguese coup, but also because several fronts of opposition were brought together for the final and decisive phase. The object here is to show how this all round pressure built up during 1974 to a point where the end of white Rhodesia is more clearly in sight than at any time UDI in 1965."

3. *Government and Politics*

a. *African Nationalists*

NATIONALIST MANEUVERS; ON THE ROAD TO ZIMBABWE, by Roger Mann, in *The New Leader*, v.59, no.21 (25 October 1976) 5–7.

"For five months Joshua Nkomo had been traveling from London to Moscow, Berlin to Belgrade, Luanda to Dar es Salaam — visiting 26 countries altogether in search of international backing for majority rule in Rhodesia . . . Independent Zimbabwe is likely to prove a moderate country with the best developed infrastructure in Black Africa. In addition, it will have the most productive agricultural sector and an industrial base that has developed spectacularly in response to the economic sanctions. The vast mining operations should expand rapidly as well. For majority rule is expected to bring a boom to the country, enabling it to quickly absorb the foreign capital kept in abeyance by sanctions. Though economic reforms are sure to be instituted when a new black government takes over — there will have to be some sort of land redistribution, for instance — they will probably not come overnight; the lesson of Mozambique has not been lost here. Initial changes are expected to occur in such areas as health and education. But there is still a long way to travel on the road to Zimbabwe. As Rhodesian blacks enter the stage of face-to-face negotiations with the whites, they continue to express intense hostility toward Smith's participation."

SETTLERS AND SETTLEMENT: THE RHODESIAN CRISIS 1974–5, by Shimshon Zelniker, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.2 (April-June 1975) 23–44.

"In a dramatic move late in 1974 the Rhodesian Government ordered the leaders of the banned African parties released from their decade-long detention. Reversing a consistently harsh record of opposition to political compromise, the rebel regime led by an Ian Smith has, with this surprise move, rekindled the hope that political settlement rather than military solution may yet bring peace to Rhodesia. Though clearly only tentative, the prospects of a settlement have been considerably reinforced by a series of significant developments late in the year . . . In sponsoring its programs the Rhodesia Party had introduced a political challenge and a choice absent from white Rhodesian politics since the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963. The manner with which the opposition has achieved such objectives will serve as the focus of this article."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies . . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of apolitical conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

ZIMBABWE DIVIDED, by John Day, in *Contemporary Review*, v.227, no.1318 (November 1975) 240–245.

"The African nationalists of Rhodesia value

unity and need unity, but they are irreparably divided. Each African nationalist party in Rhodesia since the beginning of the movement in 1957 has claimed to represent the African nation of Zimbabwe (the African name for Rhodesia) and has fervently cherished the supposed unity of this nation as strongly as it has demanded its self-government. The African nationalist movement in Rhodesia, in order most effectively to fight the white minority so firmly entrenched in political, economic and social power, had to present a united front. Yet since 1961 it has suffered continual fragmentation."

b. *White Nationalists*

POLITICS IN RHODESIA: WHITE POWER IN AN AFRICAN STATE, by Larry W. Bowman. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973. 206 p.

"Discusses the consolidation of white political control, relations between the less than 250,000 white Rhodesians who dominate five million Africans, the African nationalist movement, the push for independence from Britian, the effect of international sanctions, and the current state of Rhodesian politics. Concentrating on the 1953–1972 period, he argues that during these two decades there has been little movement toward an interracial or African nationalist government."

RHODESIA AND HER FOUR DISCRIMINATORY CONSTITUTIONS, by M. Aaron Benjamin Mutiti, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.2 (1974) 259–278.

"My objective in writing this article is to show how the nature of Rhodesia as a settler colony affected its constitutional evolution . . . In this article I intend to trace the evolution of the four Rhodesian Constitutions since 1923 and to show their differences as well as the role Britian has played in influencing the development of these Constitutions."

4. *White Racism in Rhodesia*

BLACK VS. WHITE IN AFRICA — RHODESIA'S SIDE OF THE STORY: INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.80, no.21 (24 May 1976) 31–32.

"Black majority rule, which Secretary of State Kissinger backs is no solution Rhodesia's leader is convinced of that. He discusses other options in this interview with David B. Richardson of the magazine's staff."

INSIDE AFRICA'S POWDER KEG, by Jean-Claude Pomonti, in *Atlas, World Press Review*, v.23, no.9 (September 1976) 21–23.

How "Rhodesia's white minority (270,000 whites vs. 6 million black Africans) fights for the good life."

LAND AND RACE IN RHODESIA, by Henry Vusss Moyana, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.1 (1975) 17–41.

"This essay will examine the various legislative acts intended to remove the African from agricultureal competition. It will also examine the economic effects of the policy of land apportionment on the African population. Finally, it will demonstrate the extent to which the land issue affected the political scene."

THE RESERVE OF THE "RHODESIAN WAY OF LIFE," by Saul Ndlovu, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v.26, no.603 (20 May 1975) 30–32.

"Smith's sentiments about Rhodesia are reflected in the country's economic system and general distribution of wealth based on a strictly pro-white allocation of means of production . . . The . . . gap between the African and the white standard of living did not begin when Smith's . . . Rhodesian Front party first got into office in December 1962. It dates back to earlier periods. The RF has, however, strongly consolidated it and wants it entrenched forever. It calls it 'the Rhodesian way of life.' This so-called 'Rhodesian way of life' shows that in 1960, Europeans, who then comprised eight percent of the country's total population, received 60 percent of incomes generated. Africans in employment then were 35 percent of the population."

RHODESIA: WHITE RACISM AND IMPERIAL RESPONSE, by Martin Loney. Baltimore, Penguin, 1975. 234 p.

"A . . . history which covers several centuries of white exploitation of Rhodesia's Africans, and culminates in a quasi-Marxist analysis of the British failure to force majority rule."

5. *Military Aspects*

THE MILITARY: A MISSION IMPOSSIBLE, in *Time*, v.109, no.24 (13 June 1977) 29.

The current position of the Rhodesian Army is reviewed. The Supreme Commander Lieutenant General Peter Walls has . . . "declared that he and his Army are ready to 'serve under any Rhodesian government' — presumably including one headed by blacks."

REPORT FROM ZIMBABWE: WHERE DETENTE' MEANS DETENTION, by Peter Earl, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 18–20.

"On a quiet Friday afternoon, thirty people left Mabvuku township. They have not been seen since. Not a startling fact in itself, but taken in conjunction with United Nations figures for the same period estimating that one hundred Africans a day were crossing into Mozambique from Rhodesia, the migration of thirty able-bodied men from the sleepiest of Salisbury's townships assumes ominous proportions. In spite of border patrols and curfew, black Rhodesians are still leaving the country to enlist with the guerrilla forces operating from within Mozambique, and the townships are providing ever-increasing numbers of those prepared to take up arms."

WHITE AFRICA AT BAY, in *Newsweek*, v.87, no.23 (7 June 1976) 31–36 plus.

"It is a tiny war, still in its infancy. There are only a few thousand full-time combatants on either side and, to date, casualties have been light. But the struggle between the white-supremacist regime in Rhodesia and the black African guerrillas is growing day by day. It is the last convulsion of colonialism; no one is likely to fight a major war over the other vestiges of European empires, such as French Guinea or Hong Kong or Portuguese Macao. But Rhodesia — named after Britains's Cecil Rhodes, who sent the first white settlers there in 1890 — has chosen to stand and fight, and the nascent war threatens to turn so bitter that it could plunge all of southern Africa into turmoil. Already, the United States has been confronted, in an election year, with a sensitive new foreign-policy dilemma: how to reconcile legitimate black demands for majority rule with the West's economic and strategic interests in the area. The fighting in Rhodesia is the first skirmish in white Africa's last-ditch struggle for survival. No 'blood bath' is yet in sight, but the outlook for Rhodesia is poor."

6. *Economic Aspects*

FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ZIMBABWE, by Colin Stoneman, in *World Development*, v.4, no.1 (January 1976) 25–58.

"Very little is known about the development of the structure of foreign ownership of the Rhodesian economy, because of the general inadequacy of statistics resulting from participation in federation in the 1950s and UDI. This paper is an attempt to put the story together, by a series of estimates, a rather heavy reliance on statistics published in 1964–5, and an assessment of scattered information appearing more recently. It is concluded that although Rhodesian private capital is relatively much weaker than its South African equivalent, it is dominant in some important sectors. Some possible consequences of this for Zimbabwean prospects are considered."

7. *Effect of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on Great Britain and on the Organization of African Unity (OAU)*

OAU FACES RHODESIA, by Osita C. Eze, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.1 (1975) 43–62.

"The unilaterial declaration of independence (UDI) by the white minority regime in Rhodesia posses a major problem for the Organization of African Unity. It is intended in this paper to show that UDI was no accident of history but rather an inevitable outcome of the British colonial policy in the territory. The seizure of power by Mr. Ian Smith did not take the Africans by surprise as has been suggested. But this paper will be mainly concerned with those factors which constitute obstacles to the OAU initiative in Rhodesia. Thus, the reasons for the limited successes of the OAU, as the main organ for channeling and harmonizing African opinion and the liberation efforts, will form the central theme of this paper."

U.D.I.: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE RHODESIAN REBELLION, by Robert C. Good. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973. 368 p.

"This study makes clear that Great Britain could do little to turn aside Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, and that sanctions could not be expected to significantly deter the Rhodesian rebels. The author, US Ambassador to Zambia from 1965 to 1968, feels that sanctions should continue, however, so that the West will not be identified with the white regimes in southern Africa in the future struggle for majority rule."

8. *Rhodesia and the US*

AMENDING THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945. Part 1. Washington, Government Printing Office, 15 July 1975. 22 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Recommends passage with amendment of H.R. 1287, to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt the importation of Rhodesian chrome, in accordance with U.N. economic sanctions by negating the 1971 Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act which permitted such importation. Includes minority views (p. 13–22.) H.R. 1287 is similar to 93d Congress S. 1868."

DEPARTMENT URGES PASSAGE OF BILL TO HALT IMPORTATION OF RHODESIAN CHROME, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.76, no.1966 (28 February 1977) 170–174.

"Statements by Secretary Vance and Julius L. Katz, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 10."

DRUMS OF WAR: THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN RHODESIA, by George M. Daniels. New York, Third Press, 1974. 190 p.

"A . . . mix of primary sources on Rhodesia and the liberation movements, with an afterword by Congressman Charles Diggs detailing the recent US 'tilt' toward the white-minority regimes."

RESOURCES IN RHODESIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 88 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on International Resources, Food, and Energy to consider US policy toward Rhodesia and its implications for long-term access to Rhodesian mineral resources. Appendices (p. 75–88) contain submitted Administration responses to subcom questions."

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by William D. Rogers, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.75, no.1948 (25 October 1976) 532–537.

"This is a critical moment in our relations with Africa. The Secretary of State has just returned from

two weeks in Africa. The purpose of his trip was to explore whether the United States could play a constructive role in the search for peaceful solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia."

[STATE] DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.73, no.1885 (11 August 1975) 209–212.

"Statements by Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, made before The Subcommittee on Africa of The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10."

THE "TAR BABY" OPTION: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN RHODESIA, by Anthony Lake. New York, Columbia University Press (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1976. 316 p.

"This . . . analysis of recent US policy toward Rhodesia constitutes the first major account of how our African policy is made in terms of bureaucratic politics. In the negative evolution of Rhodesian policy (i.e., the Byrd Amendment and Nixon-Kissinger policy of increased 'communication' with white minority governments), the low priority of African issues for US liberals and blacks was perhaps more important than the active efforts of the conservative pro-Rhodesian lobbies. In Lake's view this low priority requires a 'clearly stated and easily understood' policy that can be carried out by the bureaucracy without constant, high-level supervision."

US REITERATES SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN RHODESIA, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.76, no.1960 (17 January 1977) 53–57.

"Statements made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly on December 13 by US Representative William E. Scranton and on December 14 by US Representative Richard Petree, Counselor for Political Affairs, US Mission to the United Nations; a statement made in plenary on December 20 by US Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr.,; and the texts of two resolutions adopted by the committee on December 14 and by the Assembly on December 20."

9. *Rhodesia and the UN*

THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RHODESIA CASE, by Michael Stephen, in *Contemporary Review*, v.224, no.1300 (May 1974) 239–243.

"There have been but few questions at the United Nations in recent years which have raised so many important questions for the student of international law and institutions as the case of Rhodesia. The United Nations is the best institution that man has so far been able to devise for the promotion of world order and progress under the rule of law, and in many respects it works quite well, but in the field of highly political issues it has serious defects at the present time. Perhaps in this short article attention can be drawn to some of them."

10. *Soviet View of Events in Rhodesia*

DEATH THROES OF RACIST REGIME, by A. Runov, in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, no.1, (1977) 68–73. In English.

The power struggle between the white government and the black majority population in Rhodesia and the attempts by western diplomacy to find a non-violent solution.

LEANING TOWARD THE RACISTS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.27, no.39 (22 October 1975) 14.

Condensed text in Izvestia, 26 Sept. 1975, p.2, in which Communist China is scored for its policies toward Rhodesia and South Africa. States that China is motivated, among others, by trade considerations which allow her to import strategic materials, such as diamonds, copper, lead and gold from South Africa and chrome and graphite from Rhodesia.

MOZAMBIQUE — RHODESIA BORDER CLOSED, in *The Current Digest of The Soviet Press*, v.28, no.10 (7 April 1976) 24.

Condensed text of comments in Izvestia, 11 March, p.4 on the reasons why Mozambique — Rhodesia border was closed on 3 March 1976 as announced by Machel Samora — President of Mozambique.

HH. Rwanda (See appendixes)

II. Sao Tome and Principe (See also appendixes)

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE: MINI-STATE WITH MAXI-PROBLEMS, by Laurie S. Wisenberg and Gary F. Nelson, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 15–17 plus.

"The west African islands of Sao Tome and Principe gained their joint independence on July 12, 1975, as a serendipitous consequence of the Portuguese Revolution . . . One of the major rationales for the massive American involvement in Angola was the necessity to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring a naval base in Angola and, thereby, threatening Western shipping along the Cape route. Thus, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the economically hard-pressed newly independent state of Sao Tome and Principe may become another prize in the Cold War, for it can provide the Soviets with alternative naval and air facilities on the West African coast."

JJ. Senegal (See also appendixes)

AREA HANDBOOK FOR SENEGAL, by Harold

D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. 410 p. (DA Pam 550-70.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL, by Edward J. Schumacher. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 279 p.

"Testing the relevant theoretical perspectives against a . . . knowledge of the Senegalese state and party, Schumacher . . . asserts that the strength of machine party politics has been one factor inhibiting the government's implementation of its early socialist goals."

SENEGAL UNDER SENGHOR, by Elrich Meister, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 11-12.

"The Republic of Senegal, for a long time the undisputed leader of francophone Africa, shows a confusing ambivalence at first glance. The 'African socialism' of its poet-president Leopold Sedar Senghor contrasts sharply with its political reality, which is characterized in part by the stubborn retention of old hierarchies and colonial abuses. The half-way urbanized city of Dakar plays a fateful role as magnet for an undernourished rural population which, suffering from the catastrophic drought which has long afflicted sub-Saharan Africa, hopes for better things from life in the sprawling bidonvilles of the capital. At the same time Dakar seems to radiate little in the way of helpful impulses to the hinterlands."

KK. Seychelles (See also appendixes)

AN APPREHENSIVE ISLAND-NATION; THE SEYCHELLES FACES THE WORLD, by Darryl D'Monte, in *The New Leader*, v.60, no.2 (17 January 1977) 12-13.

"With its new-found freedom, the country is beginning to feel the cross-currents of world politics even more directly . . . Will the Seychelles remain a colonial appendage under the guise of freedom and the patronage of the United States? Or will it slide over to the Socialist camp, like many of its neighbors in the Indian ocean — not least of all the biggest one, India? Or will it really be able to perform a tightrope act between the two extremes? No matter what the ultimate answer, moreover, there is no avoiding the immediate forecast of rough weather."

LL. Sierra Leone (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR SIERRA LEONE, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. 400 p. (DA Pam 550-180.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Illustrations; Tables; Glossary; and Bibliography.

2. *Government and Politics*

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SIERRA LEONE CHIEFDOMS, by Roger Tangi, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.2 (June 1976) 311-321.

"Violence has been a recurring feature of political life in provincial Sierra Leone for a long time. In 1898, two years after the establishment of colonial rule, a mass rebellion, commonly known as the Hut Tax War, and directed against British political authority, took place over a large part of the Protectorate. Thereafter, the violence which periodically disrupted the chiefdoms of the hinterland, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, resulted predominantly from conflicts amongst the indigenous peoples themselves. This article is concerned with the various disturbances that flared up in the Sierra Leone chiefdoms since the late 1940s. These disturbances have been characterized by Martin Kilson ad 'a form of rural' radicalism, 'which in some instances constituted a virtual peasant revolt against traditional rulers and authority'; they were violent forms of populist opposition to specific features of chiefdom administration 'that proved unjust or unduly burdensome to the masses.' This view has been modified recently by Walter Barrows, who regards rural violence not as a result of popular discontent, but as the expression of conflict between elites within the chiefdoms. My present study seeks to develop this latter argument. In addition, the relative frequency of such local-level violence is briefly considered, and this entails some discussion of the nature of politics at the center."

LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS, by Christopher Clapham. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 156 p.

"An important study, both for Africanists and for students of methodology; examines two countries of similar origins but different fates."

3. *Role of the Military*

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE; A CASE STUDY OF AFRICAN SOLDIERS IN POLITICS, by Thomas S. Cox. Cambridge and London, 1976. 229 p.

"The most striking political reality in Sub-Saharan Africa within the last decade has been the substitution of military officers for civilian rulers of a large group of countries. Why has this occurred? How have the military regimes functioned? How have army officials interacted with civilian elites? Focusing on Sierra Leone, Mr. Cox attempts to answer these and other signigicant questions . . ." With selected bibliography.

4. *Economic Aspects*

DELCO'S COLLAPSE HITS SIERRA LEONE,

by Desmond Davies, in *African Development*, v.9, no.12 (December 1975) 19–20.

"Delco's iron ore mine in Sierra Leone has gone into liquidation depriving the country of its sole iron ore exports leaving the government with two large loans outstanding . . . [The author] tells the . . . story."

MM. Somalia (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE HORN OF AFRICA, by J. Bowyer Bell, Jr. New York, Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974. 55 p.

"The Horn of Africa is strategically important because of its geographical position 'abutting the vital oil routes out of the Arabian Sea, and also because of the developing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.' Bell focuses on the present and future significance of the area and on the political stresses developing there." With bibliography.

WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, by Tom J. Farer. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976. 157 p.

"Historical backdrop for the . . . issues presented by the Horn. Analyzing US military interests there, Farer . . . demolishes various rationales for continued US military aid to Ethiopia in its conflicts with Somalia and Eritrea, and he 'produces' . . . evidence to support his contention that the extent and significance of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean have been much exaggerated."

2. *Somali-Ethiopian Dispute*

THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE, by O. Mirkovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v.27, no.662 (5 March 1976) 8–10.

"Somalia and Ethiopia are both nonaligned African countries. They both have progressive internal systems and are engaged in the building of socialism, but they have fallen out in a dispute over three different places. These are Ogaden, Eritrea and more recently Djibouti. Since this is a strategical area, where many other interests are competing, this already complicated and delicate dispute between neighbors is liable to have much wider repercussions."

TROUBLE ON THE HORN, by Arnand de Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.26 (27 June 1977) 45–46.

Text includes excerpts from President Muhammad Siad Barre of Somalia's first exclusive interview with an American journalist in three years. President Barre characterized Ethiopia's Mengistu as . . ."a sick mind conducting blood-thirsty genocide. Ethiopia is neither Marxist nor Leninist, . . . They only know how to kill . . ." Ambassador Young's statement on the potentially stabilizing effects of Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia was . . ."misinformed . . ." while concerning the Soviets . . ." it's no secret that we don't see eye to eye on Ethiopia . . ."

3. *Somali-Soviet Relations*

N.V. PODGORNY RECEIVES MUHAMAD ALI SOMATUR, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.27, no.20 (11 June 1975) 23.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, 15 May 1975 p.1 on the visit by Div. Gen. Somatur of Somali. Participating in the discussions, on the Soviet side, among others, was V.G. Kulikov, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and U.S.S.R. first Deputy Minister of Defense.

SOMALIA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Dennis Chaplin, in *Military Review*, v.55, no.7 (July 1975) 3–9.

"As Western colonial power and bases recede, the Soviet Navy seems to be moving in and staking claims . . . In the Mediterranean, the Soviet aim was to establish bases on NATO's Southern flank, a transparent enough military objective. But, in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet naval activity is more complex in its relation to NATO, and this is worth discussion. A significant focal point for this discussion is Somalia. Somalia has received over 60 Soviet ship visits since 1968, indicating a level of interest in that area which can only arouse NATO suspicions. To all intents and purposes, the summer of 1974 saw decisive moves suggesting that the USSR plans to cultivate Somalia into a military base for Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean."

SOMALIA: THE RUSSIANS ON AFRICA'S HORN, in *Time*, v.106, no.3 (21 July 1975) 29–30.

"Outside of Eastern Europe, perhaps the Soviet Union's most notable satellite in the world today is the African republic of Somalia. A drought-stricken country of 3 million people, which achieved independence in 1960, Somalia has a 1,700-mile coastline on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, hard by the shipping lanes over which oil from the Persian Gulf is carried to Western Europe and the US. Testifying before Congress recently, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger disclosed that the Soviets were building an important missile facility at the Somali port of Berbera. Although Schlesinger backed up his charge by releasing US reconnaissance photos of the Berbera buildup, the Somali government denied the accusation and invited US Congressmen to see for themselves. Last week, after a trip to Berbera, Oklahoma Republican Senator Dewey Bartlett concluded that Schlesinger's facts were essentially correct."

SOVIET AIRLIFT SAVES SOMALI NOMADS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.27, no.42 (12 November 1975) 22–23.

Condensed text of a report in Pravda, 21 Oct. 1975, p. 5 on the economic and social conditions in

Somalia, also states that the Soviet Union provided airplanes and vehicles to shift a total of 120,000 Somali Nomadic Herosmen from Northern Regions, where droughts recur regularly, to the fertile provinces in the south . . .

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, by Brian Crozier, in *Conflict Studies*, no.54 (February 1975) 3–19.

"The expanding Soviet presence in the Democratic Republic of Somalia amounts, on the evidence of factual reports from that country, analyzed in this study, to a process of gradual satellisation. Somalia's recent case-history may be compared with that of Cuba, or perhaps with Egypt before the mass expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972. Although the strength of Moslem feeling is an obstacle to Communist penetration Soviet influence now extends over nealry all sectors of Somali administration. The Somali National Security Service was set up under Soviet advice and KGB agents are involved in its management; there are Soviet advisers in the President's office, and in the ministries dealing with propaganda, education, finance and economy. In the armed services, Soviet influence is pervasive."

THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA, by Christopher Stevens. New York, Holmes 7 Meier, 1976. 236 p.

"Traces the evolution of contacts between the Soviet Union and black Africa from 1953 to 1972, focusing on seven African countries: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. No attempt is made to set forth a grand theory of Afro-Soviet relations, but instead it is argued that all parties acted on an ad hoc basis."

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, by J. Bowyer Bell, in *Orbis*, v.19, no.2 (Summer 1975) 402–411.

"Between 1970 and 1971 Soviet naval vessels made seven visits to the ports of the Persian Gulf, but twice as many to Berbera in the Somali Democratic Republic. The littoral states of the Gulf dominate the international oil flow. Saudi Arabia alone produces six million barrels a day with 145 billion barrels in proven reserves. The rivalries and aspirations of the Gulf states have given rise to massive arm deals, extreme tension, intensive maneuvers by the huge transnational oil cartels, manipulation from abroad, and the prospect that local conflict might disrupt much of the world's oil supplies. The stability of the regimes in Baghdad and Teheran and elsewhere in the region is a matter of considerable moment in Washington and Moscow. In fact, in a world with escalating energy needs, the Gulf would appear to be a lodestone for great-power interest. Berbera, on the other hand, is a huddled sprawl of low buildings under a blistering sun in a land devoid of resources and charm, and obscure entrepot for nomadic tribes dealing in hides and camels. Berbera and Somali obviously hold an attraction for the Soviets that transcends conventional analysis. Yet their appeal is not unrelated to the Gulf, for recently the Soviets have fashioned a presence in the Horn of Africa that may hold serious implication not only for the Gulf's stability but for the future balance in the Indian Ocean. Berbera has become something more than a way-station for camels, if still something less than a lodestone for great-power interest."

4. *Soviet View of Events in Somalia*

THE FACTS REFUTE, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.27, no.27 (30 July 1975) 19.

Complete text of statement in Pravda, 3 July 1975, p.19. US Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger recently alleged the existence of a Soviet Military Base in Somalia. American propaganda immediately seized upon this fantasy . . ." Notes that Somali Secretary of State for foreign affairs, stated at a press conference that imperialism circles are resorting to unseemly methods in an effort to draw the attention of the world from their own military activity in the region of the Indian Ocean, where, as everybody knows, the USA is building not mythical but very real bases on the Island of Diego Garcia and Masira."

SOMALIA SOCIALIST ORIENTATION, by E. Sherr, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.2 (1974) 85–87. In English.

Compares changes in Somalia in the early 1970s with that of Somalia before the revolution in October 1969. Also comments on Soviet-Somalia political and economic relations.

5. *US Weapons Aid to Somalia*

CROSSED WIRES, by Arnaud De Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.90 and no.13 (26 September 1977) 42–43.

Somalia according to Somali Ambassador Abdirizak Haji Hussen feels that the US. . . "let us down badly by misleading us". . . as to US willingness to furnish Somalia with defensive weapons in the event of an Ogaden War.

NN.South Africa (Republic) (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 845 p. (DA Pam 550–93.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

HALTING PRETORIA'S A-TEST, in *Newsweek*, v.90, no.10 (5 September 1977) 36.

When the Russian's announcement that they had discovered a South African test site in the Kalahari desert which appeared to be in preparation for a nuclear test was corroborated by American satellite photos, a

joint US-Soviet effort began to prevent the tests. Britain, France, and West Germany joined in the effort which resulted in President Carter's announcement that. . . "South Africa has informed us that they do not have and do not intend to develop nuclear-explosive devices. . ." Now the question is "would South Africa actually set off a nuclear test if it had not been for pressure?"

LOOKING FOR ANSWERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Jerome Caminada, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.2 (October 1976) 95–100.

"The author, in the months he spent here, sought for answers to some of South Africa's problems and to some attitudes which he found passing strange in the circumstances. His humorous observations belie the sober undertone of this article."

THE PURITANS IN AFRICA; A STORY AFRIKANERDOM, by Wiliam A. DeKlerk. London, R. Collins, 1975. 376 p.

A story outline; Roots and Relations; The Afrikaner Revolution; The Irony of Afrikaner History. Map of South Africa. 1854–1910.

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, by J. E. Spence, *World Survey*, no.77 (May 1975) 1–18.

"In the three decades that have elapsed since the end of the second World War, South Africa's racial policies have become an issue of concern and increasingly bitter debate in a variety of international forums which range from the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity to sports federations, cultural agencies and professional associations of all kinds. For many of South Africa's critics, apartheid has been perceived as a policy which transcends the narrow confines of domestic jurisdiction; its continued implementation has, it is claimed, profound implications — not simply for the security and stability of Southern Africa — but equally for the interests of the superpowers as their leaders contrive to maintain a precarious detente already under threat from local eruptions of conflict in the Middle East, South East Asia and potentially so in Southern Africa as well. International concern has quickened following the miltiary coup in Portugal in April, 1974 and the new government's decision to abandon the military struggle against the insurgent forces waging wars of 'liberation' in Angola and Mozambique. The domestic consequences of this sudden shift in the balance of power in Southern Africa for the local protagonists will be examined presently; but in order to grasp the full impact of these events, it seems appropriate to offer some historical explanation of the Republic's present course in domestic and foreign policy."

SOUTH AFRICA, A COUNTRY THAT HAS NO ANSWER, by Sepp Wille, in *South Africa International*, v.6, no.2 (October 1975) 59–69.

"The author, Socialist Member of Parliament in Austria and a former editor of the periodical Welt der Arbeit, sets down his impressions of his visit to South Africa last year. The text is a translation from the German of Sepp Wille's article in Welt der Arbeit of December 1974."

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WALLS OF TROY, by C. W. de Kiewiet, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.3 (January 1975) 113–132.

"The author, eminent historian and Professor Emeritus of Rochester University, analyzes some of the complexities of South Africa's situation in contemporary international relations against a background of historical factors. This article appeared originally in the Autumn number of The Virgina Quarterly."

THE SOUTH AFRICAN KALEIDOSCOPE, by Martin Spring, in *South Africa International*, v.4, no.3 (January 1974) 168–175.

"South Africa, as all who have visited it or studied it closely will realize, is a bewildering kaleidoscope of anomalies and extremes: of nomadic Bushmen and world-class nuclear physicists; primitive peasants doing barely enough to stay alive and executive-suite dynamos and a handful of plants that are exceptionally large by any standards; riches and poverty. It is microcosm of the world in its ethnic, cultural, sociological and economic complexity. Just as in the world a handful of nations whose peoples are largely or entirely of Caucasian origin both produce and consume a disproportionate share of the wealth, their responsibilities toward the backward, poverty-stricken and under-nourished Third World, in South Africa a minority group largely of Caucasian origin occupies a similar situation, is plagued increasingly by the same feelings of quilt — and perhaps more than their cousins elsewhere — are doing something constructive about it. South Africa may seem a rich country to outsiders, and none can deny its mineral wealth; but in human resources, it is a poor country. It is more Black than White, more African than European, more rural than urban, more a developing than a developed country."

STANDARDIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, by L. U. Schmidt, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.3, (January 1975) 154–162.

"The author, public relations manager of the South African Bureau of Standards, sets out some of the main functions of this body which, in less than thirty years, has become one of the leading institutions of its kind in the world."

2. *Strategic Import of the Republic of South Africa*

(LI) — THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A REGIONAL POWER, by Maj. James W. Pinson. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 37 p. (P658e Research Study.)

"The strategic value of the Republic of South Africa has been increased by the current Soviet naval

expansion and the rapid depletion of the earth's mineral resources. This study emphasizes the emergence of South Africa as a regional power. The development of the nation is traced from the colonial era to the present. Geopolitical assets are examined with regard to geography and resources. A discussion of South Africa's nuclear option and the progresss of an outward strategy concludes the study."

POWER—POLITICAL POSITION AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Paul Gygli, in *South Africa International*, v.6, no.4 (April 1976) 179–187.

"A former General Chief of Staff of the Swiss Defence Force, Dr. Gygli was a guest of the South Africa, considers the Republic's situation in the wider context of international relations."

SOUTH AFRICA: BACKGROUND AND STRATEGIC VALUE, by Jack Penn, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.1 (July 1976) 41–56.

"The defense of the Free World depends vitally upon the geopolitical location of South Africa. This article is based on extracts from a paper delivered by the author to a seminar at Denver, Colorado, on 21 June 1976. Internationally known in his professional field, the author is contributing increasingly to commentary and analysis of South Africa within the wider context of Africa."

THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF SOUTH AFRICA, in *RUSI Journal*, v.121, no.3 (September 1976) 1–2.

"Increasing concern is being felt in the West about developments in Southern Africa. The Portuguese departure has left opportunities for rival factions to snatch power by force of arms and has greatly increased the dangers facing the Rhodesian regime. But the core of the situation rests firmly in the Republic of South Africa, which is the biggest country, with the biggest population (about four million whites and twenty million blacks) and the biggest economy. The West, and particularly but not exclusively the Netherlands and the British Isles, can hardly be indifferent to what happens in the Republic for reasons of kith and kin alone. Added to the social links are those of economics and military strategy, so that in sum many individuals and many organizations are touched by events that take place there."

(LI) THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Maj. Robert H. Scribble. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 37 p. (S416s Research Study.)

"Much of what is written concerning the Republic of South Africa is colored by the emotional issues of apartheid and the administration of South West Africa. This study analyzes the strategic significance of South Africa to the United States in terms of future impact, and omits references to the emotional issues. The political, economic, and military sectors are examined in light of the factual data available. Each area is considered solely from the strategic signifiance to the United States because of two major factors, raw materials and location."

3. Whither the Republic of South Africa?

a. *External Pressures*

(LI) — THE CHANGING BUFFER ZONE: ROOTS OF ACCOMMODATION, by Maj. Stephen R. Robinson. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1975. 71 p. (W1773c Research Study.)

"The existence of a geopolitical buffer zone extending northward from her land borders has been a signficant factor in most assessments of the Republic of South Africa's strength and survivability as a white minority ruled nation in Africa. The withdrawal of the Portuguese from the buffer colonies of Angola and Mozambique will precipitate change throughout the entire region. This study examines the kinds of change that will probably take place and its effect on the concept of the buffer zone as a factor in the strength and survivability of the Republic of South Africa."

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION, by Alan H. Jeeves, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 504–517.

"There is mounting evidence that Africans at every level are well aware of the changes which have swept through Southern Africa since April 1974. The predictable result has been to intensify discontent, and the government will have increasingly to reckon with the domestic implications of events beyond its borders. Whatever the success of the current 'peace offensive,' it is to the republic itself, no less than to Rhodesia and the border marches, that one must look for the crises which are to come."

SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES, by John Seiler, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.3 (1975) 447–468.

"The purpose of this article is to explore the pattern of South African responses to external pressures. My study grows out of a concern with the regional conflict situation in Southern Africa, whose dimensions have become relatively clear only since the coup in Portugal in 1974. Whatever the specific details of the policies and actions of the rest of the world, these should not rest on misperception of the basic motivation and dynamics of South African decisionmaking vis-a-vis external pressures.

b. *Changing Internal Conditions*

CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA, ed. by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 447 p.

An analysis of the political implications for blacks of economic changes now taking place in South

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Africa; also an assessment of the balance among internal forces for change in South Africa.

THE DYNAMIC OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Lawrence Gandar, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 121-125.

"The theme I have chosen. . . is what seems to me to be the overriding issue of the moment: change and what it signifies for the peoples of this country, and especially the young people."

A NEW ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Esther Roberts, in *Contemporary Review*, v.225, no.1304 (September 1974) 133-137.

"Conditions in South Africa are changing so fast that no one can foresee what the country will be like in a year's time. Towards the end of 1973 South Africa entered a new era and, just when the people were beginning to adjust to new ideas and a new outlook, the coup in Portugal aggravated the position and gave it a sense of urgency. . . In the past the tragedy of South Africa lay in the fact that no one, would satisfy all the racial groups. . . Sheer economic necessity has brought about the beginning of the end of apartheid, but the principal reason that public opinion has changed so dramatically is because the policy of Separate Development, to the Government's chagrin, has produced a number of exceptionally brilliant and surprisingly moderate, African leaders of the Homelands."

SOUTH AFRICA: AFRICAN STATE OR COLONIAL POWER?, by Gwendolen M. Carter, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.5 (September-October 1976) 2-6.

"Never before have there been such changes in southern Africa as during the past two years. Since the unexpected political coup in Portugal in April 1974, Mozambique has become independent, and so has Angola. Now there are heavy external and internal pressures on Rhodesia to concede majority rule to its huge African majority, and on South Africa to move Namibia (South West Africa) rapidly to independence. These developments mean that South Africa is no longer insulated by allies and satellites from independent, self-assertive African states. Recent events in Soweto and elsewhere have confirmed the depth of feeling among black South Africans regarding the political system imposed upon them by their white compatriots. Thus the pressures on South Africa itself are intensifying. Partly because of these new features of South Africa's internal and external situation, and partly because within its own territory a new phenomenon is being heralded — the bestowal of independence on the Transkei by the South African government — it is particularly important to analyze the question around which this article is focused: What is South Africa? Is it an African state, with an intermingled white and black population, and acceptable as such throughout the Continent? Or is South Africa a colonial power, divesting itself of the so-called homelands and their associated peoples, and endeavouring thereby, as recent statements suggest, to establish a white majority within the rest of the country?"

SOUTH AFRICA: AUTHORIZATION REFORM?, by Merle Lipton, in *The World Today*, v.30, no.6 (June 1974) 247-258.

"Many observers interpret the South African election result as a prescription for 'the mixture as before,' with a dull campaign and bigger majority for the Nationalist Party (NP) meaning—despite the surprise election of half-a-dozen Progressives—the same 'no change' apartheid policies. But such a view ignores significant features of the campaign, as well as some deeper underlying changes in different interpretation, it is necessary first to define what is meant by 'change' in South Africa, for it is largely due to confusion over this that these new trends have been missed."

TOWARD A NEW STATE STRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.1 (April 1974) 19-21.

"A new phase has begun in the dialogue concerning a constitutional restructuring of South Africa. The white parties continue to juggle with the sterile concepts of 'integration' and 'separate development' (apartheid), but even most white voters seem aware today of how remote from reality this highly polished glass-bead game has become. . . The Institute of Race Relations in Capetown held its annual convention, with the participation of delegates from universities and leaders of the black tribal lands (the so-called 'homelands'). At this conclave Buthelezi was the first black politician to sketch a solution which, in his opinion, would be acceptable to all segments of the population. He pointed out that the concept of separate development provides an ideal foundation for a federative state structure, in which separate, autonomous states are linked by a federalist formula. These states would work together in certain areas of common interest, particularly in the economic, financial, military and foreign policy spheres. Buthelezi suggested that, within the framework of this federative republic or commonwealth, there would be three types of states: those in which certain black interests dominate; those in which white interests dominate, and those which are 'multinational' in character and would not be dominated by the interests of a particular group. The borders of these states would be determined by negotiations, taking account of historical claims. Members of a particular group who farms, businesses or jobs would happen to fall in a state dominated by another group, would not be compelled to emigrate. But each state would be empowered to set up its own constitution."

UNEXPECTED SHOW OF BLACK POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.11 (13 September 1976) 35-36.

"David B. Richardson of the magazine's staff — a recent visitor to southern Africa — draws on his. . . background there for this cabled report."

c. *Land Distribution and Population Pressures*

THE APPROACHING CRISIS — LAND AND POPULATION IN THE TRANSVAAL AND NATAL, by D. C. Grice, in *South Africa International*, v.4, no.4 (April 1974) 195-210.

"Bearing in mind the Government's expressed determination to give the different African national units no more land than was promised in 1936 by the then South African Government, the additional 16 million Africans will cause certain complications. The purpose of this paper is to consider this very problem in Natal and the Transvaal and very briefly in the Orange Free State."

d. *Alternatives to Racial Conflict*

THE PROSPECT FOR SOUTH AFRICA: THE TASTE OF LIFE IN AN EMBATTLED CONCLAVE, by Benjamin Pogrund, in *Atlas World Press Review*, v.24, no.2 (February 1977) 15 plus.

Interview with Benjamin Pogrund, Assistant Editor, and a political columnist of the "Rand Daily Mail" of Johnannesburg, in which he answered the following questions, among others: Is it fair to compare today's South African Society to that of the pre-Civil War US? What about work permits? How about the different ethnic white groups? Why have the Afrikaner, and the English-speaking not mingled more? How did the Boer War affect the situation? Might a political realignment be in the wind? What pattern of violence do you foresee? How free is the press? Now that economic growth has slowed, what are the chances that economic pressure may force changes? How could US business in South Africa help?

SOUTH AFRICA: THE NEED FOR A BLUE-PRINT OF OUR FUTURE, by Jan S. Marais, in *South Africa International*, v.6, no.4 (April 1976) 153-178.

"This is the address given by the President of the South Africa Foundation on the occasion of the 16th Annual Convention on 26 March, 1976, in Johannesburg. In it Dr. Marais outlines the work and experiences of the Foundation abroad and at home, and provides some suggestions for possible guidelines on the future."

SOUTH AFRICA'S INEXORABLE CHOICE, by Laurence Gandar, in *Atlas World Press Review*, v.23, no.11 (November 1976) 18-19.

"South Africa is a country structured for conflict — by its history, its racial composition, and its traditional policies. Now at last that conflict has burst into the open for all the world to see. It is a struggle of classic simplicity—between those who hold power, which means the Afrikaners, and those who aspire to power, which means the Africans. . . Only shared power in a multiracial society commands anything like sufficient support among all racial groups to make it a feasible proposition. Hence the growing urge among South Africans of all colors to get together round the conference table to work out a common future. It will be a desperately difficult task. We may very well fail. But we really have no alternative but to try, and soon."

SOUTH AFRICA TODAY AND TOMORROW, by Helen Suzman, in *Austrailian Outlook*, v.29, no.3 (December 1975) 261-269.

"South Africa today is the product of more than a quarter of a century of rule under a government determined to separate the races in a multi-racial country. . . It is manifestly clear to all who are working for change inside South Africa — and there are thousands of whites who are so doing — that unlimited time to find a peaceful solution is no longer at their disposal, that the realities of Southern Africa in the last quarter of the twientieth century require that radical adjustments be made which will lead to a just, multi-racial society in which there is a far more equitable sharing of political power and of the wealth of South Africa among the peoples who live in it. The alternative is a bitter embattled future, with life inside the laager growing ever more stifling and uncomfortable."

TIME RUNS OUT FOR SOUTH AFRICA, by David Reed, in *Reader's Digest*, v.110, no.658 (February 1977) 85-90.

How "As black nationalism rises, a racial pressure cooker threatens to blow."

WHERE BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES LOOK TO US TO BRING PEACE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.25, (20 December 1976) 57-58 plus.

"It's a bleak outlook for all South Africa: bloodshed, chaos, racial violence. Is peace out of the question? David B. Richardson of the magazine's International Staff cabled this report on a nation's agony."

4. *Government and Politics*

a. *Political Parties*

A CRICKET IN THE THORN TREE: HELEN SUZMAN AND THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, by Joanna Strangewayes-Booth. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976. 320 p.

"This history of opposition politics in South Africa since the advent of the Nationalists to power in 1948 becomes a parable on the weaknesses and strengths of liberalism, as we witness on the one hand the dissolution of the liberal traditions of the United Party and, on the other, the power of Helen Suzman's solitary assault on apartheid."

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1943-1970, by Kenneth A. Heard. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974. 269 p.

"This book covers the period when the party espousing National Afrikanerdom established its political rule in South Africa. The elections of 1943

confirmed the actions of the government of General Jan Smuts, who had abandoned neutrality and sided with Great Britain in World War II. After 1943, the United Party was able to maintain a coalition government. But after the 1943 elections, the growing nationalistic sentiments of the white Afrikaners (approximately 58 percent of the voters) characterized the South African government; by 1960, a national referendum indicated that South Africans wanted to establish a republic and, by 1961, to leave the British Commonwealth. South Africa became the Republic of South Africa in May, 1961. Since 1961, Afrikaners, the majority of the electorate, have become even more firmly entrenched."

INSIDE THE LAAGER: WHITE POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA, by John de St. Jorre, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.1 (October 1976) 169–186.

Afrikaner Nationalism in South Africa.

b. *The Protest Movement*

THE BLACK SASH OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN LIBERALISM, by Cherry Michelman. New York, Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1975. 198 p.

"An account of the evolution of Black Sash from a mass middle-income organization concerned with the survival of parliamentary democracy into a cadre of about 1,200 white women self-exiled to the fringes of their society by their advocacy of racial integration. Candid about the women's ambiguous position vis-a-vis black racial consciousness, and objective about both their moral victories and political defeats."

FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND AFRICAN POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1882–1964. VOLUME 2: HOPE AND CHALLENGE, 1935–1952, by Thomas Karis. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1973. 536 p.

"Part I of this volume contains documents from 1935 to 1937, the proceedings, resolutions and addresses from the All-African Convention of 1935–1936, as well as documents from other organizations, publications and the the like. Part II—dealing with the period of "Moderation and Militancy, 1937–1949"—features material from the revived African National Congress, 1937–1945, and from the postwar congress, 1946–1949. Documents relating to the Programme of Action in 1950 and the Defiance Campaign appear in Part III, which covers the period 1950–1952. The volume, second in a series of three, includes a chronology, a short section on biographical data, and indexes of names and organizations."

SOWETO: THE CHILDREN TAKE CHARGE, by William McWhirter, in *Time*, v.109, no.26 (27 June 1977) 28–30.

"Soweto (an acronym for southwest townships) remembered its grim anniversary last week in a solemn moratorium that its residents, with calculated irony, called 'Black Christmas.' . . . ." "Soweto's Black Christmas and all its trimmings were planned — and enforced — by a secretive emergent political force of students, largely of high school age. Officially they are known as the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), but they are described simply, by themselves and by the older blacks of Soweto, as 'The children.' They are in fact the dominant, virtually unrivaled Political power within Soweto."

'STEVE BIKO IS DEAD,' by Raymond Carroll with Peter Younghusband in Johannesburg, in *Newsweek*, v.90, no.13 (26 September 1977) 41–42.

". . . . Biko was a 'banned person' who could not be referred to in the press or visited by more than one other person at a time. . . but to many blacks, especially the young, Biko, 30, was South Africa's Martin Luther King, a nonviolent but proudly militant man who helped to found the nation's 'black consciousness' movement and led the opposition to be apartheid. South Africa's white government announced last week that Biko had died in custody after a seven-day hunger strike. He was twentieth black to die in detention during this year, and many of his friends blame the government for his demise. . . . 'This is the big one, the one they cannot get away with, the one they cannot explain away', said Donald Woods, liberal white editor of South Africa's East London Daily Dispatch and a close friend of Biko's."

c. *Labor Power*

CASE STUDIES IN AFRICAN LABOUR ACTION IN SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA, by L. Douwes Dekker and others, in *The African Review, v.4, no.2 (1974) 205–236.*

"It has been widely argued that in a political system as tightly controlled by a dominant minority as in South and South West Africa, one of the few points of leverage at the disposal of the dominated majority lies in the use of what here can be roughly termed 'labour power.' Within this broad thesis there are several, radically different positions which can be discerned. . . The remarks take the form of a consideration, at a very general level, of some of the major constraints, internal and external, facing attempts by Africans to organize and to exert their labour power."

d. The Press: Political Aspects

THE PRESS AS OPPOSITION: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS, by Elaine Potter. Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1975. 228 p.

"The anomalous existence of the free English-language press in a repressive society and the part played by the Afrikans press in underlining the 'verligteverkrampte' divisions in national politics are. . . described. The English press is allowed to exist, in the author's view, because the white opposition to which it speaks is not considered a danger."

5. *Church and State*

CHURCH AND STATE IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Robert Von Lucius, in *South Africa International,* v.6, no.2 (October 1975) 88–99.

"The author, who completed his schooling in Cape Town and later studied law in Germany, worked as assistant at the Institute of Church Law, Bonn University 1973/74. In this article Robert Lucius outlines the modus operandi of churches in this country and discusses briefly where State might affect Church."

6. *Human Rights and Justice*

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOUTH AFRICA, by C. F. Beyers Naude, in *Africa Report,* v.21, no.2 (March–April 1976) 2–6.

"How is it possible that a civilized, western country, with the vast majority of those who hold and control the reins of power claiming to be Christian, can at the same time approve of a system where basic human rights are being denied to millions of its fellow countrymen? This can only be understood if one looks at the concept of democracy which whites in general subscribe to in our country."

JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Albie Sachs. London, Heinemann, 1973. 263 p.

"South Africa claims to have independent courts and, except where apartheid legislation is involved, a color-blind legal system. . . Sachs has set out to examine the South African legal system, not in isolation of its own internal theory, but in the context of the divided society in which it is designed to operate. . . [He] traces the development of the modern South African legal system since the arrival of the whites in the country. . . [And he] discusses the modern legal system since the question of public law, the Natal (and to some extent, Boer) legal tradition has slowly replaced the legacy of the Cape."

NOW SOUTH AFRICA'S CHURCHES PRESS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, in *U.S. News & World Report,* v.82, no.10 (14 March 1977) 29 plus.

"With more and more whites speaking upon taking action against segregation, South Africa's white rulers face their toughest challenge yet."

7. *Apartheid: Its Problems and Prospects*

(LI) — APARTHEID AND INDUSTRALIZED SOUTH AFRICA, by MAJ. Louis M. Vaughan. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 61 p. (V367a Research Study.)

"Racial segregation has existed in South Africa since 1952. In 1948, it was institutionalized under the name of apartheid. This research study explores this policy of apartheid as it exists in South Africa from an economic viewpoint. It explores the dysfunctional aspect of apartheid within the industrialized South Africa environment, and how apartheid affects the economic viability of South Africa. This paper also delves into US economic interests in South Africa and how these business interests are helping to foster and strengthen the policy of apartheid, despite the U S Government denunciation of the South African government's racial policies."

APARTHEID UNDER PRESSURE: SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY STRENGTHEN IN A CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT, by Michael T. Schieber, in *Africa Today,* v.23, no.1 (January-March 1976) 27–45.

"A sense of pressure and urgency is building up in Southern Africa much the same as has occurred in the Middle East since the end of World War II and the creation of the Palestinian State. The white minority government of South Africa finds itself in a world changing at an ever increasing pace, a pace that is placing greater demands on its capabilities and resources. To ease these strains the Republic needs time and insulation from the social revolution that appears to be sweeping the globe. By expending more economic resources on industrial development and increasing diplomatic efforts, the Republic hopes to gain time to become self-sufficient, find external markets, complete the implementation of apartheid and dissuade her opponents from using force against her. Fifteen years have passed since the events at Sharpeville. Ten years have elapsed since the decisions were made to upgrade the Republic of South Africa's Armed Forces and Military-Industrial complex. Are the assessments and resulting decisions of the early 1960s still valid for the mid-1970s and the decade to come, or is the Republic at a turning point requiring an agonizing reappraisal and shift in strategy? Has the Nationalist government decided to change its policy toward nonwhites and moderate its plans for apartheid? What new elements have appeared and what steps will the present government be likely to take to meet them? These questions weigh heavily on the minds of South Africa's leaders and their opponents. The answers will depend on the strength of the Republic's defense forces and her economy, as well as her ability to overcome her weaknesses and adapt to the changing conditions in Southern Africa."

CONQUEST AND CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Heribert Adam, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* v.13, no.4 (1975) 621–640.

"Of all the instances of European conquest, indignant world opinion views the legalized racism of white settlers in South Africa as the worst case. As the last remnant of traditional colonialism, the inevitable doom of the whites is predicted, and only the time span of an outdated racial domination is in question. The main reason for this outcome of a polarising racial confrontation is seen in the intransigence of prejudiced settlers who stubbornly refuse to share their immense privileges with one of the most exploited and oppressed populations in the world. . . This article, however, will argue that the above popular perspective represents a gross oversimplification of a far more complex

situation. The outlined prevalent view of South Africa combines conceptual errors with false methodological emphasis and, often, wishful thinking. A few theoretical remarks on the alternative approach might therefore be in order, before dealing with the substantive issues."

SOUTH AFRICA AND APARTHEID, ed. by Robert E. Peterson. New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1975. 244 p.

South Africa's Population, Economy, and Government; Birth of Apartheid (1944–53). Nationalist Power Grows (1953–9); Bantustans Created (1959–60); Sharpeville and Its Aftermath (1960); South Africa Increasingly Isolated (1961–8); Apartheid Wall Grows Higher (1968–9); and Winds of Change (1970–4). With glossary.

SOUTH AFRICA: APARTHEID AND THE COLOURED DILEMMA, by Leon Weaver, in *African Report*, v.21, no.5 (September-October 1976) 7–11.

"South Africa watchers look for indicators which will enable them to appraise the direction and rate of evolution of the domestic political system. An early and sensitive indicator may exist in the way in which resolution is reached concerning the continuing debate in that country concerning the manner and timetable for sharing power with that element of the nonwhite population known as the 'Coloreds.' A brief review is necessary of the status of the Coloreds in the politics of race of their country, the recent proposals of a Government commission of inquiry, and the Government's first reactions to them."

A SPATIAL MODEL OF AUTHORITY-DEPENDENCY RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Charles F. Schmidt, in *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, v.13, no.3 (1975) 483–490.

"It is suggested here that South Africa's socio-economic and political problems, stemming from the country's multiethnic structure, may be viewed within a conceptual framework that emphasizes the spatial dimensions of the associated conflict. A model suitable for understanding this will stress the many disparities and tensions between the white and core elites and those black counter-elites—including the leaders in the Homelands—who are emerging from the subdominant peripheral groups. Moreover, an analysis of the interaction between core and periphery will highlight the transformation necessary to reduce and resolve the conflict between whites and blacks in the South African spatial system and so promote their more equitable development."

8. *Education*

EDUCATION OF THE AFRICANS IN SOUTH AFRICA, by W. M. Kgware, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.2 (October 1974) 75–86.

"In this article the author, who is Professor of Comparative Education at the University of the North, surveys the field of development of black education in South Africa, particularly in recent decades."

9. *Economy and Industry*

a. *Economic Growth*

SOUTH AFRICA: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL CHANGE, ed. by Adrian Leftwich. New York, St. Martin, 1974. 360 p.

"The old themes are replayed here with new data. . . the overall conclusion remains the same: economic growth may alter South African society but will seriously affect racial politics."

SOUTH AFRICA'S GREAT CHALLENGES AND GOLDEN OPPORTUNITIES, by Jan S. Marais, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.3 (January 1975) 133–142.

"The author, who is President of South Africa Foundation, sets out some vital aspects of the country's economy which, in fact, are helping to accelerate changes in relations between South Africa's diverse peoples. This article is based on extracts only from an address delivered by Dr. Marais to the Deutsches Institut fur Afrika-Forschung E.V. and the Africa Verein in Hamburg on 21 October 1974."

SOUTH AFRICA'S LONELY ECONOMIC BOOM, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.4 (July 1974) 16–17.

"South Africans have had to acknowledge that, despite some cautious domestic political changes on the Cape, foreign feeling toward Pretoria has not improved. On the contrary, the policy of separate development (apartheid) being pursued by the government has increasingly forced the country into the position of an outsider in the realm of international relations. Nevertheless important foreign economic circles have not been deterred and in recent years have strongly expanded their ties to South Africa, which has more than 70% of the world's reserves of platinum, 60% of all diamonds, 75% of chromium and 30% of all uranium discovered thus far. According to knowledgeable private economic observers as well as official circles, in the years to come the country's economic development—which is being pushed forward at a Japanese tempo—should continue to blossom at a pace in the category of "economic miracle," with growth rates of up to 8% annually."

b. *Agriculture*

SMALL FARMERS IN JAPAN AND AFRICA, by Colin Maher, in *South Africa International*, v.4, no.4 (April 1974) 211–224.

"The present consciousness of the inequality between African and White wages in South Africa, even having regard to differentials of skill, has been mentioned. But there is no reason why the incomes of African peasants and of agricultural laborers should be so much below those of African workers in urban areas even taking into account the higher cost of living in the town. In Israel, for example, efforts were comparable to

those of laborers in the towns. One can conclude, therefore, that the productivity of agricultural labor should be raised in order to enable better wages to be paid; but this must be done by education and technical training for the workers and by employing the means of improvement in productivity and of soil fertility."

c. *Industry and Industrialization*

QUEST FOR PRODUCTIVITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: PARTICULARLY IN MANUFACTURING, by H. J. J. Reynders, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.2 (October 1974) 61-74.

"The author, Executive Director of the S. A. Federated Chamber of Industries and a noted economist, compares South Africa's productivity with that of other countries; discusses casual factors for inadequate productivity performance in local manufacturing and suggests means of improving productivity in this key sector."

SOME ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, by R. T. Bell, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.1 (July 1974) 23-24.

"The author is Professor of Economics, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. Here he discusses the decentralization of South African industry per se, as well as its relationship to the proportional increase in population of the African homelands."

10. *Natural Resources and Energy*

a. *Marine Life Resources*

SOUTH AFRICA: WHERE OCEANS MEET, by Margaret M. Smith, in *South Africa International*, v.5, no.2 (October 1974) 87-96.

"The author, Director of the F.L.B. Smith Institute of Ichthyology, Rhodes University, discusses the marine resources around South Africa's shores and the necessity for their conservation, comparing experiences elsewhere to emphasize her theme."

b. *Nuclear Energy*

SOUTH AFRICA IN A NUCLEAR WORLD, by A. J. A. Roux, in *South Africa International*, v.4, no.3, (January 1974) 149-167.

"Nuclear energy in a world context has been described here only in terms of one or two important developments and the role of South Africa in nuclear development has been equally fragmentary. Perhaps those concerned in the sphere of nuclear energy stand too close to the centre of developments to see things in proper perspective. History alone will be the final arbiter of the position South Africa now occupies in the nuclear energy world picture. Meanwhile the country cannot sit back and wait. Developments at Pelindaba and Valindaba are being pursued in the closest cooperation with ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission) and the uranium and manufacturing industries; and one can foresee that these will herald a new era in the industrial and economic developments—as well as the prestige—of South Africa."

c. *Cunene Hydroelectric Scheme and South Africa*

CUNENE SCHEME: A FOCUS FOR CONFRONTATION, by Roger Murray examines what the prospects for the scheme are and its importance to South Africa.

11. *Foreign Relations*

a. *South Africa's Foreign Policy*

SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA: A STUDY IN IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Sam C. Nolutshungu. New York, Africana Publishing Company. Holmes & Meier, 1975. 329 p.

"South African foreign policy, in the view of this young South African political scientist now teaching at Ibadan University, Nigeria, must be seen as an extension of domestic policies. The greatest emphasis, therefore, is given to the economic ties that bind South Africa's neighbors to the expanding white-controlled industrial empires of Johannesburg. The South Africa quest for 'dialogue' with black states to the north is seen as merely a flanking movement to weaken external support for South African dissidents. The data supporting Nolutshungu's arguments cover the period through 1973."

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1970, by James Barber. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973. 325 p.

"A. . . discussion of South Africa's foreign policy since World War II with emphasis on the unusually close relationship noted between domestic and foreign affairs, particularly with regard to racial matters. Dr. Barber suggests that, in many respects, adherence to apartheid both defines South Africa's 'policy imperatives' and often tends to produce something akin to a 'seige mentality' among its policymakers. This, however, may be changing, as the country's foreign policy shifts from one reflecting 'uncertainty' to a relatively confident 'outward policy' more in keeping with its new regional prominence."

b. *Politics, Race and International Sports*

THE POLITICS OF RACE AND INTERNATIONAL SPORT: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Richard Edward Lapchick. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press (for the Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver), 1975. 268 p.

"A. . . narrative account of the increasing ostracism of South Africa from international sporting events makes the point—that only the actuality of isolation produced any softening in white attitudes toward apartheid in sports."

SOUTH AFRICA: APARTHEID AND THE POLITICS OF SPORT, by Richard E. Lapchick, in

Africa Report, v.21, no.5 (September-October 1976) 37-40.

"May marked the sixth anniversary of South Africa's exclusion from the Olympic Movement. While certain external policy changes have taken place since 1970, sports apartheid has remained intact within South Africa. However, there have been few international sports successes for South Africa as a result of isolation. The purpose of this article is to examine the effects of sports isolation and to look at the major issues confronting South African sport in 1976 which were raised at the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid Conference held in Havana in May."

c. *South Africa and NATO*

SOUTH AFRICA: NATO'S UNWELCOME ALLY, by Charles Latour, in *Military Review*, v.58, no.2 (February 1977) 84-93.

This review of South Africa's defense posture focuses on the importance of that country to NATO although the apartheid policy troubles some of NATO's members.

SOUTH AFRICA: UNDER THE NATO UMBRELLA, by Sean Gervase, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.5 (September-October 1976) 12-16.

"There is now a very real danger that the western powers will go to the aid of the present South African government in the eventual confrontation over apartheid in Africa. For these powers are beginning to make military commitments in southern Africa, commitments which are designed to preserve "stability" in the area. These commitments are tying western governments to a regime which is in crisis and which seems unlikely to survive another decade. If the policy which is now being set in motion is not reversed, Britain, the United States, France and West Germany may well find themselves fighting the liberation movements on African soil within a few years. . . The major western powers are now trying to "extend the NATO umbrella" to South Africa, to bring it gradually into the western alliance in the hope of ensuring 'stability'."

d. *South Africa and the UN*

SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL OSTRACISM, by Richard Bissell, in *World Affairs*, v.137, no.3 (Winter 1974-1975) 179-185.

"Recent events in southern Africa and at the United Nations have once again brought into the spotlight the question of South Africa's continuing membership in the international community. The black African statesmen speak in the corridors of the UN about converting their containment policy into 'rollback,' to use the language of John Foster Dulles. The South Africans show genuine symptoms of concern over the angry attacks directed at them. And southern Africa itself is going through a century of changes at a quick trot, the independence of Mozambique and Angola obviously being a mere beginning. What makes the current drive to ostracize South Africa even more pressing in the minds of African diplomats is South Africa's emergence as one of the genuine second-rank powers in world politics. For many of the same reasons as in the cases of Brazil, Iran, India, and Nigeria, South Africa will have to be listened to with increasing care in future years. Its financial solidity through massive gold production, coupled with a solid food surplus and the potential to produce nuclear weapons, means to dominate events south of the Equator. If ostracism is to work any miracles, therefore, in changing South Africa's racial policies, some observers think it will have to be now or never. And the recent failure to exclude South Africa from the United Nations indicates that ostracism cannot be accomplished."

e. *South Africa and the U.S.*

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part 1: Report of Nov. 14-Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebanon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5-158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7-14, 1973 (p. 159-166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10-Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167-233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x-xv and throughout)."

APARTHEID: SHADOW OVER SOUTH AFRICA, by Capt. Jacques A. Rondeau, in *United States Naval Institute*, v.102, no. 9 (September 1976) 18-27.

"Apartheid tends to obscure the importance of South Africa to our national security. Should we enter into defense agreements as long as that country's 'problem' remains unsolved?"

BEHIND THE HOPE FOR RACIAL PEACE IN SOUTH AFRICA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.80, no.24 (14 June 1976) 57-59.

"The crux of it: Move from mere talk about compromise between blacks and whites to immediate action. David B. Richardson of the magazine's staff assesses US plan to defuse a dangerous conflict."

REPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA, by John T. Pawlikowski, in *Worldview*, v.19, no.3 (March 1976) 20-22.

"1976 is a year of decision — also for the United States."

SOUTH AFRICA WARNS US: "DON'T MOVE TOO FAST", by David B. Richardson, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.9 (29 August 1977) 46-48.

"US pressure to help the South African blacks already has had unexpected results. Whites are closing ranks and anti-Americanism is rising." Includes conversations with five prominent South Africans; Cas de Villiers, Director, Foreign Affairs Association; Colin Eglin, Progressive Reform Party Leader; John Barratt, Director, South African Institute of International Affairs; Sonny Leon, Colored Labor Party Leader; and Bishop Manos Buthelezi, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa.

[STATE] DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v.73, no.1887 (25 August 1975) 269-273.

"Statements by Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, made before The Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 24."

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill) on Apr. 13-25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana. Assesses US' interest in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21-33)."

UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, by Meyer Feldberg, in *South Africa International*, v.7, no.2 (October 1976) 101-110.

The author, who is Director of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Capetown addresses himself to the following question — why US pressure on American corporations operating in South Africa only became noticeable in the late 1960's. Then he takes a look at the reasons why South Africa has been singled out for attack; the rise of Civil Rights Movement; the US Guilt Complex; the Pressure Groups; Corporate Social Responsibility; Racial Chauvanism; Scale and Depth of Apartheid; the Wealth of South Africa; and the Size of US Investment in South Africa. He concludes with the opinion that — "American opposition to US business involvement in South Africa. . . began during a period of racial and social strife in the United States itself. . . [and that] the factors that caused South Africa to be especially singled out for opposition revolve around this country's apartheid policy. . ."

f. *South Africa and the Communist Powers*

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RED DRAGON: A STUDY IN PERCEPTION, by Hendrik J.A. Reitsma, in *Africa Today*, v.23, no.1 (January-March 1976) 47-67.

"The white minority government of South Africa perceives international communism, the Soviet Union, and especially the People's Republic of China as its most dangerous enemies. During the past five to ten years, South Africa has become increasingly worried—some say paranoid—about China's efforts to establish itself as an important factor in African affairs. . . Judging by South African reactions, each expansion of China's influence in Africa is accompanied by a corresponding rise in South Africa's concern. In the remainder of this essay an effort is made to present how and why South Africa perceives China's activities as a threat to its security."

WHY THE COMMUNISTS HAVE THEIR EYES ON AFRICA; INTERVIEW WITH JOHN VORSTER, PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.80, no.24 (14 June 1976) 59-60.

"Vast underground wealth and a strategic position astride important sea lanes explain Russia's interest in South Africa. Harder to understand, says a beleaguered leader, is why US refuses to sell his nation arms."

12. *Soviet View of South Africa*

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IS A NUCLEAR TESTING GROUND, in *The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press*, v.28, no.3 (18 Feb 1976) 18.

Condensed text of story in Izvestia 23 January, 1976 which charges complicity of NATO and South Africa to develop a nuclear potential for the latter. Places the blame on US and West Germany for helping South Africa to develop its nuclear potential.

SOUTH AFRICA: CITADEL OF RACISM AND REACTION, by A. Runov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.11 (1976) 66-76. In English.

The gist of the article is that traditionally the Soviet Union has been rendering support to the struggle for freedom of the peoples of South Africa. This policy as stated by Mr. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, ". . . will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases."

SOUTH AFRICA'S U.N. SEAT IS THREATENED, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.26, no.40 (30 October 1974) 26.

Condensed text of commentary in Pravda, 5 Oct 1974, p. 5, on the resolution of the 29th session of the

U.N. General Assembly "not to recognize the mandate of the delegation of the Republic of South Africa. . ." (For Soviet views of other African countries See I.C. 14.)

OO. Spanish Sahara (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

SPANISH SAHARA, by John Mercer, London, Allen & Unwin, 1976. 264 p.

"Mostly geography and anthropology, with much data on flora and fauna, but there is history, too, and background for the political disputes of today."

2. *Phosphate Reserves*

(LI) — SPANISH SAHARA: FORCES OF CONTENTION, by Lt. Col. Mowton L. Waring, Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, Air War College, 1976. 118 p. (W277s Professional Study.)

"The physical environment, historical evolution, and economic potential particularly the lucrative phosphate industry, of the West African desert are described to establish the setting in which Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and rival liberation movements have been in contention for the territory. After the involvement of each of the participants in the dispute is discussed, the potential for conflict over the territory is postulated with the implications for disrupting stability, not only in North and West Africa, but in the Mid-East and between the superpowers as well. A course of action to resolve the Arab confrontation is suggested."

3. *Conflicting Claims to Sovereignty*

DECOLONIZATION AND THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE IN THE ARAB MAGHRIB: THE CASE OF SPANISH SAHARA, by Lewis B. Ware. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air University Institute for Professional Development, December 1975. 50 p.

"Why is the seemingly innocuous and relatively unimportant Spanish Sahara the focus of international debate? According to Ware, it is because this Spanish colony contains the world's largest phosphate reserve, which is used for organic fertilizer. More important, though, it has become a pawn in the global power struggle between Moscow and Washington. Three African nations — Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria — all claim the Spanish Sahara, privately seeking to satisfy their own territorial aspirations, says Ware, while publicly supporting 'self-determination' for the colony's inhabitants. Morocco claims all of the Spanish Sahara on the basis of a treaty with England (formulated in 1895), more recent treaties with Spain and France, and the unification of the area in the 11th century under the Berber Empire. (Actually, Ware notes, the Berbers originally inhabited Mauritania, not Morocco, giving the former a greater claim to the Spanish Sahara.) King Hassan would like to incorporate this phosphate-rich area into his own for economic reasons. He has used this issue to form a national unity bloc, which could divert attention from the military's contention for power. He gained Soviet recognition of his claim by participating in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Morocco now appears to have the best chance of controlling the Spanish Sahara, and has created guerrilla movements in the area to help ensure its acquisition. While Mauritania has the most justifiable claim to the colony, it fears the consequences of internal racial strife. At present, its goal is oriented only toward creation of a buffer state in the area in order to forestall Morocco's designs. To acheive this, Mauritania backs the UN concept of a free Sahara and has sponsored its own guerrilla movements to help. Algeria has no legitimate claim, but an expanding Morocco would threaten Algeria's prominence as the leading African socialist state. Algeria needs an Atlantic outlet for its iron ore, and due to past border disputes with Morocco, has also launched a guerrilla group of its own to block Moroccan expansion. Concerned with growing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, Africa and the Iberian peninsula, but not wanting to agitate Spain or Algeria and other African nations, the US finds itself in a precarious position. Mindful that the US needs access to Spanish air bases, American foreign policy has pursued the temporary tactic of buying Spanish friendship, hoping that Juan Carlos will end Spanish repression and isolation, Western Europe will admit Spain to NATO, and war will be avoided in Northern Africa. . ."

EMERGENCE OR SUBMERGENCE OF A POTENTIAL STATE: THE STRUGGLE IN WESTERN SAHARA, by Anne Lippert, in Africa Today, v.24, no.1 (January-March 1977) 41-60.

"The systematic and brutal destruction of a people is underway today in the former Spanish Sahara, now the scene of a bitter struggle between foreign invaders and the Sahraoui people who on February 27, 1976, officially proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Sahraoui Arab Republic (D.S.A.R.) at Bir Lehlou. Since the invasion of Moroccan soldiers on November 1, 1975, more than half of the estimated 350,000 Sahraoui occupants have fled for their lives, first to refugee camps in the desert, and when these were attacked by Moroccan planes carrying napalm and gas bombs, to neighboring Algeria where relief sites have been set up in the area south of Tindouf. Chief victims of the pillage, rape, and torture by Moroccan and Mauritanian soldiers have been the women and children. Refugees in the relief camps show wrists and hands battered by Mauritanian soldiers so that they will be unable to bear arms against the invaders. Mothers and children recount executions of entire families, babies as well as the women and old men, when inhabitants of the invaded cities of the territory refused to give the 'youyou,' traditional cry of welcome, for the invaders. In this systematic genocide, food stores of the civilian population have been destroyed, homes and household goods have been burned, wells have been

poisoned, goat herds have been decimated, refugee camps have been strafed and bombed. If there is no people, there will be no resistance."

SHADOWY WAR IN THE SAHARA, by Arnaud De Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.21 (23 May 1977) 34.

"When Spain gave up its last African colony in early 1976, the former Spanish Sahara was quickly divided between two neighbors, Morocco and Mauritania. But with support from Algeria and Libya, a guerrilla band known as Polisario (an acronym for the Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, the two former Spanish Saharan provinces) began to fight for the independence of the region, which contains rich phosphate mines. Recently Newsweek's Arnaude de Borchgrave became the first foreign newsman to accompany Moroccan troops on an operation against the rebels and filed this report on an increasingly violent desert war. . ."

PP. Sudan (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two — The Arab World Today (Sudan — The Loose-Limbed Giant; Egypt — The Center of Gravity; Libya — The Radical Right; Tunisia — The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria — Austere Revolutionary; and Morocco — Kingdom of the Far West).

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. 351 p. (DA Pam 550-27.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

2. *Government and Politics*

a. *Role of the Military*

CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION UNDER MILITARY RULE IN UGANDA AND SUDAN, by Nelson Kasfir, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v.1, no.3 (May 1975) 344-363.

"It is relevant to examine what kinds of political participation occur in a military regime in order to obtain a fuller appreciation of the interplay of political forces and a more precise understanding of civil-military relations on particular issues at specific times. What, then, are the participatory structures that military rulers create to take the place of those they have banned? What are their reasons for creating them, and what are the characteristics of the participation these new structures engender? . . . Uganda under President Idi Amin and Sudan under President Ja'afar Nimeiri provide sharply contrasting experiences with the problems of establishing new modes of civilian participation under military rule."

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W.F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study of the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

POLITICS IN THE SUDAN: PARLIAMENTARY AND MILITARY RULE IN AN EMERGING AFRICAN NATION, by Peter K. Bechtold. New York, Praeger, 1976. 359 p.

"Survey of politics in the Sudan through four distinct periods — two parliamentary and two military — since independence."

b. *War and Peace in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972*

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: A FORGOTTEN WAR AND A FORGOTTEN PEACE, by Paul Ladouceur, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 406-427.

"On 27 March 1972 representatives of the government of the Sudan and of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement signed a document in Addis Ababa which brought an end to seventeen years of revolt and armed conflict in the Southern Sudan. Despite numerous difficulties, peace has been maintained, and the tasks of reconstruction in the Southern Region and of the integration of the region with the rest of the country have gone ahead. The conclusion of peace won the Sudan considerable respect in Africa and has enabled the country to play an important role in Arab-African relations. It is an African achievement which has been largely ignored by the outside world."

*THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE, by Mohamed Omer Beshir. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1975. 188 p.

"Replete with facts . . . , this account by a participant in his country's reconciliation covers the period from 1965-72, focusing on the administration rather than the politics of the process."

STILL KEEPING THE PEACE, by Nelson Kasfir.

Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, INc., 1976. 15 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.4.)

"In 1972 the Addis Ababa Agreement stopped the long civil war in the Sudan. Four years of experience brings a sobering perspective to the South's intractable problems of politics and development. Still, commitment to make the agreement work appears firm both in Khartoum and Juba."

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SUDAN, 1955-1972, by Cecil Eprile, North Pomfret, Vt., David & Charles, 1974. 192 p.

"An . . . account of the civil war between Sudan's Arab north and partly Christianized Black south, by a journalist who interviewed many of the principals on both sides."

3. *Agricultural Aspects*

SUDAN: BREADBASKET FOR THE ARAB WORLD?, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.9 (December 1975) 12-13.

If everything goes according to plan a huge mechanical monster will get to work next year eating its way through a 168-mile stretch of the Sudd — the swamplands of the Upper Nile — and dredging a new canal. The joint Egyptian-Sudanese development plan for the Jonglei Canal is ready for signing. The French firm Grands Travaux de Marseille is scheduled to execute the work, the cost of which is estimated at around $140 million, to be shared equally by the two countries concerned . . . According to an unpublished study by the International Labor Organization (ILO), it is evident that agriculture will be one of the major forces in the development of the Sudan in the years ahead. The Jonglei Canal will play a central role in that development. Not only Egypt, but the Persian Gulf states as well are already envisioning the Sudan as the granary and breadbasket of the Arab world."

THE SUDAN IN QUEST OF A SURPLUS. PART I: DREAMS AND REALITIES, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 33 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.8.)

"The Sudan's population of 17 million ethnically and culturally diverse people is scattered over an immense area. Its agricultural-cum-pastoral economy generates no surplus. The Sudan's own leaders hope to create an all-embracing national market system to sustain a modern nation state; its Arab neighbors see the Sudan as a nearby and reliable source of food products."

4. *Cultural Aspects*

CULTURE CONFLICT IN SUDAN, by Richard Critchfield, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.2 (March-April 1976) 46-49.

"The Kudor or Tribal Medicine man of Sudan's long isolated Numba Mountains has become the target of government efforts through village primary school teachers to eliminate what is officially regarded as superstition. The issue, which involves a quiet, unspectacular, day to day struggle for the minds of village children, is a touchy, if fascinating, one. The scars are still healing from Sudan's long north-south, Moslem-Chrisitian civil war; the Nuba Mountains, which begin 250 miles southwest of Khartoum lie on that great dividing line that separates the Islamic north from the rest of Africa, and the Arab world is beginning to invest heavily in Sudan's enormous and unexploited agricultural potential."

5. *Sudanese-Soviet Relations*

ANOTHER AFRICAN COUNTRY TURNS FROM RUSSIA TO THE US, by Dennis Mullin, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.13 (26 September 1977) 75-76.

"For the Sudanese, the sight of Soviet arms fueling wars on the Horn of Africa was too much to take. What will the US gain from their break with Moscow?"

WHERE RUSSIA LOST A FOOTHOLD IN AFRICA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.80, no.2 (12 January 1976) 62-63.

"Moscow suffered a setback when a communist coup backfired. Now Sudan, with US support and Arab oil money, is ready for a takeoff."

QQ. Swaziland (See also appendixes)

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part 1: Report of Nov. 14-Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebanon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5-158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7-14, 1973 (p. 159-166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10-Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167-233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x-xv and throughout)."

SWAZILAND: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION, by Christian P. Potholm. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. 183 p.

"In this study of political development in Swaziland since World War II, the author . . . focuses on the turbulent era leading to independence in 1968. He stresses that the traditional structure — in the person of the Swazi king — was extraordinarily successful in making the transition to the age of political modernity. Potholm also treats of the relations between the new African states and the white power complex in southern Africa. 'The success of the ngwenyami of Swaziland, Sobhuza II, offers a substantial amendment to the widely held theory that modern political institutions, economic development, and independence are necessarily inimical to traditional African authorities'."

RR. Tanzania (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AS A RESPONSE TO INEQUALITY IN TANZANIA AND KENYA, by David Court, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 661–690.

"This article examines the attempt of Kenya and Tanzania to deal with the universal problem of how to reconcile inequalities in the distribution of rewards with a concern for equality. It argues that in both countries the mainspring of educational policy is a desire to alleviate the potentially disruptive consequences of inequality, although for different purposes and by different means. The broad purpose of the article is to compare contrasting educational practice in Kenya and Tanzania from this perspective as a way of illuminating two distinctive modes of development. More specifically, it attempts to identify some of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in their particular use of education. Finally, it uses this analysis to make a speculative assessment of how each is faring in the task of building a relatively integrated polity."

EXORCISING THE GHOST OF KARUME, in *Africa Report*, v.19, no.2 (March–April 1974) 46–51.

"As Zanzibar enters her second decade of independence, the island government is gradually moving out of the shadow cast by its assassinated dictator."

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICS, by William John Hanna and others. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1975. 296 p.

"Studies . . . covering student political attitudes in the Ivory Coast, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana are integrated by Hanna in a group of essays which suggest a number of different answers about the likely behavior of the next generation of African cities. Because much of the data was gathered almost a decade ago, however, it seems likely that the general preeminence of apolitical conservatism among the African student populations may have altered in response to increasing perceptions of national instability and diminishing personal economic opportunities."

2. *Julius Nyerere and Tanzania's Socialism*

THE CRITICAL PHASE IN TANZANIA, 1945–1968: NYERERE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SOCIALIST STRATEGY, by Cranford Pratt. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 309 p.

"Tanzania's devolution to independence from British rule is presented here as prelude to the country's further striving for national self-reliance. Nyerere's skillful balance between the imperatives of strong leadership and popular participation. . . [is detailed]."

A DECADE OF TANZANIA'S EXPERIMENT, by Anirudha Gupta, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v.26, no.613 (20 October 1975) 9–11.

"A great many people outside Africa have often expressed their interest in. . . Tanzania's political model. When asked what they mean by the Tanzanian model however, they can only make vague generalizations about Tanzania's socialist path, its unique leadership, and independent foreign policy. . . Admitting that Nyerere's intellectual appeal is great, it is nevertheless important to point out that the political model in Tanzania does not merely represent an individual's solitary adventure. It reflects. . . sincerity and determination on the part of the Tanzanian people to restructure their society on the basis of egalitarian principles."

FOREIGN-POLICY ISSUES AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA 1961–8, by Cranford Pratt, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 445–470.

"Tanganyika became independent in December 1961 in circumstances that generated a close congruence between the domestic policies of the newly independent government and its foreign policies. Seven years later, Tanzania had firmly committed itself to a socialist transformation of its society and to a nonaligned foreign policy. This article considers the contribution of foreign policy issues through the intervening years, 1961–8, to the emergence of socialist commitment."

NYERERE ON THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA, by Cranford Pratt, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.1 (1975) 63–76.

"This paper has a limited and specific purpose which is to examine the views of President Julius Nyerere on how Tanzania can most effectively achieve a transition to a socialist society. No attempt is made to study the actual socialist policies of the Tanzanian Government nor the other influences which have determined these policies. The focus will be single-mindedly upon Nyerere's ideas on Tanzania's transition to socialism. The purpose, moreover, is to understand these ideas in their own terms rather than to assess the extent to which they are compatible with other socialist theories of the transition to socialism or to develop those elements within Nyerere's thought which can be made to serve differently conceived socialist strategies."

SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA, by Mihailo V.

Stevovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia,* v.26, no.601 (20 April 1975) 4-6.

"The construction of a socialist society in the unique conditions of Tanzania and an active policy of nonalignment are the two basic lines of development in today's United Republic of Tanzania. . . Tanzanian social, political, and economic development is closely followed not only in African countries but also in other developing countries, and the Tanzanian development experience has become the subject of extensive scholarly research."

SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRY: THE CASE OF TANZANIA, by Edmund Clark, in *World Development,* v.3, no.4 (April 1975) 223-228.

"The author attempts to draw on the experience of Tanzania in order to provide some comments on socialist investment strategies. Tanzania has been more successful in reorienting its programme of social investment than its investment programme for economic development. This failure stems from real differences within Tanzania, and among socialists generally, about appropriate socialist investment strategies for a country at Tanzania's stage of development. It also reflects the fact that socialism in Tanzania is a change imposed from the top, and the bureaucracy remains relatively immune from the pressures of the people and the poverty in which they live."

TANZANIA: LOCAL POLITICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER, by Joel Samoff. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. 286 p.

"Samoff's study constitutes, in effect, an interim report on the effectiveness of Tanzanian socialism in restraining the growth of an elite. From the evidence of what seems to be a closely observed. . . investigation of politics in a major regional center in Kilimanjaro, the author concludes that discernible progress is being made toward the achievement of Nyerere's and TANU's (Tanzania's single party) goals of egalitarianism and widespread participation."

TANZANIA'S NOBLE EXPERIENCE IMPERILED, by Isebill v. Gruhn, in *Worldview,* v.19, no.10 (October 1976) 23-25.

"The. . . realization that much is not right with Tanzania is the cause of growing despair both inside and outside that East African country. Tanzania has been the favorite of Social Democrats, Marxists, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, Scandinavian governments, and of a host of Africa observers. . . In Tanzania we have witnessed more than ten years of sustained leadership with a comparatively coherent philosophy and program of action containing a refreshing emphasis on a value-system. . . Tanzania's present economic decline is, of course, in part externally produced and beyond internal control. . . Hard economic and political realities will force difficult decisions upon Tanzanians in the near future. Those who have been cynical about the Tanzanian experiment will likely find new converts. But as long as substantial number of Tanzanians share the quiet thoughtfulness, devotion, and sensitivity expressed by my companion in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania will deserve its unique place in the world's attention and support."

TWO AFRICAN STATESMEN: KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA AND NYERERE OF TANZANIA, by John Hatch. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1976. 268 p.

"The crucial issue in Africa during the rest of this century is whether it can devise a new kind of society. Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania have determined the direction of their two countries, and the fate of their experiments—both of which are capturing the idealism of younger Africans — is of transcendent importance to the development of society there and on other continents as well. If Africa follows the traditional pattern, it might well become another South America — as the number of coups that have taken place and the rise of consumption-oriented class might indicate. In this respect, the author points out, even such momentous matters as the struggle in South Africa and the race question must not be allowed to distract attention from the crucial battle between the rural masses and the urban elite. To meet the challenge, Nyere has set his hand to providing that a rural society based on cooperation rather than competition is a practical ideal. Kaunda has a more complex and significant task: combining a rural renaissance with urban prosperity, on an egalitarian basis. 'Two African Statesmen' trace Nverere and Kaunda's developing attitudes from childhood; the impact of tribal codes, trade unions, and colonial politics on their contrasting countries; and their respective roles in world affairs, particularly the degree of their support for the nonaligned bloc and the concept of the Third World."

3. *Public Policy*

THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE TANZANIAN PUBLIC SERVICE SYSTEM UPON ADMINISTRATIVE PRODUCTIVITY, 1962-72, by Gelase Mutahaba, in *The African Review,* v.5, no.2 (1975) 201-202.

"In this paper we shall examine developments in the Tanzanian public service system since 1961 and assess their contribution to overall national development. . . We are. . . Including only the civil servants in the traditional sense, not the many people who presently work in parastatal organizations. Secondly, we are not including Zanzibar; our references are only to the mainland."

INTERNATIONAL AID AND NATIONAL DECISIONS: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI, TANZANIA, AND ZAMBIA, by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 190 p.

"Observing the operation of U.N. aid programs from their beginnings through their growth into an

international industry, the author describes the complex interactions between national governments and U.N. personnel, focusing on the potential for development aid to foster and U.N. goals of international integration and cooperation."

THE PREDICAMENT OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN TANZANIA, by Anthony H. Rweylmanu, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.2 (1975) 119–126.

"This article seeks to highlight the development of public corporations and public enterprises in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration and to suggest some factors which have tended to inhibit productive operation of these enterprises. In particular the article looks at the external factors arising from the decisions of the government and the ruling party TANU as possible sources of this predicament."

PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN TANZANIA, by Goran Hyden, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.2 (1975) 141–165.

"This article is devoted to the general style of public policymaking in Tanzania. The underlying assumption to the argument put forward. . . Is that in a socialist economy the management of public enterprises cannot be viewed in isolation from the policymaking process within the government bureaucracy and the ruling party, in this case TANU. Thus, in relation to the management of public enterprises, the style of public policymaking takes on the role of an independent variable, directly affecting the management of these enterprises."

URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN KENYA AND TANZANIA, by Richard Stren, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.2 (1975) 267–294.

"Over the past ten years, African governments have wrestled with the problems of designing and implementing comprehensive rural development policies. In an overwhelmingly rural continent with, for most areas, only a recent history of urbanization, such an emphasis is understandable. But if African cities are for the most part young, and small by world standards, they are also growing faster than cities in any other major world region. This rapid growth, superimposed on a meagre resource base, will put increasing pressure on planners to devise solutions for the adequate and equitable distribution of urban services. The solutions that emerge, however, will be heavily conditioned by two sets of factors: the immediate demands of urban growth, and the wider political/administrative and social context within which policymaking takes place. In an effort to explain more clearly how these factors operate in contemporary Africa, this article will compare the formulation and implementation of key urban policies in Kenya and Tanzania from independence until the end of 1973. Because of their importance for lower-income groups, three policy areas — land allocation, housing, and planning — are singled out for more intensive examination in this analysis."

WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA: A BACKGROUND, by Pius Msekwa, in *The African Review*, v.5, no.2 (1975) 127–140.

The author discusses the "concept of workers' participation in its historical context." He then examines "the application of the principle of participation in independent Tanzania."

4. *Ujamma, Agriculture and Rural Development*

THE FAILURE OF TANZANIA'S COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURE, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.10 (January 1975) 18–19.

"Extraordinary measures by short-sighted provincial functionaries of TANU, aimed at forcing the Ujamaa policy which is the cornerstone of President Julius Nyerere's concept of socialism, are no longer unusual in Tanzania. The compulsory system, conceived by the politicians as a means of achieving a better living standard for the people as a whole, is threatening to undermine the foundation of Nyerere's concept which is the guarantee of a life in freedom. . . A clash between party ideologists and the people had become inevitable. Although agriculture, with the Ujamaa villages as its focal point, has been the basis of Tanzania's development policy for several years now, it has enjoyed only very modest success."

OPERATION PLANNED VILLAGES IN RURAL TANZANIA: A REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT, by Juma Volter Mwapachu, in *The African Review*, v.6, no.1 (1976) 1–16.

"With over ninety percent of its 15 million people living in rural areas and involved in agricultural production, Tanzania could not take any other more practical development route than through its rural inhabitants and their main resources potential, land. Since independence in 1961, Tanzania has, therefore, been concerned with how it can evolve practical-oriented programmes to achieve speedy rural development. Its main problem has been the form of institutional arrangements to create for purposes of activating this development process."

UJAMAA: A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, by Roy Ellis, in *Africa Report*, v.19, no.6 (November–December 1974) 42–45.

"Tanzania is suffering from the effects of the world economic situation and from food shortages. Nevertheless President Nyerere's policy of Ujamaa, involving villagization and a degree of communalization, is to be implemented with even greater energy. In this report a correspondent gives his own assessment of the impact of the ideology in one part of the country."

5. *Economic Aspects*

TANZANIA ECONOMIC SURVEY, December 1975, in *African Development*, v.9, no.12 (December 1975) 71–99.

Belt Tightening and Borrowing to Survive; Too Soon to Judge Ujamaa ("Familyhood") Yet; Dar Port — How to Ease The Flow of Goods; Recession Brings Decline in Tourism Earnings; Expatriates — Tanzania Stays Dependent; Meeting The Man (Amir Jamal) Who Promotes Tanzania's Industry; Tanzania Among Worst Hit by Inflation; New Structure for Trade.

a. *Economic Development*

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, ed. by Richard Harris. Cambridge, Schenkman, 1975, 270 p.

"These essays on Kenya and Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are unified by the common perspective of their authors, part of a growing group of social scientists basing their analyses of African development on a critique of African dependency and Western neocolonialism."

THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING IN BUILDING A SOCIALIST TANZANIA, by Amon J. Nsekela, in *The African Review*, v.4, no.1 (1974) 26–42.

"Before discussing the role of the National Bank of Commerce per se, I will outline what I believe to be involved in the building of a socialist Tanzania. Only then can we really assess the possible contribution that the National Bank of Commerce can be expected to make to this task and, consequently, only then can we assess the contribution that it has made to date."

THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT THEORY: A CASE-STUDY FROM TANZANIA, by Dean E. McHenry, Jr., in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.4 (1976) 621–636.

"The frustrated aspirations of most Africans for a significantly better life following independence have evoked considerable attention. A growing number of scholars are accounting for the situation in terms of a set of loosely connected propositions contained in the 'underdevelopment theory,' at the core of which is the idea that colonialist/neocolonialist countries have created the conditions of underdevelopment by: (i) encouraging the entry of foreign investment which extracted/extracts a significant proportion of the surplus produced; (ii) fostering a commercial bourgeoise which failed/fails to use its profits for productive investment purposes; and (iii) promoting an indigenous class which acted/acts in the interest of the imperial power to perpetuate the condition of underdevelopment. The purpose of this article is to assess the validity of each of these three assertions with data from a specific industry in one of the poorest African countries."

WOMEN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA, by Gayleatha B. Cobb, in *SAIS Review*, v.19, no.3 (1975) 16–22.

"Relatively little progress has been made in the integration of African women into nontraditional sectors in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda since independence in the early sixties. Moreover, the progress in industry and services that have been made tends to center in activities traditionally viewed as "women's work." This is true in each country notwithstanding divergent political and economic policies. Old values and customs pose a tremendous obstacle to equal opportunities for women in education and employment in the modern sector. Until women as a valuable human resource are more productivity utilized — in agriculture as well as in the modern sector — these three countries will no doubt remain severely handicapped in their development efforts."

b. *Foreign Economic Relations*

THE RELATION BETWEEN TOURISM AND EMPLOYMENT IN KENYA AND TANZANIA, by Walter Elkan, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.11, no.2 (January 1975) 123–130.

"The unqualified enthusiasm of some for the development of tourism as a strategy for the development of low income countries is only matched by the equally unqualified skepticism of others. Few have felt neutral or considered the possibility that its effects might depend on the country concerned or the type of tourist development to be undertaken. This paper, based on a survey of employment in the hotel and tourist industries of Kenya and Tanzania, begins with an exposition of the general case for and against tourism as a way of promoting the development of low income countries, and then presents some of the findings of the East Africa survey. It pleads the case for less generalization and a more eclectic approach to an assessment of the costs and benefits of tourism and points out that, as is so often the case, the balance of advantage is greatly dependent upon the policies pursued with regard to the particular form of hotel and tourist development."

SPECIAL GAINS FROM TRADE WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF TANZANIA, by M.A. Bienefeld, in *World Development*, v.3, no.5 (May 1975) 247–271.

"Trade does not necessarily benefit all trading partners and heavy dependence on trade is a precarious matter. Trade with socialist countries could confer special advantages on Third World trading partners thus making a net benefit more likely. However this requires conditions in which trade ceases to be 'mere exchange of commodities' and becomes an element of planned economic integration. Given a nonplanned Third World country like Tanzania and given recent approaches to international trade by most socialist countries, it is not surprising that Tanzania is shown to have derived no particular benefits from its trade with the socialist countries. The trade was merely an exchange of commodities, with the possible exception of the trade with China."

TANZANIA'S POLICIES ON PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT, by Peter Neerso; in *The African Review*, v.4, no.1 (1974) 61-78.

"The foundations of Tanzania's present policies on private foreign investments are laid down in the Arusha Declaration which was issued by Tanzania's ruling party, TANU, in February 1967. The Arusha Declaration called for socialism and self-reliance and declared that the State must have effective control of the major means of production. After the Arusha Declaration a substantial number of foreign-owned banks, trading companies, industrial companies, etc., were nationalized. In many companies not all the shares have been taken over by Tanzania; the Government has been satisfied with 50 or 60 per cent of the shares."

6. *Tanzania's Foreign Relations*

a. *Tanzania and the East African Community (EAC)*

DIVERGING PATHS IN EAST AFRICA, by Jay E. Hakes, in *Current History*, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 202-205 plus.

"Domestic differences within the East African Community have inhibited the international cooperation among its members necessary for its success. . . In 1964, the political union of the East African states of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda was widely regarded as a strong possibility. Today, plans for increasing regional integration are only a dim memory. Economic ties continue through the operations of the east African Community (EAC), but cooperation even at this level has been badly damaged by recent events."

PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP IN EAST AFRICA, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.6 (September 1974) 17-18.

"It will need a great deal of statesmanlike skill to keep the East African Community (EAC) alive and move it closer to its ultimate goal, the creation of a political federation in this historically, geographically and ethnically linked region. Founded as a joint economic and administrative organization, the EAC embraces Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Like the older EEC in Europe, with which the East Africans are associated, nationalist-oriented thinking and ruthlessly selfish policies have destroyed much of the initiative which prompted the creation of the EAC by Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote. The institution has been weakened by idealogical and political differences of opinion, the military coup of General Idi Amin in Uganda and the subsequent flight of Obote to Tanzania, as well as the apparently permanent and costly difficulties with the administration of Community authorities. But despite the complications which have appeared in their collaboration and in decentralizing formerly important joint institutions, the East African governments continue to support the EAC, at least verbally."

b. Tanzanian-Chinese Relations (Construction of the Tanzam Railroad)

ALONG THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.1 (April 1976) 20-21.

"When the current test period is over and the railroad begins full-scale operations, 19 trains each day are scheduled to pass along the route in both directions. The project has linked huge, previously undeveloped regions in both Tanzania and Zambia with the centers of those countries, making it possible for their inhabitants to get their produce to market and stimulating agriculture and trade. . . The price of the ambitious railroad project is high. Tanzania and Zambia have incurred debts to the Chinese that will run well over into the coming century."

CHINIA'S AFRICAN POLICY: A STUDY OF TANZANIA, by George T. Yu. New York, Praeger, 1975. 200 p.

"The unusual Sino-Tanzanian alliance is viewed in the larger perspectives of Chinese goals in the Third World and the African role in international relations. Because China is becoming a major power center, this. . . study is valuable in charting Peking's behavior in one of its first overseas ventures. There are dividends, too, in the research done by Professor Yu on the roles of Sweden and the USSR in Tanzania."

CHINESE AID IN ACTION. BUILDING THE TANZANIA ZAMBIA RAILWAY, by Martin Bailey, in *World Development*, v.3, nos. 7&8 (July-August 1975) 587-593.

"There has been a growing interest in Chinese aid, as an alternative to that provided by Western and Soviet donors, but little has been published on how assistance from China has worked in practice. This article focuses on China's largest aid project, the Tanzam Railway, which was built from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian Copper Belt. The main analysis centers around Peking's reasons for financing the line, the financial terms attached to the loan, and how the railway was constructed using labour-intensive techniques. The article concludes with an examination of how Chinese assistance has helped Third World countries to increase their self-reliance."

HOPEFUL FUTURE FOR THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Gerd Meurer, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.7 (October 1975) 19-20.

"Eighteen months ahead of the originally scheduled date, Chinese and African construction crews reached the Zambian town of Kapiri-Mposhi, to link the new Tanzan Railway to the existing Zambian rail network. . . Passenger and freight service along the entire run is scheduled to begin this autumn. By that time thousands of tons of freight and thousands of people will have already been transported along stretches of the railway, which is the largest Chinese development aid project in Africa. By the end of last

year the rail line had already reached Tunduma, near the frontier between the two countries, and since then more than 200 persons daily have traveled along various stretches of the line on a noncommercial basis and more than 30,000 tons of freight destined for landlocked Zambia have been shipped by rail and then loaded onto trucks to continue the journey."

INROADS INTO EAST AFRICA: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TANZANIA, by Maj. Michael E. Dash, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.4 (April 1976) 58–64.

"The African nation which has received the lion's share of the attention of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the East African country of Tanzania. On the surface, the close relations between these two nations is an anomaly as it would appear that Tanzania has little to offer the PRC. In this case, however, appearances are indeed deceiving as the PRC has maintained a continuing interest and has provided relatively large amounts of economic and technical aid to Tanzania. One of the reasons for the PRC's continuing interest in Tanzania is the latter's strategic importance relative to Eastern and Southern Africa. In order to understand fully China's relations with Tanzania, they must be viewed in light of the PRC's foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis sub-Saharan Africa. Although the Chinese have achieved varying degrees of success in obtaining these objectives, available evidence indicates that they continue to underlie PRC policies with individual African nations."

(LI) — THE TANZAM RAILROAD: THE PRC IN AFRICA VERSUS UNITED STATES INTERESTS, by Maj John G. Nettleton. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 109 p. (N4751t Research Paper.)

"This paper investigates the effects of the Chinese supported Tanzam railway to determine the impact on US interests. The study describes US interests in Africa, analyzes China's African goals, discusses the development and progress of the railway and finally investigates the relationship of US interests in Africa to the influence China has won as a result of the Tanzam railway. The paper concludes that, although the benefits of the Tanzam will increase the prestige and influence of the PRC, no threat to the security of the free world is posed by China's support of the Tanzam railway."

c. ***Tanzanian-U.S. Relations***

AMERICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Julius K. Nyerere, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.4 (July 1977) 671–684.

The President of the United Republic of Tanzania gives his view of what U.S. policy in southern Africa should be. He says that. . . "No one is asking that American should fight for the freedom of southern Africa. Africa is simply asking that America should stop supporting racialism and unfreedom in that area. . . America should refrain from profit-making out of apartheid. . . It is only after freedom has been won in the states of southern Africa that the positive struggle to build human equality and dignity can begin there."

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R–Ill) on Apr. 13–25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana. Assesses US' interests in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21–33)."

d. *Tanzanian-Soviet Relations*

THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA, by Christopher Stevens. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976, 236 p.

"Traces the evolution of contacts between the Soviet Union and Black Africa from 1953 to 1972, focusing on seven African countries: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. No attempt is made to set forth a grand theory of Afro-Soviet relations, but instead it is argued that all parties acted on an ad hoc basis."

7. *Soviet View of Tanzania*

THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISTS, by A. Khazanov, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.4 (1974) 28–34. In English.

The title is referred in particular to Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cape Verde Islands, and Guinea-Bissau.

UNITED REPUBLIC TANZANIA, by V. Baryshnikov and A. Dmitriev, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.5 (1975) 140–142. In English.

An overview. Also notes that "The Soviet Union gives Tanzania all possible assistance in training specialists at home and in Soviet higher educational establishments. . ."

SS. Togo (See appendixes)

TT. Transkei

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE NEW AFRICA, by Gregory Copley, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, no.2 (1976) 18–25.

"1976 sees the birth of Africa's least heralded — yet possibly its best midwifed — new child, the Transkei. It will be the first part of South Africa to stand alone in the world where the new 'small nations' are determined upon perhaps the more legitimate of grounds: ethnic, linguistic, cultural and geographic commonality. The Transkei, despite inevitable small differences, has such internal harmony in those factors at least. . . It is a cautious eagerness which drives the believers in independence in the Transkei; the job must be done right the first time. There is no second chance."

THE NEWEST NATION: THE TRANSKEI; CHILD IN A HOSTILE WORLD, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, no.10 (1976) 39-41.

"October 26, 1976, sees the Republic of the Transkei unfurl its standard over its capital — Umtata . . . The Transkei becomes independent with one ethnic group, the Xhosa, dominating the nation, with common lanuage (Xhosa) and a wide understanding of two other languages prevalent (English and Afrikaans). It already has a successful agricultural base, a developing light industry, a structured judicial, parliamentary (two party) and social identity, and the beginnings of a professional foreign service. It resembles, in its preparation and prospects, the Australian-controlled Papua New Guinea territory before independence last year, although the Transkei's problems are far less awesome than those which faced, and still face, the PNG."

2. *Soviet View of Transkei*

SOUTH AFRICA GRANTS 'INDEPENDENCE' TO TRANSKEI, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.28, no.43, (24 Nov. 1976) 30.

Condensed text of an article in Pravda of Oct. 26, p. 4, in which Repbulic of South Africa is being accused of deceit in granting independence to Transkei.

3. *US View of Transkei*

URGING THE PRESIDENT NOT TO EXTEND DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER RECOGNITION TO THE TRANSKEI TERRITORY. Washington, Government Printing Ofice, 2 September 1976. 7 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Recommends passage of H. Res. 1509, urging the President to withhold diplomatic or other recognition from the Transkei territory, scheduled to be declared independent from the Republic of South Africa on Oct. 26, 1976. The Transkei territory is the first of 10 planned separate black homelands or bantustans to which all blacks within South Africa are to be assigned on the basis of ethnic origin."

UU. Tunisia (See also appendixes)

THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two — The Arab World Today (Sudan — The Loose-Limbed Giant; Egypt — The Center of Gravity; Libya — The Radical Right; Tunisia — The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria — Austere Revolutionary; and Morocco — Kingdom of the Far West).

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA, by Howard C. Reese and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1970. 415 p. (DA Pam 550-89.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliographies; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

VV. Uganda (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ISLAM IN UGANDA, by Arye Oded. New York, Halstead Press, 1974. 381 p.

"The author analyzes the manner in which Uganda became subject to the forces of Islamization during the nineteenth century. Islam has strongly influenced Uganda's subsequent political history." With bibliography.

THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN EAST AFRICA: ASIANS AND EUROPEANS IN TANZANIA, UGANDA, AND KENYA, by Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira. New York, Praeger, 1976. 230 p.

"A concerned Kenyan analyzes the human rights issues involved in the expulsion of Asians from the area; his argument is buttressed by a fund of information on each nation's laws affecting the status of aliens."

2. *Government and Politics*

CIVILIAN PARTICPATION UNDER MILITARY RULE IN UGANDA AND SUDAN, by Nelson Kasfir, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v.1, no.3 (May 1975) 344-363.

"It is relevant to examine what kinds of political participation occur in a military regime in order to obtain a fuller appreciation of the interplay of political forces and a more precise understanding of civil-military relations on particular issues at specific times. What, then, are the participatory structures that military rulers create to take the place of those they have banned? What are their reasons for creating them, and what are the characteristics of the participation these new structures engender?. . . Uganda under President Idi Amin and Sudan under President Ja'afar Nimeiri provide sharply contrasting experiences with the problems of establishing new modes of civilian participation under military rule."

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN UGANDA: FROM OBOTE TO AMIN, by James H. Mitleman. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1975. 302 p.

"Beyond Uganda — and Obote's rather hastily engineered attempts to unify and mobilize its disparate polity — Mittelman provides a. . . basic analysis of the uses of ideology in the modernization of a developing country."

POLITICS AND CLASS FORMATION IN UGANDA, by Mahmood Mamdani. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976. 339 p.

"Mamdani's work shows how the economic structure of Uganda was determined by the needs of the mother country; but his typologies about class obscure more than they illuminate what is happening in Uganda today."

THE SHRINKING POLITICAL ARENA: PARTICIPATION AND ETHNICITY IN AFRICAN POLITICS, WITH A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA, by Nelson Kasfir. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976. 323 p.

"The author goes to some length to demonstrate . . . that popular participation in African politics is on the wane. He advocates increased use of the civil services to marshal 'low-level political involvement.' "

SOLDIERS AND KINSMEN IN UGANDA: THE MAKING OF A MILITARY ETHNOCRACY, by Ali A. Mazrui. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1975. 325 p.

"This group of essays ranges over Uganda's past (largely the Ohote era) and present, African tradition and modern reassertions of it. Mazrui's. . . brief for Amin as a military populist and reincarnation of the African warrior-leader 'omits a good deal'."

THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON AFRICAN POLITICS: CONTRIBUTIONS ON UGANDA, by James H. Mittleman, in *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, v.11, nos. 3-4 (July and October 1976) 152-165.

"This essay concentrates on the post-independence period — 1962 to the present, i.e., those works published and available at North American libraries as of early 1973. It will review that literature with a primary focus on politics in Uganda . . . The discussion . . . is divided into three sections. The first part covers the literature which offers an overview of Ugandan politics. The second is concerned with the analytical literature on specific themes. Part III attempts to draw some general conclusions about the extent of coverage, areas of focus, and deficiencies in the literature. The conclusions seek to raise some central questions concerning these trends."

3. *Idi Amin Dada*

AMIN: THE WILD MAN OF AFRICA, in *Time*, v.109, no.10 (7 March 1977) 18-22 plus.

Time cover story on Idi Amin, President of Uganda and the state of affairs — Internal and External, since 1971, when Idi Amin took over the country in a *Coup Leo* by him. With information on the latest episode involving American citizens residing in Uganda who were ordered by Amin "not to leave the country," and how the White House handled the difficult situation. ". . . over the past six years, according to amnesty international, Amin has been directly or indirectly responsible for the murder of as many 300,000 Ugandans." It is also noted that Ugandan economy is in a state of "Economic Chaos" and that Uganda". . . would be stone broke if it did not receive occasional Arab and. . ." Photos.

GENERAL AMIN AND THE COUP: GREAT MAN OR HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY?, by Aidan Southhall, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.13, no.1 (1975) 85-105.

"I have come to the conclusion that General Haji Idi Amin Dada is not a bizarre or maverick intrusion upon the Uganda political scene, but deeply and significantly entwined in it. I wish to present what appears to be to be the most important interrelated factors in the conventional functional sense, but to do so diachronically, so that they become continuous themes or forces, in which successive events have causative effect on one another. This raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and epistemological questions which I shall not be able to dispose of at the same time. I shall also be forced to be selective, without being able to justify each choice and step of the argument as it deserves. Central to my interpretation is the fact that General Amin is a Nubi, and that the history of the Nubi is important for the understanding of contemporary events. The present regime is more and more dominantly a Nubi regime, and its core strength is a Nubi strength."

IDI AMIN'S RULE OF BLOOD, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.10 (7 March 1977) 28-34 plus.

"There is more of Hitler in him than Mussolini. A recent, and still confidential, report of the *International Commission of Jurists* contains 90 pages detailing his atrocities. It is too simple to dismiss Amin as a crackpot. His brutal excesses and absurd behavior tarnish the image of other Black African nations struggling to catch up with the West. And he has been a blight on his own country of 12 million. Once relatively prosperous by African standards, Uganda has withered under Amin's despotism. Gasoline is short, crops are rotting in the fields and prudent people — terrified of his secret police — stay huddled in homes at night. Since Amin came to power, an estimated 250,000 Ugandans have fled the country. . . So far, Amin has survived at least ten attempted coups, and although there may be more in the future, he appears to be surrounded by an impenetrable wall of security forces. Some Ugandan exiles believe that if Amin is eventually assassinated, it could be done only by a lone operator — a sort of Ugandan "Jackal." But even if that were to happen, Uganda might fall into the hands of petty tribal warlords ill-equipped to restore the social, economic and political structure that Amin has destroyed. It will take many years for Uganda to recover from the legacy of Idi Amin."

INTERVIEW [WITH] FIELD MARSHAL IDI AMIN DADA, in *S. Africa Report*, v.20, no.5 (September-October 1975) 2-7.

"On August 3, 1975, the day after holding his inaugural press conference as chairman of the OAU, President Amin of Uganda informally briefed five journalists. Two were Egyptians and two were Palestinians. The fifth correspondent was Africa report editor, Anthony Hughes. With Field Marshal Amin's permission he recorded the two-hour meeting, key parts of which are reproduced. . . [here]." He spoke on government and politics, foreign relations including the Middle East question, among many others.

THE 'PRAETORIAN GUARD' OF UGANDA'S IDI AMIN; REVIEW ARTICLE, by Michael Twaddle, in *International Perspectives*. (September/October 1975) 49–52.

Review of the book: General Amin, by David Martin. London, Faber, 1974. "Since 25 January 1971, the day he toppled Milton Obote from power as President of Uganda, Idi Amin has rarely been out of world-press headlines. Alternately observers outside Uganda have been fascinated by his . . . Advice to politicians like Edward Heath and Richard Nixon and . . . By his extravagant praise for such heroes as Adolf Hitler. But, until the appearance of 'General Amin' by David Martin, there was no book that could be . . . Recommended to those interested in the finer as well as the grosser aspects of his regime in Uganda."

UGANDA AND ITS PRESIDENT, by Maj Iain Grahame, in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.104, no.4 (July 1974) 480–490.

"To form a proper appreciation of current events in Uganda and the seemingly mercurial mind of its President, it is essential to understand . . . [his] background, since General Idi Amin's formulative years were spent as an N.C.O. and sergeant-major in the King's African Rifles."

UGANDA'S REGION OF TERROR, by F.K. Sempangi, in *Worldview*, v.18, no.5 (May 1975) 16–21.

"An . . . Anyanya clique is responsible, along with Amin, for Uganda's disgraceful situation. The Anyanya, a mixed group of Nubian descent, control the army and have replaced former President Milton Obote's paramilitary general service corps . . . Amin and the Anyanya have turned Uganda back from the independence it received from Britain in 1962 and have paralyzed every hope of progress."

4. *Israeli Raid on Entebbe (The Rescue of Hostages)*

HOW THE ISRAELIS PULLED IT OFF, in *Newsweek*, v.88, no.3 (19 July 1976) 42–44 plus.

"Israeli commandos flew 2,000 miles to Uganda, gunned down a gang of terrorist hijackers and freed 104 hostages in one of the most spectacularly successful rescue raids of modern times. In the first days after Israel's Mission Impossible, the Jerusalem government kept the details a closely guarded secret. But last week, NEWSWEEK correspondents Milan J. Kubic and Michael Elkins in Jerusalem, James Pringle in Nairobi, and Scott Sullivan in Washington pieced together the extraordinary story of how the Israelis did it. The inside account."

90 MINUTES AT ENTEBBE, by William Stevenson with materials by Uri Dan. New York, Bantam, 1976. 216 p.

RESCUE AT ENTEBBE: HOW THE ISRAELIS DID IT, in *Reader's Digest*, v.109, no.654 (October 1976) 122–128.

"Last July, in a lightning-swift display of military precision, courage and sheer daring, Israeli commandos rescued 102 hijacked hostages from the heart of Uganda. Here is the . . . inside story of an exploit that has already become a legend."

5. *Economic Development*

UGANDA'S AMIN'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION, by Jonathan Rollow, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.3 (May–June 1974) 36–38 plus.

"Despite a variety of problems and some hardships, Amin's programs still seem to enjoy a deep-rooted popular support."

WOMEN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA, by Gayleatha B. Cobb, in *SAIS Review*, v.19, no.3 (1975) 16–22.

"Relatively little progress has been made in the integration of African women into non-traditional sectors in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda since independence in the early sixties. Moreover, the progress in industry and services that has been made tends to center in activities traditionally viewed as 'woman's work.' This is true in each country notwithstanding divergent political and economic policies. Old values and customs pose a tremendous obstacle to equal opportunities for women in education and employment in the modern sector. Until women as a valuable human resource are more productively utilized — in agriculture as well as in the modern sector — these three countries will no doubt remain severely handicapped in their development efforts."

6. *Uganda and the East African Community (EAC)*

DIVERGING PATHS IN EAST AFRICA, by Jay E. Hakes, in *Current History*, v.68, no.405 (May 1975) 202–205 plus.

"Domestic differences within the East African Community have inhibited the international cooperation among its members necessary for its success . . . In 1964, the political union of the East African states of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda was widely regarded as a strong possibility. Today, plans for increasing regional integration are only a dim memory. Economic ties continue through the operations of the East African Community (EAC), but cooperation even at this level has been badly damaged by recent events."

PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP IN EAST AFRICA, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.24, no.6 (September 1974) 17–18.

"It will need a great deal of statesmanlike skill to keep the East African Community (EAC) alive and move it closer to its ultimate goal, the creation of a political federation in this historically, geographically and ethnically linked region. Founded as a joint economic and administrative organization, the EAC embraces Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Like the older EEC in Europe, with which the East Africans are associated, nationalist-oriented thinking and ruthlessly

selfish policies have destroyed much of the initiative which prompted the creation of the EAC by Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote. The institution has been weakened by idealogical and political differences of opinion, the military coup of General Idi Amin in Uganda and the subsequent flight of Obote to Tanzania, as well as the apparently permanent and costly difficulties with the administration of Community authorities. But despite the complications which have appeared in their collaboration and in decentralizing formerly important joint institutions, the East African governments continue to support the EAC, at least verbally."

WW. Upper Volta (See also appendixes)

AFRICA: REPORT FROM THE CONTINENT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 235 p. (93rd. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives).

"Reports by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich), on special study missions to Africa during 1972 and 1973, and on a special study mission to Oslo, Norway, in 1973. Includes: a. Part 1: Report of Nov. 14-Dec. 16, 1972, visits to Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Lebannon to observe recent development of African countries. Also reports on visits with foreign ministries of USSR, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Canada to discuss national policies toward Africa (p. 5-158). b. Part 2: Report of mission to Oslo, Norway, to attend the International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialsim and Apartheid in Southern Africa, organized by UN and Organization of African Unity, Apr. 7-14, 1973 (p. 159-166). Part 3: Report of Nov. 10-Dec. 8, 1973 visits to: Brazil, to discuss national foreign policy toward Africa; to Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta, to observe Sahel drought needs; and to Swaziland and Lesotho, to assess their policies toward South Africa and possible ties with US (p. 167-233). Includes maps of Africa and graphs on African imports/exports and food consumption and production (p. x-xv and throughout)."

XX. Zaire (See also appendixes)

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING AND MODERNISATION IN ZAIRE, by Gaston V. Rimlinger, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.12, no.4 (July 1976) 364-382.

"This paper analyses the rise and fall of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (EDNA) of Kinshasa from 1961 to 1971 in the context of the modernisation forces of a new country. Alongside the historical pecularities of the setting, the ENDA experience illustrates strikingly many of the themes surrounding similar institutions in other developing countries . . . These themes include the institution's search for an appropriate role and for security, its struggle for status and survival, its conflict with the university establishment, the competitive bids for influence of technical assistance agencies, and the need to adapt to a rapidly changing environment."

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (CONGO KINSHASA), by Gordon C. McDonald and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 587 p. (DA Pam 550-67.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Illustrations; and Tables.

GALLIC AFRICA; A LOOK AT THE EMERGING SHAPE OF THE FORMER FRENCH COLONIES IN AFRICA, by Pierre Rocheron, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, v.3, no.10 (October 1975) 15 plus.

"French-speaking Black Africa has long been 'terra incognita' for a large part of the world. There are two main reasons for this: with the exception of the ex-Belgian Congo (now Zaire), the process of decolonization has generally taken place without excessive violence or successive coups . . . If it is possible to bypass the cultural and linguistic misunderstandings, history provides several clues to a slightly different evolution in French speaking Africa. The French colonial process, with excellent intentions (and sometimes happy results, sometimes arguable ones), has always been basically one of assimilation."

MOBUTU PICKS UP THE PIECES IN ZAIRE, by Guy Arnold, in *African Development*, v.10, no.7 (July 1976) 667 plus.

"Zaire has devalued, invited the foreign firms back and has worked out a stabilization programme which has prompted the IMF to make $150m. credits available. Mobutu is also re-examining his foreign policy, left in tatters by the Angolan war."

2. *History*

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONGO, 1960-1964, by Stephen R. Weissman. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1974. 325 p.

"This is an . . . analysis of American policy toward the Congo from 1960 to 1964, utilizing such diverse sources as periodical articles, personal interviews, official Belgian documents, and memoirs of many of the parties involved, from President Eisenhower to European mercenaries. The author argues that American relations with the Congo during this episode present 'a fairly typical case of Americna intervention in the Third World' against 'pro-communist' elements perceived as a threat and handled by 'limited applications of America's overwhelming political, paramilitary, and military power'."

MISSION FOR HAMMARSKJOLD: THE CONGO CRISIS, by Rajeshwar Dayal. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 335 p.

"As the head of the U.N. mission to the Congo in

1960–61, the author found himself impaled between Congolese factions as well as between the West and the rest; this position gave him the perspective to write [an] . . . account of the much-disputed events there (including new material on the involvement of the U.N. in the Kasavubu and Mobutu coups, the arrest of Lumumba, and Hammarskjold's death.)"

3. *Role of the Military*

MILITARY REGIMES IN AFRICA, by W.F. Gutteridge. New York, Barnes & Noble Books, Harper & Row, 1975. 195 p.

"This latest study of the dean of African military historians builds on his past insights into the plethora of military coups in post-independence Africa to explore the behavior of military-led governments in their efforts to solve the problems of national development. Through case studies of Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Zaire, Uganda and the Sudan, Gutteridge shows that the importance of the personalities of military leaders has been vastly underrated. He acknowledges the importance of institutional factors in their behavior, but he also sees the weakening of such factors in modern Africa as part of a sweeping transformation of African politics."

4. *Invasion of the Province Shaba: Domestic and Foreign Aspects*

AFRICA'S POLICEMAN, by Arnaud De Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.20 (16 May 1977) 58–69.

Interview with King Hassan II of Morocco concerning the intervention of Moroccan troops in Zaire. King Hassan stated that he saw Soviet strategy in Africa as trying to "encircle, weaken and neutralize West Europe by controlling its sources of key minerals in Africa. If the Shaba operation had succeeded and if the Middle East were allowed to continue to drift, not one moderate regime would survive . . . It wouldn't be only Europe's oil route — but the oil itself. Add to the mix the threat of popular fronts in Italy and France and you don't have to be a geopolitical genius to grasp the consequences for world peace . . . Russia says it stands for noninterference in internal affairs — noninterference by non-Communist powers, that is. Because when they intervene — either directly as in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or through proxies, as in Angola — it suddenly becomes a sacred, international revolutionary duty . . . "

CUBANS IN AFRICA; WHAT ARE THEY UP TO?, by Georgie Anne Geyer, in *The New Republic*, v.176, no.14 (2 April 1977) 11–13.

"Are the Cubans . . . behind . . .[the] . . . invasion of Zaire? Are the Angolans? Or is it . . . another of those border and tribal wars which are endemic all over Africa? Most important, what are the real Cuban intentions in Africa?"

MOBUTU SPEAKS OUT, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.16 (18 April 1977) 49–50 plus.

"The war in Zaire is rapidly becoming an international affair. Last week Morocco dispatched a battalion of troops — about 1,500 men — to help repel the invaders from neighboring Angola who have occupied parts of Shaba Province (formerly Katanga). Zaire also was receiving help from France and Belgium. And in his first exclusive interview since the invasion a month ago, Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko told NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave that Egypt also had promised to send a battalion of troops. Mobutu complained . . . about a lack of support from the US, which so far has supplied him only with noncombat equipment. And he charged that Cuba and Russia were behind the invasion. Excerpts from the conversation."

NEW WAR IN AFRICA?, by James Pringle, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.13 (28 March 1977) 37–38.

"For two weeks, a stream of confusing reports about an invasion of Zaire's mineral-rich province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) had poured out of Kinshasa. By various accounts, between 500 and 5,000 former Katangan soldiers armed with Soviet-bloc weapons had crossed the border from Angola and mounted a three-pronged drive into the province. Some reports called it a local offensive by exiles who simply wanted to go home. But with 10,000 Cuban soldiers still in Angola, other diplomats contended the invasion was part of a Soviet-Cuban drive to seize control of Shaba's copper, cobalt and uranium mines. The US, Belgium and France promptly started shipping military hardware to the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko to help him repel the invaders — and the situation threatened to escalate into another big-power confrontation over Africa. Late last week, NEWSWEEK'S James Pringle flew with Mobutu to Shaba and filed this report."

5. *Energy Resources*

ENERGY CRISIS BRIGHTENS ZAIRE'S FUTURE, by Kenneth L. Adelam, in *Africa Today*, v.22, no.4 (October–December 1975) 49–55.

"One month after the 1973 Middle-East War and start of the ensuing energy crisis, President Mobutu Sese Seko asked Zairians, 'Where would we be today if we had not finished the first stage of Inga?' Inga of course refers to the gigantic hydro-electrical power complex in Bas-Zaire (formerly Lower Congo). Important as it is, Inga is only one element in Zaire's total energy picture. The recent discovery of offshore oil reserves and the operation of a petroleum refinery in Moanda, together with Inga, give Zaire one of the brightest energy prospects in all of Africa."

6. *Religious Aspects*

KIMBANGUISM: AN AFRICAN CHRISTIANITY, by Wyatt MacGoffey, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.1 (January–February 1976) 40–43.

"Almost anything one can say about Kimbanguism is controversial. It is a religious movement, one

that has given rise to the largest indigenous church in Zaire, possibly the largest in Africa, but its history is a political one. Its leaders have constantly had to struggle to assert the right of Kimbanguism to exist in the fact of hostility founded ostensibly on the movement's failure to conform to Chrisitan orthodoxy but in reality on the threat it appeared to present to the foreign-controlled mission churches and beyond them to the European or European-oriented government. Kimbanguists have of necessity become public relations experts, adept at presenting their history and doctrines in terms calculated to offer the maximum political advantage. In the process the real history of Kimbanguism has been lost, possibly forever, and its present significance is obscured by the claims and counterclaims of its partisans and opponents."

7. Zaire and South Africa

ZAIRE AND SOUTH AFRICA: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.11 (February 1976) 6–8.

"The outcome of the conflict in Angola will not only determine the future of that former Portuguese colony, it will also have a marked influence on the fate of neighboring Zaire and its President Mobutu Sese Seko, who last November celebrated the tenth anniversary of his rule. Zaire is directly affected by developments in Angola. The two countries share more than 1,500 miles of frontier; hundreds of thousands of Bakongo refugees from northern Angola have been living in Zaire for years (Zaire officials claim the figure is more than 1 million, while according to UN sources it is 500,000), and for the past 14 years Zaire has been supporting Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)... Zaire has joined the ranks of those nations in Black Africa that are seeking to establish a dialogue with South Africa's white regime. The reasons for this shift are not to be found in any change of heart on Mobutu's part, nor to be misinterpreted as a success of South Africa Prime Minister Vorster's 'outward policy.' Mobutu is simply bowing to the exigencies of a radically altered situation, partly linked to developments in Angola but mostly to the economic difficulties facing his own land... Help for Zaire's gravely threatened mining districts has come primarily from South Africa, which has taken the opportunity to thus expand its economic relations with this huge member of the Black African community. Not only has South Africa opened its ports for copper exports, it is now supplying the Shaba region with urgently needed fuel, which it is transporting in railway tank cars built in South Africa with South African credits extended to Zaire."

YY. Zambia (See also appendixes)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AREA HANDBOOK FOR ZAMBIA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1974. 484 p. (DA PaM 550-550-75.)

Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FARMING IN TWO AREAS OF ZAMBIA, by N.R. Vanzetti and J.E. Bessell, in *The Journal of Development Studies*, v.11, no.1 (October 1974) 41–54.

"Traditional agriculture, based on the maximization of security, was necessary within the context of traditional society, but it is inappropriate for the earning of the money necessary to live in a modern society. For this an individual frequently aims at the maximization of profits, and in doing so takes risks which a traditional cultivator would not take. It is not just a matter of his working harder, but also his adopting the improved techniques and improved inputs of modern technology.. The constraints preventing a cultivator from adopting improved practices can be classified into two main groups: economic and technical constraints, and personal and cultural constraints. This article will look briefly at how education has contributed to the overcoming of the personal and cultural constraints in the development of farming."

ZAMBIA: SECURITY AND CONFLICT, by Jan Pettman. New York, St. Martin, 1974. 284 p.

"Survey of Zambia's political and economic development since independence, somewhat marred by what hindsight reveals to be an exaggerated view of the *external—southern* African—threats to the nation's security."

2. Political Aspects

FREEDOM AND LABOUR: MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CONTROL ON THE ZAMBIAN COPPERBELT, by Peter Harries-Jones. New York, St. Martin, 1975. 256 p.

"A British political scientist recounts the transition UNIP, Zambia's ruling party, from the neighborhood proletarian cadres of the pre-independence era into an elite network after its advent to power."

POLITICS IN ZAMBIA, ed. by William Tordoff. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 439 p.

"Conceived as a sequel to David C. Mulford's Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957–64 (1967), this... group of essays covers party and government politics and administration from 1964 to 1972."

THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN A ZAMBIAN COMMUNITY, by George C. Bond. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976. 178 p.

"A case study in Zambian rural politics around the time of independence (1963–65). The author views this period as a brief flowering of local participation, which, even as he watched, began to wither again."

3. *Kenneth Kaunda*

A CHRISTIAN MAOIST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA?, by Marjorie Hope and James Young, in *Worldview*, v.19, no.4 (April 1976) 18-25.

An analysis of Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia — his views about the future direction for his country and its relations with the outside world. The authors think that Kaunda is moving toward "Christian Maoism," but that he is suspicious of all outside intervention.

KENNETH KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA: THE TIMES AND THE MAN, by Fergus Macpherson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1975. 478 p.

"The author of this biography is a longtime friend of its subject, as well as a historian—and his account of the. . . struggle for Zambia's freedom that was Kaunda's life until independence is. . . replete with the details of that effort."

TWO AFRICAN STATESMEN; KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA AND NYERERE OF TANZANIA, by John Hatch. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1976. 268 p.

"The crucial issue in Africa during the rest of this century is whether it can devise a new kind of society. Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania have determined the direction of their two countries, and the fate of their experiments—both of which are capturing the idealism of younger Africans—is of transcendent importance to the development of society there and on other continents as well. If Africa follows the traditional pattern, it might well become another South America—as the number of coups that have taken place and the rise of consumption-oriented class might indicate. In this respect, the author points out, even such momentous matters as the struggle in South Africa and the race question must not be allowed to distract attention from the crucial battle between the rural masses and the urban elite. To meet the challenge, Nyerere has set his hand to proving that a rural society based on cooperation rather than competition is a practical ideal. Kaunda has a more complex and signficant task: combining a rural renaissance with urban prosperity, on an egalitarian basis. 'Two African Statesmen' traces Nyerere and Kaunda's developing attitudes from childhood; the impact of tribal codes, trade unions, and colonial politics on their contrasting countries; and their respective roles in world affairs, particularly the degree of their support for the nonaligned bloc and the concept of the Third World."

4. *Economic Aspects*

CONGO, ZAIRE, ZAMBIA NATIONALIZE FOREIGN OIL FIRMS, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.26, no.3 (13 Feb 1974) 16.

Condensed text of comments in Pravda, 21 Jan. 1974), p. 3. Discussed are the reasons for nationalization by the three countries, as well as the reasons why they have concluded agreements with the Arab oil-producing countries for the direct delivery of oil [obviating the intermediary role of western companies in the supply and marketing of petroleum].

CORPORATE POWER IN AN AFRICAN STATE: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL MINING COMPANIES IN ZAMBIA, by Richard L. Sklar. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. 245 p.

"In this. . . analysis of the evolving relationship between an LDC host and its multinationals, Zambian nationalism is seen to be entirely compatible with the development of an elite class whose interests coincide with those of international captialism; although the corporations have adapted smoothly to the expressed policies of the host government, their partnership with local bourgeoisie are shown to have had a profound influence on the shape of the polity."

ECONOMIC SURVEY: ZAMBIA, November 1975, in *African Development*, v.9, no.11 (November 1975) z.1 plus.

Zambia's Economy; the Political Scene; Maize; Agriculture; Expatriotes Old and New; Copper; Transport; Indeco (State-Owned Conglomerate); Zambia's Future; Building and Construction; Inflation; Development Bank; and Rural Development.

INTERNATIONAL AID AND NATIONAL DECISIONS: DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI, TANZANIA, AND ZAMBIA, by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 190 p.

"Observing the operation of U.N. aid programs from their beginnings through their growth into an international industry, the author describes the complex interactions between the national governments and U.N. personnel, focusing on the potential for development aid to foster the U.N. goals of international integration and cooperation."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA, ed. by Richard Harris. Cambridge, Schenkman, 1975. 270 p.

"These essays on Kenya and Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria are unified by the common perspective of their authors, part of a growing group of social scientists basing their analyses of African development on a critique of African dependency and Western neocolonialism."

5. *Tanzam Railroad*

ALONG THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Peter Seidlitz, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.1 (April 1976) 20-21.

"When the current test period is over and the railroad begins full-scale operations, 19 trains each day are scheduled to pass along the route in both directions. The project has linked huge, previously undeveloped regions in both Tanzania and Zambia with the centers of

those countries, making it possible for their inhabitants to get their produce to market and stimulating agriculture and trade. . . The price of the ambitious railroad project is high. Tanzania and Zambia have incurred debts to the Chinese that will run well over into the coming century."

CHINESE AID IN ACTION. BUILDING THE TANZANIA ZAMBIA RAILWAY, by Martin Bailey, in *World Development*, v.3, nos. 7&8 (July-August 1975) 587-593.

"There has been a growing interest in Chinese aid, as an alternative to that provided by Western and Soviet donors, but little has been published on how assistance from China has worked in practice. This article focuses on China's largest aid project, the Tanzam Railway, which was built from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian Copper Belt. The main analysis centres around Peking's reasons for financing the line, the financial terms attached to the loan, and how the railway was constructed using labor-intensive techniques. The article concludes with an examination of how Chinese assistance has helped Third World countries to increase their self-reliance."

HOPEFUL FUTURE ON THE TANZAM RAILWAY, by Gerd Meurer, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.25, no.7 (October 1975) 19-20.

"Eighteen months ahead of the originally scheduled date, Chinese and African construction crews reached the Zambian town of Kapiri-Mposhi, to link the new Tanzan Railway to the existing Zambian rail network. . . Passenger and freight service along the entire run is scheduled to begin this autumn. By that time thousands of tons of freight and thousands of people will have already been transported along stretches of the railway, which is the largest Chinese development aid project in Africa. By the end of last year the rail line had already reached Tunduma, near the frontier between the two countries, and since then more than 200 persons daily have traveled along various stretches of the line on a noncommercial basis and more than 30,000 tons of freight destined for landlocked Zambia have been shipped by rail and then loaded onto trucks to continue the journey."

6. *Foreign Policy*

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ZAMBIA: IDEOLOGY AND INTERESTS, by Timothy M. Shaw, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v.14, no.1 (1976) 79-105.

"The foreign policy of any country contains a variety of values and goals, and advances several interests and concerns. This article examines the continuities and discontinuities, compatibilities and contradictions in the foreign policy of Zambia. In particular, it focuses on the emerging debate over the direction of the Zambian society and state, and over the definition of the national ideology of Humanism."

THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ZAMBIA, by Timothy M. Shaw, in *The African Studies Review*, v.19, no.1 (April 1976) 31-36.

"This paper suggests that the foreign policy system of any African state includes a wide range of actors, not just the State House and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we define the foreign policy system as the relationship among all actors within the state who have international relations, then the system includes institutions such as a range of ministries, parastatal organizations, foreign missions, and local offices of multinational corporations and international organizations. This essay examines this range of actors in Zambia."

ZAMBIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN 'DETENTE,' by Douglas D. Anglin, in *International Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1975) 471-503.

"This study attempts to trace the roots of present policies in the past and to analyze the significance of current contacts for the future." The author's view of what can be done to avoid. . . "a descent into unrestrained racial conflagration."

7. *The US and Zambia*

US AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. 33 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill) on Apr. 13-25, 1976 study mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana. Assesses US' interests in South Africa and African viewpoint on desirable US role. Includes appendix (p. 21-33)."

8. *Soviet View of Zambia*

ZAMBIA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND HOPES by B. Pilyatskin, in *International Affairs* (Moscow), no.1 (1975) 110-116. In English.

ZZ. Zanzibar (See Tanzania)

PART IV
SOURCE MATERIALS FOR RESEARCH AND REFERENCE

A. Reference Materials

AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN; ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND TECHNICAL SERIES.

This bulletin is edited and published monthly by Africa Research Ltd., Exeter, England. Contents: Economic Cooperation in Africa; Internal Economic Conditions; Internal Economic Policies; Production and Marketing; Development Plans; Communications and Technical Developments; and Economic and Technical Cooperation with Nations Overseas.

AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN; POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SERIES.

This bulletin is edited and published monthly by Africa Research Ltd., Exeter, England. Contents: International Political Developments in Africa; Internal Political Developments — Independent Nations; Political Developments — Nonindependent Territories; Political Developments with Nations Overseas; Social Developments; and Cultural Developments.

AFRICAN BACKGROUND, in *To The Point International,* v.3, no.6 (22 March 1976).

A regular feature in each issue of this periodical, covering current issues of many individual countries of Africa.

COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS. 2nd ed. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1975. 1147 p.

"This volume contains the most recent version of each of the US State Department's 164 fact-filled reports called 'Background Notes on Countries of the World.' In this edition, Gale has added three new features: the State Department's 'Status of the World's Nations'; the Central Intelligence Agency's 1975 list of 'Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments'; and the State Department's 'International Organization' series. The 'Background Notes,' which comprise the main portion of the book, are concise, up-to-date profiles on 164 countries. All are uniform in style and format, ranging from three to fifteen pages depending on a country's size and complexity. Topics are alphabetically arranged and usually include: geography, population, people, history, government, political conditions, economy, foreign relations, US policy, relations with the US, principal government officials, principal members of the US diplomatic mission, and a bibliography. The 'Status of the World's Nations' section is a survey of the nations, dependencies, and areas of special sovereignty, followed by capsules of key facts on each. A checklist of newly independent nations established since 1943 is also provided. The CIA's 1975 'Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments' is an inclusive listing of the top officials of 153 nations. Arranged by country, this section includes an overall alphabetical index to the 1,700 officials covered. The "International Organization" series is comprised of reports that discuss the aims, organizational structures, and operating methods of six of the world's most important alliances and mutual-cooperation groupings; the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Communities, and the United Nations. . ."

TREATIES IN FORCE. Washington, Department of State, 1976. 461 p.

A list of treaties and other international agreements of the United States in force on January 1, 1976.

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICA, by William E. Schaufele, Jr., in *The Department of State Bulletin,* v.74, no.1915 (8 March 1976) 295–299.

"Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs customarily focus their maiden speeches before the African-American Chamber of Commerce on the state of our economic relations with Africa even if, as in my case, they are weak in that field. However, even I recognize that our primary long-term interests in Africa are—and will undoubtedly remain—economic. We must not let the present political problems in southern Africa distort our perception of that reality. Recent progress on the major facets of our economic relations with Africa—trade, investment, and development assistance—is certainly encouraging. But problems still persist."

WEST AFRICA.

A weekly publication, published by the West Africa Publishing Company Limited, London, England, and reporting current important events of West Africa.

WORLD BANK/IDA; ANNUAL REPORT 1974–75. Washington, World Bank/International Development Association, 1974. 144 p.

WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRADE 1963–1973. Washington, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975. 123 p. (Publication 74.)

The information is provided for all the major

countries of the world. Trends in World Military Expenditures; Developed and Developing World; World Arms Trade; Relative Burden. With statistical notes and statistical tables.

WORLD OUTLOOK 1975. London, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, February 1975. 133 p.

"A guide to economic prospects worldwide, the 1975 issue of World Outlook brings together in one volume the individual forecasts of likely trends in over 150 countries (including those of Africa, among others) published in the EIU's Quarterly Economic Reviews in the last quarter of 1974. These forecasts are revised in the light of developments up to January 31."

1. *Atlases*

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MODERN AFRICA, by William A. Hance. 2nd ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 1975. 657 p.

"Hance's. . . study (first published in 1964) has now been fully revised, with a new epilogue on development problems and potentials as well as new maps and illustrative material, and statistical data updated to the early 1970s."

GOODE'S WORLD ATLAS, ed. by Edward B. Espenshade. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1976. 372 p. (Golden Anniversary edition.)

World thematic maps; metropolitan area maps; ocean floor maps; geographical tables and indexes. Regional section includes maps of Africa.

1976 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE. *107th ed. Chicago, Rand McNally &* Co., 1976. 669 p.

Includes, among many others, maps on both Chinas. The section on general world information includes: air line distances; altitudes of selected cities; latest offficial population figures; gazetteer index of countries, regions and political divisions and world political information table; general index of foreign places and physical features; steamship distances; time chart; world facts and comparisons; and world physical comparisons.

THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD. COMPREHENSIVE EDITION. New York, The New York Times Book Co., 1975. 223 p.

WORLD TABLES 1976. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1976. 552 p.

From the data files of the World Bank. The previous world tables were published in 1971. The current tables deal with selected economic development indicators, also social indicators. Includes data on African countries.

2. *Congressional Materials*

HEARINGS ON H.R. 1287 TO AMEND THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945 TO HALT THE IMPORTATION OF RHODESIAN CHROME. Washington, Government Printing Office, July 1975. 274 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Committee Serial No. 94-21. Hearings before the Subcom on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials to consider H.R. 1287 (text, p. 2), to negate the Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act and thereby prohibit US importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN economic sanctions. Includes (p. 140-274) submitted statement, correspondence, news articles, and: United Steelworkers of America, 'Jobs-or-Profits: Facts vs. Fiction on Rhodesian Chrome' (p. 152-165). Rhodesian Information Office, 'Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political Groups in Rhodesia' (p. 257-266)."

3. *Directories*

FLAGS THROUGH THE AGES AND ACROSS THE WORLD, by Whitney Smith. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1975. 357 p.

"In a major survey of flags through the ages, Dr. Smith presents a 5,000-year panorama, beginning in the ancient Middle East and China and continuing with the conquering Roman legions, the early Christians, the Crusaders, and the modern armies of today. Some of the characters in this vast human frieze include Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Ivan the Terrible and Mahdi of Islam; great men from Mahatma Gandhi to Columbus and those who followed him to settle the New World and then to fight for its independence. This is the first comprehensive work on the subject—enhanced by over 3,000 historical paintings, heraldic designs and flag reproductions. Smith provides an inexhaustible flow of information about the flags and national costs of arms of the world's 157 nations, together with a complete glossary of flag terminology and the rules and regulations of flag etiquette on land and sea around the world. . ."

PORTS OF THE WORLD 1974. 27th ed. London, Benn Brothers Limited, 1974. 867 p.

WHO'S WHO IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES, by Michael Hawkin. New York, Arno Press, 1975. 824 p.

"With this volume, Arno Press inaugurates a new series of biographical directories designed to provide authoritative and comprehensive biographical material in areas where current information is not easily accessible. The directory contains biographies covering more than 3,700 United Nations and agency personnel as well as diplomatic representatives of Member and observer States in New York and Geneva. Information for each person listed includes: name; position; business and home address and telephone number; languages spoken; career positions; countries of service; education; professional memberships and interests; books and articles written; and avocational interests. In addition, the volume lists Secretariat staff members holding the rank of chief or divisional director (P-5) and above, mission personnel from the level of counselor and up, members of governing boards and councils, and selected

other categories. Also included is a listing, by country, of more than 450 United Nations offices worldwide, containing their mailing addresses, street addresses, telephone numbers, cable and telex codes. The directory contains extensive reference material, a good part of which is devoted to the first organizational roster of the UN system ever published. The roster provides a structural breakdown of the UN secretariats, agencies and other UN organs, with names of senior officials. This roster is designed to make it easier to locate appropriate contacts in connection with a specific request or problem. The contents pages and information on how to use the volume are presented in six languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish."

4. *Encyclopedias*

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA. New York and London, Franklin Watts, 1976. 223 p.

Important aspects of the continent are covered in thematic chapters: People, Economy, Social Services, Landscapes, Wildlife, Arts, Sport, History, Government. With maps and drawings.

5. *Handbooks*

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1975, ed. by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1975. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, by Arthur S. Banks. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1976. 491 p.

"Published for the Center for Comparative Political Research and the Council on Foreign Relations, this volume is a reference tool for researchers in political science and related disciplines. An annual publication, the Handbook is a singularly valuable source of: 1) background country information, and 2) information on contemporary intergovernmental organizations of the world. The first section, in alphabetical order by customary English name followed by the national language name, presents analytical and descriptive essays encompassing demographic and political facts on 150 independent nations, as well as territories and subdivisions. Specific topics covered are political and governmental status and background including constitutional structure, current issues, ruling and opposing political parties, platforms and constituencies and cabinet structure; language; urban centers; institutions; media; foreign relations; and diplomatic representation. If a country is politically divided, the country is treated as a whole, followed by information on the separate entities, as in China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam. The second section, also in alphabetical order, provides information on 50 intergovernmental organizations that pursue cooperative efforts in such areas as trade and economy, defense, ecology, technology, health and atomic energy. Information on each organization includes formation, purpose, structure, leadership, organs, membership, and activities. While many of these organizations are very familiar, e.g., NATO, UN, WTO, EEC, many are relatively unknown. The Handbook incorporates two appendixes: appendix A lists, by country, the membership of the UN and related agencies; appendix B provides, by country, statistical data on area, population, and per capita figures for export, GNP, school enrollment, telephones, and news circulation."

6. *Yearbooks*

AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD: ANNUAL SURVEY AND DOCUMENTS 1973-74, ed. by Colin Legum. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1974. 1177 p.

"Now in its sixth year of publication, the 'Africa Contemporary Record' has become the single most important reference work in its field. A storehouse of factual information on the entire continent, this large volume presents a detailed (791 p.) and highly readable account of the year's events in fifty-two mainland and island African countries. Beyond this country-by-country review, it provides more than one hundred pages of essays on current issues—ranging, in this edition, from Legum's 'Africa, the Arabs, and the Middle East' to Aaron Segal's 'Latin America's Year in Africa'—and a section of 275 pages which reproduces key documents dealing with international, political, social and economic developments in Africa during the past year. Unlike many other annuals, the A.C.R., by means of cross-references, utilizes past volumes without replicating their content. Thus the entire series stands as a... tool for an... understanding of events in Africa."

INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK AND STATEMEN'S WHO'S WHO, 1975. London, Kelly's Directories, 1975. Various paging.

MINERAL YEARBOOK, VOLUME 3; AREA REPORTS: INTERNATIONAL. Washington, US Bureau of Mines, 1976. 1193 p.

R.U.S.I AND BRASSEY'S DEFENSE YEARBOOK, 1975/76. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1975. 418 p.

See also annuals for previous years.

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1974. Twenty-Sixth Issue. New York, United Nations, 1975. 877 p. (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/2.)

Includes some information of an economic and social affairs nature on many nations of the world.

WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1975. Stockholm, International Research Institute, 1975. 618 p.

The sixth issue of the SIPRI Yearbook continues the analysis of the world's arms races and the attempts to stop them.

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1975. ed by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 678 p.

With each passing year, the task of keeping abreast of changing developments in the Communist world becomes more difficult. This Yearbook, edited by Richard F. Staar, provides a comprehensive survey covering the calendar year 1974 of the organizational structure, internal development, domestic and foreign policies, and activity of Communist parties throughout the world.

7. *Dictionaries*

DICTIONARY OF BLACK AFRICAN CIVILIZATION. 1974.

8. *Chronologies*

CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CUMULATIVE EDITION, 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, January-December 1976. 152 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Updated monthly edition of a CRS-prepared series of chronologies of significant international events in selected areas, listing notable occurrences for 1976 in the following fields: arms control, energy, Indochina, the Middle East, US Soviet-Chinese relations, Southern Africa, and Cyprus."

B. Bibliography of Bibliographies

1. *Area and Country Bibliographies*

a. *Area*

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARA; FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH, SPECIAL PAPERS AVAILABLE. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of External Research, December 1976. 128 p. (Publication no.8879.)

"This publication is a cumulative listing of papers on Sub-Saharan Africa collected by the Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Center between June 1971 and August 1976. These studies represent research done by individual scholars, universities, and research centers either independently or with Government funds. Subjects covered deal primarily with the social sciences and humanities as they relate to foreign affairs and include such topics as education, leadership, and colonialism."

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE HORN OF AFRICA, by J. Bowyer Bell, Jr. New York, Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974.

b. *By Country*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR ALGERIA, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp.353-383. (DA Pam 550-44.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1974, pp.299-318. (DA Pam 550-166.)

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CAMEROON, by Mark W. DeLancey and Virginia H. DeLancey. New York, Africana Publishing Co., 1975. 673 p.

"The bibliography spans the period 1884 through early 1972 and excludes short notes and one-page articles. The bibliography is . . . cross-referenced according to ethnic, linguistic and geographic names as well as personal names apearing in titles."

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR CHAD, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp.231-244. (DA Pam 550-159.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (CONGO BRAZZAVILLE), by Gordon C. McDonald and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. pp.217-242. (DA Pam 550-91.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (CONGO KINSHASA), by Gordon C. McDonald and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. pp.517-568. (DA Pam 550-67.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. 3rd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. pp.399-433. (DA Pam 550-43.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR ETHIOPIA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. pp.503-531. (DA Pam 550-28.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR GHANA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. pp.373-427. (DA Pam 550-153.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR GUINEA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. 2nd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. pp.343-361. (DA Pam 550-174.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR IVORY COAST, by T. D. Roberts and others. 2nd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. various paging. (DA Pam 550-69.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR KENYA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. pp.423-451. (DA Pam 550-56.)

[SELECTION BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR LIBERIA, by Thomas D. Roberts

and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. various paging. (DA Pam 550-38.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. pp.293-316. (DA Pam 550-163.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. p.319-336. (DA Pam 550-172.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR MAURITANIA, by Brian Dean Curran and Joann Schrock. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp.155-171. (DA Pam 550-161.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR MOROCCO, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp.327-382. (DA Pam 550-49.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR NIGERIA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp.411-471. (DA Pam 550-157.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in NIGERIAN MODERNIZATION, THE COLONIAL LEGACY, by Ukandi G. Damachi. New York, The Third Press, 1974.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR SOUTHERN RHODESIA, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1975. pp.353-372. (DA Pam 550-171.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR SENEGAL, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. pp.353-383. (DA Pam 550-70.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR SIERRA LEONE, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. pp.355-375.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Irving Kaplan and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. pp.783-822. (DA Pam 550-93.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, by Harold D. Nelson and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. pp.317-333. (DA Pam 550-27.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA, by Howard C. Reese and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1970. pp.381-401. (DA Pam 550-89.)

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C. Miscellaneous Bibliographies

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[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE, THE POLITICS OF LAGOS, 1917-1967, by Pauline H. Baker. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.

[REFERENCES], in DEVELOPMENT PATHS IN AFRICA AND CHINA, ed. by Ukandi G. Damachi and others. Boulder, Colo., 1976. pp.240-248.

1. *Political Aspects*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THOUGHT IN AFRICA: AN INTRODUCTION, by E. Olisa Awogu. New York, Vantage Press, 1975. pp.274-290.

2. *Foreign Relations*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET-AFRICAN RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. London, Central Asian Research Centre, 1974. pp.187-190.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in GHANA AND NIGERIA 1957-70; A STUDY IN INTER-AFRICAN DISCORD, by Olajide Aluko. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1976. pp.264-270.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in RED STAR ON THE NILE; THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE JUNE WAR, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. pp.367-374.

3. *Religious Aspects*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ISLAM IN UGANDA, by Arye Oded. New York, Halstead Press, 1974.

4. *History*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY ESSAY], in AFRICA SINCE 1875; A MODERN HISTORY, by Robin Hallett. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1974.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE BANTU CIVILIZATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, by E. Jefferson Murphy. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1974.

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APPENDIX I
MILITARY POWER IN AFRICA
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AFRICA

Regional Survey

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

Largely colonial before 1960, largely independent thereafter, Africa is characterized by rich natural resources, inadequate economic development, increasing overpopulation in relation to food production in many areas, widespread and disruptive tribal differences, and friction engendered by the Organization of African Unity and indigenous black nationalists against several countries in southern Africa controlled by white minorities. These conditions have resulted in internal tensions, disorders, military coups, civil wars, and overt and covert military support of insurgencies against the white-dominated regimes as well as against moderate governments maintaining close ties with former colonial rulers.

Vast—measuring 4,000 miles by 4,000 miles along its greatest dimensions—Africa is divided for this discussion into four disparate regions: North Africa, the Horn of Africa, Equatorial Africa, and Southern Africa. Egypt, geographically a part of North Africa, is included in the chapter on the Middle East.

In North Africa civilization is mostly concentrated in a narrow coastal strip along the Mediterranean and Atlantic shores. Most of the littoral, as well as the interior, is desert in Egypt and Libya. In Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco the coastal regions are relatively fertile and enjoy a typical Mediterranean climate, but are backed by mountains and interior deserts. In the 8th Century this region served as a base for Arab penetration into Europe and, although separated from the rest of Africa by the formidable Sahara Desert, for expansion of Arab trade and Islamic religion and culture into trans-Saharan Africa. The countries of North Africa gained their independence after World War II, and recent significant oil discoveries promise to provide them funds for future economic development.

The Horn of Africa consists of the Abyssinian massif, bisected by the Great Rift Valley, containing the headwaters of the Blue Nile, and the surrounding arid coasts of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. The Christian Ethiopian Empire from its mountain fastness was able to defend itself successfully against waves of Moslem invaders and against all colonialists except Italy (1935-1941). For half of its external trade it depends on a railroad which reaches the sea through a French-ruled Moslem land, and recently it has been under renewed pressure from its own lowland Moslem population and the surrounding Moslem states.

Equatorial Africa is the savannah and forest area between the southern borders of the Sahara and the temperate and arid areas of Southern Africa. Both coasts are uninviting, with few natural harbors, and largely swampy terrain between the coast and the African escarpment, which begins 50 to 100 miles inland. Most river navigation stops at this point. Exceptions are the Senegal, Gambia, and Niger rivers, which are navigable 300 to 500 miles from the sea. Also, once above the Congo rapids, 80 miles from the sea, there are over 7,000 miles of river transportation routes in use. The forbidding coastal features inhibited exploration and colonial penetration of the central African plateau for centuries, and still inhibit the development of the interior and the exploitation of its vast mineral resources. The jungle-covered lowlands and Congo basin are bordered on north and south by savannah plains.

The interior of Southern Africa is also in large part guarded by the African escarpment. The savannah uplands of Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia, Malawi, and northern Mozambique give way to the Southwest Africa Deserts, the Kalahari desert of Botswana, and the lowland savannah of central and southern Mozambique. East-west railroads running through the Portuguese overseas territories of Angola and Mozambique serve the landlocked, mineral-rich interior states. South of this area to the Cape of Good Hope lies prosperous, developed, but racially divided, South Africa.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

Most of Africa, surrounded on all sides by water since the 100-mile Suez isthmus was cut by a canal a century ago, has always been isolated from the rest of the world. North Africa since prehistoric times has been closely tied to events in Southern Europe and the Middle East and has influenced and been influenced by their civilizations. However, Africa south of the Sahara was effectively isolated until the mid-19th century except for coastal trading posts and an occasional explorer.

Africa has become a cold war area of contention. Former colonial powers try to maintain special military and economic relationships with their former colonies. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and radical African states attempt political subversion, economic penetration, and military influence, while the United States tries to offset these moves through economic assistance and limited selective military aid. Political repercussions of Arab Israeli conflict extend into Africa as

Algeria, Egypt, and Libya try to exert their influence over lands to the south, while Israel campaigns politically to block these moves with military advice and to win the 30 independent African votes in the UN by technical assistance programs. Recently President al Kadhafi of Libya has made vigorous efforts, with some limited success, to persuade black African states to break relations with Israel.

Throughout newly independent black Africa friction and minor conflicts are constantly caused by the fact that boundary lines of the new nations are legacies from colonial Africa and do not follow tribal and ethnic divisions. The African nations, separately and jointly (through the Organization of African Unity), have set out on a course of nation building that puts national territory and unity ahead of ethnic ties. In general, African nations have exercised restraint in assisting or encouraging dissident ethnic elements in other states, even when ethnic loyalty might influence them to do so, both because they are vulnerable to the same kind of threat and because they are committed to the preeminence of the nation concept.

North Africa's coastal strip was a route of conquest for Carthaginian, Roman, Vandal, and Arab armies in the distant past, and for Allies and Axis during World War II. Commerce in the Mediterranean has always been subject to interdiction from North Africa, and more than one invasion of Europe has been mounted from its shores, the latest being in 1943 and 1944. North Africa in turn has been equally vulnerable to invasion and colonial penetration from Europe and the Middle East. Recently the Soviet Union has established a continuing naval presence in the Mediterranean seeking the possibility of outflanking NATO, and of gaining control of the world's richest oil reserves by winning the Arab world of North Africa and the Middle East. To some extent related to the growing Soviet presence is the fact that today North Africa is a base for the propagation of Arab radical socialism to the rest of Africa, a phenomenon comparable to the historical southern movement of Islam along the trans-Saharan trade routes.

Northeast Africa is a bastion flanking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, overlooking the narrow waters between the two. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb has from pre-history provided a short sea passage between Arabia and Africa. Western-oriented Ethiopia and the French Territory of Afars and Issas provide valuable air bases and ports from which influence can be exerted in Arabia and part of Africa, and from which movements into South Asia and the Indian Ocean can be staged. Because of the strategic location of the Horn, both the Soviet Union and Communist China have attempted to exert offsetting influence both through subversion and by economic and military aid in Somalia and Sudan. A parallel effort has been made by the Arabs, with Egypt and Syria taking the lead.

Southern Africa guards the historic sea routes between east and west, which are of increased importance while the Suez Canal is closed. The white-dominated regimes of Southern Africa are the target of liberation movements supported by most other African states (particularly the radical ones), the communist world, and many sympathizers in the West. The Portuguese territories of Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique as well as independent Rhodesia, with their less developed economies, very small white minorities, and proximity to insurgent bases, are particularly vulnerable. Well-developed South Africa, however, is separated from the Soviet-armed North African power centers of Algeria and Egypt by 4,000 miles of power vacuum and non-viable lines of communications.

The countries through which runs the Sahelian climate-vegetation strip—the southern fringe of the Sahara Desert—have suffered several years of failed rains, culminating in 1973 in the worst drought of recorded African history. The countries most severely affected—Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Mali, and Senegal—have been hampered by generally primitive transportation and governmental administration systems in distributing famine-relief aid. The famine holds potentialities for serious damage to, or even destruction of, the nomadic life patterns of large segments of the populations, a decrease in the measure of internal power held by the nomadic groups, increased unemployment and other urban problems as nomads are forced into the cities, coups d'etats triggered by dissatisfaction with governmental relief efforts, and temptations to intervention by outside powers in drought-weakened countries. Similar effects are also seen in Ethiopia.

REGIONAL ALLIANCES

Arab League. (See also Middle East Regional Survey.) The states of North Africa, plus the Sudan, are members. League affairs are directed mainly toward the Middle East and its influence is of little consequence in the rest of Africa.

The Maghreb. (Arabic for The West.) The Arabs and Berbers of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya have thought of their region as an entity from early times. This was reflected at the 1958 Tangier Conference which resulted in establishing a short-lived secretariat of the Arab Maghreb. Achievement of the immediate goal of a consultative assembly and eventual federation was prevented by border disputes and Algerian radical nationalism, which did not accord either with Moroccan conservative monarchism or Tunisian moderation. Subsequent consultations have had no tangible results, but have kept open channels of inter-government communications and cooperation on regional matters of interest.

Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 through the efforts of the leaders of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Guinea and was the culmination of earlier efforts to form a broad-based continental organization. All African countries are members except South Africa and Rhodesia. The charter prescribes non-interference in the internal affairs of states, observance of sovereignty and territorial integrity of members, peaceful settlement of disputes, condemnation of political

assassination and subversive activities, non-alignment with power blocs, and emancipation of the white-ruled African territories. The latter goal has resulted in formation of the OAU Liberation Committee, which has a planning staff and budget. It recognizes and supports the various liberation movements directed against the white-dominated regimes. Committee members are: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. In January 1973, the committee issued a Declaration on African Liberation calling for an increased effort to remove the colonial and white minority regimes still in Africa.

The OAU succeeded in arbitrating the Algerian-Moroccan border war of 1963 and in helping Tanzania replace with African troops the British troops which had quelled its 1964 army mutiny. However, it was ineffective in assisting the Congo (Kinshasa), which is now Zaire, during its rebellion in 1964-1965, in resolving the Nigerian-Biafran civil war in 1969, in reconciling various rival liberation movements, or in successfully prosecuting a war of liberation in Southern Africa or Rhodesia. Following an allegedly Portuguese-inspired mercenary raid on Guinea, in December of 1970, the OAU Defense Commission was instructed to study the establishment of a common Army. Nothing seems to have come of this.

The British Commonwealth in Africa was to have been a community of common economic interests and mutual defense objectives. British assistance to the East African states in suppressing army mutinies in 1964, and a show of force against Somali insurgents in support of Kenya in 1965, underscored this policy. However, the ability of the Commonwealth's African states to force out South Africa, Tanzania's break with Britain over Rhodesia, and reaction to British equipment sales to South Africa, indicate declining British influence over its former territories. The affiliation remains, however loose, as one of mutual interest based on historic ties, and has relevance to mutual defense in the absence of action by broader international organizations.

Common Organization of Africa and Mauritius (OCAM) was formed in 1965 as an outgrowth of earlier attempts at cooperation between French-speaking states, including the African and Malagasy Union and the Regional Council of France, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Dahomey. Aside from political and economic motives, the prime factors were establishment of a common front to meet Ghana's subversive activities, Chinese Communist infiltration and subversion, and endemic chaos in the Congo (now Zaire). OCAM's influence has recently sharply declined; Congo and Zaire withdrew from membership in 1972, and Cameroon, Chad, and the Malagasy Republic withdrew in 1973. The future of the organization now appears to lie in economic cooperation rather than political or military action. Most OCAM members have bilateral defense treaties with France which ensure their immediate internal and external security when threatened beyond their means to cope, and these so far have not been affected in the cases of those states that have withdrawn from OCAM. The 10 current OCAM members are Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta.

West African Economic Community (CEAO) was established in a treaty signed in June 1972 by seven West African states, all former French colonies. In April 1973, six of these countries—Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta—agreed to ratify and implement the treaty by January 1, 1974. Dahomey signed the 1972 treaty but later chose observer status. The purpose of the group, which is not a customs union, is the promotion of regional economic development. Most of the CEAO countries have recently suffered severe economic and human problems as a result of famine.

Sahara Group. A loose grouping of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger was set up in April 1973. Not established by treaty, the group took as its first goal the construction of the 216-mile Algerian portion of a projected trans-Sahara highway.

The East African Community (EAC), made up of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, grew out of the British colonial East Africa High Commission and was established by treaty in 1967. The EAC countries form a single trade unit; the organization operates and develops railways, ports, airways, and other communications systems.

Conseil de l'Entente is a political-economic regional grouping comprising Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta. The emphasis is on economic cooperation, and especially on a common fund used for capital development projects.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Three African countries—Algeria (exporting 1.1 million barrels a day), Libya (2.3 million), and Nigeria (2.1 million)—are members of OPEC. See Middle East regional survey for discussion of this organization.

INTRA- AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICTS

1963-1968	Somalia-Kenya border clashes
1964	Army mutinies in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda suppressed by British troops and loyalist elements
1964	Military coup attempt in Gabon put down by French troops
1964	Revolt by Lumumbist gendarmes in Congo (K)
1964-1965	Communist support of Simba revolt in Congo (K)
1964	Revolt in Mozambique
1965	Military coups in Algeria
1965	Military coup in Congo (K)
1965	Military coup in Dahomey
1965	Army mutiny in Burundi
1966	Military coup in Upper Volta

1966	Unsuccessful Army coup attempt in Sudan: attempted counter-coup suppressed
1966	Military coup in Burundi
1966	Military coup in the Central African Republic
1966	Military-police coup in Ghana
1966	Military coup in Nigeria in January, counter-coup in May
1967	Attempted coup by mercenaries and Kantangese in Congo (K)
1967	Military coup by junior officers in Dahomey
1967	Military coup in Togo
1967	Algerian and Sudanese support for UAR (Egypt) on Suez Canal front
1967-1970	Nigerian civil war (attempted secession of Biafra)
1968	French assistance to Chad in maintaining internal security
1968	Military coup in Mali
1968	Army and police coup in Sierra Leone
1968	Army coup in Congo (B)
1969	Military coup in Libya; monarchy overthrown
1969	Military coup in Sudan
1970	Mercenary and dissident invasion of Guinea (Portuguese supported) fails
1971	Coup in Uganda
1971	Rebellion in Malagasy Republic suppressed
1971	Unsuccessful rebellion in Morocco
1971	Coup in Sudan; counter-coup within three days restored original leadership
1971	Border skirmishes between Tanzania and Uganda
1971	Attempted coup in Chad; relations broken with Libya
1972	Military coup in Ghana
1972	Intertribal violence in Burundi
1972	Military takeover in Malagasy Republic
1972	Military coup in Dahomey
1972	Brief invasion of Uganda by dissident Ugandans from Tanzania
1973	Bloodless coup in Rwanda
1973	Abortive Hutu attempt to seize power in Burundi, followed by extensive reprisals

ALGERIA

El Djemhouria El Djazairia Demokratia Echaabia
Algerian Democratic People's Republic

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 919,591 square miles
Population: 14,150,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 63,000 (including Gendarmerie; 0.42% population)
Gross National Product: $5.4 billion ($366 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $100 million (1.85% GNP)
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 43.8 million metric tons
Refined Oil: 2.79 million metric tons
Gas: 2.985 billion cubic meters
Electric Power Output: 1.71 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 17 ships; 56,523 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 7 jet, and 9 turboprop transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The President of the Revolutionary Council is the chief of state and the supreme commander of the armed forces. A Higher Council of Defense includes the President, the Ministers of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Committee of National Defense in the National Assembly, and two other members designated by the President. In practice, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, who seized power by a military coup in June 1965, occupies both the positions of President and Minister of National Defense and deals directly with commanders of the armed forces, known collectively as the *Armee Nationale Populaire* (ANP) or National People's Army. The General Staff, under a Chief of Staff, is responsible for organizational, mobilization, budget, and employment planning of the four services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Gendarmerie.

The Ministry of National Defense includes a Political Commissariat responsible to the Political Bureau of the nation's single party, the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN). There are Party cells at all levels of the armed forces.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES

Algeria's foreign policy is one of extreme revolutionary idealism abetted by cautious opportunism. Algeria actively and tangibly supports wars of national liberation throughout Africa, and in Palestine, against regimes that it considers reactionary, imperialistic or racist.

These policies—combined with an abiding hostility to its more conservative neighbor, Morocco, and the need to maintain internal security against dissident groups—have led to a relatively high rate of defense expenditures. Originally the ANP was maintained by voluntary enlistments with calls for volunteers always oversubscribed. However, in April 1968 the Government decreed two years of compulsory service for all 19-year olds. Also in November 1967 military training was instituted in high schools and universities.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Support for external wars of national liberation has led to the establishment of guerrilla training bases in Algeria and to the establishment of personnel and logistic pipelines to the scenes of conflict. Internal resources plus Chinese, Cuban, and Soviet aid have filled the pipelines. This aid doubtless will continue to the degree that Algeria desires to employ it.

Locally, Algeria feels hemmed in between liberal, Western-oriented Tunisia and conservative, also Western-oriented, Morocco. While both these countries provided sanctuary for the FLN and external elements of its National Liberation Army (ALN) during Algeria's war of national liberation against France (1954-1962), they have not been as cooperative or sympathetic since. Algeria apparently supports dissident elements in both countries and Morocco probably supports Berber dissidents in the Kabyle and Aures mountains of Algeria. Moreover, much of the border between Algeria and Morocco, which passes through an area rich in raw materials, was never precisely defined by the French. Moroccan-Algerian border clashes in 1962 and the fall of 1963 erupted into serious fighting in late October 1963; the ANP, still a guerrilla-type force, was defeated by the smaller Moroccan professional army. Members of the OAU mediated the dispute, and the frontier areas were demilitarized. The dispute was formally ended by agreements signed at the OAU annual meeting of 1972.

Tunisia claims the oil fields at Edjele and surrounding portions of the Algerian Sahara. Tunisia has an advantage since the pipeline carrying oil from the Edjele fields runs through Tunisia to the port of Sekhira. The dispute is not currently active.

Internally Algeria is beset by military, ideological and ethnic divisions. During the war of independence the "internal" ALN of about 60,000 fought the French while the "external" ALN of 30,000 to 40,000 of better equipped and trained troops remained in Tunisia and Morocco. The external ALN entered Algeria upon independence and, with the addition of only 10,000 of the internal army, became the ANP, leaving 50,000 or more former insurgents, mostly Berbers, dissatisfied. This resulted in two abortive revolts immediately after independence in 1962.

Boumedienne's coup of 1965 was the result of his concern about the dangerously unrealistic socialism and revolutionary interventionism of President Ben Bella. Boumedienne's somewhat more moderate policies have been opposed by doctrinaire extreme left idealists, including many Berbers and

former members of the "internal" army. Dissidence still exists in the Berber mountain areas.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

After independence Algeria fell heir to much French equipment. After the defeat by Morocco in 1963 the Soviet Union immediately made a loan of $100 million for arms to strengthen Algeria's defense. By mid-1971 this is believed to have reached a total of over $300 million. It is not known what proportion is a loan and what is grant aid. All classes of weapons were received: tanks, artillery, APCs, surface to air missiles, jet fighters and bombers, and submarine chasers and guided missile patrol craft. Three thousand Algerian officers have been trained in the Soviet Union and about 1,000 Soviet military instructors are in Algeria. Because of Soviet control of spare parts Algeria is reported to have second thoughts about increased Soviet influence coupled to increased military aid.

Communist China aided the FLN with arms and training during the war for liberation. Since independence it has trained Algerian ground officers and pilots in China, conducted guerrilla training for dissidents from other African countries in Algeria, has provided arms for African insurgents which are transshipped through Algeria, and begun to supply arms and training for an Algerian People's Militia. Communist Cuba has also participated in the guerrilla training in Algeria.

After Algeria's independence, a bilateral treaty permitted France to maintain several atomic test and space rocket launch sites, various civil aviation facilities, and the large modern naval base at Mers-el-Kebir. The French withdrew in 1967-1968 but continue to occupy the small airfield of Bou Sfer, near Mers-el-Kebir, until 1977. About 00 French airmen are there and the field serves for observation of activities at Mers-el-Kebir and as a staging field for the support of French forces in Central and West Africa. France is believed to have retained the right to deny use of its former bases to any power except France and Algeria until 1977. This would serve legally to deny their use to the Soviet Union with its increased naval presence in the Mediterranean. France has a training mission with the National Gendarmerie and has equipped it with armored cars mounting anti-tank guns, machine guns, and other equipment. Algeria, in 1969, ordered 28 Fouga Magister armed jet trainers (these are refurbished ex-Luftwaffe aircraft).

Algeria's support for wars of liberation has included delivery of arms to the Congo (Kinshasa) rebels in 1964 and to others, and the training of insurgents in the guerrilla training center in Algiers. Palestinian guerrillas are also trained. In the June 1967 war Algeria sent a battalion of troops and a squadron of MiG-21s to assist Egypt. While the ground unit did not see action, it was reported that six of the jet fighters were lost to the Israelis (two or three when they landed at an Israeli occupied airfield in the Sinai). Two thousand Algerian troops remain in Egypt.

ALLIANCES

Algeria is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a member of the OAU Liberation Committee, which sponsors insurgent movements against the white and colonial regimes of Southern Africa. A member of the Arab League, Algeria vies with Egypt for leadership by the volume of its pronouncements against Israel and "reactionarry" regimes, and actively supports the Arab conflict with Israel. Algeria also maintains membership in the Maghreb, and is a member of OPEC.

ARMY

Personnel: 55,000

Organization:

- 4 motorized infantry brigades (with some armor)
- 3 independent tank battalions
- 50 independent infantry battalions
- 5 independent artillery battalions
- 12 companies of desert troops
- 1 paratroop brigade
- AA troops
- engineer troops

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 400 medium tanks (T-34, T-54/55)
- 50 light tanks (AMX-13)
- 50 assault guns (SU-100) SP
- 10 assault guns (JSU-152) SP
- 350 APCs (BTR-152)
- 300 artillery pieces (140mm and 240mm rocket launchers, 85mm guns, 122mm and 152mm howitzers)
- AA guns (57mm, 85mm, 100mm)

Reserves: Perhaps as many as 100,000 men are experienced veterans of the ALN and post-independence ANP, and this number will be at least maintained as classes of conscripts pass through their two-year army training.

NAVY

Personnel: 3,500

Major Units:

- 2 fleet minesweepers (T-43 class)
- 6 submarine chasers (SO-1 class; PCS)
- 1 coastal minesweeper (MSC)
- 3 guided missile patrol boat (Osa class; PTFG) (4 Styx SSM)
- 6 guided missile patrol boats (Komar class; PTFG) (2 Styx SSM)

14 torpedo boats (P-6 class; PT)
1 trawler
(possibly for intelligence collection; Sekstan class)
6 patrol vessels (20 tons each)

Major Naval Bases: Mers-el-Kebir, Oran, Arzew, Algiers, La Senia, Philippeville, Bone

Reserves: About 9,000 trained reservists.

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 4,500

Organization:
9 fighter/fighter-bomber squadrons, MiG-15/17/21)
2 light bomber squadrons (Il-28)
2 counterinsurgency (COIN squadrons (Magister)
2 transport squadrons (An-12, Il-18)
4 helicopter squadrons (Mi-1, Mi-4, Hughes 269, SA-330 Puma)
1 (or more) SAM battalion (SA-2 Guideline)

Major Aircraft Types:
198 combat aircraft
52 MiG-21 fighters
28 MiG-17 fighter-bombers
60 MiG-15 fighter-bombers
28 Magister armed trainers (COIN) (ex-Luftwaffe)
30 Il-28 light bombers
156 other aircraft
58 transports (An-12, Il-18)
50 helicopters (Mi-1, Mi-4, Hughes 269, SA-330 Puma)
48 training aircraft (T-28, Magister)

Missiles: 40 SAMs (SA-2 Guideline)

Major Air Bases: Dar-el-Beider, Maison Blanche, Boufarak, Paul-Cazelles, Marine, Oukar, Biskra, Algiers, Oran, Sidi-bel-Abbes. There are 30 additional medium airfields and 20 minor ones.

Reserves: About 3,000 reservists

PARAMILITARY

The French-trained and -equipped National Gendarmerie numbers about 8,000 and is equipped with heavy weapons up to armored cars mounting cannon (about 50 AMLs).

After the 1962 military coup the People's Militia (about 30,000 Chinese-armed and -trained party leftists) was abolished and it is doubtful that it has been re-established.

FRENCH FORCES

1 infantry company (Legionnaires); 1 Air Force detachment

BOTSWANA

Republic of Botswana

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 220,000 square miles
Population: 669,000
Total Active Armed Police Forces: 1,100 (0.16% population).
Gross National Product: $70 million ($105 per capita)
Annual Police Expenditures: $1.2 million (1.7% GNP)
Civil Air Fleet: 1 turboprop transport

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The elected President is chief of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed force. The police, the only armed force, is directly controlled by the Minister for Home Affairs who, like the other cabinet members, is appointed by the President from the Legislative Assembly.

Formerly the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, Botswana became independent in 1966. The last British troops left a year later. Botswana's defense then depended upon its British-officered police force, now about 1,100 strong, on whatever collective security might be afforded by membership in the UN, the Commonwealth, and the OAU, and on its continued good relations with Rhodesia and South Africa.

Botswana's politico-military policies are dictated by its economic backwardness and its location between South Africa and Rhodesia. Most of its income is derived from livestock shipped to South Africa. The UK subsidizes one third of its meager budget. Economic viability is possible in the future as the result of the discovery in 1967 of a 33 million-ton copper and nickel ore reserve near Francistown.

It is the interest of South Africa to cultivate the friendship of Botswana as a basis for a future *modus vivendi* with other black nations to the North, and also as a buffer against incursions of insurgents based in those nations. The alternative is an unfriendly Botswana, a member of the Commonwealth. For its part Botswana, while critical of South African apartheid, is dependent upon South Africa as a market and dependent upon the $1.5 million annually returned by the 40,000 to 60,000 Botswanans who work there. It is also vulnerable to invasion by South Africa and Rhodesia. As a result, Botswana finds it convenient to cooperate with these neighbors in their security efforts against externally supported liberation movements. In the UN, Botswana has rejected sanctions against Rhodesia. Botswana police have apprehended numerous Tanzania-trained, Zambia-based communist-armed Southwest African insurgents attempting to reach Southwest Africa through Botswana. It is likely that there is at least informal cooperation with the South African police.

Despite its weak economy, Botswana is fairly stable. The people are mostly Bantu in closely related tribal groupings. The party in power is moderate. Three minor opposition parties are all left-wing, Pan-African, and have ties with the African nationalist parties of South Africa, but have little popular support.

BURUNDI

Republic of Burundi

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 10,739 square miles
Population: 3,615,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 1,950 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.05% population)
Gross National Product: $210 million ($58 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $970,000 (0.46% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 15 million kwh

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Colonel Michel Micombero, who had previously been Premier, Minister of Defense and commander of the 950-man army, deposed the King in November 1966 and declared himself President. He continues to hold the portfolios of Defense and Interior and rules through a National Revolutionary Council composed entirely of Army officers. The eight provinces are ruled by military governors.

The Army is trained and advised by Belgium. About 40 Belgian officers are in Burundi. Evidence of Chinese Communist efforts to support subversion in Burundi and neighboring Rwanda and Congo (K)—now Zaire—led Burundi to break diplomatic relations with China in 1965. Because of this attempted subversion, the governments of the Congo (K), Rwanda, and Burundi signed a security agreement in mid-1966. Under this agreement, Zaire has trained a number of Burundi paratroopers.

Ethno-tribal divisions in Burundi have been a source of internal security problems and led in 1965, and again in early 1972, to widespread massacres. The Nilotic Tutsi (Watusi) tribe, comprising about 15 percent of the population, has traditionally ruled over the much more numerous peasant Bantu Hutu (Bahutu) tribe. The Tutsi are further divided into Big Tutsi, including the royalty and high government officials who tend to be moderate and conciliatory toward the Hutu, and the Little Tutsi, who tend to be leftist and anti-Hutu. President Micombero comes from this extremist group. In October 1965 Hutu officers in the army and gendarmerie, aided by some Tutsi soldiers and police, staged an abortive coup. Hutu in the countryside also rose and massacred several thousand Tutsi, and bloody reprisals by the Tutsi followed. In March 1972, young King Ntare V, deposed by Micombero in 1966, was allowed to return to Burundi, but was arrested and, in April, was killed during an attempt by monarchists to free him and overthrow the government. An estimated 20,000

people, most of them Tutsi, were killed in the uprising, and an estimated 100,000 Hutu were killed in the suppression of the uprising and the reprisals that followed. Zaire sent troops to assist the government in suppressing the uprising.

In May 1973 there was another abortive Hutu attempt to seize power, opened by Hutu raiders from Tanzania and Rwanda, and followed by the killing of 10,000 or more Hutu. The Army numbers about 950, organized as an infantry battalion. The strength of the Gendarmerie is about 1,000. In March 1967 the Gendarmerie was incorporated into the National Army, and the President took over the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Burundi is a member of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

CAMEROON

Republique Federale du Cameroun
Federal Republic of Cameroon

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 183,591 square miles
Population: 5,836,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 9,500 (includes Gendarmerie and Mobile Police; 0.16% population)
Gross National Product: $1.2 billion ($206 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $19.0 million (1.58% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 1.02 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 13 ships; 2,334 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 2 jet transports and 2 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President is chief of state and commander of the armed forces. This command is exercised through a Minister of the Armed Forces. Although officially nonaligned in the world ideological struggle, Cameroon is Western-oriented. Cameroon was established in 1961 from former British Cameroon and the much larger and more populous French Cameroun. The French portion, upon independence in 1960, retained close ties with the French Community and entered into certain thus-far unpublished mutual defense arrangements and a technical military assistance arrangement with France. These continued following the unification of the two Cameroons. In late 1973, however, Cameroon was negotiating for revisions in its cooperation agreements with France that would end its patron-protege relationship with the former ruling country and would establish normal state-to-state relations.

Cameroon's main strategic problem since its independence is related to the maintenance of internal security against the efforts of a communist insurgent group sponsored, trained and supplied by Communist China and the radical African states. This is the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (PUC), which has maintained a low-key insurgency with a strength of about 1,200. It has some bases in the mountains, but by 1968 its activities had been reduced to occasional hit and run raids from the sanctuary of Congo (Brazzaville). Its leader was captured, tried, and executed in 1971.

A potential for internal instability is inherent in the ethno-religious diversity of the people. There are about 200 tribes speaking 24 major languages. In the north, where the Moslem 15% of the country's population is concentrated, the Fang and Fulani tribes predominate. One third of the population, mainly the southern Bantus, profess Christianity and the remainder are animist. The core of the leftist insurgency comes from the Bamileke, about 20 percent of the population, in the central highlands area. So far the north-south split on ethno-religious grounds, so prevalent in West African states, has not manifested itself.

French military assistance has continued since 1960 at a rate of about $7 million annually. Until recently, French officers commanded Cameroonian units while others trained, staffed and performed technical services. A small instructor-adviser detachment continues to work with the military and police forces. Training of Cameroonian officers and NCOs is conducted in France, also. Between 1960 and 1964 some 10,000 French troops were in Cameroon, assisting the government against the insurgency. The troops have been evacuated, except for the training detachment.

The United States in 1962-1963 provided $249,000 military assistance and $1,000 in surplus equipment.

Cameroon, which withdrew in 1972 from the French-oriented OCAM, is a member of Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations. It has also withdrawn from *Air Afrique*, French-backed and shared by

OCAM nations, and now has its own successful Cameroon Airlines.

Cameroon's relative stability, in a region plagued by military coups, is perhaps due to a military balance of power. There is a Gendarmerie of 3,000 men and a mobile police force (the Cameroonian Guard) of 2,000 in addition to an Army of 4,000. All three forces are said to watch each other jealously and all are under close observation by the President's own special security police. The Army is organized as three infantry battalions, an armored car company, and engineer and support companies. There is a Navy of 200 men, operating two 75-ton patrol boats (YP), one 46-ton patrol boat (YP), and four landing craft (LCVP). The Air Force of 300 operates six Magister armed jet trainers, one C-47 transport, four light aircraft and two Sud SA-1221 Djinn helicopters. There are airbases at Batouri, Douala, Foumban, Garoua, Kaele, N'Gaoundere, Maroua Salak. Port Pouet, Yaounde, Tiko.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Republique Centrafricaine

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 241,313 square miles
Population: 1,637,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 2,000 (including paramilitary; 0.12% population)
Gross National Product: $220 million ($134 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $6 million (2.7% GNP)
Civil Air Fleet: 2 jet, 1 turboprop, 1 piston transport

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

President Bokassa, former Chief of Staff of the Army, deposed his predecessor on January 1, 1966, and also assumed the offices of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He promptly abolished the Constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. He rules by decree, assisted by the Council of Ministers. Among reasons advanced for the military coup were economic stagnation, discovery of vast uranium ore deposits in which France was much interested, Army-Gendarmerie rivalry, and growing Chinese Communist influence. Bokassa broke diplomatic relations with Peking and publicized Chinese Communist plans for increased control.

Upon independence from France in 1960, the CAR signed a defense agreement with France which included internal security matters, base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military assistance. Ubangi veterans of the French Army formed the CAR Army. French officers were seconded as instructor-advisers. France has furnished equipment as well as training, has kept garrisons at Bangui and Bouar, and in November 1967, at the request of the President during a governmental crisis, deployed a paratroop company to the Bangui airfield.

The CAR is a member of the UN, the OAU, the OCAM, the French-sponsored Equatorial Defense Council, and the Union of Central African States (UEAC)

The United States furnished $200,000 in vehicles and other equipment in 1962 under an internal security assistance program.

Israel has assisted the CAR to establish a youth organization on the lines of its own, a paramilitary organization for pioneering new agricultural settlements, and a preliminary training and indoctrination organization. Several thousand youths have passed through the training programs given by a team of 20 Israeli officers.

The Army consists of 700 men, organized as an infantry battalion with a supporting engineer company. The equipment includes French EBR-75 armored cars and EBR-ETT armored personnel carriers. The Air Force of 100 men operates ten A-1 Skyraider attack aircraft, two C-47, ten Noratlas and ten AL-60 transports, and ten Sikorsky H-34 and Alouette II helicopters. Air bases are Bangui, Bouar, Bambari, and Berberati. There is a Gendarmerie with a strength of 500 and a *Garde Republicaine* of 700 men.

CHAD

Republique du Tchad
Republic of Chad

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 495,752 square miles
Population: 3,791,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 1,950 (including Gendarmerie; 0.05% population)
Gross National Product: $300 million ($79 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $8.0 million (2.66% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 15 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 5 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President of the Republic is also Prime Minister. Control of the armed forces is exercised through a Minister of Defense.

Upon independence from France in 1960 the army was formed from Chadian veterans of the French Army. It inherited a stock of French arms and equipment, and a bilateral military technical assistance agreement provided additional equipment and some 500 French officers and men as instructor-advisers. This agreement, similar to those executed between France and other former African colonies, provides also for French assistance in maintenance of internal security, base rights, and transit and overflight privileges. The French Army continued to control northern Chad until 1965, and under the agreement France maintains a reinforced infantry battalion at Fort Lamy which has been used for intervention—at the request of the governments concerned—in Congo (Brazzaville) in 1963, Gabon in 1964, and in Chad itself in 1968. The strength of French troops stationed in Chad was reduced in June 1971 to about 900 officers and men, apart from advisers attached to the Chad Army. French military assistance has amounted to about $1.2 million yearly. Chad is a member of the UN, the OAU, the Equatorial Defense Council, and the Union of Central African States (UEAC). It withdrew from the OCAM in 1973.

Chad is faced with the same north-south split along lines of race, religion, and living patterns that threatens the domestic tranquility of many Sudanic African countries. The sedentary animist and Christian people of the south accepted education and training from the French, and have controlled the government since independence. The nomadic Moslems of the north retain their traditional ways under feudal leaders and maintain close ties with kinsmen in Libya and Sudan. There was serious insurgency in the northern and central regions from 1963 to 1968, leading the president in August 1968 to request and obtain military assistance from the French Government to put down the rebellion. In August 1971 the Chadian government broke diplomatic relations with Libya after a foreign-inspired coup attempt failed to oust President Francois Tombalbaye.

French influence in Chad suffered as a result of French intervention in the rebellions of the 1960's. Not only were the French resented by the insurgents and their sympathizers in the north; the Chadian government also resented French pressure for administrative reform and made the French scapegoats for the government's own actions. In September

1973 President Tombalbaye announced a cultural and social revolution that would stress Tchaditude and reject Western, and specifically French, values. He changed his own first name to Ngarta, and the name of the country's capital was changed from Fort Lamy to N'Djamena. The single political party was abolished and replaced by an Executive Council. Thus far no military or strategic reorientation appears to be involved.

The Army of 1,200 men consists of two infantry battalions and supporting light artillery batteries. There is an Air Force of 200 men with five A-1 Skyraider attack aircraft, one C-47 and ten Noratlas transports, ten Sikorsky H-34 and ten Alouette II helicopters. Air bases are Abeche, Fada, Largeau, Fort Archambault, N'Djamena, Mongo, Moudou, Pala, Bongor.

There is also a Gendarmerie of 550 men. In 1965 it was planned, with French assistance, to recruit and train six brigades of Gendarmerie to be stationed in the disaffected areas. The extent of implementation of this plan is not known.

CONGO

Republique Populaire du Congo
People's Republic of Congo

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 134,749 square miles
Population: 982,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 4,800 (incl les Gendarmerie; 0.48% population)
Gross National Product: $233 million ($237 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $6 million (2.6% GNP)

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Congo is governed by an eight-man National Revolutionary Council which seized power from the constitutional government in August 1968. The Council is headed by President Marien N'gouabi, a former Army Captain who led the coup.

At the time of independence from France in 1960 the Army was formed from French African units. A mutual defense agreement provides for French assistance in internal security, base rights, and provision of arms and training. The Army has been involved in the political unrest that has plagued the republic since 1963. The latest Army seizure of power resulted from military concern about growing communist influence in the government and the creation by the government of a Presidential Guard cadred by 100 Cuban negroes and of a Cuban-trained people's militia known as the Youth of the National Movement of the Revolution, or the *Jeunesse*. The Army demanded that this rival military force be incorporated in the Army. When left-wing dissidents opposed the transfer, violence broke out in July and August 1968. In the ensuing conflict over 450 of the *Jeunesse* were killed. The coup was the result of an internal power struggle, exacerbated by deep-rooted tribal rivalries, rather than of political ideology; the political orientation of the present military government is still leftist. In 1970 President Marien N'gouabi put down two attempted coups against his regime. N'gouabi charged that Congo (Kinshasa; now Zaire) supported the rebels, but cordial relations between Brazzaville and Kinshasa were reestablished later in the year. Constant maneuvering for power continues among various factions formed largely on the basis of tribal loyalties, army unit loyalties, and orientation toward China or the Soviet Union. There were unsuccessful coup attempts in 1972 and 1973.

Under its leftist governments, Congo has been a base for radical and communist subversion in Africa since 1963. Instructor-advisers from communist countries and the radical African states (Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, and formerly Ghana) came to Congo to train not only the *Armee Nationale Populaire*, but also the exiled insurgents from surrounding African countries who had taken refuge there.

The Army has a strength of about 3,000 and consists of two infantry battalions (one parachute-commando), a support battalion containing armored cars, artillery, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and combat engineer units, a communications company, and a transportation company. French weapons are being replaced with more modern Soviet and Chinese equipment. Service is voluntary and for two years. The Navy numbers about 200, with a patrol craft (YP) at Pointe Noire

and 12 river patrol craft (PBR) on the Congo and Oubangui Rivers. The Air Force is also about 200 strong and operates two C-47 transports, two liaison aircraft, and three helicopters. Air bases are at Brazzaville, Dolisie, and Pointe Noire.

There is a People's Militia (under the command of the Army), and a Gendarmerie of 1,400 in 20 companies.

Congo is a member of the UN and OAU. It withdrew from OCAM in 1972.

DAHOMEY

Republique du Dahomey

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 43,383 square miles
Population: 2,900,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 3,060 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.10% population)
Gross National Product: $235 million ($81 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $4 million (1.7% GNP)

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

On October 26, 1972, an Army junta headed by Major (now Lt. Colonel) Mathieu Kerekou seized power. Control of the country is now firmly in the hands of President Kerekou and his Military Revolutionary Government of Dahomey (MRGD). Kerekou quashed a coup attempt in February 1973. He has forced out the senior officers who aided him in his 1972 coup, and is attempting to broaden his base of support by establishing a 67-member National Revolutionary Council (September 1973), setting up local councils, and bringing young intellectuals and younger officers into government.

Dahomey received its independence from France in 1960; initially, its armed forces comprised former soldiers in the French Army. Upon independence, a defense agreement was signed which provided for French assistance in maintaining internal security, base rights, and arms and training. In 1962 the United States furnished token military assistance of $62,000 which included some vehicles, motor launches, and police equipment. Israel has given some military vehicles and has helped establish and train a National Service Corps (which begins with six-months military training followed by a year of agricultural service) and a National Youth Movement. Dahomey is a member of the UN, OAU, OCAM, and the *Conseil de l'Entente*.

Dahomey's weak economy and dense population cause dependence on France for an annual budget subsidy of about $10 million. Internal security problems have come mainly from tribal-regional divisions among politicians, civil servants, and the Army. Three power centers exist: Abomey in the southwest, Porto-Novo in the southeast, and the politically and economically undeveloped north. There were six presidents in the first turbulent decade of independence, with the Army playing the principal role in their selection and ousting. At the time of Kerekou's 1972 coup, the country was being governed under a May 1970 charter that called for rotation of the presidency every two years among members of a presidential council, and one transfer of power had taken place peacefully. There have recently (1973) been announcements that a constitutional convention will be held within a year, but no action has been taken.

The Army numbers about 1,750 men, organized into three infantry battalions. Voluntary enlistments are for 18 months. Arms and equipment are mainly French and include a few armored cars. There is no navy, but about 100 army personnel man three patrol carft used for port control at Cotonou. The Air Force, part of the army, is 110 men strong, and operates one C-47 transport, one light transport, two liaison aircraft and one Alouette II helicopter. There is a Gendarmerie of 1,200 men organized into eight companies.

EGYPT

Al Jumhuriyah Misr al'Arabiyah
Arab Republic of Egypt

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 386,900 square miles
Population: 36,960,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 313,500 (not including security forces; 0.86% population)
Gross National Product: $7.6 billion ($206 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $1.6 billion (23.3% GNP)
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 11.2 million metric tons
Refined Products: 6.4 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 7.13 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 127 ships; 241,429 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 11 jet, 6 turboprop, and 2 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with strong executive powers, is the supreme commander of the unified armed forces, and presides over the National Defense Council. Under the President there is a single military Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, who has direct access to the

President, and is not responsible to the Minister of War, who is the administrative director of the armed forces.

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces controls all components of the armed forces and is responsible for organization, training, armament, and combat readiness.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

According to Egyptian military leaders four missions have influenced the design of the Egyptian armed forces: accomplishment of the officially announced military goal of recapturing all territories lost to the Israelis; defense against attempts to impose foreign domination; defense against intra-Arab hostilities or a threat thereof; and control of internal disturbances. Under President Gamal Nasser stress was placed on gaining hegemony, or at least preeminence, over the Arab states of the Middle East and nearby African states.

This apparent objective was pursued in part to obtain access to the income of the rich oil-producing Arab states, in part to secure the headwaters of the life-giving Nile against diversion, and in part to secure strategic positions surrounding Israel. Pursuit of this objective was demonstrated by: Egyptian-sponsored subversion and coup attempts against Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan; by the military occupation of Yemen; and by support of subversion among the Arab populations of Ethiopian Eritrea and the Persian Gulf regions of Iran. After President Nasser's sudden death on September 28, 1970, his successor, President Anwar Sadat, made every effort to insure continuity, and government policy was dominated by the unresolved conflict with Israel.

In the disastrous and humiliating defeat which Egypt suffered at the hands of Israel in three or four days of fighting in June 1967, the Israeli armed forces destroyed seven Egyptian divisions, destroyed or captured 800 tanks, and destroyed approximately 280 aircraft, most of them on the ground. After that war the major objective of Egyptian leaders was rebuilding strength, efficiency, confidence and morale in the armed forces. To that end, Egypt's Communist allies, led by the USSR, provided military aid, both in materiel and in training. Not only was lost equipment replaced, but the forces were reorganized and officers and men were trained to operate the most sophisticated modern hardware.

Egypt's surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973, thanks to the interwar buildup achieved immediate but transitory success. Israel's prompt recovery from the initial losses, however, not only reduced the scope of the Egyptian gains, but also was marked by a dramatic Israeli crossing to the west bank of the Suez Canal before the ceasefire of October 24 finally ended the fighting. Since the diplomatic efforts of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger have achieved a withdrawal of troops by both Egypt and Israel the possibility of a more stable situation on the Egyptian-Israeli border at last seems greater.

Military service is compulsory for all men 18 years and over. University students may postpone their service until they finish school or reach the age of 28. The length of service is one year for university graduates, 18 months for high school graduates, and three years for all others. Enlisted men serve nine years more in the reserves. About 30,000 to 35,000 men are inducted per year, most of them into the army.

There are three officer training schools. The Military Academy in Cairo graduates army line officers and trains naval and air force officers for one year, after which they report to the Naval Academy at Ras al-Tin or the Air Force Academy at Bilbeis.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

The population of Egypt is compressed within the narrow Nile River Valley, which comprises only 3.6 percent of its total area, where the population density is over 2,200 per square mile—one of the highest in the world. Thus the population of Egypt, and its productive capacity, are dangerously concentrated, and vulnerable to threat or damage by a hostile foreign power. Although the new Aswan high dam will increase productivity, and will slightly enlarge the arable area of Egypt, it will also be very vulnerable. The performance of the Israeli armed forces in June 1967, and the helicopter-borne commando raid of November 1968 against Nile bridges and power plants, demonstrate that this vulnerability of population and of productive resources could be exploited by Egypt's principal enemy.

The 1967 war also demonstrated the vulnerability of Egypt's principal source of capital—the Suez Canal. The loss of income fron the Canal would have ruined Egypt's economy if the oil-rich members of the Arab League had not provided substitute subsidies. However, recent discoveries of oil in the Western Desert may be important even after the Canal is reopened, since modified transportation patterns while it has been closed, and the increasing use of super-tankers (which cannot negotiate the Canal), may greatly reduce the future volume of traffic.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Egypt was almost completely dependent upon the USSR, or upon Soviet satellites of the Warsaw Pact, prior to the October War, for military equipment, and for training of its forces in the use of modern equipment. Estimates of total Soviet aid are that over $4.5 billion was received between June 1967 and 1972. Prior to that $1.5 billion had been delivered.

The 20,000-man Soviet mission was expelled from Egypt in 1972. Thereafter the technicians remaining are estimated to have numbered about 1,000. Soviet pilots flew reconnaissance missions from Cairo in MiG-25s. These were primarily high-speed and high-altitude flights over the Sinai Peninsula and other Israeli positions.

ALLIANCES

Egypt is a member of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is the leading member of the Arab League and the principal force behind the United Arab Command, the League's military organization. Egypt is also the predominant member of a three-way military alliance with Jordan and Iraq. It also has joint military command relationships with Sudan, Libya and Syria, and since September 1971 has joined with Libya and Syria in the Federation of Arab Republics. In May 1971 Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.

ARMY

Personnel: 276,000

Organization:

- 3 armored divisions
- 5 infantry divisions
- 5 mechanized infantry divisions
- 16 artillery brigades
- 2 airborne brigades
- 20 battalion combat groups

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 50 heavy tanks (JS-3 and T-10)
- 1,575 medium tanks
  - 1,300 T-54/55, T-62
  - 100 T-34
  - 150 Centurion Mk.3
  - 25 Sherman
- 170 light tanks
  - 150 PT-76
  - 20 AMX-13
- 150 assault guns (SU-100 and JSU-152)
- 1,200 APCs (BTR-40P, BTR-50P, OT-64, BTR-152, BTR-60P)
- K-61 amphibious assault vehicles
- 2,200 light, medium, and heavy artillery pieces (122mm, 130mm, and 152mm guns and howitzers, and 160mm mortars) self-propelled AA guns (ZSU-57/2 and ZSU-23/4)
- 203mm howitzers
- RPG-7 antitank weapons
- 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm antitank guns
- 24 SSMs (Frog 3/4)
- 25 SSMs (Samlet)
- SSMs (Scud)
- Snapper, Sagger, and Swatter antitank missiles
- SA-7 Grail missiles
- 420 vehicle-mounted rocket launchers 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm AA guns integrated with Air Force interceptors

Reserves: Approximately 600,000 trained reservists

NAVY

Personnel: 14,500 (organized in four commands: Destroyer, Submarine, Minesweeper and Torpedo)

Major Units:

- 12 submarines (6 R class; 6 W class; SS)
- 5 destroyers (4 Skory class; 1 British Z class; DD)
- 3 frigates (British Hunt, Black Swan, River class; DE)
- 2 corvettes (British Flower, Bangor class, PF)
- 10 fleet minesweepers (6 T-43, 4 Yurka class; MSF)
- 2 inshore minesweepers (T-301 class; MSI)
- 12 subchasers (SO-1 class; PCS)
- 15 guided missile patrol boats (12 Osa, 3 Komar class; PTFG) with Styx SSM
- 26 torpedo boats (20 P-6; 6 Shershen class; PT)
- 14 landing ships (10 Vydra; 4 SMB-1 class; LS)
- 2 auxiliaries

Naval Bases: Ras al Tin, Port Tawficq, Port Said, Mersa Matruh (probably for Soviet use)

Reserves: About 25,000 trained reservists

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 25,000

Organization:

- 13 fighter-interceptor squadrons (MiG-21/19)
- 20 fighter-bomber squadrons (Su-7, MiG-17)
- 1 medium bomber squadron (Tu-16)
- 2 light bomber squadrons (Il-28)
- 5 transport squadrons (Il-14, An-12, C-47)
- 150 SAM battalions (Sa-2, 3, 4, 6)

Major Aircraft Types:

- 590 combat aircraft
  - 200 MiG-21 fighter-interceptors
  - 60 MiG-19 fighter-interceptors

130 Su-7 fighter-bombers
150 MiG-17 fighter-bombers
20 Tu-16 medium bombers
30 Il-28 light bombers
490 other aircraft
80 transports (40 Il-14, 30 An-12, 10 C-47)
250 trainer/support aircraft (MiG-15, L-29, Saeta)
160 helicopters (Mi-4/6/8, Sea King)

Missiles: 650 SAM launchers (SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-4 Ganef, SA-6 Gainful)
ASM-5 Kelt carried by Tu-16 bombers
AAm K-13 Atoll carried by fighter-interceptors

Reserves: 35,000 trained reservists

Major Air Bases: Almaza, Cairo West, Bilbeis, Beni Suwayf, Luxor, El Minya, Ras Banas, Hurghada.

PARAMILITARY

The National Guard, a poorly-armed and equipped home guard type force, of 120,000.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 10,833 square miles (10,040 Rio Muni, 779 Fernando Po, 14 minor islets)
Population: 300,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 1,000 (includes Gendarmerie)
Gross National Product: $60 million ($200 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $200,000 (est.) (0.33% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 11 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 2 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Spanish colonies since 1778, the island of Fernando Po and mainland Spanish Guinea (Rio Muni) received independence as Equatorial Guinea on October 12, 1968. Included in Fernando Po are adjacent islets and the island of Annobon, and in Rio Muni the island of Corisco, Islas Elobey and adjacent islets.

Before independence Fernando Po's strategic location, combined with the presence of 40,000 Ibos (Biafrans) on the island, and Spain's permissive policies, had caused the island to become an air base for arms and food flights to Biafra in the Nigeria-Biafra civil war (1967-1970).

Before Spain granted independence Nigeria had contemplated annexation or purchase of Fernando Po. Also, Cameroon had claimed both Fernando Po and Rio Muni, and Gabon had claimed Rio Muni. Since independence Cameroon and Gabon have each renounced these claims, contingent on a like restraint by the other. In 1972 Gabon occupied two tiny disputed islands, ostensibly over a fishing dispute and probably as a part of an attempt to extend its territorial waters; the presence of offshore oil is suspected in this area. Equatorial Guinea charged invasion and both called on the UN for help. Gabon withdrew, and the matter is now quiescent.

The minority, but wealthier, Bubis of Fernando Po fear diversion of their island's economic resources to development of poorer Rio Muni, whose population is predominantly of the Fang tribe.

Equatorial Guinea's currently depressed economy is based on cocoa, coffee, and timber, grown on large plantations that were formerly worked by imported Nigerian labor. The departure of most of the Nigerians after disputes over wages and working conditions has sharply cut production of all crops, reducing timber production to near zero.

Spain contributes substantially to Equatorial Guinea's economy both through subsidies and as a trading partner; 80% of the country's trade is with Spain.

The armed forces have received training from Spain, some communist countries (especially China) and other African countries.

Equatorial Guinea is a member of the UN and the OAU.

ETHIOPIA

Yaityopya Nigusa Nagast Manguist
Empire of Ethiopia

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 471,776 square miles
Population: 25,900,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 53,000 (includes security forces and frontier guard; 0.20% population)
Gross National Product: $2.1 billion ($81 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $41 million (1.95% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 455 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 23 ships; 45,903 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 4 jet and 19 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The Emperor, Haile Selassie I, has been the hereditary constitutional monarch since 1931, with full sovereignty vested in his person as chief of state and head of government. He is commander in chief of each of the three armed services and may determine their size and organization. The limitations on his authority, minimal until 1974, have greatly increased, with the balance of power shifting to leaders of the armed forces. The armed services are administered by a Ministry of National Defense. The Minister is an Army general nominally appointed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the Emperor.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

When dramatic change finally came to Ethiopia in the spring of 1974, it was triggered not by the separatist movements that have long threatened the heterogeneous nation, but rather by inflation following a famine (1973) that was apparently unnecessarily devastating because of mismanaged relief efforts. There were strikes and riots in Addis Ababa in late February over the cost of living, and a week later (February 26) the army's 2d Division took control of Asmara, Ethiopia's second largest city. The troops' grievances were unrelated to Asmara's location in Eritrea or the Eritrean Liberation Front; spokesmen for the Army rebels demanded higher pay, better fringe benefits, and the dismissal of many cabinet members. They were joined by most other units of the armed forces, with the 4th Division taking control of Addis Ababa.

The prime minister resigned, there were numerous cabinet changes, and the Emperor announced pay increases for the armed forces, but unrest continued. A general strike, pay demands by priests, student protests, and scattered peasant uprisings were followed by more concessions from the Emperor. By mid-1974 the Army was controlling the government, and the emperor had been shorne of most of his power.

Ethiopia has a long tradition of independence broken only by brief Italian conquest (1935-1941). This tradition is perpetuated by a current posture of nonalignment. Ethiopia supports the UN and the principle of collective security. In implementation of this policy it has contributed to UN forces in Korea (1951-1953) and the Congo (1960-1964). It has also taken a lead in the African unity movement, was a founder of OAU, and built the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Independence has been maintained over the centuries against neighboring enemies by the relative inaccessibility of the high (6-10,000 feet) central plateau. For more than a millenium Ethiopia's traditional enemies have been Arabs and other Moslems who surround it on three sides.

Diplomacy has been used with great efficacy by Ethiopia, and specifically by Haile Selassie. The Emperor developed a good personal relationship with Nasser, and Ethiopia now maintains generally good relations with the Arab countries. The Emperor has made numerous useful state visits during recent years, including one to Peking in 1971. He has firmly established Ethiopia as an African state, despite ethnic, religious, and historical separateness. He has also repeatedly acted successfully as a mediator, most recently helping bring improved relations between Senegal and Guinea (1972), helping end the conflict between north and south in Sudan

(1972), and helping solve a dispute between Amin of Uganda and Nyerere of Tanzania (1973).

This carefully constructed diplomatic system now appears to be in a state of change. Ethiopia's chief remedies for its strategic problems during the past 20 years have been its intensive and skillful diplomatic efforts and the military aid it has received from the United States. In 1973, however, the United States rejected an Ethiopian request for several hundred million dollars worth of modern military equipment, including M-60 tanks, Phantom jets, and SAM missiles. The request, if of the size reported, was for more equipment, in cost, than the United States had given to Ethiopia during the past 20 years, a period during which it gave considerably more military aid to Ethiopia than to any other African country. On the heels of the US rejection came an offer from China of heavy arms, including tanks and possibly aircraft, to counteract extensive Soviet aid to Somalia. China has already (1971) made Ethiopia an $85 million development loan, still largely unused. Although US officials in Ethiopia reportedly doubt that China will actually send much in the way of heavy arms, there can be little doubt that US aid and influence in Ethiopia are steadily decreasing, and that Sino-Soviet rivalry in the key strategic area of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is increasingly affecting Ethiopia. Ethiopia's official neutrality between the Arabs and Israel is also shaken; under Arab pressure, it broke off diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Ethiopia's principal strategic problems are: internal ethno-religious and socio-economic tensions, an encirclement by largely hostile Arab and Moslem neighbors.

The aging Emperor rules over a heterogeneous nation split along both ethnic and religious lines. There are some 40 different tribes, mostly of Semitic or Hamitic origin. The ruling Amharas and Tigreans of the highlands comprise 40 percent of the population and are mostly Coptic Christians; the coastal and lowland peoples of various origins are mostly Moslems. Concentration of power and wealth in the Amharas has aroused jealousy among others.

There is continuing friction with Moslem neighbors, especially over the Somalian question and Eritrea. Half a million Moslem Somalis live in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which adjacent Somalia claims. In the early and middle 1960s there were numerous border clashes between Ethiopian and Somalian Army and police forces along this border, complicated by traditional movements of Somali nomadic herdsmen across the poorly defined frontier. Somalia's growing arsenal of communist arms from Egypt, the Soviet Union and China posed a serious threat to Ethiopian territorial integrity and stimulated its further military buildup. In early 1968 Somalia renounced its former irredentist policy against Kenya, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland, and sought friendly relations with these countries. The basic issues remain, however, despite the present detente, and they have been complicated by the recent discovery of oil potential in Ogaden and greatly increased Soviet military aid to Somalia.

Eritrea, the former Italian colony awarded to Ethiopia after World War II, has been another source of friction with the Moslem world. Eritrea's population of 2,000,000 is almost evenly divided between Christians and Moslems. The Moslem-supported Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), with headquarters in Damascus, is linked ideologically to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Estimates of numbers of armed insurgents generally range from 1,000 to 2,000. Syria, Iraq, and Libya have reportedly been the chief recent supporters of the secessionist movement, with ELF training received in the past from Syria, Cuba, and China. No open support has been given by the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries, although arms from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt have been smuggled to the insurgents through Yemen and Sudan. Algeria has provided refuge to ELF activists, but little more. Southern Yemen has recently been an important center of ELF support. Although the Eritrean problem is as far from solution as ever, the insurgency has been relatively quiescent recently, as a result of forceful Ethiopian military efforts, skillful diplomacy aimed at restraining outside support for the ELF, and Arab concentration on the conflict with Israel.

In mid-1965, Sudan and Ethiopia—both coping with foreign-based insurgents—each agreed to prevent its territory being used for any activity harmful to the national interest of the other. (Similar agreements have since been discussed with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.) There has been considerable friction periodically since 1965, but Sudan has now withdrawn support from the ELF and moved the approximately 20,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan farther from the Ethiopian border. Ethiopia has also made constructive diplomatic moves, and the situation is now relatively stable.

The only railroad linking the Abyssinian plateau with the sea runs to the port of Djibouti in French Somaliland (now the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas). The security of this access to the sea is vital to Ethiopia. The Afar and Danakil tribes indigenous to this territory are closely related to Ethiopian tribes, but the Issas are Somalis, and Somalia has claimed the territory. A possible confrontation was deferred by a 1966 plebiscite of bona fide residents of French Somaliland who voted overwhelmingly to remain under French dominion. But if Somalia, or any potentially hostile regime, were to obtain control of Djibouti, Ethiopia would be likely to act on the bases of strategic necessity and ethnic kinship with a portion of the population.

Military service in Ethiopia is voluntary and is a profession sought by the warrior Amharas and Tigreans.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Historic ties, a desire to maintain a certain balancing

neutrality among foreign military influences, and the realities of the world power struggle, have shaped Ethiopia's acceptance of several forms of military assistance. The British, who drove out the Italians in 1941, conducted military training from 1947 to 1951, and are still active in training and advising the Navy. Sweden helped organize and train the Air Force, organized a cadet school in 1946, and helped establish the office of the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Armed Forces in 1956. France, India, Israel, and Norway have helped train the Navy. Prior to rupture of diplomatic relations Israeli advisers conducted special infantry training, and provided advisers for the Frontier Guard and the Commando Police. West Germany has provided equipment for police field units. India has helped with training of the Imperial Bodyguard and the Military Academy. Most of this assistance is by contract, paid for by Ethiopia.

Military assistance from the United States, since 1953, has been considerably more substantial. It has comprised armament, equipment, and supplies of all kinds, worth $163 million through 1972, and the training of about 3,000 Ethiopians in the United States. Recently the rate of US assistance has been about $10-$12 million annually, and this is the amount expected through fiscal year 1974. Through 1972 some $8.4 million worth of excess American military stocks was furnished. The United States has provided this armament in the conviction that it contributes to stability in the Horn of Africa, and in consideration of Ethiopian permission, by a 1953 agreement, to operate the Kagnew Communications Station at Asmara, in Eritrea. US advisers have recently been phased out of sensitive positions in the Ethiopian government, however, and there is in general a gradual US withdrawal from Ethiopia in progress.

The Kagnew station, said to be the world's largest high frequency radio relaying and receiving station, was established in 1942 to insure strategic communications to the Middle East and South Asia. It includes elements of the US space communications and tracking system as well as receivers to monitor Soviet rocket tests and strategic communications. Some other African countries, as well as some Ethiopians, have objected to this US presence as inconsistent with Ethiopia's professed nonalignment. It has been a source of irritation for both Ethiopia's external relations and its domestic politics. In October 1970, the US State and Defense Departments disclosed an unpublicized agreement with Ethiopia (made in 1960) to equip and train the 40,000-man Ethiopian army and to oppose any threats to Ethiopia's territorial integrity. In exchange, the US was authorized to expand Kagnew Station. Recently, the use of earth satellite communications has made the Kagnew station less essential to the US than it was earlier, and it is being phased out.

For its part, Ethiopia has provided pilot and supporting aviation training for students from other African countries including Sudan, Kenya, and Nigeria.

ALLIANCES

Ethiopia is a member of the UN and the OAU. In 1963, in response to armed incursions of Somali nomadic tribesmen across the borders of both countries, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a treaty of mutual defense, directed against Somalia.

ARMY

Personnel: 40,000

Organization:

- 4 infantry divisions (each of 3 brigades of 3 battalions; 8,000 men per division; 1 division is the Imperial Bodyguard)
- 4 artillery battalions
- 5 antiaircraft batteries
- 1 armored battalion
- 1 airborne (parachute) infantry battalion
- 2 combat engineer battalions
- 8 training battalions
- 1 armored car squadron

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 70 tanks (M-41 and M-24)
- 50 APCs
- 50 armored cars (AML-245, M-9, M-20)
- 50 105mm howitzers, 155mm guns
- 6 helicopters UH-1
- AA guns

NAVY

Personnel: 1,500

Organization:

Coastal Patrol Force
Diving Section (parachutists and attack-divers)
Marine Corps

Major Units:

- 1 coastal minesweeper (MSC)
- 1 training ship (ex-AVP)
- 4 patrol launches (YP)
- 5 patrol gunboats (PGM)
- 4 landing craft mechanized (LCM)

Naval Bases: Massaua, Asab

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 3,000

Organization:
- 1 bomber squadron (Canberra)
- 2 fighter/fighter-bomber squadrons (F-5, F-86)
- 2 COIN squadrons (Saab 17A/B, T-33, T-28)
- 1 transport squadron (C-119, C-54, C-47, Dove)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 48 combat aircraft
  - 15 F-5 fighters
  - 12 F-86 fighters
  - 8 Saab 17A/B COIN aircraft
  - 9 T-33, T-28 armed trainers
  - 4 Canberra light bombers
- 82 other aircraft
  - 30 transports (C-54, C-47, Dove, Il-14, C-119)
  - 30 Saab 91 Safir trainers
  - 8 T-28 trainers
  - 14 Alouette II/III, Mi-8, UH-1 helicopters

Military Air Bases: Debre Zeit, Bishiftu, Jijiga, Harar

PARAMILITARY

The National Police Force is about 28,000 strong with 4,000 of these committed against the insurgency in the province of Eritrea, as are the 3,000 special Commando Police. The Frontier Guard numbering some 1,500 men patrols the Somalia border against the incursions of the *shifta* (gangs of bandits).

FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND ISSAS

Territoire Francais des Afars et des Issas

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 8,880 square miles
Population: 97,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 4,400 (4.53% population)
Gross National Product: $60 million ($619 per capita)
Civil Air Fleet: 5 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Former French Somaliland, while having a measure of local self-government, is subject to France in matters of foreign affairs and defense through a resident High Commissioner.

The Territory's strategic problems are a combination of significant location and internal ethnic divisions. Located at the Indian Ocean entrance to the Red Sea, it is a trade crossroads, entrepot, and refueling point, and also a base for air transport between Europe, East Africa, Arabia, and India. This strategic position assures French influence in the Middle East and East Africa. Additionally, the Territory's modern port, Djibouti, is connected by rail to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and half of that country's external trade travels by this route. Ethiopia, therefore, has a vital interest in the Territory. To date control by France has been acceptable to the inhabitants of the Territory. Continued French sovereignty appears very important to the stability of the Horn of Africa, discouraging conflict between Ethiopia and the states that surround it, and preventing Arab control of the straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Internally, the indigenous population is about equally divided between the Afars, related to the Ethiopian Danakil tribe, and the Issas, a Somali tribe. However, the Somali presence is artificially increased by an influx of tribesmen seeking jobs in the more prosperous territory. On this ethnic basis, Somalia has claimed the Territory. In response, Ethiopia claimed that the area was part of its 19th Century empire. Both would probably attempt to enforce these claims by arms should France withdraw. It is to avoid this, as well as for strategic reasons, that France has maintained its colonial position. In a referendum on March 19, 1967, the electorate voted 60 percent for continued association with France. Most of this majority were Afars; many Issas, who otherwide might have constituted a majority, were barred from voting because they were considered transients from Somalia. Predictably, this decision, and consequently the election results, became controversial and resulted in riots by the nationalist Issa *Parti Mouvement Populaire*. Order was restored by 7,000 Garde Mobile troops from France. Although quiet for the time being, the Issa independence movement provides a potential for future internal conflict related to a confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The Territory's economy, development, and defense are subsidized by France at the rate of about $30 million yearly. Summarized below are the military elements of the French armed forces stationed in the Territory.

ARMY

Personnel: 3,600

Organization and Equipment:
- 1 mixed regiment
- 1 infantry regiment (Foreign Legion)
- 1 artillery regiment
  - AMX-13 light tanks
  - Ferret scout cars

NAVY

Personnel: 300
Equipment:
- 2 minesweepers
- some landing craft

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 500

Organization and Aircraft Types:

1 squadron of A-1s

1 transport squadron with Noratlas piston transports and H-34 and Alouette II helicopters

PARAMILITARY

There is a Gendarmerie of 500, headed by French Gendarmes, and including 400 locally recruited auxiliaries.



GABON

Republique Gabonaise

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 103,100 square miles

Population: 500,000

Total Active Armed Forces: 1,350 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.27% population)

Gross National Product: $310 million ($620 per capita)

Annual Military Expenditures: $3 million (estimated; 0.96% GNP)

Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 6.3 million metric tons
Refined Products: 927,000 metric tons

Electric Power Output: 98 million kwh

Civil Air Fleet: 15 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President of this parliamentary democracy is both chief of state and Premier. Currently he is also Minister of National Defense, thus combining in one person the commander in chief and civilian administrator of the armed forces.

Upon independence from France in 1960, Gabon entered into a series of mutual defense and military assistance agreements with France relating to internal security, base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military assistance. In February 1964 the internal security agreement was implemented when a military coup led by dissatisfied junior officers of the Army and Gendarmerie sought to depose the regime in power. A reinforced French regiment was flown in, with fighter support from bases in Dakar and Brazzaville, crushed the revolt, and restored the government.

Gabon is rich in raw materials: timber, petroleum, iron, manganese, and uranium. This, together with foreign technical assistance and investment, and relative stability, has permitted one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa. France's nuclear program is largely dependent upon uranium from Gabon.

In 1972 Gabon seized two tiny offshore islands claimed by Equatorial Guinea, as part of Gabonese efforts to extend the country's territorial waters to 100 miles; oil deposits are suspected in the disputed area. Equatorial Guinea charged invasion, and both sides appealed to the UN. The matter was peacefully settled and Gabon withdrew, but the potential for conflict remains.

Gabon is a member of the UN, OAU, OCAM, the Equatorial Defense Council, and the defense agreement of the African and Malagasy Union in 1961.

The Gabonese Army was formed in 1960 around a nucleus of French Army veterans. France has continued to supply arms and equipment and instructor-advisers. French military assistance costs about $800,000 annually. The Army numbers 600 and is organized as a two-company infantry battalion. Service is voluntary and for one year. The Navy has 100 men and a small patrol craft (YP) based at Libreville and Port Gentil. The Air Force of 50 operates one C-47 transport, three liaison aircraft, and four Alouette II helicopters. There are international airports at Libreville and Port Gentil. The Gendarmerie has a strength of about 600, including 60 French officers and NCOs. French forces in Gabon consist of 400 army personnel, including a paratroop company.

THE GAMBIA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 4,467 square miles
Population: 380,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 170 (Police Field Force; 0.04% population)
Gross National Product: $40.0 million ($105 per capita)
Electric Power Output: 7.4 million kwh

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The Gambia was granted independence by Britain in 1965; in April 1970 it was proclaimed a republic within the Commonwealth with the president/prime minister as head of state. With no formal armed forces, there is no Defense Minister.

The Gambia, a 300-mile strip along both banks of the Gambia River, is bounded on all sides except the river mouth by Senegal. Because of this unusual geographical relationship, as well as tribal and religious (Moslem) affinities, very close ties are maintained with Senegal, including a mutual defense pact and joint economic development of the Gambia River Valley.

Because of its strategic position in the bulge of West Africa, its deep water port at Bathurst, and nearby Yendum airport, The Gambia was a port of call for Allied naval convoys during World War II and a US air stop for flights to the Middle East.

The Gambia is a member of the UN, the OAU, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. An agreement with Britain provides for police and paramilitary training, advisers, and equipment. The defense agreement with Senegal provides for a joint Defense Committee with a permanent Secretariat, and Senegalese assistance in training any Gambian military unit should it be required.

The Gambia has no armed forces as such. Within the 580-man British led and trained police force is a Field Force of 170 men and two British officers, which operates as a mobile military company.

GHANA

Republic of Ghana

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 92,100 square miles
Population: 9,900,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 18,600 (0.18% population)
Gross National Product: $2.62 billion ($290 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $49 million (1.87% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 1.0 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 2.93 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 74 ships; 166,183 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 2 jets, 3 turboprop and 1 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

After the ousting and exile of Ghana's dictatorial President Nkrumah in 1966 by a military coup, the country was ruled for three years by a seven-man National Liberation Council. Following promulgation of a new constitution, civilian rule was restored in September 1969 but was ended in January 1972 by a bloodless coup led by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong. The military junta withdrew the Constitution, dissolved Parliament, and established a National Redemption Council as the governing body. The new government has moved leftward, restoring relations with Guinea and increasing contacts with communist countries. A coup attempt was suppressed in July 1973.

The Ghanaian armed forces were formed upon independence in 1957 from the Gold Coast Regiment of Britain's Royal West African Frontier Force. Initially most of

the officers and many NCOs were British. In 1961, however, these 200 seconded British officers and NCOs were dismissed by the Nkrumah government, and military assistance began to be accepted from other sources. However, a British Joint Services Training Team remained and Ghanaian cadets continued to be trained at Sandhurst.

Up until the 1966 coup, the Soviet Union had given an estimated $10 to $50 million in military aid including ground arms and ammunition, aircraft, training of cadets in Russia, and training of Nkrumah's Presidential Guard regiment. When the Presidential Guard resisted the February 1966 coup, eleven Russian instructor-advisers were reportedly killed.

Pilot training has been conducted in Ghana by Indians, Israelis, and Canadians and in Britain and Italy. US military assistance from 1950-1972 amounted to $235,000. In addition, 138 students have been trained in the US under the MAP. Pakistan has provided limited training assistance, arms have been purchased from New Zealand and Australia, and aircraft from the Soviet Union (only civil aircraft for Ghana Airways), Italy, and Canada. Yugoslavia assisted in the construction of a naval base.

Ghana possesses strategic mineral wealth which, with effective management, could ensure a viable economy and place it among the economic leaders of Africa. It exports over 450,000 tons of manganese ore and 270,000 tons of bauxite yearly. The 750,000 kw Volta hydroelectric power project, completed before Nkrumah's overthrow, has permitted an increased production of refined aluminum. Oil deposits have been discovered recently, and gold and industrial diamonds are mined in significant quantities. Nkrumah left the country with heavy foreign debts, most of which the new government has repudiated or declared a moratorium on. The loss of foreign credit, the government's nationalization of foreign assets, and extremely high prices for food are elements of a very serious economic situation.

Ghana is faced by substantial internal and external threats. Insurgency potential is inherent in tribal divisions and among some 1,500 government employees discharged since the 1966 coup. The main external threat comes from Guinea, which gave sanctuary to Nkrumah. However, even before his death in 1972, his host Sekou Toure had lost enthusiasm for the projected invasion and counter revolution.

Ghana is a member of the United Nations, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Organization of African Unity.

ARMY

Personnel: 16,500

Organization:
- 2 Brigade Groups (3 infantry battalions each with support troops of reconnaissance, artillery, engineers, transport)
- 1 paratroop battalion

Major Equipment Inventory:
- Saladin armored cars (British)
- Ferret scout cars (British)
- 76mm guns (USSR)
- infantry crew served and individual weapons (USSR and British)

Reserves: 500 Army Volunteer Force; 2 reconnaissance squadrons

NAVY

Personnel: 1,000

Major Units:
- 2 corvettes (PC)
- 1 coastal minesweeper (MSC)
- 2 inshore minesweepers (MSI)
- 2 seaward defense vessels (SC)
- 3 patrol boats (YP)
- 1 training ship
- 1 maintenance repair craft

Reserves: 200

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 1,100

Organization:
- 1 fighter-bomber squadron (MB-326B)
- 2 transport squadrons (Otter, Caribou, Heron)
- 1 communication/liaison squadron (Beaver, BN-2A)
- 1 helicopter squadron (S-58 Wessex, Hughes 269 Osage, Whirlwind)
- 1 training squadron (Bulldog)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 6 combat aircraft
- 6 MB-326GB fighter-bombers
- 44 other aircraft
  - 19 transports (7 Otter, 8 Caribou, 3 Heron, 1 HS 125)
  - 19 communication/liaison (11 Beaver, 8 BN-2A)
  - 6 trainers (Bulldog)

Air Bases: Accra Takoradi, Kumasi, Temale

GUINEA

Republique de Guinee

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 94,925 square miles
Population: 4,200,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 8,450 (includes Republican Guards and Gendarmerie; 0.20% population)
Gross National Product: $417 million ($99 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $17.8 million (4.26% GNP)
Merchant Fleet: 9 ships; 15,538 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 5 turbo prop, 3 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Since independence from France in 1958 President Sekou Toure has headed a strongly centralized one-party government. As chief of state he commands the armed forces through the Minister of the People's Army.

At the time of independence Guinea chose not to remain a member of the French Community; as a result all French interests were withdrawn and no French military assistance was provided. At that time some 22,000 Guineans were serving in the French armed forces. Of these 10,000 elected to remain with the French and 12,000 were demobilized. All French military equipment and stores were removed, leaving Guinea with no military force except an ill-equipped Gendarmerie. Guinea claims that its request to purchase 500 small arms from the US was turned down. Communist bloc assistance began in March 1959, and a year later a Soviet military mission arrived. Since March 1960 Soviet arms shipments are said to have exceeded $15 million. Upon the base of the French-trained Gendarmerie and French Army veterans selected for political reliability, an Army of 2,000 men was formed. Additional military aid has been received from Communist China and Cuba. In 1960 Guinea sent a battalion for six months with the UN Operation in the Congo.

Having rejected French ties, Guinea has supported the overthrow of the governments of those former French African colonies which do maintain close relationships with France: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Dahomey, and Senegal. As one of the radical bloc of African states, Guinea has provided sanctuary and training for exile insurgent groups from some of these countries as well as from Ghana, Portuguese Guinea, and Angola. The Soviet Union, China, and Cuba have aided this effort with funds, training, and arms, while Guinea has reexported its surplus Soviet arms to insurgent groups active elsewhere in Africa. A Guinea-Sierra Leone mutual defense pact, negotiated in 1970, was invoked by the Sierra Leone government in March 1971, when its overthrow was threatened; Guinean troops responded, and about 200 are still stationed in Sierra Leone.

Guinea's mineral wealth assures a substantial future economic potential and considerable strategic importance, despite its current poor economic situation. Almost one-half of the world's known reserves of bauxite are in Guinea, and about 1.5 million metric tons a year are being exported. A 200 million-ton deposit of iron ore also exists and about 700,000 metric tons a year are exported. Gold and diamonds are mined in significant quantities, and oil has been discovered.

Guinea's strategic position in the bulge of West Africa led the Soviet Union to undertake a project to expand Conakry's airport to take the largest jets. But Guinea denied the Soviet request for permission to use the field for flights to Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis. The denial was probably as much due to the December 1961 dismissal of the Soviet ambassador for subversive activities as it was to Guinea's declared nonalignment. Soviet arms aid ceased during this period. However, there was a rapprochement in 1965, and Soviet aircraft, torpedo boats, and fishing trawlers have since been received. During the period of Guinea's coolness toward the Soviet Union, West Germany instituted a $2.5 million military aid program for the training and equipping of three engineer companies and for building military roads and communications.

Due to economic stagnation and tensions arising from President Toure's one-man rule, there is a substantial potential for insurgency. Perhaps as many as 1,000,000 Guineans have moved to neighboring countries, mostly in search of jobs. Opposition parties have been established by these expatriates in Paris, Dakar, Freetown, and Abidjan. In the Ivory Coast, 5,000 have formed the Guinean National Liberation Front and are cooperating with Guinean expatriates elsewhere. The Army and police are said to be dissatisfied with alleged government mismanagement; there is also a coup potential within radical elements of Toure's *Parti democratique de Guinee*. These are members of the Cuban-trained and Chinese-armed People's Party Militia, who believe that Toure's nonalignment betrays the revolution. On November 22, 1970, an anti-Toure force of

about 300 men landed from four ships and attacked Conakry, capital of Guinea. After three days of fighting the invaders and their local supporters were defeated. Guinea accused Portugal of sponsoring and manning the invasion. Portugal denied these charges. A UN Security Council mission, after investigating Toure's charges, accused Portugal of being actively involved in the attempt to overthrow Toure.

From 1950 through 1972 the United States provided $902,000 in military assistance and excess defense materials, and trained four students in the US.

Guinea's Army of 5,000 is organized into five infantry battalions supported by an armored battalion, an artillery battalion, and three engineer companies. Military service is compulsory for two years, although not all eligible men are called up. Equipment includes Soviet T-34 tanks, a few BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, 100mm antitank guns, 122mm howitzers, and 14.5mm ZPU-1 antiaircraft machineguns. The Army, however, has been diverted largely to civic action type tasks, major diversions which must adversely affect combat efficiency. Reserves number about 15,000.

The main combat units of the 150-man Navy are six Soviet P-6 torpedo boats (PT) received in 1967. There are also two small patrol craft (YP) for port and river security and two landing craft (LCVP). Ports are Conakry and Kakande.

The Guinean Air Force numbers about 800 men. Some Soviet transports, Il-14, Il-18, and An-14 have been received. There are also eight MiG-17 fighters and Soviet Yak-18 piston primary trainers and L-29 and MiG-15 jet trainers.

There is a 900-man Gendarmerie. The People's Militia, some 5,000 men from the Party youth organization, was formed in 1966 officially to shield Guinea against invasion, but generally assumed to be a counterforce against the possibility of an Army coup. Units are assigned to the main population centers and have actually taken over internal security tasks from the Army. Republican Guards number 1,600 men.

Guinea is a member of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

IVORY COAST

Republique de Cote d'Ivoire

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 124,503 square miles
Population: 4,637,500
Total Active Armed Forces: 6,400 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.13% population)
Gross National Product: $1.82 billion ($392 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $28.8 million (1.58% GNP)
Merchant Fleet: 36 ships; 82,316 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 8 jet and 1 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The elected President is head of government, as well as chief of state; he is commander in chief of the armed forces and is currently also Minister of Defense. President Houphouet-Boigny, one of Africa's most distinguished statesmen, is assisted in military and paramilitary matters by a Minister of the Armed Forces. Youth and Civic Service. There is constitutional separation of powers between the elected Executive, the National Assembly, and the Judiciary.

The country is committed to a paramilitary civic action effort in support of nationbuilding. The *Service Civique* and a youth organization promote literacy, modern agricultural methods, basic technical skills, health and sanitation, and social services. The armed forces, however, have not been performing a civic action role. Military service is compulsory but selective, six months in the Army or two years in the *Service Civique.*

Ivory Coast has enjoyed relative internal stability since its independence in 1960. Several cabinet ministers and Army officers were arrested in 1963 for plotting against the government, but there have been no overt rebellious acts. President Houphouet-Boigny is a member of the Baoule tribe, largest in the country, and other tribes fear its domination. Should the President die in office, transfer of power is likely to be contested. Another potential source of trouble is the fact that about one-quarter of the population are recent immigrants from neighboring states, attracted by the burgeoning economy.

There appears to be no significant external threat. The radical leaders of Ghana and Guinea were evidently plotting to

overthrow Houphouet-Boigny until Nkrumah was deposed in 1966. Subsequently, the new government in Ghana professed its friendship. Guinea, after a brief threat to cross Ivory Coast to restore the radical regime in Ghana, is now beset by its own internal problems. Overthrow of the radical regime in Mali in 1968 ended a potential threat from across the northern border.

For its own part Ivory Coast adheres to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other African states and subscribes to an orderly approach to African unity rather than an early continental union. It has avoided involvement in cold-war issues but has maintained policies friendly to the West while establishing diplomatic relations with some communist regimes. However, Houphouet-Boigny has strongly condemned communist-supported subversive efforts in Africa.

Close military and economic ties have been maintained with France since independence in 1960, and French developmental assistance is largely responsible for Ivory Coast's growth and relative prosperity. Mutual defense and military assistance agreements relate to internal security, base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military training and aid. Over 30,000 Frenchmen are in Ivory Coast in business and in advisory posts. Of these, 140 French military men are on training assignments with the armed forces, 400 are on civic action projects, and 350 guard the principal airport at Abidjan. In September 1967 France and Ivory Coast held joint amphibious exercises. French armed forces in Ivory Coast number 600 organized in a regimental combat group. An armored car squadron from the group is on detachment in Niger.

The United States provided $60,000 in military aid through 1972. Israel has had a training mission in Ivory Coast since 1963 with the *Service Civique*, and with a women's army unit.

Ivory Coast is a member of the UN and OAU, and was instrumental in furthering the discussions that led to forming the OCAM in 1965. It is a member of the *Conseil de l'Entente* with Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Togo, and in 1961 entered into a mutual defense pact with Niger and France. In 1966 it entered into an agreement of mutual friendship and defense with the new government of Ghana.

The Army numbers 4,000 and is organized into three infantry battalions, one armored squadron, one reconnaissance squadron, one paratroop company, two artillery batteries with 105mm howitzers and 40mm AA guns, and one engineer company. Reserves number from 12,000 to 15,000 men. Equipment is French and includes five AMX-13 light tanks, armored cars, and infantry heavy weapons. The 100-man Navy operates two small landing craft (LCVP) and three patrol boats (PGM) of 75-235 tons. The largest is armed with eight SS-12 missiles. Seaports are Abidjan, Sassandra, Tabou, and a new port in the southwest, San Pedro. The 300-man Air Force operates seven light transports (four Broussard, one C-45, one Falcon, one Aero Commander), three C-47 transports, five helicopters (four Alouette II and one Puma), and some trainers. Principal airfields are at Port Bouet (Abidjan), Bouake, Man Daloa, Sassandra, Korhogo, Tabou, and Odienne.

The Gendarmerie is 2,000 strong. The *Service Civique* and the youth organization receive military training, but their strengths and the extent to which they are armed are not known. There is reputed to be an armed militia of loyal Party militants created for the purpose of ensuring an orderly transfer of power within the Party in the event of the President's death. Its strength is not known.

KENYA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 224,960 square miles
Population: 12,400,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 9,020 (including internal security forces; 0.07% population)
Gross National Product: $2.0 billion ($161 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $27.5 million (1.37% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 2.5 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 556 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 23 ships; 21,857 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 4 jet, 8 turboprop, 37 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President is commander in chief of the armed forces, which he controls through the Minister of Defence. The armed forces are integrated under the Commander of the Army, who is also Commander, Kenya Military Forces. He reports directly to the Minister of Defence without intermediate joint staff organization.

The Kenyan Army grew out of three battalions of the former King's African Rifles, at the time of independence in 1963. Africanization of the Army proceeded much faster in Kenya than in neighboring Tanganyika and Uganda. However, British officers still held top command positions in January 1964, when a strike or mutiny occurred at the headquarters of the 11th Battalion of the Kenya Rifles near Nakuru in protest against continued British presence and also against inadequate pay. At the request of President Jomo Kenyatta, British forces intervened to suppress the outbreak. Kenyatta disciplined the mutineers with long prison sentences, and intensified on-going efforts to develop a modern force with professional, non-political elan.

Kenya relies on a voluntary recruitment program for its armed forces; because of ample manpower it is able to be rigidly selective. The Kenyan Army enjoys a standard of health and education considerably higher than that existing in the country as a whole. Service is for nine years.

The foremost defense problem facing Kenya today is that posed by separatist elements among some 300,000 Somali peoples who are presently living in the northeastern section of Kenya. Since independence Kenya has been concerned about Somali ambitions to establish a Greater Somalia embracing parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya's 1963 defense treaty with Ethiopia stems from this fear. (On June 9, 1970, the border with Ethiopia was delineated and accepted by both countries.) A State of Emergency was proclaimed in the area in 1963, and until 1968 there was almost constant irregular conflict on the Kenya-Somali frontier. The recent establishment of better relations between Kenya and Somalia has decreased the danger of war; however, many Somali insurgents (known as *shiftas*) are operating without the sponsorship of the Somalia government, and remain a threat to Kenya's internal security.

There is some potential for insurgency. It is contained, however, by the large and professional Kenya Police. Tribal unrest has increased since the 1969 assassination of one of Kenya's leading statesmen, Tom Mboya, by a member of the majority Kikuyu tribe. Nevertheless, the 1969 election was quiet. In June 1971, a small group of alleged conspirators was sentenced to imprisonment for attempting to overthrow the government. The Chief of the Defence Staff was dismissed for having been implicated in the conspiracy.

Upon independence the Kenyan Army, already equipped by Britain, was given $9.8 million in additional arms and equipment plus another $23.8 million in military assets, mainly installations. To establish a Navy with patrol craft, Britain has provided a base at Mombasa, training, and $3.64 million in equipment. Over 300 British military men continue on duty with the Kenyan armed forces in a training role. Kenyans receive training in Britain. Joint training exercises of British and Kenyan units are held annually in Kenya. By a 1964 agreement Britain granted Kenya $140 million in development and military aid.

In addition to British assistance, Kenya has received aircraft from Canada, and Kenyans have been trained in Bulgaria, Ethiopia, and Israel. In 1964 some members of KANU, the majority party, were reported to have received military training in Eastern European Communist countries and others to have had guerrilla training in Communist China.

Kenya is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, the OAU, and the East African Community. A 1964 agreement with Britain permits the British Army to train in Kenya and the RAF and RN to use Kenyan bases.

The Army of 6,300 is organized as four infantry battalions, one parachute company, a support battalion, and one armored reconnaissance platoon. Equipment includes Saladin armored cars and Ferret scout cars; 81mm and 120mm mortars and 120 recoilless rifles. There is a Navy of 300 men operating three patrol boats (PGM). The Air Force of 620 men has six BAC 167 Strikemaster light jet attack aircraft, two C-47, seven Beaver and six Caribou transports, five Bulldog trainers and five Bell 47 helicopters. Major air bases are at Eastleigh (Nairobi), Nanyuki, Embakasi, Nyeri, Mombasa, and Kisumu.

The 11,500-man police force is the largest and best equipped in East Africa. Approximately half perform internal security functions; the force is well trained in riot control and includes an air unit and constabulary-type General Service Units (1,800 men).

LESOTHO

Kingdom of Lesotho

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 11,719 square miles
Population: 1,100,000
Total Active Police Forces: 900 (0.08% population)
Gross National Product: $80 million ($73 per capita)
Annual Police Expenditures: c. $1.2 million (1.5% GNP)
Civil Air Fleet: 6 piston transport

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Lesotho, the former British protectorate of Basutoland, became independent in 1966. The Paramount Chief, or King, is constitutional monarch; the Prime Minister is leader of the majority in the National Assembly and thus head of the

Government. A power struggle between these two shortly after independence revealed basic factional and ideological divisions within the country. In January 1970, the Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan, suspended the constitution and announced a state of emergency, arresting the leaders of the opposition party and placing the King under house arrest. After a majority of the College of Chiefs refused to depose the King, the King was given permission to leave for the Netherlands. He returned after six months and took a new oath to abstain from involving the monarchy in politics. Chief Jonathan, in addition to being Prime Minister, holds the positions of Minister of Defense, Internal Security, and Internal Affairs. Despite membership in the UN, the British Commonwealth, and the OAU, the nation's external security is completely dependent on friendly relations with South Africa, by which it is totally surrounded.

Both the UN and Britain have warned South Africa not to attempt to annex Lesotho. Nevertheless, Lesotho could be effectively and easily blockaded by South Africa and could offer little assistance to punitive measures directed against any insurgent movements based there. Accordingly, as early as 1965, before independence, attempts to use Lesotho as an insurgent base were broken up by the Government, and political refugees from South Africa were expelled. Despite Lesotho's open criticism of *apartheid* its policy of cooperation with South Africa was continued with little prospect for change.

Lesotho is also dependent on South Africa economically: as a source for all imports, as a market for its exports of livestock and animal products, and as employer for 200,000 workers who send home $3 million annually. Lesotho originally received one-half its annual budget, which totalled about $15 million in 1972-73, from Britain, but recent revenue increases, largely from Lesotho's share in the South Africa Customs Union pool, have made possible a balanced budget. Britain still contributes capital development funds. Mineral exploration has generally been unfruitful, although some diamonds are mined and exploration continues for oil and additional diamond deposits. The only other prospect for earning additional foreign exchange is the Malibamatso (formerly Oxbow) hydroelectric project. It would generate 250 million kwh of power annually, which, along with badly needed water, could be sold in South Africa. Relations between South Africa and Lesotho are currently so cool, however, that no price for the water can be agreed upon, or even discussed; World Bank financing is in abeyance until this problem can be settled.

LIBERIA

Republic of Liberia

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 43,000 square miles
Population: 1,650,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 4,200 (0.25% population)
Gross National Product: $460 million ($279 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $3.1 million (0.67% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 520,000 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 502 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 2,234 ships; 44.44 million gross tons (most of these are foreign owned and registered under the Liberian flag as a convenience)
Civil Air Fleet: 2 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Governmental structure is patterned on that of the United States, the President being commander in chief of the armed forces. Control is exercised through a Minister of National

Defense who directs the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Coast Guard Commander.

Government power is centralized. President William Richard Talbert took office in June 1971 following the death of W.V.S. Tubman, who had been president for 25 years. The Honorables, some 25,000 to 50,000 descendants of Afro-American colonizers from the United States, allegedly dominate political and economic affairs, at the expense of the interior tribes. This provides a potential for instability. Alleged governmental corruption, indebtedness, and lack of economic development despite rich iron and rubber resources, are further causes of unrest.

Liberia's strategic position in the bulge of West Africa resulted in an agreement on March 31, 1942, giving the United States the right to construct, control, operate, and defend airports in Liberia for the duration of the war. Under this agreement, Robertsfield near Monrovia was developed as a link in an air route from the US to the Middle East by way of Brazil.

The US Military Aid Program from 1950 through 1971 has given Liberia $7.9 million in arms and equipment; a small Military Assistance and Advisory Group helps with the training of the Liberian forces. From 1950 through 1972 485 Liberian military students were trained in the United States under MAP. An agreement signed in 1959 provides for consultation if either Liberia or the United States is attacked or threatened.

Liberia is a member of the UN and OAU and has taken the initiative in encouraging pan-African cooperation. Liberia provided a small battalion to the UN Operation in the Congo from mid-1960 to mid-1963. In 1968 Liberia contributed funds to the Liberation Committee of the OAU for support of militant nationalists in Southern Africa and the Portuguese territories.

The army, known as the National Guard, is 4,000 strong, organized into three infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, and a heavy weapons support company. Equipment includes a few armored cars and light artillery pieces and two trainer and two transport aircraft. The naval force is the Coast Guard with 200 men operating one patrol gunboat (PGM), two patrol craft (YP), the Presidential yacht, and some landing craft. Principal ports are Monrovia and Buchanan. There is no air force, but the airports of Robertsfield and Spriggs Payne are near Monrovia.

The armed forces are maintained by voluntary enlistment. However, a law rendering male citizens liable for military service between the ages of 16 and 45 years is used to maintain the Militia. This paramilitary force, perhaps 20,000 strong, is organized in two divisions, each with two brigades of four regiments. It is lightly armed and used mainly for security in the interior and in border areas.

LIBYA

Al Jumhuriyah al Libiyya al Arabiyah
Libyan Arab Republic

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 679,536 square miles
Population: 2,110,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 24,000 (1.1% population)
Gross National Product: $4.3 billion ($2,037 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $140 million (3.25% GNP)
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 107.6 million metric tons
Refined Products: 435,700 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 456 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 13 ships; 5,932 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 7 jet, 5 turboprop and 10 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The constitutional monarchy was overthrown September 1, 1969, by a "Captain's coup" which deposed the king and established a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the sole holder of power. A republican constitution decreed in December set up a cabinet in which the coup leader, Captain (self-promoted to Colonel) al Kadhafi, President of the RCC, is both Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and thus commander in chief of the armed forces. There is no provision for a representative assembly, elected or otherwise; hence military budgets are by decree.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES

The coup signaled an immediate change in the former kingdom's relatively moderate stance within the Arab League. The RCC lost no time in announcing that it was in full support of Egyptian President Nasser's anti-Israel policies and that it planned to achieve a socialist society.

Kadhafi has become something of a leader in inter-Arab affairs, pushing for the use of oil to exert stronger pressure on the United States and other Western powers to stop support of Israel. With promises of economic aid he has also persuaded five black African states (Uganda, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Burundi) to break diplomatic relations with Israel. Kadhafi's long-term potential for Arab and African leadership has been diminished, however, by his growing reputation for unpredictable and sometimes imprudent statements and action.

Kadhafi's position within Libya also appears to have deteriorated. In spring 1974 the Revolutionary Command Council relieved him of "political, administrative, and traditional" duties, leaving him as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and ostensibly giving him additional time for

"ideological and mass reorganization" work. Premier Abdel Salaam Jallud, who took over Kadhafi's relinquished duties, has a reputation for pragmatism and a relatively good relationship with President Sadat of Egypt. The full significance of the shift is not yet known.

As early as September 17, 1969, Libya began to cut former economic and military aid ties with the US and UK. By mid-December an agreement was made with the British for return to Libyan control by March 30, 1970, of their bases at Tobruk and al Adem, and the withdrawal of the training mission at Benghazi. At Wheelus AFB (US) near Tripoli, training of Libyan personnel had ceased in September, and in December agreement was reached that the base be turned over by June 30, 1970. Also in December was announced the cancellation of a contract for furnishing, installing, and training operators for a complete British surface-to-air missile system, with radar and all ancillary elements, at a reported cost of over $420 million.

In late 1969 Libya turned to France and the Soviet Union for military assistance. France agreed to sell 110 Mirage 5 aircraft with Mach-2 speed; by the end of 1973 about 80 of these had been delivered. (The contract is said to include the sale of certain electronic equipment and an unannounced number of tanks.) Arms shipment from the USSR began in July 1970.

Libya's strategic importance is principally due to its oil resources. Since 1959, when the first wells were brought in, it has climbed to fourth place in the Mediterranean-Middle East area, after Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and has exceeded each of them as a supplier to West Europe. Far-reaching concessions were obtained from foreign companies exploiting Libyan oil resources when these companies were threatened by the RCC, in March 1971, with the prospect of nationalization.

British Petroleum's Libyan operations were nationalized in December 1971, and in May 1973 Kadhafi demanded 100% control of the three largest oil operations in Libya, all of them largely American owned. The following month he nationalized outright a smaller American-owned operation.

Kadhafi has pushed hard for a Federation of Arab Republics, made up of Egypt, Syria, and Libya. According to plans that all three countries had agreed to, the Federation would be governed by a Presidential Council composed of the three presidents, and would have a joint military command. In referendums held in September 1971 the citizens of all three countries voted to form the Federation. It has never been formed, however, and the idea is now dormant and possibly moribund, as a result of Sadat's growing distrust of Kadhafi, mutual animosities between Libyans and Egyptians, and a general feeling among governmental leaders in the countries involved that the plans make radical changes too fast.

A much more quickly aborted merger that would have joined Libya and Tunisia was announced in January 1974; the

announcement was followed in a few days by the dismissal of the Tunisian foreign minister who had helped push the merger. Earlier Tunisian acquiescence in Kadhafi's merger plans had apparently been achieved only because of Tunisian President Bourguiba's failing mental and physical strength.

There have been two opportunities for the RCC to show its stability against counter-subversion. The Council reported in December 1969 that it had suppressed an attempted counter-coup led by its Defense and Interior Ministers. A cabinet shake-up resulted in Colonel al Kadhafi taking the portfolio of Defense and his deputy taking that of Interior. In June 1970 the government announced that it had crushed a new plot headed by the nephew of the ousted King Idris.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The reversal of military policy noted above has stopped all military aid from the United States and Britain. Libya had received, from 1950 through 1972 $16.2 million from the United States. In addition 470 Libyan military students had been trained under the MAP, 429 of them in the US. Pilots and naval cadets are trained in Greece.

The purchase of French aircraft entails provisions for French instruction of pilots and mechanics. The Libyan dearth of pilots and technically trained manpower, combined with the three-year stretch-out of plane delivery, will postpone the realization of a modern air force for the immediate future. France states that the contract precludes the transfer of planes to a third party. The conditions of Soviet aid are unclear.

ALLIANCES

Libya is a member of the UN, the Arab League, the OAU, the Maghreb, and the OPEC.

ARMY

Personnel: 20,000

Organization:
- 4 armored battalions (British-equipped)
- 5 infantry battalions (British-equipped)
- 3 artillery battalions (US-equipped)
- 2 AA battalions

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 6 Centurion medium tanks
- 115 T-54/55 and 15 T-34 medium tanks
- 40 armored cars (Saladin) and scout cars (Ferret and Shorland)
- 150 APCs (Saracen, BTR-60, M-113)
- 150 105mm and 155mm howitzers, 122mm guns
- 100 antitank missiles (Vigilant and Swingfire)
- 12 helicopters (AB206, Bell 47G, Alouette)
- 40mm AA guns (Bofors)

NAVY

Personnel: 2,000 (including Coast Guard)

Major Units:
- 1 fast frigate (DEG), 6 Seacat SAM
- 1 patrol gunboat (PGM)
- 2 inshore minesweepers (MSI)
- 3 fast patrol boats (PTF), 8 SS-12 SSM
- 8 patrol boats (YP)
- 2 auxiliaries

Naval Base: Tripoli; ports at Benghazi, Darnah, Tobruk and Burayqah

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 2,000

Organization:
- 1 fighter squadron (F-5)
- 2 fighter-bomber squadrons (Mirage)
- 1 transport squadron (C-47, C-130)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 88 combat aircraft
  - 80 Mirage
  - 8 F-5 fighters
- 62 *other aircraft*
  - 26 transports (9 C-47, 1 C-140, 16 C-130)
  - 15 jet trainers (3 T-33, 12 Magister)
  - 21 helicopters (9 Super Frelon, 7 Alouette II/III, 2 AB-206, 3 OH-13)

Missiles: SAMs (Thunderbird and Rapier)

Air Bases: Wheelus and Idris (Tripoli), Benina (Benghazi), El Adem, El Awai

Note: Total order for Mirage 5s is as follows: 58 single-seat ground attack, 32 single-seat fighter-bomber, 10 single-seat reconnaissance, and 10 two-seat trainers. Of these about 80 had been delivered by the end of 1973.

PARAMILITARY

A paramilitary force of elements loyal to the new regime has been organized. Its composition and strength are unclear.

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

Republika Malagasy

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 228,000 square miles
Population: 7,500,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 8,700 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.11% population)
Gross National Product: $1 billion ($133 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $13.8 million (1.38% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 601,700 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 152 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 48 ships; 52,162 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 3 jet, 6 turboprop, 16 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

In May 1972, student protests triggered extensive rioting and arrests that led to a transfer of power to General Philibert Ramanantsoa, Army Chief of Staff. A referendum in October gave Ramanantsoa full control of the country, with military rule to be maintained for five years.

Upon independence in 1960 the Malagasy Republic concluded mutual defense and military assistance agreements with France which provided for aid in maintaining internal security, for base right, transit and overflight privileges, and military training and aid. Under the agreements France retained the headquarters of Overseas Zone 3 (Indian Ocean) and a garrison of about 2,500 men at the Diego-Suarez naval base, plus detachments at Ivato and Antsirabe. The Malagasy Republic signed an agreement with France in June 1973 under which all 4,000 French troops remaining in the country would be phased out. All ground troops were to have left by September 1973, and the naval base was to be closed in two years. French military assistance has amounted to about $12.5 million annually, but the future of this assistance is uncertain. West Germany has also provided military assistance including 30 light military vehicles and the training of seamen in Germany. Israel has trained 500 security police and provided their weapons. The United States has furnished about $200,000 worth of equipment for the Gendarmerie and police.

Before the 1972 coup the policies of the Malagasy Republic were generally pro-West. The new government has been more strongly anticolonial and independent, breaking several ties with France, and also breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa. The Malagasy Republic is a member of the UN and the OAU, but although it lies only 250 miles off the southeast African coast, its population is mainly of Malay descent, and its interest in African affairs has been slight. It withdrew from OCAM in 1973. It also withdrew from the franc zone, issuing its own currency.

There is internal friction between the Protestant highland peoples of Malay stock and the Catholic coastal peoples of mixed Malay, African, and Arab background. The government is endeavoring to unify these divergent groups. A more serious potential danger to internal stability lies in tensions resulting from the slow economic growth rate coupled with a high birth rate.

All male citizens are subject to 18-month conscription either for military or for civic service. The Army is 4,000 strong and organized into two mixed regiments (each consists of four infantry companies), one paratroop company, one reconnaissance squadron, one engineer unit, one artillery battery, and headquarters and support units. The Navy of about 200 men operates one 250-ton patrol vessel (PGM), one training ship, one tender, and one company of Marines. The Major naval base is Diego-Suarez with ports at Tamatave, Majunga, Tulear, Nossi-Be, Fort Dauphin, and Manakara. The Air Arm has 400 men and operates three C-47, three Flamant, and seven Broussard transports, five helicopters (Bell 47 and Alouette II/III) and some trainers. Main air bases are Arivoniamamo (Tananarive), Ivato (Tananarive), Diego-Suarez, Fort Dauphin, Tamatave, Majunga, and Tulear. There is a Gendarmerie numbering 4,100 men.

MALAWI

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 45,747 square miles
Population: 4,800,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 1,200 (0.02% population)
Gross National Product: $330 million ($69 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $1.5 million (0.45% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 144 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 1 jet, 4 turboprop, and 2 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Malawi, a member of the British Commonwealth, is a republic governed by a President who dominates a one-party parliament, and who is the commander in chief of the nation's armed force. Malawi's strategic problems are two-fold: maintaining internal and external security against dissidents at home and abroad, and preventing Malawi from becoming a base for liberation movements directed against white-dominated southern Africa.

Although nominally nonaligned, the government of President H. K. Banda has in recent years severed relations with Communist China, Egypt, and Ghana, and established relations with South Africa and Portugal. Although a member of the OAU, Malawi advocated realism in expectations of African unity, and restraint in achieving Pan-African aims. President Banda's official visit to South Africa in 1971 and President Fouche of South Africa's visit to Malawi in 1972 were the first official visits exchanged by South Africa and any independent black African state.

In 1964 several dissident ministers fled the country and fomented a liberation movement among the 20,000 Malawians working in Tanzania. This movement received support from Algeria, Egypt, Cuba, and Communist China, and was provided sanctuary and bases in Tanzania and Zambia. From these latter neighboring countries, raids against Malawi have been mounted periodically, but the rebels have gained little support from the population and have been quickly rounded up.

For export of its agricultural produce and import of essential goods, landlocked Malawi depends upon rail traffic from the port of Beira in Mozambique and road traffic from Rhodesia across a portion of Mozambique. South Africa has provided a loan to build an additional rail link to the line running to the port of Nacala in Mozambique. Communications by road exist with similarly landlocked Zambia and with Tanzania, but these are tenuous, longer, and do not have the capacity of the routes through Mozambique and Rhodesia. Some 200,000 Malawians work in Rhodesia and 80,000 in South Africa, remitting part of their wages to families at home. This represents a significant contribution to the national income which could be terminated at any time by the host countries.

Thus Malawi is mainly dependent economically on three white-dominated neighboring countries. This reality has shaped the policy of Malawi toward white Southern Africa. However, despite efforts of Malawian security forces, minor elements of Mozambique and Rhodesian liberation movements have made use of Malawi for sanctuary and infiltration.

Malawi's borders were determined by colonial fiat and do not match either ethnic divisions or old tribal boundaries. Based on ethnic realities and tribal history—and also probably as a counterirritant to Tanzania's and Zambia's support for Malawian dissidents—Dr. Banda has laid claim to three districts in Tanzania and to three districts in Zambia. However, no efforts appear to be in progress to force these claims.

Malawi was formerly dependent upon Britain for about 40 percent of its budget, but Britain and Malawi agreed in 1972 to terminate budgetary assistance. Some 50 British officers and NCOs are seconded to Malawi in both command and training posts, but they are being replaced as fast as Malawian officers become trained and qualified. The Army, some 1,200 strong, consists of the 1st Battalion Malawi Rifles, plus supporting services, three patrol craft (YP) on Lake Nyasa, and an air unit. The air unit operates two HS-748 Andover and two Britten-Norman BN-2 aircraft. Airfields are Blantyre-Limbe, Lilongwe, Mzimba, Mzuzu, and Karonga.

The Young Malawi Pioneers, a youth organization, is believed to have paramilitary functions and the League of Malawi Women augments the security services.

MALI

Republique du Mali

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 478,652 square miles
Population: 5,500,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 5,140 (including Gendarmerie; 0.09% population)
Gross National Product: $333 million ($61 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $5.0 million (1.5% GNP)
Civil Air Fleet: 1 jet, 2 turboprop, and 1 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

In June 1960 the French colonies then known as the French Sudan and Senegal became independent as the Federation of Mali. Two months later Senegal withdrew from the Federation and the former French Sudan proclaimed itself the Republic of Mali on September 22, 1960. Under a leftist government Mali severed its ties with France and remained outside the French Community. Ruinous economic policies and the growing power and truculence of the Popular Militia, military arm of the President and the Party, led to a military coup d'etat by a group of young officers in November 1968.

The new National Military Committee, headed by a lieutenant, who became head of state and of the government, established a government of military officers and civilian notables. Orientation, while remaining leftist, is much less doctrinaire and more in the national self-interest than previously. Relations with the West have been improved, and nonalignment in international affairs is the stated national policy. In March 1971 an attempted coup failed, and the alleged leaders, including the first vice-president, were dismissed from the army and arrested.

Mali is a member of the UN and the OAU. It contributed a 575-man infantry battalion to the UN's Congo force for four months in 1960. The new regime has not rejoined the French Community or sought membership in the OCAM.

Between 1961 and 1971 Mali received over $20 million in military assistance from the Soviet Union. This included MiG-17 fighters, T-34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, military vehicles, small arms, training in the Soviet Union, and a Soviet military mission in Mali. Until the 1968 coup, Communist China armed and trained the Popular Militia. In 1964, the United States sent a military mission to Mali to train engineer units for civic action and in 1966 to train a paratroop company; about $2.9 million in American military assistance was provided from 1961 to 1972, and 73 military students have been trained under MAP.

Tribal divisions are not so serious in Mali as in many other African countries since about 60 percent of the population is from the Mande tribe. The Berber Tuaregs have traditionally opposed the central government authority and police action against them is occasionally necessary, but they comprise less than five percent of the population.

The Army has a strength of about 3,500 and is organized into three infantry battalions, one paratroop company, and service support units. Equipment is largely Soviet. There is a river patrol force of about 40 men operating three patrol craft (YP) on the Niger River. The Air Force has about 400 men and operates six MiG-17 jet fighters, two MiG-15 jet fighter-trainers, two C-47 transports, two Il-14 transports, two Broussard liaison aircraft, and two Mi-4 helicopters. Air bases are at Bamako and Gao with other fields at Mopti, Kayes, Nioro, Tombouctou, and Yelimane. There is a Gendarmerie of 1,200.

MAURITANIA

Republique Islamique de Mauritanie

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 397,683 square miles
Population: 1,300,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 1,000 (0.08% population)
Gross National Product: $200 million ($154 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $8 million (4% GNP)
Iron Ore Production: 8.6 million metric tons
Merchant Fleet: 4 ships; 1,681 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 1 turboprop, 4 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President of the Republic commands the armed forces through an appointed Minister of Defense. The National Assembly passes upon the defense budget submitted by the Minister.

The Army was formed from Mauritanian-manned French Army units upon independence in November 1960. The following year mutual defense and military assistance agreements were signed with France which provided for help in maintaining internal security base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military aid and training. All French troops were withdrawn by January 1966. French military aid has been received at the rate of about $1.2 million per year.

There are both external and internal threats to Mauritania's security. Morocco claims all of Mauritania on dubious historical grounds. In 1957, when it was announced that Mauritania would receive independence, an irregular force calling itself the Moroccan Army of Liberation was raised in Morocco—though disavowed by the Moroccan government. This group raided into Mauritania in an attempt to foment a popular uprising and unite the two countries. The incursion was quickly suppressed by French troops. Morocco has neither renounced its claim nor recognized Mauritania. Further, both countries claim Spanish Sahara, which is situated on the African coast between them. Should Spain withdraw (it has ceded its enclave of Ifni to Morocco) this could precipitate a crisis between Morocco and Mauritania. In the event of conflict, Mauritania's miniscule army would be no match for Morocco's much larger modern force.

Mauritania's eastern border with Mali was under dispute until largely settled in favor of the latter in 1968. However, this still vaguely defined border remains a potential source of irritation.

The most important of a number of relatively minor internal tensions is the ethnic division between the Arabic speaking Moorish-Arab-Berber majority (80 percent of the population) and the black minority. Proportionally more blacks than Arabs sought an education during the French regime, and these tend to get positions in government and business, where they can effectively oppose trends toward Arabic control of government administration.

Substantial natural resources provide most of Mauritania's foreign exchange earning. There are several iron ore deposits, and a large copper ore reserve has been discovered. The fishing industry has great potential and is being developed to a catch of 250,000 tons per year. Trawlers are built in France and smaller fishing craft are built locally.

Mauritania is a member of the UN and OAU. In 1965 it withdrew from the French-oriented OCAM and adopted a policy of nonalignment. In June 1973 the franc was replaced by the gold-backed ouquiya. To demonstrate its solidarity with the Arab world at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, it broke diplomatic relations with the US; they were resumed in December 1969.

The Army numbers 900 men and is organized into a parachute-commando company, several mechanized reconnaissance squadrons, an artillery battery, and a camel corps. Equipment is French, including light artillery and EBR-75 armored cars. Military service is voluntary and is for two years. There is no navy as such but four small patrol craft (2 PGM, 2 YP) are operated at Port Etienne for port control and customs. The Air Force has a strength of about 100 and operates one C-47 transport, two Broussard utility aircraft, and six light trainers. Airfields are at Atar, Nouakchott, Port Etienne, Fort Gouraud, Fort Trinquet, Akjoujt, Kaedi, Rosso, Kiffa, and Aioun-el-atrous.

MOROCCO

Al-Mamlaka Al-Maghrebia
Kingdom of the West

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 174,471 square miles
Population: 17,400,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 59,750 (includes security forces; 0.45% population)
Gross National Product: $4.2 billion ($241 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $116.9 million (2.78% GNP)
Iron Ore Production: 388,000 metric tons
Fuel Production: Coal: 474,000 metric tons
Crude Oil: 28,000 metric tons
Refined Products: 1.98 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 2.1 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 39 ships; 46,907 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 6 jet transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

In this constitutional monarchy the King rules as well as reigns. Despite such trappings of democracy as a bicameral legislature and a Prime Minister, the King dominates the government and has on occasion assumed the Premiership. He is Chief of the General Staff and Supreme Commander of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR). A general, appointed by the King, acts as Minister of National Defense and coordinates the armed forces, Gendarmerie, Royal Police Force, and the Auxiliary Force. Another general, Army Chief of Staff, acts as the King's Adjutant in his role as Chief of the General Staff. A Military Cabinet advises the King on defense matters. The King personally appoints trusted officers to key posts.

The nation is divided for defense into three military zones and one independent sector: Littoral Zone with headquarters at Casablanca, Central Zone with headquarters at Meknes, Independent Sector with headquarters at Marrakech, and the Saharan Zone controlled from the overall headquarters at Rabat. Upon independence in 1956 the Army was formed mainly from Moroccan veterans of the French and Spanish colonial armies, with the further addition of about 5,000 former guerrillas of the Moroccan Army of Liberation.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES

Morocco has followed a policy on non-alignment in East-West relations and of moderation with regard to the burning issues of the Pan-Arab movement. These policies, as well as a dispute over mineral-rich portions of southwestern Algeria claimed by Morocco, together with the heavy arming of Algeria by the Soviet Union, have resulted in tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Morocco has suspected Algeria of aggressive intentions. With a stronger warlike tradition than Algeria, Morocco is confident of success in any campaign fought on near equal material terms, as demonstrated in the brief frontier war of October 1963. However, subsequent Soviet assistance to Algeria has given that nation a four-to-one advantage over Morocco, which has sought additional military aid from the US with a view to reducing Algeria's preponderance to a less overwhelming two-to-one. The stated objective has been a deterrent capability to defend effectively for a few days until the UN can act or friendly powers intervene. In January 1969 Algeria's President Boumedienne and Morocco's King Hassan II concluded a Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation, apparently upon the initiative of the former. In May 1970, agreement was reached on demarcation of the disputed frontier. These conciliatory moves should dampen tensions between the two countries, although some basic issues remain.

Morocco's own irredentism is far from defensive. One of many ancient Moroccan empires included what is now southwestern Algeria, Spanish Sahara, Mauritania and parts of Mali. The King, both on this basis and in his role as hereditary

religious leader of this region, lays claim to these territories for Morocco (although the agreement with Algeria apparently modifies these claims). It is likely that Morocco's moderate King would not continue to assert such claims were it not for pressures from the extreme rightist *Istiqlal* party.

The Army is 80 percent Berber in composition, but most officers are urban Arabs. The ranks were filled by volunteers until 1966 when a Royal decree prescribed conscription of all 18-year-olds for 18 months' service.

In July 1971 an abortive revolt led by a small group of dissident Army officers attempted to topple the King's government. Leading the attack on the King's summer palace were two of his most trusted officers. A total of nine of the country's fifteen generals died as a result of the revolt (including loyal and dissident officers killed during the revolt, and several executed later). An Army cleanup followed, with anti-royal elements purged from the officer corps. The King has promised to eliminate the cause of the uprising by attacking corruption and launching a program of social and economic reforms. In August 1972 another apparent plot against the monarchy, led by the Minister of Defense, was revealed after two Air Force jets fired on the King's plane. The plot was immediately suppressed.

Despite its relatively moderate stance toward Israel, Morocco contributed men and tanks for the 1973 war. Several contingents of Moroccan troops—perhaps 5,000 in all— and some tanks, were sent to Syria on Soviet ships in the spring and summer of 1973.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

As both an Atlantic and a Mediterranean power occupying one side of the strategic Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco's strategic situation is significant. Its Western orientation and its location on the fringe of Europe, yet behind a water barrier, led to the US-French agreement to establish four US Strategic Air Command advanced B-47 bomber bases in French Morocco in 1951. These were continued after independence, but abandoned in 1963 as a result of a change in Moroccan policy, and the phase-out of the B-47. Morocco's strategic location will unquestionably continue to attract the interest and attention of major powers.

The conservative monarchy is anathema to leftists and radical Arab elements; its economic problems, as well as the regime's moderate stand on Israel and other Arab issues, provide ample excuses for subversive attempts. Internal unrest is currently Morocco's most serious strategic problem.

In 1968 Spain ceded to Morocco the small enclave of Ifni. Morocco still claims barren, sparsely-populated Spanish Sahara. Profitable exploitation of fishery resources and possibly the world's largest phosphate deposit, may cause Spain to be more reluctant to part with this territory. Further, this Spanish colony is also claimed by Mauritania.

While Morocco recently has not pressed its traditional claims to Mauritania and parts of Mali, these have not been withdrawn and provoke a certain degree of nervousness on the part of these former portions of the ancient Moroccan empire. However, only in the event of extensive internal disintegration in these poverty-stricken countries is Morocco likely to attempt to make good these claims.

An incident with Spain occurred in January 1973 over Moroccan extension of territorial waters from 12 to 70 miles; there was an exchange of fire between Spanish and Moroccan naval ships just six miles off the Spanish coast. A fishing agreement between the countries expired December 31, 1972, and even while it was in effect there had been numerous seizures of Spanish ships. In March 1973 Morocco claimed that Libya had trained two small guerrilla bands that entered southern Morocco, carried out attacks, and were subdued. Neither of these incidents appeared to have serious consequences.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

At independence France turned over some $40 million in military equipment; Spain also contributed a significant amount. Spain has since further contributed by training Moroccan officers. French military aid and arms sales continued to 1966 when it was terminated, except for the continued training of 200 officers.

Soviet military assistance began in late 1960. Finding Algeria more willing to cooperate in return for arms, the Soviets soon stopped aid to Morocco, but in October 1966 they sold Morocco spare parts for the aircraft, tanks, and artillery previously provided. Total Soviet grants and sales have amounted to nearly $20 million. In 1968 through a barter exchange with Czechoslovakia for $16 million in primary products, Morocco obtained 80 reconditioned T-54 tanks.

From 1956 through 1972 the US provided $38.8 million in military assistance. Excess military stocks provided through 1972 totalled an additional $4.0 million. In early 1967, following a visit to the United States by the King, $14 million additional assistance was promised and delivery began on F-5 jet fighters and antitank weapons. A substantial US military mission was established. Military sales from 1967 to 1972 amounted to $30 million, and 2,000 students have been trained under MAP.

ALLIANCES

Morocco is a member of the UN, the OAU, the Arab League and its Unified Military Command, and the less formal Maghreb (Northwest Africa) grouping. In support of UN peacekeeping operations Morocco sent a brigade to the Congo from August 1960 to March 1961.

After the 1963 cancellation of the air base agreement with the United States, the Americans retained a major communication center at Kenitra. About 1,700 US military personnel are stationed there.

ARMY

Personnel: 52,000

Organization:
- 1 armored brigade
- 3 motorized infantry brigades
- 1 light security brigade
- 1 parachute brigade
- 12 independent infantry battalions
- 4 artillery groups
- 1 mortar battalion
- 3 desert cavalry groups
- 2 camel corps battalions

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 120 medium tanks (T-54)
- 120 light tanks (AMX-13)
- 40 half tracks (M-3)
- 95 APCs (Czech-built)
- 75 self-propelled guns and howitzers (SU-100, M-56 Scorpion, and AMX-105)
- 80 armored cars (AML-245, EBR-75, and M-8)
- 100 light artillery pieces (75mm and 105mm howitzers, 76mm, 85mm, and 105mm guns, 37mm and 100mm AA guns)
- 6 helicopters (Alouette II/III)

Reserves: About 160,000 trained reservists.

NAVY

Personnel: 1,500

Major Units:
- 1 frigate (DE)
- 1 subchaser (PC)
- 2 patrol gunboats (PGM)
- 12 patrol boats (YP)
- 1 landing craft (LCU)
- 1 yacht (training ship)

Naval Bases: Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Kenitra, Tangier

Reserves: About 2,000 men

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 4,000

Organization:
- 1 fighter squadron (F-5)
- 2 attack squadrons (Magister)
- 1 transport squadron (C-47, C-119)
- 1 utility-liaison squadron (Broussard)
- 2 helicopter squadrons (AB-204/205, H-34, OH-13, HH-43)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 56 combat aircraft
  - 24 F-5 fighters
  - 32 Magister armed trainer/light attack aircraft (mostly ex-Luftwaffe)
  - (12 MiG-17 fighter-bombers in storage)
- 177 other aircraft
  - 11 C-119 transports
  - 10 C-47 transports
  - 21 utility-liaison aircraft (Broussard)
  - 60 helicopters (AB-204/205, H-34, OH-13, HH-43)
  - 75 trainers (T-6, T-28)

Air Bases: Sale (Rabat), Meknes, Marrakech, Nouasseur; other fields at Fez, Ville, Agadir, Khouribga, Anfa (Casablanca), Larache, Sidi Slimane, Ben Guerir, Boulhout, Solon, Oujda, Kenitra

Reserves: About 5,000 trained reservists

PARAMILITARY

There are 2,250 Gendarmerie plus 20,000 auxiliaries. The Gendarmerie maintains two mobile security battalions and mans posts spread over the country. The Royal Guards are basically palace guards at the King's various residences. The function of the auxiliaries is unknown. All are subordinate to the Defense Ministry, except the palace guards, the traditional Senegalese.

NIGER

Republique du Niger

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 489,206 square miles
Population: 4,243,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 3,400 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.08% population)
Gross National Product: $230 million ($90 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $4.0 million (1.05% GNP)
Production of Uranium Oxide: 867 metric tons (5th in world)
Electric Power Output: 20 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 2 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Constitutional government fell victim in April 1974 to the Sahelian drought, which has been especially severe in Niger. A military coup, led by Lt. Col. Seyni Kountie, seized control from Hamani Diori, who had served competently as president since 1960, dissolved the National Assembly, and outlawed all political activity. Although Kountie laid the whole blame for the former government's fall on its allegedly inadequate response to the famine, the press reported speculation that France had played a covert role in the overthrow, in order to maintain its highly privileged position in the exploitation of Niger's high-grade uranium mines, a position that was threatened by Diori's skilled efforts to gain a greater share of uranium revenues for Niger. There is no evidence of French collusion, however, and the new Niger regime has asked for the removal of remaining French troops, something the previous regime had not done. The new regime also appears to be continuing the policy, initiated by Diori, of entering into mineral-exploration agreements with non-French organizations.

The President, who was elected under a one-party system, was also Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs and commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

Niger is the terminus of two trans-Saharan caravan and motor routes from Algeria. One military problem is the protection of these routes from the occasional bandits among the nomadic tribesmen in the north.

Former President Diori had been probably the most successful leader of the region in containing internal dissidence; the leaders of the new government, lacking his skill and experience, may have more difficulty. With a low per capita income, a high birth rate, and the tensions between Negro and Berber peoples common to northern sub-Sahara Africa, Niger can expect continuing socio-economic tensions. The country's large high-grade uranium ore deposits and large iron deposits not only make Niger strategically significant, but can be expected eventually to provide income to more than offset current budget deficits, and perhaps to ameliorate internal tensions.

Niger is a member of the UN, the OAU, and the OCAM. Upon independence it entered mutual defense and military assistance agreements with France covering base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military training and equipping. It also entered into a quadripartite defense agreement with France, Dahomey, and Ivory Coast; and joined the *Conseil de l'Entente*, a political-economic grouping of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Upper Volta. France still maintains a training mission, and a French armored company is stationed at Niamey.

The Army is about 2,000 strong and is maintained by selective two-year conscription. It is organized into five infantry companies, one armored car company, and a para-commando platoon. The Air Force has a strength of about 100 and operates four Noratlas transports, one C-47 transport, and three Broussard utility aircraft. Air bases are Niamey, Zinder, Agadez, Tahoua, and Maradi. There is a river patrol with two PBR on the Niger River operating from Niamey. The Gendarmerie has a strength of 1,300.

NIGERIA

Federal Republic of Nigeria

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 356,669 square miles
Population: 69,524,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 106,000 (0.15% population)
Gross National Product: $9.1 billion ($131 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $300 million (3.29% GNP)
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 89.8 million metric tons
Refined Products: 2.2 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 1.81 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 56 ships; 99,226 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 4 jet, 5 turboprop and 14 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

A federal republic and member of the British Commonwealth, Nigeria, following the termination of its civil war in 1970, remains under the Federal Military Government which conducted the war against the Biafran secession. At the head of this government is a Supreme Military Council under Major General Yakubu Gowon, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Council controls all government, including military affairs, by decree, the Constitution having been in abeyance since the troubled period of 1966, which preceded the hostilities of the civil war. The chiefs of staff of the three services are members of the Council, which has a general staff modelled on the British system.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES

Nigeria has made an excellent economic and psychological recovery from the civil war, and is now resuming the leadership role in Africa that is suggested by its size, economic resources and military establishment.

Upon independence from Britain in 1960 the Army was formed from Nigerian elements of the Royal West African Frontier Force. At the time 25 percent of the officers were Nigerian; the rest were seconded from the British Army. As a result of increased officer training in Britain, Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Israel, Ethiopia, and in US university ROTC, the last British officers were relieved in 1966.

The original civilian government of the shaky, ethnically divided Federation was overthrown in a military coup in January, 1966. The new head of government and about half of the Army officers were Ibos—a progressive tribe of

southeastern Nigeria, constituting about 12% of the population, whose energy and education had given them leadership in Nigerian business and government far out of proportion to their numbers. Tribal resentment of Ibo influence, combined with widespread political unrest resulted in a counter-coup in July, which triggered nation-wide attacks against Ibo government officials and businessmen. Growing alienation from the rest of Nigeria led the Ibos of the Eastern Region to secede from Nigeria in May 1967. The Federal Government refused to permit this. A long, bloody, civil war followed, in which the Federal Government finally overcame desperate Ibo resistance in January 1970. The rebel leader, General Ojukwu, fled to Ivory Coast, where he was granted asylum.

During the civil war the Nigerian forces expanded from 12,000 to over 180,000 with consequent dilution of trained leaders. However, after nearly three years of combat, and with substantial modern equipment resources, they now include one of the more powerful, and certainly more experienced, light infantry armies in Africa. Despite expressed fears at releasing large numbers of men upon the civil economy, the forces have been reduced without apparent severe disruption. Military service is voluntary. Immediately after victory, the Nigerian Federal Government under Major General Gowon proclaimed a policy of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. Gowon repeatedly expressed a hope of returning the country to constitutional government before 1976, but there have been no recent signs that this will be done, and the population seems generally well satisfied with the military government and with popular General Gowon. Relations between the Ibos and the rest of the population have improved. The most important factor in this recovery is oil. With an output of about 2.3 million barrels a day, Nigeria had become the world's eighth largest oil producer by fall 1973. Nigeria's oil became even more important with the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, and Nigerian oil revenues are expected to increase fourfold over 1973 to at least $8 billion in 1974. The government is allocating large amounts to reconstruction of the Ibo areas, construction of roads, railroads, and airports, and aid to agriculture.

Nigeria is also using its new power, with moderation, in foreign affairs. General Gowon is now chairman of the OAU, the Nigerian oil minister is head of the OPEC, and Nigeria has taken the lead in African trade negotiations with the European Economic Community. Nigeria has also proposed a new West African economic community which, unlike the current CEAO, would comprise both French- and English-speaking nations; this would presumably strengthen Nigeria's regional leadership role at the expense of French influence in West Africa. Although northern Nigeria has suffered some damage during the current drought, the country's own resources have been adequate to provide relief. Nigeria has given famine-relief aid to the Sahelian states and has made development loans to Dahomey, Chad, and Niger.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

There are few significant issues that might create tension with neighboring states. Nigeria can apparently look forward to a period of easy, unaggressive regional leadership. Its main strategic problem is avoidance of the kind of internal conflict that so recently devastated the nation.

The defeated Ibos, now somewhat reduced in numbers through casualties and non-combat military and civilian deaths, are not likely again to attempt to secede. However, they do remain the most progressive, energetic, and educated segment of the population, and the oil fields in the Eastern Region will tend to provide resources and incentive to their more rapid advancement and development. The Yorubas of the Western Region, some 15 million people, may again become jealous of the Ibos, as may the somewhat less educated and more warlike Moslem Hausa-Fulanis of the Northern Region, some 10 million in number. A fair and popularly accepted realignment of internal administrative subdivisions needs to be sought. A root cause of the troubles preceding the civil war was a too sudden and arbitrary attempt by the military government of January to July 1966 to abolish all internal boundaries and regional administration in the name of national unity, an act which in fact served to decontrol traditional rivalries and hatreds. Therefore, caution is needed in drawing new boundaries and, especially, time must be found to select and train fair and competent administrators. These conditions appear to be understood by the Federal Military Government.

At present, more serious internal problems than inter-tribal rivalries appear to be urban blight, agricultural depression, and the increasing gap between the extremely wealthy beneficiaries of Nigeria's new economic riches and the great number of Nigerians living in poverty. As indicated above, some governmental efforts are being made to attack these problems.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

After independence, Britain provided arms, naval craft and navy training, with two ships being supplied by the Netherlands. West Germany trained the Air Force, and Italian trainers, German liaison aircraft and French transports were purchased. The US granted $1.5 million in military assistance from 1960 through mid-1972, and trained 462 students under MAP.

During the civil war, many countries kept to a hands-off policy, but Britain, the Soviet Union and, for a time, France responded to cash offers for needed arms. From Britain came armored cars, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia sent jet fighters and transport aircraft. The US reduced its military assistance to military medical training only, but renewed assistance after hostilities ceased.

ALLIANCES

Nigeria is a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, OAU, and OPEC. In support of UN peacekeeping operations Nigeria provided a two-battalion force for the UN operation in the Congo from December 1960 to June 1963, and one battalion thereafter to June 1964.

ARMY

Personnel: 100,000

Organization:
- 3 infantry divisions
- 3 reconnaissance regiments
- 3 artillery regiments

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 20 armored cars (AML-60/90)
- 150 armored cars (Saladin)
- scout cars (Ferret)
- APCs (Saracen)
- light artillery (25-pounder gun, 76mm gun, 105mm howitzer, 122mm gun/howitzer)

Reserves: Over 100,000 battle-trained men

NAVY

Personnel: 3,000

Major Units:
- 1 frigate ASW (DE)
- 2 corvettes (DE)
- 3 fast patrol boats (PT, P-6 type)
- 6 subchasers (SC)
- 1 landing craft (LCU)
- 2 survey ships
- 1 tug

Reserves: Possibly 2,500 having war service

Naval Bases: Lagos, Calabar

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 3,000

Organization:
- 1 light bomber squadron (Il-28)
- 2 fighter-bomber squadrons (MiG-17)
- 1 light ground attack squadron (L-29)
- 1 training group (P-149, Bulldog)
- 1 transport group (C-47, Do-27, F-27)
- 1 helicopter squadron (Whirlwind and Alouette II)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 36 combat aircraft
  - 20 MiG-17 fighter-bombers
  - 10 L-29 armed trainer/light ground attack aircraft
  - 6 Il-28 light bombers
- 60 other aircraft
  - 6 C-47 transports
  - 6 F-27 Friendship transports
  - 20 Do-27/28 utility aircraft
  - 8 helicopters (Whirlwind and Allouette II)
  - 20 trainers (P-149, Bulldog)
- On Order: 3 Navajo and 4 new helicopters to be used for search and rescue manufactured by Messerschmidt-Bollkow-Blohm, BO-5

Reserves: Over 4,000 with wartime service

Air Bases: Lagos, Kaduna, Ikeja, Maiduguri, Kano

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Portuguese Africa includes three entities: Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. An amendment to Portugal's Constitution in 1952 changed the status of these regions from colony to Overseas Province, with each considered an integral part of the Portuguese Republic. The central government in Lisbon administers the provinces through the Overseas Ministry; local authority is exercised in each by a provincial Governor General. In June 1971 Portuguese constitutional reforms granted greater autonomy for the African provinces—allowing local legislation and local administration, and authorizing the raising of revenue from a budget drafted and approved by locally elected assemblies.

In spring 1974, frustration over the long and costly fighting in Portuguese Africa brought down the authoritarian government of Portugal. A military coup by younger Portuguese officers brought to power General Antonio de Spinola, himself a veteran of the colonial wars and the author of a recent book urging autonomy within a Portuguese federation for Portugal's African possessions. In August Spinola announced his government's intention to grant immediate independence to the African territories.

Portuguese Army, Navy and Air Force units are occasionally transferred among the three African Overseas Provinces to meet changing requirements. Thus the composition of forces as shown below changes from time to time.

ANGOLA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 481,351 square miles
Population: 6,100,000 (includes 300,000 Europeans)
Total Active Armed Forces: 60,000 (0.98% population)
Gross National Product: $1.67 billion ($274 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $25 million provincial funds plus an estimated $35 million from Portugal
Production of Iron Ore: 5.8 million metric tons
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 7.1 million metric tons
Refined Products: 501,800 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 644 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 10 piston transports

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Angola is the largest Portuguese African possession, strongest economically, and most firmly held by Portugal. Its population is about 95 percent black and five percent European. Most of the blacks live by subsistence agriculture, despite rich natural resources. Angola is the world's third largest producer of coffee, and also produces significant amounts of oil and iron ore. The Benguela railroad serves the Katanga province of Zaire as well as Zambia for the export of their copper and to transport their import requirements. First class harbors exist at Luanda, Lobito, and Mocamedes. Recent oil discoveries in the Cabinda enclave are expected to result in sufficient additional production to more than supply the entire Portuguese currency bloc. With peace, Angola could be economically viable and make significant contributions to the Portuguese economy. However, at present, despite a favorable growth rate, development is limited by insurgency, by lack of capital, by shortage of skilled workers, and by poor transportation.

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

President Antonio de Spinola's government promised the Angolans a referendum in 1975 to decide between complete independence and a loose federation with Portugal, and the junta-appointed Governor General, General Silvino Silverio Marquez, offered the three guerrilla groups that have been operating in Angola for many years complete amnesty and a

place at a high level of government in return for an end to the insurgency. One of the groups, the *Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA), promptly accepted the offer, but the others delayed, uncertain of their future under those conditions.

The revolt has been characterized by fragmentation of organizations, factionalism within the organizations, and dispersion of effort typically along tribal lines. These divisions have been quickly exploited by PIDE, the Portuguese secret police. Initially, the Bakongo tribe (10 percent of population), living on both sides of the Angola-Zaire border, furnished most of the rebel forces in the north, with bases in Zaire. They were affiliated with the Union of the People of Angola (UPA), later consolidated with other parties into the *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (FNLA), which set up the *Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio* (GRAE). With headquarters in Kinshasa, GRAE claims to be a government in exile. Its military arm, *Exercito de Liberatacao Nacional de Angola* (ELNA), operates on three fronts along the Zaire border, from the lower Zaire (Congo) River to Katanga, and has claimed to have established a headquarters in Angola. The principal rival group has been the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, a Marxist organization supported by several communist nations. Most MPLA leaders are mulattos and Kimbundu intelligentsia from the Luanda region, and MPLA's main strength is among the Kimbundu tribesmen (25 percent) in north central Angola.

The *Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA), a 1964 offshoot of GRAE, operates from within Angola opposite Zambia. The movement is based on the Ovimbundu tribe (33 percent) and the smaller Chokwe, Lwena, and Luchazi tribes in the east central and southern areas.

MPLA and GRAE were formerly fiercely and violently opposed to each other and to UNITA, but in 1972 they combined to form the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola; UNITA was not invited to join, according to UNITA leaders, even though they asked to do so. The cooperation of the two groups does not appear to have been very successful.

GOVERNMENT MILITARY POSTURE

Metropolitan Portuguese forces in Angola, in a joint command, number about 45,000 supplemented by 15,000 locally recruited African troops. In addition, there are numerous paramilitary units including police and *voluntarios*, or auxiliaries, who are often demobilized soldier settlers. Probably all able-bodied males of the 300,000 Portuguese residents are armed, trained, and have designated emergency duties. Small Navy patrol craft guard the coast against infiltration from the sea, while the Air Force of over 100 aircraft provides direct air support to ground units. In addition to a squadron of Fiat G-91 jet fighter-bombers there are units of T-6 armed trainers, Noratlas transports, liaison aircraft, and Alouette helicopters.

INSURGENT POSTURE

The hard-core strength of GRAE's military arm, ELNA, has been estimated at about 5,000 well-armed insurgents. GRAE formerly had recognition and support from the OAU's Liberation Committee, but this support has now been withdrawn. The OAU has no clear-cut policy toward the new, combined organization, Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola; President Mobutu of Zaire is known to be cool toward it. It currently receives arms and training from the radical African states who in most cases get the arms from communist countries. A base for GRAE's northeastern front exists in Zaire's Kwango district, and for its eastern front in Katanga.

MPLA's armed force, *Exercito Popular de Liberataeao de Angola* (EPLA), operates with about 1,000 armed men on an "eastern front" near the Zambian border. Groups have been trained abroad by Soviet, Cuban and Algerian instructors. In May 1974 a contingent of 112 instructors from China arrived in Zaire to train MPLA guerrillas.

UNITA has about 1,000 guerrillas at bases inside Angola, from the Benguela railroad south to the South West Africa border. Its leaders have received training in China; its arms and funds reportedly come from China, channelled through Dar es Salaam and transshipped via Zambia. UNITA leaders claim that all their weapons have been captured from MPLA and GRAE forces.

MOZAMBIQUE

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 303,073 square miles
Population: 8,980,000 (includes 120,000 Europeans)
Total Active Armed Forces: 45,000 (0.50% population)
Gross National Product: $2 billion ($223 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $25 million provincial funds plus an estimated $50 million from Portugal
Fuel Production: Coal: 300,000 metric tons
Refined Petroleum Products: 796,300 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 558 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 3 jet and 3 turboprop transports

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Despite vigorous efforts by the new Portuguese government to make peace with insurgent forces, the principal rebel group, FRELIMO (*Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique*), has refused to accept a cease fire on terms of independence and free elections. FRELIMO demands immediate independence with transfer of power directly to itself. Communist China is believed to be encouraging FRELIMO in this stand. Most of the black population of Mozambique (more than 98% of the total) is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Export of agricultural products provides income, as do remittances of migrant labor, and transit shipments from inland regions (Malawi, Rhodesia, and South Africa's Transvaal) by railroad through the ports of Nacala, Beira, and Lourenco Marques. A 360 million-ton iron ore deposit has been discovered in the north; petroleum and other mineral exploration has been accelerated. Exploitation of mineral discoveries is expected to improve the economic situation; so too will sale of hydroelectric power to South Africa from the Cahora Bassa dam project under construction on the Zambezi River. Guerrilla attempts at sabotage have been contained, and completion is expected in 1974. Meanwhile, a serious adverse balance of payments continues.

The Portuguese established trading posts in the early 16th Century and control over the entire area was achieved by the end of the 19th Century. However, priorities elsewhere in the empire held back development until the 20th Century. Development was on a small scale until the 1961 revolt in Angola alerted Portugal; belated economic and social reforms were at once begun. Underground nationalist movements had existed for some time, and in 1962 the more prominent of these united as FRELIMO with headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

FRELIMO began military operations in 1964 from training bases in southern Tanzania, under the leadership of a cadre trained in Algeria. Most of the rebels are recruited from the fierce Makonde tribe living on both sides of the Tanzanian border in the northeast. On the northwest border the Nyanje tribe also has been recruited to the rebel cause. In the two northern districts, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, FRELIMO controls perhaps 50 percent of the countryside. More recently it opened a new area of operations in the Tete district along the Zambian border, and incursions are also mounted from Malawi. All told it controls about five percent of Mozambique territory. FRELIMO policy prohibits terroristic acts against the population. It claims to have a functioning governmental structure inside Mozambique.

A rival movement, opposed to FRELIMO's strategy, is the *Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique* (COREMO). It is a coalition of a number of minor parties and factions organized in 1965, with headquarters in Lusaka. COREMO's strategy is to train and then infiltrate cadres to all areas of Mozambique to build a clandestine politico-military organization in preparation for a massive country-wide uprising and establishment of a leftist government. There are a number of other groups claiming a following in the liberation movement, but these are of little significance.

Since 1964, when the situation in Angola became fairly stabilized, Portugal has been operating energetically against the Mozambique insurgents. During 1970 and 1971, Portuguese forces in Mozambique concentrated against FRELIMO rebels, mainly in the districts bordering Tanzania. According to Portuguese government sources, more than 700 rebels were killed, 200 were captured, and almost 7,000 surrendered. More recently, however, the rebels have been making increasingly bold attacks, hitting the railroad from Beira to Rhodesia at least six times in early 1974, and raiding farther and farther south. FRELIMO has continued, and even intensified, its attacks since the 1974 change of government in Lisbon.

Despite general UN disapproval of Portuguese colonial policy, Portugal has had no difficulties in purchasing essential combat and support weaponry. Informal arrangements for coordination of security operations, and mutual support if required, exist with Rhodesia and South Africa. Landlocked Malawi, dependent on Mozambique for access to the sea, cooperates in making insurgent operations from its territory difficult.

Tanzania openly supports the rebels, but its border is clearly marked by the Ruvuma River. The Portuguese, while threatening, have not yet struck rebel bases north of the river. Rebels also operate from Zambia, possibly with tacit official approval, although the situation is ambiguous. The border is undefined by natural features and has been crossed frequently by Portuguese ground patrols and aircraft in hot pursuit of rebel bands. Inevitably Zambian villages are hit and Zambians

by helicopter. In late 1973, the rebel organization–African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)–claimed to control three-fourths of Portuguese Guinea. It is said to have achieved considerable success in developing political, social, and economic infrastructure in the areas it controls. In the summer of 1972 PAIGC held elections in those areas, and it was preparing to declare the independence of PAIGC-controlled territory when, in January 1973, Amilcar Cabral, PAIGC's leader, was assassinated. The Portuguese denied responsibility for the assassination, and most informed observers seem to support this denial. Direction of PAIGC was taken over by a triumvirate of leaders who are considered more militant than Cabral. The independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau was proclaimed on September 24, 1973; it has been recognized by more than half the members of the UN and has joined the OAU. Portuguese officials, however, ridicule PAIGC claims to control a major portion of the country's territory and to have established a functioning government and economy.

The Balante tribe (30 percent of the population) provides most of the rebel activists and support. Conversely, the Moslem Fulani tribe (20 percent) living in the northeast have remained loyal to the Portuguese and have been heavily armed for self-defense. The Government has established over 400 fortified villages among the Fulani and other loyal tribes. As a result of rebel terrorism, as much as Portuguese oppression, about 10 percent of the population are refugees in Senegal.

The rebel movement has achieved far greater success than those in Angola or Mozambique, and Portuguese presence and interests are vastly less. The rebels are steadily building up strength in the interior and eventually might muster sufficient force to defeat the Portuguese militarily everywhere but in the coastal enclaves. Should Portugal withdraw from Guinea, a Portuguese-speaking PAIGC cadre could be made available to export its more viable ideology and revolutionary technique to the other Portuguese possessions, with possible disastrous results for Portugal. Meanwhile, the insurgency drags on as Portugal alleges that the Soviet Union has recently doubled its support of the rebels with the ultimate hope of thereby securing a base on the Guinea coast or in the Cape Verde Islands.

GOVERNMENT MILITARY POSTURE

Portugal's current commitment is estimated at about 30,000 including locally recruited troops and paramilitary units. A number of navy patrol and landing craft are used along the coast and up rivers. A squadron of 12 Fiat G-91 light jet fighter bombers and a squadron of T-6 armed trainers, 12 DO-27 Skyservant liaison aircraft, and Alouette helicopters operate from Bissau's international airport and interior strips. The Portuguese military high command claimed significant progress in fighting the insurgents in 1970. Severe fighting, mainly in the areas bordering Senegal and the Republic of Guinea, was reported during 1971 with heavy losses on both sides.

INSURGENT POSTURE

PAIGC was formed in 1956 and outlawed in 1959. It established headquarters in Conakry, Guinea, and a base training camp at Kindia in Guinea. Support in money, arms, and training has been received from the Liberation Committee of OAU, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Senegal, Cuba, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and East European communist countries. In May 1971 several hundred Cuban advisers arrived in Senegal to train PAIGC forces. They were stationed in the PAIGC camp at Cumbamory in Senegal. According to Portuguese sources each operational guerrilla unit is now led by a Cuban officer.

PAIGC fighting forces are organized on the classic three levels of guerrilla warfare: local part-time guerrillas who harass and form an intelligence network, a militia for local defense, and a mobile fully armed force. The latter element is thought to number 6,000 men. Most of the top leaders received training in China. Arms include communist small arms and mortars and Czech and East German antiaircraft machineguns.

A rival group, the Front for the Liberation of an Independent Nationalist Guinea (FLING), is headquartered in Senegal and does not sponsor active subversion inside Guinea. However, it claims to be more representative of the people, as PAIGC leadership is largely from the Cape Verde Islands. In light of the support shown to Guinea-Bissau the prospects of its gaining control in the area are slight.

killed. Zambian protests have been loud, and to date Portuguese replies have been conciliatory and reparations have been offered.

GOVERNMENT MILITARY POSTURE

A Military Commander in Chief directs all operations under the Governor General and through Army, Navy, and Air Force Commanders and the Director of Police.

Regular Portuguese forces number about 45,000, with 15 to 25 percent being black. There are numerous paramilitary units of police, armed Portuguese settlers, and biracial local militia. The fortified villages are garrisoned by a militia of intervention of 10,000.

Navy patrol and landing craft guard the coast against infiltrations; these transport and land troops in coast and river areas. Two patrol craft armed with 22mm guns are operated on Lake Malawi to prevent infiltrations down the lake from Tanzania or across from Malawi. A new naval patrol base is at Porto Amelia; rear naval bases are at Beira and Lourenco Marques.

The Air Force giving direct air support to the ground units includes a squadron of Fiat G-91 jet fighter-bombers and units of B-26 light bombers, T-6 armed trainers, Noratlas transports, liaison aircraft and Alouette helicopters. Airfields are Lourenco Marques, Beira, Lumbo, Porto Amelia, Ngamba, and Palma on the coast; Umtamba and Mwidumba in the northeast; Porto Arroio in the northwest; nine new jet fields inland; Vila Cabral, Maniamba, Marrupa, and Nova Freixo in the northwest; Fingoe and Tete in Tete district; Mueda in the Cabo Delgado district; and Dona Ana and Mocuba in the Zambezia district.

INSURGENT POSTURE

FRELIMO claims about 15,000 armed trained men. OAU's Liberation Committee recognizes and supports FRELIMO, and has given the liberation of Mozambique top priority over other movements in Africa. FRELIMO is said to have received financial support from sympathizers in the West, while its arms come from communist countries. Rear training bases are at Kongwa and Bagamoyo in central Tanzania and a number of forward bases lie just behind the Ruvuma River border in southern Tanzania. Three, staffed with Communist Chinese instructors, are Mbamba Bay, Songea, and Machingwea; others staffed by Tanzanian army and police are Newala, Tunduru, Masasi, Kitangari, Mingoyo, Mtwara, and Lindi. In 1966 the military headquarters was displaced forward from Dar es Salaam into Mozambique where FRELIMO now says 80 percent of the basic and small-unit training is conducted.

Details of COREMO's military forces are unknown.

PORTUGUESE GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 13,948 square miles
Population: 563,000 (includes 3,000 Europeans)
Total Active Armed Forces: 30,000 (4.55% population)
Gross National Product: $140 million ($248 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $35 million
Electric Power Output: 3.5 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 7 piston transports

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Portugal maintained trading posts on the coast from the 15th to the 19th Centuries but did not consolidate the interior until the early 20th Century. The economy is mainly agricultural and there is a $5 million annual trade deficit. The territory thus has little value to Portugal except as a link in the sea and air routes to Angola and Mozambique and as a prestige symbol.

Strategically, Portuguese Guinea (called Guinea-Bissau by its insurgents and by the considerable number of foreign states that have recognized its independence) occupies a significant position in the bulge of West Africa close to central Atlantic sea lanes, and a relatively short distance by air to Brazil. The province has close ties with Portugal's Cape Verde Islands, 600 miles to the northwest, which occupy a comparable strategic position in the Atlantic.

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

Revolt by a native liberation movement began in mid-1962; this escalated to full-scale guerrilla warfare in 1963. By the end of 1966 an apparent stalemate had been reached, with the rebels holding at least half of the countryside and the Portuguese holding the fortified towns and cities as well as a number of entrenched military posts in the hinterland supplied

RHODESIA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 150,820 square miles
Population: 5,690,000 (260,000 whites)
Total Active Armed Forces: 11,000 (includes security police; 0.2% population)
Gross National Product: $1.50 billion ($264 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $30.5 million (2.03% GNP)
Iron and Steel Production: 970,363 metric tons
Fuel Production: Coal: 3.33 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 6.41 billion kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 7 turboprop and 16 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

Until November 11, 1965, Rhodesia was a self-governing British colony. On that date under a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the British Governor was replaced by an Officer Administering the Government as chief of state and commander in chief of the Rhodesian Defense Forces. The head of government is the Prime Minister, in a traditionally British parliamentary government, and the armed forces are administered by a Minister of Defence. In May 1970 Rhodesia declared itself a republic.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

The central policy of the current government is the maintenance of control by the white population, who comprise about five percent of the total population. The government has been undeterred by refusal of Britain and the UN to recognize its independence, by the resultant economic sanctions against it, and by infiltrations of armed insurgents (from exiled liberation organizations). Defying Britain and the UN, and declaring a state of emergency, Rhodesia has been forced to readjust its economy, apparently with little hardship. Local industry has been built up, the armed forces and police have been increased, and close cooperation in economic and defense matters has been established with South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, and Portuguese Mozambique.

All white males serve for one year in the armed forces followed by three years in the part-time Territorial Force. From this they pass to the class A and B reserves. Virtually all white males are in either the Defence Force reserve or the police reserve. Blacks comprise less than one-third of the regular forces and two-thirds of the police. Those blacks that are in military and police forces are recruited from the Fort Victoria area where the local tribes are hostile to all other tribes. Few blacks are believed to be in the reserves.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Rhodesia's strategic problems derive from its independent policy and the UN's and indigenous nationalists' reactions against it. Negotiations have continued sporadically with Britain in an attempt to work out a mutually satisfactory political solution. In November 1970 Britain revealed that it had reached an agreement with Rhodesia whereby Britain would introduce legislation to confer independence upon Rhodesia as a republic and would commend this legislation to the British Parliament, on the understanding that an amendment to the Rhodesian constitution would provide for unimpeded progress to majority rule and would safeguard against racial discrimination. Large-scale violent demonstrations by Rhodesian Africans against British reconciliation with the Rhodesian government led to Britain's rejection of the treaty in May 1972.

There are two outlawed nationalist liberation organizations: Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU). They have been outlawed and maintain headquarters in Dar Es Salaam, with training centers and bases elsewhere in Tanzania, and invasion bases in Zambia. In 1967 these two became allied with a similar South African organization, African National Congress (ANC), and the three cooperate in training and operations. ZAPU and ZANU are believed to have several thousand men in training in Tanzania, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Algeria, Egypt, and Cuba. Infiltrators killed or captured have all carried the latest arms of Soviet or Chinese manufacture. Most recent reports indicate that ZANU is now by far the most effective of the insurgent groups; it operates largely in northeastern Rhodesia, presumably in cooperation with the Mozambique group FRELIMO. The African National Council, formed in December 1971, formally presented the African's case against British-Rhodesian reconciliation to a visiting British commission in 1972.

Rhodesia's borders are protected on three sides by friendly nations: Mozambique, South Africa, and Botswana. The first two are informally allied with Rhodesia in defense against African liberation movements, and the third cooperates out of practical necessity. It is the fourth side—the 400-mile Zambezi River border with Zambia—through which the liberation movement attempts to infiltrate. The Rhodesian government has acknowledged that some infiltrators can be expected to get through and perform their missions of subversion, terrorism, and destruction. Despite the thinly defended border, Rhodesian Defence Forces and Police, assisted by South Africa police units, have been quite successful in inflicting severely disproportionate casualties on the infiltrating bands and in rounding up the survivors. There was widespread terrorism in Rhodesia in 1973, however. In January 1973 Rhodesia closed the Zambia border, except for copper shipments, to put pressure on Zambia to control anti-Rhodesian guerrillas. Rhodesia offered to open the border the following month, but Zambia refused to ship copper through Rhodesia during the period when the border was closed and refused to ship anything after the offer to open it was made.

In the larger picture of Southern Africa defense, Rhodesia must be considered a forward position for South Africa and a flank protection for Mozambique. Fully recognizing this, South Africa and Portugal have assisted Rhodesia

economically and militarily. In the event of a serious invasion of Rhodesia active military support by these two neighbors is to be expected. Although many African nations have called for an invasion, either by an African alliance or by Britain, the African nations are too weak and disunified militarily, and Britain is committed to a policy of peaceful coercion.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Except for a few Canadian and French aircraft, all arms and equipment received before UDI were British. After UDI Britain declared not only an arms embargo but full economic sanctions as well. This action was followed by almost all members of the UN. The sole notable exceptions were Portugal and South Africa, but between them these two countries produce or have access to almost every type of military equipment that Rhodesia could require. South Africa very probably has been supplying Rhodesia's increased defense needs since 1965.

ALLIANCES

While no formal defense agreement with either South Africa or Portugal is known to exist, there appear to be informal working arrangements on defense matters of mutual concern.

ARMY

Personnel: 3,400

Organization:
- 3 brigade headquarters (see Reserves)
  - 2 infantry battalions (one with Ferret scout cars)
  - 1 artillery battery
  - 1 Special Air Service squadron (parachute commandos)

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 20 scout cars (Ferret)
- light artillery (25-pounder)

Reserves: There are 3 brigade establishments or headquarters, two of which are based on the regular infantry battalions cited above. The Territorial Forces referred to below would be used to bring these brigades up to strength:
- 8,400 Territorial Force
  - 4 infantry battalions (subordinated to the 3 brigade headquarters)
- 25,000 Reserve Force
  - command headquarters and supporting units
  - 8 infantry battalions
  - 1 artillery battery

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 1,200

Organization:
- 2 fighter-bomber squadrons (Hunter and Vampire)
- 1 light bomber squadron (Canberra)
- 2 armed reconnaissance/training squadrons (AL-60, AM-3C, Provost)
- 1 transport squadron (C-47)
- 1 helicopter squadron (Alouette III)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 58 combat aircraft
  - 12 Hunter fighter-bombers
  - 12 Vampire fighter-bombers
  - 10 Canberra light bombers
  - 6 AL-60, 6 AM-3C armed trainers
  - 12 Provost armed trainer/reconnaissance aircraft
- 19 other aircraft
  - 4 vampire trainers
  - 3 Canberra trainers
  - 4 C-47 transports
  - 8 Alouette III helicopters

Air Bases: New Sarum (Salisbury), Thornhill (Gwelo), Cranbourne, Bulawayo, Umtali

Reserves: Territorial and Reserve personnel are assigned; numbers not known.

PARAMILITARY

The active police force is some 6,400 strong and has armored cars. It is trained and organized for counterinsurgency. The police reserve numbers 28,500.

RWANDA

Republique Rwandaise

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 10,169 square miles
Population: 3,900,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 2,500 (0.06% population)
Gross National Product: $210 million ($54 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $3.5 million (1.66% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 48.1 million kwh

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The elected President is commander in chief of the armed forces, exercising this authority through the Minister of National Guard and Police, a military officer. Legislative and budgetary power is shared by the Executive with the National Assembly. Foreign policy is Western-oriented, in part because of Chinese Communist subversive activities.

Rwanda's internal and external strategic problems revolve around a major ethnic division, exacerbated by its central location among neighbors with similar internal security problems. The population is 13 percent Hamitic Tutsi (Watusi) and 86 percent Bantu Hutu. The exceptionally tall-statured Tutsi were a dominant feudal cast ruling the Hutu serfs until the UN-supervised elections of 1961, which the Hutu won. This resulted in violence, and over 160,000 Tutsi fled to neighboring countries. In 1963, 3,000 Tutsi–supported by Chinese agents in Uganda–invaded Rwanda, but were defeated by the National Guard and police in a series of skirmishes. The attempt was repeated in late 1966 by some 2,000 Tutsi armed and trained by Chinese Communist agents in Burundi, with the same result. Burundi then broke relations with Communist China, and a security agreement was entered into between Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda to preclude further such subversive activities. However, Burundi has a similar ethnic situation with the Tutsi minority in control, and recent tribal warfare in Burundi has brought an influx of Hutu refugees to Rwanda. In early 1973 there were reports of Hutu attacks on Tutsis in Rwanda, with 600 of the latter fleeing to Uganda. Hutu raiders from Rwanda briefly invaded Burundi in May. A bloodless coup in July 1973 brought to power Major General Juvenal Habyalimana, a Hutu like his predecessor; he has indicated that there will be no fundamental policy changes. Rwanda's internal problems are exacerbated by a high population density and high birth rate, combined with a nonviable economy; its yearly budget deficit is made up by Belgium.

With its own dissident ethnic refugees living and plotting in neighboring countries, and with similar refugees from these surrounding countries seeking sanctuary in Rwanda, cooperation and understanding among all of these countries is essential. Rwanda apparently cooperates to some extent with Burundi on mutual security matters growing out of this ethnic dissidence, and with bordering Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania on matters of refugees, insurgents, and mercenaries. Rwanda is a member of the UN, the OCAM, and the OAU.

Belgian troops withdrew shortly after Rwanda's independence in July 1962, although Belgian military equipment and about 30 instructor-advisers have remained Belgian military assistance has continued at the rate of about $250,000 yearly. Diplomatic relations with China were reestablished in November 1971, and China provided technical assistance for a highway and several agricultural projects.

The National Guard numbers 2,500 and is organized into two infantry battalions, an armored car unit, and supporting elements. The air unit of the National Guard operates two C-47 transports and two Dornier Do-27 liaison aircraft. There are three AM-3C aircraft on order.

SENEGAL

Republique de Senegal

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 76,124 square miles
Population: 4,200,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 7,500 (including Gendarmerie; 0.17% population)
Gross National Product: $870 million ($207 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $18.0 million (2.06% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 800 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 39 ships; 16,280 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 3 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The elected President determines and directs national policy, appoints the cabinet and senior military officials, and is commander in chief of the armed forces. He controls the military through a Minister of Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Army is also Commander of the Gendarmerie.

Senegal professes a policy of nonalignment in international affairs. Relations with Portuguese Guinea are strained, however, because of Senegal's support for nationalist guerrillas based in Senegal, who often cross the border and attack

Portuguese forces. Close ties are continued with France, and also are maintained with The Gambia, an enclave within Senegal, with agreements for cooperation in defense and foreign affairs. Senegal supports regional federation and cooperation and is active in the UN, OAU, and OCAM.

Senegal has remained fairly stable internally since independence in 1960, and since the split with Mali a few months later. Disturbances in 1962, 1967, and 1968 were put down effectively by the armed forces and the police. However, there are considerable internal economic difficulties, exacerbated by the high population growth rate. There is a multiplicity of tribes, but ethnic conflicts appear minor; the fact that 80 percent of the population is Moslem has a stabilizing influence.

Senegalese were considered among the best fighting troops of the old French Colonial Army. It was from these veterans that the Senegal armed forces were formed upon independence. Some 10,000 additional Senegalese veterans of the French Army could be considered a potential reserve.

Shortly after independence mutual defense and military assistance agreements were signed with France, which included an internal security agreement, base rights, transit and overflight privileges, and military training and equipment grants. Dakar remained headquarters for French *Zone d'Outre-Mer I*, and a French garrison, now 2,000 men, remains there. In addition to providing a ready unit for deployment anywhere in Africa, this force guards the airfield and certain key installations. It would also be available to assist the government in maintaining internal security under existing agreements. French Forces consist of the following: Army (1,200), 1 mixed regiment; Navy (500), 2 coastal escorts; Air Force (300), 6 Noratlas transports.

Since the initial outfitting with French arms and equipment, Senegal's armed forces have received military assistance from the United States in the amount of $2.8 million from 1961 through 1972 plus $11,000 in excess military stocks.

The armed forces are maintained by selective compulsory service of 24 months. The 5,500-man army is organized into three infantry battalions of five companies each, an engineer battalion, a field artillery battery, a light antiaircraft battery, supporting services, and a mobile force which serves as a general reserve. The mobile force consists of an armored car company, two parachute companies, two commando companies, a motor transport company, and a signal company. Equipment includes French light artillery, AML-245 and M-8 armored cars, and individual and crew served weapons.

The 200-man naval force has coast guard and river patrol and transport missions. It operates one patrol gunboat (PGM), with eight SS-12 SSM, one patrol boat (SC), two patrol boats (YP), and two landing craft mechanized (LCM). The former French naval base at Dakar has extensive modern facilities.

The Air Force is 200 strong and operates ten aircraft in support of the Army: four C-47 transports, four Broussard liaison aircraft, and two Bell 47G helicopters. Airfields are at Yoff (Dakar), St. Louis, Tambacounda, Ziguinchor, Thies, and Kedougou.

There is a National Gendarmerie of 1,600 men.

SIERRA LEONE

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 27,925 square miles
Population: 2,800,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 2,450 (including constabulary; 0.09% population)
Gross National Product: $490 million ($187 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $3 million (0.61% GNP)
Iron Ore Production: 2.4 million metric tons
Refined Petroleum Products: 300,400 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 197 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 8 ships; 1,795 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 2 piston transports and 1 jet operated by British United Airways for Sierra Leone Airways

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Sierra Leone was granted independence by Great Britain in 1961, and became a sovereign republic within the British Commonwealth in April 1971. The Sierra Leone parliament, called the House of Representatives, is a unicameral body. The majority party leader is the Executive President, who is both head of state and of government; he is also Minister of Defence. There is a Vice President and Prime Minister who is charged with general supervision of all ministries. In 1961 the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier

Force became the nucleus of the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF). In 1971 the RSLMF was renamed the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces.

Sierra Leone's policy is characterized by nonalignment. Sierra Leone condemns *apartheid* in South Africa, supports self-determination for Portugal's African territories, and advocates the use of force by Britain to depose the white regime in Rhodesia. Implicitly, for defense against possible external aggression, the nation depends upon collective security and protection by Britain and the United States. Sierra Leone is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, and the OAU. It contributed a rifle company to the UN Operation in the Congo for 14 months in 1962 and in 1963. Modest military and police forces are maintained to insure internal security and prevent infiltrations.

Sierra Leone is strategically significant for its excellent harbor in the West African bulge and its mineral wealth. The natural harbor at Freetown is one of the finest in West Africa, with anchorage for more than 200 ships of unrestricted draft. Diamonds are a major export (1,955,011 carats valued at over $61 million exported in 1970) as are iron ore (2 million tons annually) and bauxite (200,000 tons annually). There is also a 30 million-ton reserve of titanium oxide exploited at the rate of 100,000 tons annually.

Serious internal security problems stem from political and ethnic disputes. The two principal tribes, the Temne in the north and the Mende in the south, are generally opposed politically in the two major parties. The Creoles, descendants of freed African slaves from the British West Indies who founded the colony, have recently allied with the Temne in a new government which in 1968 overthrew the existing military government with the assistance of Army and police NCOs. The military government had assumed power in March of 1967 after an election deadlock and charges of corruption in the civilian government. Unrest and suspicion have continued. In March 1971 a military coup led by the Army Commander in Chief failed; the coup leaders were tried and executed. Immediately after the coup, Prime Minister Stevens asked Guinea for assistance (under terms of an agreement reached in 1970) in restoring stability to Sierra Leone. Guinea responded by sending airborne units and three MiG fighters.

Upon independence in 1961, British military equipment was turned over to the RSLMF, and British officers continued for several years to occupy key command and staff positions. With complete Africanization of the RSLMF only a small British training mission remains. Britain continues to be the source of military equipment and RSLMF personnel are trained in Britain and Nigeria. Israel has also conducted military training and in 1966 assisted in the establishment of a military academy for officer cadets and youth movement leaders.

The RSLMF is 1,850 strong, organized in an infantry battalion, an armored car squadron, a signal squadron, supporting services, and a harbor and coastal patrol unit. The latter unit of about 50 men operates with a patrol boat (YP) and two harbor launches. Acquisition of a patrol gunboat is planned. There is a combined Army/Police organization (AM/POL) for land and coastal patrol.

The regular police force of about 2,000 includes a special constabulary of 600. There is a special police in industrial areas of about 300 and each chiefdom has its small police force. Sierra Leone recently acquired two Saab MFI-15 light trainer aircraft.

SOMALIA

Al-Jumhouriya As-Somaliya
Al-Democradiya
Somali Democratic Republic

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 246,155 square miles
Population: 3,000,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 22,750 (including security troops; 0.75% population)
Gross National Product: $190 million ($63 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $9.0 million (4.7% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 70 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 148 ships; 873,209 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 2 turboprop and 5 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

In October 1969, following the assassination of the President, the army and police seized power. A Supreme Revolutionary Council was established, the National Assembly and Cabinet were dissolved, political parties were abolished, the constitution suspended, and the Prime Minister arrested.

The new regime announced that it would support all liberation movements in countries under colonial rule, as well as those in illegally occupied territory. This particularly refers to about 1,000,000 Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas. Although Somalia proclaimed a policy of nonalignment in foreign relations, its foreign policy has been consistently anti-Western and pro-Communist. Somalia supports the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Somali people are made up of separate clan-families that are an important focus of loyalty. The Issas of the French territory of the Afars and Issas, for example, are such a Somali clan-family. The Darod clan-family is the largest, and most Somalis living in Kenya and Ethiopia belong to this group; Darods within Somalia have especially advocated unification of all Somalis in one nation-state, and when Darods have held top government positions, unification has generally been pushed most strongly.

The fact that the Somalis are a nomadic people, and that many of them live in Somalia and also in Kenya or Ethiopia during the same year, further complicates the matter of Somalian nationality.

In 1963 Somalia rejected a joint US-Italian military aid proposal as too small to liberate the Somalis outside the country. It turned instead to the Soviet Union and received a $32 million loan with the objective of raising a 10,000-man army; the Soviets trained the army. It is estimated that later additions raised the amount loaned to $55 million. Up to 1967, when the previous government stopped its arms buildup, it is believed that Somalia received about 40 aircraft, 150 armored vehicles, antiaircraft and field artillery, and quantities of vehicles and infantry weapons. The port of Berbera, 150 miles from the strategic strait of Bab el Mandeb was modernized by the Russians to handle ships up to 10,000 tons and provided with radar. The Soviets have apparently built an airfield in the interior with SAM-2 missile sites around it. After the 1969 military coup, Soviet military assistance to Somalia increased considerably, and several hundred Soviet officers serve as military advisers and technicians.

Somalia is useful to the Soviet Union as a base on the Red Sea. The Soviet-built facilities at Berbera, Kismayu (used by Italian submarines during World War II), Mogadishu, and other ports appear to be far beyond anything needed or usable by Somalia. The Soviet Defense Minister paid a four-day visit to Somalia in February 1972.

Military assistance has also been received from other countries. Egypt supplied 12 torpedo boats, training aircraft, and light arms for Somali guerrillas. Sudan trained staff officers, cadets, and signal and engineer NCOs. Somali soldiers were also trained in the USSR, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Italy, Iraq, and Syria. The United States, Italy, and West Germany supplied equipment and training for the police and a commando battalion. This assistance was suspended in 1970.

In addition to Somalia's strategic location at the Horn of Africa, it achieved further strategic significance in early 1968 with the discovery by UN geologists of what may be one of *the world's largest deposits of uranium* ore. The ore is close to the surface and susceptible to economical strip mining methods. This discovery and its exploitation is of great importance in the light of increasing world demands for nuclear fuel.

Communist China signed an economic aid agreement with Somalia in 1970 that provided about $125 million in projects including road building, agriculture, and fisheries.

Agreements ending conflict along the Somali borders, at least temporarily, were signed with Kenya in 1967 and Ethiopia in 1968; a policy of relative detente and relaxation of Somali irredentism has been continued by the military regime since 1969. Somalia still remains committed to eventual unification, and also serves as a refuge and base for Somali liberation groups and for other liberation groups operating in Ethiopia.

Military service is voluntary; but all students over 18 years of age are required to undergo military training.

ARMY

Personnel: 13,000

Organization:
- 9 mechanized infantry battalions (700 men each)
- 4 tank battalions
- 1 commando battalion
- 2 field artillery battalions
- 2 heavy AA battalions
- 3 light AA battalions

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 220 medium tanks (T-34, T-55)
- 250 APCs (BTR-40, BTR-50, BTR-152)
- 100 guns and howitzers (76mm guns, 122mm howitzers, 100mm radar controlled AA guns, 37mm AA guns, 14.5mm automatic AA cannon)

NAVY

Personnel: 250

Major Units:
- 6 patrol gunboats (USSR Poluchat type) (PGM)
- 12 fast torpedo boats (P-6 type) (PT)
- 1 Komar class fast rocket torpedo boat (PT with Styx SSM)

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 2,500

Organization:
- 2 fighter squadrons (MiG-15, MiG-17)
- 1 light bomber squadron (Il-28)
- 1 transport squadron (An-24, An-26)
- 1 helicopter unit (Mi-4, Mi-8)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 36 combat aircraft
  - 12 fighters (MiG-17)
  - 12 fighters (MiG-15)
  - 12 light bombers (Il-28)
- 66 other aircraft
  - 19 transports (3 An-2, 12 An-24/An-26, 4 C-47)
  - 12 helicopters (Mi-4, Mi-8)
  - 35 trainers (Piaggio P-148, Yak-11, MiG-15)

Major Air Bases: Hargesia, Mogadishu

PARAMILITARY

Paramilitary forces are significant. There are about 7,000 police composed of 4,000 National Police, 500 Finance Guards or customs police who are under control of the armed forces probably for port security duties, and 2,500 rural police or *Illaloes*, a constabulary. To 1964 the US had supplied $1.57 million worth of training, facilities, radios, vehicles, and patrol boats for these security forces, and in 1968 West Germany supplied $750,000 worth of vehicles and facilities. A Home Guard was established at the time of the 1967 crisis and 3,000 men were called up for six months of duty and training. Upon completion of this tour another 3,000 were called up while those discharged went into a reserve pool. If continued, the reserve pool should now number 12,000 with another 3,000 on active duty.

SOUTH AFRICA

Republiek van Suid-Afrika
Republic of South Africa

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 790,261 square miles (including South West Africa)
Population: 23,746,320 (including South West Africa; 3,900,000 whites)
Total Active Armed Forces: 47,600 (includes anti-terrorist police; 0.22% population)
Gross National Product: $21.7 billion ($820 per capita
Annual Military Expenditures: $583.2 million (2.68% GNP)
Iron and Steel Production: 21.6 million metric tons
Uranium Oxide Production: 5.069 metric tons
Fuel Production: Coal: 58.4 million metric tons
Refined Petroleum Products: 11.4 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 52.9 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 255 ships; 511,190 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 34 jet, 3 turboprop, and 64 piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

Under a combined presidential-parliamentary system the President, elected by a bicameral Parliament, is chief of state and nominally commander in chief of the South African Defence Force (Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag). Actual power is vested in the Prime Minister, head of the majority party in Parliament, who controls the Defence Force through a Minister of Defence. Due to South Africa's internal security situation a Ministry of Police (since combined into a Ministry of Interior and Police) was established in 1966; the Prime Minister for a time held the portfolios of both that ministry and the Ministry of Defence.

The Defence Force consists of the Permanent Force of professionals, the Citizen Force of part-time soldiers, and the Kommando Force of a home guard nature. The Permanent Force and the Citizen Force have ground, sea, and air components, while the Kommandos have ground and air units. The Defence Force has an integrated organization under a Commandant-General. Under him are Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and an Adjutant-General, a Quartermaster-General, and a Surgeon-General whose functions are essentially administrative. For operations, service components are integrated under a Commander Joint Combat Forces, who reports to the Commandant-General.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

South Africa's basic social policy of *apartheid* (separation of white and black races in most activities and stringent restriction of the civil rights of blacks) has caused most of the nation's strategic problems. These in turn have necessitated a series of responsive policies.

The threat of foreign-based black liberation movements, the potential for revolt among the black two-thirds of the population, the UN arms embargo endorsed by most nations, the bellicose calls for invasion by the black African states, and action in the UN and the International Court of Justice to remove South West Africa (Namibia) from under South Africa's authority, have all resulted in positive acts and policy statements.

To deter external attack and internal revolt, provisions for defense have been strengthened and a state of siege proclaimed. Defense capability is based upon a rapid mobilization of the highly trained Citizen Force to augment the small Permanent Force. Emphasis has been placed upon mobility and striking power for all permanent and mobilized units. Kommando units were increased, given more intensive training, and provided with modern weapons. Physical security of key installations has been increased with fences, guard towers, lighting, and the like. Internal security matters are the subject of top-level coordination between SADF and the Police. The 1971 defense budget was increased about 20 percent over the previous year and was several times that of 1960.

The effects of the arms embargo have been attenuated by the development of a domestic armaments industry, and circumvented by obtaining certain sophisticated armaments such as high performance aircraft from France and Italy. This industry is being vigorously developed, against the possibility that the embargo may become more widespread, and more strictly enforced. South Africa has all of the essential skills, technology, and raw materials for complete self-sufficiency in production of armaments of the largest and most sophisticated variety. This potentiality is becoming reality, with the production of submarines and other warships, missiles, land combat vehicles, aircraft, and air defense systems. A two-year supply of oil has been stockpiled, oil exploration accelerated, and a tanker fleet acquired.

South Africa is second to the United States in the production of uranium oxide, possessing two fields, one connected with its gold fields and the other, still in the early stages of development, in South West Africa. It is, moreover, constructing a uranium enrichment plant using a new and much less expensive process. Although it has not yet produced a nuclear explosion, South Africa has both the technology and the resources to do so, and could develop nuclear weapons in the near future, although the government's announced policy is to use uranium only for peaceful purposes.

The South African government has clearly stated that it will resist, by force if necessary, any attempts to separate South West Africa. Infiltrations of terrorists from Zambia into the Caprivi Strip, a thin finger of South West African territory lying between Angola and Zambia on the north and Botswana on the south, have been dealt with promptly and effectively. To assure friendly buffer states to the north, economic and military support have been given to northern neighbors, particularly Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Normal relations are also offered the neighboring black African states, and are enjoyed by Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. These states cooperate with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal in security matters.

South Africa has announced that it will fight the terrorists wherever the opportunity is offered.It has made good this offer in Rhodesia and, if needed, can be expected to do so elsewhere. It has also stated that it will hit back at countries providing bases and sanctuaries for the terrorists. To date the situation has not become desperate enough to warrant such retaliation, but there is little doubt that South Africa has the will to do this, should it seem necessary

The Communist Party was declared illegal in South Africa in 1950. Despite strong disapproval of South Africa's internal policies, the US and Britain find it convenient to collaborate with South Africa against any external communist threat to Southern Africa and its approaches. In this connection South Africa has assumed the mission of assisting in keeping open the Cape of Good Hope sea routes in the event of general war.

Citizens from 17 to 65 years of age are liable for military service on call, and those 17 to 25 are liable for up to four years' service. At present, active service, other than for those who volunteer for the Permanent Force, is for nine or twelve months, depending upon the arm of specialty, followed by service for the rest of the four years in the Citizen Force or Kommandos. Call-up is by selective draft with about 80 percent of eligible whites being called, between 25,000 and 33,000 annually. Most members of the Defence Force are white. The Police is 50 percent European (white) 45 percent Bantu (black), and the remainder Colored (mixed) or Asiatic (East Indian).

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

The threat to white political hegemony posed by the 14 million blacks, repressed under *apartheid* and increasingly agitated by the foreign-based liberation movements, is the gravest and most immediate strategic problem for South Africa.

The liberation organizations are: the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), supported by Communist China; the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), supported by the Soviet Union; the National Liberation Front of South Africa (NALFSA), and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). All of these organizations are headquartered in Dar es Salaam and are trained in various communist and radical African countries. PAC, because of its inefficiency and noncooperation, has been denied further funds by the OAU and outlawed in Zambia. The future of NALFSA is not clear; it has applied to OAU for recognition and claims to have been formed to direct liberation operations from within South Africa; the others are supported by the OAU Liberation Committee. ANC and SWAPO coordinate their activities and cooperate with the Rhodesian movements, ZANU and ZAPU, as well. They have bases in Tanzania and Zambia, and have trained some 2,000 terrorists. Most of the political resistance to South African rule over South West Africa comes from a small but politically sophisticated Herero tribe who occupy the land in the center of the territory.

As internal dissatisfaction has caused a tightening of security measures in South Africa, infiltrations across northern borders have led to the establishment of forward defense by the Defence Force. This has included intensive operations in the Caprivi Strip, support of Rhodesia with police units, building a jet airbase and holding large-scale maneuvers near the Rhodesian border, and cooperation and unspecified assistance to Portuguese territories and Botswana.

In the light of white South Africa's determination and socio-economic viability, as well as constant and efficient attention to security measures—as opposed to the disunity and military weakness of the rest of Africa—combined with the operational and logistical difficulties of getting at South Africa, it is difficult to see how the liberation movements can be more than an irritation over the next few years. Over the

longer term, however, the picture can well be different, with almost inevitable white relaxation of restrictions as the blacks gain more education and economic strength. This will result in increasing viability of internal black anti-regime forces. Eventually it would appear that white South Africa must seek a satisfactory accommodation with its black citizenry, or else risk serious, and probably disastrous insurgency.

South Africa's position at the southern tip of the African continent controls sea lanes from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and the Far East; these have an increased importance whenever the Suez Canal or the Mediterranean is closed. The former British naval base at Simonstown, near Capetown, to which Britain retains use rights, has the biggest and best equipped drydock and dockyard between Europe and Singapore. With Britain's withdrawal of nearly all forces east of Suez, and the entry of Soviet fleet units into the Indian Ocean, South Africa anticipates an eventual threat to its sea flanks and is strengthening its defense forces by acquiring more coastal craft and helicopters, by establishing a submarine base to accommodate three submarines constructed in France, and by opening a new maritime headquarters at the Cape. A reconstructed naval base at Durban was opened in 1971.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Until the arms embargo in 1963, some ground force weapons, ships, and most aircraft were purchased from Britain, with some aircraft coming from the US. Since the embargo France has sold over $100 million in arms to South Africa, including Mirage III jet fighters with air-to-surface missiles, helicopters, transports, AMX tanks, and AML armored cars, and three Daphne class coastal submarines. Italy has sold MB-326 armed jet trainers and components and tools with which to build 300 more. West German scientists and firms are reported to be helping to build nuclear reactors and to develop guided missiles. Under an agreement concluded in June 1971, French designed Mirage III and F-1 jet fighters will be built under license in South Africa. Total US military sales 1970-72 equal $3.15 million.

In addition to the police assistance mentioned, South Africa is probably furnishing arms and military advice to Rhodesia. Advice and cooperation in security matters is also extended to Portuguese territories, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Historically South Africa has been aligned with the West, fighting as a member of the Commonwealth with the allies in World Wars I and II, participating in the Berlin Airlift in 1948, and sending a fighter-bomber squadron to the UN Command in the Korean War from September 1950 until the armistice in 1953.

ALLIANCES

South Africa keeps its membership in the UN although it has withdrawn or has been expelled from some of the specialized agencies. When it became a republic in 1961 South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth.

South Africa has no openly formal alliances with Rhodesia or Portugal, stating these are not necessary between good neighbors. However, the South African Prime Minister has expressed a willingness to send troops whenever and wherever they are asked for. In 1967 the South African and Portuguese defense ministers met in Lisbon and proclaimed a common objective to pursue resolutely the defense of their positions in Africa.

The United States under a joint agreement maintains three space tracking stations in the vicinity of Pretoria. One is operated by the Department of Defense; the other two by NASA.

Under the Simonstown Naval Base Agreements of 1955 and 1961, the South African Navy cooperated with the Royal Navy and provided base facilities in return for assistance in arms procurement. Under a revised agreement, Britain has withdrawn Royal Navy units stationed at the base, and the two countries will jointly command the base. The British government is legally obligated under terms of the Simonstown Agreement to supply the South African government with a number of Westland Wasp helicopters to equip three frigates supplied earlier, as well as spare parts to keep the ships operational.

ARMY

Personnel: 32,000 (10,000 regular and 22,000 Citizen Force)

Organization: eleven territorial commands: Western Province. Eastern Province, Natal, Orange Free State, Western Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Witwatersrand, North West Cape, South West Africa, South Western Districts, and Walvisbaai Commands. Within these commands, there are training units and full-time force units, the permanent staff being formed by members of the Permanent Force. Combat arms of the Permanent Force are organized into battalions with smaller units for supporting services. Similar Citizen Force units are rapidly mobilizable and combine with Permanent Force units into brigades and task forces.

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 240 medium tanks (Centurion Mk.5, M-4, and Comet)
- light tanks (AMX-13)
- 550 armored cars (Staghound, AML-60, AML-90)
- 200 scout cars (Ferret)
- APCs (Saracen)
- light and medium artillery
- antiaircraft artillery

Reserves: About 205,000, including 23,000 in organized Citizen Force units, and 75,000 Kommandos.

NAVY

Personnel: 4,600 (3,350 Permanent Force, 1,250 Citizen Force in training)

Major Units:

- 2 destroyers (DD, with Wasp ASW helicopters)
- 6 frigates (DE, 3 with Wasp ASW helicopters)
- 3 submarines (SS; French-built Daphne class)
- 1 escort minesweeper (PF/MSF)
- 10 coastal minesweepers (MSC)
- 5 seaward defense craft (SC)
- 5 patrol boats (YP)
- 1 fleet replenishment ship (AOE)
- 9 auxiliaries

Naval Bases: Simonstown, Capetown, East London, Port Elizabeth, Durban, Walvis Bay

Reserves: 4,750 trained reserves in Citizen Force

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 8,000 (5,000 Regular, 3,000 Active Citizen Force)

Organization:

Strike Command
- 3 fighter/fighter reconnaissance squadrons (Sabre, Mirage)
- 2 strike reconnaissance squadrons (Canberra, Buccaneer)

Maritime Command
- 1 maritime patrol squadron (Shackleton)
- 1 short range patrol, fish surveillance (Piaggio P-166)
- 1 ASW flight (Wasp helicopters on destroyers and frigates)

Transport Command
- 1 long range transport squadron (C-130, C-160)
- 2 transport squadrons (C-47, DC-4)
- 1 VIP transport squadron (Viscount, C-47, HS-125)

Light Aircraft Command
- 4 helicopter squadrons (Alouette III, Puma, Super Frelon)
- *6 refresher training squadrons (MB-326 Impala, T-6)
- *2 forward air controller squadrons (Cessna A-185)
- *12 air commando squadrons, civil auxiliary (light civil aircraft)

Training Group
- Primary, basic, advanced weapons training, multi-engine, helicopter schools (T-6, Impala, C-47, Alouette II/III, Vampire)

Maintenance Group

Major Aircraft Types:

114 combat aircraft
- 48 Mirage, fighter/fighter reconnaissance
- 20 Sabre fighters
- 9 Canberra strike reconnaissance
- 15 Buccaneer strike reconnaissance
- 8 Shackleton maritime patrol
- 9 P-166 Albatross short range maritime patrol (9 P-166 on order)
- 5 Wasp ASW helicopters (7 Wasp on order)

651 other aircraft
- 54 transports (7 C-130, 9 C-160, 23 C-47, 5 DC-4, 1 Viscount, 4 HS-125, 5 Do-27)
- 40 army support (FAC) (Cessna 185, AM-3C)
- 76 helicopters (40 Alouette III, 20 Puma, 16 Super Frelon)
- 421 training aircraft, primary, basic, multi engine, advanced weapons, helicopter (170 T-6, 200 Impala, Vampire)

Missiles: Matra R-530, Aerospatiale AS-30, ASM, Cactus all weather SAM, Sidewinder, AIM.

Air Bases: Swartkop (Pretoria), Waterkloof, Langebaanweg Cape, Rooikop, Dunnottar, Lyttleton, Ysterplatt, Bloemspruit, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Durban, Capetown, Germiston, Port Elizabeth, Pietersburg, Potchefstroom

Reserves: The Citizen Air Force is organized into eight squadrons operating Impala and T-6 armed trainers and C-47 transports.

PARAMILITARY

The National Police numbers about 32,700 (one-half white) and has reserve of 12,000 (all white). An anti-terrorist police force of 3,000 is equipped with 430 riot trucks, 80 Saracen APCs, and heavy infantry weapons.

The Kommandos, or militia with an essentially home guard function, number about 75,000 and are organized into infantry, armored car, and air units.

*Active Citizen Force (ACF) squadrons.

SUDAN

Jamhuryat es-Sudan al-Democratia
Democratic Republic of the Sudan

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 967,491 square miles
Population: 17,400,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 40,100 (including frontier and national police; 0.23% population)
Gross National Product: $2 billion ($115 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $174 million (8.7% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 1.1 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 392 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 14 ships; 35,502 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 2 jet, 8 turboprop, and 1 piston transport

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The President of the Republic is commander in chief of the armed forces. He is currently also Prime Minister. The Second Vice-President is presently Defense Minister. Under the Defense Ministry is the Headquarters of the Armed Forces, which controls six regional commands—Northern, Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern Commands, and the Khartoum Garrison.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

The British-officered Sudan Defense Force became the Sudan Armed Forces upon independence in 1956. Following

the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Sudan dropped its policy of neutrality in world affairs for one of active support of Arab opposition to Israel and its supporters. To demonstrate this policy a contingent of 2,000 troops is maintained on the Suez Canal, and relations with Britain and the United States were severed.

Sudan has supported the UN in its peacekeeping efforts, having sent an infantry battalion for the first nine months of the UN Operation in the Congo, 1960-1961. Sudan advocates self-determination for the black peoples now under white-dominated regimes in southern Africa, and opposes African regimes which it considers reactionary. Evidence of the latter policy was support of rebels against the Mobutu government in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1964-1965.

Enlistment in the services is voluntary; there are more candidates than vacancies. Since a 1955 revolt of Negro units from the southern provinces, they have not been enlisted, nor have Nile Valley villagers. The forces thus are composed mainly of nomadic tribesmen.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Sudan has long been considered a natural bridge between the Arab world and Black Africa. Psychologically, this concept has reduced significance at this time after more than a decade of internal conflict between the Arab north and the Negro south.

Although the sources of the Nile River, which gives life to Egypt, lie in Ethiopia and Uganda, most of its course passes through Sudan. Increasing amounts are being diverted for various irrigation schemes, and potentially Sudan could control it totally and reduce the flow to Egypt to a trickle. For this reason Egypt, or powers occupying Egypt, have historically sought to dominate the Sudan.

Sudan is divided ethnically and religiously between some ten million Arabic-speaking Moslems in the northern six provinces and about four million Negro animist and Christian peoples in the southern three provinces. For generations the poorer southerners have felt oppressed by the more developed and politically dominant northerners. From 1958 until early 1972 most of the south was in armed revolt, seeking autonomy. The revolt resulted in at least a half-million deaths and a quarter-million refugees in the five countries bordering the south. The revolt was ended by an agreement of March 1972, creating South Sudan as an autonomous region.

In July 1971 the government was temporarily overthrown by a group of left-wing officers. The coup was communist-inspired and the powerful Communist Party of Sudan came out in open support of the new regime. Lasting only three days, the new regime was toppled by military forces loyal to the President, General al Nemery. The coup leaders were arrested, tried, and executed. A purge of the Communist Party followed; its Secretary General was arrested, convicted and executed. The Party was outlawed and its members went into hiding or were arrested. The coup's failure was a setback for Soviet policy in the Sudan. Soviet-Sudanese relations became strained and Sudan sought closer relations with Peking and the West; however, several hundred Soviet military advisers remained in the country.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

In 1956 Britain left sufficient weapons and equipment to outfit the small armed forces then planned. Small British army and air training missions continued in Sudan through 1966. Naval training has been conducted in Britain and Yugoslavia. Air training has been conducted in Egypt, Britain, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and West Germany. Aircraft have been obtained from Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Egypt. Military training has been provided by Britain, the United States, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and India. Small arms, artillery, and vehicles have been purchased from West Germany and armored cars from Britain and the United States. From 1956 through 1972 the US has provided $700,000 worth of military aid and trained 125 students under the MAP.

Following the 1967 change of policy toward the West, Sudan has accepted large quantities of military aid from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The Soviet program alone has amounted to about $150 million. Soviet and Czech contributions included tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and jet aircraft, as well as training missions. This has represented the Soviet Union's first significant military assistance effort in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1971, Communist China has made large loans for development purposes and has offered to supply Sudan with arms and with spares for Soviet weapons. In 1972 an agreement was reportedly signed under which the Chinese would provide training for the Sudanese Army.

Sudan has provided training for Somalian staff officers, officer cadets, and signal and engineer NCOs. It is also alleged to have given sanctuary and training to Chadian and Eritrean dissidents, and to have allowed arms shipments to the Eritreans and to rebels against Zaire government.

ALLIANCES

Sudan is a member of the UN, the OAU, and the Arab League.

ARMY

Personnel: 35,000

Organization:

- 6 infantry brigades
- 1 independent infantry battalion
- 1 armored brigade
- 3 artillery regiments

1 parachute regiment
5 AA battalions
1 engineer regiment

Deployment: Two thirds of the Army has been in the three southern provinces. One unit (2000 men) is with the Egyptians on the Suez Canal.

Major Equipment Inventory:
100 T-54/55 medium tanks (50 each)
20 T-34 medium tanks
20 T-62 light tanks
95 armored cars (Saladin and M-706 Commando)
200 APCs (BTR-40, BTR-152, and Saracen)
60 scout cars (Ferret)
55 25-pounder guns
40 105mm howitzers
122mm guns and howitzers
20 120mm mortars
80+40mm (Bofors) and 37mm and 85mm (Soviet) AA guns
SAMs (Sa-2 Guideline)

NAVY

Personnel: 600

Organization: Coastal Patrol unit at Port Sudan: River Patrol unit on Nile River

Major Units:
2 patrol gunboats (PGM), 190 tons
4 patrol gunboats (PGM), 100 tons
3 auxiliaries
2 landing craft

Naval Bases: Port Sudan, Khartoum

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 1,500

Major Aircraft Types:
46 combat aircraft
16 MiG-21 fighters
15 MiG-17 fighter-bombers
15 Jet Provost ground attack aircraft
66 other aircraft
4 F-27M Troopship transports
5 An-24 transports
6 An-12 transports
3 Pembroke light transports
8 PC-6A light transports
10 Mi-8 helicopters
30 trainers (Provost and others)

Air Bases: Khartoum, Malakal, Juba, Atbara, Geneina, El Obeid, El Fashir, Wad Medani, Dongola, Merowe, Waw, and Port Sudan.

PARAMILITARY

There are 2,000 Frontier Police and 1,000 civil police.

SWAZILAND

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 6,704 square miles
Population: 500,000
Total Active Police Forces: 1,100 (.22% population)
Gross National Product: $110 million ($247 per capita)
Iron Ore Production: 3.1 million metric tons
Fuel Production: Coal: 130,000 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 90 million kwh
Annual Military and Police Expenditures: $1.9 million (1.72% GNP)
Civil Air Fleet: 4 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

As a constitutional monarch within the British Commonwealth, the King is chief of state with a Prime Minister heading the government. The Prime Minister is

appointed by the King from the Parliament and exercises executive authority.

Swaziland's independence, granted by Britain in 1968, depends upon collective security and strict neutrality. Bordered by Mozambique on one side and South Africa on the others it has cooperated with the police of both of these white-controlled countries in running down insurgents who attempt to use Swaziland as a refuge.

Swaziland depends on Mozambique and South Africa both as markets for agricultural exports and as sources of manufactured goods. Furthermore, a railroad running through Mozambique to the port of Lourenco Marques is the only means of marketing its mineral exports, which provide economic viability and a relatively high (for Africa) GNP per capita. Swaziland is the world's fifth largest producer of asbestos. Coal and tin are also mined.

A potential for internal dissension exists in the distribution of land and the new mineral and industrial wealth. About 40 percent of the land is owned by the few thousand Europeans and Eur-Africans. These same people generally are the investors in new enterprises of the burgeoning economy.

Another potential problem of internal and external security stems from dissent among the blacks of South Africa and the active insurgency underway in Mozambique. While the government of Swaziland is against *apartheid* and in favor of self-determination, its weakness and dependence place it on the horns of a policy dilemma.

Swaziland is a member of the British Commonwealth, the UN and the OAU.

In addition to a police force of 600 men, and the new 500-man army, the King has a force of 4,000 Swazi warrior-retainers. However, they probably do not possess modern weapons and so would have limited use as a paramilitary force until armed and trained.

Swazi Air Limited, with 35 pilots and a number of piston transports and light aircraft, provides internal transportation and connections with world air routes.

TANZANIA

United Republic of Tanzania

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 364,943 square miles
Population: 14,500,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 11,600 (0.08% population)
Gross National Product: $1.6 billion ($110 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $39.2 million (2.45% GNP)
Refined Petroleum Products: 819,800 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 396 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 11 ships; 18,218 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 5 piston aircraft

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The Tanzanian armed forces differ greatly from the defense establishment in other formerly British nations, largely as a result of the extensive remodeling of the Army undertaken by President Nyerere following a mutiny in January 1964. Civilian control is exercised directly by the President, although nominally all defense matters are under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Second Vice-President. The First Vice-President of Tanzania (who by the terms of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar merger in April 1964 is also the President of Zanzibar) is also the nominal head of the Zanzibar portions of the armed forces. The Chief of Staff theoretically commands the entire military establishment, which has been named the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces (TPDF). In practice, the senior officer on Zanzibar commands the island portion of the TPDF.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

At present, due to the small size of the TPDF, and the large supply of available manpower, no conscription is necessary. Enlistments are for a two-year term. Tanzania also has a nonmilitary National Service Corps, which is obligatory for all male high school and college graduates from the ages of 18 to 35. After the disbanding of the mutinous Tanganyika Rifles in 1964, the bulk of the recruits for the TPDF were obtained from the National Service Corps. At present there are no formal reserve forces, although the surplus of manpower,

coupled with the government's desire to involve the citizenry actively in nationbuilding, has led to several tentative efforts in that direction. In March 1965 the Tanzanian Parliament approved plans to create Field Force Units in each region and to give members of the Police Force, Prison Service, National Service, and the Youth League of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) full military training with modern weapons. (TANU is the only legal political party in mainland Tanzania.)

Tanzania's foreign policy is nonaligned in international affairs, seeking friendly relations with all reciprocating countries. The notable exception in Tanzania's insistence on majority rule by the Africans of Southern Africa and disapproval of any African country which is unduly influenced by the white Southern African regimes or by outside powers. In furtherance of the goal of African unity, Tanzania belongs to: (1) the OAU, and to its Liberation Coordinating Committee for which it provides a headquarters in Dar es Salaam, and (2) the East African Community, for which it also provides a headquarters at Arusha. Further, it allows sanctuary, training bases, and arms shipments for various liberation movements and exile groups. After the military coup in Uganda overthrew President Obote in January 1971, relations between Uganda and Tanzania became strained. Obote took refuge in Tanzania, and his claims have been supported by President Nyerere. There was a brief invasion of Uganda by Obote supporters based in Tanzania in 1972, but it was quickly suppressed.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Although Tanzania has been spared the sort of tribal dissensions which have created severe internal security problems elsewhere in Africa, the geopolitical position of Tanzania, and its policy objectives, have caused it to become a logical haven for guerrilla bands dedicated to overthrowing the white regimes in the south of the continent. Their presence could provoke retaliation from white African governments. Tanzania has objected to reconnaissance flights over its territory by Portuguese aircraft from neighboring Mozambique. Sporadic incidents along the Ruvuma River, boundary between Tanzania and Mozambique, have also occurred.

Tanzania's neutral policy, and its need for development and military assistance, have caused it to seek and accept aid from all quarters. Communist China has responded to Tanzanian receptiveness with substantial aid grants. China appears to be trying to gain a foothold in this country, which borders on eight other African nations, and which serves as a base for numerous liberation movements. The Chinese have completely built, equipped, and staffed a police college at Moshi, have established a joint shipping line with two ships, have trained and equipped the marine police force, and have established propaganda outlets by building and operating a 50-kilowatt radio broadcasting station as well as a university bookstore and student center. Construction of the planned 1,116 mile Tanzania-Zambia railroad (from Kapiri Mposhi to Dar es Salaam, begun on October 16, 1970), will ensure the presence of over 13,000 Chinese in Tanzania and Zambia for seven to ten years. These Chinese technicians and workers are all members of the railway engineering and signal corps of the People's Liberation Army and have received basic military training. Both Chinese and Cubans are training the freedom fighters of the various liberation movements whose camps are in the area to be traversed by the railroad. It would be easy to turn these against the Tanzanian government, or to train indigenous malcontents secretly should the government lean the wrong way.

There are few dangerous ethnic, political, or economic divisions among the Tanzanian people. A plethora of over 120 tribes, none large or powerful enough to constitute an independent political threat to the federal government, has actually served to minimize ethnic differences among the African population. The Arab, Asian, and European populations are too small to constitute a threat to established order. The religious divisions between Moslems, Christian and native religionists are more significant, but at present show no signs of leading to disorders.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Arms and training are received from a number of foreign countries, thus avoiding over-dependence on any foreign power. Israel, China, West Germany, and Canada have helped train the Air Force and have furnished aircraft. The Netherlands, Indonesia, and West Germany have provided naval training; West and East Germany and Communist China have provided patrol boats. China has trained and equipped the police and Israel has trained police paratroops. The initial provision of arms was British, but this ceased when Tanzania temporarily broke diplomatic relations in 1965 over Rhodesia. Since then China and the Soviet Union have provided most military equipment. China has been sending increasing amounts of equipment for the TPDF, including two squadrons of MiG-17s (24 aircraft), 28 light and medium tanks, 32 guns and howitzers, an undisclosed number of AA guns, and light arms. In 1971 the Chinese began building a naval base at Dar es Salaam, and China has recently completed a military airfield near Morogoro. Tanzanian sailors and officers as well as pilots and technicians are receiving training in China.

Although sympathetic to the various Southern African liberation movements, it is not known whether or not Tanzania provides direct military assistance. It does provide sanctuary and training, and allows rebels to base and train and receive arms from China in Tanzania. Also its monetary contributions to the OAU's Liberation Coordinating Committee helps support these movements.

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ALLIANCES

Tanzania is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, the OAU, and the East African Community.

ARMY

Personnel: 10,000

Organization:
- 4 infantry battalions
- 1 artillery battalion
- 1 tank company

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 14 T-69 light tanks
- 16 T-59 medium tanks
- 15 APCs (BTR-152)
- scout cars (BTR-40)
- 20 25-pounder guns
- 76mm Soviet artillery pieces (light)
- Chinese mortars
- 122mm howitzers

NAVY

Personnel: 600

Major Units:
- 6 patrol boats, ex-Chinese Shanghai type (PGM)
- 2 motor torpedo boats, ex-Chinese P-6 (PT)

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 1,000

Major Aircraft Types:
- 24 combat aircraft
  - 24 MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters (acquired from China; to equip two squadrons)
- 48 other aircraft
  - 11 transports (1 An-12, 5 DHC-3, 4 DHC-4, 1 HS-748)
  - 12 trainers (7 P-149, 5 PA-28-140)
  - 25 utility/liaison

Air Bases: Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tabora, Zanzibar

PARAMILITARY

Members of the National Service, Prison Service, Tanzanian Youth League, Police, and other uniformed government employees receive military training and are considered available for paramilitary duties or to expand the Army. The Police, under the Minister for Home Affairs and with a strength of 8,350, includes a 120-man paratroop company and a marine police unit with four patrol boats (YP). Ports patrolled by the Marine Police are Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Mtwara.

TOGO

Republique Togolaise
Togolese Republic

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 21,900 square miles
Population: 2,000,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 2,350 (including Gendarmerie; 0.11% population)
Gross National Product: $270 million ($135 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $3.0 million (1.11% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 30 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 2 piston transport

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The President, as both chief of state and head of the government, is also Commander in Chief of the armed forces and Minister of Defense. The current military ruler, General Eyadema, has consolidated these positions with those he held formerly: Chief of Staff of the Togolese Armed Forces and Commander 1st Battalion Togolese Infantry.

Since independence from French rule in 1960, Togo has maintained close relations with France including a defense agreement, the details of which remain unpublished, as well as agreements for staging, transit, and overflight privileges, and military assistance. Togo is a member of the OCAM and *Conseil de l'Entente*. Togo maintains a policy of nonalignment, and is a member and strong supporter of the UN and a member of the OQU.

Since a military coup in 1967, rule is by decree and ordinance, although a new constitution is being drafted, and a return to civilian government is promised.

Potential ethnic conflict exists between the culturally dominant coastal tribes, particularly the Ewes, and the poor but more warlike northern tribes, particularly the Cabrais, who provide the best soldiers for the Army. The economy, formerly agricultural, has become diversified by exploitation of a 70 million-ton phosphate deposit. Recently discovered are a 550 million-ton deposit of high-grade iron ore and large deposits of limestone and bauxite.

The 1,000 man Army is organized into one infantry battalion, a reconnaissance unit with armored cars, an engineer unit, a band, and supporting elements. Weapons, equipment, and training are French. The Navy with 250 men operates three patrol gunboats (PGM), one offshore patrol, and one river gunboat (PGR). The Air Force has about 100 men and operates one C-47 transport, two Broussard liaison aircraft, and two Alouette helicopters. There is an international airport at Lome and four airstrips in the interior. Paramilitary forces include a Gendarmerie of 1,000 men.

TUNISIA

Al-Djoumhouria Attunusia
Republic of Tunisia

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 63,378 square miles
Population: 6,000,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 27,650 (includes Gendarmerie; 0.52% population)
Gross National Product: $2.06 billion ($375 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $23 million (1.61% GNP)
Iron Ore Production: 872,047 metric tons
Fuel Production: Crude Oil: 4.1 million metric tons
Refined Products: 1.1 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 768 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 23 ships; 28,268 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 5 jet and 1 turboprop transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

A strong President of a one-party political system is chief of state, head of the government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. He appoints his Cabinet, including the Minister of Defense, through whom he administers the armed forces. The Tunisian National Army (TNA) was formed upon independence in 1956 with key positions going to reliable party and resistance movement (*fallagha*) members, although most of the troops were Tunisian veterans of the French Army. The naval and air arms are small adjuncts of the TNA and subordinated to it.

Tunisia's announced, and then aborted, merger with Libya (January 1974) added to concern about the present mental competence of President Habib Bourguiba, a revered figure who led the country to independence in 1956 and has since provided strong and constructive leadership.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

Tunisia has consistently supported policies of moderation in international affairs and collective security through international organizations, particularly the UN. To this end, in 1960 a brigade was sent to the UN Operation in the Congo.

In its attempt to bring reason and moderation to the Arab side in the dispute with Israel, Tunisia has become the target of ideological and subversive attacks from the radical Arab states. These external threats, given greater emphasis by the

buildup of Soviet-supplied arms in neighboring Algeria and Libya, have provided an incentive for strengthening Tunisia's defenses, modifying the past policy of channelling scanty resources into social services and national development. To increase readiness, and to permit modernization, there has been a reduction of past employment of the Army on civic action projects.

Absolute defense against such strongly armed neighbors as Algeria and Libya is beyond Tunisia's capabilities. Therefore, the stated defense objective is a small Army of well-trained professionals to provide deterrence, to deal with minor incursions, and so to delay any major attack that an international organization or friendly powers would have time to come to Tunisia's aid. To this end increased military assistance has been sought from the United States. In return, Tunisia has continued to urge moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict (while affirming solidarity with the Arab nations), did not join in condemnation of America's role in Vietnam, and has voiced concern over the increased Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean. Tunisia also maintains close relations with France.

Military service is compulsory, although selective. Conscription is at age 20 followed by one-year of active service, nine years in the first reserve, and 15 years in the second reserve.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Tunisia's strategic problems stem from its location, the possibility of an attack by radical neighbors, and internal dissent sparked by external subversive efforts as well as its own faltering economy. The naval base at Bizerte, and the port of Tunis, permitting control of the narrow waters between Tunisia and Sicily, make Tunisia's location as strategically significant today as it was in World War II. Tunisia's proven oil reserve of 60 million tons is significant.

Formerly strained relations with Algeria have improved. In January 1971 a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between Tunisia and Algeria, and in May a joint military commission completed a final delineation of the frontier. The dispute over the El Borma oil field was resolved in favor of Algeria. However, sources of tension remain on such issues as Tunisia's moderate stand on Israel. Similar tensions exist with Libya, and Tunisia is thus uncomfortably positioned between two radical Arab states. More serious to the Tunisian regime have been frequent subversion attempts by Algerian, Libyan, Syrian, and Egyptian agents. These are probably aided by some leftist elements among Tunisian youth, opposed to the regime's conservatism. The current lack of economic growth, combined with a high birth rate—which are causing the country to fall behind in the race for modernization—also provoke unrest. Following the death or retirement of benevolent dictator President Bourguiba, these pressures could result in a possibly violent change to a more radical government.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Extensive French training and equipment continued after independence. Sweden provided training aircraft and pilot instruction in 1960-1961 on a sales basis, as did Italy in 1965-1966. Britain also has sold some arms to Tunisia. A 1961 military assistance treaty with Egypt was apparently never implemented.

From 1960 onward the United States has been the major supplier of arms, all on a grant aid basis. Between 1960 and 1972 $31.4 million in arms was furnished. In this same period about $2.0 million of excess military stocks was provided and 455 were trained under the MAP. In 1968 a formal Military Assistance and Advisory Group was established in Tunis. Aid has included training with US forces in West Germany and the United States, modernizing the infantry weapons of the Army, and the beginning of an air defense system.

ALLIANCES

Tunisia is a member of the UN and the OAU. Although a member of the Arab League, Tunisia has frequently boycotted its meetings because of differences with League policies which preclude the possibility of peace with Israel. Tunisia is also a member of the moribund Maghreb Consultative Committee and has tried to advance cooperation among the four Northwest African states, but with little success.

ARMY

Personnel: 20,000

Organization:

- 6 infantry battalions
- 1 Sahara patrol group
- 1 mixed armored battalion
- 1 artillery group
- 1 commando battalion

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 20 light tanks (M-41 and AMX-13)
- 20 armored cars (Saladin and M-8)
- 105mm self-propelled guns
- 155mm guns
- 40mm AA guns (Bofors)

Reserves: About 25,000 trained reservists

NAVY

Personnel: 1,900

Major Units:

1 corvette (PCE)
1 sub chaser (PC)
6 patrol boats (YP)
4 patrol gunboats (PGM)
7 patrol boats (PCF)
1 tug

Naval Bases: Tunis, Bizerte

Reserves: about 3,000

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 750

Major Aircraft Types:

20 combat aircraft
- 12 F-86 fighters
- 8 MB-326 armed trainers/ground attack aircraft

37 other aircraft
- 3 Flamant light transports
- 12 T-6 trainers
- 14 Saab 91 trainers
- 8 Alouette II helicopters

Air Bases: Tunis (El Aouina), Monastir, Bizerte, Gabes, Sfax, Djerba

Reserves: about 2,500 trained reservists

PARAMILITARY

A Gendarmerie of six battalions totals 5,000. There is a National Guard of 5,000.

UGANDA

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 91,134 square miles
Population: 10,462,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 9,850 (including security police; 0.09% population)
Gross National Product: $1.50 billion ($143 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $20 million (1.33% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 817 million kwh
Merchant Fleet: 1 ship; 5,510 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 7 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The present government, led by President Idi Amin, came to power in January 1971 through a military coup. The former president, Milton Obote, took refuge in Tanzania, where he has received support from President Nyerere. Clashes between Ugandan and Tanzanian forces along the border followed Amin's takeover, and relations between the two countries have been strained since then.

The present Ugandan armed forces were formed from the former King's African Rifles (KAR), the British colonial army in East Africa, upon independence in 1962. The manpower requirements are easily met by voluntary enlistment.

Most armed forces officers were British until January 1964. At that time the mutinies in Tanganyika and Kenya were duplicated by Ugandan mutineers. Although the uprising was quelled with British assistance, the Army was eventually successful in gaining its demands—immediate Africanization of the officer corps, a new battalion, and pay increases. Since then Army influence has increased, culminating in the 1971 coup.

Bagandan separatist sentiment is the most pressing of tribal disputes in Uganda. However, the new government is popular among the Baganda.

There are recurrent border troubles caused by more than 250,000 refugees from Rwanda, Zaire, and Sudan. Frequent attempts of militant refugees to infiltrate their own countries create severe problems of border surveillance. Neighboring governments, especially Sudan, have threatened to cross the Uganda border for retaliatory strikes against refugee insurgent bases.

In August 1972 President Amin ordered all Asians, about 48,000 people, to leave the country, but under pressure from Tanzania he limited the expulsion to those 25,000 Asians holding British or other foreign passports. There was at this

time an invasion by supporters of former president Milton Obote from Tanzania, but it was quickly snuffed out by Amin.

Scattered guerrilla activity was reported early in 1973. Reports indicated some guerrillas were followers of Obote, while some belonged to a group called Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), said to oppose Obote's return. Amin also made charges, in February, against Luo tribe members in Kenya, and seemed to threaten the 50,000 Luos of Uganda with expulsion. The charges and threats were later retracted. In March 1974 Amin survived with ease a 15-hour coup attempt by troops who were Christian members of the Lugbara tribe, led by a brigadier from Amin's own Kakwa tribe.

Uganda is a member of the UN, OAU, and the British Commonwealth.

Initially training and equipment for the armed forces were supplied by the British. In recent years Israeli military assistance has been extensive; however, early in 1972 the Israeli military mission was expelled. In 1973, 300 Ugandan soldiers received training in Libya. Aircraft have been received from Israel, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Light weapons may have been furnished by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China. The Ugandan Army is 8,550 strong, organized as two brigades of four infantry battalions each, plus supporting armored cars, two border guard battalions, one mechanized battalion, one parachute/commando battalion, and one artillery regiment. Equipment includes five M-4 medium tanks, 16 Ferret scout cars, 20 BTR-40 and 152 and 12 OT-64B APCs. The Air Force, 500 men, operates seven MiG-15/17 fighters, four P-149 trainers, one Caribou transport, six AB-205, two AB-206, two Scout and seven Russian-made Mi4 helicopters in addition to eight Magister and 12 L-29 Delfin trainers, six C-47 transports, and seven liaison aircraft. The main air bases are at Gulu, Kampala and Entebbe.

The General Service Units (GSU) of the police number 800 men, trained for riot control. Under the Ministry of Interior they have remained a genuinely multi-tribal force, still conditioned by the apolitical standards of the British civil service. The police air wing currently operates three helicopters, a Twin Otter, and several other aircraft.

UPPER VOLTA

Republique de Haute-Volta

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 105,869 square miles
Population: 5,491,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 3,050 (including National Guard; 0.05% population)
Gross National Product: $340 million ($62 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $4.0 million (1.17% GNP)
Electric Power Output: 18.6 million kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 3 piston transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

The current president achieved his position by a military coup in January 1966. A new constitution was approved by a national referendum in June 1970. Under this constitution the President of the Republic continues to be, for a transitional period of four years, the senior officer in the Army. Thereafter the President is to be elected by direct universal suffrage; one-third of the Cabinet is to consist of military men. The armed forces of Upper Volta are administered through the Minister of Defense.

Upper Volta has maintained close relations with France since independence in 1960, although it did not join the French Community. Staging, transit, and overflight privileges were accorded France and there is a military assistance agreement for arms, equipment, and training. For defense Upper Volta relies essentially on whatever collective security can be provided by its memberships in the UN, OAU, OCAM, and *Conseil de l'Entente*. Within the *Conseil* Upper Volta has cooperated with Ivory Coast and Niger in mutual internal and external security problems.

In 1966 and 1967 the Army easily suppressed abortive countercoup attempts by supporters of the ousted politicians. Ethnic divisions do not threaten stability. The dominant Voltaic Mossi comprise about one-half the population. The Mandingo tribes are next in importance, with smaller proportions of Fulani, Haussa, and Tuareg tribesmen. Islam has made little penetration and most of the people retain their animist beliefs or have been converted to Christianity.

Upper Volta's stability is threatened by its faltering

agricultural economy and its growing population. There are important mineral deposits—manganese, copper, tin ore, limestone, bauxite, and graphite—but these are not being exploited because of the high cost of a 712-mile trip to the coast.

Prior to and just after independence, during the period 1957-1961, France furnished military instructors and $18 million in equipment. Another $25 million was provided for administration of veterans affairs and military pensions for the 200,000 Voltaic veterans of French service. These veterans represent a pool of trained manpower as well as a potential pressure group. Shortly after independence the United States provided $77,000 for military equipment to be used in Army civic action projects and trained 24 students under the MAP. Israel has also furnished some police training and police advisors.

Military service for two years is compulsory by law but the armed forces are kept up to strength by volunteers. The Army numbers 1,500 and is organized as one infantry battalion, an armored car reconnaissance squadron, a paratroop company, and an engineer company. The Air Force is 50 strong and operates one C-47 transport, and one Aero Commander 500B light transport, and two Broussard liaison aircraft. Major air bases are Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. There is a National Guard, or gendarmerie, of 1,500.

ZAIRE*

Formerly Congo (Kinshasa)
République de Zaïre
Republic of Zaire

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 905,559 square miles
Population: 23,380,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 46,000 (excluding Internal Security Police and Gendarmerie; 0.19% population)
Gross National Product: $2.18 billion ($93 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $85 million (3.89% GNP)
Fuel Production: Coal: 102,000 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 3.19 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 7 ships; 39,317 gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: 7 jet, 8 turboprop, and 27 piston transports

*The name was adopted in 1971. It is an early (1484) Portuguese transliteration of a Bantu word meaning "big river", and is a name for the Congo River.

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

President Joseph Mobutu, former Army Commander in Chief, who seized control of a government torn by internal dissension in November 1965, is also Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He controls the Armed Forces through the Military High Command, a council of senior commanders.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

Policies have centered on building a competent and loyal military force with help from the Western powers, securing the borders against the infiltration of arms and agents by Communists and other dissidents, preventing secession, and extending government control throughout the land.

Despite past attempts of radical African states at subversion in Zaire, it joins them in supporting the Southern African liberation movements and actively supports the Angolan nationalist groups by according recognition and allowing their bases to be located in Zaire.

The armed forces are maintained by voluntary enlistment.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Dominating central Africa, and rich in copper, cobalt, uranium, and other minerals, the Congo—as Zaire was called in the colonial era—was a prize that fell to Belgium in the late 19th Century. Since independence (1960) it has been a target for communist subversion. The secession of mineral-rich Katanga was an attempt by the Katangans (apparently with Belgian encouragement) to salvage the mining area from the chaos which for several years engulfed the rest of the country. The Katanga secession and a serious army revolt were put down by a four-year occupation of much of the country by a UN peacekeeping force of 15-20,000 troops. Concurrently a massive UN and Western training and technical assistance program sought to prepare the Congo for self-government and self-defense.

After the UN forces withdrew in 1964, the northeast Congo erupted in communist-led tribal warfare. Russian and Chinese arms were delivered via Sudan; an insurgent cadre was trained in the radical African states and communist countries, and foreign communist agents (including Cubans) were active in the rebel leadership. With the help of white mercenary commandos, who were supported by a mercenary air force (reportedly US-sponsored) the rebellion was suppressed by 1965. Subsequent brief revolts in 1966 and 1967 were suppressed. Scattered instances of tribal and religious violence have been promptly brought under control.

That Zaire has survived a decade of almost uninterrupted threats and violence is a tribute both to the determination of the Mobutu government and the patience and support of the UN and the West. Since 1967 there have been minor outbreaks of tribal and religious violence which were quickly brought

under control. Development of the economy and governmental functions continues and appears to be succeeding. In 1970 the most serious continuing external danger was ameliorated, if not resolved, by renewal of diplomatic ties with its neighbor, Congo (Brazzaville). The possibility of retaliation by Portugal for support to the Angolan rebels continue to pose a problem of border security despite the rapprochement with Brazzaville.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

After the UN had put down the army revolt and the Katanga secession, the government invited, through the UN, six nations to assist in rebuilding the armed forces as an effective force for internal security and defense of the borders. Belgium has trained the ground forces, Italy the air force, Norway the naval element, Israel the paratroop-commandos, Canada the communications and transport units, and the United States has provided supply and administrative support. The United States, which had paid half the $500 million cost of the UN intervention, contributed $26.3 million in military assistance from 1964 through 1972 and over $1.7 million in excess military stocks through 1971. Under the MAP 541 have been trained. Italy's initial contribution was about $5 million. Belgian aid has been slightly over $1 million a year, and some 500 Belgian adviser-instructors work with the army. Nigeria has assisted in police training. An organization known as WIGMO (Western International Ground Maintenance Organization, alleged to be a US instrument) has kept the government's aircraft in operation and provided the pilots, mostly Cuban exiles. During the 1967 revolt Ghana helped ease the pilot shortage by sending pilots to fly armed trainers.

ALLIANCES

Zaire has no alliances other than military aid agreements with countries named above. It is a member of the UN and the OAU. It withdrew from OCAM in 1972.

ARMY

Personnel: 45,000

Organization:
- 1 parachute division
- 6 brigades
- 6 parachute battalions
- 12 infantry battalions
- 1 heavy weapons battalion
- 4 commando battalions
- support units

Major Equipment Inventory:
- 10 medium tanks
- scout cars (Ferret and M-3)
- 80 armored cars (AML-60 and AML-90)
- light artillery pieces

NAVY

Personnel: 150

Major Units:
- 1 river gunboat (PGR)
- 6 patrol boats (YP)

AIR FORCE

Personnel: 850

Organization:
- 2 air groups
  - 3 light ground attack squadrons (T-6, T-28D, Magister, MB326GB)
  - 1 light reconnaissance squadron (Pembroke)
  - 3 transport squadrons (C-54, C-47, Caribou)
  - 1 light transport squadron (Dove, C-45, Heron)
  - 2 helicopter squadrons (Alouette II/III, Bell 47, SA-330 Puma)
  - 2 training squadrons (SF-260M, T-6)
  - 2 logistic support squadrons (C-46, Caribou, C-130)
  - 1 liaison squadron (Do-27/28, Auster)

Major Aircraft Types:
- 44 combat aircraft
  - 8 T-28D armed trainers
  - 10 T-6G armed trainers
  - 9 Magister armed trainers
  - 17 Aermacchi MB326GB light ground attack aircraft
- 103 other aircraft
  - 4 Pembroke reconnaissance aircraft
  - 2 C-54 transports
  - 2 C-130 transports
  - 10 C-47 transports
  - 6 C-46 transports
  - 4 Caribou transports
  - 11 light transports
  - 6 liaison aircraft
  - 12 SIAI-Marchetti SF260M trainers
  - 8 T-6 trainers
  - 4 L-29 Delfin trainers
  - 34 helicopters (Alouette II and III, Bell 47, and Puma)

Major Air Bases: Kinshasa, Kisangani, Lubumbashi, Luluabourg, Mbandaka, Kamina, Likasi, and Kolweze

PARAMILITARY

There is a civil police force of 21,000, about half trained for internal security. The police operate a small water patrol force in three locations: in the Zaire estuary from Matadi to the sea, on the Zaire River where it forms the border with Congo (Brazzaville), and on Lake Tanganyika.

There are six National Guard and seven Gendarmerie battalions of unknown strength.

ZAMBIA

Republic of Zambia

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 290,724 square miles
Population: 4,700,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 7,600 (including internal security forces; 0.16% population)
Gross National Product: $1.99 billion ($423 per capita)
Annual Military Expenditures: $20 million (1% GNP)
Fuel Production: Coal: 623,000 metric tons
Electric Power Output: 1.2 billion kwh
Civil Air Fleet: 3 jet, 4 turboprop transports

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES AND POSTURE

Since independence in October 1964, Zambia has been governed by a strong presidential form of government. The President is commander in chief of the Zambia Defence Force and controls it through the Minister of Defence. Legislative responsibility for implementation of defense policy and for budgeting is shared by the President and Parliament.

Zambia is a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, and the OAU. It is nonaligned in international affairs, but is a proponent of majority rule by Africans in Southern Africa.

While opposing Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, and its white-dominated government, Zambia is economically dependent on Rhodesia and so maintains a formal but tenuous relationship, frequently punctuated by mutual recriminations. Zambia is implementing plans to reduce this dependence by developing its own hydroelectric power sources and coal mines, building an oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam and, in conjunction with Tanzania, has accepted Communist China's offer to build a railroad from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The first track of the new line was laid in October of 1970 and it is due for completion in 1974, 18 months ahead of the original schedule. The railway's great benefit to Zambia will be in moving its copper exports, greatest in the world, to port without dependence on white-controlled Rhodesia, Angola, or Mozambique. The Soviet Union has repeatedly offered armaments, but the offers have been turned down on the grounds that this action would turn Zambia into an ideological battleground between East and West.

In 1965, despite sympathy for Southern African liberation movements, because of fear of reprisals Zambia forbade use of its territory for their military training or for transshipment of arms to the south. However, because of its large size, rugged terrain, and small armed forces and police—and particularly its geographic location—Zambia has to some extent become a forward base and sanctuary for freedom fighters of liberation organizations generally headquartered in Tanzania.

Zambia is traversed by the only convenient land routes for the northern-based Southern African liberation movements to get to Rhodesia, South Africa, and Southwest Africa. Similarly, Angolan and Mozambique liberation guerrillas operate on both sides of the border, and Portuguese counter-insurgency forces occasionally cross the ill-defined frontier in hot pursuit. Zambia is realistically apprehensive about violation of its territorial integrity by counter-insurgency forces, or even the possible retaliatory occupation of portions of Zambia, and so Zambian police reluctantly attempt to inhibit guerrilla activity. Following incidents near the border, Rhodesia closed its Zambia border in January 1973; copper from Zambia was to be permitted to cross despite the closure. Rhodesia then offered to open the border early in February 1973, but Zambia both refused to ship copper through Rhodesia before the February reopening and refused to ship anything after the reopening. Determined not to be dependent on Rhodesia, it used longer routes that avoided Rhodesia. Zambia received $50 million in grants and low-interest loans after a UN appeal in March, with Communist China, Canada, the United States, and West Germany among those contributing most.

Completion of the pipeline and railroad through Tanzania to Dar es Salaam, the development of coal and hydroelectric power to reduce dependency on Rhodesia, and expansion and improvement of its Defence Forces and police will enable Zambia to abandon its current reluctant policy of neutrality.

Financing of the Defence Force and concurrent economic expansion are permitted by Zambia's copper wealth. This, and the concomitant economic growth and social services it provides, have made for relative political stability. The 70,000 whites in government posts, industry, and trade are closely watched; they are not yet a divisive factor, although considered a potential danger.

Upon independence British military equipment in Zambia was turned over to the Defence Force, and additional equipment has since been granted or sold by Britain. Until recently the recruiting of white officers and NCOs was permitted by Britain, which made up deficiencies by secondment from the British Army and Royal Air Force. Training of Zambian personnel, including officer cadets, has been conducted in Britain, Canada, and Ireland. Israeli instructor-advisers are working with the police Special Branch (counterintelligence). However, Zambianization of the Defence Force has become a matter of national policy. In 1970, the British commander of the Zambian Army was replaced by a Zambian. In 1971 fifteen British officers in the Zambian Defence Force were dismissed and ordered to leave the country. Their positions were taken over by Zambians.

Military service is voluntary. The Zambian Army consists of about 4,500 troops organized into one brigade of three infantry battalions and one reconnaissance squadron; other units are one artillery battery, one engineer company, and one signal company. Equipment includes 30 Ferret scout cars and sixteen 105mm howitzers and Rapier SAMs. There are 2,000 reserves in two Territorial infantry battalions and special detachments.

The Air Force of 1,000 operates 24 combat aircraft, four Jastreb, 12 MB326 light ground attack, and eight SF-260 armed trainers. There are also two Galeb and six Chipmunk trainers, two C-47 and four Caribou transports, six Beaver and

two Pembroke communication/liaison aircraft and three AB-205 helicopters. On order are 22 more AB-205 helicopters and six more MB326 light ground attack aircraft. Air bases are at Lusaka, Livingstone, Kalabo, Broken Hill, Ndola, Abercorn, Kasama, Mpika, Luwingu, N'changa, and Chingola.

The police forces total at least 6,250 and have taken on increasingly paramilitary characteristics. Among such units are the 1st and 2nd Mobile Police Battalions of 750 men each and four Police Strike Force companies of 150 men each.

APPENDIX II
MINERAL INDUSTRIES OF AFRICA

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[Excerpted from: Mineral Industries of Africa. Washington, US Department of The Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1976.]

ALGERIA

Algeria is a small producer of numerous minerals (antimony, coal, copper, lead and zinc, lime, phosphate rock, pyrites, salt, silver, and sulfur) and is one of Africa's largest producers of barite, bentonite clay, cement, gypsum, iron ore, mercury, natural gas, and petroleum.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production[e]	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Barite	40	50	1	Small	(1)
Mercury (76-lb flasks)	13,300	98	5	Small	(1)
Natural gas (billion cu ft)	335	30	1	230,000	9
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	373	95	2	8,000	1

[e]Estimated. (1) Less than 1%.

ANGOLA

The mineral industry of Angola is a minor factor in the mineral economy of the world, but is of major significance to that nation's economy. Mineral-rich with a small population, Angola has great potential for growth. In 1973 and 1974, a healthy trade surplus and growing oil production were signs of its potential. Following the change of the Government in Portugal on April 25, 1974, however, Angolan productivity took a downturn. Independence was granted to Angola on November 11, 1975.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Asphalt (thousand tons)	[e]50	1	1	530,000	3
Beryl	0.1	57	2	Small	1
Cement	78	14	(1)	NA	NA
Copper, metal content	-	-	-	1,030	(1)
Diamond (thousand carats)	2,100	100	5	100,000	9
Gold (troy oz)	2	-	(1)	660	(1)
Granite (cu m)	[e]9,000	73	(1)	Large	5
Gypsum	40	15	(1)	Large	5
Iron ore, gross weight	5,800	90	1	2,200,000	1
Marble (cu m)	[e]1,500	1.5	(1)	Large	10
Natural gas (billion cu ft)	24	0	(1)	1,448	(1)
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	61	97	(1)	1,300	(1)
Salt, marine	100	25	(1)	NA	NA

[e]Estimated. NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

BENIN

The mineral industry of Benin makes no significant contribution to the mineral economy of the world and very little to the nation's economy. In 1974, small amounts of salt (2,500 tons) from seawater, gravel (15,000 tons), and cement (90,000 tons) from imported clinker were produced.

BOTSWANA

The mineral industry of Botswana is not significant in the mineral economy of the world. The country has sizable reserves and resources, which promise to form a more solid industrial base. The Government encourages free enterprise in mining, and as a result, the mineral industry has been a major contributory factor in the nation's rapid expansion in recent years.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Coal	33	0	(1)	5,000,000	(1)
Copper, metal	2	100	(1)	480	(1)
Diamond (thousand carats):					
Gem	408				
Industrial	2,310	100	6	100,000	10
Nickel, metal	0.9	100	(1)	500	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

BURUNDI

The mineral industry of Burundi is not significant in the mineral economy of the world and is of minor importance to the economy of the country. Mineral production in 1974 was limited to small tonnages of bastnäsite (rare earth) and cassiterite (tin) concentrates, lime, small quantities of placer gold, and unmeasured amounts of peat and common construction materials, such as stone, sand and gravel, and clay.

Role in world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	Estimated 1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Estimated reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Rare earths	0.1	100	1	1	1
Tin	.05	100	1	.5	1
Nickel	-	-	-	4,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

The nation's mineral industry is small and provides only a minute fraction of its gross domestic product (GDP). In recent years, production of gold, stone, and cassiterite have been reported. Primary aluminum metal and cement are also produced. The nation has other known mineral resources that are not currently exploited.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Tin (metal)	36	50	(1)	Small	(1)
Aluminum	34	65	(1)	NA	NA
Cement	201	29	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The mineral industry of the Central African Republic is a minor element in the mineral economy of the world but is a major factor in the country's development. Current mineral production is limited to diamonds. Development of a uranium deposit is a possibility. The mineral industry is important to the country's economy, contributing about 30% of the total exports. Government policies, along with the country's isolation and limited market, have hindered growth of the industry.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand carats)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Diamond	450	100	1	10,000	1

CHAD

The mineral industry of Chad is not a significant factor in the mineral economy of the world. Deposits of bauxite, iron, tin, tungsten, kaolin, and bentonite have been found. Also recorded have been traces of copper, nickel, and uranium. The Continental Oil Co. of Chad began searching for oil in 1969. By late 1975 about $14 million had been invested by the company in seismic testing and experimental drilling, the latter near Doba in the south and in Kanem Prefecture north of Lake Chad. Although some oil-bearing rock was found, it was not porous enough to permit extraction in commercial quantities.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Trona	5	40	(1)	5,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The mineral industry of the People's Republic of the Congo is not an important factor in the mineral economy of the world. The country has significant reserves of potash but only modest reserves of lead, zinc, copper, petroleum, and natural gas. The mineral industry, particularly the petroleum industry, has been a major factor in the country's recent development, and much of the country's present growth prospects depend on the vitality of this basic industry.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 mine production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world reserves (%)
Gold (thousand troy oz)	1	100	(1)	150	(1)
Copper, metal	1.5	100	(1)	80	(1)
Lead, metal	4	100	(1)	330	(1)
Zinc, metal	2.4	100	(1)	220	(1)
Natural gas (million cu ft)	709	-	(1)	15,000	(1)
Petroleum (million 42-gal bbl)	18	100	(1)	250	(1)
Potash	465	99+	(1)	4,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

The mineral resources of the Arab Republic of Egypt are not significantly developed. The country has important reserves and resources of iron, manganese, natural gas, petroleum, phosphate rock, salt, gypsum, and sand.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Iron ore	e1,300	20	(1)	400,000	(1)
Natural gas (billion cu ft)	15	None	(1)	4,000	(1)
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	54	e5	(1)	3,900	(1)
Phosphate rock	550	30	(1)	200,000	1.0

eEstimated. (1) Less than 1%.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

The mineral industry of Equatorial Guinea is not a significant factor in the mineral economy of the world. There is no reported mineral production, but it is presumed that small amounts of stone and sand and gravel are quarried for local use.

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia's contribution to the mineral economy of the world is very minor. The country has potential, however, in mineral deposits as yet unexploited. Although only a few minerals are exported, a wide variety are produced for local consumption. Recent internal political strife has hampered mineral exploration and development.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	208	0	(1)	NA	NA
Copper, metal	0.4	100	(1)	160	(1)
Gold (thousand troy oz)	16	0	(1)	2,500	(1)
Gypsum	12	0	(1)	Medium	(1)
Limestone	48	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Platinum (troy oz)	230	0	(1)	190,000	(1)
Salt	132	6	(1)	Small	(1)
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	3,800	10	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

THE FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND ISSAS

The mineral industry of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas makes no contribution to the mineral economy of the world. Mineral trade consists primarily of imports and reexports of petroleum products, cement, metals, and semimanufactured metal products. Exploratory work for a geothermal source of energy was proceeding in otherwise barren basalt fields. The reopening of the Suez Canal and events in Ethiopia and Somalia have resulted in a rise in strategic importance of Port Djibouti. A salt works was planned for Djibouti.

GABON

The mineral industry of Gabon makes significant contribution to the mineral economy of the world and to the economy of the nation itself. Gabon is Africa's fourth-largest oil producer (after Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria) and is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The country is also an important producer of uranium and manganese. Gabon's phenomenal increase (199% since 1972) in gross domestic product for 1974 was a result of increased commodity prices as well as increased production of minerals.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	80	0	(1)	NA	NA
Gold (thousand troy oz)	7	100	(1)	100	(1)
Manganese ore	2,200	100	10	190,000	5
Uranium, U_3O_8 content	0.8	100	4	24	5
Natural gas, marketed (million cu ft)	1,600	0	(1)	6,500,000	(1)
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	74	88	(1)	1,250	(1)
Petroleum products (million 42-gal bbl)	6	(1)	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

GAMBIA

The mineral industry of Gambia is a negligible factor in the world economy and consists chiefly of trade (import) in mineral commodities. Small amounts of unrecorded sand and gravel are reportedly produced for local consumption. Mineral activity has been reported, however, with recent exploration efforts for kaolin, ilmenite, and oil.

GHANA

The mineral industry of Ghana makes a minor but significant contribution to the world mineral economy, and forms an important part of the Ghanaian economy. Minerals mined include diamonds, gold, bauxite, and manganese. Salt is produced from marine sources, granite is mined for building stone, and some clays are mined for use in bricks and ceramics. Ghana also has an aluminum smelter, an oil refinery, and two cement plants that utilize imported clinker.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Aluminum:					
Bauxite, gross weight	360	92	0.5	330,000	1.5
Smelter, metal	160	91	1.2	NA	NA
Cement	450	(1)	(1)	NA	NA
Diamond (thousand carats):					
Gem	260	100	6	7,000	2.5
Industrial	2,300	100	-	23,000	-
Gold (thousand troy oz)	760	100	2	4,000	(1)
Manganese, ore and concentrate	300	100	1	900	(1)
Salt, marine	45	(1)	(1)	NA	NA
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	8,500	25	1	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

GUINEA

Nearly all of the mineral industry of Guinea is based on the production of bauxite. Guinea has approximately one-fourth of the world's bauxite reserves and was expected to be the third largest producer in 1976. Bauxite and alumina are the principal sources of Guinea's export earnings.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Aluminum:					
Bauxite	6,600	70	8	4,600,000	17
Alumina	660	100	2	NA	NA
Diamond (thousand carats)	80	100	(1)	500	(1)

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

GUINEA-BISSAU

Guinea-Bissau makes no contribution to the mineral economy of the world. The country has no important mineral production, depending upon agricultural products and timber for exports and exchange earnings. Only small amounts of marine salt, sand, gravel, and stone are reportedly produced for local consumption. The main mineral commodities imported are cement, iron and steel semimanufactures, and mineral fuels. Formerly Portuguese Guinea, the new nation was granted independence on September 10, 1974.

IVORY COAST

The mineral industry is a minor factor in the Ivory Coast economy and consists primarily in the production of diamonds. Petroleum products are refined from imported crude and cement is manufactured from imported clinker. A manganese mine was closed in 1970 due to reserve depletion.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	630	3	0.1	NA	NA
Diamond (thousand carats)	280	100	0.6	5,000	1
Petroleum products (million 42-gal bbl)	9	9	0.05	NA	NA

NA Not applicable.

KENYA

The mineral industry of Kenya is not a significant factor in the mineral economy of the world. Mineral resources are either undetermined or undeveloped. The production of cement, soda ash, limestone, and fluorspar accounts for 88% of the total value of Kenya's mineral output.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	880	47	0	NA	NA
Soda ash	200	72	5	Small	(1)
Stone	2,200	5	(1)	Large	(1)
Fluorspar	27	95	1	Large	(1)

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

LESOTHO

The mineral industry of Lesotho is insignificant in the mineral economy of the world. The country's only current mineral product is diamond, of which it is a minor producer; there are no other known mineral resources of commercial quality.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand carats)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Diamond	11	100	(1)	300	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

LIBERIA

The mineral industry of Liberia is a minor factor in the mineral economy of the world, but it is significant to the economy of the nation itself. Liberia produces notable amounts of iron ore and diamonds. Refined oil products and cement are produced from imported crude materials.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Diamond (thousand carats):					
Industrial	259	100	1	10,000	1
Gem	377	100	-		
Iron ore, gross weight	24,000	100	3	700,000	(1)
Cement	90	(1)	(1)	NA	NA
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	4,000	(1)	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

LIBYA

The mineral industry of Libya is centered on petroleum and natural gas; production of other minerals is insignificant. Oil production in 1974 ranked 11th in the world, but natural gas production was small by world standards.

Role in the world mineral supply

Major commodities	1974 production*	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Natural gas (billion cu ft)	425	20	1	27,000	1
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	555	99	3	31,000	4

*Estimated.

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

The outstanding feature of the mineral economy of the Malagasy Republic is the varied mineralization fairly well distributed throughout the country. Despite this varied mineralization, development of large deposits of economic minerals is the exception rather than the rule. The country's agricultural economy prevails. There is little market for indigenous mineral products so mineral development has been limited to those with export markets.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Chromite ore	160	64	2	7,000	4
Graphite, flake	17	98	4	30,000	10
Mica, phlogopite	1	100	(1)	25	25

(1) Less than 1%.

MALAWI

The mineral industry of Malawi is of minor significance to the mineral economy of the world. It is also of little significance to the economy of the nation itself, with exception of the far-reaching effects of inflationary imported fertilizer and petroleum prices. Mineral production consists of cement, dolomite, agates, and small amounts of sand and gravel for local use. Mineral exploration has continued at a fairly high level, and much interest has been shown in Malawi's coal and carbonatites. Imports of refined petroleum products account for about 15% of the total import value.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	81	(1)	(1)	NA	NA
Dolomite-limestone	124	0	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

MALI

The mineral industry of Mali contributes very little to the world economy. Production of modest amounts of cement, marble, salt, and gold are known, but because reliable figures were not available in 1974, only estimates can be given. Mineral exploitation of other commodities remained in the research stage.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	48	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Marble	3	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Salt	3	30	(1)	23,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

MAURITANIA

The mineral industry of Mauritania is a minor factor in the mineral economy of the world, but it is significant to the economy of the nation itself. Iron mining is the dominant mineral industry, but copper, gypsum, salt, and small amounts of byproduct gold are also produced. The iron mines were nationalized in 1974, and the copper mines in 1975. The Government is moving ahead with studies aimed at a copper smelter at Nouakchott, a steel mill, and a petroleum refinery at Nouadhibou.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise indicated)

Major commodities	1974 mine production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world reserves (%)
Copper, metal	20	100	(1)	670	(1)
Gypsum	8	-	(1)	11,000	(1)
Iron ore and concentrate	13,000	100	1	1,500,000	(1)
Salt, marine	1	0	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

MOROCCO

The mineral industry of Morocco is dominated by the production and export of phosphate rock. Although other minerals are produced for the export markets, including antimony, cobalt, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, silver, and barite, the quantities are small, and the total value is about one-tenth that derived from phosphate rock exports. All mines, subsidiary operations, and infrastructures are State owned.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Antimony	2	100	3	20	(1)
Cobalt	1,800	100	6	7	(1)
Copper	5	98	(1)	200	(1)
Iron ore	500	100	(1)	50,000	(1)
Lead	100	96	2	1,500	1
Manganese ore	780	80	1	1,000	(1)
Silver (thousand troy oz)	3,137	100	1	10,000	(1)
Barite	100	100	2	6,000	(1)
Phosphate rock	19,700	97	18	10,000,000	72

(1) Less than 1%.

MOZAMBIQUE

The mineral industry of Mozambique makes a very minor contribution to the mineral economy of the world, although the country has sizable mineral resources. After the change in the Portuguese Government on April 25, 1974, production decreased 50% in some mineral commodities. Independence was granted to Mozambique on June 25, 1975.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Aluminum, bauxite	3	0	(1)	60,000	(1)
Beryl concentrate	-	100	(1)	150	2
Cement	470	7	(1)	NA	NA
Clays, bentonite	1	24	(1)	15,000	(1)
Coal, bituminous	430	21	(1)	400,000	3
Columbite--tantalite concentrate	90	100	(1)	Medium	10
Copper ore, metal content	0.6	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Feldspar	1	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Fluorite	-	0	(1)	660	(1)
Limestone	5	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Mica, scrap	0.8	0	(1)	Small	(1)
Salt	21	17	(1)	Small	(1)
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	3,500	75	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

NIGER

The mineral industry of Niger has become more important to the country's economy in recent years owing to the mining of uranium near Arlit. Although the industry remains small compared with the agricultural sector, mining is the principal employer of industrial labor, and uranium is the most valuable export commodity. Aside from uranium, mineral production in 1974 was limited to limestone and gypsum (for cement), tin concentrate, salt, minor quantities of gold, and various amounts of crude construction materials, such as stone, sand and gravel, and clay.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Estimated reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	21	5	(1)	NA	NA
Coal	-	-	-	4,500	(1)
Gypsum	2	-	(1)	Small	(1)
Iron ore	-	-	-	100,000	(1)
Limestone	40	-	(1)	Large	(1)
Salt	2	5	(1)	Small	(1)
Tin	.1	100	(1)	Small	(1)
Uranium (U_3O_8)	1	100	(2)6	(3)52,000	(4)6

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%. (2) Exclusive of centrally controlled economies. (3) To $15 per pound U_3O_8. (4) To $30 per pound U_3O_8.

NIGERIA

The minerals industry of Nigeria is dominated by the petroleum industry, and the importance of the petroleum sector to the Nigerian economy is overwhelming. In 1974, petroleum provided 93% of Nigeria's export earnings, about 90% of Government revenues, and 47% of the gross domestic product. Total output reached 823 million barrels, making Nigeria the world's sixth-largest oil producer. Nigeria was the second leading supplier of crude to the United States in 1974 and the largest supplier in 1975.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Columbium concentrate, gross weight	1.3	100	5	300	4
Tin	5.5	100	2	300	3
Cement	1,200	0	(1)	NA	NA
Coal	350	5	(1)	Small	
Natural gas (million cu ft)	14,300	NA	(1)	Large	NA
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	823	90	4	20,000	3

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

RWANDA

The mineral industry in Rwanda is limited principally to tin ore and wolfram, and is the second most important source of foreign exchange after agricultural products.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 mine production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world reserves (%)
Beryl	0.1	100	3	340	1
Columbium-tantalum (thousand lb)	70	100	(1)	Small	(1)
Tin	1	100	1	20	(1)
Tungsten	0.3	100	1	3	1

(1) Less than 1%.

SENEGAL

Mining is limited to phosphate rock and minor amounts of salt, attapulgite (fuller's earth), and building stone. Prospecting for copper, chromium, and oil is continuing by several international companies, but commercial deposits have not been located.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Phosphate rock	1,900	100	2	130,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

SIERRA LEONE

The mineral industry of Sierra Leone is of minor significance to the mineral economy of the world, but is of major importance to the economy of the nation itself. Sierra Leone ranks seventh in the world's production of diamonds, the principal mineral export. Mineral production includes bauxite, iron ore, marine salt, gold, and petroleum refinery products. Sierra Leone imports all crude petroleum and cement needed.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Aluminum, bauxite	700	100	0.9	130,000	(1)
Diamond (thousand carats):					
Gem	670	100	4	3,000	2
Industrial	1,000	100		23,000	
Iron ore	2,000	100	(1)	100,000	(1)
Marine salt	4,000	(1)	(1)	NA	NA
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	1,800	30	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

SOMALIA

The mineral industry of the Somali Democratic Republic is not a significant factor in the mineral economy of the world. Mineral trade consists largely of imports and reexports, including refined petroleum products. Mineral production is largely confined to marine salt, meerschaum, sandstone for local building and reportedly a small amount of piezoelectric quartz and tin. An oil refinery, cement factory, and new salt works are planned. Petroleum and uranium prospecting is active.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The mineral industry of the Republic of South Africa is a significant factor in the mineral economy of the world. The country has large reserves and resources of many minerals and in 1974 was the world's leading producer of gold, antimony, vanadium, and gem diamonds, and also was one of the top three producers of asbestos, chromite, industrial diamonds, manganese, platinum-group metals, uranium, and vermiculite. The mineral industry has been the major factor in the country's development and continues to be the principal support upon which the country's strong economic growth is based. The Government encourages free enterprise in mining and, as a result, the industry is one of the most viable and highly developed in the world.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Antimony	15	98	23	140	5
Asbestos, all types	330	96	8	6,000	10
Chromite ore, gross weight	1,900	46	25	1,100,000	77
Coal	66,000	4	3	37,000,000	(1)
Copper	180	59	3	4,800	(1)
Diamond (thousand carats)	7,500	90	20	50,000	30
Fluorspar	200	64	5	14,000	15
Gold (thousand troy oz)	24,300	95	64	800,000	53
Iron ore, gross weight	11,000	20	1	4,200,000	1
Manganese ore, gross weight	4,700	87	19	2,000,000	30
Nickel	22	60	3	400	1
Phosphate rock, gross weight	8,000	10	2	250,000	1
Platinum-group metals (thousand troy oz)	2,800	80	35	400,000	65
Uranium, U_3O_8	3	75	13	200	20
Vanadium, V_2O_5 content	15	95	43	1,800	32
Vermiculite	180	95	31	4,000	10

(1) Less than 1%.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The mineral industry is an important element in the economy of Southern Rhodesia. The major revenue-producing minerals are asbestos, chromite, coal, copper, gold, and nickel, although over 40 different kinds of minerals including iron, tin, phosphates, and lithium are also produced. The value of mineral production totaled over $289 million in 1974.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Asbestos	150	90	4	5,000	10
Chromite	650	95	9	560,000	20
Coal	3,100	45	(1)	2,000,000	(1)
Copper	41	90	1	600	(1)
Gold (thousand troy oz)	800	95	2	20,000	(1)
Nickel	18	95	2	700,000	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

(International Territory)

The mineral industry of South-West Africa is the most important sector in the country's economy. South-West Africa is a significant world producer of gem diamonds, arsenic, vanadium, lead, zinc, and lithium minerals and is expected to become a major producer of uranium within the next few years.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Arsenic	7	100	17	Small	(1)
Cadmium	0.2	100	1	2	(1)
Copper	32	100	1	2,000	(1)
Diamond (thousand carats):					
Gem	1,500	99	12	Large	5
Industrial	80	100	1	Small	(1)
Lead	60	100	2	Small	(1)
Lithium minerals	6	100	2	Small	(1)
Silver (thousand troy oz)	1,500	100	1	15,000	(1)
Tin	0.7	100	1	Small	(1)
Uranium	-	-	-	(2)100	5
Vanadium	0.8	100	4	Small	(1)
Tungsten	0.2	100	1	Small	(1)
Zinc	40	100	1	300	(1)

(1) Less than 1%. (2) To $30 per pound U_3O_8.

SPANISH SAHARA

Phosphate rock is the only mineral extracted or processed in the Spanish Sahara.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Phosphate rock	2,200	91	2	1,700,000	4

SUDAN

Mining in Sudan is mainly confined to small-scale gold operations, a salt industry based on solar evaporation of Red Sea water and building stone, gypsum, mica, talc, and chromite mining. Sudan also has a cement plant and oil refinery. The mineral industry of Sudan is a minor factor in the mineral economy of the world.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	300	0	(1)	NA	NA
Chromite ore	20	100	(1)	1,500	(1)
Gypsum	30	0	(1)	Medium	(1)
Magnesite	0.1	0	(1)	2,500	(1)
Salt	50	1	(1)	NA	NA
Talc	5	-	(1)	Small	(1)
Petroleum products (thousand 42-gal bbl)	6,000	2	(1)	NA	NA

NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

SWAZILAND

The mineral industry of Swaziland makes a significant contribution to the nation's economy. The nation is also one of the world's six long-fiber chrysotile asbestos producers. Iron ore and coal are also produced along with small amounts of kaolin, barite, pyrophyllite, and tin. Transportation is a critical factor for most of Swaziland's mineral industry.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Asbestos, chrysotile	32	100	1	320	5
Barite	.3	100	(1)	750	(1)
Clays, kaolin	2	100	(1)	260	(1)
Coal, bituminous	116	100	(1)	200,000	3
Iron ore	2,480	100	(1)	30,000	(1)
Pyrophyllite	.04	100	(1)	Small	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

TANZANIA

The mineral industry of Tanzania is a small factor in the mineral economy of the world. The principal minerals exported are diamonds, tin ores, salt, and gem stones. Agriculture is the main source of wealth. The Government discourages free enterprise.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand carats)

Major commodity	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Diamond	339	99	1	6,000	1

TOGO

The mineral industry of Togo is of minor importance to the mineral economy of the world, but is a major factor in the country's economic development. Phosphate rock is the predominant mineral product, and cement production may be expanded. Other current mineral output includes marble, other construction materials, and salt. Despite the recent nationalization, the Government continues to welcome foreign private investment.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cement	130	0	(1)	NA	NA
Phosphate rock	2,600	100	2	e54,000	1

eEstimated. NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

TUNISIA

The natural gas, petroleum, and phosphate rock sectors of the mineral industry, although small by world standards, are the key elements in the Government's efforts to industrialize Tunisia's predominantly agricultural economy. Additionally, attention is being given to expanding production of barite, cement, fluorspar, iron ore, lead, salt, silver, and zinc.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Fluorspar	28	95	1	1,700	1
Natural gas (billion cu ft)	50	0	(1)	1,800	(1)
Petroleum, crude (million 42-gal bbl)	32	72	(1)	1,200	(1)
Phosphate rock	3,800	62	3	500,000	2

(1) Less than 1%.

UGANDA

The mineral industry of Uganda is a small factor in the mineral economy of the world. Blister copper is the major item of mineral production in terms of value. Cement, phosphatic fertilizer materials, salt, beryl concentrates, tin concentrates, and tungsten concentrates are also produced. The main source of wealth is agriculture, from which over 90% of the population derives its livelihood.

UPPER VOLTA

Upper Volta produced no commercial quantities of minerals in 1974. Great potential is being recognized, however, as agreements are signed and development proceeds on the country's sizable reserves of manganese, limestone, and marble.

REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

Zaire is the world's largest producer of cobalt, germanium, and industrial diamond and is sixth in mine production of copper. The essentially State-controlled mineral industry dominates the economy of Zaire and contributes over two-thirds of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Zaire is a charter member of the Conseil Intergouvernemental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre (CIPEC).

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 mine production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Cadmium	0.3	100	1	10	(1)
Cement°	470	Nil	(1)	NA	NA
Coal	100	Nil	(1)	500,000	(1)
Cobalt	17	100	57	700	15
Columbium-tantalite, concentrates	0.5	100	(1)	78	26
Copper	500	98	99	20,000	4
Diamond (thousand carats)	13,600	100	38	500,000	73
Germanium (thousand kg)	62	100	55	1,800	2
Gold (thousand troy oz)	130	-	(1)	13,000	(1)
Manganese, ore	310	75	(1)	8,000	(1)
Petroleum products (million 42-gal bbl)°	6	10	(1)	500	(1)
Silver (thousand troy oz)	1,700	-	(1)	40,000	(1)
Tin, metal	4	100	2	180	2
Tungsten, concentrate	0.3	100	(1)	3	(1)
Zinc	70	100	1	2,000	(1)

°Estimated. NA Not applicable. (1) Less than 1%.

ZAMBIA

The mining industry is the most important sector of the Zambian economy. Copper mining contributes over 40% of the value of gross domestic product. It accounts for over 95% of the total export value, and is expected to continue as the principal national income earner. Prospecting continued in all areas with particular attention to minerals other than copper in an effort by the Government toward diversification. Expansion plans were instituted for the gypsum mine, and production of feldspar and fluorspar was begun. The country became self-sufficient in coal supplies with the startup of the Maamba coalfield.

Role in the world mineral supply
(Thousand metric tons, unless otherwise specified)

Major commodities	1974 production	Estimated share of production exported (%)	Share of world output (%)	Reserves	Share of total world resources (%)
Beryl	0.2	100	6	11	1
Cobalt	3	60	10	Small	(1)
Copper	700	95	9	27,000	7
Gold (troy oz)	5,800	100	(1)	Small	(1)
Lead	25	75	(1)	Small	(1)
Silver (thousand troy oz)	290	100	(1)	Small	(1)
Zinc	82	60	(1)	Small	(1)
Coal	810	-	(1)	Small	(1)

(1) Less than 1%.

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BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State]

APPENDIX A
ALGERIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1975 (Publication 7821).]

background notes

department of state * january 1975

Algeria

OFFICIAL NAME: Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria

GEOGRAPHY

Algeria is situated in northwestern Africa between Morocco and Tunisia, with a coastline of some 620 miles along the Mediterranean Sea. Its large Saharan area in the south is bordered by Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Spanish Sahara.

Two Atlas Mountain ranges that cross the country laterally divide Algeria into three zones. Between the northern Tellian Atlas and the Mediterranean is a narrow but fertile coastal plain (the Tell, Arabic for hill) with a moderate year-round climate and adequate rainfall. Stretching southward from the Tellian to the Saharan Atlas is the High Plateau region averaging 3,000 feet above sea level with limited rainfall and great rocky plains and desert. It is generally devoid of vegetation except for a few oases and intermittent bush and pasture land. The third and by far largest zone, south of the Saharan Atlas, is mostly desert. About 80 percent of the total land area is covered by desert, steppes, wasteland, and mountains.

Algeria's weather is irregular from year to year, but in the north the summers are usually hot with little rainfall. Winter and rain come to the north in October, but frost and snow are rare except in the higher ranges of the Tellian Atlas. Dust and sandstorms are most frequent between February and May.

PEOPLE

Northern Algeria accounts for 12 percent of the total area and 95 percent of the total population, with a density of more than 130 people per square mile. Only about 500,000 people live in the Saharan area. Forty-five percent of the population is urban and there is an increasing migration toward urban areas. Fifty-six percent of the population is under age 20.

Nearly all Algerians are Muslims of Arab, Berber, or mixed Arab-Berber stock. There is a Catholic community

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 919,590 sq. mi. (almost one-third the size of the continental U.S.). CAPITAL: Algiers (pop. 1 million). OTHER CITIES: Oran (pop. 330,000), Constantine (pop. 254,000), Annaba (pop. 170,000).

People

POPULATION: 15.3 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.5% (1974). DENSITY: 16 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arabs and Arabized Berbers. RELIGION: Sunni Moslem (98%). LANGUAGES: Arabic, Berber, French. LITERACY: 25%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 53 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Centralized republic. Rule is by decree. INDEPENDENCE: July 5, 1962.

BRANCHES: *Supreme policymaking and executive legislative bodies*–National Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers, both headed by the President. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: National Liberation Front (FLN). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult for Wilaya and Communal Assemblies. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 31 Wilayas (states) subdivided into communes.

FLAG: Red star and red crescent superimposed on background of green (left half of flag) and white (right half).

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $6.5 billion (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 11.8%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $425 (1974 est.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 9%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 19%. *Labor* 50%. *Products*–wheat, barley, oats, wine, grapes, citrus fruits, olives, vegetables, figs, dates, tobacco, esparto grass, livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 6%. *Products*–petroleum, gas, petrochemicals, fertilizers, iron and steel, textiles, transportation equipment.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, lead, zinc, mercury.

TRADE: *Exports*–$2 billion (1973 est.): crude petroleum products (83%), wine. *Partners*–France (22%), F.R.G. (22%), other EEC countries (18%), U.S. (11%). *Imports*–$1.9 billion (1973 est.): food, capital goods, consumer products. *Partners*–France (33%), F.R.G. (14%), other EEC countries (20%), U.S. (9%).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 4.19 dinars=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$132 million (1972) from free world and multilateral sources. *U.S. only*–$200,000 in PL 480 foodstuffs (1973) for distribution by World Food Program for School Feeding.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab League, Organization of Nonaligned States, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).



of about 45,000 and small Protestant and Jewish communities. Many foreign technicians and teachers, including about 65,000 French and about 1,000 Americans, reside in Algeria. The total foreign European population is estimated at 75,000.

HISTORY

Algeria, whose indigenous tribes were Berbers of Nilotic origin, was successively invaded by the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, and finally the French. The greatest cultural impact came from the Arab invasions of the 8th and 11th centuries A.D. which brought Islam and the Arabic language.

In 1830 France began its conquest of Algeria and proceeded to colonize the territory. Through the develop-

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ment of a modern economic sector, large numbers of Frenchmen were attracted to settle there, most of them engaged in business and agriculture. Northern Algeria was eventually organized into Overseas Departments of France with representatives in the French National Assembly. Control of the country was entirely in French hands, and the rural "traditional" sector where the Muslim population lived remained relatively separated from the modern economic infrastructure of the European community.

The inability of the Algerians to obtain equal political rights, despite French attempts at reform, led to an organized revolt which began on November 1, 1954. The revolution, launched by a small group of nationalist leaders organized into the National Liberation Front (FLN), involved extensive terror and counterterror tactics on both sides. After protracted negotiations, a cease-fire was signed by France and the FLN on March 18, 1962, at Evian, France. The Evian accords also provided for interim administrative arrangements, until a self-determination referendum could be held, and for continuing economic, financial, technical, and cultural relations.

The referendum was held in Algeria on July 1, 1962, and France declared Algeria independent on July 3. The provisional Algerian Government proclaimed July 5, the 132d anniversary of the French entry into Algiers, as National Independence Day.

On September 8, 1963, a constitution was adopted by referendum, and later the same month Ahmed Ben Bella was formally elected President. On June 19, 1965, President Ben Bella was replaced in a bloodless coup d'etat by a National Revolutionary Council headed by Minister of Defense Col. Houari Boumediene. The National Assembly was dissolved and the constitution suspended.

GOVERNMENT

Algeria has a strong centralized government. The National Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers, both headed by the President (Chief of State and Head of Government), frequently meet together and are the source of executive and legislative power. The National Revolutionary Council is composed of military officers and prominent national and regional leaders. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet), predominantly a civilian body, supervises the day-to-day running of the government.

Although the National Assembly and the constitution have been suspended since 1965, the regime of President Boumediene has progressively set up new elected bodies at the local and regional levels. Communal assemblies were instituted in 1967 and *Wilaya* assemblies in 1969, the members of which are elected by universal adult suffrage from lists of two candidates for each seat provided by the FLN, the sole legal political party. (The Algerian Communist Party was formally banned in November 1962.) The assemblies are largely administrative in function without significant political authority. A congress of the presidents of these assemblies is held annually. There is no juridical basis for these meetings, but they have attained quasi-institutional status.

Algeria is divided into 31 *Wilayas* (regional administrative entities) which are further subdivided into *da'iraat* (districts) and 676 communes. Each *Wilaya* is administered by a *Wali* (governor) who is appointed by decree and is responsible to the Minister of the Interior.

Algeria's judicial system is in the process of transition from the French system inherited from the colonial era. All civil, criminal, public, commerical, and family legislation remaining on the books from that period is being reviewed by the National Commission of Legislation and amended to meet Algerian requirements. Comprehensive new codes are being prepared in the areas of commerce, customs, labor, water usage, forests, and grazing lands. The code dealing with family and personal status will continue to be based on Moslem law but administered by the civil courts. The new system will retain at its apex the Supreme Court, which was established in 1963 with responsibility for regulating jurisprudence. The revised legal code is scheduled to be completed by July 5, 1975.

Principal Government Officials

President, Revolutionary Council; President, Council of Ministers; Minister of Defense—Houari Boumediene

Minister of State—Cherif Belkacem

Minister of State for Transport—Rabah Bitat

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Abdelaziz Bouteflika

Interior—Vacant

Agriculture and Agrarian Reform—Larbi Mohamed Tayebi

Finance—Smail Mahroug

Information and Culture—Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi

TRAVEL NOTES

U.S. citizens need a visa to enter Algeria. Travelers should clearly stiplulate both the intended date of entry and planned duration of stay on their visa application forms.

Language–Arabic and Berber are the indigenous languages but French is widely spoken and understood. Notices and most public and business documents are printed in French as well as Arabic. There are French-language newspapers.

Work Week–Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m.-12:00 noon, and 2:30 p.m.-6:00 p.m. Government ministries open for limited business on Saturday mornings; most State corporations are closed on Saturdays. Algerian time is 5 hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time.

Health–Smallpox vaccination is required for entry. Typhoid, tetanus, polio, and cholera inoculations are recommended. Tap water is considered relatively safe in the major cities but less so in the countryside. Reliable bottled water is generally available.

Climate and Clothing–The coastal areas have a mild climate, hot in summer and cool and rainy for several months in winter. Winter clothing is worn almost continuously from November until April, particularly at night. Light topcoats are often needed outdoors. Interiors are not always adequately heated in winter. Rainwear is advisable.

Hotels and Restaurants–Algiers has a chronic hotel shortage, and reservations should be made in advance. There is generally no difficulty getting hotel space in most Algerian cities except in the oases towns of the Sahara during the Christmas and spring vacation periods. Several good restaurants offer European menus; others specialize in North African and Vietnamese food.

Transportation–There are several flights daily between Algiers and Paris and regular air service to a number of other European, African, and Middle Eastern cities. The domestic airline serves Oran, Constantine, Annaba, and many of the Saharan cities including Tamanrasset. There is railway passenger service between the major northern cities and bus service to many of the smaller cities and towns. Good paved roads, one of which links Morocco and Tunisia, cover the northern region and connect the oases cities of Laghouat, Biskra, Touggourt, Ouargla, and Ghardaia. The Trans-Saharan Highway is now surfaced from Ghardaia to a point south of In Salah. Rental cars are available.

Saharan Travel–Factual information on Saharan travel can be obtained by contracting the Algerian Tourist Agency (A.T.A.), Algerian Consulates, and the *Amicale des Sahariens* (Paris: 33, Rue Paul Valery, 16e, Tel. KLE 20-24; Algiers: 14, Avenue du 1er Novembre, Tel. 62-22-02).

Communications–There are international airmail, telegraph, telex, and telephone communications with the United States and Europe. Long-distance calls can be made from any post office.

Prices–Locally produced goods are usually inexpensive, but the contrary is true for imported items. Rents, especially in Algiers and Oran, are extremely high and suitable quarters are scarce. Electricity is very expensive.

Currency and Customs Regulations–Visitors are permitted to bring in any amount of foreign exchange provided it is declared at customs. A special form is provided at the frontier to be completed in duplicate, one copy of which remains with the visitor for presentation on departure. Foreign currency can be exchanged at all banks, seaports, and airports and in some hotels and vacation villages. Unused foreign currency is reexportable on exit.

Each visitor over 17 may bring in 200 cigarettes, 50 cigars, or 400 grams of tobacco, and one liter of alcoholic beverage, provided they are carried in hand luggage.

Justice–Boualem Benhamouda
Higher Education and Scientific Research–Mohamed Seddik Benyahia
Industry and Energy–Belaid Abdesselam
Commerce–Layachi Yaker
Posts and Telecommunications–Said Ait Messaoudene

Ambassador to the U.N.–Abdellatif Rahal
Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim, Washington–Abdelkader Maadini

The Algerian Embassy in the United States is located at 2118 Kalorama Road, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The government of President Boumediene, which came to power in 1965, has been remarkably stable with almost no change at the top ministerial levels. Recently it embarked on a program of reorganizing and revitalizing the FLN to broaden popular participation in the party and to strengthen the mass organizations of peasants, youth, women, and veterans. The Algerian Government espouses the ideology of revolutionary socialism and applies this philosophy to its domestic and foreign policies. Its principal domestic objectives are to achieve economic development as rapidly as possible through industrialization and to raise the standard of living of the Algerian people under a system based on a mixture of socialism and state capitalism.

Major problems facing Algeria are the high rate of unemployment and underemployment; provision of adequate health, educational, and other basic services for its rapidly growing population; a lack of trained high- and middle-level cadres to run the multiplying and technologically complex new industries; and a lagging agricultural sector.

ECONOMY

The Algerian economy is almost totally government-controlled with the central government entirely responsible for economic planning, development, and administration. State enterprises (about 80 in number) and government agencies control much of the foreign trade, almost all of the major industries, large parts of the distribution and retail systems, all public utilities, and the entire banking and credit system.

In the decade following independence, Algeria proceeded to nationalize all major foreign business interests as well as many private Algerian companies. Nationalization ranged from the assumption of a controlling interest in certain cases to complete takeovers in others. The Algerian Government has settled most of the compensation claims by foreign firms whose properties were nationalized. Under the revised Algerian Investment

Code, the government determines the extent to which new domestic or foreign investment will be allowed in a given development project and the conditions under which any such private investment will be obliged to operate. Normally, only those foreign private investments which involve the formation of joint ventures between foreign firms and appropriate Algerian State enterprises are allowed, with the latter retaining a controlling interest. Credit and banking are closed to foreign investment.

The Algerian Government reserves the right of expropriation with compensation within 9 months of the formation of a joint venture, but to date no foreign investments approved under the 1966 Code have been expropriated. Currently nine U.S. private firms have joint venture agreements with Algerian State enterprises, all in petroleum or mining activities, and five U.S. oil companies have joint exploration agreements with the state oil and gas monopoly, SONATRACH.

In the period 1970-73, the gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 11.2 percent; petroleum and natural gas accounted for 19 percent of the total GDP, and industry, much of it petroleum-related, accounted for over 12 percent. With a daily production of about 1 million barrels, Algeria is 13th among the world's producers of oil. However, Algeria has the world's fourth largest natural gas reserves and is investing enormous sums in the development of these deposits for export in liquefied form and as a feedstock for domestic industry. The Algerian Government strongly defends high oil and gas prices on the grounds that prices for petroleum and other raw materials have not brought adequate returns in years past to producer countries and that the developing countries need this income to advance their economies.

The U.S. imports about 130,000 barrels a day of crude oil and condensates from Algeria. Four U.S. firms have signed contracts with SONATRACH to import liquefied natural gas into the United States. Some of the contracts are still pending the outcome of negotiations on price revisions and approval by the Federal Power Commission. Large-volume imports under these contracts must await construction of additional liquefaction facilities and tankers and probably will not occur before 1976 or 1977.

Under the second 4-year plan, 1974-77, the Algerian Government plans to invest $27.5 billion in economic development projects. The industrial sector will absorb 43 percent of this spending, followed by economic infrastructure with 14 percent, social investment (notably housing and health) with 13 percent, and agriculture with nearly 11 percent. More than a third of the industrial investment will be in hydrocarbons, with emphasis on liquefied natural gas plants, refineries, and exploration for new deposits. Algeria's steel, nonferrous metal, chemical, fertilizer, and cement production will be expanded, and new industries in the fields of electrical and mechanical components, construction materials, cellulose fibers, and foodstuffs will be created.

Algeria now has 47,000 miles of roads, a 2,400-mile railway system, and 3 international and 10 secondary airports. The plan envisages the opening of 600 miles of new national highways and improvement of 1,200 miles of existing roads. The railroad system will be modernized with new rolling stock and expanded track systems. The Algiers airport is to have a new terminal and the State-owned airline will add several planes to its fleet.

Improvements in the communications network, already underway, should be accomplished by 1977. Algeria is among the first countries in the world to adopt the earth satellite telecommunications system for domestic use. A ground station for international communications and about a dozen ground stations for the domestic telephone, telex, and TV network are being built.

Although more than half of the population still depends directly on agriculture for a living, less than one-tenth of the GDP comes from this sector. Under the current 4-year plan, more resources will be allocated to agriculture in an effort to improve and expand crop production and modernize farming methods. Algeria currently produces large quantities of wheat and barley, wine, olive oil, citrus fruit, and dates. However, it remains a major importer of wheat and other food products such as beans and tallow, and the growing needs of an expanding population will require a high level of food imports for the foreseeable future.

The modern or "self-managed" sector of agriculture in Algeria comprises one-third of the arable land, also the best land, in the country. This land, mostly abandoned properties of former French owners who left Algeria at the time of independence, is organized into worker-managed State farms, which support more than 5 million people. The government has embarked on an agrarian reform program which aims to nationalize with compensation the remaining large properties owned by absentee landlords and redistribute them to the peasants who farm them. The individual holdings will be organized into cooperatives, as was done with public lands which were recently distributed among some 500,000 small farmers.

The pattern of Algeria's foreign trade has changed markedly in the last 6 years. In 1967 Algeria sent 59 percent of its total exports to France and received 60 percent of its imports from France. By 1972 exports to France dropped to 20 percent of the total and imports from France declined to 31 percent of the total. The difference was made up by a very large increase in trade with the EEC (European Communities) countries and the United States.

With the exception of special trade arrangements with its immediate neighbors, Algeria accords most-favored-nation treatment to all countries. Algeria is seeking a new association agreement with the EEC to regularize its trade, financial, and workers arrangements with the member countries but is resisting pressures to give them privileged treatement in return. The Algerian Government is practicing austerity by limiting imports largely to capital and industrial goods related to its development needs. Imports consist primarily of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and transportation equipment.

U.S. exports to Algeria have more than tripled since 1968, and in 1973

Algiers—General View



were valued at $160.5 million. This sum includes $59 million worth of wheat and other grain. Other important items were animal fats; construction, mining, and industrial machinery; aircraft and parts; railway locomotives; trucks; and fertilizers. Crude oil, gas, and petroleum derivatives generated 83 percent of Algeria's total export receipts in 1973.

Wine is Algeria's principal agricultural export. Because it is burdened with a chronic wine surplus for which domestic and foreign markets are lacking, the Algerian Government has adopted a policy of gradually converting lower quality and less productive vineyards to other crops.

Algerian exports to the United States, consisting almost exclusively of crude oil and condensates, were worth $193 million in 1973. The value of exports to the United States in 1974 may rise to $600 million because of the steep increase in the price of oil.

Algeria receives economic development assistance, including grants, technical assistance, and concessionary loans from a number of Western and Eastern European countries, the People's Republic of China, Canada, the U.N. Development Program, specialized agencies of the U.N., and the World Bank. France is by far the largest aid donor and maintains about 8,000 technical specialists, many of them teachers, in Algeria. Although the United States discontinued economic assistance to Algeria in 1967, it has maintained its contributions of foodstuffs for the World Food Program's school feeding program there.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Algerian defines its foreign policy as one of strict independence and nonalignment. It is a leading proponent of the radical Third World viewpoint in international affairs and has taken an active role in the Organization of Nonaligned States. Algeria is a chief spokesman for the movement to reform the international economic structure to obtain a greater share of the world's wealth for the developing countries by securing higher prices for the raw materials they produce.

As a result of its own revolutionary experience, Algeria has a strong affinity for what it considers legitimate "liberation movements" elsewhere in the world and is particularly vocal in support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and southern African nationalist groups.

Algeria maintains good relations with its immediate neighbors. Algeria and Tunisia agreed on the demarcation of their common border in 1969, and Algeria and Morocco signed an agreement in June 1972 settling their long-standing boundary dispute. Algeria is interested in developing political and commercial relations with African countries to the south and is looking to sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Maghreb as eventual markets for its industrial products. The Algerian Government is pressing ahead with paving of the principal highway from Algiers to the Niger border, which, when completed, should facilitate expanded trade between North and West Africa.

Algeria has diplomatic relations with nearly 100 countries of the East and West, and over 50 countries maintain diplomatic, consular, or commercial representation in Algiers.

U.S.-ALGERIA RELATIONS

U.S.-Algeria relations have been marked since Algerian independence by major political differences over international issues. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967, at the time of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Diplomatic relations were resumed on November 12, 1974. During the period 1969-74, relations gradually improved, partly as a result of our growing mutual interest in trade, development of energy resources, and the application of U.S. technology to Algerian industrial development. The U.S. Government has encouraged the export of U.S. goods and services to Algeria by making Export-Import Bank financing available, and Export-Import Bank exposure in Algeria was $563 million as of June 30, 1974.

In late 1973 and during 1974, the Secretary of State visited Algeria several times for talks with President Boumediene and other high-level Algerian officials, and President Boumediene paid an unofficial visit to Washington in April 1974, all of which contributed to better U.S.-Algerian relations.

The United States has no AID or Peace Corps programs in Algeria. A small number of Algerian graduate students are enrolled in U.S. universities, and some professionally distinguished Algerians have visited the United States under the auspices of the Department of State Cultural Exchange Program, which also administers a limited number of grants to U.S. citizens to teach and conduct research at Algerian universities.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Richard B. Parker
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Robert W. Barr
Political Affairs Officer—Stephen Lyne
Economic Affairs Officer—Charles Higginson
Consul, Oran—Larry Colbert

The U.S. Embassy in Algeria is located at Villa Mektoub, 4 Chemin Cheikh Bachir Brahimi, Algiers. The mailing address is Boite Postale 549, Alger Gare, Alger, Algeria. The United States also maintains a Consulate in Oran.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7821
Revised January 1975

APPENDIX B
ANGOLA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, October 1976 (Publication 7962).]

background notes

Angola

department of state • october 1976

GEOGRAPHY

Angola, a newly independent state on the west coast of southern Africa has an area of 481,351 square miles (1,246,699 square kilometers)—almost twice the size of Texas. It is divided into two parts: Angola proper, which lies south of the Congo River and is bounded by Zaïre on the north and northeast, Zambia on the east, Namibia (South West Africa) on the south, and the Atlantic Ocean on the west; and the enclave of Cabinda, which lies on the seacoast northwest of Angola proper and is bordered by Congo (Brazzaville), the Atlantic Ocean, and the tongue of Zaïre territory which separates Cabinda from Angola proper.

The flat land which lies in a narrow strip along Angola's coast rises abruptly toward the interior, a vast plateau and upland region which ranges from 3,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation and forms one of Africa's great watershed areas.

Because of its size, variations in terrain, and exposure to ocean currents of varying temperatures, Angola's climate is diverse. The southern regions and the coastal plain up to Luanda tend to be semiarid, particularly in the Moçâmedes Desert. The north has two seasons, especially on the plateau: from May to October it is dry and cool, with occasionally freezing temperatures, and during the November to April rainy season it is very hot and humid.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 481,351 sq. mi; 1,246,699 sq km. (about twice the size of Texas). CAPITAL: Luanda (pop. 500,000). OTHER CITIES: Huambo (pop. 50,000), Lobito (pop. 40,000).

People

POPULATION: 5.5 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1% (1970). DENSITY: 12 per sq. mi; 4 per sq. km. ETHNIC GROUPS: 38% Ovimbundu, 23% Kimbundu, 13% Bacongo, 1% European, 1-2% mestiços, 23% others. RELIGIONS: Catholic, Protestant, animist. LANGUAGES: Portuguese, a number of African languages. LITERACY: 15-20%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: na.

Government

TYPE: People's Republic—one-party rule. INDEPENDENCE: Nov. 11, 1975. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: na. BRANCHES: *Executive*—na. *Legislative*—na. *Judicial*—na. POLITICAL PARTIES: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is the only legal party. SUFFRAGE: na. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 16 Provinces.

FLAG: Two horizontal bars, red over black; centered, a yellow five-pointed star half-encircled by a machine gear which is in turn crossed by a machete.

Economy

No statistics have been available since the civil war in 1975. Information for 1974 reflects prewar conditions and is not related to present circumstances.

GNP: $2.98 billion (1974). GROWTH RATE: na. PER CAPITA INCOME: $492 (1974). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: na.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 22%. *Labor* 80%. *Products*—coffee, cotton, sisal, tobacco.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*—various light industries, cement, fishing.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, coffee, diamonds, iron ore.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*—$672 million. *Partners*—US, Portugal, Canada, Japan. *Imports*—$541 million. *Partners*—Portugal, Germany, South Africa, US, UK.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 29.50 escudos=US$1 (still pegged to Portuguese escudo).

ECONOMIC AID: Angola has received large amounts of aid from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern bloc countries since independence. *US only*—none.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: WHO, ILO, UNICEF, OAU, Nonaligned Conference.


PEOPLE

The average population density is 12 persons per square mile, but distribution is very uneven with more than 70 percent of the people concentrated in the west and north. Densities in the east are less than two persons per square mile.

Angolans are almost entirely Bantu of various tribal groupings. However, more than three-fourths of Angola's 5.5 million people are accounted for by the four most important tribal groupings:

The *Ovimbundu*, in central and southern Angola, is the largest group, consisting of almost 40 percent of the population. They are important traders who were also slavers in years past.

The *Bacongo* in the northwest, spilling over into adjacent areas of the



NOTE: The names of the following cities have been changed by the authorities in Luanda. The new name is enclosed in parentheses after the former designation. Carmona (Uige); Sao Salvador do Congo (M'Banza Congo); Ambrizete (N'Zeto); Santo Antonio do Zaire (Sovo); Salazar (Dalatando); Henrique de Carvalho (Suarimo); Sa da Bandeira (Lubango); Pereira de Eca (N'Giva).

two Congo Republics and Cabinda, comprise only 13 percent of the population. The Bacongo tribal groups formed a loose federation—the Kingdom of the Kongo, with which European contact was made when Portuguese caravels first landed at the mouth of the Congo River in the 15th century.

The *Kimbundu,* who occupy the terrain inland from Luanda, are culturally, although not ethnically, related to the Bacongo. Among the more detribalized Africans in Angola, they represent about 23 percent of the total population.

The *Chokwe,* a less developed people who live in eastern Angola, make up about 8 percent of the population. This mobile, aggressive tribe in the past also engaged in trade and slavery.

Other prominent tribal groupings in eastern Angola include the Lunda, whose language is similar to that of the Chokwes, and the Ganguelas. A tribe of pastoral warriors, the Cuanhama, live in far southern Angola. Numbering only about 54,000 they are related to the Ovambos of neighboring South West Africa.

In 1970, Portuguese sources estimated the Catholic population of Angola to be about 2.2 million. Protestant missionaries arrived toward the end of the 19th century from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries. They played a significant role in educating black Angolans, and, in fact, the leaders of all three of Angola's liberation movements were educated in Protestant missions. Many rural Angolans continue to adhere to traditional beliefs.

The diverse tribal backgrounds of the Angolan Africans suggest the wide range of languages prevalent in the territory. No one African language extends beyond the tribal area. Portuguese is the only language common to the whole territory. The literacy rate among Africans has been estimated in the past at 15-20 percent.

The numerically small (100,000-150,000) population of *mestiços* (Angolans of mixed racial parentage) comprise the single most active group politically, culturally, and economically. Many prospered under Portuguese rule, and they now occupy the most prominent position in society, with influence and control far in excess of their numbers.

Prior to the coup in Portugal in April 1974, about 400,000 whites comprised 8 percent of the population. All but 30,000-40,000 fled to Portugal during the 1975 civil war, and few have been permitted to return by the victorious MPLA authorities.

TRAVEL NOTES

Travelers Advisory: There is no official U.S. representation in Luanda. American citizens are advised not to travel to Angola due to the uncertain security situation in Luanda and in the interior, as well as the inability of the U.S. Government to assist any Americans who experience difficulties with the authorities in Angola.

Climate and Clothing: Casual attire is the norm in the hot, humid climate prevailing in Luanda. Business dress is also generally casual, though suits are sometimes worn in calls on senior government officials.

Customs: It is difficult to obtain a visa to visit Angola. At the time of writing there are no Angolan diplomatic representatives in the West authorized to issue visas. Businessmen with established contacts in Angola should work through them to obtain a telegraphic visa. Others wishing to travel there should send a telegram containing your name; nationality; passport number, date, and place of issue; business affiliation; and reason for visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Smallpox immunization is required; cholera and yellow fever immunization along with typhoid, malaria, polio, and gamma globulin shots are recommended. Currency rules are strict and constantly changing, and travelers should pay particular attention to the instructions given to arriving passengers to avoid difficulties with the authorities.

Health: Trained medical personnel are scarce in Luanda and nearly nonexistent in the interior. Cuban and Eastern bloc medical personnel are attempting to fill the void left by the departing Portuguese. Travelers with health problems should avoid Angola or, if stricken in Angola, take early transportation to an area with adequate medical facilities. Only bottled water or beverages should be consummed. Raw vegetables should be avoided. Some type of antimalaria tablet should be taken by all visitors.

Telecommunications: Luanda is linked to Lisbon via satellite. Intercontinental telephone and telex communications are therefore quite good. Local Luanda telephone service is adequate but deteriorating, and calls in the interior are difficult to make, due to the destruction of lines during the civil war.

Transportation: Luanda can be reached several times a week by jet from Lisbon and once-a-week from both Paris and Rome. Within Africa, regular service seems to be available from Nigeria, Gabon, and Mozambique. The Angolan airline has scheduled but undependable service to most points in the interior. Road travel outside Luanda is discouraged by the government, ostensibly because of destroyed bridges but also because of the continuing fighting in areas of Cabinda and northern and central Angola. Taxis are almost nonexistent in Luanda and public transportation is spotty.

HISTORY

The first European to reach Angola was the Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão who landed at the mouth of the Congo River in 1483. Cão found the land under the rule of an African monarch, the King of the Kongo, whose capital became the present day M'banza-Congo (São Salvador). In 1490 the Portuguese sent a small fleet of ships carrying priests, skilled workers, and tools to the Kongolese King who received the mission warmly, accepted Christianity, and agreed to send his son, later King Afonso, to Lisbon. The initial contacts between Angola and Portugal were friendly and mutually respectful.

Soon, however, slaving led to the deterioration of Portugal's relations with King Afonso and his successors. Internal revolts hastened the decline of the Kongo Kingdom. Meanwhile, the Portuguese expanded their contacts southward along the coast, founding Luanda in 1576.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

No material, aside from press reports, is currently available in English on the recent events in Angola and the post independence government. For a description of events during the colonial period see:

Abshire, David and Samuels, Michael, eds. *Portuguese Africa—A Handbook.* New York: Praeger, 1970.

American University. *Area Handbook for Angola.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.

Marcum, John. *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I.* Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969.

Wheeler, Douglas and Pelissier, René. *Angola.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

In 1641 a Dutch fleet seized the rich slave ports of Luanda and Benguela, and the Portuguese retreated to the interior. They held out stubbornly until 1648, when a powerful expedition from Brazil restored the coast to Portuguese control.

The slave trade continued to dominate the scene until the middle of the 19th century with Angola serving as a major source of supply for Brazilian plantations. It has been estimated that about 3 million Angolans were transported to the New World during the three centuries of slave trade activity.

Angola's boundaries were settled by the Berlin West Africa Congress (1884-85), in which France, Germany, and Portugal won recognition of the borders of their colonies with the Congo. The frontier with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was settled in 1905. Tribal wars and uprisings were common, continuing into the early part of the 20th century, when separate uprisings were put down by the Portuguese in northern, central, and southern Angola. Following World War II, the interest of the Salazar government in Portugal in colonizing Angola increased considerably.

Black and mestiço discontent over Salazar's unwillingness to concede eventual independence for Angola led to the outbreak of two separate independence wars in 1961. While initially hard-pressed, the Portuguese forces gradually reduced the guerrilla efforts of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) to inconsequential levels. A third movement, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), began a third guerrilla war against the Portuguese in the late 1960's and was generally as ineffective as the other two. Open dissension between and within these groups was a serious factor in reducing the effectiveness of Angolan nationalists.

However, a military coup in Lisbon in April 1974 brought about a Portuguese decision to give early independence to all their African territories, including Angola. In January 1975, the Portuguese worked out a complex agreement with the three movements for a Transitional Government and elections to pave the way to independence. This tripartite government was a dismal failure. The MPLA tried to impose a military solution, encouraged by the receipt of large quantities of Soviet and Eastern bloc weapons. These proved to be inadequate to defeat the Chinese-and Zaïrian-supported FNLA forces, and in July 1975, the MPLA requested and was eventually given Cuban Army troops.

The United States became disturbed by the extent of Soviet involvement in Angola and began supplying arms to FNLA and UNITA forces in August 1975. South African forces entered southern Angolan border regions in August to protect a hydroelectric project. Later, these forces trained and eventually, in late October 1975, fought alongside UNITA and FNLA troops.

Cuban combat units began landing in Angola in September 1975 and eventually numbered at least 15,000. These forces ultimately defeated the FNLA and UNITA armies in conventional combat and established MPLA control over most of Angola. However, the UNITA and the FNLA have reverted to guerrilla warfare, forcing the Cuban troops to remain in Angola in a combat role to help maintain the MPLA in power.

Cabinda. This tiny but oil-rich enclave was colonized by the Portuguese in the 1880's and was administered from Lisbon until the 1950's. The 80,000 Cabindans are a proud people who consider themselves to be Cabindans, not Angolans. For more than 16 years there has been a Cabindan independence group—the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), now called the Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MOLICA)—which struggled for the separation of Cabinda from Angola. FLEC forces, with outside help, fought the MPLA and the Cubans in late 1975 but were defeated. Guerrilla warfare within Cabinda is continuing and the overwhelming sentiment of the Cabindan people appears to be in favor of independence.

GOVERNMENT

The MPLA built upon the remnants of the colonial apparatus to construct their government in Angola after independence on November 11, 1975. At the time of writing, the United States did not recognize the authorities in Luanda as the legitimate government of Angola, principally because they are clearly a minority faction apparently dependent on a foreign occupation army to remain in power. The FNLA and the UNITA had established a rival regime in the southern city of Huambo, but this was dissolved after their capital fell to Cuban forces in February 1976.

While the fledgling MPLA regime benefits from the presence of competent officials in the senior ranks, there is a lack of trained personnel in the middle and technical levels. Personnel deficiences, together with the rigors of a continuing civil war on three separate fronts, black-mestiço friction within the government and the MPLA movement, and the collapse of most sections of the economy with the

departure of the Portuguese, have made the task of organizing a government a slow, uncertain one. Dr. Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA movement, is also Chief of State.

The MPLA appears to be in the process of evolving from a liberation movement into a more disciplined political "party" to guide the development of Angola into a "revolutionary socialist state." A 36-member Council of the Revolution is the supreme organ of government. There is no legislature.

For purposes of administration, Angola is divided into 16 Provinces. The Provincial Commissar is appointed by the Interior Minister. A system of rural administration patterned on the Portuguese colonial system is being established, but continued guerrilla warfare in much of the country has inhibited the MPLA's ability to govern effectively in the rural areas.

Principal Government Officials

President–Agostinho Neto
Prime Minister–Lopo de Nascimento
Foreign Minister–José Eduardo dos Santos
Minister of Justice–Diógenes Boavides
Minister of Information–Joao Martines
Minister of Defense–Henrique Carreira
Minister of Internal Administration–Alves Baptista (also known as Nito Alves)
Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination–Carlos Rocha
Secretary of State for Finance–Saydi Mingas
Secretary of State for Industry and Energy–Augusto Lopes
Secretary of State for Communication and Transportation–Alberto Bento Ribeiro
Secretary General of the MPLA–Lucio Lara
U.N. Observer–Elisio de Figueredo

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Despite the MPLA victory in early 1976, Angola continues to be beset with strife within the MPLA and widespread guerrilla warfare pitting Cuban and MPLA forces against the FNLA, the UNITA, and Cabinda separatist groups. The factions contesting control in Angola are:

MPLA: The movement is split by ethnic rivalries between the black majority and the more Europeanized black and mestiço elite which effectively runs the government.

UNITA: Jonas Savimbi, the founder and head of the UNITA, apparently retains the loyalty of most of the Ovimbundu tribe. He continues to seek a government of national unity with the MPLA, but he demands that the Cuban forces be withdrawn before he will enter into such a coalition. The UNITA has indicated it will continue its guerrilla activity until the Cuban troops leave.

FNLA: FNLA forces were badly defeated by the Cubans. However, they retain broad popular support among the northern Bacongo tribe and have continued guerrilla resistance to the Cubans and the MPLA. It is unlikely that the MPLA will succeed in entirely suppressing Bacongo tribes' resistance by military means. Holden Roberto remains the leader of the FNLA, and like Savimbi, he has called for a government of national unity.

Cabinda separatists: The tiny enclave of Cabinda (population 80,000) has long desired independence from Angola and has been coveted by both Zaïre and Congo (Brazzaville). Gulf Oil's Cabinda production earns over $400 million a year for the Angolan Government–more than half of Angola's foreign exchange earnings. The Cabindans seem to have united the fractious wings of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) to form the Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MOLICA), which is presently waging hit-and-run operations against the several thousand Cuban and MPLA troops in the territory. There is widespread support in Cabinda for independence; Luanda has indicated that it might agree to some measure of autonomy for Cabinda but never to full independence.

Fidel Castro has said he will withdraw Cuban forces if and when the MPLA troops are capable of controlling Angola on their own. However, given the size and popular support of the opposition, the huge areas involved, and the complexity of the equipment given to the MPLA along with their lack of trained personnel, it does not appear that the MPLA will be able to carry the burden alone for some time.

MPLA policy calls for close political cooperation with Communist and other nations which have helped it in the past. Clearly, Cuba and the Soviet Union are the bulwarks of the regime, providing military and civilian personnel, equipment, training, and moral support. Other Eastern bloc States, as well as Yugoslavia, have also been active supporters. In Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Mozambique have been close to the MPLA.

President Neto has several times stated his determination to maintain the independence of Angola from all foreign domination and to follow a nonaligned policy. He has said he will not permit foreign military bases to be established and that Angola seeks relations with all states.

ECONOMY

In the wake of the disastrous civil war and the flight of most of the Portuguese population, there are few statistics available describing the Angolan economy. The fighting has caused a nearly total breakdown in the internal economy and the normal internal flow of foodstuffs and basic materials into Luanda. The departure of 300,000-350,000 Portuguese as well as thousands of trained Cape Verdeans and mestiços brought nearly complete paralysis to the economic system in the country.

Before the fighting began, Angola gave promise of being a significant economic power in sub-Saharan Africa in this decade. In terms of annual export earnings, the Angolan economy was based on oil ($450 million), coffee ($205 million), diamonds ($80 million), and iron ore ($75 million). In addition, Angola exported significant quantities of sisal ($41 million), cotton ($14 million), fish, and cement, and earned about $100 million annually from traffic from Zaïre and Zambia on the Benguela Railroad. This diversified base and a significant number of trained people gave Angola an excellent opportunity to expand its internal economy and provide employment for increasingly large numbers of

rural Africans who flocked to the cities in search of a better life.

The Angolan economy is now only a shadow of its earlier self. Oil production has returned to nearly prewar levels but all other areas of the economy are stagnant or radically diminished. Coffee exports, for example, appear to be about 25-30 percent of prewar levels, diamond production is greatly restricted, and there are no iron ore exports. Productivity in the small industrial sector has been curtailed by labor problems, particularly demands for much higher wages, lighter work loads, and greater worker control of the enterprises. Many plants and stores were abandoned by their Portuguese owners and managers and have never been reopened; others limp along with skeleton staffs and shortages of raw materials.

In the interior, nearly all the Portuguese have fled. Most farms and shops remain closed. Travel along roads is restricted because of the widespread guerrilla warfare and demolished bridges. Foodstuffs, still relatively abundant in the north and south, cannot be shipped to Luanda.

The Benguela Railroad has apparently been fully repaired and is capable of handling rail traffic from the Zambian-Zairean copper-producing regions to the Atlantic port of Lobito. However, traffic has not yet been permitted to travel the entire length of the road, perhaps because of security problems.

Foreign trade is off dramatically from prewar levels. Angola is still making purchases of some essential imports, but most foreign buying has been curtailed by the lack of currency and the port situation in Luanda.

There have been selective nationalizations of firms but this has so far been confined to enterprises which the government considers to have been abandoned by their owners. The Socialist policies of the regime have been tempered by pragmatic self-interest, and the realization that the best means to revive the economy is to permit private firms, particularly the large foreign oil companies, to resume their former roles in the economy.

Foreign businesses operating in Angola are subject to oversight by a workers' committee which generally takes an active interest in the treatment accorded Angolan workers. These committees have the authority to expel or refuse entry to any foreign business staff member they choose, and this power has been exercised on several occasions recently.

Labor unions are state controlled and therefore do not approve strikes or work stoppages. Nevertheless, workers frequently walk off the job or slow down production to protest pay rates or personnel grievances. The government is engaged in a broad campaign to exhort the worker to produce more and to forgo pay increases.

Angola has not actively sought any Western bilateral aid, and the United States provides no assistance to it. However, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Eastern bloc States have begun programs in health, education, and transportation. The U.N. Development Program and UNICEF are studying assistance programs. The International Red Cross had been involved in a medical program, but its plans to undertake larger programs were refused by the MPLA.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Despite Angola's professed nonalignment, the MPLA leadership has affirmed its solidarity with the Socialist camp and obviously feels closer ideologically to Havana and Moscow than to the West. In addition to the large Cuban Army contingent, thousands of Cubans and hundreds of Soviets and Eastern Europeans are working closely with the new regime in many fields.

Angola has joined the Organization of African Unity, the nonaligned bloc, and several specialized U.N. organizations. Its entry into the United Nations was blocked by a U.S. veto in June 1976. It has not yet joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. It attended the July 1976 meeting of the Eastern bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), the first time an African State has done so.

Angola has close ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. In October 1975, Angola signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Only a few states outside Eastern Europe have signed such agreements with Moscow, and Angola is only the second sub-Saharan State to have done so.

Angola has worked closely with several African States, including Nigeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Mozambique, Guinea, and Tanzania. Several Western States recently have been permitted to establish relations with Luanda, including Italy, several Scandanavian countries, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The Portuguese Embassy was closed in May in a dispute over anti-MPLA news stories in Portugal, but agreement was recently reached to reopen it in the near future. At present, Angola maintains no permanent embassies abroad, although they do have an observer at the United Nations.

Angola is seeking to improve relations with her closest neighbors, Zaire and Zambia. Zambia has formally recognized the MPLA but has not yet opened an embassy in Luanda. Zaire and Angola have established a joint commission which meets occasionally to iron out mutual problems.

U.S.-ANGOLAN RELATIONS

The United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the MPLA regime in Luanda and does not have any relations with that country. There is no protecting power looking after U.S. interests in Angola.

The United States is not opposed to the MPLA itself and has maintained that any Angolan Government should be broader based and not dependent for survival on a large Cuban expeditionary force. We look forward, however, to establishing normal ties with Angola.

The United States does not discourage American firms from operating in Angola. For example, the Boeing Company was permitted to deliver two 737 jets to the Angolan airline and to continue to work on an extensive air-traffic control system for 16 airports in Angola. Gulf Oil and Texaco have resumed their former production and exploration activities in Angola.

The United States is considering a request from the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance to Angola to help in the resettlement of the population and in economic reconstruction. We have contributed $600,000 toward an International Red Cross medical program operating in various regions of Angola. In addition, we have also funded the advanced education in the United States and abroad of 45 Angolan students equally divided among the three liberation movements.

Principal U.S. Officials

There is no U.S. representation in Angola.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7962, Revised October 1976

APPENDIX C
BOTSWANA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, January 1975 (Publication 8046).]

background notes

Botswana

department of state * january 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Botswana

GEOGRAPHY

The Republic of Botswana, situated in southern Africa, is bounded on the south and east by the Republic of South Africa, on the northeast by Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, and on the west and north by Namibia (South West Africa).

Botswana, a vast tableland with a mean altitude of 3,300 feet, is a natural habitat for most species of African fauna. The rolling sands and extensive grassy areas of the Kalahari Desert cover the southwest. In the northwest and north the Okavango and Chobe Rivers water the land, the former spreading over a great inland delta (6,500 square miles) commonly called the Okavango Swamps. In general, the eastern and northern regions have the best agricultural land and the most favorable rainfall.

The climate is generally subtropical, but varies with the latitude and altitude. Average annual rainfall is 18 inches and ranges from 25 inches in the north to 9 inches or less in the Kalahari Desert. The territory lies in the summer rainbelt, with rains beginning in October and ending in April. May to September are normally completely dry months. Temperatures range from over 100°F in summer to below freezing in winter.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 220,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Texas). CAPITAL: Gaborone (pop. 21,000). OTHER CITIES: Francistown (22,000), Lobatse (13,000), Selebi-Pikwi (40,000).

People

POPULATION: 672,000 (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3% (1974). DENSITY: 3 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Batswana, other African groups, white (about 1%). RELIGIONS: Christian 15%, majority animist. LANGUAGES: English (official), Setswana. LITERACY: 22% (English), 33% (Setswana). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 55 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic, parliamentary democracy. INDEPENDENCE: September 30, 1966. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: March 1965.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*–High Court, Court of Appeal, local customary courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Botswana National Front (BNF), Botswana People's Party (BPP), Botswana Independence Party (BIP). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 District Councils, town councils.

FLAG: Blue field divided by black horizontal band with narrow white stripe on either side.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $130.6 million (1972). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 20%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $230. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 4.9%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 5%. *Labor* 75%. *Products*–livestock, sorghum, corn, millet, cowpeas, and beans.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 16%. *Products*–diamonds, copper, nickel, frozen beef, tourism.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, copper, nickel, salt, soda ash, potash, coal.

TRADE: *Exports*–$91.9 million (1973): meat products and diamonds (85%), hides and skins. *Partners*–U.K., South Africa, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia. *Imports*–$135.4 million (1973): machinery, transport equipment, manufactured goods, food, chemicals, mineral fuels. *Partners*–South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, U.K.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 South African rand=US$1.45 (Dec. 1974).


ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$177.4 million (1969-73). *U.S. only*–$49 million (1965-73).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth of Nations, Southern African Customs Union.

PEOPLE

Most Batswana live in the eastern part of the country. Only 11 towns have populations of more than 10,000. Several large, traditional villages, including Serowe and Kanye, have over 40,000 people.

Many Batswana work in neighboring African countries. According to the 1971 census, the nomad population is estimated at 10,550. Of the resident population, the vast majority are Batswana, divided into eight main tribal groups: Bamangwato, Bakwena, Batawana, Bangwaketse, Bakgatla, Bamalete, Barolong, and Batlokwa. There are also small Kalanga, Herero, and Bushman minorities. The rest of the population includes some 1,400 British, 3,400 South Africans, 2,700



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Rhodesians, and 4,500 of other nationalities.

HISTORY

By about 1700 A.D., the ancestors of today's African population were established as self-sufficient herdsmen and agriculturists, and as hunters and gatherers. The first contact with Europeans was through missionaries in the early 19th century at a time when the territory was torn by intertribal warfare. In the last quarter of the century hostilities broke out between the Batswana and the Boers from South Africa (Transvaal). Following appeals by the Batswana for assistance, the British Government in 1885 proclaimed the whole of Bechuanaland to be under British protection. The southern part of the territory was first constituted a Crown Colony, later became part of the Cape Colony, and is

now part of the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa. The northern part, known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, remained under the administration of the British Government. In 1909, when the Constitution of the Union (now Republic) of South Africa was drawn up, the African inhabitants of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho), and Swaziland asked that they not be included in the proposed Union.

A gradual expansion of a British central authority in the years that followed was accompanied by a steady evolution of local tribal government. In 1934 proclamations were issued that regularized the positions and powers of the chiefs and defined the constitution and functions of the native courts under the native authority system evolved in other British dependencies. Tribal treasuries were created in 1938.

In 1920 the central authority established two advisory councils representing the African and European inhabitants respectively. In 1951 a Joint Advisory Council was formed consisting of official and nonofficial European and African members. Over the years these advisory bodies were consulted on a constantly expanding range of matters.

In 1958 the Joint Advisory Council passed a resolution that a Legislative Council should be formed. Following study and recommendations of a constitutional committee, a Constitution establishing such a Council became effective May 2, 1961, and the Council held its first session at Lobatse on June 21.

In April 1963 the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced to the British Parliament Her Majesty's Government's intention to review the Botswana Constitution with a view to further political advance. Her Majesty's Commissioner subsequently met with members of the local political parties and other groups; there was unanimous agreement on the specifics of a constitutional revision; and the conclusions were published in Botswana in November 1963.

In June 1964 the British Government announced its acceptance of proposals for a form of self-government for Botswana which provided for a ministerial system and was designed to lead naturally to independence. These proposals had been agreed upon unanimously during discussions in Botswana between Her Majesty's Commissioner and representatives of the chiefs, political parties, and important minority communities. In February 1965 the seat of government was moved from Mafeking in the Republic of South Africa to the new capital at Gaborone. The new Constitution came into effect in March 1965, and general elections were held. Botswana became independent on September 30, 1966.

GOVERNMENT

Under the Constitution, executive power in Botswana is vested in the President. He is elected by the National Assembly from among its members for a 5-year term. The President selects his Cabinet from the National Assembly; it consists of a Vice President and an unspecified number of Ministers.

The unicameral National Assembly is presently composed of 37 members (excluding the Speaker)—32 directly elected, 4 elected by the members themselves, and an Attorney General who may speak but not vote. General elections must be held at least every 5 years. Botswana is divided into 32 single-member constituencies with approximately equal population per constituency. A voters roll based on universal adult suffrage is maintained for each constituency.

The Constitution also provides for a House of Chiefs, which serves as an advisory body to the government. The chiefs of the eight principal tribes are permanent *ex officio* members, and four other members are elected by the subchiefs in the Chobe, Francistown, Ghanzi, and Kgalagadi districts. The National Assembly is prohibited from proceeding with any bill relating to matters of tribal concern unless a draft has been referred to the House of Chiefs.

Botswana's High Court is the trial level court with general civil and criminal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed by the President and may be removed only for cause and after a hearing. Chiefs and headmen preside over courts which are constituted according to local custom and enforce traditional law. The Constitution contains a code of fundamental human rights which is enforced by the courts.

Local government is carried out by nine District Councils and four town councils. Executive authority is vested in the District Commissioner who is appointed by the central government. He is assisted by the partly elected and partly appointed District Councils and District Development Committees.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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TRAVEL NOTES

Botswana is served by air from Johannesburg, South Africa, and Lusaka, Zambia, by Air Botswana, Zambia Airways, and South African Airways. Hotel facilities are comfortable in all major centers. Botswana's climate is basically healthy, the water is potable, and the locally grown beef tasty. Some 16% of the land has been designated as national parks or game reserves, and Botswana's Chobe National Park and Moremi Wildlife Reserve are considered superb in terms of wildlife and setting. The Botswana Government does not require visas of American citizens entering Botswana.

Principal Government Officials

President–Sir Seretse Khama
Vice President, Minister of Finance and Development Planning–Quett K. J. Masire

Other Ministers

Mineral Resources and Water Affairs–Motlatsi K. Segokgo
Agriculture–E. S. Masisi
Works and Communications–James G. Haskins
Local Government and Lands–Leonard Makgekgenene
Home Affairs–B. K. Kgari
Education–K. P. Morake
Health–M. P. K. Nwako
Commerce and Industry–G. K. T. Chiepe
Minister of State (External Affairs)–A. M. Mogwe
Minister of State (Public Service, Information, and Broadcasting)–D. Kwelagobe
Ambassador to the U.S.–Amos M. Dambe
Ambassador to the U.N.–T. D. Mogami

Botswana maintains an Embassy in the United States at 4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008. Botswana's Mission to the United Nations is at 866 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Botswana's four political parties, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana National Front (BNF), the Botswana People's Party (BPP), and the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), participated in the October 26, 1974 election, the country's second since independence in 1966. President Seretse Khama was reelected by a large margin. His party, the ruling BDP, raised its total of elected seats in the National Assembly by three–to 27. The BNF holds two seats; the BPP, two; and the BIP, one. Botswana's small white minority participates freely in the political process under the government's nonracial policy.

ECONOMY

Botswana has about 2.2 million head of cattle and most are sold to the Botswana Meat Commission at Lobatse–said to be the largest meat export company in Africa. The value of exported meat and meat products during 1973 was $49.6 million. The mining industry is rapidly developing, and Botswana is becoming an important exporter of diamonds and other minerals.

Crop agriculture, tourism, and secondary industry are being developed. The Botswana Development Corporation is actively seeking to interest foreign capital in investment opportunities.

Common Customs Union

Botswana is a member of a common customs union with South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland. South Africa levies and collects most of the customs, sales, and excise duties for the four countries–paying a share of collections, determined largely by each country's level of imports, to the other three. Imports from outside the customs area are subject to common tariff rates and regulations. The customs agreement was renegotiated in 1969, and Botswana's share of the revenue increased from $1.7 million in 1968 to an estimated $29.9 million in 1973. The four countries also form a common currency and exchange control currency. In September 1974 the Botswana Government announced its intention to withdraw from the *rand* currency area to form its own central bank and issue its own currency within 2 years.

Mining

Two large mining companies, De Beers Botswana Mining and Bamangwato Concessions, Ltd. (BCL), both partly owned by the Botswana Government, are actively developing major mineral finds in the eastern and central regions. De Beer's diamond mine at Orapa is producing about 3 million carats of diamonds per year, mostly of industrial quality. BCL (85 percent owned by Botswana Roan Selection Trust, Ltd. (BRST), of which American Metals Climax and Anglo-American each own 50 percent) is developing the copper-nickel complex at Selebi-Pikwe. Mining began at Pikwe in 1974, aimed at an estimated annual output of 46,000 tons of copper-nickel matte and 125,000 tons of elemental sulphur. A $6.5 million loan from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was used to construct a 50-mile water pipeline from the dam at Shashe to Selebi-Pikwe. Other governments and international agencies provided additional financing for infrastructure, and total investment in the project amounted to some $280 million.

Makgadikgadi Soda, Ltd., a subsidiary of BRST, is planning development of the Sua Pan salt deposit to produce soda ash, potash, and salt. Botswana is believed to have 5 billion tons of coal deposits. Two other major copper deposits are being explored, one by U.S. Steel.

Transportation

Botswana has about 50 miles of paved roads and 5,000 miles of gravel or dirt roads. The U.S. Government has provided a $16.6 million long-term loan to finance the construction of a 190-mile road from Nata to Kazungula on the Zambezi River. The road will provide Botswana with direct overland access to Zambia and other African countries to the north and is scheduled to be completed in 1976.

The Cape Town-Bulawayo railroad runs through Botswana for 394 miles, paralleling the main north-south road. In September 1974 the Botswana Government announced its intention to study means of purchasing the Botswana portion of this line, presently owned by Rhodesian Railways.

Airstrips serve most major towns; Gaborone, Francistown, and Selebi-Pikwe have paved runways.

Budget

The national recurrent budget for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1975, is balanced at $84.2 million, financed entirely from domestic sources. The development budget, financed from international sources, calls for an expenditure of $87.7 million in the 1974-75 financial year. Prior to 1972, the United Kingdom had provided grants-in-aid to balance the recurrent budget.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Botswana makes clear its opposition to neighboring South Africa's policy of separate racial development. But because of its geographic position and relative economic strength, it maintains a working relationship and close economic ties with South Africa. In recent years Botswana has made a determined effort to broaden and diversify its contacts to include relations with African nations to the north, Eastern European nations, and Arab nations. It follows a nonaligned policy in international forums.

U.S.–BOTSWANA RELATIONS

The United States desires to expand and strengthen its present friendly relations with Botswana. It wishes to encourage the country's progressive political, economic, and social development as a nonracial, democratic, independent nation. The United States provides a Peace Corps program, furnishes development assistance and food aid, and has an investment guaranty agreement with the Botswana Government. Total U.S. assistance from FY 1965 to FY 1973 amounted to about $49 million. The United States also seeks to expand the role of American investment and trade in Botswana's program of economic development.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–David B. Bolen
Deputy Chief of Mission–Samuel B. Thomsen

The U.S. Embassy in Botswana is in Kohinoor House, P.O. Box 90, Gaborone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8046
Revised January 1975

APPENDIX D
BURUNDI
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, July 1976 (Publication 8084)]

background notes

Burundi

department of state • july 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Burundi

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Burundi is a landlocked country in central Africa bordered on the north by Rwanda, on the east and south by Tanzania, and on the west by Zaire and Lake Tanganyika.

Burundi consists mainly of grassy uplands, some forests, and rugged hills with tortured relief, similar to that of some areas in the American West. Geographically astride the Congo-Nile crest, Burundi's highest altitude is 8,900 feet above sea level. The Ruzizi River Valley and Lake Tanganyika, the second deepest lake in the world, constitute part of the western portion of the Great Rift Valley. The southernmost source of the White Nile is located at Rutovu in southern Burundi.

Located only two degrees south of the Equator, the average daily temperature at Bujumbura is 73.4°F, but it drops markedly in the upland interior where night frost may occur. A short dry season occurs during January followed by the major rainy season from February to May. The major dry season, dusty and hazy, usually lasts from May to September.

Burundi's population density is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, the country is virtually without villages or towns and owes its traditional social structure to family compounds (*rugos*). The only urban concentrations are at the few former colonial administrative and commercial centers—Bujumbura and Gitega being the major ones.

The indigenous population consists of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The Hutu are mostly farmers of Bantu language stock who occupied parts of Burundi before the Tutsi arrived. The Tutsi are a pastoral people who, according to legend, migrated from Ethiopia with their lyre-horned cattle many centuries ago and adopted Kirundi, the Bantu language of the Hutu. The pygmy Twa are probably the last survivors of the aboriginal population who were driven into Burundi's forests and marginal grasslands by later immigrants.

HISTORY

Before the Europeans arrived in earnest in the latter half of the 19th century, Urundi (now Burundi) was a kingdom with a highly stratified, feudalistic social structure. Traditionally the rulers were drawn from princely dynastic families, referred to as Ganwa, from among whom a king (Mwami) was chosen as a symbol of unity. The commoners were divided into two ethnic groups: the Tutsi, the invading cattle breeders who came in the 16th or 17th centuries; and the

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 10,744 sq. mi. (about the size of Md.). CAPITAL: Bujumbura (pop. 160,000). OTHER CITY: Gitega (25,000).

People

POPULATION: 4 million (1976). URBAN: 200,000. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1976). DENSITY: 372 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Hutu 85%, Tutsi 14%, Twa 1%. RELIGIONS: Christian 60%; animist, Muslim. LANGUAGES: Kirundi, French (both official); Swahili. LITERACY: 55% in Kirundi. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 39 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: July 1, 1962. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: July 11, 1974.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Prime Minister). *Legislative*—none. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: National Party of Unity and Progress (UPRONA). SUFFRAGE: Universal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: Capital city and 8 Provinces, subdivided into 18 arrondissements and 78 communes.

FLAG: White saltire with 2 red and 2 green panels; white circle in center with 3 red stars.

Economy

GNP: $338 million (1975). ANNUAL REAL GROWTH RATE: 2% (1971-75). PER CAPITA INCOME: $92 (1974). PER CAPITA REAL GROWTH RATE: 0%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 68%, *Labor* 92%. *Products*—coffee, tea, cotton, food crops.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 1%. *Products*—light consumer goods such as beverages, household goods, soap.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Nickel, uranium, cobalt, copper, platinum deposits discovered but not yet exploited.

TRADE (1975): *Exports*—$46.2 million: coffee 80%; tea. *Imports*—$42.5 million: textiles, food, transport equipment, petroleum products. *Partners*—US, Belgium, FRG, France.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 89.55 Burundi francs=US$1 (May 1976).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED (1975): *Total*—$40 million: Belgium, France, FRG, other EC countries, UN Development Program, World Bank. *US only*—$784,000.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Development Bank (AfDB), EC (associate member).


UGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
ZAIRE
TANZANIA
TANZANIA
Kagitumba
Rutshuru
Kisoro
Kabale
Lake Bunyoni
Lac Burera
Ruhengeri
Lac Ruhondo
Byumba
Lac Rwanya
Lake Mujunju
Goma
Gisenyi
LAC KIVU
Lac Muhazi
Lac Ihema
KIGALI
Kaleha
Kibuye
Gitarama
ILE IDJWI
Nyaborondo
Lac Mugesera
Kibungo
Lake Bisongou
Nyanza
Rusumo Falls
Bukavu
Cyangugu
Gikongoro
Cohoha
Butare
Muyinga
Ngozi
Bubanza
Cankuzo
Muramvya
BUJUMBURA
Gitega
Ruyigi
Uvira
LAKE TANGANYIKA
Bururi
Rutana
Fizi
Nyanza-Lac
Burundi
International boundary
National capital
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
International airport
0 10 20 30 Miles
0 10 20 30 Kilometers
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

518047 5-76

Hutu, resident farmers who gradually mortgaged their services and relinquished their land to the nobility in order to obtain the new symbol of status and wealth—cattle.

Much of Urundi's history was characterized by a constant play for power between the ruling Mwami and the Ganwa. Since neither was able to win total military control, and since the continuing support of the masses was needed to fight their battles, government was more decentralized, royal attitudes more conciliatory toward commoners, and social mobility less restricted than in neighboring Ruanda (now Rwanda) with its otherwise similar social and ethnic group structure.

Although the area was visited briefly by European explorers and missionaries as early as 1858, it was not until the 1890's that Urundi, along with Ruanda, came under European administration as part of German East Africa. Belgian troops from the Congo occupied both countries in 1916, and in 1923 the League of Nations mandated them to Belgium as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi became a U.N. Trust Territory with Belgium as the administering authority.

Limited self-government was established when U.N.-supervised elections for a legislative assembly were held in September 1961. The *Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès National du Burundi* (UPRONA), led by the Mwami's son Prince Louis Rwagasore, won an overwhelming victory based on his successful effort to identify UPRONA with the Mwami and with progress for all of the people of Urundi. The country's relatively flexible, traditional social system and the popular loyalties to the Mwami from all groups increased the potential at this time for a transition to a modern, mass-based democratic system. However, the assassination of Prince Rwagasore in October 1961 by rival Ganwa politicians set off a chain of events which led to the abandonment in 1965 of the Western-style democratic experiment.

Following independence on July 1, 1962, when Urundi became Burundi, a constitutional monarchy was established. Under the Mwami the country fell into political disorder and economic stagnation. He failed to meet the aspirations of a variety of leaders; disregarded parliamentary processes, such as ignoring the results of the 1965 elections; and did nothing to relieve mounting ethnic group tensions. During the first 4 years after independence, seven governments came and fell, and two Prime Ministers were assassinated—the second one, a Hutu, in January 1965.

Meanwhile, in many rural areas there were sporadic local riots of Hutu peasants who preferred the model of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Republic. Certain disgruntled Hutu leaders attempted a coup against the Mwami in October 1965, but it was put down by military troops. Severe reprisals, however, brought chaos and uncertainty to Burundi, and the Mwami fled to Europe. His son, Prince Charles, ruled for about a year—first as regent and then as Mwami. In January 1966 Capt. Michel Micombero was appointed Prime Minister, and on November 28 he formally took charge, with army backing, and proclaimed Burundi a republic. In the ministerial and provincial personnel shuffles which followed, the army emerged as the dominant force and ultimate power in Burundi. This is still true, even though today most officials are civilians.

The new military government inherited the principal problems of the old regime, including continuing efforts by Hutu politicians to obtain greater participation in the ruling process and by rival Tutsi factions to gain control. An alleged Hutu plot to overthrow the government was revealed in 1969 and resulted in the execution of many remaining Hutu leaders, including most Hutu army officers. In 1971, 19 prominent Tutsi leaders were tried and convicted of treason. In 1972 thousands of Hutu refugees in Tanzania launched a poorly planned and uncoordinated attack on southern Burundi. Several thousand Tutsi and uncooperative Hutu were massacred before the dissidents lost momentum and were stopped by government troops.

The hard-line elements of the ruling leadership took advantage of this situation to capitalize on the fears of Burundi's Tutsi for their ethnic survival, and 200,000 Hutu, particularly those with some primary education, were forced to flee the country or were executed in the reprisals. Today over 90,000 Burundi Hutu refugees are in Tanzania, 25,000 in Zaire, and 8,000 in Rwanda under U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees programs. Burundi retains 40,000 Rwandan (Tutsi) refugees.

Ethnic political problems will probably remain quiescent for some years to come because of the ruling regime's firm control of the country, the exhaustion and rejection of violence on all sides after the upheavals of 1972, and the lack of either effective leaders or material support for rebel groups outside. With the current "ethnic peace," more moderate and development-oriented government officials have been able to concentrate their energies on confronting the country's host of critical economic development problems. The long-term ethnic peace of the country will depend to a large extent on the regime's ability and willingness to extend to the entire population whatever economic opportunities and benefits may come in the next decade from the anticipated exploitation of major mineral deposits, especially nickel. Meanwhile, however, even with wisdom and good intentions of the rulers, ethnic nerves are still raw. The economic problems of over-crowded farmlands, a burgeoning population, declining food yields, insufficient infrastructure, poor health care, and a massive lack of skilled and adequately educated citizens pose overwhelming challenges to progress and development.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

A new Constitution, promulgated on July 11, 1974, brought Burundi under a written juridical framework for the first time since the Mwami suspended Burundi's first constitution in 1966. It embodies the political status quo which has evolved since Capt. Micombero's bloodless coup d'etat in 1966. It assigns all powers of state to President Micombero who was elected by the party in October 1974 for a second, renewable, 7-year term.

The 1974 Constitution makes the

President at once the leader of Burundi's single political party (UPRONA), the Chief of State, and Chief of the Armed Forces. The President, by decree, makes and abrogates laws and regulations, and he is responsible for all foreign policy activities and decisions. He also appoints governmental ministers who carry out the day-to-day functions of the government.

The national judiciary is subject to Burundi's basic law (based on a composite of French and German civil codes and Burundi customary law) and to the "revolutionary concept" of law as interpreted by the UPRONA Party. The Constitution emphasizes the equality of all Burundians, outlaws ethnic discrimination, and provides a partial "bill of rights," subject to whatever restrictions the laws may provide. It does not provide for any elections at any level of government or for any form of direct consultations with the people at large.

President Micombero has established several institutions by decree and periodically consults them for help in running the government. These include: the Council of Ministers; the National Consultative Council, which can raise any question of national policy or any political issue for discussion with the President; the National Defense Council; and the Supreme Military Council.

Presently composed of Burundi's 21 most important military officers, the last body is a descendant of the National Revolutionary Council which was first convened after the 1966 coup. It is able to present the state of senior military opinion to the President. And though it too can be manipulated by the regime, it does represent the army, which is the principal, if unobtrusive, source of national political power.

Burundi's only political party, UPRONA, is primarily responsible for propagating the government's line to the masses and for mobilizing them in the political and developmental processes. It includes within its formal structure Burundi's only labor organization, the *Union des Travailleurs du Burundi*, its only youth movement, the *Jeunesse Revolutionnaire Rwagasore*, and its sole women's group, the *Union des Femmes Barundikazi*.

Burundi's principal long-term political problem—and challenge, although presently relegated to the background in the aftermath of the ethnic upheavals of 1972 and 1973—is to find a way to prevent further domestic strife and to provide all Burundians an equal chance for social and economic development.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—**Lightweight, washable clothing is appropriate for Bujumbura. A lightweight raincoat and sweater are needed in the mountainous interior.**

Customs and Currency—**Appropriate visas should be obtained from the Burundi Embassy before arrival. An international health certificate showing valid immunizations against smallpox and yellow fever is required. There is no limit on importing foreign currencies, but rigid regulations govern the conversion of Burundi francs into hard currency. All exchange transactions may legally take place only at institutions specifically designated by the government.**

Health—**Principal health hazards for travelers are malaria, colds and influenza, intestinal upsets, and infections, even of small cuts. Begin taking a malaria suppressant 1 week before arrival. Hospital facilities and doctors are available in Bujumbura. Medicines are often in short supply.**

Hotels—**A new international-class hotel called La Source du Nil is expected to open in Bujumbura in the fall of 1976. Modest accommodations are presently offered at the Paguidas Hotel (P.O. Box 2) and the Burundi Palace Hotel (Avenue de l'Uprona). It is advisable to make reservations in advance. There are very few hotels or guest houses in the interior of the country, although lodging can be obtained at some of the religious missions.**

Telecommunications—**Radiotelephone contacts are available to East Africa; the quality is usually good. Calls to and from the rest of the world are made via Brussels, but delays in booking calls and the high frequency of static and interference in communications make this link often unsatisfactory. Commercial telegraph facilities are available.**

Transportation—**Regular, direct flights to and from European and African cities are available. Bujumbura has recently started urban bus service between some residential quarters and the city center, but its utility for tourists would be minimal. The rest of Burundi has no regular public transportation system, although taxis operating from a few stands in the center of town may be hired for travel within Bujumbura or for longer trips into the interior. Some vehicles are available for rent in Bujumbura, but at very high prices. Gasoline pumps in the interior are scarce; hence fuel cans must be carried for some itineraries.**

Principal Government Officials

President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense—Lt. Gen. Michel Micombero

Ministers

Agriculture and Livestock—Pierre Bigayimpunzi
Civil Service—Gregoire Barakamfitiye
Communications and Civil Aviation—Issac Rwasa
National Education and Culture—Artemon Simbananiye
Finance and Economy—Gabriel Mpozagara
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation—Melchior Bwakira
Interior—Joseph Rwuri
Justice—Philippe Minani
National Orientation—Bernard Bizindavyi
Public Health—Joseph Nindorera
Public Works, Transport, and Equipment—Edouard Nzambimana
Social Affairs—Damien Barakamfitiye
Secretary General of Presidency—Gaetan Nikobamye
Secretary General of Technical Study Bureau (Planning)—Donatien Bihute
Ambassador to the U.S.—Laurent Nzeyimana
Ambassador to the U.N.—Patrice Mikanago

Burundi maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2717 Connecticut Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

ECONOMY

More than 95 percent of Burundians live on the land and depend on traditional agriculture for a level of survival which has become increasingly marginal owing to falling agricultural productivity and overpopulation. About the only reliable, though annually fluctuating, source of cash income for these small-holder peasants is from their annual harvest of coffee, which about 20 percent of them cultivate. The harvest must be sold to a national coffee company at predetermined prices set each year by the government. Coffee production fell off during the first several years after independence, began to rise and peaked at 28,000 tons in 1974, then tumbled to about 15,000 tons in 1975. Nonetheless, experts estimate that average production rates will rise to about 30,000 tons annually by 1980, as the beneficial effects of a development effort financed by the World Bank are felt.

Coffee is also the foundation for Burundi's small monetized economy and annually provides about 80 percent of total export earnings. In 1975 it provided 14 percent of total budgetary receipts. The proportion of coffee exports will be still higher in 1976 due to favorable world prices. Of Burundi's other exports, only tea is doing well, increasing in value from $153,000 in 1971 to $1.6 million in 1975. Experts project a doubling of the 1975 tea production by 1980. Elsewhere the trend is downward. Cotton production, around 20,000 tons annually in the early sixties, was less than 4,000 tons in 1975. Cotton, hides and skins, and minerals contributed less than 10 percent of 1975 total export values.

Local economic activity in the monetized economy consists mostly of: fast turnover merchandising of imported products for the urban population; supplying rural markets with cloth, agricultural tools, and a few staples; a small construction industry engaged primarily in housing and road construction and, currently, in building an international-class hotel which Burundi hopes will help attract tourists; and a small consumer goods and light manufacturing industry. Except for an increasing demand on local production facilities for beer and nonalcoholic beverages, the consumer and light manufacturing industry has suffered from excess capacity since the political separation of Burundi and Rwanda in 1962.

Burundi's government has continued to follow conservative economic policies, prevailing since preindependence days, which are dedicated to balancing the budget and either balancing imports and exports or producing a trade surplus. It has succeeded in doing so during 10 of the last 14 years since independence and has brought Burundi's double-digit inflation of the past several years under control. Rapidly rising import costs during this period and uncertain coffee revenues, however, brought the government to implement strict measures in 1975 to hold down the value of imports and to attack inflation. This has contributed to a lingering depression in Burundi's small monetized economic sector that was triggered several years ago by poor world coffee prices, which remained very low until mid-1975; by continuing high import costs; and by a very poor 1975 coffee harvest.

At the same time, government resources—human, financial, and economic—are stretched so thin (even the low government-paid salaries in 1975, for example, consumed nearly 50 percent of annual operating budget outlays) that Burundi has had to rely heavily on foreign assistance for project capital, university-level teachers, and technological expertise. Most project help is devoted to infrastructure development and the industrial crop sector, principally coffee and tea production, and to some attempts at agricultural diversification. Plans are underway to create a sugar industry which may produce as many as 16,000-20,000 tons annually by the early 1980's. The World Bank agreed in 1976 to loan $6 million for the continuation of a Lake Tanganyika fishing project which was begun by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).

The most interesting and important recent activity in the economic development field was the discovery of huge, rich nickel deposits and reserves of other minerals, including uranium, which have not yet been fully explored. An international consortium led by an American entrepreneur is leading efforts to find a way to exploit these nickel deposits. But present low world demand for nickel and the extremely high cost of exploiting it, owing to Burundi's total lack of infrastructure and landlocked isolation, will probably stretch nickel development efforts out over at least the next decade.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS

During most of Burundi's first 14 years of independence, its foreign policy has focused on defusing crises arising from its own and its neighbors' ethnic and political problems which have caused transborder movements of

large numbers of refugees. This period now appears over, and Burundi is committed to maintaining close ties with all three contiguous states, as well as other African states in the area.

After a Hutu coup d'etat in Rwanda in 1959, followed by unsuccessful Rwandan Tutsi efforts up to 1963 to regain power, thousands of Rwandan Tutsi refugees fled to Burundi. Their activities against Rwanda brought Rwanda and Burundi to the brink of war. Similarly, civil disorders in Congo-Kinshasa (now Zaire) in 1963 and 1964 resulted in Congolese refugees fleeing to Burundi. At a 1966 conference, 11 African nations—Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo-Kinshasa among them—agreed that although refugees might be granted asylum, they would not be allowed to receive financial aid or military training from the host country. Subsequently, relations between Burundi and Congo-Kinshasa improved markedly, and President Mobutu at the OAU's request used his good offices to mediate the Burundi-Rwanda dispute. In August 1969 Rwanda and Burundi exchanged ambassadors for the first time. Ethnic upheavals in Burundi during 1972 again strained Burundi-Rwanda relations almost to the breaking point. But calmer heads prevailed, and good relations eventually were restored when a new government assumed power in Rwanda in June 1973. Events associated with the 1973 ethnic troubles in southern Burundi also nearly caused a rupture in Burundi-Tanzanian relations; but these too have since been fully repaired.

During the past several years, Burundi has added new dimensions to its foreign policy by working closely with Zaire and Rwanda and by arranging for study groups with Tanzania to foster cooperative efforts toward regional economic development. It has become more active in the OAU by identifying itself with so-called "progressive" African states, and it has adopted a similar stance in the U.N. General Assembly and in the nonaligned movement. Burundi is also vocal and uncompromising in its stand against the white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Most of the resources for Burundi's economic and social development continue to come from West European sources and U.N.-related international organizations.

U.S.-BURUNDI RELATIONS

A U.S. Consulate was opened at Bujumbura in October 1960; it was elevated to Embassy status in July 1962. Difficult periods in bilateral relations occurred in 1966, when the American Ambassador was expelled without cause, and in 1972-73, in the wake of Burundi's internal strife.

The U.S. Government endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Burundi's Government and people and encourages them in their efforts to achieve a stable, effective government which will make peaceful development possible for all Burundians.

After the attempted Hutu coup d'etat in 1972, the U.S. Government and other American groups contributed over $923,000 in disaster relief to Burundi. Although the United States has no formal bilateral aid agreement with Burundi, there are self-help project funds and a Catholic Relief Services program using P.L. 480 commodities for maternal-child health clinics and food-for-work projects which totaled more than half a million dollars in 1975 and which will double in 1976. There is also a cultural exchange program involving two Fulbright professors of English at the University of Burundi and travel grants for selected Burundians in development sectors to visit the United States. The U.S. Government has no military relationship with Burundi.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—David E. Mark
Deputy Chief of Mission—Harriet W. Isom
Political Officer—David Harper
Economic/Commercial Officer—Joseph P. Gregoire

The U.S. Embassy is located at Chaussee Prince Louis Rwagasore (P.O. Box 1720), Bujumbura.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8084, Revised July 1976

APPENDIX E
CAMEROON
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1976 (Publication 8010).]

background notes

Cameroon

department of state * january 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: United Republic of Cameroon

GEOGRAPHY

Cameroon, referred to as the "hinge" of Africa, is in the western part of the continent on the Gulf of Guinea about midway between Senegal and the Republic of South Africa. It is roughly triangular in shape with a wide base in the south, where it borders the mainland portion of Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni), Gabon, and Congo (Brazzaville), and with its apex at Lake Chad in the north. The Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria lie to the west and the Central African Republic and Chad to the east.

Cameroon has four distinct topographical regions. In the south is a low coastal plain with equatorial rain forests. In the center is a transitional plateau, whose heights reach 4,500 feet above sea level. The west is an area of mountainous forests, including Mt. Cameroon, the highest peak in sub-Saharan West Africa at 13,000 feet. The north consists of low rolling savanna gradually sloping to a marshland surrounding Lake Chad.

The climate is as varied as the topography. The coast has high temperatures and humidity throughout the year. Inland, and to the north, the temperature fluctuates seasonally and the humidity declines, while in the extreme north the air is very dry.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 183,568 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Calif.). CAPITAL: Yaoundé (pop. 274,000). OTHER CITIES: Douala (435,000), Nkongsamba (67,000).

People

POPULATION: 6.35 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2%. DENSITY: 35 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 200 tribes. RELIGIONS: Islam, Christianity, animism. LANGUAGES: English, French (both official); 24 African dialects. LITERACY: 65%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 49 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Independent republic. INDEPENDENCE: January 1, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: May 20, 1972.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Head of Government and Chief of State), 5-year term. *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly (120 members, 5-year terms). *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: National Cameroonian Union (UNC). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 7 Provinces.

FLAG: Three vertical stripes from left to right–green, red, and yellow–with one yellow star in middle of red stripe.

Economy

GNP: $1.89 billion. GROWTH RATE: 5% (est.). PER CAPITA: $304.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 35%. *Labor* 75-80%. *Products*–coffee, cocoa, tropical agriculture.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10-15%. *Products*–small manufacturing, consumer goods, aluminum.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Timber, some oil, bauxite.

TRADE: *Exports*–$520.4 million (1974): cocoa and coffee (60%), timber, aluminum, cotton. *Partners*–France (28%), other EC countries, US, adjacent African states. *Imports*–$476.5 million: manufactured consumer goods, capital goods, food, beverages, tobacco, fuel. *Partners*–France (47%), US, other EC countries.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: About CFAF 220=US$1 (floats with French franc).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–approx. $158 million (1974): France, $83.8 million; FRG, $38 million; Canada, $17.3 million; EC Development Fund; UNDP; USSR; PRC. *US only*–$50 million (1960-75); $3.5 million (1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, OAU, Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Intelsat, associate member of EC.


PEOPLE

About four-fifths of the Cameroonians live in the French-speaking eastern part of the country. Some 20,000 Europeans and 500 U.S. citizens reside throughout the country. The main seaport and largest city is Douala; the capital, Yaoundé, is the second largest city.

Located in the geographical and racial crossroads of Africa, Cameroon has a complex of about 200 tribes speaking 24 major African languages. It is the only African nation where both French and English have been given official status.

By African standards, Cameroon's education system is unusually extensive. In 1961 the government established the University of Yaoundé, the first African university to teach courses in both French and English.

Muslims predominate in the north and Christians in the south. Pagan animists, however, comprise about half the population, and Muslims and


CAMEROON
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers
LAKE CHAD
Maroua
Yagoua
Kaélé
Garoua
Benoué
Ngaoundéré
Mbéré
Tibati
Wum
Bamenda
Mbum
Mamfe
Bafoussam
Batang
Noun
Lom
Kadei
Nkongsamba
Kumba
Bafia
Ntui
Nanga-Eboko
Bélabo
Bertoua
Batouri
Wouri
Buea
Douala
Sanaga
Victoria
Edéa
YAOUNDÉ
Nyong
Mbalmayo
FERNANDO PO
Kribi
Ebolowa
Sangmélima
Dja
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BIGHT OF BIAFRA
Bata
Ntem
Ngoko

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Christians continue to be influenced by pagan practices.

HISTORY

European contact with what is today the United Republic of Cameroon began in the 1500's with the voyage of the Portuguese navigator Fernando Po. Throughout the next three centuries Spanish, Dutch, and British traders visited the area. The slave trade, while it lasted, was active along the Cameroonian coast. Religious mission settlements began to appear in the mid-1800's and have been active ever since.

Modern Cameroonian history began in July 1884 when Germany, the United Kingdom, and France all attempted to annex the area. The German consul at Tunis, Tunisia, was the first to arrive and, in a treaty with the "Kings" of Douala, succeeded in bringing Cameroon under German control.

Over the years Germany strengthened its claim by various treaties with the United Kingdom and France, but finally in 1916 British and French armies invaded the German protectorate. A declaration signed at London in 1919 divided Cameroon between the U.K. and France with the larger area (East) going to France. The division was sanctioned in 1922 under the League of Nations mandate system.

French Cameroon refused to accept the armistice which followed the fall of France in 1940. Gen. Charles de Gaulle's envoy, Col. Jacques Le Clerc, landed at Douala in August and seized the territory for the Free French. Troops trained in Cameroon later saw action in North Africa and Syria.

In 1946 the French and British mandates over the territory were converted by the United Nations into trusteeships. In December 1958 the U.N. General Assembly voted to end the French Trusteeship, and on January 1, 1960, it achieved independence as the Republic of Cameroon.

In February 1961 the British held a plebiscite in British Cameroon, under U.N. auspices, to determine whether the people there wished union with Nigeria or with the new Republic of Cameroon. The northern electorate chose the former alternative, the southern, the latter. Cameroon contended that the total vote of the British Cameroons should decide the issue, rather than the separate vote of the northern and southern parts, but its position was rejected. On June 1, 1961, the northern area was attached to Nigeria. On October 1, 1961, reunification of the southern part and the new Republic of Cameroon was realized.

From 1961 until the spring of 1972, Cameroon was governed as a federation, with East (former French) Cameroon and West (former British) Cameroon having individual governments, each with parliament and ministries, in addition to the Federal Government structure. President Ahidjo in 1972 proposed abolition of the Federal structure, declaring that the cost and inefficiency of the system was slowing the country's progress toward national identity, and that in any case the 11 years' experience since independence had assured that regional interests were well protected under the national government. A referendum held on May 20, 1972, gave massive endorsement to the proposal, and a decree of June 2 proclaimed the United Republic of Cameroon in existence since the referendum of May 20, with the same date to be observed thereafter as the national holiday.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution which came into effect with the unitary state of May 20, 1972, provides for a strong executive authority. The President is empowered to name and dismiss members of the Cabinet, negotiate and ratify treaties, accredit ambassadors, commute sentences, and exercise pardon. He is the head of the armed forces. When circumstances call for it, he can decree a state of national emergency and thereby become invested with special powers. The Prime Minister—a position created in mid-1975—coordinates governmental activities in areas other than foreign affairs, national defense, and security. He operates under powers delegated to him by the President, who appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and all other members of the government. In case of temporary absence or incapacity, the President may appoint the Prime Minister to act for him. Death or permanent incapacity as determined by the Supreme Court results in the accession to office by the President of the National Assembly for a brief period until new elections are held.

The first National Assembly under the new Constitution was elected in May 1973. Laws are adopted by majority vote of members present, except in cases where the President of the Republic calls for a second reading, and adoption requires approval by a majority of the Assembly's membership. The only formal legislative body is the National Assembly.

Each of the seven provincial governments consists of a governor, ap

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Clothing should be washable due to the dusty air in the dry season from mid-November through mid-March. In the rainy season, it may be cool enough for jackets, sweaters, or shawls. In Yaoundé, the daily temperature can vary from a high of 85°-90° to a low of 65°-70°.

Customs—It is strongly recommended that all travelers obtain an entry visa prior to arrival in Cameroon. Temporary visitors may be able to obtain a border visa on presentation of proper documents, but this procedure takes extra time. Transit visitors may enter without a visa, again on presentation of proper documents, provided they continue their journey on the first available means of transportation toward their country of destination. Vaccination certificates against yellow fever, smallpox, and cholera are required in all cases.

Health—Always boil and filter water for cooking and drinking. Thoroughly wash raw fruits and vegetables before eating. Shots for tetanus, typhoid, paratyphoid, polio, and hepatitis are recommended.

Telecommunications—Local telephones in Yaoundé and Douala have automatic dialing systems. Telephone service to the US, Europe, and other major points in Africa is good.

Transportation—Several major airlines connect Douala and Yaoundé to European, US, and other African cities. Cameroon has a good internal transportation infrastructure with trains, buses, and planes connecting major points. Local taxi service is available in Yaoundé.

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pointed by the President, and his administrative staff. Each Province is divided administratively into divisions which are further separated into subdivisions. The internal administrative system is under the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Other ministries, of course, may have representatives at each administrative level.

The judicial system follows the same administrative levels. At the top is the President and his judicial advisers (Supreme Court). In descending rank are the Appeals Courts, Chief Judges for the divisions, and local magistrates.

In addition to the formal governmental structure, traditional kingdoms and organizations exercise various functions of government among tribal groups. Tribal laws and customs are honored in the formal court system when not in conflict with national law. Formal governmental and tribal structures are mutually reinforcing while allowing for local variation based on tribal or regional customs.

Principal Government Officials

President of the Republic—Ahmadou Ahidjo

Prime Minister—Paul Biya

Ministers of State

Armed Forces—Sadou Daoudou

Equipment and Housing—Enoch Kwayeb

Territorial Administration—Victor Ayissi Mvodo

Posts and Telecommunications—Emmanuel Egbe Tabi

Ministers in Charge of Missions at the Presidency—Francois Sengat Kuo, Abdoulaye Yadji

Minister Delegate of General State Inspectorate and Administrative Reform—Charles Onana Awana

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Jean Keutcha

Economy and Plan—Youssoufa Daouda

National Education—Bernard Bidias á Ngon

Health—Paul Fokam Kamga

Animal Husbandry—Abdoulaye Maikano

Agriculture—Gilbert Andze-Tchoungui

Finance—Marcel Yondo

Justice and Keeper of the Seals—Joseph Charles Doumba

Public Service—Vroumsia Tchinaye

Mines and Power—Henry Elangwe

Youth and Sports—Felix Tonye Mbog

Social Affairs—Mrs. Delphine Tsanga

Labor and Social Welfare—Paul Dontsop

Information and Culture—Rene Ze Nguele

Transport—John Nkengong Monie

Ambassador to the U.N.—Ferdinand Oyono

Chargé d'Affaires in the U.S.—Eric Dikoko Quan

Cameroon maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2349 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The two major political parties, President Ahidjo's Cameroonian Union (UC) in East Cameroon and the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in the West, controlled their respective state assemblies and delegations in the Federal National Assembly upon reunification in October 1961. In April 1962 they joined to form one parliamentary group in support of the government and in the interest of national unity. Opposition parties continued to exist, although they were not represented in the Federal National Assembly.

President Ahidjo long maintained that a single "unified party" was necessary to create national unity out of tribal diversity and to achieve the development of the country, and he maintained that democracy could be preserved within the single party. The leading opposition party in East Cameroon supported the President in the 1965 elections, and the opposition party in the West joined the KNDP in the state government in August 1965. The President's objective was realized on September 1, 1966, when three West Cameroonian political parties and the UC were dissolved and a single new

party—the Cameroon National Union (UNC)—was formed. On September 8, 1966, two of the three small East Cameroonian parties also joined the new UNC.

From 1955 until the mid-1960's, Cameroon was subjected to sustained terrorist activity, led by the outlawed Union of Cameroon Peoples (UPC) and supported by foreign Communist and radical African regimes. Terrorism was gradually reduced to isolated banditry; the capture of the last important rebel leader in 1970 meant the end of concerted rebel action and the effective achievement of political consolidation.

Political life in the country today finds its expression in the only existing party, the UNC. The youth and women's organizations function as divisions of this political party, and a unified labor movement is less formally associated with it. Party membership is not obligatory, but is regarded with importance. The most recent legislative elections were held in 1973 with the UNC providing the list of candidates. President Ahidjo, reelected unopposed, began his fourth 5-year term in May 1975.

ECONOMY

By means of a liberal but planned economy, Cameroon is making moderate but steady progress in overcoming the low level of economic development which it shared with other African states at independence. The third 5-year plan (1971-76) concentrated on the development of agricultural and industrial production. The fourth 5-year plan now being prepared is expected to carry over major projects left uncompleted under the third plan, to emphasize self-sufficiency, and to focus on strengthening the country's agro-industrial base.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Cameroonian economy. Almost 80 percent of the labor force is employed on the land, and cash crops account for about 70 percent of the country's export earnings. Coffee, cocoa, and timber are major sources of export revenue. Other significant export crops include bananas, rubber, cotton, peanuts, and palm oil. This diversity of agricultural production has helped Cameroon to withstand the effects of sudden fluctuations in world prices for individual tropical agricultural products. The government is steadily improving its crop support infrastructure to provide increased services to farmers (provision of credit, fertilizers, and insecticides) and to improve the marketing procedures of its crops. Cocoa, the traditional money crop, is still grown on family-owned farms; other crops are largely organized on a plantation basis.

Cameroon has a sizable and expanding industrial sector (25 percent of GDP in 1973). About 200 small manufacturing, processing, and assembly plants produce consumer goods. In addition, there is a large ALUCAM aluminum manufacturing complex at Edea (French-Cameroonian owned). Using low-cost hydroelectric power from Edea Falls and ore imported from Guinea, this factory produces 40,000-50,000 metric tons of aluminum annually.

The country's physical infrastructure is gradually being improved, but the need is growing faster and has resulted in severe bottlenecks. Progress is being made in improving the national transportation system, but much of the country is still inaccessible during the rainy season. This infrastructure improvement has opened vast forests in the south and east to exploitation, but transportation problems are slowing the continued expansion of the timber industry. By 1975 the Transcameroonian Railway, the country's most important development project, had linked Ngaoundere in northern central Cameroon with the port of Douala. Upgrading of the original portion between Douala and Yaoundé (built about 50 years ago) began in late 1975. Expansion of the port of Douala which handles almost all of Cameroon's traffic is also scheduled to begin in 1976. The road system linking Cameroon with its neighbors is being improved and expanded.

Electric power production, which provides about 80 percent of Cameroon's energy needs, has steadily expanded. Some commercial exploitation of Cameroon's petroleum reserves is envisioned by the end of 1976, and should reserves justify it, a refinery may be built.

Trade and Investment

Exports and imports continued to increase in the period 1966-74, although a trade deficit appeared in 1970 and grew substantially in 1972 due to a reduction in volume and price of the cocoa crop and large imports of capital goods for railroad construction, telecommunications equipment, and aircraft. In 1973 and 1974 Cameroon had a positive trade balance due to increased prices for its major exports; however, the balance for 1975 is expected to be negative.

About 70 percent of Cameroon's total trade is with the six EEC countries. Exports to Cameroon's partners in the UDEAC and Chad increased to $35.3 million in 1974, mainly in manufactured goods. Exports to the United States, principally coffee (92 percent of the total) and cocoa, were $21 million in 1974. Imports from the United States—tobacco, textiles, transportation and communications equipment—amounted to $29.7 million.

Economic progress, realistic and moderate government policies, a very favorable investment code, and a well-conceived development plan combine to make Cameroon attractive to foreign investment, which is primarily French. The government encourages other foreign private investment and in 1967 concluded an Investment Guaranty Agreement with the United States as further inducement to potential U.S. investors. In addition to the liberal investment code, there is a virtual absence of restrictions on remittance of earnings and repatriation of capital. Depending on the magnitude and the contributions which the proposed investment will make to national economic development and fulfillment of Cameroon's development plan, a new undertaking of an industrial or agricultural nature may enjoy one of four categories of benefits under the code. These benefits include exemptions from import duties and taxes on equipment and raw materials, reduced export duties, exemptions from internal consumption and income taxes, as well as guarantees that firms will not be subject for

specified periods (up to 25 years) to any new taxes or duties which might be enacted after the investment is made.

Economic Assistance

Foreign financial assistance is of major importance to Cameroon's development effort. France has been Cameroon's major aid donor. Under our bilateral program the United States has provided economic assistance to Cameroon since its independence. Major projects which have received U.S. assistance are the Transcameroonian Railway, the Kumba-Mamfe Road, and the University Center for Health Sciences. The United States also maintains a modest Food for Peace Program ($220,000 in FY 1975) and Peace Corps presence (about 85 volunteers).

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cameroon's foreign policy has been marked by moderation. This quality together with the record of stability and progress built up under President Ahidjo's leadership has brought increasing stature to Cameroon in African circles. Like other African countries, in recent years Cameroon has increasingly espoused positions underlining its nonalignment and adherence to Third World principles. Condemnation of South Africa and Rhodesia has been consistent and emphatic.

Cameroon has also diversified its foreign contacts. It continues to maintain major treaty relationships with France, its former administering power, in the areas of economic, cultural, and military assistance cooperation. It is also an associate member of the European Community under the Lomé Convention (1975), a member of the UDEAC, the U.N., the OAU, the LCBC, the Non-Alignment Conference, and Intelsat.

Diplomatic relations with Communist countries, which supported the Cameroonian terrorists, began cautiously in the mid-1960's as the rebel cause and its foreign support dwindled. Formal relations have been established in recent years with a large number of previously shunned Communist countries. Economic and cultural cooperation agreements have been signed with several, including the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C.

U.S.-CAMEROON RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Cameroon are cordial. In February 1970, William P. Rogers became the first Secretary of State to visit Cameroon. President Ahidjo made an official visit to the United States in March 1962; in October of 1963, 1967, and 1969 he made short informal visits to Washington, D.C. He visited California, Texas, Florida, and New York in September 1970.

The United States has operated an economic assistance program in Cameroon since 1961 and a Peace Corps program since 1962. U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) activities have concentrated increasingly on agriculture, public health, education, and the development of human resources. About 85 Peace Corps volunteers are working primarily in programs to develop cooperatives and inland fisheries and in English-language teaching.

Each year the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Cameroonian Government, invites prominent government officials, media representatives, educators, and scholars to visit the United States to become better acquainted with the American people and to exchange ideas and views of mutual interest with their American colleagues. About one dozen Cameroonian graduate students are supported by the U.S. Government. This cooperative effort in mutual understanding is furthered through frequent visits to Cameroon by representatives of American business and educational institutions, as well as by visits of Fulbright-Hays scholars and specialists in a variety of fields.

The Cameroonian Government is making an intensive effort to diversify and expand its foreign economic relationships. It has undertaken a program to attract greater private investment in Cameroonian development; and the U.S. Government is trying to encourage a positive response to these efforts.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Herbert J. Spiro
Deputy Chief of Mission—Gerald A. Friedman
AID Area Development Officer—John W. Koehring
Public Affairs Officer—Jerry Prillaman
Peace Corps Representative—James Ekstrom
Consul, Douala—William C. Mithoefer

The U.S. Embassy in Cameroon is located on Rue Nachtigal, Yaoundé.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8010, Revised January 1976

APPENDIX F
CAPE VERDE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, October 1976 (Publication 8874).]

background notes

department of state * october 1976

Cape Verde

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Cape Verde

GEOGRAPHY

The Cape Verde islands are located in the central Atlantic Ocean some 385 miles off the west coast of Africa. The archipelago consists of 10 islands and 5 islets, which are divided into windward and leeward groups. The six islands in the windward group are Santo Antão, São Vicente, Santa Luzia, São Nicolau, Sal, and Boa Vista. The four islands in the leeward group are Maio, São Tiago, Fogo, and Brava.

Although the islands are volcanic in origin, the only active crater is on Fogo. (Its most recent eruption was in 1951.) Three islands—Sal, Boa Vista, and Maio—are somewhat level and lack natural water supplies. Mountains over 4,200 feet high are found on the islands of São Tiago, Fogo, Santo Antão, and São Nicolau.

All of the islands, but especially the windwards, have been eroded by sand carried by high winds. On most of the mountainous islands the landscape appears jagged, with sheer cliffs rising from the sea. Generally the higher areas and the coasts are devoid of natural vegetation, which is largely confined to the interior valleys.

Rainfall is very irregular, and its failure causes periodic droughts and famines. At Praia the average precipitation is only 9.5 inches. Sandstorms blowing from the Sahara sometimes form a dense sand mist that obscures the sun; however, sunny days are frequent.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 1,557 sq. mi. (slightly larger than R.I.). CAPITAL: Praia (pop. 20,000). OTHER CITY: Mindelo (30,000).

People

POPULATION: 300,000 (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1975 est.). DENSITY: 192 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 71% Creole (mulatto), 28% African, 1% European. RELIGIONS: 65% Roman Catholic, 30% animist. LANGUAGES: Portuguese, Crioulo. LITERACY: 25% (est.). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 45 yrs. (est.).

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: July 5, 1975. CONSTITUTION: In preparation.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Head of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of Ministers. *Legislative*—National Assembly. *Judicial*—National Council of Justice, lower courts.

POLITICAL PARTY: African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 15. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 24 Electoral Districts.

FLAG: 3 stripes of equal size; vertical red band on staff side; horizontal yellow (upper) and green (lower) bands. On the red band is a black star surrounded by two corn stalks emerging from a sea shell.

Economy

GNP: $50 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: na. PER CAPITA INCOME: $167 (1975).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 10%. *Labor* 67%. *Products*—bananas, corn, sugarcane, coffee.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 5%. *Products*—fish and its products, salt, siliceous rock.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Salt, siliceous rock.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*—$1.92 million: fish, salt, bananas. *Partners*—Portugal, Japan, US. *Imports*—$33.3 million: manufactured goods, fuels, food. *Partners*—Portugal, UK.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 31 escudos (Portuguese or Cape Verdean) = US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$30 million (1975): Portugal, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, UNDP. *US only*—$5 million (FY 1975-76).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Sahel Committee Against Drought (CILSS).

PEOPLE


The archipelago was uninhabited when discovered by the Portuguese in 1456. The population is largely descended from African slaves brought to the islands to work on Portuguese plantations. Most Cape Verdeans are of mixed African and Portuguese origin. Vestiges of African culture are more pronounced on the island of São Tiago, where 40 percent of the people live.

The islands are poor in resources, and for years Cape Verdeans have emigrated for survival. There are sizable Cape Verdean communities in the United States (mainly in New England), Brazil, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Angola.

Although the official language is Portuguese, most Cape Verdeans speak a creole dialect—Crioulo—which consists of archaic Portuguese that has been modified through contact with African languages. There is a rich tradition of literature and music in Cape Verdean Crioulo.

HISTORY

In 1462 Portuguese settlers arrived at São Tiago and founded Riberia



Grande—the earliest European city in the tropics. In the 16th century the archipelago prospered from the transatlantic slave trade, and Portuguese settlements were subject to occasional attacks by pirates. Ribeira Grande was sacked by Sir Francis Drake in 1585; after a French attack in 1712, it was abandoned.

The archipelago experienced recurrent drought and famine from the end of the 18th century, and with the decline of the slave trade its fragile prosperity slowly vanished. The islands' position astride Atlantic shipping lanes made Cape Verde an ideal location for the resupply of ships, and the excellent harbor at Mindelo on São Vicente became an important commercial center. In 1875 a submarine cable station was established at Mindelo. As early as 1810 U.S. whaling ships picked up crews from Brava and Fogo for service in seeking whales which abounded in the waters near Cape Verde. The first American consulate in Cape Verde was estab-

lished in 1816, and U.S. consular representation in the archipelago continued throughout the 19th century.

In 1951 the status of Cape Verde was changed from a Portuguese colony to an overseas province. On December 18, 1974, Portugal and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) signed an agreement in Lisbon that provided for a transitional government composed of Portuguese and Cape Verdean officials who would prepare Cape Verde for independence. On June 30, 1975, Cape Verdeans elected a National Assembly. This Assembly received the instruments of independence from Portugal on July 5, 1975, and the United States recognized the Republic of Cape Verde on that day.

GOVERNMENT

The Organic Statute of the State of Cape Verde, promulgated on December 17, 1974, by the President of Portugal, is the basis for governmental organization in Cape Verde. On June 30, 1975, about 100,000 Cape Verdeans (80 percent of those eligible to vote) cast ballots to elect 56 deputies to the legislative branch of government, the National Assembly. The National Assembly then selected the executive branch of government from among its members. The Assembly has not yet prepared a definitive constitution.

The judicial system is headed by a National Council of Justice which is composed of three judges named by the government and six assessors elected by the people or appointed by the National Assembly. The National Council of Justice hears appeals from lower courts. In each district a Council of Justice, composed of citizens elected for 1-year terms, has primary jurisdiction.

Principal Government Officials

President–Aristides Pereira
Prime Minister–Pedro Pires
President of the National Assembly, Minister of Foreign Affairs–Abilio Duarte
Minister of Economy–Osvaldo Lopes da Silva
Minister of Finance–Amaro da Luz
Ambassador to the U.S.–Raul Querido Varela
Ambassador to the U.N.–Vacant

Cape Verde is in the process of establishing an Embassy in Washington, D.C.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The only political party permitted to operate in Cape Verde is the PAIGC. It is also the ruling party in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The PAIGC was organized clandestinely in Bissau in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, a Cape Verdean, and Raphael Barbosa. The PAIGC sought to make demands on the Portuguese authorities in an effort to improve economic, social, and political conditions in then-Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde. The PAIGC's armed struggle against Portugal began in 1961 with acts of sabotage and eventually grew into a war in Portuguese Guinea which pitted 10,000 PAIGC soldiers against 35,000 Portuguese and African troops fighting for Portugal. Although the PAIGC had a clandestine organization in Cape Verde, it did not attempt to disrupt Portuguese control of the archipelago. It became an overt political movement in Cape Verde after the Portuguese revolution of April 1974.

The PAIGC party congress, composed of representatives from both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, meets about every 3 years. It last met in July 1973, and the third congress is scheduled to be held in Cape Verde in 1977. The party's High Council for the Struggle, equivalent to a central committee, has 85 members and is ordinarily convoked once a year by the Executive Committee for the Struggle. The Executive Committee currently has 24 members; it is the PAIGC's political bureau and acts for the High Council. Three Cape Verdean officials are on the Executive Committee: President Pereira, who is Secretary General of the PAIGC; Prime Minister Pires; and National Assembly President Duarte.

A basic tenet of PAIGC doctrine is the "unity" of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In 1975 a Council of Unity, composed of representatives of the national assemblies of the two states, began studying possible forms of association. There has not been a unification or federation of the two nations, but efforts are being made to strengthen the economic and political links.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate–Cape Verde has a dry, temperate climate with little variation in temperature throughout the year. September is the warmest month (80°F) and February the coolest (71°F). Rain is scarce; most falls between July and Oct. Strong northeast winds blow almost constantly.

Customs and Currency–Americans must have visas and inoculations against smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever. Typhus, typhoid, and tetanus immunizations are recommended. Portuguese Cape Verdean escudos are not convertible outside the country. Portuguese escudos also circulate in Cape Verde. The government plans to establish a central bank and issue the Cape Verdean escudo which will have parity with the Portuguese escudo.

Health–Sanitation is fair in Praia and Mindelo. Hospitals are located in these two cities, but medical care is generally inadequate.

Telecommunications–The submarine cable station at Mindelo links Cape Verde with Europe. Radiotelegraph facilities are available at Sal, Praia, and Mindelo.

Transportation–Regular flights connect Sal with Lisbon and Bissau. Direct flights link Praia with Dakar and Bissau. Scheduled domestic air service connects Sal, Praia, and Mindelo with the other islands. International shipping companies make regular stops at Mindelo, and small boats operate unscheduled intra-island services. Taxis are available at Praia, Sal, and Mindelo. Accommodations are extremely limited at Sal and Mindelo, and virtually nonexistent in Praia.

ECONOMY

Cape Verde is poor in natural resources and suffers from inadequate rainfall and water. In periods of normal rainfall only 4 of the 10 islands (Santo Antão, Brava, Fogo, and São Tiago) support significant agricultural production. Mineral resources are salt, pozzolana (a volcanic rock used in cement production), limestone, and kaolin.

About 100,000 persons are engaged in agriculture. Subsistence crops–corn, beans, sweet potatoes, and manioc–occupy most of the arable land. During the 1974-75 drought, Cape Verde produced only 4 percent of its corn requirements–the dietary staple.

In years of adequate rainfall, bananas, sugarcane, and Arabica coffee are exported in small quantities.

The seas around the archipelago are rich in fish, and about 2,000 fishermen supply the local market and provide quantities of fish and shellfish for export. There are cooling facilities and processing plants at Mindelo, and the government is examining ways to develop its fishing industry.

Cape Verde's strategic location at the crossroads of central Atlantic air and sea lanes has been enhanced by improvements at the harbor of Mindelo (Porto Grande) and at Sal's international airport. Plans for ship repair facilities and a petroleum refinery at Mindelo are being studied. The islands' location and climate also offer possibilities for the development of tourism, but basic infrastructure is needed.

Because of the islands' meager resources, many Cape Verdeans seek work abroad. Worker remittances sent to the islands from abroad are estimated at $6 million annually.

Cape Verde has signed economic accords with Portugal, which provide for $12 million in loans and grants. Since independence the United States has provided grant aid for food, technical assistance, and soil and water conservation.

The archipelago has 1,200 miles of roads, of which 200 miles are paved. The major port is Mindelo, and there are port facilities at Praia, São Filipe, Maio, and Porto Novo. In addition to the international airports at Sal and Praia, there are also airports on São Vicente, São Nicolau, Maio, Fogo, Brava, and Boa Vista.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cape Verde proclaims a policy of nonalignment and seeks cooperative relations with all friendly states. Cape Verde assigned one of its first ambassadors to the United States. Ties with Guinea-Bissau are close because the same political party, the PAIGC, rules both nations. The common heritage of Portuguese language and culture provides an affinity with other Portuguese-speaking nations.

The sizable Cape Verdean communities in Senegal and the Netherlands, as well as in other European and African nations, have caused Cape Verde to seek good relations with a variety of states. It also maintains cooperative relations with Algeria, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union.

Cape Verde takes an active interest in international affairs, especially African affairs. It participates in most international conferences on economic and political matters.

U.S.-CAPE VERDE RELATIONS

The United States recognized Cape Verde on its independence day, July 5, 1975, and supported its admission to the United Nations. The cordial relations between the two nations are rooted in historic ties between the peoples of Cape Verde and the United States. Cape Verdeans began migrating to America early in the 19th century; today about 300,000 persons of Cape Verdean descent live in the United States, mainly in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.

The United States acted promptly to provide humanitarian aid and economic assistance to Cape Verde in the period immediately following independence. Additional assistance programs in agriculture, water resources, and food are under consideration.

The United States desires to expand and strengthen its presently friendly relations with Cape Verde and wishes to encourage and assist the country's economic and social development.

Principal U.S. Official

Ambassador—Melissa F. Wells

The United States does not maintain a resident diplomatic mission in Cape Verde. The U.S. Ambassador to Cape Verde is also accredited to, and resident at, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau.

READING LIST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8874, Released October 1976

APPENDIX G

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, December 1975 (Publication 7970)]

background notes

Central African Republic

department of state * december 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Central African Republic

GEOGRAPHY

The Central African Republic (C.A.R.), located about 400 miles from the sea, is at almost the precise center of the African Continent. It is bound by Chad on the north, Sudan on the east, Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville) on the south, and Cameroon on the west.

Most of the country lies between 1,600 and 3,600 feet above sea level; with an average of about 2,000 feet. Essentially, the country is a vast, well-watered plateau drained by two major river systems. The northerly system drains into the Chari Basin and eventually into Lake Chad; the southerly system drains into the Oubangui River, a confluent of the Congo River. Except for the Oubangui itself and very short sections of two other rivers, navigation is seasonal and difficult.

Vegetation varies from the tropical rain forest in the extreme southwest to the semidesert in the northeastern tip. Most of the country is open savanna.

The C.A.R. has ample rainfall and humidity, but not the oppressive tropical climate found in many coastal areas of Africa. In the western highlands the climate is occasionally quite cool. Average monthly temperatures at Bangui range between 70°F and 90°F. Annual rainfall in the Oubangui River valley is about 70 inches. In the extreme northeastern portion of the country, rainfall averages only 31.5 inches per year. Much of the country's precipitation occurs from May through October; however, heavy rains occur intermittently throughout the year. Sunny skies and warm weather generally prevail from December through April.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 242,000 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex.). CAPITAL: Bangui (pop. 301,000). OTHER CITIES: Berberati (93,000), Bouar (48,000), Bangassou (46,000), Bambari (35,000), Mbalki (17,000).

People

POPULATION: 2.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.3% (1974). DENSITY: 7 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Over 80; 66% Baya-Mandjia and Banda, 7% M'Baka. RELIGIONS: 40% Protestant, 28% Catholic, 24% animist, 8% Muslim. LANGUAGES: French (official), Sangho (national). LITERACY: 18%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 40 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic (proclaimed Dec. 1, 1958). INDEPENDENCE: August 13, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Feb. 1959 (abolished 1966).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President for life (Head of Government and MESAN) assisted by Council of Ministers (Cabinet). *Legislative*–Presidential decree. *Judicial* (autonomous)–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Movement d'Evolution Sociale en Afrique Noire (MESAN). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 21. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: 14 Prefectures.

FLAG: Blue, white, green, and yellow horizontal bands from top to bottom; vertical red band in the center; yellow star at upper left on the blue band.

Economy

GDP: $250 million (1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $155.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 10%. *Labor* 87%. *Products*–cotton, coffee, peanuts, food crops, livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* na. *Products*–timber, textiles, soap, cigarettes, processed food.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, uranium, timber.

TRADE: *Exports*–$70.6 million (1974): diamonds, cotton, timber, coffee. *Imports*–$89.1 million (1974): machinery and equipment, petroleum products, textiles. *Partners*–France (60% of imports, nearly 50% of exports), other EC countries, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Japan, US, UDEAC states.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: CFAF 2.25=US$1.


US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: Bilateral for FY 1976–$721,000. FY 1975–P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) $234,000; self-help $85,000; Peace Corps, nearly 50 volunteers; through Exim Bank, $3.9 million in financing.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), OAU, UN and associated agencies, IMF, IBRD, African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), associate member of European Communities (EC).

PEOPLE

More than 70 percent of the Central Africans live in rural areas. Only a few regions along the rivers and on the Chad frontier are densely populated.

Each of the more than 80 ethnic


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers
CHAD
SUDAN
ZAIRE
CAMEROON
CONGO
Am Timan
Maroua
CAMEROON
Yaoundé
Pala
Moundou
Sarh
Birao
Ndélé
Ouadda
Batangafo
Crampel
Bocaranga
Bossangoa
Bozoum
Bouar
Sibut
Bambari
Bria
Yalinga
Obo
Bossembélé
Bangassou
Batouri
Berbérati
BANGUI
Mobaye
Mbaiki
Libenge
Nola
Bondo
Titule
Aketi
Buta
Bumba
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

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divisions has a language of its own. Sangho, the language of a small riverine group along the Oubangui River, is the lingua franca. Only a minority of the population has more than an elemental knowledge of French, the official language.

During the 1973-74 school year, about 194,000 pupils attended primary schools; about 18,500 were in secondary schools. Jean-Bédel Bokassa University, the only institution of higher learning, graduated its first class in 1974. A number of Central Africans receive university training in France and other countries.

HISTORY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The precolonial history of the area now called the Central African Republic was marked by successive waves of migration, of which little is known. This period accounts for the complex ethnic and linguistic patterns today. Until 1958 the country was known as Oubangui-Chari, one of the four territories of French Equatorial Africa (AEF).

A convention concluded on April 19, 1887, with the Congo Free State granted France possession of the right bank of the Oubangui River. This convention and later international agreements established the boundaries of Oubangui-Chari.

In 1889 the French established an outpost at Bangui, located at the upper limit of the year-round navigable portion of the Oubangui River. In 1894 Oubangui-Chari became a territory; then it was placed under a High Commander and gradually given an administrative structure which began to be organized around 1900. United with Chad in 1906, it formed the Oubangui-Chari-Chad colony. In 1910 it became one of the four territories of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa, along with Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon.

In August 1940 the territory responded, with the rest of the AEF, to the call from Gen. Charles de Gaulle to fight for Free France. After the war, the French Constitution of 1946 inaugurated the first of a series of reforms which were to lead eventually to complete independence for all the French territories in West and Equatorial Africa. The rights granted in 1946 included French citizenship for all inhabitants and establishment of local assemblies. The next major landmark was the Basic Law (*Loi Cadre*) of June 23, 1956, which eliminated all remaining voting inequalities and provided for creation of governmental organs to assure a measure of self-government to individual territories. Then the constitutional referendum of September 1958 led to dissolution of the AEF and further expansion of the internal powers of the former overseas territories. The C.A.R. became an autonomous republic within the newly established French Community on December 1, 1958, and continues to celebrate this date as its National Day. The country adopted a constitution (now abolished) in February 1959 and became independent in 1960.

The Republic

The first President, revered as the founder of the C.A.R. and of its mass political party (MESAN), was Barthelemy Boganda. He died in an airplane crash in March 1959, and his cousin, David Dacko, succeeded him as head of both party and government. In January 1964 President Dacko was reelected for a 7-year term by a majority of 99.4 percent.

The Constitution, adopted in February 1959, proclaimed the nation's attachment to "the Rights of Man, the principles of democracy and the self-determination of peoples" and provided for a highly centralized, unitary state. Legislative authority was vested in a unicameral 50-seat National Assembly, elected for a 5-year term by direct universal suffrage. Broad executive powers were given to the President, who could appoint and remove all members of the government and the administrative services, promulgate all laws and issue regulations, and proclaim a state of emergency. The Constitution also provided for a judicial branch and guaranteed its independence from the other two.

In December 1960 the principal opposition party, the Movement d'Evolution Démocratique en Afrique Centrale (MEDAC), was dissolved by government order. In November 1962 all opposition parties were banned and MESAN became the sole political party. The next month the Constitution was amended to institutionalize MESAN as the single national movement through which the people exercised their sovereignty. The MESAN steering committee was given responsibility for recommending national policy to the executive branch and for nominating candidates for the Presidency and the National Assembly. The President pledged, however, to consult with labor, women's, youth, and other representative groups on important decisions.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Carter, Gwendolyn. *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Hazelwood, Arthur, ed. *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Kalck, Pierre. *The Central African Republic: A Failure in Decolonization.* London: Pall Mall Press, 1971.

Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. *The Emerging States of Equatorial Africa.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960.

Wai, U Tun, ed. *Surveys of African Economies, Vol. 1: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon.* Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1968 .

PERIODICALS—*Le Monde, Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens, Europe Outre-Mer,* and *Bulletin d'Afrique Noire:* Paris.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing–Lightweight, washable clothing is recommended. Bring a jacket or sweater for the rainy season (May-October).

Customs–No visas are required of carriers of US passports at this time; however, travelers should consult the CAR Embassy before commencing travel. Those with visas for Rhodesia or South Africa may be barred from entry. Visitors are cautioned not to display or use photographic equipment without the expressed permission of the Ministry of Information. Photographs may not be taken of government personnel or ceremonies or roads and houses having an unsatisfactory appearance.

Health–Yellow fever and smallpox inoculations are required. Shots for tetanus, typhoid, cholera, polio, and hepatitus are recommended. Prepare raw fruits and vegetables and tap water for cooking and drinking with care. Local facilities are adequate for routine medical problems.

Telecommunications–Cable telephone service to the US and elsewhere is good. A new satellite system is being built in the western and central parts of the country which will provide a high-quality telephone service between the CAR's important economic and administrative centers.

Transportation–Bangui M'Poko International Airport has regular air service to Paris (via N'Djamena, Chad), Cairo, Moscow, Kinshasa, and Yaounde. The nearest railroad is in Cameroon. Buses and taxis are available but not generally used by tourists. Some 810 miles of the east-west Trans-African highway lie in the CAR (between Beloko on the Cameroon border and Bangassou bordering Zaire in the southeast). About 113 miles of this road are paved, and most of the rest is of laterite. Roads often flood out during the rainy season.

During 1963 the government undertook, through MESAN, an intensive campaign in the provinces to instill a sense of national unity and purpose in the isolated and diversified citizenry. At the end of the year the President began a campaign for a 3-year austerity program to permit investment in the country's development and in the economic and social needs of the people.

The Bokassa Government

Following a swift and almost bloodless coup d'etat on January 1, 1966, Col. (now Marshal) Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, assumed power as President of the Republic. He announced that he had acted to eliminate the waste and corruption of certain officials in the Dacko government; to halt the country's drift into increasing economic stagnation; and to remove the influence of the Chinese Communists, who he charged were threatening the independence and freedom of the C.A.R.

President Bokassa abolished the Constitution of 1959; dissolved the National Assembly; and issued a constitutional decree which placed all legislative and executive powers in the hands of the President, maintained the independence of the judiciary and the official status of MESAN as the national movement, and stated that all previous laws and regulations remained in effect unless specifically abrogated by the government's future decrees.

GOVERNMENT

In March 1972 President Bokassa was made "President for life." He continues to rule by decree and is assisted by a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) which he appoints. He also appoints the Supreme Court judges and the administrative officials of the 14 Prefectures.

Principal Government Officials

President for Life of the Republic; President of the Government; President for Life and Secretary General of MESAN; Keeper of the Seals; and Minister of Defense, Civil Service and Social Security, Interior, and Telecommunications–Marshal of the C.A.R. Jean-Bédel Bokassa

Prime Minister; Vice-President of MESAN–Elisabeth Domitien

Ministers of State

Tourism, Waters, Forests, Hunting and Fishing–Angé Patasse

Defense (Deputy), Veterans and War Victims, Energy–François Gon

Urbanization and Housing–Henri Maidou

National Education, Educational Reform, Youth, Sports and Culture–Jean-Louis Psimhis

Public Works–Joseph Potolot

Information–Christian Lingama Toleque

Treasury–Alphonse Koyamba

Ministers

Foreign Affairs–Antonio Franck

Finance–Marie-Christiane Gbokou

Justice and Labor–Augustin Dallot-Befio

Plans, International Cooperation and Statistics–Jean-Paul Mokodopo

Commerce–Alexis Tcheouti

Transportation–Henri-Paul Boundio

Agriculture–Albert Mandjeka

Public Health–André Zane-Fe Touam-Bona

Social Affairs–Marie-Joseph Zane-Fe Touam-Bona

Civil Aviation–François Otina

Government Personnel–Michel Bangue-Tandet

Ambassador to the U.S.–Christopher Maidou

Ambassador to the U.N.–Jean Arthur Bandio

The C.A.R. maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1618 22d St., NW.,Washington, D.C. 20008.

ECONOMY

The worldwide energy crisis and inflation during 1973 had both favorable and unfavorable effects on the economy. World market prices for the C.A.R.'s principal exports rose rapidly. However, rising transportation costs hurt the landlocked country. In addition, unusually low water levels hindered river transportation, the country's most economical trade route. Although 1974 was a year of minimal economic growth, the basic structure of the economy remained sound, and the long-range economic potential is good. The energy crisis has renewed interest in the Bakouma uranium deposits and other unexploited mineral resources. Ecological conditions are favorable for agricultural expansion.

To improve the economy the government places considerable emphasis on policies to overcome such obstacles as the country's great distance from the sea, limited transportation system,

dearth of skilled labor, largely subsistent agricultural production, and lack of financial resources.

Agriculture

The C.A.R. is a predominantly agricultural country. Insufficient rainfall during the 1973-74 crop year caused significant drops in overall production, as well as difficulties in getting the cash crops to market. The cotton crop was the lowest in 8 years, at 45,732 tons. Estimates for the 1974-75 crop year show a decline to 43,000 tons. Potential production is perhaps two or three times that amount. However, shortages of fertilizer and insecticides, and decreased incentive on the part of the farmer, will probably contribute to maintaining production at current levels for the foreseeable future. Improved rains in late 1974 should bring a slight increase in coffee production from about 9,000 tons in 1973-74 to about 10,500 tons in 1974-75.

With the assistance of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, the government is encouraging agricultural expansion, especially in food crops. The country has vast areas of unused arable crop land, and its potential as a breadbasket for Africa could someday be realized. Improved labor, capital, roads, markets, and communications are needed, and the government is seeking foreign investment in large agribusiness schemes.

Forestry

Over the past 5 years the timber industry has attained an annual average growth rate of 24.2 percent. In 1973 timber exports reached 70,382 cubic meters of sawn lumber and 154,982 cubic meters of logs. Provisionary figures for 1974 indicate that exports declined 15 percent due primarily to worldwide inflation which has contracted the construction business and thus reduced the global timber market. The C.A.R. Government is encouraging the industry to transform timber into lumber, plywood, veneer, etc., and the 15 companies in this sector are actively investing in factories and sawmills.

Transportation problems, too, plague this bulk export industry. The 1,200-mile-long export route is via river to Brazzaville, Congo, then rail to Pointe Noire on the Atlantic Ocean. The tremendous increase in freight tonnage in recent years on this route has overwhelmed the transportation system. This increase combined with unusually low river levels has created severe movement and handling problems. In spite of river and port improvements, major relief will not come before the second line of the Brazzaville-Pointe Noire railroad is finished in 1977.

Mining and Industry

Diamond production in 1974 attained a level of about 350,000 carats. Total exports of 343,950 carats, valued at $14.4 million, accounted for about 35 percent of the nation's foreign exchange receipts. The principal firm is an American company, Diamond Distributors International (DDI). DDI, the Canadian Mining Company, and the C.A.R. Government formed a local company, SCED, in late 1973 to mechanize mining operations and aid artisanal diggers. SCED had a successful first year and by expanding its river dredging operations in the near future will contribute to the growth of this sector.

Commercial exploitation of uranium appears to be back on track after several years of stalling and jockeying for exploitation rights. The Bakouma uranium deposits contain about 20,000 tons of uranium-metal valued at up to $300 million at current market prices. The uranium occurs in a high phosphate ore which has heretofore been technically difficult to separate and, at least until the recent energy crisis, uneconomical to exploit. The Aluminum Company of Switzerland (Alusuisse) was granted exclusive rights to the deposits in January 1974, and in November the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) was included in the Alusuisse-led consortium, which also includes the C.A.R. Government. This group hopes to begin commercial mining of the deposit in 1976. This should generate a sizable increase in gross exports and increase employment opportunities in the sparsely populated eastern region of the country.

The C.A.R. has other minerals such as iron, zinc, bauxite, limestone, and copper in significant quantities, but much exploration remains to be done before reserves can be reliably estimated.

Although the possibility for oil exists in the C.A.R., no significant testing has yet been accomplished. Shell and the American Continental Oil Company (CONOCO) hold an oil exploration concession for a northern section of the C.A.R. near Chad and are currently drilling for oil.

The industrial sector in the C.A.R. numbers slightly more than 100 firms ranging in size from small artisan workshops to the large textile complex of *l'Industrie Cotonnière Centrafricaine* (ICCA), which employs 1,200 workers. ICCA had sales of $1.2 million and capital of about $9 million in 1974. Most industries are producing import substitutes or transforming agricultural or timber products into semifinished products. The textile, soap, cigarette, and food processing industries have helped the C.A.R. reduce imports in these categories. Outside of the timber sector no major factories were constructed or opened in 1974 or 1975.

In May 1974 the government nationalized the entire petroleum sector (including two American subsidiaries). This followed similar nationalizations in Congo (Brazzaville) and was apparently related to arrangements made in connection with negotiations with Algeria for new sources of petroleum supplies and to differences over taxation of company profits. A government company, Centra-Hydro, has taken over the management of the petroleum distribution system. Centra-Hydro has had difficulties arranging for transporting petroleum supplies and purchasing lubricants. Shortages of all products are currently evident in Bangui. In 1974 the retail price of gasoline increased from $0.26 per liter to $0.39 per liter, a 33-percent jump.

Trade and Aid

The latest trade statistics cover the year 1972. When statistics for 1973 and 1974 become available, they will show a serious deterioration in the C.A.R.'s trade balance, due to adverse

climatic conditions and the quantitative rise in the price of petroleum. For 1974 and 1975 a $5 million balance-of-payments deficit is expected, due to increasing petroleum prices.

The U.S. runs a large trade deficit (about $5 million in 1974) with the C.A.R., as it is the major purchaser of Central African diamonds. Sales of goods and services by General Telephone and Electronic International (GT&E) for the construction of a national telecommunications system has helped reduce this deficit during the past 3 years.

The C.A.R. receives significant foreign aid from France, the European Development Fund (FED), the United Nations Development Fund (UNDF), the Soviet Union, and the World Bank Group (IBRD, IMF, and IDA). France is the largest aid donor.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The C.A.R. continues to maintain close ties with France and is a member of the French Community and the franc zone and an associate member of the EC. Although negotiations to form a confederation with the other states of former French Equatorial Africa failed in 1960, the four countries preserved a number of the features of their previous association, including cooperative arrangements in customs, transportation, and higher education. The Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) groups the C.A.R., Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon in an economic and customs union which came into effect January 1, 1966.

Following the 1966 coup, the new government broke diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., but it has maintained all other previous international ties and has since established some new ones. Presently nearly 30 countries have accredited diplomatic representatives to the C.A.R., and the C.A.R. maintains 20 resident diplomatic missions abroad.

Bangui is the headquarters of two African regional organizations, UDEAC and OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauricienne). OCAM heads of state decided to shift that organization's headquarters from Yaounde, Cameroon, to Bangui in August 1974.

U.S. -C.A.R. RELATIONS

American citizens, principally missionaries, have been living and working in the C.A.R. since the early 1920's. The first American diplomatic or consular establishment in the country, an Embassy, was opened February 10, 1961. Relations between the C.A.R. and U.S. are friendly; both governments cooperate on issues of mutual interest.

U.S. primary interests in the C.A.R. include the continued improvement in the existing cooperative and friendly relations, the protection and advancement of U.S. commercial interests in the C.A.R., and the protection of the rights of resident and transient Americans. Consistent with U.S. humanitarian and political interests in assisting developing nations, the U.S. endeavors to provide the C.A.R. with development assistance within the constraints of our capabilities.

In 1975 a bilateral aid program was implemented. A program amounting to about $800,000 is planned for fiscal year 1977. U.S.-supported U.N. programs also play a significant role in the C.A.R.'s efforts to achieve national economic development. The Peace Corps programs, which were first implemented in 1972, continue to expand in scope and number of participating volunteers.

The C.A.R. signed an Investment Guaranty Agreement with the United States on December 31, 1969. There are presently three American Companies with substantial interests in the C.A.R.: Diamond Distributors International, General Telephone and Electronic International, and the First National City Bank of New York, which has a partially owned subsidiary in Bangui. These firms employ about 10 Americans in management and technical capacities.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Anthony C. E. Quainton
Counselor of Embassy—William L. Swing
Political Officer—David S. Rupp
Economic/Commercial Officer—Robert E. Bribbin
Consular Officer—Ronald L. Faucher
Administrative Officer—Jon L. Noyes

The U.S. Embassy is located at Square de la Republique Centrafricaine, Bangui.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7970, Revised December 1975

APPENDIX H
CHAD
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, October 1975 (Publication 7669).]

background notes

Chad

department of state * october 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Chad

GEOGRAPHY

In area and population, Chad is the largest country of former French Equatorial Africa. Landlocked in the heart of Africa, it is surrounded by Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger. The country is shaped like a shallow basin which rises gradually from 750 feet above sea level at Lake Chad in the west to more than 12,000 feet in the Tibesti Mountains in the north. Rivers of the southern watershed flow into Lake Chad; the north is desert.

Chad's heavy rainy season lasts from early April to mid-October in the south and from early June to late September in the center. Except for occasional stormy rainfalls, the north is dry.

PEOPLE

Perhaps as early as the 8th century, Arab elements entered Chad from the north across the Libyan Desert, bringing with them the Islamic faith which their descendants follow today. After the fall of Christian Nubia in the 14th century, an Arab and Islamic influx from the east began. As a result of these Arab penetrations, the population of Chad is divided between the Saharan Muslims and the indigenous Negroid southerners. The latter group, with the exception of a small Christian minority, has retained traditional animistic practices. About 5,000 Europeans reside in Chad.

HISTORY

From ancient Arab manuscripts and modern archeological investigations, it is known that well-developed societies flourished around Lake Chad more than 1,000 years ago. From the time of these early kingdoms to the present, Chad has served as a crossroads for the Muslim peoples of the desert and savanna regions and the animistic Negroid tribes of the tropical forests.

Between the 9th and 16th centuries A.D. an enigmatic group called the Sao produced many interesting and beautiful terracotta artifacts which have been found in the Logone and Chari River basins. The Sao eventually disappeared under pressure of the growing Islamic political organizations. The most important of their kingdoms

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 496,000 sq. mi. (4/5 the size of Alaska). CAPITAL: N'Djamena (pop. 170,000). OTHER CITIES: Moundou, Abéché, Sarh (each has 30,000-40,000 people).

People

POPULATION: 4.1 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1% (1974). DENSITY: 8 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Sudanic group (Sara, Banana, Moundang, Baguirmian), Nilotic group (Ouaddian, Dar Massalit, Moubi, Dadjo), Arab-speaking group (Hassaouna, Djoheina), Saharan peoples (Kanimbou, Toubou). RELIGIONS: Islam, animist, Christian. LANGUAGES: French (official). Most Chadians speak their own African languages. LITERACY: 10% (est.). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 43 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 11, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: April 14, 1962 (currently suspended).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*–Supreme Military Committee. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, several lower courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 14 Prefectures.

FLAG: Blue, yellow, and red vertical bands from left to right.

Economy

GNP: $298 million (1973 est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: $73.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 50%. *Labor* 96%. *Products*–subsistence crops, cotton, cattle, fish, gum arabic.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 4%. *Products*–livestock and its products.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Fish, petroleum and uranium (unexploited), natron, kaolin.

TRADE: *Exports*–$53 million (1973): cotton, livestock and its products. *Partners*–EEC, Nigeria. *Imports*–$111 million (1973): motor vehicles and parts, petroleum products, machinery and parts, cotton fabrics. *Partners*–EEC, Nigeria, PRC.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 FF = 50 CFAF. CFAF currently floating in the range of 200-230 CFAF=US$1.

U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: $12.7 million (1972-75), including PL 480 commodities.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, OAU, GATT, EEC (associate member), Franc Zone, African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), West African Economic Community, Central Bank of Central Africa, African Development Bank (AfDB).


CHAD
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers
LIBYA
Largeau
Mao
Bol
Biltine
Abéché
Ati
SUDAN
N'DJAMENA
Mongo
Am Timan
Bongor
Laï
Fort-Archambault
Moundou
Doba
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Chari
Logone
Bahr el Ghazal
Bahr Salamat
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

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were Kanem-Bornou, Baguirmi, and Ouaddai. At their peak these kingdoms controlled practically all that is now Chad and parts of Niger and Sudan.

The French first penetrated Chad in 1891, when the European scramble for African territories moved to the interior. It was necessary for the French to establish their authority through the use of military expeditions, primarily against the Muslim kingdoms. The final battle for Chad, a victory for France, was fought near N'Djamena on April 22, 1900.

In 1959 the territory of French Equatorial Africa was dissolved, and the four states, now Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), and Chad, became autonomous members of the French Community. In 1960 Chad became an independent nation. Since the coup d'etat of April 13, 1975, which overthrew the Tombalbaye regime, Chad has been ruled by its army.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The 1962 Constitution was suspended at the time of the 1975 coup, and a provisional government was set up. The President is Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the highest policymaking body in the country. The SMC is the executive arm of the government and performs the duties of a legislature. It is composed of military officers who have functional responsibilities. Under executive direction of the SMC, the Council of Ministers carries out and administers the policies of the provisional government.

The legal system is based on French civil law and Chadian customary law. Administratively, each of Chad's 14 Prefectures has an appointed governor responsible to the central government.

The SMC has banned political activity and all political parties for the present as it strives to mobilize national energies to revive and stabilize the country's economy. Chad is faced with intermittent banditry and acts of terrorism by groups in the northern and central-eastern areas of the country.

Principal Government Officials

President; Chairman of the SMC; Minister of National Defense and Veterans Affairs–Felix Malloum

Vice Chairman of the SMC; Minister of Interior and Security–Mamari Djime Ngakinar

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs and Cooperation–Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue

Finance–Negue Djogo

Agriculture, Livestock, Waters, Forests and Fisheries–Gouara Lassou

Public Works, Mines and Geology–Wawa Dahab Zakaria

Ambassador to the U.S.–Bawoyeu Alingue

Chad maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1132 New Hampshire Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

ECONOMY

About 96 percent of the Chadians are engaged in subsistence agriculture, fishing, and stockraising, with low productivity. Subsistence food production, which never entered the market economy, accounted for more than half of the 1973 GNP estimate of $298 million. This figure, therefore, has little meaning; however, based on this estimate, per capita income in 1973 was about $73.

Among the obstacles to economic development are:

–a desert area as large as Texas;

–a scarcity of known mineral resources; and

–a landlocked position, isolated by inadequate transportation.

Until the Sahelian drought of 1967-73, which badly damaged the harvests and herds, Chad was self-sufficient in food production. After the effects of the drought disappear, Chad should again become self-sufficient by expanding its yields and acreage. Food crops produced mainly for local consumption include millet, sorghum, rice, sweet potatoes, yams, and cassava. Peanuts are grown in rotation with cotton, and date production is becoming important.

Fishing along the rivers and Lake Chad is an important economic activity. Most of the 100,000 tons of fish caught annually is consumed locally, but an appreciable quantity, dried or smoked, is exported mainly to Nigeria.

The only minerals now being exported are natron (native sodium carbonate) and gum arabic, but production of each is only a few hundred tons annually. A substantial deposit of kaolin (a clay used in ceramics and brick) has been located. A U.S. company is exploring for oil in two areas of the country and has found traces of petroleum. A discovery of commercially exploitable oil would greatly improve Chad's economic situation.

The vastness of the country, its landlocked position, and the nature of its soil and climate contribute to transportation problems in Chad.

In 1973 the European Economic Community (EEC) supplied around 51 percent of Chad's imports, about 42 percent of the total comes from

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–Except for the rainy season (June-September), the climate is similar to Arizona's. Summer clothing is suitable for N'Djamena; a light sweater is recommended during the cool season (November-February).

Customs–Visas are required for entry.

Health–Several European physicians practice in the capital. Local pharmacies do not always carry common medications. Sanitation level is low. Insects, rats, and rabies are an ever-present problem. Avoid local milk products, leafy vegetables, and tap water. Malaria suppressant drugs should be started 2 weeks before arrival and continued until 2 weeks after departure. Gamma globulin shots are recommended.

Telecommunications–Long-distance telephone service to Europe, the US, and other points in Africa is sporadic. Worldwide telegraph service is available.

Transportation–N'Djamena's International Airport is served by several weekly flights to and from Paris, Douala, Libreville, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Bangui, and Yaounde. Air Tchad operates year round between the capital and other larger towns in Chad. During the dry season, road travel is possible throughout most of the country by sturdy, preferably four-wheel-drive, vehicles. Taxis, available in the capital, are expensive. Buses run between major villages during the dry season. Chad has no railroad.

France alone. Imports from the United States average $3 million annually; exports to the U.S. are negligible. Fish, cattle, meat, and hides offer possibilities for increased exports. Cotton now constitutes 70 percent of Chad's recorded exports. Livestock and its products represented about 18 percent of exports in 1973.

Chad's foreign trade may be higher than statistics indicate, since a large part of its trade with Nigeria is carried on across an uncontrolled border and is not recorded. This trade includes export of cattle, hides, and fish, and the importation of Nigerian consumer goods.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chad has retained close ties with France since independence. Relations with other Western nations are good. Chad also maintains cordial ties with the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and several other Communist states. An advocate of regional cooperation, Chad helped to form the multilateral Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), which includes all the countries bordering the lake, in order to develop this potentially rich area.

U.S.-CHAD RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Chad are friendly. Other than ongoing oil explorations, there is at present little direct U.S. commercial interest in Chad, although the climate for American investment in areas such as hotel construction and mineral exploration, as well as for joint ventures in small industries like tourism, meat-processing, or cottonseed-oil, is believed to be good.

The U.S. Government has funded bilateral assistance in livestock development, capital and technical aid, donations of food under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), and a short-term relief and rehabilitation program to relieve some of the problems and suffering created by the drought in the Sahel region. In addition the United States has assisted Chad through the LCBC to develop transportation and communications facilities and agriculture. The U.S. has also participated in the smallpox-measles eradication campaign. Some 45 Peace Corps volunteers work in agricultural, teaching, and rural development projects.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Edward S. Little
Counselor of Embassy—Richard A. Dwyer
Peace Corps Director—Jeanne F. Faraher
Public Affairs Officer—E. David Seal

The U.S. Embassy in Chad is located at Rue du Lt. Col. Colonna d'Ornano, N'Djamena. Its mailing address is B.P. 413, N'Djamena, Chad.

READING LIST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7669, Revised October 1975

APPENDIX I

CONGO, BRAZZAVILLE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, September 1976 (Publication 7896).]

background notes

Congo, Brazzaville

department of state * september 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: People's Republic of the Congo

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

The Congo (Brazzaville) is located on the Equator in west-central Africa extending more than 800 miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean. It is bordered by Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Zaire, and Cabinda (part of Angola).

The country has four topographical regions: a coastal plain which extends inland about 40 miles to the foothills of the Mayombe Mountains, the fertile Niari Valley in the south-central area, the central Batéké Plateau separating the basins of the Ogooué and Congo Rivers, and the Congo River Basin in the north composed of largely impassable flood plains in the lower portion and dry savanna in the upper portion. Much of the Congo is covered by dense forests.

The tropical climate is not conducive to sustained physical effort. Temperatures average 75°F year round, and annual rainfall varies from 45 to 80 inches. The main dry season lasts from May through September.

About 40 percent of the people live in urban areas, principally Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and Loubomo (formerly Dolisie). In the rural areas the Congolese are divided into many small communities which have little outside contact. About 9,000 Europeans, mostly French, reside in the Congo.

HISTORY

The early history of the area now known as the Congo is believed to have focused on three tribal kingdoms—the Kongo, the Loango, and the Teke. The Kongo was a highly centralized kingdom established in the 4th century which developed a close commercial relationship with the Portuguese, the first Europeans to explore the area. With the development of the slave trade the Portuguese turned their attention from the Kongo kingdom to that of the Loango. When the slave trade was prohibited by European powers in the 1800's the Loango kingdom was reduced to many small independent groups. The Teke kingdom of the interior sold slaves to the Loango kingdom. Teke independence ended in 1883 when its king concluded a treaty with Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, thereby placing his lands and people under French protection. Under the French the area was known as Middle Congo.

In 1910 Middle Congo became part of French Equatorial Africa, which also included Gabon, the Central African Republic, and Chad. During World War II it was an important center of Free French activities. In 1944 at Brazzaville, Gen. Charles de Gaulle promised reforms in French Africa. These reforms, inaugurated by the

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 132,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than N. Mex.). CAPITAL: *Brazzaville* (pop. 180,000). OTHER CITIES: Pointe-Noire (115,000), Loubomo (34,000).

People

POPULATION: 1.3 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.4%. DENSITY: 6 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 15 groups, 75 tribes; major groups are Bakongo, Bateke, M'Bochi, Sangha. RELIGIONS: 48% animist, 47% Christian, 5% Moslem. LANGUAGES: French (official), Lingala, Kikongo. LITERACY: 20%.

Government

TYPE: People's republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 15, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: January 3, 1970.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of State (Cabinet). *Legislative*—dissolved in August 1968. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Congolese Labor Party (PCT). SUFFRAGE: Universal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Regions, divided into districts, and capital district.

FLAG: Red with two green palm branches framing a crossed hoe and hammer topped by a gold star in the upper left.

Economy

GDP: $56 million (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4.9% (1973). PER CAPITA INCOME: $340.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* less than 1% cultivated. *Labor* 70-80%. *Products*—cocoa, coffee, tobacco, palm kernels.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 20%. *Products*—processed agricultural and forestry goods.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Wood, potash, petroleum, natural gas.

TRADE (1973): $62 million: tropical wood, sugar, tobacco. *Imports*—$85 million: machinery, transport equipment, consumer goods, food. *Partners*—France, Italy, FRG.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 246 CFA=US$1 (July 1976).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$214.4 million (1961-75). *US only*—$1.9 million (prior to 1965).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN; Organization of African Unity (OAU); Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC); African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM); associate member of EEC.



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French Constitution of 1946, conferred French citizenship on the inhabitants, decentralized certain powers, and initiated participation by local advisory assemblies in the political life of the overseas territories. More reforms followed with the enactment of the Overseas Reform Act (*Loi Cadre*) of June 23, 1956, which removed remaining voting inequalities and provided for the creation of governmental organs assuring a measure of self-government. A constitutional referendum in September 1958 replaced the federation of French Equatorial Africa with the French Community. Middle Congo, as well as the three other territories, became a fully autonomous member of the French Community under the name of Republic of the Congo. On August 15, 1960, it became an independent country but retained close formal bonds with the community.

The immediate postindependence era was dominated by Abbé Fulbert Youlou, who was deposed from the presidency in an uprising led by labor elements in August 1963. All members of the Youlou government were either arrested or removed from office, and Abbé Youlou died in exile in Spain in 1972. The Congolese military took brief charge of the country and installed a civilian provisional government headed by Alphonse Massamba-Débat. Under the Constitution of 1963, Massamba-Débat was subsequently elected President for a 5-year term. His term came to an abrupt end in August 1968 when Capt. Marien Ngouabi and other army officers toppled the government in a coup d'etat. After a period of power consolidation under the newly formed National Revolutionary Council, Capt. Ngouabi (now Maj.) assumed the presidency on December 31, 1968. On December 30, 1969, President Ngouabi proclaimed Africa's first "people's republic" and announced the decision of the national political party, the National Revolutionary Movement, to change its name to the Congolese Labor Party (PCT).

GOVERNMENT

According to the Constitution promulgated on January 3, 1970, political power is concentrated in the Central Committee of the PCT and the Council of State (Cabinet). The leader of the PCT is also President of the Republic; his tenure is not specified in the Constitution. The presidentially appointed Council of State is the executive organ of the government.

The Constitution does not provide for a legislature. The President, in meetings of the Political Bureau, exercises legislative power by decree. In the Declaration of December 12, 1975, the Central Committee of the PCT detailed the evils which were gradually destroying the life of the party, undermining the revolution, demobilizing the masses, and compromising the economic situation. It called for the establishment of a special 5-member revolutionary general staff to remedy the situation.

There is no section in the Constitution on the judicial branch. The Supreme Court is referred to in the section on international agreements as being empowered to give advice on whether such agreements conform to the Constitution. Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President.

Each of the Congo's nine Regions is under the authority of a commissioner appointed by the central government.

Principal Government Officials

President—Maj. Marien Ngouabi
Prime Minister—Maj. Louis-Sylvain Goma
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Theophile Obenga
Ambassador to the U.N.—Nicolas Mondjo

The Congolese Mission to the United Nations is located at 14 E. 65th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Since the Ngouabi government took power in 1968, political power has been increasingly centralized in the presidency, and the promulgation of the 1970 Constitution further strengthens this trend. The PCT is the only legal party in the country.

Policy objectives of the government are broadly expressed in terms of "scientific socialism," despite varying, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations within the country as to modes of application of this doctrine. Although some elements openly press for a program of rapid state assumption of control of the whole economy, the government has thus far avoided a policy of total nationalization.

The Ngouabi government is struggling with the same basic problems that confronted its predecessor—lack of capital and adequate personnel, unemployment, economic underdevelopment, and low living standards. Continuing conflicts among government leaders with varied tribal and regional origins and ideological beliefs further complicate these problems.

ECONOMY

Most of the population is engaged in subsistence farming, producing corn, bananas, cassava, rice, peanuts, tropical fruits, goats, and chickens. Cash crops, which are not grown in great quantity, range from palm nuts, sugarcane, bananas, and peanuts to tobacco, coffee, and cocoa beans. Most agriculture commercialization is under the direction of a state marketing board.

The Congo depends on imported items of all kinds including 90 percent of the meat consumed. Trade balances are chronically and heavily negative. Tropical wood is the most important export item.

France has been the primary source of foreign aid; however, since the August 1963 coup, trade and aid patterns have changed somewhat. The Congo has concluded several trade agreements with the People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., and other Communist bloc countries.

There is no heavy industry in the country. In addition to processing wood, the Congo produces soap, sugar, palm oil, beer, cement, textiles, and cigarettes.

The most valuable mineral resource yet discovered is a large deposit of high-grade potash near Pointe-Noire. Potash exports are estimated at about 430,000 metric tons annually. The geological structure of the ore body has posed serious difficulties for any substantial increase in annual production. Offshore petroleum production

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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commenced in 1972. In time it could provide the Congo with a major source of revenue.

The Congo's geographic location at the crossroads of transit trade to and from Zaire, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Gabon, and the lingering effects of Brazzaville's former position as administrative capital of French Equatorial Africa also have a substantial impact on the country's economy. Customs receipts, providing much of the income revenue, and extensive employment in service and transport industries are the primary benefits derived from these circumstances.

The port of Pointe-Noire is served by the 319-mile-long Congo-Ocean Railway connecting it to Brazzaville and the Congo River transport to the north. Pointe-Noire also serves as the port of evacuation for COMILOG, a manganese mining activity in Gabon, 49 percent of which is owned by a U.S. company. International airlines provide service to the Congo, and the government-owned Lina Congo provides internal air service. The road network is very inadequate, which makes retail distribution in the interior difficult and costly, impedes the marketing of rural agricultural production, and limits the accessibility of rich timber stands in the north.

The Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and Gabon formed the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) in the late 1960's. They also form a monetary union and share a common currency issued by a common central bank.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The stated foreign policy of the Congo is one of nonalignment, but the leftist government sides with the Communist and radical states on almost all matters of international importance. Since early 1964, the Congo has established diplomatic relations with virtually every country in the Communist world.

Relations with Zaire, severed in late 1968, were fully restored in December 1970, and normal ferry traffic between the two capitals across the Congo River was resumed.

U.S.-CONGO RELATIONS

The United States has attempted to maintain friendly relations with the Congolese Government and people. As a result of three instances of arrest, detention incommunicado, and expulsion (in two of the cases) of U.S. officials by the Congolese authorities, all official U.S. personnel were withdrawn from the country and the U.S. Embassy closed in August 1965. At the time of withdrawal the Congolese Government was informed that the United States would be prepared to consider reopening its Embassy upon receiving meaningful assurances of Congolese intention to respect U.S. rights of legation (the full range of traditional diplomatic rights, privileges, and immunities). The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany represents U.S. interests in the Congo. U.S. assistance from 1960 until relations were broken totaled $1.9 million.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing–Summer clothing is suitable year round. Bring sweaters for cool evenings during the dry season (May-Sept.).

Customs–Visas and cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever shots are required.

Health–Hospitals are only located in the major towns; health care is rather basic. Visitors are urged to take malaria suppressives. Avoid raw foods, undercooked meats, and tap water.

Telecommunications–Local is unreliable; international only to Paris.

Transportation–Public transportation is inadequate. Taxis are plentiful; agree on the price in advance. Air charters are the only reliable means of transportation in the interior. Third-country nationals are discouraged from taking the Brazzaville-Kinshasa ferry.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7896, Revised September 1976

APPENDIX J
DAHOMEY
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, February 1975 (Publication 8308).]

background notes

department of state * february 1975

Dahomey

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Dahomey

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Dahomey, located on the south side of the West African bulge, is bounded by Nigeria, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, and the Gulf of Guinea.

North of the coastal lagoons the country is flat and generally covered with dense vegetation. Dahomey's coastline runs about 75 miles along the Gulf of Guinea.

The climate of the coastal region is hot and humid much of the year, though it is tempered somewhat by a sea breeze. The long rainy season on the coast lasts from mid-March to mid-July, and the short rains are from mid-September through November. The interior has only one rainy season (June-October).

Dahomey is one of the most densely populated territories of former French West Africa. About 90 percent of the people live in rural sectors of the country. Porto Novo is the official capital, but most governmental operations are located at the political capital, Cotonou.

More than 40 ethnic groups are found in Dahomey, but 4 of them—the Fons, the Adjas, the Baribas, and the Yorubas (who are related to those in Nigeria)—account for more than half the population.

Dahomey is not linguistically homogeneous; however, French is used as a common language.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 43,483 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Pa.). OFFICIAL CAPITAL: Porto Novo (pop. 80,000). POLITICAL CAPITAL: Cotonou (140,000).

People

POPULATION: 2.9 million (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3-4% (1972-73). DENSITY: 66 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Fons, Adjas, Baribas, Yorubas. RELIGIONS: 65% animist, 15% Christian (in south), 13% Moslem (in north). LANGUAGE: French (official). LITERACY: 20%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 42 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Military revolutionary. INDEPENDENCE: August 1, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: None at present.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*—National Revolutionary Council (NRC, merely consultative). *Judicial*—Supreme Court, 2 lower levels.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: Universal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 6 Departments.

FLAG: Vertical green stripe on the staff side, with upper horizontal yellow stripe and lower red stripe.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $272 million (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4.6% (1972). PER CAPITA INCOME: $85. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: Negligible.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 18%. *Labor* 90%. *Products*—corn, rice, beans, palm products, manioc.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*—mainly processing agro-industrial products, small-scale assembly.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Low-grade iron ore, limestone, some offshore oil (none presently being exploited).

TRADE: *Exports*—$62 million (1972): palm products, cotton, peanuts, coffee. *Partners*—U.S., France, other EC (European Communities). *Imports*—$90 million (1972): manufactured and capital goods, foodstuffs, tobacco. *Partners*—U.S., France, Federal Republic of Germany, U.K.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Floating with French franc (CFAF50=1FF).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$18.36 million (1972). *U.S. only*—$22.9 million (development loans).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African, Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), Entente Council, West African Monetary Union.

HISTORY

In the 17th century the Portuguese, setting out from Lagos, Nigeria, founded the trading post of Porto Novo in what is now the southeastern extremity of Dahomey. At that time Dahomey was composed of an agglomeration of small, mutually suspicious principalities, most of them tributary to the powerful Kingdom of Abomey to the north. Since its founding in the 16th century, Abomey had successfully pushed south against the Yorubas and other coastal tribes. In 1863 the King of Porto Novo, anxious to free himself of this oppression, requested protection from the French, who had already signed a commercial treaty with Dahomey in 1851. French military campaigns subjugated other important groups, and in 1892 all of Dahomey was organized as a French protectorate. Until after World War II, governmental affairs in France's African territories were administered directly from Paris through Governors General and territorial governors. With the establishment of the Fifth French Republic, Dahomey became an autonomous state in the French Com-


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
NIGER
UPPER VOLTA
TOGO
GHANA
NIGERIA
BIGHT OF BENIN
Sokoto
Jega
Gaya
Malanville
NIGER
Pendjari
Makrou
Alibori
Kandi
Sota
Pama
Tindangou
Natitingou
KAINJI LAKE
Djougou
Ouémé
Lama-Kara
Bassari
Parakou
Kaiama
Shaki
Ilorin
Okpara
Bafilo
Savé
Savalou
Isoyin
Zou
Dassa-Zoumé
Atakpamé
Mono
Kouffo
Abomey
Ouémé
Kpomé
Pobé
Palimé
Yoto
Lokossa
PORTO-NOVO
Ouidah
Cotonou
Aflao
Akatsi
LOMÉ
DAHOMEY
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 25 50 Miles
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munity on December 4, 1958. Dahomey achieved independence and was admitted to the United Nations in 1960.

Since independence, Dahomey has experienced many difficulties in securing national unity. The effects of regional and personal rivalries have caused a series of largely bloodless coups d'état and other government changes which began in October 1963 when Hubert Maga, who became President at the time of independence, was deposed by the military. He was succeeded by a provisional government directed by Col. Christophe Soglo, then Chief of Staff of the Dahomean Army. In general elections held on January 19, 1964, the electorate chose Sourou-Migan Apithy as President and Dr. Justin Ahomadegbe as Vice President. A 42-member National Assembly was also selected from a single list prepared by the *Parti Démocratique Dahoméen.*

In November 1965, following continued rivalry between the three civilian leaders, Army Chief of Staff Soglo (then General) led a group of officers that forced the resignation of the President and the Vice President. National Assembly President Congacou formed a provisional government. The army intervened again in December 1965 and established a military-backed regime with Gen. Soglo as President.

Another coup occurred in December 1967, led by young army officers who were dissatisfied with the accomplishments of the Soglo government. A Revolutionary Military Committee was formed with Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley acting as President. A new constitution was adopted on March 31, 1968, and a presidential election was held on May 5. However, because they were prohibited from playing a direct role in the election contest, the three Dahomean civilian ex-Presidents prevailed upon their many followers to boycott the elections. Only 26 percent of the electorate voted, causing the Revolutionary Military Committee to annul the elections.

Still resolved to return the country to civilian rule, the army leaders named Dr. Emile-Derlin Zinsou, who had served as Foreign Minister under Gen. Soglo, to form a government. Despite an attempt by the three former civilian ex-Presidents to block the nomination, Dr. Zinsou was installed as President on July 17, 1968. Following the formation of the cabinet of the new government on July 31, the Revolutionary Military Committee dissolved itself on August 1, the anniversary of Dahomey's independence.

A dispute with the Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Maurice Kouandete, led to the overthrow of the Zinsou government on December 10, 1969. This move caused Dahomey's most protracted political crisis.

A provisional government was formed on December 14, 1969, led by a military triumvirate which included Lt. Cols. Paul-Emile de Souza, Benoit Sinzogan, and Maurice Kouandete. Former civilian Presidents Maga, Ahomadegbe, and Apithy were permitted to return to Dahomey and were asked to decide on a single candidate for the presidential role. After more than 4 months Maga and Ahomadegbe agreed to form a government headed by a collegial presidency, with the three civilian members rotating the chairmanship every 2 years. Hubert Maga emerged as the first to serve as President, followed by Ahomadegbe, who took office in May 1972.

Dissatisfied with what they considered to be corrupt, unresponsive civilian rule, and also opposed to their own commanders, Dahomey's junior- and middle-grade army officers seized control of the government on October 26, 1972. Under Major (now Lt. Col.) Mathieu Kerekou, a Military Revolutionary Government was established with a Cabinet composed of majors and captains. The military government represented a clear break with all earlier Dahomean administrations. It quickly promulgated an Action Plan which envisaged marked revolutionary changes in the political and economic life of the country. Increasing radicalization has occurred under this military government. In late 1974, President Kerekou said Dahomey's revolution would follow a Marxist-Leninist course, to include expansion of the state sector by nationalization of some private interests (including certain foreign-held assets).

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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

In line with its Action Plan, the military government is ambitiously restructuring the political system it inherited. New institutions have been established at the national, departmental, district, and village level, with the goal of popularizing the revolution. The government also hopes, in this manner, to make the political system more responsive to local concerns. Although no political party has yet been established, committees to defend the revolution are being created in all political and economic divisions.

Government is essentially by decree of the Council of Ministers, headed by President Kerekou. A National Revolutionary Council (NRC) has been created to give policy direction and advice. This appointed Council numbers 67, of whom 30 are civilians. A National Political Bureau, composed of 12 members of the NRC, serves as the executive arm of that body. Parallel organizations have been established at the departmental and local levels. The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code, but is undergoing adaptation to changing local circumstances.

Principal Government Officials

President, Minister of Defense and the Plan, Coordination of Foreign Aid, Information and National Orientation—Lt. Col. Mathieu Kerekou
Keeper of the Seal, Minister of Justice and Legislation—Lt. Col. Barthelemy Ohouens
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation—Maj. Michel Alladaye
Minister of Finance—Maj. Isidore Amoussou
Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N.—Tiamiou Adjibade

Dahomey maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2737 Cathedral Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

ECONOMY

Fundamental economic changes are part of the revolutionary program—President Kerekou has called for an end to foreign economic domination. However, he has indicated Dahomey will remain part of the CFA (African Financial Community) monetary system. In early December 1974, the government nationalized oil distribution companies, an insurance company, foreign-owned transportation companies, two banks, and the overseas telephone system. French private interests were principally affected, along with some U.S. and other foreign interests. While the revolutionary government has declared that a place continues to exist for private enterprise, it plans to establish control over Dahomey's major "means of production." The government has promised compensation for nationalized foreign property.

Dahomey's economy is heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture. The economy's performance declined somewhat during 1972-73 (the most recent years for which economic data are available). Palm products, the country's chief export, registered lower production due to lack of water. Real per capita income probably fell slightly because of rising prices and increased population.

Cotton production has steadily increased, more than doubling over the past 5 years, to a total of 49,700 metric tons in 1972-73. Peanut and coffee production, other staples of Dahomey's export trade, declined somewhat during the same period. Attempts have been made to diversify the economy and lessen dependence on these few export crops.

As export revenues have declined, so have government tax receipts, reversing a favorable fiscal record established in the early 1970's. The government is strenuously trying to reduce personnel expenditures and also vigorously pursue a more stringent tax collection policy. The national budget showed a substantial deficit in 1972.

Chronic trade deficits have characterized Dahomey's balance of payments for many years. Imports, which largely originate in France and other EC (Euorpean Communities) countries, include manufactured goods, foodstuffs, textiles, and fuels. Large-scale capital inflows (mostly official) from abroad have offset the trade deficit and the balance of payments has remained in basic equilibrium.

Prospects for increased industrial output rest with the expansion of textile facilities, a new palm processing mill, and several other potential investments.

In recent years foreign assistance to Dahomey has averaged $15-20 million a year, with France the major donor. Other EC countries, the United States, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have contributed most of the remainder. Dahomey is anxious to broaden its economic base.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Revolutionary Government has continued Dahomey's ties with the French-speaking African community. However, the government is pledged to reassert Dahomey's sovereign independence, which is to include expanded ties with English-speaking neighbors. Economic relations with Nigeria are increasing notably, as both countries extend their range of cooperation. Dahomey is a member of the nonaligned group and tailors its foreign policy accordingly. The present government has broadened relations with the Communist states, having recently exchanged embassies with the People's Republic of China and North Korea.

Dahomey has indicated its desire to continue traditional friendly ties with France, other European countries, and the United States.

U.S.-DAHOMEY RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Dahomey have been cordial since ties were first established following Dahomey's independence in 1960. Major efforts have been made to attract U.S. private investment to Dahomey, which could result in the realization of one or more projects over the next few years. U.S.-Dahomey trade in the past few years has been modest, about $4-5 million.

U.S. assistance to Dahomey has increased notably with the provision of two development loans. AID is financing a $10.9 million road rebuilding project in northern Dahomey. A U.S. firm will begin construction on this project in 1975. In addition, AID is providing a $12 million loan toward the construction of a bridge-dam complex near Cotonou, in cooperation with the African Development Bank. Various AID-sponsored projects within the Entente Council framework are also of benefit to Dahomey.

The Peace Corps has had an active program in Dahomey for the past several years. About 50 volunteers are currently working in the country, primarily in public health, agriculture, and education programs.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—James B. Engle
Deputy Chief of Mission—Martin L. Cheshes
Director, Peace Corps—Charles E. Yonkers
Public Affairs Officer—Sherman H. Ross

The U.S. Embassy in Dahomey is located at Rue Caporal Anani Bernard, Cotonou.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLICATION 8308

APPENDIX K
EGYPT
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, September 1975 (Publication 8152).]

background notes

Egypt

department of state * september 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Arab Republic of Egypt

GEOGRAPHY

Egypt is located in the northeastern corner of the African Continent and is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea; on the west by Libya; on the south by the Sudan; and on the east by the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, and the State of Israel. Only about 10,000 square miles of the area—consisting of the ribbon-like Nile Valley, the Nile delta north of Cairo, and a few oases—are cultivated. Water from the Aswan High Dam is expected to increase the cultivable area eventually to about 12,500 square miles.

Egypt is an almost rainless block of desert consisting mainly of high plains and some rugged hills and mountains in the east along the Red Sea coast and along the valley of the Nile River. The country's existence depends almost exclusively on the Nile River, which rises in Ethiopia and Uganda and flows northward through Sudan into Egypt, where it stretches almost 550 miles from Aswan to Cairo.

Extending south from the 32d parallel to below the Tropic of Cancer, Egypt has a warm, arid climate. Winter temperatures at Cairo normally range between 40° and 65°F; summer temperatures between 70° and 100°F. Rainfall is almost entirely limited to the northern coastal area, where it averages 8 inches a year. South of Cairo (where annual rainfall averages 1 inch), precipitation drops to nearly negligible amounts. The highest point is Mt. Catherine in the southern Sinai—8,600 feet above sea level. The lowest is the Qattara Depression, a basin in the western desert of about 10,000 square miles, the floor of which is some 400 feet below sea level.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 386,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Calif., Nev., and Ariz. combined). Includes the approx. 22,500-sq. mi. Israeli-occupied area of the Sinai peninsula. CAPITAL: Cairo (pop. 8.4 million). OTHER CITIES: Alexandria (pop. 2.5 million), Port Said, Suez, Ismailia.

People

POPULATION: 38 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1%. DENSITY: 95 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Egyptians, Copts, Bedouins, Nubians. RELIGIONS: Sunni Muslim (90%), Christian. LANGUAGES: Arabic, English, French. LITERACY: 38%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 54 years.

Government

TYPE: Republic. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1971. INDEPENDENCE: 1922.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State); Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—unicameral People's Assembly (350 elected members and 10 appointed by the President). *Judicial*—Court of Cassation, State Council.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes—red, white, and black from top to bottom—with a golden hawk in the center stripe.

Economy

GDP: $9.2 billion (FY 1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: NA. PER CAPITA INCOME: $240.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 3%. *Labor* 50%. *Acres per capita* 0.2%. *Products*—cotton, wheat, rice, corn.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 11%. *Products*—textiles, processed foods, tobacco manufactures, chemicals, fertilizer, and petroleum and petroleum products.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*—$1.3 billion: cotton, rice, petroleum, manufactured goods. *Partners*—U.S.S.R., East European countries, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, India. *Imports*—$1.8 billion: foodstuffs, capital goods. *Partners*—U.S.S.R., Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, U.S.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Egyptian pound=US$2.56.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Arab League, Organization of African Unity (OAU), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

PEOPLE

Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second most populous on the African Continent (after Nigeria). Ninety-nine percent of the people are compressed into 3.5 percent of the country's area of the Nile Valley and its delta, making a population density there of more than 2,700 persons per square mile—one of the highest in the world. The proportion of people living in rural areas is decreasing as job opportunities in the urban centers are drawing more to the cities. The cities of Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia, which lie along the Suez Canal and had a combined population of 700,000 before the 1967 war with Israel, were largely evacuated as a result of the war. Many have now returned.

Lying at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean basin,



Egypt has developed a fairly homogeneous population. Basically, Egyptians are of Hamitic origin, with some admixture in the north with people from the Mediterranean and Arab areas and in the south with the Nubian groups from black Africa. However, the vast majority of Egyptians remain as they were when the pyramids were built—essentially a single people sharing a common ancestry and culture. Indigenous minorities include more than 3 million Copts, who have retained their historic Christian affiliation; 50,000 Bedouins, who are basically nomadic; and Nubians, in the south, who originally came to the Nile Valley from Sudan.

HISTORY

Egypt has a continuous recorded history of 5,000 years, the longest in the world. The country has had periods of strength, when neighboring territories fell under its domination, and periods of weakness, when it came under foreign rule. Egypt was a united kingdom from about 3200 B.C. until Alexander the Great conquered it in 333 B.C. From then until the 20th century it was under continuous foreign domination—by the Romans, the Persians, the Arabs (who introduced Islam to Egypt, which had been one of the first countries to adopt Christianity), and the Turks. The last period of foreign rule began in 1882, when the British occupied that area; in 1914 it became a British protectorate.

Suez Canal

In the mid-1800's, while Egypt was under nominal Turkish sovereignty and Europe was experiencing industrial and commercial growth, the French took the initiative in providing a link for a shorter trade route between Europe and Asia. They obtained a 99-year concession from the Egyptian ruler to build and maintain a canal between Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, thus providing a waterway between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. With European capital the French organized the Suez Canal Co., and construction on the canal began in April 1859. The Suez Canal was opened for navigation on November 17, 1869.

The British Government obtained effective control of the canal in November 1875 by purchasing more than 150,000 shares of stock from the Suez Canal Co. for about $20 million. This purchase left France and the United Kingdom as the majority stockholders. The Convention of Constantinople of October 29, 1888, provided that the canal was to be open to vessels of all nations, although the Egyptians closed the canal to Israeli shipping after 1948 by invoking article X (which authorized closure if necessary for the maintenance of public order).

In 1956 the new Egyptian regime, headed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the canal in reaction to withdrawal of Western promises of aid in building the Aswan High Dam. The Suez crisis eventually led to war in October and November of that year, at which time Israel invaded the Sinai and was joined subsequently by the United Kingdom and France who attacked the Suez Canal area. During this war the canal was blocked by sunken ships. It was reopened to international traffic 5 months later, and in July 1958 the Egyptian Government and the new company, called the Suez Canal Authority, agreed to reimburse $64 million to the former stockholders. The final payments were made in July 1963.

In June 1967 the canal was again closed as a result of war between Egypt and Israel. Egypt, however, received a subsidy from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to compensate for the loss in revenue.

The canal remained closed during the years when Israeli forces occupied the eastern shores of the canal in Sinai. Following the October 1973 war and the military disengagement agreement concluded between Israel and Egypt under U.S. auspices, the whole of the canal, including the eastern shore in Sinai, came under Egyptian control. Egypt declared its intention to reopen the canal as soon as possible. The United States responded to an Egyptian request for assistance in this endeavor by initiating mine clearance and salvage operations, which began in the late spring of 1974. The U.K. and France also provided assistance. U.S. naval vessels and aircraft, along with U.S. Army ordnance experts, assisted and advised their Egyptian counterparts during these operations. On June 5, 1975, the strategic waterway was reopened to international traffic.

Independence and Revolution

Although an Egyptian nationalist movement developed in the 1870's against British and French domination of the government, the country did not gain its independence until post-World War I. In 1922, Egypt became a monarchy under King Fuad I. The British, however, retained extensive powers as well as a major military presence in the Suez Canal Zone, which was used as a major Allied base of operation during World War II.

Under the leadership of Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a group of military officers (the "Free Officers") staged a coup d'etat on July 23, 1952, and exiled King Faruk, who had ascended the throne on the death of King Fuad in 1936. The Free Officers declared Egypt a republic on June 18, 1953. They were motivated by a desire to remove elements that traditionally had exploited the country. The regime they founded sought to raise the standard of living, develop the country's military and economic strength, and unify the Arab world under Egyptian leadership.

Pursuit of these objectives at times has led Egypt into collision with the West. Under Egyptian pressure, the British in 1954 agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The year 1955 found Egypt opposing the Baghdad Pact. Four years later this was recreated as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a Western-supported defense arrangement which included Iraq, Egypt's rival for leadership in the Arab world. Later in 1955 Egypt accepted military assistance from the U.S.S.R., and in 1956 it accepted the Soviet offer of aid to construct the Aswan High Dam after the United States withdrew its offer to help finance the first stage. Egyptian-Soviet military and economic relations have continued to grow over the years.

President Nasser's leadership and identification with Arab nationalism and social aspirations acted as a powerful magnet during the early years of the regime. The union of Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic was proclaimed on February 1, 1958, and was subsequently ratified by plebiscite. The union was troubled by economic and political incompatibilities, however, and Syria seceded in September 1961. Egypt nevertheless continued to call itself the United Arab Republic.

In April 1971 Egypt agreed to join Libya and Syria in a supranational federation to be called the Confederation of Arab Republics. Arrangements were made to draft a constitution and submit the federation plan to plebiscite in the three countries on September 1, 1971. On September 2, 1971, announced results showed that the formation of the Federation of Arab

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–Clothing should be suitable for hot summers or cool winters.

Customs–Visas are required and should be obtained before arrival. International health cards bearing valid smallpox certificates are required. Immunizations for typhoid, poliomyelitis, cholera, paratyphoid, and gamma globulin should be kept current.

Egypt, along with most Arab countries, forbids entry to anyone whose passport bears any indications of travel to or from Israel.

Health–Cairo has several well-equipped hospitals, and the practice of medicine and surgery is excellent.

Telecommunications–Telephone service on the whole is good, although delays may be encountered even on calls to towns near Cairo; service and reception vary with demand and atmospheric conditions. Telegrams can be sent from the main post office or from hotels (for an additional charge).

Transportation–Both regional and worldwide airlines serve Cairo's International Airport. Internal air service is available from Cairo to Luxor and Aswan. Rail service is available south to Aswan and north to Alexandria from Cairo. The capital has an abundance of taxis.

Republics was approved in Egypt, Libya, and Syria by some 10 million voters–98.1 percent of those eligible for the ballot. On the same day the United Arab Republic became the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Wars With Israel

In 1948-49 Egypt played a major role in a war between the Arab states and the newly established State of Israel. A truce was brought about under U.N. auspices, and in 1949 four armistice agreements were negotiated and signed at Rhodes,Greece, between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Egypt assumed the administration of the Gaza Strip, a small area of the original Palestine mandate bordering on the Sinai to which many of the Arab refugees had fled.

By 1955, however, the armistice had deteriorated seriously, and the Egyptian-Israel armistice line became the scene of armed hostilities launched from both sides. In July 1956 the withdrawal of U.S. aid for the Aswan High Dam project, followed by President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal for the stated purpose of using its revenues to finance the dam, climaxed in the 1956 Suez war. Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula at the end of October was followed by British and French landings at Suez in November, which were made with the stated purpose of separating the combatants and preserving the international character of the Suez Canal. The canal was closed to all shipping as a result of the hostilities.

A cease-fire was quickly arranged, and British and French forces were replaced by the end of December with forces of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The Suez Canal was cleared and reopened in March 1957, following withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Although the Egypt-Israel line remained relatively quiet following the 1957 settlement, in 1966 and 1967 incidents of terrorism and retaliation across the other armistice lines with Israel became progressively more serious. With the rise of tension in the area, the arrangements with regard to navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and for the stationing of U.N. troops between Israel and Egypt came apart in May 1967. Egypt moved armaments and about 80,000 troops into the Sinai Peninsula and asked the U.N. Secretary General to withdraw the U.N. forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. On May 22 President Nasser declared the Straits of Tiran closed, thereby blockading the Israeli port of Eilat.

Hostilities broke out on June 5 between Israel and Egypt. Jordan and Syria soon joined Egypt. After 6 days of fighting, all parties had accepted the cease-fire called for by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Israel was left in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. The Suez Canal was once again closed to shipping.

Efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967) were unsuccessful and led to growing frustration and bitterness on the part of Egypt and other Arab countries. After more than 6 years of what was called a "no peace, no war situation," Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. Israeli forces eventually were able to throw back the Syrian advance and to establish a foothold on the western shore of the Suez Canal. But Egyptian military forces were able to hold on to a thin perimeter along the eastern shore of the canal gained when Egyptian forces successfully crossed the canal and overran the Israeli-held Bar Lev Line.

U.S. diplomatic efforts during October and November in the capitals of the belligerents and at the United Nations brought an end to hostilities on all fronts. An intense diplomatic initiative led by the United States resulted in the introduction of U.N. forces and observers to the cease-fire zones. The parties directly concerned agreed to meet in Geneva in December 1973 for a peace conference under the cosponsorship of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to seek a negotiated settlement of the longstanding dispute. But it was U.S. diplomacy during this critical period that led to a military disengagement agreement, signed in January 1974 by Israel and Egypt. Israeli forces withdrew from the enclave gained on the western shore of the canal, and both sides agreed to the establishment of a U.N. buffer zone separating the Egyptian forces along the eastern shore of the Suez Canal from the Israeli forces concentrated further east. A similar military disengagement agreement was later reached between Israel and Syria. The way was thereby opened for further intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts toward progress on a negotiated settlement using the step-by-step approach.

In August 1975 U.S. diplomacy stimulated another attempt to achieve a second interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. This effort was successful, and on September 1 an agreement was initialed; on September 4 it was signed. The agreement notes that Egypt and Israel agree to resolve the conflict between them by peaceful means, to observe the cease-fire, and to abjure the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other. Egypt agreed to permit nonmilitary

cargoes destined for, or coming from, Israel to transit the Suez Canal. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from the Giddi and Mitla Passes in the Sinai, to enlarge the buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces and to return to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oil fields. The U.S. offered to man an early warning system in the Sinai. This proposal, which will result in the posting of up to 200 American civilian technicians in the Sinai, requires congressional approval. Implementation of the agreement is currently underway. The agreement specifially calls for continued efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

GOVERNMENT

Egypt has a strong, presidential-type government. Under the Permanent Constitution proclaimed on September 11, 1971, executive authority is vested in the President. He is popularly elected to a 6-year term and must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast. The President appoints the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). When the People's Assembly is not in session he rules by decree, but any legislation so promulgated must be submitted to the Assembly for approval when it reconvenes. Nonsubmission of decrees to, or their rejection by, the Assembly deprives them of force of law. In normal circumstances the President may veto a bill or draft law and return it to the Assembly within 30 days of its enactment. If the specified time limitation is exceeded or the Assembly again passes it by a two-thirds majority, it becomes law. Should a temporary event prevent the President from exercising his functions, the Vice President may act for him. If the President resigns, he addresses his resignation to the People's Assembly. In case of a mid-term permanent vacancy in the position of the President by death or disability, the Presidency is assumed by the Speaker of the People's Assembly. If the Assembly is dissolved at that time, power is then assumed by the President of the Higher Constitutional Court, provided that neither he nor the Speaker are running for President at the same time.

The unicameral People's Assembly has 360 members—350 elected from the 175 parliamentary constituencies and 10 appointed by the President. An Assembly term is 5 years. At least half of the members must be workers or peasants (*fellahin*). Under the Constitution the People's Assembly has the sole authority to enact legislation while it is in session.

Egypt's judicial system is based on European (principally French) legal concepts and methods. The highest court is the Court of Cassation, whose judges are appointed by the President.

Principal Government Officials

President—Anwar Al Sadat
Vice President—Muhammad Husni Mubarak
Prime Minister—Mamduh Salim
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Ismail Fahmy
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of War—Gen. Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy
Ambassador to the U.S.—Ashraf Ghorbal
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ahmad Esmat Abdel Meguid

Egypt maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2310 Decatur Place, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008. There are also Consulates General in New York and San Francisco.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Political parties in Egypt were outlawed in 1953. The regime has sought to replace them with a single mass organization which would support the regime and its policies. The first two efforts, the National Liberation Rally and the National Union, were not successful. The present organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was established in 1962 and was subsequently reorganized in 1966 and in 1971.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser dominated virtually every aspect of life in Egypt from 1952 until his death in September 1970. He was looked upon as a leader among the Arab states as well. Following Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat, one of the 1952 revolutionary group, was nominated President by the governmental and ASU organs and elected by national plebiscite. His term began in October 1970 for a full 6 years. The last People's Assembly elections were held in October 1971.

On September 11, 1971, Egypt's Permanent Constitution, based on studies by the ASU and the People's Assembly, was passed by general referendum. It embodies the goals and principles of the revolution and henceforth serves as the basis of government.

The declared long-range objectives of the Egyptian Government are to bring the benefits of education, representative government, and modernism to all the people of Egypt. One of its major actions has been a restructuring of the socioeconomic system. Through a program of nationalization of major industrial and commercial companies, sequestration of foreign-owned proper-

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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ties, breaking up of large estates, and exclusion of traditional leaders from influential positions, the government has largely displaced the old landowning aristocracy. In its place there has emerged a new elite of technicians and army officers.

ECONOMY

Egypt's economic growth in recent years has been slow due in large part to the 1967 war. As a consequence of that war, canal earnings stopped, tourist receipts declined, and the Sinai oil fields were lost, seriously limiting imports of needed commodities and impairing repayment of foreign indebtedness. With the reopening of the canal, the return of the oil fields, and increased foreign contributions to promote economic development, it is expected Egypt's economic growth will now accelerate.

Egypt's economic problems cover a broad front. Severe import restrictions and deflationary policies have had to be imposed, creating a serious constraint on economic production and growth. Due to shortages of raw materials and spare parts, Egypt's industries have been operating at considerably less than full capacity. The lack of fertilizer imports has limited agricultural productivity (about 80 percent of Egypt's exports, mainly cotton, are processed agricultural products).

Investment expenditures have been low, and job opportunities have grown more slowly than the labor force, increasing underemployment. This has been intensified by the rapid population growth and a need to expand social services at the expense of investment in productive enterprises. Migration to the cities has increased the urgent need for social and welfare services.

The Egyptian economy is dominated by the public sector. However, Egypt has recently taken a number of significant steps to implement a new development strategy that envisages expansion of the private sector and the encouragement of foreign private investment.

Agriculture and Industry

The Egyptian economy is basically agricultural, as it has been for centuries. Half of the total labor force of 10 million is engaged directly in this sector, and many others are engaged in processing or trading agricultural products. Thus, the majority of the population depends on some 6 million acres of high fertility soil in the Nile Valley and delta areas for their means of support.

The climate and availability of water permit multiple cropping (several crops a year on the same piece of land) and almost doubles the actual crop area in any one year, but farming is generally inefficient by modern standards. Production is for the market with very little subsistence agriculture. Cotton, wheat, rice, and corn are the principal commodities; cotton provides almost one-half of all export earnings.

To limit development of a one-crop economy, the government restricts the planting of cotton to one-third of each owner's land. Although wheat is less profitable than several other crops, the law requires most landowners to plant at least one-third of their land in wheat. Nevertheless, the annual shortfall between cereal production and consumption averages 2.5 million tons.

In 1947 half of the cultivable land was held by less than 2 percent of the landowning population. Maximum holdings have now been reduced to 100 acres per family, and some 300,000 families (8 percent of the rural population) have received land under agrarian reform distribution.

Since the per capita resources of water and cultivable land are limited, Egypt has concentrated on industrialization as a means of raising productivity. As the government has assumed larger and larger managerial responsibilities, the role of the small entrepreneur class has dwindled. Since the nationalization of the early 1960's, all major industries and public utilities have been run by organs of the central government. Nevertheless, the principle of private enterprise continues to be recognized, and most agricultural land, as well as a large proportion of trade, remains privately owned.

The industrial sector currently accounts for slightly over 20 percent of GNP, 35 percent of total exports, and about 13 percent of total employment. As a result of the Egyptian Government's recent steps to encourage participation by foreign capital in the development effort, a number of projects—involving at least partial foreign equity totaling more than $3 billion—are being discussed. These projects range in size from immense petrochemical complexes, refineries, and sponge iron plants to a variety of small manufacturing ventures in the $2-$10 million range.

Natural Resources

Egypt has few natural resources other than the agricultural capacity of the Nile Valley. The major minerals found are phosphates, petroleum, and iron ore. Petroleum production is moderate from offshore fields in the Gulf of Suez and some recent strikes in the Western Desert. Egypt has become an exporter of small quantities of petroleum despite the loss, at least for the present, of its Sinai oil fields and has hopes that further petroleum discoveries will be made in the future.

In the past year, 22 petroleum companies, including about 15 American firms, have signed petroleum exploration and development agreements with the Egyptian General Petroleum Co. Obligations have been made to spend several hundred million dollars on exploration in the next 2 years.

Trade and Balance of Payments

In recent years Egypt has had regular and substantial deficits in its foreign trade—imports have exceeded exports. With growing domestic demand for its export crops and the forced shift of its earnings away from convertible foreign exchange, Egypt has been required to set import limits that severely hamper not only economic development but the efficient use of existing agricultural and industrial capacity. Lack of import capacity for pesticides and fertilizer has delayed the spread of the "Green Revolution" to Egypt, and much industrial plant lies idle or underutilized through lack of replacement machinery, spare parts, and raw materials. In short, Egypt's ability to earn foreign exchange for needed imports is circumscribed by its financial inability to import the necessary inputs for export production. In 1973 exports totaled about $1.015 billion, while imports were about $1.600 billion. Cotton is the most important export from Egypt, accounting for more than 50 percent of

total earnings. Rice, petroleum, and manufactured goods, however, are assuming increasing importance. Foodstuffs (especially wheat—almost 3 million tons a year) and capital goods have accounted for a substantial share of Egypt's imports. In recent years Communist countries have taken about 50 percent of Egypt's exports and supplied about 35 percent of its imports.

The recent balance-of-payments difficulties have forced Egypt to maintain a substantial level of short-term borrowing. Added to its long- and medium-term debts, this burdens the economy with a very substantial debt service ratio.

Until the June 1967 war, earnings received from Suez Canal revenues and tourism covered a substantial proportion of Egypt's trade deficit. In 1966 Suez Canal earnings amounted to about $220 million. Despite the special subsidy payments from some other Arab states, Egypt is still dependent on substantial additional inflows of foreign capital to finance its economic growth.

Transportation and Communication

Transportation facilities in Egypt follow the pattern of settlement along the Nile. The major line of the nation's 4,000-mile railway network runs from Alexandria to Aswan. Other important lines run along the north coast to the Libyan border and eastward to the Suez Canal. More than 14,000 miles of motor roads (5,000 miles of which are hard surfaced) cover the Nile Valley delta and Red Sea coast. The Nile River system of approximately 1,000 miles, plus another 1,000 miles of navigable canals, are also extremely important for inland transport. The major ports are Alexandria and Port Said. All major cities, except Alexandria, have airports, of which Cairo International is the most important.

Radio Cairo, a government monopoly, is the most important communications facility in the Arab world and beams its broadcasts to all Middle East countries. Television was introduced in 1960 and can be viewed in 95 percent of the Republic. The Cairo and Alexandria press are very active, and Cairo newspapers and books are read throughout the Arab world. The Egyptian film industry, once the Arab world's leading one, has become less active but is still important.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Egypt is acknowledged as the leading state in the Arab world. Its population, industry, and armed forces are the largest of the Arab countries. The Egyptians are also Arab leaders in, among other spheres, the arts, literature, publishing, and movie production.

Egypt is influential in various other international contexts. From the 19th and early 20th centuries, when France and the United Kingdom competed for predominance and guided the building of and managed the Suez Canal, Egypt has retained a special importance for those two nations. Following the 1967 war, Egypt's relations with the U.S.S.R. grew increasingly close. Egypt also plays an important role as a Mediterranean state. It has been very active as a third world nation and, through a special relationship which evolved in the 1950's and 1960's with Yugoslavia and India, is looked upon by many in Africa and Asia as a leader of the nonaligned group of states. It has developed its cultural ties as well with the substantial Muslim population of sub-Sahara Africa and has extensive influence in that area.

The main themes of Egypt's foreign policy are Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and the championship of the Arab cause vis-a-vis Israel. President Nasser caught the imagination of many Arabs as the first important Arab leader in the post-World War II era to espouse anticolonialism, sharply reduce foreign influences in Egypt, and vitalize dreams of unification of the Arab world as a single nation. Through dynamic leadership, the new Egyptian regime in the 1950's and early 1960's became the personification for many Arabs of a movement for (a) Arab unity, (b) reduction of foreign influence, and (c) modernization. For the Egyptians, however, insistence on pan-Arab nationalism has gone hand-in-hand with a strong sense of pride in their own Egyptian nationality, a stronger feeling of identity than is found in the other Arab countries.

Arab socialism, as espoused by President Nasser and adhered to by his successor, was developed gradually by the Nasser regime in response to the economic and social needs of the population. The Arab socialism of Egypt is not rigidly Marxist, rejects the doctrine of class struggle, and does not oppose private ownership of property. It is centered on state capitalism, raising living standards through industrialization, and bringing about a broader distribution of wealth. Nasser's propagation of Arab socialism brought him into sharp ideological conflict with the governments of more conservative Arab countries in the period before the 1967 war.

The importance of the Arab-Israel dispute in Egyptian foreign policy has varied over the years, depending on the extent of tensions with Israel and the vicissitudes of Egypt's disagreements with other Arab countries. Since the 1967 war it has been Egypt's all-encompassing external concern. Egypt accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, but it never abandoned the option of attempting to regain its territories occupied by Israel in 1967 through recourse to war.

Relations with the U.S.S.R. deteriorated following the expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972. Relations between Moscow and Cairo are troubled, however, by Egyptian complaints that the U.S.S.R., following a massive Soviet military supply effort during the October 1973 war, has dragged its feet on military supplies since the war and has turned a deaf ear to Cairo's requests for a rescheduling of Egypt's heavy debt burden.

U.S.-EGYPT RELATIONS

Before 1967, U.S. relations with Egypt went through several cycles. The United States attempted to cooperate with the new Egyptian regime when it came to power in 1952. Relations were soon soured, however, by differences over such matters as U.S. friendship with Israel, U.S. refusal to finance the Aswan High Dam, the Baghdad Pact, and U.S. arms supplies to other Middle East countries. Relations between the two countries began to improve late in 1958, and the

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United States provided technical assistance, development loans, and large quantities of agricultural commodities to Egypt. In 1964 relations began to deteriorate again, primarily over questions relating to third countries rather than to strictly bilateral problems. When the "6-day war" broke out in 1967, Egypt accused the United States of being actively involved in the hostilities on the side of Israel and broke relations on June 6, 1967. (President Nasser subsequently admitted that this charge was based on misinformation.)

Formal diplomatic relations were reestablished on February 18, 1974. A close cooperative effort aimed at working out a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute has been bolstered by efforts in the economic field. The United States launched a $250 million AID program during FY 1975. An intense effort is underway to further deepen and broaden U.S.-Egyptian relations in the economic, cultural, and scientific fields under the auspices of the Joint U.S.-Egyptian Commission, established in June 1974 during former President Nixon's visit to Egypt.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Hermann F. Eilts

Deputy Chief of Mission—Frank E. Maestrone

Counselor for Political Affairs—Arthur Lowrie

Counselor for Economic/Commercial Affairs—Edward L. Peck

Counselor for Public Affairs—Howard H. Russell, Jr.

Counselor for Economic Development—Wilbert R. Templeton

The U.S. Embassy in Egypt is located at 5 Sharia America Al Latiniyyah, Garden City, Cairo.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8152, Revised September 1975

APPENDIX L
ETHIOPIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, December 1975 (Publication 7785).]

background notes

Ethiopia

department of state * december 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Ethiopia

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Ethiopia is located in the eastern Horn of Africa and is bounded on the north by the Red Sea, on the east by the French Territory of the Afars and Issas and the Somali Democratic Republic, on the south by Kenya, and on the west by the Sudan.

The country has a high central plateau which varies from 6,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level, with some mountains reaching 15,000 feet. Elevation is generally highest just before the point of descent to the Great Rift Valley, which splits the plateau diagonally. A number of rivers cross the plateau—notably the Blue Nile rising from Lake Tana. The plateau gradually slopes to the lowlands of the Sudan on the west and the Somali-inhabited plains to the southeast.

The climate is temperate on the plateau and hot in the lowlands. At Addis Ababa and Asmara, both at about 8,000 feet, maximum temperature is 80°F and minimum 40°F. The weather is usually sunny and dry with some intermittent showers occurring between February and April and the "big rains" beginning in late June and ending by mid-September.

The population is highly diverse. Most of the people speak a Semitic or Cushitic language. Of the more than 40 different groups, the Amhara, Tigre, and Galla together make up more than three-fourths of the population. In general, most of the highlanders are Christian; Muslims and animists inhabit the coastal areas. English is the most widely spoken foreign language and the major one taught in the schools.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 472,000 sq. mi. (compares in size with Tex., Okla., and N. Mex. combined). CAPITAL: Addis Ababa (pop. 900,000). OTHER CITY: Asmara (240,000).

People

POPULATION: 28 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1975 est.). DENSITY: 58 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 25% Amhara, 40% Galla, 12% Tigre, 9% Sidama, 2% Somali. RELIGIONS: 35-40% Ethiopian Orthodox Christian, 40-45% Muslim, 15-25% animist. LANGUAGES: Amharic (official), Tigrinya, Gallinya, Arabic. LITERACY: 7%.

Government

TYPE: Provisional Military Government. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1955 (suspended).

BRANCHES: *Executive*—Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). *Legislative*—none; Parliament dissolved in 1974. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: 14 Regions.

FLAG: Green, yellow, and red horizontal stripes from top to bottom.

Economy

GNP: $2.4 billion (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4% (est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: $88 (1974 est.).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 53% pasture, 12% cultivated. *Labor* 86%. *Products*—cereals, coffee, pulses, oilseeds, hides, skins, meat.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*—processed food, textiles, cement, building materials, hydroelectric power.

MINERAL RESOURCES: Potash, salt, gold, copper, platinum.

TRADE: *Exports*—$305 million (1974 est.): coffee 50%; pulses; hides, skins, and meat. *Partners*—US, FRG, Saudi Arabia, Italy. *Imports*—$268 million (1974 est.): manufactured goods, transport equipment, foodstuffs, fuels, textiles. *Partners*—Italy, Japan, FRG, US.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Eth. $2.07=US$1.

AID RECEIVED: *Total economic*—approx. $600 million (WWII-1973). *US only*—$309 million (1951-74): AID $244 million, Peace Corps $30 million, P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) and drought relief $35 million; military assistance (1953-75): $221 million in grants; $36 million in credits.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), International Coffee Organization (ICO).

HISTORY

Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa and one of the oldest in the world. Herodotus, the Greek historian of the 5th century B.C., described Ethiopia in his writings. The Old Testament records the visit of the Queen of Sheba to Jerusalem. According to legend Menelik I, the son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, founded the Ethiopian Empire. Missionaries from Syria and Egypt introduced Christianity in the 4th century A.D.



Under Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) the kingdom began to emerge from its medieval isolation. When he died his grandson, Lidj Yassu, succeeded to the throne but soon lost support because of his ties with the Muslims. In 1916 the Christian nobility deposed him and proclaimed Menelik's daughter, Zauditu, Empress, and her cousin, Ras Tafari Makonnen, regent and successor to the throne. In 1930 the Empress died, and her cousin, adopting the throne name Haile Selassie, was crowned Emperor.

His reign was interrupted in 1935 by the Italian invasion and occupation. The Emperor took his cause to the League of Nations, but the League failed to respond to his plea for assistance. He was forced into exile in England. On May 5, 1941, exactly 5 years after Italian occupation forces had taken over Addis Ababa, the Emperor reentered the city. He reigned until 1974, when the military led a relatively peaceful revolution which gradually reduced his authority.

On September 12, 1974, the Ethiopian Empire officially came to an end. The military leaders deposed Haile Selassie, proclaimed the establishment of the Provisional Military Government (PMG), and invited Haile Selassie's son, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, to ascend the throne as King. The Crown Prince, then abroad, de-

clined to return to Ethiopia. The throne has remained vacant, and on March 20, 1975, all royal titles were abolished.

GOVERNMENT

When the military leaders established the PMG, they dissolved Parliament and suspended the 1955 Constitution. The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), also referred to as the *Dirg* (Amharic word for committee), now exercises full government powers. It is largely a group of young officers and enlisted men who had been directing the revolution since it started in February 1974. The Chairman of the PMAC acts on its behalf on ceremonial occasions, but the PMAC's decisions and rule are effected collectively. A new constitution is under preparation which, after submission to the people for approval, would provide for the future government of Ethiopia.

The PMG has announced that Ethiopia's traditional policy of nonalignment will be continued, as well as adherence to the principles of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and that Ethiopia will also respect all international obligations.

Principal Government Officials

Acting Chief of State, Acting Head of Government, Chairman of the PMAC—Brig. Gen. Teferi Bante

Ministers

Commerce and Industry—Mohammed Abdurahman
Defense—Ayalew Mandefro
Finance—Negash Desta
Foreign Affairs—Kifle Wodajo
Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim, to the U.S.—Ghebeyehou Mekbib
Ambassador to the U.N.—Mohamed Hamid Ibrahim

Ethiopia maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2134 Kalorama Rd., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The revolution had among its goals greater economic equality and an end to feudal powers and privileges. Since coming to power, the PMAC has instituted a policy of Ethiopian socialism, which includes the nationalization of rural and urban lands and of major Ethiopian and foreign industries. The policies have encountered some resistance, including student unrest, labor disputes, and demands for a return to civilian rule.

The major problem facing the PMAC is the insurgent independence movement in the northern province of Eritrea, where sporadic fighting has been underway for over 10 years. The struggle intensified in February 1975 following a PMAC decision to send reinforcements to the government forces in that area. The PMAC has also been faced with dissension among the disparate tribes and ethnic groups in other areas of the country.

ECONOMY

Ethiopia is nearly self-sufficient in agricultural produce, except for cotton cultivation which is increasing. Coffee is Ethiopia's major product; most of it is exported to the United States. Although many of the coffee trees grow wild, plantation coffee is becoming more important. Cattle and good grazing lands are plentiful, and next to coffee, cattle raising probably has the greatest potential.

The country has had a series of droughts since 1972, which have resulted in much suffering for the rural population and an estimated 100,000 deaths. The international community has responded with donations, including $30 million from the United States. The PMG is proceeding with relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement projects.

Some gold, copper, and a little platinum are mined in Ethiopia. A large potash deposit in the north has development potential.

Ethiopia has two seaports of its own—Assab and Massawa—and also uses the port of Djibouti in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. Djibouti is connected with Addis Ababa by rail, a distance of 500 miles, and with Assab and Massawa by rail as well as by road. Total all-weather road mileage is about 4,000 miles, but only about a third of this is asphalt. Internal surface transportation is a problem, however, as nearly half the population lives more than one day's walk from an all-weather road.

Ethiopian Airlines has been a major factor in Ethiopia's development. An air transport company owned by the Ethiopian Government, it services more than 40 domestic airfields and has international jet service to more than a dozen countries. Efficiently run and with an impressive safety record during its more than 25 years of operation, it also overhauls and maintains aircraft belonging to national airlines in a half-dozen nearby countries.

Ethiopia depends on external sources for most of the foreign exchange needed to carry out development programs. Such aid has come

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Spring- and fall-weight woolens and light wraps are satisfactory year round. Lined raincoats, umbrellas, and boots are essential from June through mid-September.

Customs—A valid Ethiopian visa is required for entry as are current vaccinations for smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever. Strictly enforced regulations limit importing and exporting Ethiopian currency to not more than E$150.

Health—Adequate medical facilities and modern medicines are available in Addis Ababa and Asmara. Take reasonable precautions regarding food and drink. Tap water is not potable. The altitude in Addis Ababa and Asmara could cause dizziness.

Telecommunications—Long-distance telephone and telegraph service is available to the large towns in Ethiopia, to the US, and to most European and many African countries.

Transportation—The most direct air route from the US to Addis Ababa or Asmara is via Rome or Athens. International airlines link Addis Ababa and Asmara to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Ethiopian Airlines serves the historic cities of Bahar Dar, Gondar, Lalibella, and Axum, which can also be reached by road. Current unsettled conditions in the countryside make it advisable to check into the local security situation before making any trip outside the capital. Municipal bus transportation is likely to be crowded; however, taxis are usually available at modest rates.

READING LIST

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Pankurst, Richard. *The Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

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from the IBRD, the Export-Import Bank, and the U.S. AID, as well as from the U.K., the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., and others.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Ethiopia was relatively isolated from the major movements of world politics, including colonialism, until the 1935 Italian invasion. Since World War II it has played a very active role on the African and world scenes. A charter member of the U.N., Ethiopia dispatched troops to participate in the U.N. operations in Korea in 1951 and the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960.

Former Emperor Haile Selassie was one of the founding fathers of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), and he figured importantly in the settlement of a number of intra-African disputes. Addis Ababa is the headquarters of the OAU and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

Ethiopia's relations with most of its neighbors are currently good, although a territorial claim by Somalia is a source of continuing tension. Ethiopia's foreign policy is officially described as nonaligned, and the country has attempted to remain aloof from great-power confrontations.

U.S.-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS

U.S.-Ethiopia relations have been amicable since the first treaty between the two nations was signed in 1903. After World War II the ties grew steadily closer. A general technical assistance agreement of June 1951 has provided the basis for the many economic development projects undertaken. Of equal importance is the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in September 1951. On May 22, 1953, two agreements were signed: the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, by which the United States agreed to furnish Ethiopia with certain military equipment for its internal security and to train Ethiopian troops in the use of the material; and an agreement regularizing the operations of the U.S. communications facility (Kagnew Station) at Asmara.

U.S. assistance under AID has been primarily in the agricultural, educational, public health, and transportation fields and is currently concentrated on agriculture. The Peace Corps program in Ethiopia has emphasized education. Cultural exchanges between the two countries have been relatively numerous, and several hundred Ethiopians are now studying in the United States.

U.S. policy toward Ethiopia, as toward other African countries, includes the following concepts: avoidance of great-power conflict on the continent; self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of African countries; economic and social development in accordance with local aspirations; mutual understanding of each other's roles; access to resources and markets on an equitable and reciprocal basis; and recognition of Africa's strategic importance in terms of its location, air and sea routes, and U.S. facilities.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission—Arthur T. Tienkin
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Arthur Lewis
Director, U.S. AID Mission—John L. Withers
Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)—Brig. Gen. Richard S. Fye
Peace Corps Director—Willard Hoing
Consul General, Asmara—George B. Sherry

The U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia is located at Asfa Wossen St., Addis Ababa. The Consulate General is at 32 Franklin D. Roosevelt St., Asmara.

Department of State Publication 7785, Revised December 1975

APPENDIX M
FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1975 (Publication 8429)]

background notes

French Territory of Afars and Issas

department of state * january 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Le Territoire Francais des Afars et des Issas

GEOGRAPHY

The French Territory of Afars and Issas (F.T.A.I.) is located in northeast Africa, bounded on the east by the Gulf of Aden, on the southeast by the Somali Democratic Republic, and on the southwest and north by Ethiopia.

The Territory has three principal geographic regions: the coastal plain, less than 650 feet above sea level; the mountains, some 3,000 feet above sea level with occasional peaks rising to 5,000 feet; and the plateau behind the mountains, rising from 1,000 to 5,000 feet. The land is bare, dry, and desolate; it is marked by sharp cliffs, deep ravines, burning sands, and thorny shrubs.

The climate is torrid, the rainfall sparse and erratic. From May to October when the monsoon blows from the northeast, the average temperature rises to 92°F, with readings recorded as high as 113°F.

PEOPLE

The indigenous population is divided almost equally between the Somalis (Issa and Ishaak tribes) and Afars (Danakils). Both are Hamitic peoples and nearly all are Muslims. A foreign community of about 15,000 resides at Djibouti. French and Arabs are by far the most numerous, but the foreign community also includes a few Greeks, Indians, and Italians. French is the official language; Somali, Afar, and Arabic are all widely used.

Slightly more than half of the population resides at Djibouti. Most of the people living outside Djibouti are nomadic herdsmen.

HISTORY

Rochet d'Hericourt's exploration into Shoa, 1839-42, marked the beginning of French interest in the African shores of the Red Sea. Further observations by Henri Lambert, French Consular Agent at Aden, and Captain Fleuriot de Langle led to the signing of a treaty of friendship and assistance between the sultans of Raheita, Tadjoura, and Cobaad, and France. The sultans sold the anchorage of Obock.

Growing French interest in the area must be viewed against British activity in Egypt and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1884 and 1885, calling the area French Somaliland, France expanded its protectorate to include the shores of the Gulf of Tadjoura and the hinterland. Boundaries of the protectorate were marked out in 1897 by France and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and further affirmed by agreements with Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1945 and 1954.

The administrative capital was moved from Obock to Djibouti in

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 9,000 sq. mi. (approx. the size of New Hampshire). CAPITAL: Djibouti (pop. 100,000). OTHER CITIES: Obock, Tadjoura.

People

POPULATION: ca. 180,000 (1974 est.). DENSITY: 20 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Somalis (Issas) and Afars. RELIGION: Muslim. LANGUAGES: French (official), Somali, Afar, Arabic. LITERACY: 10%.

Government

TYPE: French Overseas Territory. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1963.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–High Commissioner and Council of Government. *Legislative*–Territorial Assembly. *Judicial*–Laws of metropolitan France apply.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Party for Progress and Defense of Interests of F.T.A.I. SUFFRAGE: Universal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 5 Cercles (districts).

FLAG: The French flag–vertical stripes of blue, white, and red–is flown.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): ca. $65 million (1972 est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: ca. $400 (1972 est.).

NOMADIC PASTORALISM: *Land* 98%. *Labor* 50%. *Types*–goats, sheep, camels.


SERVICES: *Labor* 50%. *Types*–port and maritime workers, export-import trade, construction, municipal services.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Livestock, sand.

TRADE: *Exports*–$9 million (1972, excludes transit trade): hides, cattle, coffee (transit from Ethiopia). *Partners*–France, Ethiopia. *Imports*–$60 million (1972, excludes transit trade): textiles, consumer goods, foodstuffs. *Partners*–France, Ethiopia, Japan.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 177 Djibouti francs=US$1 (May 1974).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: None.



1896. Djibouti, which possesses a good natural harbor and ready access to the Ethiopian highland, attracted trade caravans crossing East Africa. The Franco-Ethiopian railway linking Djibouti to the heart of Ethiopia was begun in 1897 and reached Addis Ababa on June 7, 1917, further facilitating the increase of trade.

French Somaliland furnished a battalion of troops to fight for France in World War I. During the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930's and during World War II there were constant border skirmishes between French and Italian forces. After the fall of France until 1942 the area was ruled by the Vichy government. In December 1942 the French Somaliland forces broke a Vichy blockade to join the Free French and

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on F.T.A.I. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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the Allies. A local battalion participated in the liberation of metropolitan France.

On July 22, 1957, the colony was reorganized to give the people a considerable degree of self-government. A decree of July 22, 1957, which applied the *loi cadre* (Overseas Reform Act) of June 23, 1956, established a 32-member Territorial Assembly. The Assembly elected eight of its members to an Executive Council. Members of the Executive Council were responsible for one or more of the territorial services and carried the title "Minister." The Council advised the Governor General, who was appointed from France.

In a constitutional referendum held in September 1958 French Somaliland opted to join the French community as an Overseas Territory. As a result, it was entitled to representation by one Deputy and one Senator in the French Parliament and one Counselor in the Assembly of the French Union. On the demise of the French Union Assembly, the Territory was assigned a seat on the Economic and Social Council.

The first elections to the Territorial Assembly were held under a system of proportional representation on November 23, 1958. In the next Assembly elections in 1963, a new electoral law, enacted by the French National Assembly, abolished proportional representation in favor of a system of a straight plurality vote based on political lists submitted in seven designated districts by political parties. Ali Aref Bourhan, an Afar, was selected by the Territorial Assembly to be President of the Executive Council.

In August 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle visited Djibouti. His stay was marked by 2 days of public demonstrations demanding independence. On September 21, 1966, Louis Saget, appointed Governor General of the Territory after the demonstrations, announced that the French Government had decided to hold a referendum to determine whether the people wished to remain within the French Republic or become independent. In the referendum held March 19, 1967, 60 percent of those voting chose to continue the Territory's association with France.

A directive from Paris dated July 5, 1967, formally changed the name of the Territory from French Somaliland to French Territory of Afars and Issas (Le Territoire Francais des Afars et des Issas).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The directive of July 1967 reorganized the governmental structure of the Territory. The senior French representative, formerly the Governor General, is now called the High Commissioner. The Executive Council was redesignated as the Council of Government and still has nine members.

The High Commissioner promulgates the laws and decrees governing the Territory. He may also veto or commit for reexamination bills passed by the Territorial Assembly. Powers reserved to the central government in Paris and the High Commissioner include foreign policy, external communications, defense, finance, internal security, and radio and television. Remaining governmental powers are allocated to the Council of Government and the Territorial Assembly.

A combination of French and Islamic laws are followed in the F.T.A.I. For administrative purposes the Territory is divided into five Districts.

The Territorial Assembly is composed of 40 Deputies, elected for 5-year terms. In the most recent election on November 18, 1973, the Party for Progress and Defense of Interests of F.T.A.I. won all 40 seats. This predominantly Afar party, headed by Ali Aref Bourhan, is committed to the continued association of the Territory with France. The chief opposition party is the Somali-led African People's Union, which advocates independence.

Principal Government Officials

High Commissioner–Christian Dablanc
President of the Governing Council; Minister of Port and Industry–Ali Aref Bourhan

Ministers

Interior and Muslim Affairs–Mohamed Kamil Mohamed
Finance–Andre Glardon
Labor–Ibrahim Ahmed Burale
Civil Service and Pensions–Jama Jilal Jama
Education, Sports, and Youth–Omar Mohamed Kamil
Rural Economy and Industrial Development–Hassan Mohamed Moyale
Public Health–Chehem Daoud Chehem
Public Works, Transport, and Tourism–Mohamed Jama Elabe
Economic Affairs and Prices–Ismail Balaya Ragueh

ECONOMY

The maritime and commercial activities of the port of Djibouti and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad are the basis of the F.T.A.I. economy. There are few known mineral deposits in the Territory. The soil is arid and unproductive; 89 percent is desert wasteland and only 10 percent is pasture land and 1 percent forest land. There is no significant productive industry. Services and commerce provide most

of the GDP, and the foreign communities in Djibouti earn most of the income.

Djibouti is located on the west side of the Bab-el-Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It is an important port of call on the shipping lanes transiting the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and functions as a bunkering port and small French naval base. The railroad shops, machinery repair shops, docks, import-export houses, and urban service industries at Djibouti provide most of the jobs. Outside Djibouti are nomadic herdsmen, little affected by the modern commercial economy generated by the port and railroad.

Most exports and imports transit Djibouti en route to or from Ethiopia. Chief exports transiting Djibouti are coffee, salt, hides, dried beans, cereals, wax, and other farm products. Exports from F.T.A.I. itself are minimal. Most of the products destined for F.T.A.I. come from France. The unfavorable balance of trade is partially offset by invisible earnings such as transit taxes, harbor dues, and in past years by railway profits. However, an adverse balance of payments for the Territory has occurred in recent years.

The port of Djibouti suffered a sharp reduction in activity with the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967. The number of ships calling fell from a high in 1965 of 3,074 vessels to 983 in 1968. During the same period, transiting cargo declined from 360,000 tons to 290,000 tons. Although the number of vessels calling at Djibouti, in recent years, has not reached earlier proportions, the port is handling larger tonnages per vessel. With the expected reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, vessel traffic should increase substantially.

The improved natural coastal harbor consists of a roadstead outer harbor and an inner harbor. The 1/2-square-mile water area of the inner harbor is well protected. The roadstead is partially protected by reefs and the configuration of the land. There are five outer berths and six inner berths for large vessels, extending for 2,000 meters, as well as a 240-meter long berth.

The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad is the only line serving central and southeastern Ethiopia. The Territory and Ethiopia have an interdependent trade structure. Djibouti offers Ethiopia's exports and imports a good port while Ethiopia offers the Territory a rich hinterland. Despite increased use of the Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawa, Djibouti continues to handle a significant percentage of Ethiopia's foreign trade. Over the past 5 years an average of 30 percent of Ethiopia's imports and 20 percent of its exports transited Djibouti. The single-track railway occupies a prominent place in Ethiopia's internal distribution system for such domestic commodities as cement, cotton textiles, sugar, cereals, and charcoal. In addition, a paved road now under construction will link Djibouti with the Addis Ababa-Assab highway.

Djibouti has the only paved airport in the Territory. Its runway is being improved and lengthened and is capable of handling all equipment in use by the six international airlines serving the city and by the national airline, Air Djibouti.

The Territory has about 100 miles of surfaced roads and 564 miles of graded earth roads. In addition, there are many miles of ungraded dry-weather tracks.

France maintains a powerful radio transmitter in the Territory—Radio Djibouti—broadcasting to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in French, Arabic, Afar, and Somali. Television was begun in 1967 and now broadcasts 180 hours per month on two channels. There are about 1,500 telephones, 15 telex subscribers, a telegraph system, and 5 major transmitters for use with ships at sea.

In 1972 the regular budget for the Territory, excluding port operation and military expenditures, was $12.6 million. Current budget commitments are met only with French assistance. Emphasis is placed on social services, especially primary education and health.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

France conducts the foreign relations and defense of F.T.A.I. In January 1974 French President Georges Pompidou visited Djibouti and reiterated that the F.T.A.I. was attached directly to France and would remain so because that was the wish of its people. France, however, may not wish to maintain her relationship with the Territory indefinitely, and should France ever withdraw, a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia could develop over the future status of the Territory.

U.S.-F.T.A.I. RELATIONS

At present the United States does not have a resident diplomatic representative in the Territory. Occasionally an officer from the U.S. Embassy at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, visits Djibouti. The United States has no assistance program or Peace Corps contingent in the Territory.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—**Lightweight clothing is recommended year round. Rainfall is rare.**

Customs—**Visas can be obtained from French embassies and consulates worldwide. U.S. currency can be exchanged in Djibouti.**

Health—**Visitors should exercise care regarding what they eat and drink. A number of competent doctors practice in Djibouti, but lack of equipment limits medical facilities.**

Telecommunications—**International telephone and telegraph is generally reliable.**

Transportation—**Djibouti is served by international airlines with daily flights to France, Mauritius, and Reunion. There is also regular service to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, San'a, and Aden, and daily trains to Addis Ababa. Local taxis are plentiful.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8429
Revised January 1975

APPENDIX N
GABON
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, May 1976 (Publication 7968)]

background notes

Gabon

department of state * may 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Gabonese Republic

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Gabon straddles the Equator on the west coast of Africa, bordering Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and the People's Republic of the Congo. It has a 550-mile coastline on the Atlantic Ocean.

Most of the country is covered with dense, equatorial rain forest. The Ogooué River is navigable from Ndjolé to the Atlantic, and its watershed covers almost the entire country. Port-Gentil, at the mouth of the Ogooué, is the center of the plywood and petroleum industries.

Little rain occurs from June to September, but the humidity is high. In December and January there is occasional rain; during the remaining months rainfall is heavy with an annual average of more than 100 inches at Libreville.

Gabon's population declined between 1900 and 1940, due to a combination of historical and environmental factors. The country is one of the most sparsely populated in Africa, and labor shortage is a major obstacle to development.

Almost all Gabonese are of Bantu origin. There are at least 40 tribal groups with separate languages and cultures. The largest is the Fang, and others include the Eshira, the Bapounou, the Bateke, and the Okande. Tribal boundaries are less sharply drawn in Gabon than elsewhere in Africa. French, the official language, is a unifying force. More Frenchmen live in Gabon today than in colonial times.

Gabon is often called the "Bastion of the Cross in Africa" because of its high percentage of Christians.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 102,317 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Colo.). CAPITAL: Libreville (pop. 100,000). OTHER CITIES: Port-Gentil (55,000), Franceville (15,000).

People

POPULATION: 550,000 (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.7%. DENSITY: 5.4 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Fang, Eshira, Bapounou, Bateke, Okande. RELIGIONS: Christian 46%, Muslim, animist, fetishist. LANGUAGE: French. LITERACY: 20% (est.).

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 17, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: February 21, 1961.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). SUFFRAGE: Universal and direct. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Provinces.

FLAG: Green, yellow, and blue horizontal bands from top to bottom.

Economy

GDP: $1.6 billion (1975). REAL GROWTH RATE: 30% (1975 est.). PER CAPITA GDP: $2,800.

AGRICULTURE: *Land*–less than 1% cultivated; 75% forested. *Labor* 70% (of total work force). *Products*–cocoa, coffee.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 30% (of total work force). *Products*–petroleum, lumber, minerals.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Wood, petroleum, iron ore, manganese, uranium.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*–$928 million: petroleum 70%, wood 10%, manganese, uranium, iron ore. *Imports*–$440 million: construction equipment, machinery, food, automobiles, manufactured goods. *Partners*–France, US, other EC countries.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 224 CFAF=US$1 (Mar. 1976).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN; Organization of African Unity (OAU); African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM); Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC); associate member of EC; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

HISTORY

The Gabonese are descendants of numerous ethnic groups which came to the area from several directions during the past 700 years to escape enemies or find new land. Isolated by their physical environment, the arriving peoples retained their own cultures. The most recent movement occurred in the early 19th century, when the Fang fought their way to the coast after news of the arrival of European traders had reached them inland. Relatively little is known of tribal life in the period before European contact, but the force and beauty of much tribal art suggest a rich cultural heritage.

Gabon's first European visitors were Portuguese merchants who arrived in the 15th century and named the country after the Portuguese word "gabao," a coat with sleeves and hood which resembles the shape of the Como River estuary. Dutch, British,


Kribi
Ebolowa
CAMEROON
Dja
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Ntem
Bata
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Rio Benito
Evinayong
Minvoul
Oyem
CONGO
Belinga
Djadié
Mekambo
CORISCO
Cocobeach
LIBREVILLE
Como
Abanga
Lara
Makokou
Ivindo
Kango
Booué
Ndjolé
Bifoum
Port-Gentil
Lambaréné
Okandja
Lastoursville
Ogooué
Koula-
Moutou
Ngounié
Mandji
Moanda
Franceville
Mouila
COMILOG
CABLEWAY
Moanda
CONGO
Nyanga
Tchibanga
Mossendjo
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
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Kibangou
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International boundary
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and French traders came in the 16th century. France assumed the status of protector by signing treaties with Gabonese coastal chiefs in 1839 and 1841. In 1849 the French captured a slave ship and released the passengers at the mouth of the Como River. The slaves named their settlement Libreville—"place of liberation." Various French explorers penetrated Gabon's dense jungles between 1862-87. The most famous one, Savorgnan de Brazza, used Gabonese bearers and guides in his searches for the headwaters of the Congo River.

France occupied Gabon in 1885 but did not administer it until 1903. In 1910 it became one of the four territories of French Equatorial Africa, a federation that survived until 1959 when Gabon refused political union. The territories became independent in 1960 as Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon.

GOVERNMENT

Under the 1961 Constitution, Gabon is a republic with a presidential form of government. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a 7-year term. The Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Cabinet are all appointed by the President to serve at his pleasure.

The 47 Deputies of the unicameral National Assembly are elected concurrently with the President. Judges of the independent Supreme Court are appointed by the President.

For administrative purposes, Gabon is divided into 9 Provinces, which are further divided into 36 prefectures and 8 separate subprefectures. The provincial governors, the prefects, and the subprefects are all appointed by the President.

Principal Government Officials

President of the Republic; Head of Government; Minister of National Defense; Information; Posts and Telecommunications; Plan, Development, Land Distribution, and National Guidance; Popular Education; Civil Service; Specialized Party Organs; and Women's Advancement—Albert Bernard Bongo

Prime Minister; Chairman of the National Consultative Council; Minister of Intergovernmental Coordination, Housing, Urban Affairs, and Land Survey—Léon Mebiame

Vice Prime Minister in Charge of Relations with the Assemblies; Minister of Labor and Social Security—Jean-Stanislas Migolet

Ministers of State

Transportation, Civil Aviation, Merchant Navy, and the Trans-Gabon Railroad—Georges Rawiri

Mines, Industry, and Hydraulic Resources—Edouard-Alexis Mbouy-Boutzit

Agriculture and Rural Development—Simon Essimengane

Foreign Affairs and Cooperation—Paul Okumba d'Okwatsegue

Ambassador to the U.S.—Vincent Mavoungou

Ambassador to the U.N.—Alexis Obame

Gabon maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2210 R St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20011.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

At the time of Gabon's independence there were two principal political parties: the *Bloc Démocratique Gabonais* (BDG), led by Leon M'Ba, and the *Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise* (UDSG), led by J.H. Aubame. In the first postindependence election, held under a parliamentary system, neither party was able to win a majority. However, the BDG succeeded in obtaining the support of three of the four independent legislative Deputies, and M'Ba was named Prime Minister.

It was soon decided that Gabon could not afford a two-party system, due to lack of trained men, and the two party leaders agreed on a single list of candidates. In the February 1961 election, held under the new presidential system, Prime Minister M'Ba became President. Aubame became Foreign Minister.

This one-party system appeared to work well until February 1963 when the larger BDG element forced the UDSG members to choose between a merger of the parties or resignation. The UDSG Cabinet Ministers resigned, and President M'Ba called for new elections for a reduced number of National Assembly Deputies (from 67 to 47), which were held on February 23, 1964.

The UDSG could not muster a list a candidates able to meet the requirements of the electoral decrees, and when it seemed that the elections would go to the BDG by default, the Gabonese military revolted and toppled the M'Ba government in a bloodless coup d'etat on February 18, 1964. French military forces intervened to reestablish M'Ba's government the following day. Elections were held on April 12 with many opposition participants. BDG-supported lists won 31 seats; opposition lists won 16.

Late in 1966 the Constitution was revised to provide for automatic succession of the Vice President should the President die in office. On March 19, 1967, Leon M'Ba and Albert Bongo were elected President and Vice President. President M'Ba died on November 28, 1967, and Albert Bongo became President. President Bongo was reelected in February 1973. Under

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and clothing—Libreville is hot and humid most of the year. Wear lightweight summer apparel. Bring sweaters for cool evenings during the dry season (June-Aug.).

Customs—Visas are required and may be obtained from the Gabonese Embassy in Washington. Tourists should allow 8-10 weeks; businessmen 3-4 weeks. Cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever shots are required.

Health—Hospitals and private clinics are available throughout the country for most common problems. Major cities have doctors in private practice; several are US-trained. Residents and visitors are strongly advised to take regular preventative medication against malaria. Avoid raw fruits and vegetables, undercooked meats, and tap water.

Telecommunications—Local and long-distance telephone service is available 24 hours. Telegraph rates are about two-thirds higher than in the US.

Transportation—Public transportation is somewhat inadequate in the major cities. Taxis are plentiful and moderately priced, but service is erratic. Air Gabon and air charters provide excellent service to many points in the interior.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Carter, Gwendoiyn, ed. *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966.

Darlington, Charles. *African Betrayal.* New York: McKay, 1968.

Surveys of African Economies, vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1968.

Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960.

Weinstein, Brian. *Gabon: Nation Building on the Ogooué.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.

the 7-year rule the next Presidential election is scheduled for 1980. In April 1975 the office of Vice President was abolished and replaced by the office of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, unlike the Vice President, has no right to automatic succession.

In March 1968 President Bongo declared Gabon a one-party state by dissolving the BDG and establishing a new party, the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). He invited all Gabonese, regardless of their past political affiliations, to participate.

The goal of the PDG is to submerge those regional and tribal rivalries which have factionalized Gabonese politics in the past and to forge a single national movement in support of the development policies of the government.

ECONOMY

Gabon is in a period of dynamic economic development. Per capita GDP is the highest in black Africa. The 1974 trade surplus was about $488 million.

Until 1963 wood accounted for about 75 percent of Gabon's exports. Since then the country's enormous mineral wealth has begun to be exported. In 1975 petroleum accounted for about 70 percent of export earnings; wood accounted for about 10 percent. Gabon is the world's largest exporter of manganese; it also exported significant quantities of uranium in 1975.

Gabon exports small amounts of coffee and cocoa. It is not self-sufficient in food production, however, and imports about 90 percent of its total consumption.

The government is using a percentage of its oil revenues to create transitional industries to process its minerals, petroleum, and forest products within the country. In 1975 Gabon pushed forward with an ambitious plan to develop its transportation infrastructure. Improvement in roads, ports and port facilities, and the network of major and minor airports are some of the areas of activity.

Work on the billion-dollar Trans-Gabon Railroad was in full swing in mid-1976, with first traffic scheduled for 1978-79. When completed, the railroad will open the interior rain forests to the sea and provide greater access to the mineral wealth of the southeastern region. The first leg of the railroad will extend from Libreville to Franceville, which is located near the manganese mines at Moanda and the uranium mines at Mounana. The second leg, scheduled for completion in 1981-82, will open up the billion-ton iron ore reserves located in the northeast near Belinga.

Although rich in comparison with other developing nations, Gabon still depends on external sources for the investment capital and the trained labor necessary for its continued development. Its balance of payments has been favorable since 1973, but its economy has not been able to absorb the rapid rise in the money supply and domestic inflation is a serious problem. Despite these difficulties, Gabon has many natural resources and great potential for continued growth. Gabon welcomes private foreign investors and has enacted an investment law providing them substantial concessions and guarantees.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Gabon wishes to establish relations with any country that can help its economic development and will adhere to its principles of noninterference in internal affairs. Gabon has followed a policy of nonalignment, advocating dialogue in international affairs and recognizing both parts of divided nations. Since 1973, concurrently with its rapidly expanding economy, the number of countries that have established diplomatic relations with Gabon has doubled.

In inter-African affairs, Gabon is among the so-called "moderates"—states which espouse development by evolution rather than by revolution and which tend to favor regulated free enterprise rather than doctrinaire socialism as the system most likely to promote rapid economic growth. While supporting OAU positions on key issues, Gabon has preferred to concentrate its attention and resources on its own development rather than on problems of international relations.

U.S.-GABON RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Gabon are excellent. The United States buys a substantial percentage of Gabonese crude oil exports and most of its manganese; in turn, it sells Gabon increasing amounts of heavy construction equipment, aircraft, and machinery.

The major current U.S. assistance program in Gabon consists of a small Peace Corps contingent which maintains about 30 volunteers primarily working in teaching English and in rural school construction.

U.S. private capital has been attracted to Gabon since pre-independence days. It now totals about $200 million and is rapidly expanding. An investment guaranty agreement exists between the two countries.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Andrew L. Steigman
Counselor of Embassy—Edmund T. DeJarnette
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Elton Stepherson, Jr.
Economic/Commercial Officer—Marc Allen Baas
Peace Corps Director—James Ekstrom (resident in Cameroon)

The U.S. Embassy is located on the Blvd. de la Mer, B.P. 4000, Libreville.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7968, Revised May 1976

APPENDIX O
THE GAMBIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, February 1977 (Publication 8014)]

background notes

The Gambia

department of state • february 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of The Gambia

PEOPLE

Almost 85 percent of the people live in rural areas. The principal ethnic groups are Mandingo, Fula, Wolof, Jola, and Serahuli. There are also about 400 Europeans (primarily British) and a few hundred Syrians, Lebanese, and Mauritanians, nearly all of whom reside at Banjul.

English is the official language, although most of the Gambians speak their native languages. Islam is the principal religion, followed by animism. There are a few thousand indigenous Christians.

HISTORY

From what is known of its early history, The Gambia was once part of the Empire of Ghana and the Kingdom of the Songhais. When the Portuguese visited in the 15th century, it was part of the Kingdom of Mali.

By the 16th century Portuguese slave traders and gold seekers had settled in the lower river area. In 1588 the claimant to the Portuguese throne, Antonio, Prior of Crato, sold exclusive trade rights on the Gambia River to English merchants; this grant was confirmed by letters patent from Queen Elizabeth I. In 1618 James I granted a charter to a British company for trade with The Gambia and the Gold Coast (now Ghana).

During the late 17th century and throughout the 18th, England and France struggled continuously for political and commercial supremacy in the regions of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers. The 1783 Treaty of Versailles gave Great Britain possession of The Gambia, but the French retained an enclave at Albreda on the north bank of the river (ceded to the United Kingdom in 1857).

In 1807 slave trading was abolished throughout the British Empire, and the British tried unsuccessfully to end the slave traffic in The Gambia. They established the military post of Bathurst (now Banjul) in 1816. In the ensuing years Banjul was sometimes under the jurisdiction of the Governor General in Sierra Leone. In 1843 it was made a separate British colony. Beginning in 1866 The Gambia and Sierra Leone were again united under a single administration, but in 1888 The Gambia became a separate entity once more.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 4,003 sq. mi. (10,367 sq. km.); about four-fifths the size of Conn. CAPITAL: Banjul (pop. 40,000).

People

POPULATION: 525,000 (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.8% (1976 est.). DENSITY: 131 per sq. mi. (51 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Mandingo (40%), Fula (13%), Wolof (12%), Jola (7%), Serahuli (7%). RELIGIONS: Muslim (85%), animist and Christian (15%). LANGUAGES: English (official), Mandinka, Wolof, and other native tongues. LITERACY: about 10%.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: February 18, 1965. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: April 24, 1970.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government), Vice President, Cabinet. *Legislative*–unicameral House of Representatives. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, subordinate courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Progressive People's Party (PPP), United Party (UP), National Convention Party (NCP), National Liberation Party (NLP). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 21. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: Banjul and 5 divisions.

FLAG: Three horizontal bands of red, blue, and green, with blue center band bordered by two narrow white stripes.

Economy

GDP: $88 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 12%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $140-$160 (1975). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 14% (1975 est.).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 55%. *Labor* 85%. *Products*–peanuts, rice, millet, sorghum, fish, palm kernels, livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Products*–peanut products, soft drinks, consumer clothing items.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Fish.

TRADE: *Exports*–$42 million (1975 estimate): peanut products (95%), palm kernels, fish, hides and skins. *Partners*–U.K., other EEC countries. *Imports*–$45 million (1975 est.): textiles, foodstuffs, machinery, transportation equipment. *Partners*–U.K., other EEC countries, Japan, People's Republic of China.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 4 dalasi=1 British pound sterling; 1.98 dalasi=US$1 (1975).

U.S. ECONOMIC AID: $5.2 million (1956-73); some P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) foodstuffs and $675,000 (recovery and rehabilitation program) to relieve conditions created by Sahelian drought.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., British Commonwealth, Organization of African Unity (OAU), CILSS (Interstate Commission to Combat the Sahelian Drought).



An 1889 agreement with France established the present boundaries, and The Gambia became a British Crown Colony, divided for administrative purposes into the colony (city of Banjul and the surrounding area) and the protectorate (remainder of the territory). The Gambia received its own executive and legislative councils in 1901 and gradually progressed toward self-government in the decades that followed. A 1906 ordinance abolished slavery throughout the colony.

During World War II Gambian troops fought with the Allies in Burma, and Banjul served as an airstop for the U.S. Army Air Corps and port of call for Allied naval convoys. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stopped overnight at Banjul en route to and from the Casablanca Conference, marking the first visit to the Continent of Africa by an American President in office.

After World War II the pace of constitutional advance quickened, and full internal self-government was granted in late 1963 following general elections held the preceding year. Political attention in The Gambia began to focus increasingly on independence.

The Gambia achieved independence on February 18, 1965, as a constitutional monarchy within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Shortly thereafter, the government proposed conversion from a monarchy to a republic with an elected President replacing the British Monarch as Chief of State. This proposal was submitted to a popular referendum in November 1965 but failed to receive the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution which had come into force at the time of independence. The referendum results won widespread attention abroad as testimony to The Gambia's observance of secrecy in balloting, honest elections, and civil rights and liberties. In 1970 another referendum was approved by the required majority, and The Gambia became a Republic on April 24.

GEOGRAPHY

The Gambia is located on the bulge of West Africa and comprises a narrow strip of land 7 to 20 miles (11-32 km.) wide along the lower reaches of the Gambia River. It extends inland 200 miles (320 km.) from the Atlantic Ocean and, except for the seacoast, is completely surrounded by the Republic of Senegal.

The Gambia is low-lying, with a maximum altitude of 120 feet (73 m.) above sea level. Thick mangrove swamps border the lower half of the Gambia River, where vegetation often rises 100 feet (30 m.). Behind the mangroves are river "flats" which are submerged completely during the wet season, in some cases with salt water. Sand hills and rolling plateaus lie farther back from the river.

The climate is subtropical with a marked hot and wet season (June-October) and a cooler dry season (November-April). Annual rainfall varies from 30 to 55 inches (76-140 cm.) and comes only in the summer. Temperatures range from 60° to 110°F (16°-43°C) with daily temperatures exceeding 90°F (32°C) from April to June.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

According to the new Constitution, promulgated on April 24, 1970, the government is divided into independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Executive power is vested in a President who is popularly elected to a 5-year term. The Vice President is elected at the same time as the President and must be a member of the same political party. The President is assisted in his functions by a Cabinet which he appoints.

The legislature is composed of 40 Members. Thirty-five are elected by universal adult suffrage for 5-year terms and four are representative Members elected by the tribal chiefs. The Attorney General, appointed by the President, is an *ex-officio* Member.

The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various subordinate courts. Judges are appointed by the central government.

Local government varies. Banjul has an elected town council. There are also four rural areas, each with a council containing a majority of elected members. Each council has its treasury and is responsible for local government services. The tribal chiefs retain traditional powers of customary law.

The Gambia is one of the few African countries with a genuine multiparty system. The governing Progressive People's Party (PPP) won the general elections of March 1972 over its principal opponent, the United Party (UP), taking 28 of the 32 elected constituencies. The National Convention Party (NCP) is now expected to be the major challenger to the PPP in the next elections scheduled for spring of 1977. A fourth party, the National Liberation Party (NLP), has also been formed.

The Gambia has no army and depends on a 775-member police force for domestic law enforcement and internal security.

Principal Government Officials

President—Alhaji Sir Dawda Kairaba JAWARA

Vice President–Assan Musa CAMARA
Attorney General–Alhaji Momadu Lamin SAHO
Minister of External Affairs–Alhaji Alieu Badara N'JIE
Minister of Finance–Alhaji Ibrahima Muhamadu GARBA JAHUMPA
Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources–Alhaji Yaya Lang CEESAY
Minister for Health and Labor–Alhaji Kalilou SINGHATEH

The Gambia maintains no diplomatic representation in the United States. There is an honorary Gambian Consul located at 300 E. 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 (tel. 212-355-1097).

ECONOMY

The Gambia's economy is almost entirely agricultural. Manufacturing accounted for 5 percent of GDP in 1974-75. The government offers generous tax and customs incentives to foreign investors under the Development Act of 1973.

Some subsistence crops are raised, primarily grain, sorghum, and rice. Governmental policy is designed to eliminate bulk cereal imports by 1980. Rice production has been given special emphasis, but imports are still required. There is an IBRD-supported rice development program.

Although priority is given to agricultural diversification, almost all suitable land is planted with peanuts. The customs duty on peanuts provides most of The Gambia's revenue. In 1974-75 the United States furnished 3.2 percent of recorded imports and received .2 percent of imports from The Gambia.

Fishing and tourism have developed rapidly in the 1970's. The fish catch grew from 4,500 tons in 1970-71 to 15,000 tons in 1974. About 75 percent of the catch is consumed domestically.

Twenty-four thousand tourists came to The Gambia in the 1975-76 season, a drop of 1,000 from the previous year, but substantially greater than the 800 in 1968-69. Airport and hotel expansion plans are aimed at attracting 85,000 tourists a year by 1985.

The country is well situated to handle overseas trade for a large hinterland. The Gambia River provides excellent access to the interior and is the territory's principal means of communication and transportation. It is navigable by oceangoing vessels for 150 miles (240 km.) inland and by small steamers for an additional 138 miles (222 km.) to the eastern border and beyond. The estuary constitutes a good natural harbor, and Banjul is the only seaport. With International Development Assistance (IDA) aid, a deep-water wharf was constructed in 1974. Two smaller wharfs are in use already. There are also about 30 small stations along the river. Flood and salinity conditions limit the river's utility during the wet season.

The Gambia's first Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1975-1980 envisages substantial steps forward in those fields.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

While The Gambia follows a formal policy of nonalignment, it maintains particularly close and friendly relations with the United Kingdom, Senegal, and African states which are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Although its representation abroad is limited, The Gambia takes an active interest in international–especially African and Arab–affairs.

The Gambia maintains especially close relations with Senegal, with which it has signed agreements for cooperation in the fields of defense and foreign affairs. Leaders of the two countries meet periodically to consider problems of mutual interest, and technical questions are referred to an interministerial committee for resolution. Each state has appointed a High Commissioner to reside in the capital of the other to facilitate regular consultations and harmonization, wherever possible, of Gambian and Senegalese policies. A Senegambian Commission and Senegambian Permanent Secretariat have been established.

U.S.-THE GAMBIA RELATIONS

U.S. policy is to expand and strengthen its friendly ties with The Gambia. The United States provides modest economic and technical assist-

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–The Gambia's subtropical climate has a distinct hot rainy season (mid-May to mid-November) when an umbrella is needed. During the cold dry season (mid-November to mid-May) a light jacket or sweater is worn.

Health–Sanitation in Banjul is fair. Tap water is not potable. Smallpox immunization is required; yellow fever, tetanus, typhus, and typhoid are recommended. The swampy areas around Banjul breed mosquitoes.

Telecommunications–Telex service is available to the US, Europe, and Dakar. There is radiophone service to the UK, most of Europe, and the west coast of Africa.

Transportation–Banjul is 25 minutes by air from Dakar, where there are excellent and frequent worldwide connections. Taxis are available at stands; agree on the fare in advance.

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Gailey, Harry A. *A History of The Gambia.* New York: Praeger, 1965.
Gambia 1962 and 1963. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964.
The Gambia. London: HMSO, 1963.
Gamble, D.P. *Bibliography of The Gambia.* Bathurst: Government Printer, 1967.
Haley, Alex. *Roots.* Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Co., 1976.
Van der Plas, Charles D. *Report of a Socio-Economic Survey of Bathurst and Kombo St. Mary in The Gambia.* New York: United Nations, 1956.
Woolf, Bella Sidney. *Gambia: The Story of the Groundnut Colony.* New York: Macmillan, 1952.

ance and donates food—primarily sorghum, bulgur wheat, dry skim milk, and vegetable oil—to The Gambia through Catholic Relief Services. From 1956 through 1973 U.S. assistance totaled $5.2 million.

To relieve some of the problems caused by the Sahel region drought, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) is furnishing to The Gambia emergency Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) foodstuffs and has established a $675,000 recovery and rehabilitation program which will emphasize short-term agriculture development projects. There is a special self-help program which amounted to $50,000 in FY 1977.

There is a successful Peace Corps program involving about 40 volunteers, most of whom are engaged in agriculture and secondary school teaching. The current cultural exchange program is small but active. There is little U.S. investment in The Gambia.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—O. Rudolph Aggrey (also accredited to, and resident at, Dakar, Senegal)

Chargé d'Affaires—Michael G. Wygant

The U.S. Embassy in The Gambia is located at 16 Buckle Street, Banjul (tel. 526/7).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8014, Revised February 1977
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977 O—210-847 (2364)

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 35 cents (single copy). Subscription price: $23.10 per year; $5.80 additional for foreign mailing.

APPENDIX P
GHANA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1976 (Publication 8089)]

background notes

Ghana

department of state • january 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Ghana

GEOGRAPHY

Ghana is situated on the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of Africa only a few degrees north of the Equator. It is bounded on the north by Upper Volta, on the west by the Ivory Coast, and on the east by Togo.

Half of Ghana is less than 500 feet above sea level; the highest point reaches 2,900 feet (along the eastern boundary). The 334-mile coastline is mostly a low sandy shore, backed by plains and scrub and intersected by several rivers and streams, most of which are navigable only by canoe. A tropical rain forest belt extends northward from the shore near the Ivory Coast frontier for 175 miles, broken by heavily forested hills and many streams and rivers. This area (the Ashanti) produces most of Ghana's cocoa, minerals, and timber. North of this belt, the country varies from 300 to 1,300 feet above sea level and is covered by low bush, parkland savanna, and grassland plains.

The climate resembles that of other equatorial countries. The eastern coastal belt is warm and comparatively dry; the southwest corner is hot and humid; the forest belt, warm and humid; and the north, hot and dry. Except in the north, there are two rainy seasons, separated by a short and fairly dry period in July and August and a longer dry season from December to February. In the North the rainy seasons tend to merge. The harmattan (the dry, northeasterly wind) blows in January and February. Annual rainfall in the coastal zone averages 33 inches.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 92,100 sq. mi. (about the size of Ill. and Ind. combined). CAPITAL: Accra (pop. 848,800). OTHER CITIES: Kumasi (249,000), Tamale.

People

POPULATION: 9.5 million (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7%. DENSITY: 105 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Akan, Ewe, Ga. RELIGIONS: 45% animist, 43% Christian, 12% Muslim. LANGUAGES: English (official), Akan, Ewe, Ga, Hausa. LITERACY: 25% (est.). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 48 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Military. INDEPENDENCE: 1957. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1969 (abolished 1972).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Supreme Military Council (SMC), National Redemption Council (NRC). *Legislative*–disbanded. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, abolished.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Banned. SUFFRAGE: No elections planned. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Regions.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes of red, gold, and green, with a black star in the center of the gold stripe.

Economy

GDP: $3.69 billion (1974). REAL GDP GROWTH: 4.7% (1971-74 avg.). PER CAPITA GDP: $380. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 7.6% (1974).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 70% arable and forested (approx.). *Labor* 60% (includes forestry and fishing). *Products*–cocoa, timber, coconuts, coffee, subsistence crops, rubber.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*–mining, lumber, light manufactures, fishing, aluminum.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Gold, diamonds, bauxite, manganese, fish.

TRADE: *Exports*–$724 million (1974): cocoa beans ($406 million), logs and timber. *Imports*–$821 million (1974): oil, light manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, food, livestock. *Partners*–EC (notably UK and FRG), US ($125 million exports; $77 million imports).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1.00 cedi=US$0.87 (Nov. 1975).


ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *US only*–$333 million (through 1975): loans $208.3 million; grants $60.1 million; P.L. 480 $64.7 million. *Other bilateral assistance*–$393.1 million (1960-73): loans and grants.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), British Commonwealth.

PEOPLE

The greatest population concentration is found in the coastal areas, the Ashanti region, and the two principal cities of Accra and Kumasi. Population density is about 105 per square mile with no burden put on the productive land area.

According to tradition, most Ghanaians are descended not from the earliest inhabitants but rather from migrating tribes. The first migratory movement probably came down the Volta River at the beginning of the 13th century. Ghana has many small ethnic divisions, with more than 50 languages or dialects spoken. Among the more important linguistic groups are the Akans–including the Fanti


GHANA
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
Bawku
Navrongo
Tumu
Bolgatanga
Lawra
Walewale
White Volta
Tamale
Yendi
Bole
Black Volta
Oti
TOGO
LAKE VOLTA
Berekum
Sunyani
Ejura
Afram
Tano
Kumasi
Nkawkaw
Ho
Bia
Offin
Antubia
Awaso
Obuasi
Akosombo
Akosombo Dam
Volta
Koforidua
Kade
Birim
LOMÉ
Dunkwa
Oda
Keta
Nsawam
CAPE SAINT PAUL
Swedru
Tema
ACCRA
Prestea
Tarkwa
Pra
Winneba
Cape Coast
GULF OF GUINEA
Sekondi
Takoradi
Axim
CAPE THREE POINTS
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

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who live principally on the coast; the Ashanti in the forest areas immediately to the north; the Guans on the plains of the Volta River; the Ga- and Ewe-speaking peoples of the south and southeast; and the Moshi-Dagomba-speaking tribes of the Northern and Upper Regions.

English is the official and commercial language and is taught in all schools. About 25 percent of the general population is literate in English, although the rate is much higher among young people.

HISTORY

The history of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) before the last quarter of the 15th century is based primarily on the traditions and memories preserved in tribal stories and folklore. Many of these traditions refer to migrations from the ancient kingdoms of the western Soudan (now the Mauritania-Mali area). The name Ghana was chosen for the Gold Coast because of speculation that the migrants moved south from the ancient kingdom of Ghana.

The first fully authenticated contact between Europe and the Gold Coast dates from 1470 when a party of Portuguese landed. In 1482 the Portuguese built Elmina Castle as a permanent trading base. The first recorded English trading voyage to the coast was made by Thomas Windham in 1553, and in the course of the next three centuries the English, Danes, Dutch, Germans, and Portuguese controlled various parts of the coastal areas at different periods. In 1821 the British Government took over the control of the English private trading company operating the Gold Coast settlement, and in 1844 the Fanti chiefs in the immediate neighborhood approved a pact, or bond, by which they agreed, among other things, to submit cases of murder and other crimes to Queen Victoria's judicial officers sitting with the chiefs.

From 1826 to 1900 the British fought a long series of campaigns against the Ashantis of the interior. Only in 1901 did they succeed in making Ashanti a colony and the Northern Territories a protectorate. The fourth territorial division eventually to form part of the nation, British Togoland, was part of a former German colony administered by the United Kingdom from Accra as a League of Nations mandate after 1922. In December 1946 British Togoland became a U.N. Trust Territory, and in 1957, following a plebiscite held in 1956, the United Nations agreed that the territory should become a part of Ghana when the Gold Coast achieved independence.

Constitutional progress was marked by continuous development in the Legislative Council, although until 1946 it was not the legislature for the whole country but only for the coastal area then known as the "Colony." Ashanti, until 1946, and the Northern Territories, until 1951, were administered directly by the British Governor. The Constitution of 1951 provided for a greatly enlarged legislature comprised principally of members elected directly or indirectly by popular vote. An Executive Council was responsible for formulating policy, with a majority of African members drawn from the legislature but including three *ex officio* members appointed by the governor.

The Constitution approved on April 29, 1954, established a Cabinet composed wholly of African representative ministers drawn from an all-African legislature chosen by direct election. The Convention People's Party (CPP), in the elections which followed, won the majority of the seats in the new Legislative Assembly.

In May 1956 Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah's Gold Coast government issued a white paper containing proposals for Gold Coast independence, including a proposal for changing the name of the country to "Ghana." The British Government, confronted with a serious dispute which had arisen on the issue of a unitary or federal form of government, stated it would agree to a firm date for the granting of Gold Coast independence if a reasonable majority for such a step were obtained in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly after a general election. The new general elections, held July 12-17, 1956, resulted in the CPP being returned to power with 71 of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

Ghana became an independent state on March 6, 1957, when the United Kingdom relinquished its control over the Colony of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, the Northern Territories Protectorate, and British Togoland.

In subsequent reorganizations, the Colony of the Gold Coast has been divided into four Regions: Western, Central, Eastern, and Greater Accra, with a portion at the mouth of the Volta River assigned to the Volta Region. The Ashanti area has been divided into the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions, and the Northern Territories into the Northern and Upper Regions. Most of British Togoland was joined with the Volta estuary portion of the Colony to form the Volta Region; a few areas of British Togoland in the north were attached to the neighboring Northern and Upper Regions.

Postindependence Politics

After independence the CPP government under Nkrumah's leadership

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–Accra's temperature varies between 76°F and 98°F. Humidity is highest at dawn and falls each day from 93.5% to 66%. Bring the kind of clothes you wear in hot weather and a very lightweight raincoat.

Customs–US citizens must have visas and be inoculated against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera. Ghanaian currency cannot be brought into the country.

Health–Raw fruits and vegetables, meats, and water for cooking and drinking should be well prepared. It is not safe to swim in freshwater streams or lagoons.

Telecommunications–Overseas radiotelephone connections may be made from Accra via London. Cable service is good.

Transportation–Several flights a week arrive at Accra's international airport from the US and Europe. Ghana Airways has scheduled flights between Accra and Kumasi, Tamale, and Sunyani.

Ghana has about 3,500 miles of hard surface roads; however, it is difficult to drive outside major cities during the rainy season. Cars with drivers can be rented. Taxis are sometimes difficult to find, especially during rush hours.

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sought to develop Ghana as a modern unitary state along Socialist lines. To accelerate the transformation from an essentially agricultural, tribally oriented society into a modern semi-industrialized state and to assist Ghana along the "road to socialism," the government placed great emphasis on political and economic organization, endeavoring through labor, youth, farm, cooperative, and other associations integrated with the CPP to increase both stability and productivity. According to Nkrumah, the government acted only as "the agent of the CPP" in seeking to accomplish these goals.

The CPP's control was challenged and criticized. When Prime Minister Nkrumah thought it necessary, he resorted to what he termed "emergency measures." The government used the Preventive Detention Act (1958), which provided for detention without trial for up to 5 years, and amended it to provide for renewed 5-year detention periods. In August 1960 Nkrumah, having just been elected President, was given authority to oblige newspapers and other publications "indulging in the systematic publication of matter calculated to prejudice public order or safety, or the maintenance of public services or economy of Ghana" to be submitted to scrutiny before publication. The press and radio were government controlled.

On August 1, 1962, an attempt was made to assassinate Nkrumah, and three subsequent terrorist bombings occurred at Accra. Stringent security measures were taken. Still another attempt was made on Nkrumah's life by a police constable in January 1964.

Prior to the adoption of a republican Constitution on July 1, 1960, with a presidential form of government, Ghana had a ministerial form similar to that of many British Commonwealth members. The 1960 Constitution vested great power in the Office of the President. After a constitutional referendum in January 1964, Ghana became a one-party state with the CPP as the single party. The same referendum empowered the President to remove members of the judiciary at his discretion. Previously they could be removed only for cause with the assent of two-thirds of the National Assembly. Executive authority in the various regions was in the hands of regional and district commissioners appointed by and responsible to the national government.

1966 Coup d'Etat

On February 24, 1966, while President Nkrumah was en route to the People's Republic of China, the Ghanaian Army and police overthrew his regime. Nkrumah and all his ministers were dismissed, the CPP and National Assembly dissolved, and the Constitution suspended. The new regime cited as the principal reasons for its action: Nkrumah's flagrant abuse of individual rights and liberties; the corrupt, oppressive, and dictatorial nature of the old regime; and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. The coup received widespread support from the Ghanaian people, and the new government's action in releasing hundreds of prisoners who had been detained by Nkrumah for political reasons under the Preventive Detention Act led to spontaneous demonstrations of support for the new military government.

The leaders of the February 24 coup established a National Liberation Council (NLC) as the new Government of Ghana, disclaiming any intention to rule indefinitely and pledging an early return to a duly constituted civilian government. They asked members of the judiciary and civil service to remain at their posts and established committees of civil servants to handle the administration of the country.

As promised by the NLC, Ghana's government was returned to civilian authority in October 1969, after a parliamentary election in which the Progress Party, led by Dr. Kofi A. Busia, won 105 of the 140 seats. Until mid-1970, the powers of the Chief of State were held by a Presidential com-

mission led by Brigadier A.A. Afrifa. In a special election on August 31, 1970, former Chief Justice Edward Akufo-Addo was chosen President, and Dr. Busia became Prime Minister.

Faced with mounting economic problems, Dr. Busia's government undertook a drastic devaluation of the cedi in December 1971. The government's inability to control the subsequent inflationary pressures stimulated further popular discontent, and there was no opposition when military officers seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat on January 13, 1972.

Led by Col. I.K. Acheampong, the coup leaders formed the National Redemption Council (NRC), to which they admitted other military officers, the head of the police, and one civilian. Within weeks, the NRC took dramatic initiatives in foreign economic policy and began a reorientation of Ghana's international posture. The NRC has announced no plans for the return of civilian control, maintaining that it will retain authority until its goals, which emphasize nationalism and self-reliance, have been achieved.

GOVERNMENT

The National Redemption Council disbanded the National Assembly and abolished the existing Constitution. The Supreme Court, which had legislative review powers, was abolished, but the rest of the country's judicial system was left intact.

In October 1975 the government was reorganized and a Supreme Military Council (SMC) was created to assume executive and legislative authority. The NRC continues but is subordinate to the SMC. It includes the members of the SMC, the Commanders of the Army's First and Second Brigades, and the Commissioners of State who head ministries.

Initially, the NRC was composed of the Inspector General of Police, the Attorney General (the only civilian member), and eight military officers, four of whom participated in the January 1972 coup. Since October 1975, the Attorney General has been joined by the Commissioner for Economic Planning, giving the NRC two civilian members; the police representation is now three; and all others are members of the armed services.

For purposes of local administration, Ghana is divided into 9 Regions, each under the control of a regional commissioner, all of whom are military officers appointed by the SMC. In many parts of the country, traditional rulers still exercise limited powers and regional councils of chiefs play a consultative role.

Principal Government Officials

Members of SMC and NRC

Chairman and Head of State–Col. I.K. Acheampong
Chief of Defense Staff–Maj. Gen. L.A. Okai
Air Force Commander–Brig. Charles Beausoleil
Army Commander–Brig. F.W.K. Akuffo
Navy Commander–Comdr. C.K. Dzang
Commandant, Border Guards–Brig. E.K. Utuka
Inspector General of Police–Ernest Ako

Commissioners of State (NRC)

Agriculture–Lt. Col. P.K. Nkegbe
Cocoa Affairs–Cdr. J.A. Kyeremeh
Defense, Finance, and Sports–Col. I.K. Acheampong
Education, Youth, and Culture–E. Owusu Fordwor
Economic Planning–Robert Gardiner
Foreign Affairs–Col. R.J.A. Felli
Health–Brig. N.A. Odartey-Wellington
Justice and Attorney General–J.G. Koranteng-Addow
Industries–Lt. Col. G. Minyila
Information–Brig. R.E.A. Kotei
Internal Affairs–Ernest Ako
Labor, Social Welfare, and Cooperatives–Cdr. J.K. Amedume
Lands and Mineral Resources–Lt. Col. T.T. Kutin
Local Government–Lt. Col. B.K. Ahlijah
NRC Affairs–E.K. Buckman
Trade and Tourism–Col. K.A. Quarshie
Transport and Communications–Col. D.A. Iddisah
Works and Housing–Lt. Col. K.A. Jackson

Ambassador to the U.S.–Samuel E. Quarm
Ambassador to the U.N.–Francis E. Boaten

Ghana maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2460 16th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009. Its Permanent Mission to the U.N. is at 150 E. 58th St., 27th Fl., New York, N.Y. 10022.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The SMC and NRC remain highly critical of the Busia government, and many Busia supporters were imprisoned after the coup. However, the NRC announced on July 4, 1973, that all political prisoners had been released. Several of Busia's political opponents and some Ghanaians prominent in the Nkrumah regime have been named to influential positions. Nkrumah himself died in exile in 1972.

All political parties are banned in Ghana. Most labor, youth, tribal, and professional organizations have pledged their support to the SMC and NRC. Although some independent newspapers are published, public criticism of the regime is rare, and the press and broadcast media give extensive coverage to government policies and directives. The government has experienced no public opposition during its first 45 months in power.

ECONOMY

By African standards, Ghana has a diversified and beneficial resource base. The country remains basically agricultural, however, with most of its labor force working on the fertile land. Cash crops include cocoa and its products, which provide almost two-thirds of all export revenue; logs and lumber, which provide an additional one-eighth; coconuts and other palm products; shea nuts; and coffee. Rubber production is increasing, all of it used domestically. Corn (maize), plantain, rice, cassava, and peanuts (groundnuts) are the basic foodstuffs. Ghana is nearly self-sufficient in all of these commodities except corn. It is, however, reducing its reliance on corn imports.

Coastal, and to a lesser extent inland, fisheries provide important sources of protein, and there is some export of marine fish. Ghana imports livestock, but efforts are being made to increase both livestock and poultry

production. There is also a pilot project to introduce rabbit as food.

Mineral resources, almost totally exported in their primary state, include gold, diamonds, manganese, and bauxite. There is offshore oil exploration, and an onshore area has been designated for exploration—all by major foreign oil companies. However, only one offshore well has been proved, and by itself it is not commercially viable.

Ghana's industrial base is relatively advanced compared with other African countries. Its significant export industry is aluminum (using imported alumina as the input in a U.S.-owned smelter). Import-substitute industries include textiles; steel (using scrap as the raw material); tires; oil refining; car, bus, and truck assembly; and flashlight batteries and other simple consumer goods.

The NRC inherited foreign debts totaling almost $1 billion, chronic trade and payments imbalances, and an acute shortage of foreign exchange. Within weeks of assuming power the NRC announced that it was unilaterally abrogating existing arrangements for the rescheduling of approximately $300 million in medium-term debt from the Nkrumah period, and that it would not repay nearly one-third of this amount owed to firms which allegedly engaged in fraudulent practices. At the same time, the new regime announced that it would repay long-term debt as it fell due and short-term debt as foreign exchange resources permitted. Ghana's creditors objected to the unilateral action and commenced negotiations which resulted in agreement in 1974 to reschedule the medium-term debt on very liberal terms. Since then Ghana has been paying its long- and medium-term debt obligations as agreed, and it has been paying its short-term debt as exchange has become available.

The NRC's second significant economic initiative was the announcement of its intention for Ghanaians to "capture the commanding heights of the economy" by participating in the ownership of foreign firms active in Ghana. Subsequent decrees called for a minimum of 55 percent Ghanaian participation in timber and hard minerals production. The Investment Policy Decree of April 1975 gave legal backing to the bulk of the policy; it calls for the complete Ghanaianization of small-scale commercial, and some industrial, activities; and, with some exceptions, it requires from 40 to 55 percent Ghanaian ownership in larger scale firms. Implementation was originally to have commenced at the end of 1975 and has now been postponed until June 30, 1976.

An Investment Policy Implementation Committee has been appointed to value the shares of foreign firms which must be sold to Ghanaians. Stated policy is to value assets fairly and to permit repatriation of proceeds from the sale of shares. However, there is yet no "track record" of decisions regarding valuation of shares, and foreign exchange constraints would not permit immediate repatriation of significant proceeds. Indeed, a number of firms in the commercial sector (as opposed to the industrial sector) have been unable to remit profits abroad for many years, although the government has not challenged the ownership of these profits nor denied the eventual right to repatriate them. All these factors, however, constitute a dampening effect on private foreign investment in spite of the government's desire for additional foreign investment in the agricultural and selected industrial sectors.

Concommitant with the Investment Policy Decree was a decree calling for increased training of Ghanaians by foreign-owned firms and progressive turning over of positions held by expatriates to Ghanaians. For some time an Immigrant Quota Committee has been allocating the number of positions for expatriates in these firms, with gradual reductions of the quotas.

The SMC government continues the NRC's policies of emphasizing self-reliance, with greater production of domestic foodstuffs ("Operation Feed Yourself") and a consequent reduction in food imports, local production of agricultural raw materials ("Operation Feed Your Industries"), and revitalization of uncompleted or incompletely utilized facilities. Implementation, however, is not rapid.

Trade

Since the chief export, cocoa, is a notoriously volatile commodity, and since there is a high propensity to import, planning is difficult and the balance of payments is frequently adverse. In recent years the price of cocoa has been markedly higher than it was at historic levels, but production has stagnated and earnings continue to fluctuate. Further, like all oil consumers and importers of most manufactured goods, worldwide inflation and especially petroleum prices have taken their toll on balance-of-payments figures.

The NRC instituted strict import controls when it first acceded to power, then eased them, and following an admitted loss of control of import licensing in 1974 it imposed severe restrictions on imports in 1975. Since these tightened controls were hastily and somewhat arbitrarily applied, many industries were forced to operate at low capacities and in some cases had to shut down for a time, due to inadequate raw material supplies and lack of needed spare parts.

In 1974 the United States was third among suppliers to Ghana, accounting for some 10.7 percent of the market. The U.S. is the second most important customer of Ghana's cocoa.

Economic Development

Ghana attained independence with a substantial physical and social infrastructure, as well as $481 million in foreign reserves. During the Nkrumah era, the infrastructure was developed further, and there were important public investments in the industrial sector. With assistance from the United States, the World Bank, and the British Government, a major dam was constructed at Akosombo on the Volta River. Two American companies, assisted by loans from the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Export-Import Bank, built a large aluminum smelter to use power generated at the Akosombo Dam.

Unfortunately, many of the Nkrumah era investments were in public works which had little revenue-generating capacity, or in agricultural and industrial schemes poorly conceived and badly managed. With cocoa prices falling and the country's reserves fast disappearing, Nkrumah's government resorted to supplier credits to finance many projects. By

the mid-1960's, Ghana's reserves were gone and it was evident that Ghana would be unable to repay the supplier credits on schedule. The National Liberation Council, which overthrew Nkrumah, tried to rationalize the economy it inherited. Uneconomic projects were abandoned, and inefficiently managed enterprises were sold to the private sector. Ghana's creditors agreed to three reschedulings of the repayment due on the Nkrumah era supplier credits. Foreign donors, with the United States playing a leading role, provided commodity import loans to enable the government, which faced a critical foreign exchange shortage, to import essential commodities.

Prime Minister Busia's government liberalized previous controls in an effort to attract foreign investment and to encourage domestic entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, investors were cautious, and cocoa prices began declining in the midst of an import surge, precipitating a serious trade deficit. Although the Busia regime received considerable foreign assistance and benefited from some debt relief, it too was unable to overcome the restraints on growth posed by the debt service burden, payments imbalances, foreign exchange shortages, and mismanagement.

Although foreign assistance helped prevent economic collapse in the post-Nkrumah era and was responsible for subsequent improvements in many sectors, statistically the 10 years preceding the NRC takeover was a period of economic stagnation. Population growth offset the modest increase in GNP and, with inflation a serious problem throughout the decade, real wages declined for many Ghanaians.

The NRC announced an austerity program to achieve a restructuring of the economy. Its emphasis on self-reliance and better management drew admiration abroad. However, with greatly fluctuating export earnings, stagnating exports in quantity terms, rising imports (at least in value, due to worldwide inflation), management disappointments, policy announcements sometimes not executed, and little evidence of a promised economic development plan, fresh capital assistance has been notably slow in coming from abroad. Further, the capital assistance provided by Western governments and by the World Bank has been utilized slowly. Technical assistance, however, has continued uninterrupted from a variety of foreign sources, mostly Western.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Successor regimes have not echoed Nkrumah's call for the immediate unification of Africa, but African issues remain important and are the SMC's principal foreign policy interest. The regime has withdrawn Busia's advocacy of dialogue with South Africa to give its support to the liberation movements in southern Africa.

Although Ghana coordinates its position on some international issues with other African states, most foreign policies reflect the SMC's assessment of Ghana's national interests. Cordial relations are maintained with both Western and Communist governments. In 1972 Ghana recognized the German Democratic Republic, and relations with the P.R.C. and Guinea, suspended after Nkrumah's ouster, were resumed by the NRC.

Ghana is an active member of the Organization for African Unity, the U.N. and its specialized agencies, and the British Commonwealth.

U.S.-GHANA RELATIONS

Except for a strained period in the last years of the Nkrumah regime, the United States has enjoyed good relations with Ghana since that country's independence. Thousands of Ghanaians have been educated in the United States, and thousands of American tourists, including a substantial number of students, visit Ghana each year. Close relations are maintained between educational and scientific institutions in the two countries.

Ghana was the first country to which U.S. Peace Corps volunteers were assigned, and they have worked there continuously since 1961. Some 240 volunteers are now engaged in secondary school teaching and a variety of other activities. Since 1957 Ghana has received about $333 million in economic assistance from the U.S. in the form of project loans (notably for the dam and the aluminum smelter), commodity import loans, food aid, and technical assistance. The current AID program in Ghana encompasses a $19 million program loan and technical assistance, with emphasis on agricultural development, rural health, family planning, and small-scale industries.

Current bilateral problems are essentially limited to Ghanaian disappointment in the U.S. failure to join the International Cocoa Agreement. This problem is among the many subjects which the two governments discuss with candor in an environment of mutual respect and established friendship.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Shirley Temple Black
Deputy Chief of Mission—John A. Linehan, Jr.
Political Counselor—Craig Baxter
Economic/Commercial Counselor—Ralph H. Graner
Director, U.S. AID Mission—W. Haven North
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Kenneth Bache

The U.S. Embassy is located at Liberia and Kinbu Roads, Accra. The mailing address is P.O. Box 194, Accra, Ghana.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8089, Revised January 1976

APPENDIX Q
THE GUINEAS
BACKGROUND NOTES

1. Equatorial Guinea
2. Guinea — Bissau
3. Republic of Guinea

[Washington, Department of State, 1975/1976]

APPENDIX 1
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, April 1975 (Publication 8025)]

background notes

Equatorial Guinea

department of state * april 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Equatorial Guinea

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Equatorial Guinea is located in west-central Africa and has two Provinces. The Province of Macias Nguema Biyogo includes the island of the same name, about 20 miles from Cameroon; the adjacent islets; and the island of Pagalu, about 370 miles southwest of the main island. The Province of Rio Muni includes the continental area between Cameroon and Gabon; the islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, and Elobey Chico; and adjacent islets.

Macias Nguema Biyogo is the largest island in the Gulf of Guinea (780 sq. mi.). It has two large volcanic formations, separated by a valley that bisects the island at its narrowest point. The 120-mile coastline is high and rugged in the south and is lower and more accessible in the north, with an excellent harbor at Malabo. Rio Muni (10,040 sq. mi.) has a coastal plain which gives way to a succession of valleys separated by low hills and spurs of the Crystal Mountains.

The climate is tropical—heavy rainfall, high humidity, and frequent season changes with violent windstorms or tornados. Temperatures and humidity on Macias Nguema Biyogo are generally higher than in Rio Muni. Average temperature is about 80°.

Almost 75 percent of the residents of Macias Nguema Biyogo are Nigerian contract laborers and permanent settlers. The rest are emigrants from Rio Muni, native Bubis, Fernandinos, Cameroonians, and Europeans.

In Rio Muni, 75 percent of the population are Fangs; the rest are coastal tribes—Benges, Combes, Bujebas, and Balengues. The coastal region is inhabited also by Nigerian contract workers and about 200 Europeans.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 10,820 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Md.). CAPITAL: Malabo (also capital of Macias Nguema Biyogo Province.) *OTHER CITY: Bata (capital of Rio Muni Province).*

People

POPULATION: 318,000 (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2% (1974). DENSITY: 30 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Fangs (75%), Benges, Combes, Bujebas, Balengues, Fernandinos, Bubis. RELIGIONS: Roman Catholic (60%), Protestant, animist. LANGUAGES: Spanish (official), African dialects, English, pidgin. LITERACY: 20%.

Government

TYPE: Unitary republic. INDEPENDENCE: October 12, 1968. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: July 29, 1973.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President. *Legislative*—unicameral Assembly (60 deputies). *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Partido Unico Nacional (PUN). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 2 Provinces.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes—green, white, red—joined by a blue triangle on staff side.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $70 million (1972). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 0.2% (1965-72). PER CAPITA INCOME: $240 (1972). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: -1.5% (1965-72).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 85-90%. *Labor* 95%. *Products*—cacao, wood, coffee.

INDUSTRY: Negligible.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Wood, petroleum (under exploration).

TRADE: *Exports*—$16 million (1973): cacao, wood, coffee, bananas, palm oil. *Imports*—$17.3 million (1973): foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, machinery. *Partners*—Spain (80%), F.R.G., U.S., U.K.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Same rate as Spanish peseta, approx. 55-60EG pesetas=US$1 (Feb. 1975).


ECONOMIC AID: Spain is the largest aid donor. Equatorial Guinea enjoys certain trade privileges and price supports in Spain.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Organization of African Unity (OAU), Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC).

HISTORY

Macias Nguema Biyogo was discovered between 1469 and 1474 by Portuguese explorers seeking a route to India. They retained control until 1778, when the island, adjacent islets, and the commercial rights to the mainland between the Niger and Ogooué Rivers were ceded to Spain. Conflicting claims to the mainland were settled by the Treaty of Paris in 1900, and periodically the island and the mainland territories were united administratively.

In 1959 the present Provinces were



established, with status similar to the Provinces of metropolitan Spain. As the Spanish Equatorial Region, it was ruled by a Governor General, who had military and civilian powers.

In 1960 the first elections for selected village, municipal, and provincial councils were held, and the first Equatorial Guinean representatives were seated in the Spanish *Cortes* (parliament). Under the Basic Law of December 1963 limited autonomy was granted, a new political and administrative structure was authorized, and the name was changed to Equatorial Guinea. Although Spain's Commissioner General had extensive powers, the Equatorial Guinean General Assembly could take considerable initiative in formulating laws and regulations.

In March 1968 Spain announced that it would grant independence to Equatorial Guinea as rapidly as possible. A constitutional convention produced an electoral law and draft constitution which represented a compromise between divergent views on the extent of ties between the two Provinces. A referendum was held on August 11, 1968, in the presence of a U.N. observer team, and 63 percent of the electorate voted in favor of the Constitution. In September Francisco Macias Nguema was elected the first President. Independence was granted in October.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution of August 11, 1968, established Equatorial Guinea as a unitary republic with two Provinces but attempted to protect the identity of Macias Nguema Biyogo. On August 23, 1972, a constitutional decree (No. 1/72) proclaimed President Macias as President for life; head of the nation and the party; commander in chief of the army; and Grand Master of education, science, and culture.

A new Constitution, adopted in July 1973, was approved by the Assembly of the Third Congress of the Partido Unico Nacional (PUN) and ratified by referendum. An article requiring election of the President by direct secret universal suffrage was suspended in relation to President Macias.

The PUN designates the People's National Assembly delegates and has the power to remove them. The President can dissolve the Assembly and call new elections. Judicial power, according to article 67, "emanates from the people and is exercised in its name by the Supreme People's Court and other civil and military courts." All judges are nominated by the President and are revocable by him.

Principal Government Officials

President for life; Minister of National Defense and Foreign Affairs—Francisco Macias Nguema
Vice President—Miguel Eyegue Ntutumu
Ambassador to the U.N.—Benjamin Evua Miko

The address of the Equatorial Guinea Mission to the U.N. is 440 E. 62nd St., Apt. 6D, New York, N.Y. 10022.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Only after local autonomy was granted in 1963 did Equatorial Guinea have much political activity. The National Union Movement for Equatorial Guinea (MUNGE), National Liberation Movement of Equatorial Guinea (MONALIGE), and Popular Idea of Equatorial Guinea (IPGE)—all in Rio Muni—favored independence of the two Provinces as a single political entity. The Bubi Union and Fernandino Democratic Union—in Macias Nguema Biyogo—preferred separation from Rio Muni or a loose federation.

The Rio Muni parties joined in a nationalist alliance for the 1968 constitutional convention but split during the conference over constitutional provisions and the extent and nature of future ties with Spain. Francisco Macias Nguema led a protest against the draft constitution and campaigned against it in the referendum. After approval of the referendum, however, he indicated he was prepared to form a government within its framework. He successfully ran for President in 1968 as the candidate of an independent coalition and selected as his Vice President Edmundo Bosio Dioco, a former presidential candidate.

Political differences have become more serious since independence. Most preindependence leaders are inactive; many of their followers, including proponents of provincial separation and participants in a March 1969 abortive coup d'etat, are dead, imprisoned, or in exile.

A single party, Partido Unico Nacional (PUN), with President Macias as the leader, was established in July 1970. Women and youth groups were recruited, and party offices were established in the main towns.

On May 7, 1971, key portions of the 1968 Constitution were abrogated and the President assumed complete control of the government.

ECONOMY

Equatorial Guinea's economy is based largely on three products—cacao, wood, and coffee—which are exported to Spain at prices above the world market rates. In 1973 it exported approximately 16,000 metric tons of cacao. Most of the high-quality cacao is grown on plantations on Macias Nguema Biyogo, owned mainly by Africans and worked by Nigerian contract labor. The rest is grown on cooperatives of small family farms in both Provinces. Coffee is grown mostly on small farms in Rio Muni. Rio Muni and Gabon have a virtual monopoly of the world production of okume, from which plywood is made. Timber production, which amounted

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Hot and humid most of the year, with over 100 inches of rain. Bring lightweight summer apparel, rainwear, and a sweater for the mountains.

Health—Public hospitals are available, but trained personnel and medications are limited. Inoculations against tropical diseases are necessary. Visitors are urged to bring a supply of coffee, tea, sugar, bread, soap, and other essentials. Tap water is *not* potable.

Telecommunications—Daytime local and long-distance telephone service is sometimes available. Telegraph rates are higher than in the U.S.

Transportation—There are few buses. Taxis should be hired for length of stay to insure transport as needed. They are sometimes available at the airport. Malabo is served by airlines once weekly from Madrid via Lagos and from Moscow via N'Djamena; four times a week from Douala; and daily, except Sunday, from Bata. Charter air services from Douala and Libreville provide economical direct flights.

Visas—Required for all Americans. Application should be made to the Equatorial Guinea Mission to the U.N. at least 3 to 4 weeks prior to departure, as requests normally are referred to Malabo.

Business Representatives—There is no resident American diplomatic presence. The American Ambassador in Yaounde, Cameroon, is accredited to Equatorial Guinea, and day-to-day inquiries are handled by the American Consul in Douala.

READING LIST

The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Equatorial Guinea: Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People. A/7200/Add. 4 (Part II). New York: United Nations, 1969.

Pélissier, René. "Equatorial Guinea: A New Republic." *Geographical Magazine.* November 1968.

to 100,000 metric tons in 1970, came to a virtual halt in 1971 due to a lack of skilled labor. Trade agreements negotiated in 1973 to promote the timber industry offer good prospects for the future.

There is little industry, and the local market for industrial products is small. Traces of petroleum, iron ore, and radioactive materials have been found and are being explored.

A local labor shortage has resulted in a heavy migration, especially from Nigeria. A series of migrant labor treaties, signed since 1971 between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, have expired. By the end of 1974 a new agreement had not been successfully negotiated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

A transitional agreement, signed in October 1968, implemented a Spanish preindependence declaration to assist Equatorial Guinea by continuing its financial and technical assistance at the preindependence level through 1969. It also provided for the temporary maintenance of Spanish military forces there. Permanent agreements for economic and technical cooperation, private concessions, and trade relations are still being negotiated.

In February 1969 a dispute erupted between President Macias and Spanish officials, and the former asked that all Spanish troops leave immediately. The troop departure, completed in early April, also led to an exodus of almost all Spaniards, including proprietors, technicians, and civil servants. Diplomatic relations were never broken with Spain.

Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon claim special ties with some Equatorial Guineans. The Nigerian Government is interested in measures to protect the welfare of Nigerian contract workers. Some Nigerian groups have advocated annexing or purchasing Macias Nguema Biyogo; however, their government has never espoused this claim. Cameroon and Gabon consider that each has a valid claim to Rio Muni, and Cameroon to Macias Nguema Biyogo as well. Both have large Fang populations, and the Doualas of Cameroon claim tribal ties with the Bubis. During the summer of 1974 incidents on the land border between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon focused attention on the territorial claim issue. A joint commission comprised of representatives of both governments met to reconcile the borders defined in the 1900 Treaty of Paris with longstanding de facto areas of effective occupation and control. By autumn a settlement on the land frontier and a general agreement on an ocean demarcation line had been reached.

Having achieved independence under the sponsorship of the United Nations, Equatorial Guinea feels a special kinship with that organization. It became the 126th U.N. member on November 12, 1968.

The government's basic foreign policy is one of nonalignment. It has established diplomatic relations with North Korea, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and the German Democratic Republic.

U.S.-EQUATORIAL GUINEA RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Equatorial Guinea are good. The United States recognized Equatorial Guinea upon its independence on October 12, 1968, and established diplomatic relations with it on November 21, 1968. There is no U.S. bilateral aid program in Equatorial Guinea; modest assistance has been provided from time to time under our regional program.

Principal Government Officials

Ambassador—C. Robert Moore (also accredited to, and resident at, Yaounde, Cameroon).

Principal Officer, Douala, Cameroon—William C. Mithoefer, Jr.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8025
Revised April 1975

APPENDIX 2
GUINEA BISSAU
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, March 1976 (Publication 8209)]

background notes

Guinea Bissau

department of state • march 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Guinea-Bissau

GEOGRAPHY

Guinea-Bissau is located on the West African coast between Senegal and Guinea. Its territory also includes the offshore Bijagos Archipelago.

A low coastal, swampy plain covers much of the country, especially in the southwest. The land rises gradually toward a savanna in the east; the highest elevation of 985 feet is in the southeast. Several rivers mark the coastline; the three most important—the Cacheu, the Geba, and the Corubal—are navigable for considerable distances.

The soil is largely alluvial and fertile. Palms and mangrove thickets cover most of the lowland along the coast and the rivers. Further inland is a transitional zone with hardwood forests, and in the interior are tree-dotted grasslands.

The climate is tropical with a mean average temperature of 77° F. The wet season lasts from June to November, followed by a dry season during which the northerly harmattan (dust-laden wind) blows from the Sahara Desert. April and May are the hottest months; December and January are the coolest. The city of Bissau annually receives about 70 inches of rain.

PEOPLE

Among the nation's main tribal groups, wide differences prevail in language, customs, and social organization. Those in the coastal region, such as the Balanta, have retained their traditional religious beliefs, although some have been converted to Christianity. The Fulani and Malinke, located in the northwest, have been more closely associated with Europeans, but most of them are Muslim. The Mandyako and Felup peoples live in the north and central coastal regions. All these tribes practice traditional farming, and the Fulani also raise cattle.

Of the nonindigenous people, the Cape Verdian community is the most numerous—about 10,000. Approximately 1,000 Portuguese and Lebanese residents are engaged in commerce and civil service.

HISTORY

After the fleet of Nuno Tristão arrived on the Guinea coast in 1446, Portugal claimed the territory and called it Portuguese Guinea. Although Cape Verdians were granted trading rights in the territory in 1462, few prominent trading posts appear to have existed before 1581.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, Cacheu, probably established in 1470, was the chief slave trading center in the region. After the slave trade declined at the beginning of the 19th century, Bissau, which had been founded as a fort in 1765, became the chief commercial center.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 14,000 sq. mi. (twice the size of N.J.). CAPITAL: Bissau (pop. 80,000).

People

POPULATION: 700,000 (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3% (1975 est.). DENSITY: 50 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 30% Balanta, 20% Fulani, 14% Mandyako, 13% Malinke, 7% Papel. RELIGIONS: 69% animist, 30% Muslim, 1% Christian. LANGUAGES: Portuguese (official), Crioulo, and numerous African languages. LITERACY: 5%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 40 yrs. (est.)

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: Proclaimed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) on September 24, 1973. Portugal granted *de jure* independence on September 10, 1974. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: September 24, 1973.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President of the Council of State (Chief of State), Council of State Commissioners. *Legislative*—National Assembly. *Judicial*—Court system is being established.

POLITICAL PARTY: The sole party is the PAIGC. SUFFRAGE: Universal over 15. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 8 Regions.

FLAG: Three stripes of equal size; vertical red stripe with black star on the staff side, upper horizontal yellow stripe and lower green stripe.

Economy

GNP: $105 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: na. PER CAPITA INCOME: $150 (est.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: na.

AGRICULTURE: *Products*—peanuts, timber, rice.

INDUSTRY: *Products*—palm oil, hides and skins, beer, soft drinks.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Potential bauxite deposits.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*—$3 million: palm oil, peanuts, timber, coconuts, hides, and skins. *Imports*—$38 million: manufactured goods, fuels, rice and other food products. *Partners*—Portugal, Spain, UK, Japan, Italy, Cape Verde Islands.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 25 escudos (Portuguese or Guinea-Bissau)=US$1. New currency, the peso, was introduced on March 1, 1976.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—approx. $16 million (Sept. 1974 to July 1975). *US only*—$1 million for refugee resettlement (1975); 25 student training grants.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, OAU, West African Economic Community (CEAO).

In the 19th century the Portuguese, who had held only a few coastal trading posts and did not explore the interior, found themselves contesting territorial claims by France and the United Kingdom. The Island of Bolama, which had been in dispute between the United Kingdom and Portugal for more than a century, was awarded to Portugal in 1870 by U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant, who acted as arbitrator. France and Portugal set-

tled their border problems in 1886, and the territory's frontiers were established by 1905.

The capital of the Portuguese colony from 1890 to 1941 was Bolama. In 1941 the capital was moved to Bissau because of its superior port and defense facilities.

In the early days of Portuguese rule, relations between the settlers and the indigenous peoples were adversely affected by the slave trade. Between 1890 and 1910, the Portuguese attempted to expand inland and were faced with a number of uprisings. The country was finally pacified during the period 1912-15, following a series of campaigns led by Capt. Teixeira Pinto. In 1952, by consititutional amendment, the colony of Portuguese Guinea became an Overseas Province of Portugal.

In 1956 the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) was organized clandestinely in Bissau by Amilcar Cabral and Raphael Barbosa. Cabral, a Cape Verdian, received a degree in agronomy in Lisbon and entered the Portuguese agricultural service in Guinea in 1950. The PAIGC sought to make demands on the Portuguese authorities in an effort to improve economic, social, and political conditions in Guinea. A violent police response to a 1959 dockworkers' strike in Bissau caused the PAIGC to turn to armed struggle, which began in 1961 with acts of sabotage. In 1962 the President of the PAIGC, Raphael Barbosa, was arrested in Bissau.

Cabral, as Secretary General of the PAIGC, directed a liberation movement which eventually pitted 10,000 PAIGC soldiers against 35,000 European and African troops fighting for Portugal. By 1970 the PAIGC had effective control of sizable areas of the southern and eastern parts of Guinea. To counteract PAIGC influence, the Portuguese evacuated the population of outlying villages and concentrated the people around Portuguese garrisons.

In 1971 the PAIGC established a civilian administration within the areas under its control. By late 1972 elections for a PAIGC National Assembly had been held in the territory controlled by the PAIGC. On January 20, 1973, Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry, Guinea, by dissident elements within the PAIGC. Aristides Pereira then became Secretary General of the PAIGC, and Luis Cabral, Amilcar's younger brother, was named Deputy Secretary General.

THE PAIGC's second congress was held in July 1973. The congress decided that the PAIGC's National Assembly would meet in September. The 120-member Assembly met at Madina do Boe, Gabu District, and on September 24, 1973, declared the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The Assembly also chose Luis Cabral as President of the Council of State and confirmed Aristides Pereira as Secretary General of the PAIGC.

Portugal granted *de jure* independence to Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974, and the United States recognized the new state on that date.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Constitution was adopted in 1973 by the PAIGC's National Assembly. The PAIGC, the highest organ of power, is the only political party permitted to operate in Guinea-Bissau and is defined by the Constitution as the "supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people." The party's High Council for the Struggle, equivalent to a central committee, has 85 members and is ordinarily convoked once a year by the Executive Committee for the Struggle. The Executive Committee has 24 members, is the PAIGC's political bureau, and acts for the High Council. The PAIGC party congress meets once every 3 years.

The democratic process is said to be insured through the operation of the party itself. According to the theory of "democratic centralism," every citizen over the age of 15 can be involved in popular democracy by participation in the election of PAIGC candidates for the National Assembly. The National Assembly, the highest organ of the state, is elected for a period of up to 3 years and meets at least once a year.

The 15-member Council of State is elected for a 3-year term from among the members of the Assembly. The Council of State elects a President, who is Chief of State and Commander of the Armed Forces. The organ known as the Council of State Commissioners is responsible to the Assembly and the Council of State.

Officials elected to Regional Councils are empowered to preserve public order, provide local administration, and promote economic and educational development in the Regions. The Constitution provides for a judicial system to be established according to law, but the organization of that system is still being established.

Principal Government Officials

President of the Council of State—Luis de Almeida Cabral
Chief State Commissioner—Comdr. Francisco Mendes

Other Commissioners

Foreign Affairs—Victor Saude Maria
Economic Development and Planning—Vasco Cabral

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Lightweight, loose-fitting, washable clothing is recommended.

Currency—The Guinea-Bissau peso is not convertible outside the country. Portuguese escudos also circulate in Guinea-Bissau. Dollars and travelers checks can be exchanged in Bissau.

Customs—Visas are required for Americans entering Guinea-Bissau. Travelers must be immunized against smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever. Typhus, typhoid, and tetanus immunizations are recommended. Malaria suppressives should be taken.

Health—Sanitation in Bissau is fair. Tap water is unsafe. The two hospitals in Bissau are adequately staffed, but medicines are sometimes in short supply.

Telecommunications—Telephone communications are adequate. Overseas calls go via Lisbon and must be arranged in advance. Telegraphic communications are generally reliable but often delayed.

Transportation—Bissau is linked to Lisbon, Dakar, Conakry, Algiers, and the Cape Verde Islands by regular air service. Scheduled domestic air service is available between Bissau and most of the country's population centers. Uncertain road conditions and/or frontier difficulties make land transport between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal and Guinea virtually impossible. Taxis and city buses operate in Bissau. Accommodations in Bissau are very limited.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Abshire, David and Michael Samuels, eds. *Portuguese Africa—A Handbook.* New York: Praeger, 1969.

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Cabral, Amilcar. *Revolution in Guine.* London: Love & Malcomson, 1969.

Chilcote, Ronald H. *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa—Documents.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972.

Davidson, Basil. *The Liberation of Guine.* Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1969.

Mission to Guinea-Bissau. New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1972.

Report of the Special Mission (to Guinea-Bissau) 14 March 1972. New York: United Nations General Assembly Document A/AC.109/L.804 July 3, 1972.

Finance—Carlos Correia
Without Portfolio—José Araujo

Ambassador to the U.S. and the U.N.—Gil V.V. Fernandes

The address of the Guinea-Bissau Ambassador to the United States is 211 East 43d St., Suite 604, New York, N.Y. 10017.

ECONOMY

Guinea-Bissau is in the process of rebuilding an economy which was seriously disrupted by the extended conflict between the PAIGC and Portugal. The economy is based on traditional agriculture and cattle raising. At one time rice production amounted to 170,000 tons; however, in 1972 the crop in Portuguese-held territory was given as only 28,000 tons. The present government is taking steps to increase rice production and expects to achieve self-sufficiency in this crop within 3 years. The country is developing its fishing industry.

Industry is very limited; a palm oil plant and a modern brewery are the principal enterprises. The government emphasizes cooperative organizations for both agriculture and commerce.

The war with Portugal severely hindered exploration for natural resources. Extensive bauxite deposits are believed to exist in southeast Guinea-Bissau, and there is interest in petroleum exploration both in the interior and coastal regions.

Since independence, Guinea-Bissau has been trying to establish itself on a strong economic footing. The government is presently negotiating with Portugal in an effort to resolve a number of economic problems caused by Portugal's colonial policies.

The young nation is also working to establish strong trade links with its neighbors. Guinea-Bissau has agreed to cooperate more closely with Senegal on common economic problems and recently signed the Lomé Convention in trade and aid with the European Communities. Guinea-Bissau also participated in the formation of the West African Economic Community and is seeking the economic cooperation and assistance of a variety of nations and international organizations.

Guinea-Bissau has 2,230 miles of roads, of which 265 miles are paved. There is no railroad, but rivers are navigable for oceangoing vessels for some distance inland. Bissau is the principal port. This city has modern airport, and there are smaller airfields inland.

Reliable economic and financial statistics on the nation in the post-independence period are not yet available.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guinea-Bissau has proclaimed a policy of nonalignment, balancing close ties with most Communist states and good relations with a number of other nations, notably Cape Verde, Portugal, Brazil, Algeria, Senegal, and the United States. Although its representation abroad is limited, Guinea-Bissau takes an active interest in international relations, especially African and Arab affairs.

Guinea-Bissau was the first Portuguese African territory to achieve independence, and the government is proud of its reputation as a leader in the struggle for African liberation. The common heritage of Portuguese language and culture provides an affinity with Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde.

A basic tenet of the doctrine of the ruling party in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC, is the "unity" of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. The PAIGC is also the ruling party in Cape Verde. The two states cooperate closely on many diplomatic, cultural, and economic subjects of common interest, and many Cape Verdians live and work in Guinea-Bissau. There has not been a unification or federation of the two nations, but efforts are being made to strengthen the economic and political links.

U.S.—GUINEA-BISSAU RELATIONS

The United States recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974, and has expressed the desire for friendly and cooperative relations with the new nation. The U.S. Government is currently in the process of establishing an American Embassy in Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau's leaders have repeatedly stressed their intention to develop and strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. Guinea-Bissau's Ambassador to the United States was one of the first sent abroad by the newly independent nation.

U.S. assistance to date has consisted of a $1 million grant to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, for the resettlement of refugees returning to Guinea-Bissau following the war with Portugal, and 25 training grants at African technical schools for Guinea-Bissau students.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8209, Revised March 1976

APPENDIX 3
REPUBLIC OF GUINEA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, August 1976 (Publication 8057)]

background notes

Guinea

department of state * august 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Guinea

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Guinea is located on the "bulge" of West Africa. Its neighbors are Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The Atlantic Ocean is on the west.

The country's four regions are: the narrow coastal belt (Lower Guinea), the pastoral Foutah Djallon (Middle Guinea), Upper Guinea, and the southeastern Forest Region. The Niger, Gambia, and Senegal Rivers all rise in the Foutah Djallon.

Guinea lies within two climatic zones. The coastal region and most of the country inland have a tropical climate with two rainy seasons, relatively high and uniform temperatures, and high humidity. Conakry's year-round average high is 85°F and the low is 74°F; its average annual rainfall is 169 inches. Upper Guinea has a single rainy season and greater daily and seasonal temperature variations.

The three most important ethnic groups are: more than 1 million Foulahs (or Peuls) who inhabit the mountainous Foutah Djallon region; some 700,000 Malinkés (or Mandingos) in the northeast; and about 400,000 Soussous in the coastal areas. Non-Africans number about 3,500.

Seven tribal languages are used a great deal, but French is the only significant written language.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 95,000 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Ore.). CAPITAL: Conakry (pop. 530,000). OTHER CITIES: Labé (419,000), N'Zérékoré (291,000), Kankan (265,000), Siguiri (254,000).

People

POPULATION: 4.5 million (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1976). DENSITY: 47 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Foulah, Malinké, Soussous, 15 smaller tribes. RELIGIONS: 75% Muslim, 25% animist, less than 1% Christian. LANGUAGES: French (official), tribal languages. LITERACY: 10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 41 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic (under one-party presidential regime). INDEPENDENCE: October 2, 1958. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: November 12, 1958.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State). *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*–High Court of Justice.

POLITICAL PARTY: Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: Regions, districts, local entities, local revolutionary powers (PRLs).

FLAG: Red, yellow, and green vertical stripes.

Economy

GDP: $725 million (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH: 6.0% in mining, 2.8% in agriculture, 3.2% in manufacturing (1975). PER CAPITA INCOME: $90-$130. PER CAPITA GROWTH: 4%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* na. *Labor* 85%. *Products*–rice, cassava, millet, corn, coffee, bananas, palm products, pineapples.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 9%. *Products*–bauxite, alumina, light manufacturing and processing.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Bauxite, iron ore, diamonds, gold.

TRADE (1976): *Exports*–$272 million: bauxite, alumina, pineapples, bananas, palm kernels, coffee. *Imports*–$206 million: petroleum, production materials, machinery, transportation equipment, foodstuffs. *Partners*–Communist countries, Western Europe, US, Canada.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Syli 21.53=US$1.


ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–na. Primarily from USSR, Eastern Europe, international organizations, PRC, US. *US only*–$130 million (1958-76).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and most of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Development Bank (AfDB), Niger River Commission, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

HISTORY

Guinea is partial heir to the series of West African empires which, at their height, cast a degree of political and commercial influence over many ethnic groups from Guinea's Atlantic coast to the southern edge of the Sahara. The empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai spanned the period from about the 10th to the 15th century. French military penetration into the area began in the mid-19th century. By signing treaties with the French in the 1880's, Guinea's leader Samory Touré secured a free hand to expand eastward. In 1890 he allied himself with the Toucouleur Empire and Kingdom of Sikasso and tried to expel the French from the Sudan. He was finally defeated in 1898, and France gained control of Guinea and the Ivory Coast.

France negotiated Guinea's present boundaries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the British in Sierra Leone, the Portuguese in Portu-


Guinea
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
Senegal
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Ivory Coast
North Atlantic Ocean
Koundara
Kolibá
Gambia
Mali
Rio Geba
Bafatá
Rio Corubal
Gaoual
Labé
Tougué
Dinguiraye
Siguiri
Bafing
Niger
Yanfolila
Boké
Télimélé
Pita
Dabola
Dalaba
Kouroussa
Fria
Konkouré
Mamou
Kankan
Niger
Boffa
Kindia
Faranah
Dubréka
Conakry
Forécariah
Falaba
Seniere
Little Scarcies
Kambia
Makeni
Pamalaire
Mile
Kérouané
Kissidougou
Odienné
Port Loko
Freetown
Mamprua
Guéckédou
Macenta
Beyla
Pendembu
Kenema
Sewa
Bo
Jong
Moa
Yomou
Nzérékoré
Sipilou
Danané
Ganta
14
12
10
8

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guese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau), and the Liberians. After 1894 Guinea was governed by the French Ministry of Colonies assisted by the Supreme Council for Overseas France which included parliamentary deputies from the colonies, delegates elected by French citizens in the colonies, and representatives of African interests nominated by colonial governors.

The French colonies of West Africa were formed into a federation headed by a governor general, with lieutenant governors in charge of the individual colonies. They were subdivided into districts governed by commandants. The commandant ruled through a hierarchy of African chiefs whom he appointed and whom he could dismiss.

Although Europeans held the high administrative posts until after World War II, Africans occupied some of the lower posts, even in the early 20th century. Colonial reforms after World War II gradually reduced the French administration and placed more political responsibility and power in the hands of Africans. These reforms resulted from a heightened sense of nationalism and separatism on the part of the Guinean educated elite and from political pressures in France.

After World War II, French labor confederations and political parties became active in Guinea. Guinea's labor unions were modeled on the French and usually became affiliated with them. Sékou Touré first gained a mass following as leader of Guinea's strongest union, the CGT *(Confederation Generale du Travail)*. In 1947 the Democractic Party of Guinea (PDG) was founded as a section of the new interterritorial African Democratic Rally (RDA). This gave Touré and his associates a political instrument which reached beyond the town-centered membership of the unions to the general population.

The RDA broke with the Communists in 1950, and Touré, as head of the PDG, asserted the inapplicability of the Marxist class struggle doctrine to Africa and the necessity of freeing the movement of any vestige of European control. Six years later the unions, under Touré's leadership, withdrew from the CGT to organize a purely African confederation. In the elections of 1957 the PDG won 58 of the 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly. It played the leading role in Guinea's decision in 1958 to reject participation in the proposed French Community.

Guinea became an independent republic in 1958, the only French colony to vote against community status. Sékou Touré and the PDG have remained in power since independence.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution established a presidential system within the framework of a strongly centralized republican form of government. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a 7-year term and selects his own Cabinet. A National Assembly of 150 members is elected for a 5-year term.

Actual administration of the country is carried out by a highly centralized regional administration, with a parallel structure for the party (PDG) and the government. The country is divided into 33 Regions, each headed by a presidentially appointed governor. This is matched by 34 PDG Regional Federations. There are 170 administrative *arrondissements* and the same number of PDG "sections." Several hundred Party-State Local Revolutionary Powers (PRLs) of 7 members each exercise considerable authority.

Principal Government Officials

President; Secretary General of PDG—Ahmed Sékou Touré
Prime Minister—Dr. Louis Lansana Béavogui
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Fily Cissoko
Minister of Economic Development and Financial Domain—Ismael Touré
Ambassador to the U.S.—Habib Bah
Ambassador to the U.N.—vacant

Guinea maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2112 Leroy Place, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

In practice, Guinea is governed by one political party, the PDG, which celebrated its 29th anniversary on May 14, 1976. Decisions by the party's National Political Bureau guide the formulation of government policy. The President, Sékou Touré (reelected for a third 7-year term in January 1975), is Secretary General of the Party and Chairman of the National Political Bureau.

Democracy is held to be achieved through operation of the party itself. According to the theory of "democratic centralism," every Guinean can, through membership in his local PDG section, feed his suggestions and opinions into the party machine. In the National Political Bureau, the will of the people, as expressed through the party organizations, is said to be translated into policy which in turn is implemented through the party machine. Periodic party congresses also serve to provide a forum for expression. In pursuit of its policy of African socialism, the PDG and the government maintain stringent controls over all aspects of economic and social life. On the international level, the government is receptive to private investors and has accepted grants, loans, and technical assistance from Communist as well as Western nations.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Basic tropical clothing, including rainwear from May to Oct., is appropriate.

Customs—Visas and valid smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera vaccinations are required. Guinean currency may not be imported or exported. All payments must be made in Guinean sylis.

Health—Sanitation is fair. Tap water is not potable. Tetanus, typhoid, and typhus shots are recommended.

Telecommunications—Long-distance telephone calls can be made, but service is unreliable. Telegraph service is costly and often delayed.

Transportation—Air Afrique, Air Zaire, Sabena, Aeroflot, and Air Algeria operate through Conakry to Europe. Air Guinea operates regional flights. Schedules change on short notice occasionally, and last-minute checks are advisable.

ECONOMY

Guinea's mineral wealth (including about one-fourth of the world reserves of high-grade bauxite, over 2 billion tons of high-grade iron ore, and significant diamond deposits), its capacity for hydroelectric power development, agriculture, and fishing make its economy potentially one of the

strongest in Africa. Possibilities for foreign investment and commercial activities exist in all of these areas.

The government enacted a private investment law in 1972. It wants to attract foreign investment on a scale which will allow for exploiting its resources, particularly iron ore, on mutually advantageous terms (along the lines of the Boké bauxite project agreement) and which will result in developing its regional infrastructure, both power sources and transportation. The United States and Guinea have an investment guaranty agreement.

Joint venture bauxite/alumina operations in northwest Guinea provide the principal source of foreign exchange. The FRIGUIA consortium, 49 percent owned by the government and 51 percent by an international consortium, produces 640,000 tons of alumina annually. The *Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée* (CBG) produced 7.1 million tons of bauxite in 1975 and should reach its planned production of 9 million tons by 1976. The *Office des Bauxites de Kindia* (OBK) produced 1.8 million tons in 1975, all exported to the U.S.S.R. OBK began operations in 1974; plans call for an eventual annual production of 2.5 million tons. Two other bauxite/alumina development agreements were initialed in late 1974 and early 1975 which, if developed, would have project start-up costs of over $2 billion. Total foreign investment in Guinea exceeds $600 million, of which about $150 million is U.S. private investment.

Outside of mixed companies, such as the bauxite/alumina operations, and small privately owned retail trading and transport businesses, the economy is state-owned and -operated. Public utilities, financial institutions, and import/export and distribution agencies have all been nationalized.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guinea professes a policy of nonalignment, balancing close ties with most Communist states and good relations with some Western powers, including the United States. It reestablished relations with France and the F.R.G. in 1975. Relations with Israel remain broken. Ideological differences affect its relations with neighboring Ivory Coast and Senegal. During the Angola dispute, Guinea was one of the foremost advocates of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

On November 22, 1970, skirmishes of undisclosed origin caused casualties and some physical damage to Conakry. A U.N. factfinding mission, sent to Guinea on November 23, reported that elements of the Portuguese armed forces had participated in the attack. Apprehension over the possibility of future incursions of this nature was a significant feature of Guinea's foreign policy and domestic security for a number of years.

Economic cooperation is a major element in Guinea's foreign relations. Organizationally, separate State Committees are responsible for economic cooperation between Guinea and six geographic regions of the world.

U.S.-GUINEA RELATIONS

The United States seeks to promote closer relations with the Guineans and to identify and develop common interests. The U.S. encourages regional economic development and private U.S. investment.

From independence through 1971, the United States assisted Guinea's economic development with an AID program that amounted to almost $100 million. It consisted of agricultural commodities, transportation equipment, machinery, and technical assistance. A P.L. 480 Food for Peace program continues, and AID operations, most of which were suspended in 1971, resumed in 1976 with an agricultural development and training project.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William C. Harrop
Deputy Chief of Mission—Edward A. Mainland

The address of the U.S. Embassy is B.P. 603, Conakry, Guinea.

READING LIST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8057, Revised August 1976

APPENDIX R
IVORY COAST
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, June 1976 (Publication 8119)]

background notes

Ivory Coast

department of state * june 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Ivory Coast

GEOGRAPHY

Ivory Coast is located on the south side of the African bulge. It is bounded on the north by Upper Volta and Mali, on the east by Ghana, on the west by Liberia and Guinea, and on the south by a 340-mile coastline on the Gulf of Guinea. Heavy surf and a lack of natural harbors, dense tropical forest, and a paucity of gold discouraged early European voyagers. They continued east and established forts on the Gold Coast (now Ghana).

Ivory Coast is fringed by a series of coastal lagoons on the southeast. Here lies the capital city of Abidjan, the commercial and population center of the country. Abidjan is the terminus of the 716-mile railway that connects Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, with the Gulf of Guinea. Early 20th-century attempts to dig a canal through the sand bar that blocked the Ebrié lagoon from the sea were unsuccessful, but in 1950 the Vridi Canal, begun in 1936, was completed. The canal opened the port of Abidjan to deep-draft vessels, and traffic increased by 50 percent almost immediately. A second deepwater port, San Pedro, in the western part of the country, was dedicated in 1972 and will greatly accelerate development of that relatively virgin area.

Dense forest in the western half of the country extends to the sea. Scrub savanna covers a narrow strip stretching from Fresco in the approximate center of the coastline eastward to the Ghana frontier. Lush tropical forest extends inland to a line about halfway between Dimbokro and Bouaké. There the significant cash crops—coffee, cocoa, tropical woods, bananas—are grown. North of the forest lies an inland savanna zone of sandy soils, where the vegetation is sparse and the landscape unbroken. Only the Guinea Highlands in the northwest, which rise 4,800 feet above sea level, break the monotony of the inland plain.

Southern Ivory Coast falls within a tropical climatic zone. It has a narrow daily range of temperature (73°-80°F); humidity averages 84 percent throughout the year, and the heavy annual rainfall averages 80-120 inches. The principal rainy season extends from mid-May to mid-July.

PEOPLE

Ivory Coast contains more than 60 ethnic groups, usually classified into seven principal divisions—Akan, Krou,

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 124,500 sq. mi. (slightly larger than N. Mex.). CAPITAL: Abidjan (pop. 500,000). OTHER CITIES: Bouaké, Gagnoa.

People

POPULATION: 6.2 million (1975). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.8% (1973). DENSITY: 36 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Over 60. RELIGIONS: 63% animist, 25% Muslim, 12% Christian. LANGUAGES: French (official), tribal dialects. LITERACY: 20%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 43 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: Aug. 7, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Nov. 3, 1960.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*—Supreme Court (with 4 Chambers: constitutional, judicial, administrative, auditing).

POLITICAL PARTY: Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 21. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 25 Departments.

FLAG: Three vertical bands of orange, green, and white.

Economy

GDP: $3.7 billion (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 7% (1970-74 avg. in constant prices). PER CAPITA INCOME: $602. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 16% (1970-74 avg. in current prices).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 52%. *Labor* 85%. *Products*—coffee, cocoa, timber, bananas.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 14%. *Products*—construction, food, textiles, shoes, metals.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, iron ore.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*—$1.23 billion: coffee, cocoa, other agricultural products. *Partners*—France, US $86 million, EC. *Imports*—$976 million: semifinished products, raw materials and fuels, consumer goods. *Partners*—EC, France, US $67 million.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Approx. 220 CFA francs=US$1 (floats with French franc).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$506 million (1945-75): France, EC, others. *US only*—$35.8 million (1945-75).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), West African Economic Community (CEAO), Common African, Malagasy and Mauritius Organization (OCAM), Council of the Entente, EC (associate member), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Communauté Financiére Africaine.



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Lagoon, Nuclear Mandé, Peripheral Mandé, Sénoufo, and Lobi. The Baoulé, in the Akan division, is the largest subgroup with about 765,000 members. They live in the central part of the country around the city of Bouaké. Most of the principal divisions have their centers in one of the neighboring countries.

Non-Ivorian Africans living in Ivory Coast are estimated at about 1 million, including 500,000 Upper Voltans and 200,000 each from Mali and Guinea. About 50,000 non-Africans live in the country.

In 1960, 22 percent of school-age children attended classes, and in 1972, 52% attended.

HISTORY

The early history of Ivory Coast is virtually unknown, although it is thought that a neolithic culture existed there. France made its initial contact with Ivory Coast in 1637 when missionaries landed at Assini near the Gold Coast border. Early contacts were limited to a few missionaries because of the inhospitable coastline and fear of the inhabitants.

In the 18th century the country was invaded by two related ethnic groups—the Agnis who occupied the southeast and the Baoulés who settled in the central section of the country. In 1843-44 Adm. Bouet-Williaumez signed treaties with the kings of the Grand-Bassam and Assini regions, placing their territories under a French protectorate. French explorers, missionaries, trading companies, and soldiers gradually extended the area under French control inland from the lagoon region. However, pacification of the country was not accomplished until 1915.

French Period

Ivory Coast officially became a French Colony in 1893. Capt. Binger, who had explored the Gold Coast frontier, was named the first Governor. He negotiated boundary treaties with Liberia and the United Kingdom (for the Gold Coast) and later started the campaign against Almany Samory, a Malinké chief who waged war against the French until 1898.

From 1904 to 1958 Ivory Coast was a constituent unit of the Federation of French West Africa (now Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Benin, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast). It was a Colony under the Third French Republic and an Overseas Territory under the Fourth Republic. Until after World War II governmental affairs in French West Africa were administered from Paris through Governors General and territorial governors. The philosophy of French policy in West Africa was mainly one of "association," which meant that all Africans in Ivory Coast were officially French "subjects" without rights to representation in Africa or France.

A harsh and racially conscious Vichy regime remained in control until 1943 when members of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's provisional government assumed control of all French West Africa. The Brazzaville conference in 1944, the first Constituent Assembly of the Fourth Republic in 1946, and the memory of the loyalty to Free France displayed by Africans during World War II led to far-reaching governmental reforms in 1946. French citizenship was granted to all African "subjects," the right to organize politically was recognized, and various forms of forced labor were abolished.

After World War II Félix Houphouët-Boigny was elected by a narrow margin to the first Constituent Assembly. He represented Ivory Coast in the French National Assembly from 1946 to 1959 and devoted much of his efforts to interterritorial political organization and amelioration of labor conditions, until a turning point was reached in relations with France with the Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) of 1956. This act transferred to elected territorial governments in French West Africa a number of powers previously reserved for metropolitan administrators and removed remaining voting inequalities.

Independence

In December 1958 Ivory Coast became an autonomous republic within the French Community as a result of the September referendum that brought community status to all the members of the old Federation of French West Africa except Guinea (which voted against association). Ivory Coast became independent August 7, 1960, and thereafter permitted its community membership to lapse.

The contemporary political history of Ivory Coast is closely associated with the career of one man: Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Republic and leader of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), the only political party in the country. He was one of the founders of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), the leading pre-independence interterritorial political party in French West Africa. The RDA established constituent units in all the French West African territories (except Mauritania) as well as in the Congo (Brazzaville), Chad, Gabon, and Cameroon.

Houphouët-Boigny first came to national political prominence in 1944 as founder of the Syndicat Agricole Africain, an organization that won improved labor conditions for African farmers and formed a nucleus for the PDCI. After his 13-year service in the French National Assembly, including almost 3 years as a minister in the French Government, he became Ivory Coast's first Prime Minister in April 1959 and the following year was elected its first President.

Houphouët-Boigny reinforced his position as a dominant figure in West Africa by leading Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, and Dahomey (now

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Summer clothing is appropriate year round. Umbrellas and light raincoats are useful during the rainy season.

Customs—Visas are required for entry and for travel to neighboring West African countries. If no Ivorian representation exists in a country where the visa is sought, it may be obtained from a French Consulate.

Vaccinations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are required. Ivorian officials abroad generally verify that shots have been obtained before issuing an entry visa.

Health—Incidence of disease in Ivory Coast is higher than in the US. Health risks can be minimized by proper shots, food preparation, and strict sanitary and hygienic practices. Avoid tap water.

Telecommunications—Local phone service is adequate, and international calls can be placed through Paris 24 hours a day. International telegraph service is reliable, but service within the country is sometimes erratic.

Transportation—Weekly flights are available from New York to Abidjan's Port Bouet Airport. Air Ivoire serves the country's principal cities, and small planes are available for charter. Air fares are quite expensive. The railroad runs between Abidjan and Ouagadougou, Upper Volta.

Most Abidjan roads are paved, and several fine macadam roads lead to major towns within 300 kilometers of the capital. All unpaved roads are dusty during the dry season and slippery and treacherous during the rainy season. Heavy-duty vehicles are essential for trips into the more isolated areas. Third-party liability insurance is mandatory. Metered taxis, with low fares, and rental cars are available.

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Benin) into the Council of the Entente in May 1959. (Togo joined in 1966.) He has maintained that the only true road to African solidarity is through step-by-step economic and political cooperation with recognition of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other African states.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution provides for a strong presidency within the framework of a separation of powers. The executive is personified by the president, elected for a 5-year term by universal adult suffrage. He is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, may negotiate and ratify certain treaties, and may submit a bill to a national referendum or to the National Assembly. The Cabinet is selected by the President from outside the National Assembly and is responsible to him.

The unicameral National Assembly is composed of 120 members elected by direct universal suffrage for a 5-year term concurrent with the President. It passes on legislation introduced by its own members or by the President.

The judicial system culminates in a Supreme Court. There is a High Court of Justice competent to try government officials for high crimes.

For administrative purposes Ivory Coast is divided into 25 Departments, each headed by a prefect appointed by the central government.

Principal Government Officials

President—Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Ministers of State—Auguste Denise, Loua Diomande, Nanlo Bamba
Minister of State for Interior—Mathieu Ekra
Minister of State for Public Health—Jean-Baptiste Mokey

Ministers

Justice, Keeper of the Seals—Camille Alliali
Foreign Affairs—Arsène Assouan Usher
Defense and Civic Services—Kouadio M'Bahia Blé
Economy and Finance—Henri Konan Bedié
Construction and Urbanism—Alexis Thierry-Lebbé
Plan—Mohamed Diawara
Agriculture—Abdoulaye Sawadogo
Scientific Research—Jean Guédé Lorougnon
Technical Instruction and Professional Training—Ange Barry-Battesti
National Education—Paul Akoto-Yao
Commerce—Maurice Seri-Gnoleba
Public Works and Transport—Desire Boni
Animal Production—Dicoh Garba
Labor—Albert Vanie-Bi-Tra
Youth, Popular Education and Sports—Etienne Ahin
Information—Laurent Dona-Fologo
Budget—Abdoulaye Kone
Mines—Paul Gui-Dibo
Water and Forests—Koffi Attobra
Primary Education and Educational Television—Pascal Dikebie N'Guessan
Cultural Affairs—Jules Hié-Neá
Internal Security—Gaston Ouassenan Koné
Cooperation—Clement Kaul-Meledgé
Posts and Telecommunications—Bangali Koné
Maritime Affairs—Lamine Fadiga
Civil Service—Kei Boguinard
Women's Affairs—Jeanne Gervais
Tourism—Ibrahima Koné
Social Affairs—Alphonse Yao-Kouman
Conservation—Francois Dacoury Tabley
National Assembly Relations—Emile Brou
Ambassador to the U.S.—Timothée N'Guetta Ahoua
Ambassador to the U.N.—Siméon Ake

Ivory Coast maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2424 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Ivory Coast has enjoyed relative political stability since independence. President Houphouet-Boigny presided over a reconciliation ceremony in May 1971 with persons alleged to have been involved in plotting against the state in 1963. A coup plot organized by a few junior military officers was uncovered in mid-1973, and 14 plotters were quickly tried by a military tribunal. The President, a moderate leader with considerable stature in Africa, has used the novel approach of direct personal dialogue in public with representatives of various segments of Ivorian society. The PDCI, the single ruling party, includes most elements of the country's political life and serves as a forum for deciding policy matters and an instrument for insuring the application of government policies. The latest Presidential and National Assembly elections were held in November 1975.

ECONOMY

Ivory Coast's predominantly agricultural economy is one of Africa's most prosperous. Agricultural activities dominate the traditional and cash

sectors of the economy, accounting for 60 percent of the total production. Four categories of agricultural crops account for some 74 percent of the country's export earnings—coffee, cocoa (Ivory Coast is the world's third largest producer of both), tropical woods, and bananas. Dependence on this limited range of export goods is steadily lessening, as the government encourages production of palm oil, rice, pineapple, coconut, rubber, and sugar. Agricultural production doubled in the past decade.

Ivory Coast's industrial sector has been enjoying phenomenal growth, nearly quadrupling since independence in 1960. To date, industrial expansion has relied largely on import substitution and agricultural processing, but economic planners are thinking increasingly in terms of creating industries oriented primarily to export markets.

Current mineral production is limited to diamonds. However, a U.S. company has an iron ore concession near Man which is expected to lead to a multimillion dollar investment. Small deposits of gold and tantalite exist but are not commercially exploitable. There is currently offshore exploration for oil.

Ivory Coast's currency is the franc issued by the Communauté Financiere Africaine, a financial grouping of 13 African countries associated with France. The CFA franc is fully convertible with the French franc.

Ivory Coast normally enjoys large favorable balances of trade. France accounts for the largest share of foreign commerce, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.

The government welcomes foreign private investment, and numerous U.S. firms have established offices at Abidjan.

Economic Development

Ivory Coast's economy has benefited from a rapid pace of development since 1950, beginning with the opening of the Vridi Canal, which made Abidjan a deepwater port. After independence, Ivory Coast's leaders decided to follow a policy of economic liberalism, based on a fundamental belief in private enterprise. The policy has been faithfully followed and periodically reemphasized, with the accent increasingly placed on the need for participation of Ivorian capital in new enterprises, the active promotion of Ivorian-owned enterprises, and the rapid "Ivorianization" of management and employment.

When Ivory Coast became an Overseas Territory under the Fourth French Republic, it benefited from the French overseas development fund—FIDES (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development). Between 1947 and 1957 FIDES granted $109 million to Ivory Coast for development. The country has continued to benefit from considerable French assistance and receives important aid from the European Development Fund of the European Community.

Ivory Coast adopted its third 5-year development plan covering the period 1971-75. The plan called for more than $900 million in public investment. Requiring only $80 million in foreign aid, the plan devoted about 70 percent of the total investment to economic infrastructure and agricultural development and the remainder to social and cultural improvement. It was designed to maintain a real growth rate of 7.7 percent, to promote "Ivorianization," and to achieve "a true transformation in the conditions of existence."

Public organizations, as well as private firms, have found Abidjan well situated as a headquarters for their activities in the region. Among others located at the city are the West African office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the multinational Air Afrique.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Ivory Coast's foreign policy has had an orientation which has been generally favorable toward the West. It broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in May 1969 and reaffirmed its strongly anti-Communist stance. Ivory Coast became a member of the United Nations in 1960 and participates in most of its specialized agencies.

The Houphouët-Boigny government has favored a step-by-step approach to the question of African unity rather than broad proposals for early continental union. A member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Ivory Coast maintains close ties with its French-speaking neighbors in the Council of the Entente. The Entente countries continue to cooperate closely to harmonize their economic policies and promote regional economic development.

The President's belief in discussion among opposing parties has been manifested since November 1970 in his call for a dialogue between black Africa and South Africa. He believes that black Africa will not succeed in changing South African policies through the use of force, whereas it may be possible to change South African attitudes through meaningful dialogue. His proposal has met a very mixed reception from other African states.

U.S.-IVORY COAST RELATIONS

U.S.-Ivorian relations are friendly and close. The United States is sympathetic to Ivory Coast's program of rapid, orderly economic development and to its moderate stance on international issues.

Bilateral U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funding, with the exception of self-help funds, has been phased out and replaced by regional AID projects, such as those concerned with road construction and maintenance and livestock production and marketing. About 100 Peace Corps volunteers in Ivory Coast are engaged primarily in education, construction, and agriculture.

The United States and Ivory Coast maintain an active cultural exchange program whereby prominent Ivorian government officials, media representatives, educators, and scholars visit the United States to become better acquainted with the American people and to exchange ideas and views with their American colleagues. This cooperative effort in mutual understanding is furthered through frequent visits to Ivory Coast by representatives of American business and educational institutions, as well as by visits of Fulbright-Hays scholars and specialists in a variety of fields.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–Robert S. Smith
Counselor of Embassy–Goodwin Cooke
Political Officer–Donald J. McConnell
Economic/Commercial Officer–John P. Crawford
Director, AID Regional Development–Miles Wedeman
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)–Sherman Ross
Director, Peace Corps–Donna Soso

The U.S. Embassy in Ivory Coast is located at Rue Jesse Owens, Abidjan.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8119, Revised June 1976

APPENDIX S
KENYA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, October 1975 (Publication 8024)]

background notes

Kenya

department of state * october 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Kenya

GEOGRAPHY

Kenya, on the east coast of Africa, is bounded on the north by Ethiopia and Sudan, on the south by Tanzania, on the west by Uganda and Lake Victoria, and on the east by Somalia and the Indian Ocean.

Positioned on the Equator, Kenya is a country of striking topographical and climatic variety. The northern three-fifths is arid and almost waterless. The region north of the winding Tana River rises gradually to the southern mountains of Ethiopia. South of the Tana River, the only part of Kenya that is tropical, the coastline is hot and humid. Thornbush scrubland reaches about 175 miles inland from the coast.

The Great Rift Valley, extending south from Lake Rudolf in the west, is from 30 to 40 miles wide and often 2,000 to 3,000 feet lower than the surrounding country. Mt. Kenya (17,040 feet high) and Mt. Elgon (14,000 feet high) are in the Aberdare Mountains and Mau Escarpment of the Great Rift. High, sweeping plateaus, varying in altitude from 3,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level, stretch between the mountain ranges and have some of Africa's most fertile soil. The land gradually descends from the western rift formation to the shores of Lake Victoria. Eighty-five percent of the population and almost all economic activity are centered in the southern two-fifths of the country.

The capital city of Nairobi has become a hub of communications, commercial, and industrial activities in East Africa. It is the starting point for many of the safaris for which Kenya and the entire surrounding region are world famous. Adorned with flowering trees and shrubs, beautiful homes, and public buildings, Nairobi calls itself the "City in the Sun." The port of Mombasa receives ships from all over the world, as well as visitors from all parts of East Africa and the Indian Ocean Basin.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 224,900 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex.). CAPITAL: Nairobi (pop. 750,000). OTHER CITIES: Mombasa (334,000), Nakuru (50,000), Kisumu (35,000).

People

POPULATION: 13.4 million (mid-1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.4% (1975). DENSITY: 57 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Of the African population, Kikuyu 20%, Luo 15%, Baihya 13%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 5%; of the 282,000 non-Africans, Asians, Europeans, Arabs. RELIGIONS: Of the African population, animist 38%, Protestant 37%, Roman Catholic 22%, Muslim 3%. LANGUAGES: English, Swahili and many other African languages. LITERACY: 25%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 51 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: December 12, 1963. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1963 (amended 1965, 1967).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State, Head of Government, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces). *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly (Parliament). *Judicial*–High Court, various lower courts, Court of Appeal for East Africa.

POLITICAL PARTY: Kenya African National Union (KANU). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 40 rural Districts, joined together to form 8 rural Provinces. Nairobi area has special status.

FLAG: Black, red, and green horizontal stripes from top to bottom, separated by narrow white bands. A warrior's shield and crossed spears are centered on the flag.

Economy

GDP: $2.3 billion (1974, current prices). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.6% (1974); 7% average (1964-73). PER CAPITA GDP: $181 (current prices).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 10%. *Labor* 31%. *Products*–corn, wheat, rice, sugarcane, coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, meat and its products, hides, skins.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 13%. *Products*–petroleum products, cement, beer.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Wildlife, land.

TRADE: *Exports*–$611.5 million (1974 f.o.b.): petroleum products, coffee, tea, sisal, meat, cement. *Partners*–East African Community (EAC), UK, FRG, Netherlands, Zambia. *Imports*–$1.026 billion (1974 c.i.f.): machinery, crude oil, motor vehicles, chemicals, consumer products. *Partners*–UK, Japan, Iran, FRG, Saudi Arabia.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 7.1428 K Sh (Kenya Shillings)=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$1.12 billion (est. through 1973). *US only*–$125 million (FY 1954-75): grants and loans.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, EAC, OAU, Commonwealth of Nations.


KENYA
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
UGANDA
SOMALIA
TANZANIA
INDIAN OCEAN
Administrative boundary
Mega
LAKE RUDOLF
Turkwel
Marsabit
Wajir
Bardera
Soroti
Suam
Kitale
Lake Baringo
Eldoret
Kakamega
Butere
Thomsons Falls
Solai
Isiolo
Nanyuki
Kisumu
Nakuru
Nyeri
Embu
Garissa
Tana
LAKE VICTORIA
Thika
NAIROBI
Athi
Lake Magadi
Magadi
Musoma
Lake Natron
Tsavo
Galana
Arusha
Moshi
Voi
Malindi
Mombasa
Mkomazi
PEMBA I.
Tanga
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

517844 10-75

Kenya generally has two rainy seasons, the "long rains" from April to June and the "short rains" from October to December; however, in the high areas west of the Rift Valley and north of the railway the wettest months are April-August. With the exception of the coast and the immediate interior, where the average temperature is about 80°F, Kenya's climate is cool and invigorating due to its altitude. At Nairobi the mean temperature is 67°F, the mean maximum being 77°F and the mean minimum 57°F.

PEOPLE

The majority of the Kenyan Africans are farmers; most do some cash cropping as well as subsistence agriculture. Of the estimated 282,000 non-Africans in Kenya, the Asians are engaged primarily in marketing, distribution, and transportation; the Europeans in large-scale farming, business, the professions, and public services; and the Arabs in trading.

HISTORY

Dr. Louis B. Leakey, members of his family, and others have found bone and skull fragments and stone tools which indicate that protohumans were roaming the area that is now East Africa over 2 million years ago. Kenya's history is a story of the movements of various linguistic groups and subgroups of Africa. Cushitic, Bantu, and Nilotic-speaking peoples migrated to the area at various times and in different numbers. These movements were largely inland from the coast. The coastal region was visited by the Arabs at an early date; its proximity to Saudi Arabia invited colonization as long ago as the 8th century. The Arabs were followed seven centuries later by the Portuguese, then by the British.

Until East Africa was partitioned among the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885, much of the coast was under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Trade at the principal ports was controlled by British and Indian merchants during this period. Later, Germany acquired concessions in the region. A series of frontier agreements concluded between 1886 and 1893 fixed the boundaries of the respective East African spheres of influence of Germany and the United Kingdom.

In 1887 the Sultan of Zanzibar granted to what later became the Imperial British East African Company a 50-year concession covering his mainland possessions not falling within the German sphere, with the exception of a 10-mile-wide coastal strip called the Protectorate. In 1895 the British Government purchased the company's rights and appointed a commissioner to the area, thereafter designated the East Africa Protectorate. The name was changed to Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1920.

In 1907 a nominated Legislative Council was established, and in 1919 the selection of most of its members was placed on an elective basis. Until 1944, when the first African was nominated to the Legislative Council, Africans had no direct participation in the central government's legislative or executive institutions. The first direct elections for Africans, under a restricted multi-vote franchise, occurred in 1957. From October 1952 to December 1959 Kenya was under a state of emergency arising from the Mau Mau rebellion against British colonial rule.

Partly because of the emergency and partly because of the important political role played by the European settlers, Kenya's constitutional development eventually was to lag behind that of its East African neighbors. Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Uganda became independent in 1961 and 1962, respectively; Kenya did not achieve independence until December 12, 1963.

Moreover, the internal political quarrels and tribal distrust that have long plagued the country's politics made cooperation among African politicians exceedingly difficult. The vexing constitutional issues were not finally settled until early March 1963. The complicated constitution established a quasi-federal system under which regional, and even local, governments had considerable powers. In this latter respect the constitution reflected the small tribes' fears of domination by the Kikuyu and Luo, Kenya's two largest tribes.

After its overwhelming victory in the May 1963 elections, the majority political party, the Kenya African Na-

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Light- and medium-weight clothing is worn most of the year. Sweaters and light raincoats are needed during the rainy season.

Customs—US citizens entering Kenya need a passport, visa, and up-to-date health certificates showing immunizations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera.

Health—Modern public health measures in Nairobi and a pleasant climate reduce the risk of contracting tropical diseases. Outside the capital, take the usual precautions and avoid tap water and unwashed fruits and vegetables. In Nairobi hospitals are acceptable for most problems, and physicians are available for most specialties. Most medications are available at pharmacies.

Telecommunications—Nairobi telephone service is adequate; long-distance service is available throughout East Africa and there is excellent service via satellite to the US. Telegraphic service to all parts of the world is fair.

Transportation—The normal and practical way to reach East Africa is by air—either on one of the direct flights via West Africa or with one change via a choice of European cities, with stopovers normally permitted in either direction. For travel within Kenya, rental or chauffeur-driven cars may be hired. (Kenya has left-hand drive.) Visitors do not generally use local country or urban buses, but some of the intercity buses are quite acceptable and relatively cheap. There are both metered and nonmetered taxis. If a cab has no meter the price should be agreed on with the driver before starting out.

The main railway line spans the country from east to west and, with a number of branch lines, links most of the towns. The leisurely overnight mail trains between Nairobi and Mombasa provide excellent sleeping and catering facilities. All major towns are linked by internal air services operated by East African Airways, while places of special tourist interest are served by regular flights of local light-aircraft companies. All game areas have airfields. For many areas, especially the remoter parks and places of interest, air charter may be the most convenient way to travel.

READING LIST

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Kenyatta, Jomo. *Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963-1964.* Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964.

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tional Union (KANU), formed a new government headed by Jomo Kenyatta, and Kenya began full internal self-government. Several months later KANU demanded and received certain modifications in the constitution which strengthened the central government's powers, especially over the police and the sivil service. This modified document became the Constitution for Kenya when it received its independence. On December 12, 1964, Kenya became a Republic within the Commonwealth of Nations.

GOVERNMENT

The President is elected by the National Assembly to serve a 5-year term. However, if he dissolves the Assembly during his term, a new presidential election must be held. The President appoints the members of the Cabinet—the Vice President and heads of various ministries—from among those elected to the Assembly.

The unicameral National Assembly consists of 158 members, elected to a term of up to 5 years, plus 12 who are chosen by the elected members. In addition the Attorney General is an ex officio member of the National Assembly.

The judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and at least 11 Puisne Judges, all appointed by the President.

The basic local administrative divisions are the 40 rural Districts, each headed by a Commissioner appointed by the President. The Districts are joined together to form eight rural Provinces. The Nairobi area is not included in any District or Province but has a special status of its own. The administration of Districts and Provinces is closely supervised by the central government.

Principal Government Officials

President—Jomo Kenyatta
Vice President; Minister for Home Affairs—Daniel arap Moi

Other Ministers

Defense—James S. Gichuru
Foreign Affairs—Munyua Waiyaki
Minister of State—Mbiyu Koinange
Finance and Planning—Mwai Kibaki
Local Government—Paul J. Ngei
Labor—James Nyamweya
Attorney General—Charles Njonjo
Commerce and Industry—J. Gikonyo Kiano
Power and Communications—Issak E. Omolo Okero
Agriculture—Jeremiah J. M. Nyagah
East African Community Minister for Economic Affairs—Robert J. Ouko
Ambassador to the U.S.—Vacant
Ambassador to the U.N.—Charles Maina

Kenya maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2249 R St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Upon independence Jomo Kenyatta, the head of KANU, became Prime Minister. The country joined the Commonwealth of Nations, thus recognizing the British Queen, who was represented by a Governor General, as Chief of State. When Kenya became a Republic in 1964, the office of Governor General was abolished; Kenyatta became President and Chief of State, and A. Oginga Odinga was named Vice President. In November 1964 the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), dissolved itself, and its members joined KANU.

The dissolution of KADU, which had been supported largely by the smaller tribes and was based on a regional or federal concept of government, was followed in 1965 by a constitutional amendment which eliminated the regional assemblies. These had been created by the Constitution in order to provide some autonomy to the country's regions. Under the Constitution Amendments Act of 1965 the power of these assemblies was drastically reduced and their name changed to Provincial Councils. The Provincial Councils, in turn, were abolished in June 1968.

In April 1966 KANU split when Oginga Odinga resigned from the party and as Vice President of Kenya. He then formed an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), of which he became president. Several members of the Senate and the House of Representatives also resigned to join KPU, although some of them later changed their minds. Under the terms of an amendment to the Constitution, they were made to stand for reelection in June 1966, while those whose allegiance had not wavered were not required to do so. At this "little general election" KPU won 7 House and 2 Senate seats, while KANU

rates the traditional East African common functions; formally establishes a common market, or customs union, which began in 1927 under informal arrangements; and adds the services of the East African Development Bank and a European Economic Community (Common Market) Tribunal.

The EAC is headed by a triumvirate consisting of the Presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda who form the East African Authority, the chief policymaking body. With the establishment of the EAC, the portfolio of East African Minister was created for each country. The three Ministers are responsible for the daily policy decisions of the EAC under the overall direction of the East African Authority.

The services administered by the EAC may be divided into those financed by the General Fund (Customs and Excise Department, Civil Aviation, Meteorological Department, and various research organizations) and the financially independent, or "self-contained," corporations (Railway Corp.; Harbors Corp.; Posts and Telecommunications Corp.; and Airways Corp.).

While the headquarters of all principal units of the East African Common Services Organization were at Nairobi, under the EAC two of the six major headquarters are located in each country.

The Treaty for East African Cooperation contains a provision for the EAC members to negotiate with other countries who desire to associate with the EAC or to participate in any of its activities. As of mid-1975 the EAC member states were engaged in a full-scale review of the treaty.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Kenya's foreign policy is based on these principles: (a) nonalignment, (b) promotion of African unity, including self-determination for the peoples of southern Africa, (c) support for the principles of the U.N. Charter, and (d) support for international economic policies which will lead to an increased flow of resources and transfer of technology to the developing nations.

Kenya enjoys good relations with neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia despite differing political systems. However, a dispute arose in 1964 with the Somali Democratic Republic over the 275,000 ethnic Somalis who inhabit Kenya's Northeast Province. Somalia urged self-determination for the people of the area, while Kenya refused to consider any steps which might threaten its territorial integrity. In October 1967 the two countries recognized the need to restore peaceful relations, and relations have improved.

U.S.-KENYA RELATIONS

U.S.-Kenya relations are warm and friendly. About 4,900 U.S. citizens reside in Kenya, and more than 42,000 Americans visited there in 1973. The resident U.S. community includes some 1,100 missionaries and their families. In addition, about 140 U.S. firms are represented in Kenya with an investment totaling more than $200 million, primarily in commerce, light manufacturing, and the tourist industry.

The current program of U.S. bilateral assistance to Kenya is directed primarily toward development of the agricultural sector, with particular focus on the small farmer. The major form of assistance is a series of annual sector loans. Technical assistance grant projects are currently underway in such areas as veterinary medicine, agricultural credit, livestock production, and rural development. The USAID program also includes participation in a multilateral effort to assist Kenya in instituting a national population/family planning program. The United States has an active Peace Corps program in Kenya. Volunteers are concentrating their efforts in agriculture and education. The U.S. Information Service (USIS) maintains a library at Nairobi and engages in an active program throughout the country. The United States also supports Kenyan economic development through assistance to activities carried out by the EAC.

Each year the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Kenya Government, invites prominent government officials, media representatives, educators, and scholars to visit the United States to become better acquainted with the American people and to exchange ideas and views of mutual interest with their American colleagues. This cooperative effort in mutual understanding is furthered through frequent visits to Kenya by representatives of American business and educational institutions, as well as by visits of Fulbright-Hays scholars and specialists in a variety of fields.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Anthony D. Marshall
Deputy Chief of Mission—Ralph E. Lindstrom
Director, U.S. AID Mission—Charles J. Nelson
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Richard G. Cushing

The U.S. Embassy in Kenya is located on the 6th floor of Cotts House on Wabera Street, Nairobi, P.O. Box 30137.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8024, Revised October 1975

APPENDIX T
LESOTHO
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, January 1975 (Publication 8091)]

background notes

Lesotho

department of state * january 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Lesotho

GEOGRAPHY

Lesotho *(le-soo-too)* is an enclave located within the east-central part of the Republic of South Africa. The only country in the world entirely surrounded by another, it is bounded on the north and west by the Orange Free State Province, on the south by Cape Province, and on the east by the Natal Province.

About one-fourth of the western sector is lowland country, varying from 5,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. This is the main agricultural zone. The rest of the country is comprised of highlands that rise to 11,000 feet in the Drakensberg Range which forms the eastern boundary with Natal. Lesotho's mountains form part of the major watershed of the Republic of South Africa.

Rainfall is variable and averages about 28 inches a year over most of the country. Most of it falls from October to April, but normally no month has less than half an inch. In the lowlands the temperature varies from 90°F or more in summer to 20°F in winter. The range in the highlands is much wider and temperatures sometimes dip below zero.

PEOPLE

The people of Lesotho—the Basotho—live mostly in the southwest.

Much of the working force is employed from 3 to 9 months a year in South Africa in mining, farming, or industry. At any given time an estimated 200,000 workers are absent from Lesotho. The remaining work force is employed primarily in subsistence agriculture and raising livestock.

The main campus of the regional University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland is situated at Roma, some 20 miles from Maseru.

The Basotho are a relatively religious people. Most Christians are Roman Catholic; however, the Lesotho Evangelical Church and the Anglican Church are also prominent.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 11,716 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Maryland). CAPITAL: Maseru (est. pop. 29,000). OTHER CITIES: Teyateyaneng (est. pop. 5,000), Lerike (est. pop. 4,000).

People

POPULATION: 1.2 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.2%. DENSITY: 102 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: About 85% Sotho, 15% Nguni (Bathepu), less than 1% white, mixed, and Asian. RELIGIONS: Christianity (70%), animism. LANGUAGES: English (official), Sesotho (official), Xhosa, Zulu. LITERACY: 40%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 46 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Constitutional monarchy with King as Chief of State; Constitution suspended since 1970. INDEPENDENCE: October 4, 1966. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: October 4, 1966.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—Prime Minister (since 1970 governs by decree), Cabinet. *Legislative*—appointed Interim National Assembly has limited legislative powers. *Judicial*—Court of Appeal, High Court, subordinate courts, and customary courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Basutoland National Party (Prime Minister's party), Basutoland Congress Party, Maremathou Freedom Party, United Democratic Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 districts.

FLAG: Two vertical bands of green and red on left side, rest is blue with traditional Basuto conical straw hat in white.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $86.8 million (1970-71 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 0%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $100 (est.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 0%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 13%. *Labor* 91%. *Products*—corn, wheat, sorghum, peas, beans.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 1%. *Products*—carpets, candles, fertilizer, pottery, jewelry.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, water.

TRADE: *Exports*—$8 million (1972 est.): wool, mohair, cattle. *Partner*—South Africa. *Imports*—$5.6 million (1972): manufactured goods, foodstuffs, machinery, transport equipment. *Partner*—South Africa. (Ultimate origins and destinations of Lesotho's external trade not known.)

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 South African rand=US$1.43.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total* (1966-73)—$30 million in capital assistance. *U.S. only* (1965-73)—approx. $20 million ($3.6 million in grants and loans, $16.3 million in PL 480 food aid).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth of Nations, Southern African Customs Union.



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HISTORY

Basutoland (now Lesotho) apparently was sparsely populated by Bushmen until the end of the 16th century. Between the 16th and 19th centuries an influx of migrants (refugees from tribal wars in surrounding areas) populated the region which led to the development of a distinct Basotho tribal group. The result is a fairly homogeneous cultural entity.

In 1818 Moshesh I, a tribal chief from the north, succeeded in uniting the Basotho people. He ruled from

1823 to 1870 and consolidated various tribes that had been scattered earlier by Zulu and Matabele warriors. During his reign, a series of wars with the Orange Free State (1856-68) resulted in the loss of a large area to South Africa, now known as the "Conquered Territory." Moshesh appealed to the British for help, and in 1868 the country was annexed by the United Kingdom.

For a considerable period thereafter the energies of the British administration were absorbed largely in the tasks of settling disputes, maintaining the position of the Paramount Chief under the system of "indirect rule," and resisting South African efforts to incorporate Basutoland into the Union of South Africa.

From 1884 to 1959 legislative and executive authority was vested in a British High Commissioner. In 1910 the Basutoland Council, which came into existence on an informal basis in 1903, was formally established as a consultative body.

In 1955 the Basutoland Council asked that it be empowered to legislate on internal affairs. A new constitution in 1959 gave Basutoland its first elected legislature, a significant step in the country's political development. The British then acceded to the expressed desire of the people to achieve full independence. In April 1965 general elections with universal adult suffrage were held, following a constitutional conference at London in 1964. The Basutoland National Party (BNP) won 31 seats in the 60-seat legislature, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) 25 seats, and the Maremattou Freedom Party (MFP) 4 seats. On October 4, 1966, Basutoland attained full independence as the Kingdom of Lesotho.

The election of January 27, 1970, the first held after independence, indicated that the ruling BNP might not remain in power. Citing election irregularities, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan nullified the elections, declared a national state of emergency, and suspended the constitution and the Parliament.

GOVERNMENT

Under normal conditions, Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament consisting of a National Assembly (60 seats) and a Senate (33 seats).

King Moshoeshoe II (MO-SHWAY-Shway) is Chief of State. The Prime Minister (Head of Government) is appointed by the King and is the member of the National Assembly who commands the support of the majority of its members. The Cabinet is also appointed by the King in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister from among members of both houses of Parliament.

The Prime Minister is presently ruling the country by decree, with the advice of an appointive Interim National Assembly, established in 1973, which includes representatives of Lesotho's four legal political parties. The preparation of a new constitution is under discussion.

Lesotho's highest court is the Court of Appeal, which exercises limited appellate jurisdiction. The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. Subordinate courts administer statute laws while Paramount Chiefs administer customary tribal laws.

For administrative purposes the country is divided into nine districts. Each district is headed by an Administrative Secretary appointed by the central government. Assistant Ministers of the government have also been posted to the districts to coordinate government policy and insure its implementation with the assistance of civil servants.

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State—King Moshoeshoe II
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Security—Dr. Leabua Jonathan
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Works and Communications—Chief Sekhonyana M. 'Maseribane

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Joseph R. L. Kotsokoane

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Ashton, Hugh. *The Basuto.* London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland: Report of An Economic Survey Mission. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1960.

Basutoland, 1964. London: HMSO, 1965.

Coates, Austin. *Basutoland.* London: HMSO, 1966.

Department of State. "The Organization of African Unity." No. 2 in the *International Organizations Series.* Pub. 8444. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973 (rev.).

Department of State. "United States Foreign Policy 1972." *General Foreign Policy Series 274.* Pub. 8699. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Halpern, Jack. *South Africa's Hostages; Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.* Baltimore: Penguin, 1965.

Hailey, Lord. *The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories.* London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Khaketla, B. M. *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under the Microscope.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.

Stevens, Richard P. *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa.* New York: Praeger, 1967.

Tilden, G. *The Rise of the Basuto.* Cape Town: Juta, 1950.

Weisfelder, Richard F. *Defining National Purpose in Lesotho.* Athens: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1969.

HMSO publications may be obtained from British Information Services, 845 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

TRAVEL NOTES

Lesotho's beautiful mountain scenery and pleasant climate have made it increasingly attractive to tourists from South Africa, Europe, and elsewhere in recent years.

***Clothing*—Light summer suits and dresses are appropriate from October to June. Winter clothing is needed from July to September.**

***Customs*—Visas for Lesotho can be obtained on arrival, but travelers without South African visas are not permitted to leave the international area of the Johannesburg airport. The airport has hotel rooms to accommodate those who must remain overnight to make onward connections. Up-to-date health certificates are required.**

***Health*—Tap water is safe. Medical facilities in Maseru are adequate. Recommended immunizations include polio, gamma globulin, smallpox, typhoid, and cholera.**

***Telecommunications*—Telephone and telegraphic service is available in and between the larger population centers, but much of the interior can only be reached by wireless.**

***Transportation*—Maseru is a short flight from Johannesburg, South Africa. There are some taxis in Maseru; car rental is available; and traffic moves on the left.**

Finance—Evaristus Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana
Health and Social Welfare—Patrick 'Mota
Justice—C.D. Molapo
Interior—Julius Monaleli
Agriculture—Khetla T. J. Rakhetla
Education and Cultural Affairs—A. S. Ralebitso
Commerce and Industry—Joel R. M. Moitse
Minister to the Prime Minister—Gabriel C. Manyeli

Ambassador to the U.S.—Ephraim Tsepa Manare
Ambassador to the U.N.—Teboho John Mbulelo Mashologu

Lesotho maintains an Embassy in the United States at 1601 Connecticut Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009. Lesotho's Mission to the U.N. is at 866 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The existence in Lesotho of continued resistance to the rule of Prime Minister Jonathan and the BNP remains a serious domestic problem for the government. Scattered attacks on police posts occurred in January 1974 in an attempt to overthrow the government. Apparently these were organized by elements in the wing of the BCP led by oldtime nationalist Ntsu Mokhehle. In the wake of the unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt, some insurgents and other BCP supporters were killed, others were imprisoned, and others fled the country. By late 1974, some had been released, others were on trial, and others were still held without trial.

ECONOMY

Lesotho's economy is based on subsistence agriculture, livestock raising, and the earnings of laborers employed outside the territory. (Remittances from laborers in South Africa totaled $22.3 million in 1972.)

Only about 900,000 acres of the country are cultivable, and soil erosion is an ever-present problem. Grazing rights are communal, but arable land is allocated to individuals and families by the chiefs. A large share of the land is held in trust for the Basotho by the King and may not be alienated. Nearly all the agricultural production is consumed by the resident population and foodstuffs must be imported.

At present very little manufacturing is done in the country. The Lesotho National Development Corp. is actively encouraging foreign investment in Lesotho and has been moderately successful in starting light industries and in attracting investment in tourist infrastructure, including a commitment to build a $6 million hotel.

Lesotho has received economic assistance since independence from a number of sources, including the United Kingdom, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the United States, and South Africa.

Several specialized agencies and programs of the United Nations are active in Lesotho, including the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).

There are some 2,000 miles of graveled and earth roads and vehicle tracks. Ninety-four miles of road have been reconstructed and paved with a $4.1 million loan from the International Development Association (IDA). Pack animals constitute the only means of transport in many areas, and there are many miles of bridle paths.

Lesotho is linked with South Africa by a short rail line from Maseru to Marseille on the Bloemfontein-Natal main line. Elsewhere the railway runs close to the territorial boundary, and goods are transported by road to and from the nearest station in the Orange Free State.

Airstrips are located at Maseru, Mokhotlong, Sehonghong, Semonkong, and Qacha's Nek. There are 26 other secondary landing fields. Most of these facilities are suitable only for light aircraft. Maseru is served by three flights weekly from the Jan Smuts International Airport at Johannesburg, South Africa.

Most trade is with the Republic of South Africa, and Lesotho is heavily dependent on that country for its economic existence. All of Lesotho's trade outlets run through South Africa, and it is Lesotho's only major source of wage employment.

Lesotho, together with Botswana and Swaziland, is a member of a common customs union with South Africa and consequently no tariffs exist on most goods moving among them. South Africa levies and collects the bulk of the customs, sales, and excise duties for the four countries, paying a share determined by an established formula of total customs collections to the other three. Imports from outside the customs union, regardless of ultimate destination, are subject to the same tariff rates. The customs agreement was renegotiated in 1969, and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have substantially increased their shares of the customs revenue. They also form a common currency and exchange control area known as the South African Monetary Area and use the rand as currency. The combining of all the trade of the customs union

countries makes it difficult to be precise in discussing Lesotho's trade.

Cooperative organizations have been successfully established for agricultural marketing and credit. There are also a cooperative savings society and a central banking and marketing union.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Lesotho is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The country's relationship with South Africa is a major factor in its survival.

The South Africa Act of 1909, which established the Union of South Africa, included procedures for the possible future transfer of Basutoland, Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and Swaziland, to the Union.

During the passage of this act through the British Parliament, the British Government gave its pledge that transfer would not take place until the inhabitants of the territories could be consulted and the British Parliament given an opportunity to express its views.

Abortive negotiations by the South African and the British Governments took place between 1913 and 1939 but the original pledge was consistently reiterated by successive British Governments. In 1954 Sir Winston Churchill stated that there could be no question of the British Government agreeing at that time to the transfer of the territories. Since Lesotho obtained its independence, the question of South African takeover has become less important.

Lesotho's geographic location and heavy economic dependence on South Africa, makes it extremely sensitive to political and economic developments in the Republic of South Africa. Although it sharply criticizes South Africa's racial policy, the Government of Lesotho cannot avoid vital economic and commercial ties with the Republic.

The Government of Lesotho is continually under pressure from domestic and external sources to more actively express its opposition to South Africa's racial policies. Since independence, the Government of Lesotho under Prime Minister Jonathan has worked steadily to strengthen Lesotho's national sovereignty while maintaining a reasonable working relationship with South Africa.

While retaining close diplomatic relations with a few Western nations, Lesotho has worked in recent years to diversify its international contacts to include Arabs, Eastern European, and other African states. It has also concentrated on strengthening relations with Botswana and Swaziland, its traditional partners in southern Africa.

Other African countries maintain an attitude of general understanding of the limitations placed on Lesotho because of geographical and economic dependence on South Africa.

U.S.-LESOTHO RELATIONS

The United States continues to expand and strengthen its friendly relations with the people of Lesotho. It encourages the country's progressive political, economic, and social development as a nonracial, democratic, independent nation.

Estimated U.S. assistance to Lesotho for fiscal year 1973 was as follows: Agency for International Development (AID), $1.5 million; Public Law 480 (Food for Peace program), $2.5 million; and Peace Corps, 33 volunteers. Total aid from fiscal years 1965 through 1973 amounted to about $20 million.

U.S. AID programs to Lesotho have focused primarily on the country's need to increase its agricultural production and improve education and health standards. The joint World Bank-U.S. Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project encompasses 300,000 acres and 80,000 people and is designed to increase smallholder production and arrest soil erosion.

Peace Corps volunteers work in tractor-farming cooperatives, credit union development, secondary school education—especially mathematics and science curriculum development—and manpower training programs focusing on vocational training.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—David B. Bolen (also accredited to Botswana and Swaziland, resident in Botswana)

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim—Donald D. Haught

The address of the U.S. Embassy in Lesotho is P.O. Box 333, Maseru, Lesotho.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8091

APPENDIX U
LIBERIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, June 1975 (Publication 7991)]

background notes

department of state * june 1975

Liberia

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Liberia

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Liberia lies at the southwestern extremity of the western bulge of Africa and is bordered by Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. It has a 370-mile-long coastline on the Atlantic Ocean.

From a narrow strip of level coastal land dotted with lagoons, tidal creeks, and marshes, the rolling country rises in a series of plateaus. Low mountains are found intermittently throughout the country but are rarely more than 3,000 feet in elevation except for Nimba and Wale Mountains, which reach 4,500 feet. Six principal rivers flow into the Atlantic Ocean.

Liberia lies within the tropical rain forest belt and has distinct wet and dry seasons. Almost all rainfall occurs between April and November and averages 150-170 inches annually. Along the coast it may exceed 200 inches. The average annual daily temperature is about 80°F.

The population includes 16 recognized tribal groups and about 45,000 descendants of emancipated slaves from the United States. About 5,000 foreigners, some of whom are U.S. citizens employed by various U.S. business enterprises and by the Liberian Government, reside in Liberia. Approximately 90 percent of the population retain their tribal customs.

Paganism is widespread despite intensive missionary efforts. Christians are principally of Protestant denominations. Islam has been making slow, steady progress among some tribes in recent years.

HISTORY

It is believed that the early inhabitants of present-day Liberia migrated into the area from the north and east between the 12th and 16th centuries. Apparently none of the sub-Saharan Empires encompassed Liberia. Portuguese explorers visited Liberia's coast in 1461, and during the next 300 years European merchants and coastal Africans engaged in trade.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 43,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Ohio). CAPITAL: Monrovia (pop. 100,000). OTHER CITIES: Buchanan (pop. 25,000 est.), Harper (pop. 10,000 est.).

People

POPULATION: 1.65 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.3%. DENSITY: 38 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 16 tribes (97.5%, principally Mande, West Atlantic, and Kwa), Americo-Liberians (2.5%). RELIGIONS: tribal religions 70-80%, Muslim 10-20%, Christian 10%. LANGUAGES: English (official), 28 tribal dialects. LITERACY: 10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 45 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: 1847. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: July 26, 1847.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government), Vice President, Cabinet. *Legislative*–Bicameral (Senate, House of Representatives). *Judicial*–Supreme Court, circuit courts.

POLITICAL PARTY: True Whig Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Counties.

FLAG: Eleven red and white stripes with a white star on a blue field in the upper left corner. At the time of the flag's adoption in 1847, the single star represented the only Negro State in Africa. The stripes stand for the signers of the country's Declaration of Independence.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $500 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 5%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $333. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 3.3%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 50%. *Labor* 25%. *Products*–rubber, palm kernels, coffee, rice, cassava.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 95% (includes agricultural industries). *Products*–iron ore, rubber.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds.

TRADE: *Exports*–$371 million (1974): iron ore, diamonds, rubber, coffee, palm kernels, cocoa. *Imports*–$310 million (1974): machinery, transportation equipment, foodstuffs, manufactured goods. *Partners*–U.S., F.R.G., Japan, U.K.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Liberia uses U.S. dollars.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$390 million (through 1974). *U.S. only*–$250 million (1946-74): AID, Food for Peace, and Peace Corps grants ($136 million) and loans ($114 million).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU).



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The Republic of Liberia had its origin in 1816 when the American Colonization Society was given a charter by the U.S. Congress to send freed slaves to the west coast of Africa. These settlers arrived in Liberia in 1822. The U.S. Government under President James Monroe furnished funds and assisted in negotiations with native chiefs for the cession of land. In 1839 the settlers united to form the Commonwealth of Liberia under a governor appointed by the American Colonization Society. In 1847 Liberia became the first independent Republic in Africa, with a Constitution modeled after that of the United States. The United Kingdom officially recognized the Republic in 1848 as did France in 1852. The United States did not grant recognition until 1862. The Republic's first 100 years were characterized as a "century of survival" because of attempts by neighboring powers (French and British) to encroach on Liberia.

William R. Tolbert, Jr., 19th President of Liberia, acceded to office in *July 1971 upon the death of* William V. C. Tubman, who had served as President since 1944.

GOVERNMENT

Liberia's government is modeled after that of the United States and is based on the 1847 Constitution. The President and Vice President are elected by popular vote for an initial

term of 8 years and may be reelected to 4-year terms. The President is assisted by a Cabinet of 16 members whom he appoints.

The Senate is presided over by the Vice President and has 18 members (two from each county) elected to 6-year terms. The House of Representatives has 52 members elected to 4-year terms on the basis of proportional representation.

The judicial branch is headed by a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. Subordinate courts are established as deemed necessary by act of the legislature. All judges are appointed by the President and serve for life.

A Superintendent appointed by the President heads each county.

Principal Government Officials

President–William R. Tolbert, Jr.
Vice President–James E. Greene

Ministers

Foreign Affairs–C. Cecil Dennis
Finance–Edwin Williams
Justice–Lawrence A. Morgan
National Defense–Allen H. Williams
Postal Affairs–McKinley A. DeShield
Local Government, Rural Development, and Urban Reconstruction–E. Jonathan Goodridge
Action for Development and Progress–Julius Cooper
Education–Jackson Doe
Public Works–Gabriel J. Tucker
Agriculture–James T. Phillips, Jr.
Health and Welfare–Oliver Bright
Commerce, Industry, and Transportation–William E. Dennis, Jr.
Information, Cultural Affairs, and Tourism–Edward B. Kesselly
Planning and Economic Affairs–David F. Neal
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs–E. Reginald Townsend
Land and Mines–A. E. Nyema Jones
Labor, Youth, and Sports–J. Jenkins Peal
Chairman of Public Utilities Authority–Taylor A. Major
Director General, National Public Health Service–Edwin M. Barclay
Speaker of the House–Richard A. Henries
Chief Justice–James A. Pierre
Ambassador to the U.S.–S. Edward Peal
Ambassador to the U.N.–Nathan Barnes

Liberia maintains an Embassy in the United States at 5201 16th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20011.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The government is highly centralized under the leadership of President Tolbert. Public schools, hospitals, roads, and police are operated by the central government. Only Negroes or those of Negro descent may become citizens of Liberia. All citizens are privileged to vote, and only citizens may own land.

Although opposition parties are not proscribed and dissident groups have formed short-lived opposition parties, only one strong political party exists–the True Whig Party, which was formed in 1869 and has been in power since 1881. The most recent presidential election was held in May 1971 at which time the late President Tubman and Vice President Tolbert were reelected. Upon the President's death in July, Vice President Tolbert succeeded to the 4-year presidential term. He was inaugurated in January 1972.

President Tolbert has continued the "unification" policy of his predecessor, which endeavors to integrate culturally the indigenous tribal peoples and the descendants of the freedmen who settled Liberia. Much progress has been made in assimilating the tribal peoples of the interior into the mainstream of modern national life.

ECONOMY

Liberia's three natural resources–iron ore, rubber, and timber–serve as a base for its economy. The first two are well developed. Timber resources are excellent but are only beginning to be exploited. Other mineral and plantation resources may be developed as a result of surveys undertaken by the Liberian Government with the help of the U.S. Government and other external donors. Modern techniques are employed in the extraction of ore.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on Liberia. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

American University. *Area Handbook for Liberia.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Clifford, Mary Louise. *The Land and People of Liberia.* J.B. Lippincott Co., 1971.

Clower, Robert W. et. al. *Growth Without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia.* Northwestern University Press, 1966.

Holsoe, Svend. *A Study Guide for Liberia.* Boston: Boston University Press, 1967.

Liebenow, J. Gus. *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege.* Cornell University Press, 1969.

Martinelli, Laurence. *The New Liberia.* New York: Praeger, 1964.

McLaughlin, Russell U. *Foreign Investment and Development in Liberia.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

Newsom, David D. *African Issues at the United Nations,* Dept. of State pub. 8614. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Wilson, Charles M. *Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm.* New York: Harper, 1971.

Notable gains have been made in the development of Liberia's infrastructure, a major area of U.S. assistance. Projects completed with the help of U.S. grants or loans include the Free Port of Monrovia, Robertsfield International Airport, part of the interior road system, Monrovia's water supply and sewage disposal systems, a hydroelectric dam at Mt. Coffee near Monrovia, elementary and secondary schools, and the National Medical Center in Monrovia, including the 271-bed Kennedy hospital and training center which were opened in June

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—**Lightweight, loose fitting washable clothing is recommended.**

Customs—**All Americans entering Liberia must have visas, which are not issued at the airport. Inoculations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are required. Typhoid, polio, tetanus, rabies, and gamma globulin shots are recommended.**

Health—**Drink only boiled water. Eat fruit only if its skin is unbroken. Take malaria suppressants. Stay out of fresh water, particularly in the interior.**

Telecommunications—**Long-distance telephone service and cable service are available.**

Transportation—**Flights are available to Robertsfield International Airport, about 36 miles from Monrovia. No regularly scheduled airport bus or taxi service exists. Limited schedule airline service is available to a few points within the country.**

Taxi service in Monrovia is available and reasonably priced. Tipping is not customary. Agree on a price in advance when traveling outside the metropolitan area.

Touring—**Tourist facilities are limited. Unpaved roads in the interior are difficult to travel in the rainy season and dusty in the dry season.**

1971. Projects in process using U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) loans are further improvements to the international airport, construction of two additional rural access roads, and provision of highway maintenance equipment to support the Ministry of Public Works.

Consistent with the high priority which Liberia places on rural development, AID is directing more of its resources to agriculture. AID's other area of emphasis is public administration where it is helping to establish the Institute of Public Administration and to activate the Civil Service Bureau.

More than 350 Peace Corps volunteers are assisting Liberian development by providing needed skills in education, public health, agriculture, public administration, and other areas.

Liberia's open-door investment policy has attracted large sums of private investment for development projects, such as the Bomi Hills and Mano River iron ore projects, and additional amounts are expected in the future. In 1963 a Swedish-American group began extracting major iron ore deposits at Nimba Mountain (the LAMCO project). Investors from the Federal Republic of Germany have developed iron ore resources at the Bong Mountain range. A large private U.S. rubber company has longstanding major holdings in Liberia; several other private U.S. and foreign firms are in the process of developing new rubber plantations.

Liberia encountered serious financial difficulties in 1963 as a result of large short-term debt obligations, a drop in world prices of rubber and iron ore, and a reduction in private and public capital investment. In 1969 the Liberian external debt was rescheduled with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time an austerity program was adopted. The long-term economic prospects of the country now are excellent, but foreign debt will be a continuing problem for the next few years.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

One of the basic tenets of Liberia's international policy is the belief that the future of small nations can best be served by cooperative efforts. For this reason Liberia was one of the charter members of the United Nations and remains one of the staunchest supporters of its specialized agencies.

In pan-African affairs Liberia has been an active leader and plays an important role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The government has been represented at all of the important conferences of African leaders and has frequently taken the initiative in encouraging such gatherings. The Liberian leadership supports peaceful settlement of disputes and frequently has used its good offices to encourage moderation.

U.S.-LIBERIA RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and Liberia have been friendly since the inception of the Republic in 1847. U.S. official policy toward Liberia is based on the desire to maintain and strengthen these close ties.

The United States continues to give assistance and support to Liberia's efforts to improve the welfare of its people and strengthen its representative government. Additional support for Liberian efforts has been given by U.S. business, missionary, and educational organizations, which have continued to be active in the country.

The United States and Liberia have an active cultural exchange program which is administered by the U.S. Educational and Cultural Foundation at Monrovia.

In February 1970 William P. Rogers became the first Secretary of State to visit Liberia. Mrs. Nixon represented the United States at the inauguration of President Tolbert in Monrovia in January 1972.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Melvin L. Manfull
Deputy Chief of Mission-Maurice D. Bean
Director, U.S. AID Mission—Stanley Siegel
Chief, U.S. Army Training Mission—Col. Allan M. Buckner
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Howell S. Teeple

The U.S. Embassy in Liberia is located on United Nations Drive, Monrovia.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7991, Revised June 1975

APPENDIX V
LIBYA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, September 1974 (Publication 7815)]

background notes

department of state * september 1974

Libya

OFFICIAL NAME: Libyan Arab Republic

GEOGRAPHY

The Libyan Arab Republic is located on the north-central coast of Africa. It is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north (coastline about 1,100 miles), Egypt to the east, Sudan to the southeast, Tunisia and Algeria to the west, and Niger and Chad to the south.

About 92 percent of Libya's terrain is desert or semidesert, consisting of barren, rock-strewn plains and sand sea with two small areas of hills and mountains rising to a maximum of 3,000 feet above sea level—Jebel Nafusa in the northwest, south of Tripoli, and Jabal Al-Akhdar in the northeast, east of Benghazi. Another zone of hills and mountains in the Saharan south and southwest rises to 10,335 feet. Libya has no permanent rivers. Except for scattered oases, only the narrow coastal strip and the slopes of the two northern hill areas are suitable for cultivation. An estimated 7 percent of the total land area is devoted to agriculture and nomadic herding.

Rainfall, about every 3 years, is irregular, scanty, and often damagingly low. A feature of the Libyan climate is the ghibli—a hot, dry, dust laden southern wind lasting for periods of 1 to 4 days. The ghibli usually occurs in spring and fall, causing the temperature to rise by as much as 40 degrees in a few hours. Temperatures along the coast reach the high 90's in summer with humidity occasionally as high as 90 percent.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 679,360 sq. mi. (compares in size with Alaska). CAPITAL: Tripoli (pop. 247,000). OTHER CITIES: Benghazi (pop. 137,000), 1968 estimates.

People

POPULATION: 2.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.7% (1973). DENSITY: 3.2 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arabs and Arabized Berbers 97%, Negroes. RELIGION: Sunni Islam. LANGUAGE: Arabic. LITERACY: 27-35% (est.). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 37 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: December 24, 1951. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: December 11, 1969.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—Revolutionary Command Council, Council of Ministers (Cabinet). *Legislative*—Revolutionary Command Council. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 10 regions.

FLAG: Red, white, and black horizontal stripes in descending order, with an eagle in the center white stripe.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $5.2 billion (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 9% (1969-73). GDP PER CAPITA: $2,400. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 5.5% (1969-73).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 7%. *Labor* 32.5% (1968). *Products*—cereals, dates, olives, peanuts, citrus fruits, livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Labor*—24.3% (1968). *Products*—crude petroleum, processed foods, textiles.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Petroleum, natural gas.

TRADE: *Exports*—$4.1 billion (1973): crude petroleum (90%). *Partners*—Italy 22%, United Kingdom 18%, West Germany 18%, France 12%—1971 estimates. *Imports*—$1.8 billion (1973): machinery, manufactures, foodstuffs. *Partners*—Italy 22%, United Kingdom 10%, West Germany 9%, France 9%—1971 estimates.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Libyan pound=US$3.38.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Arab League, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

PEOPLE

Libya's large land area directly contrasts its small population. Population density is only about 3.2 persons per square mile for the entire country. Ninety percent of the people live in less than 10 percent of the total area, primarily along the coast. About 27 percent of the population is urban, mostly concentrated in the two largest cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya has a young population—44 percent are less than 15 years of age.

Libyans are primarily a mixture of Arabs and Arabized Berbers. Small



Tebou and Touareg tribal groups in southern Libya lead nomadic or semi-nomadic lives. There are about 300,000 foreign residents, most of whom are Egyptians.

HISTORY

For most of its history, Libya has been subjected to foreign rule. In antiquity, various parts of it were ruled by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, and Byzantines. Although the Greeks and Romans left impressive ruins of their cities at Cyrene, Leptis Magna, Sabratha, and elsewhere, little else remains today to testify to the presence of these ancient cultures.

Libya was conquered in the 7th century by the Arabs. In the following centuries the Arabs' language, culture, and religion were adopted by the bulk of the indigenous population. The Ottoman Turks conquered the country in the 16th century, and Libya remained a part of their empire—although at times a virtually autonomous one—until it was invaded by Italy in 1911 and became an Italian colony.

In 1934 Italy adopted the name "Libya" (used by the Greeks for North Africa exclusive of Egypt) as the official name of its colony consisting of the Provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. King Idris I, then Emir of Cyrenaica, led Libyan resistance to Italian occupation between the two World Wars. In 1947 he returned from exile in Egypt and combined forces with the Allies to liberate the country from Italian control. From 1943 to 1951 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British administration, and the French controlled Fezzan. Under the terms of the 1947

peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished title to Libya.

On November 21, 1949, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution to the effect that Libya should become independent before January 1, 1952. King Idris I represented Libya in the subsequent U.N. negotiations. Libya declared its independence on December 24, 1951, the first country to achieve independence through the United Nations. It was simultaneously proclaimed a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris.

King Idris ruled the Kingdom of Libya until the government was overthrown by a military-led revolution on September 1, 1969. The new regime, headed by Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic.

The Libyan Arab Republic advocates the unity of all Arab countries. As a first step in this direction, it joined Egypt and Syria in 1971 to form the Confederation of Arab Republics (C.A.R.). The C.A.R., however, has never evolved beyond the stage of symbolic unity. Unity agreements between Libya and Egypt (August 1972) and Tunisia (January 1974) have also faltered and remain largely unimplemented.

GOVERNMENT

The Libyan Arab Republic operates under the Provisional Constitution of December 11, 1969, which proclaims Libya "an Arab, democratic, and free Republic which constitutes a part of the Arab nation and whose objective is comprehensive Arab unity."

Under the Provisional Constitution, the 12-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the country's highest authority. "It exercises the functions of supreme sovereignty and legislation and decides the general policy of the State on behalf of the people" and is empowered to "adopt all measures to protect the Revolution." The RCC supervises the armed forces and has power to proclaim war, conclude treaties, and appoint the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Chairman of the RCC functions as *de facto* Chief of State.

The Council of Ministers, which currently includes three RCC members, is responsible to the RCC, may be dismissed by it, and is charged with carrying out its policy decisions. The Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU), made up of representatives from each part of the country, was established in 1971 as the country's sole political organization.

Under the Provisional Constitution all Libyans are declared equal before the law and have the right to resort to the courts. Libyan legal codes, including commercial and civil law, are based to a considerable degree on the legal codes of European countries such as Italy and France. Islamic law is applied in matters regarding the personal status of Muslims, and the government has declared that all laws in Libya will be consistent with Islamic law.

For internal administrative purposes Libya is divided into 10 regions, each under a Governor: Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebha, Zawia, Derna, Khalij, Jabal al Akhdar, Misurata, Gharyan, and Homs.

Principal Government Officials

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)

Chairman—Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi
Members — Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud
Maj. Bashir al-Hawadi
Lt. Col. Abu Bakr Yunis
Maj. al-Khwayldi al-Humaydi
Maj. 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni
Maj. Mustafa al-Kharubi
Maj. Muhammad Najm
Maj. 'Awad 'Ali Hamza
Maj. Mukhtar al-Qarawi
Capt. 'Umar 'Abdulla al-Muhayshi

Council of Ministers (Cabinet)

Prime Minister; RCC Member—Major 'Abd as 'Salam Ahmad Jallud
Minister of Defense; RCC Chairman—Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi
Minister of Interior; RCC Member—Major al-Khwayldi al-Humaydi
Minister of Foreign Affairs (acting)—'Abd al-'Ati 'Ubaydi
Minister of Treasury—Muhammad az-Zaruq Rajab
Minister of Petroleum—'Izz ad-Din Mabruk
Minister of Economy—Abu Bakr 'Ali Sharif
Minister of Industry and Mineral Wealth—Jadallah 'Azzuz at-Talhi
Minister of Justice—Muhammad 'Ali al-Jadi
Minister of Planning—'Abd al-Karim Fathallah Billuh
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs—'Abd al-'Ati al-Ubaydi
Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform—Muhammad 'Ali Tabu
Minister of Education and National Guidance—Dr. Muhammad Ahmad ash-Sharif
Minister of Health—Dr. Muftah al-Usta 'Umar
Minister of Information—Abu Zayd 'Umar Durdah
Minister of Housing—Engineer Muhammad Ahmad al-Manqush
Minister of Communications—Engineer Taha Sharif Bin 'Amir
Minister of State for Agricultural Development Affairs—'Abd al-Majid al 'Qa 'Ud

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Keith, Agnes N. *Children of Allah.* Boston: Atlantic-Little, 1966.

Khadduri, Majid. *Modern Libya.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963.

Newsom, David. "The United States and North Africa." *Current Foreign Policy* series. Dept. of State pub. 8622. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Wright, John. *Libya.* New York: Praeger, 1969.

TRAVEL NOTES

Language–The language of Libya is Arabic, although many businessmen and officials speak English. Since the 1969 Revolution, by government decree, Arabic is the only language used for street and road signs, shop signs, public notices, official publications, etc. Visitors are required by law to bear passports printed in Arabic. However, an official transcription of relevant passport information on a page of the passport is acceptable. The U.S. Passport Office and certain U.S. Embassies abroad are authorized to provide this service for Americans intending to visit Libya. Travelers seeking assistance or further information should contact the nearest U.S. Embassy, Consulate, or Passport Office. Travelers to Libya must also obtain a Libyan visa.

Transportation–There is regular and frequent air service between Tripoli and Rome, Valletta, Tunis, Cairo, and Beirut. Internally, there are regular flights among Tripoli, Ghudamis, Sabhah, Ghat, Kufra, Tobruk, and Benghazi. These cities and others are also connected by bus and road. There are no railroads in Libya.

Communications–International telephone, telegraph, and mail service to the United States and Europe is available. All mail is subject to inspection.

Health–Typhus, typhoid, smallpox, polio, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and infectious hepatitis are endemic. Cholera and other diseases also occur. Travelers should have all appropriate immunizations and observe careful sanitary practices.

Clothing and Climate–Libya has a Mediterranean climate near the coast but temperature extremes are greater inland, where the summer heat can be intolerable. Lightweight clothing is appropriate for the long, hot summer. Heavier clothes and a lined raincoat are generally adequate for the rainy winter season, December through February. Women should not wear shorts, miniskirts, tight-fitting clothes, or two-piece bathing suits in public.

Minister of Youth and Social Affairs–'Abd al-Hamid as 'Sayd az-Zintani

Minister of Civil Service–Muhammad Abu Bakr Bin Yunis

Charge d'Affaires in the U.S.–Hussein Zagaar

Ambassador to the U.N.–Kamal Hassan Maghur

Libya maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2344 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

On September 1, 1969, a secret army organization known as the Free Unionist Officers seized power throughout Libya, neutralized political and military opposition, and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. Quickly consolidating its control over the country, this military group formed a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and announced that it would respect all agreements and treaties and observe the rights of the petroleum companies.

The new regime declared a motto of "freedom, socialism, and unity" and pledged itself to: (1) remove backwardness; (2) take an active role in the Arab cause in "Palestine;" (3) promote Arab unity; and (4) encourage domestic policies based on social justice, nonexploitation, and an equitable distribution of wealth.

As under the former monarchy there are no conventional political parties. However, the Libyan ASU, modeled after the Egyptian ASU, acts in theory as a channel for various groups to bring issues to government attention. In April 1973, the Chairman of the RCC Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi announced the start of a "cultural revolution" and called upon the populace to establish "popular committees" in schools, businesses, industrial enterprises, and public institutions to oversee their administration in the public interest. The following year these popular committees were subordinated to the ASU.

An early announced objective of the new government was the withdrawal of all foreign military installations from Libya. Following negotiations, British military installations at Tobruk and nearby El Adem were closed in March 1970 and U.S. facilities at Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli were closed in June 1970. In July the Libyan Government also ordered the expulsion of several thousand Italian residents and in 1971 ordered the closure of libraries and cultural centers operated by foreign governments.

ECONOMY

Oil is Libya's main source of revenue. Since the first major oil discovery in 1959, Libya has had a rapidly expanding economy. Beginning in 1961, crude oil production expanded rapidly, reaching a maximum of 3.7 million barrels per day in the spring of 1970. Thereafter, a deliberate conservation policy instituted by the RCC entailed substantial production cutbacks. Production was further reduced for political reasons following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and had fallen below 2 million barrels per day by early 1974. Because of the sharp increase in posted prices, however, Libyan Government revenue from petroleum actually rose from $.8 billion in FY 1969 to $1.7 billion in FY 1972. Oil revenue for FY 1973 was estimated at $1.6 billion, other revenue at $200 million.

Libyan Government expenditures have not kept pace with the rapid rise in oil revenues. The resulting surplus had led to the growth of large Central Bank reserves of foreign exchange and gold. In mid-1973 these reserves were already in excess of $3 billion. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) increased from about US $40 in 1950 to over $2,400 in 1972. Total GDP in 1972 was estimated at $5.2 billion. The impact of this increase has, however, been uneven, and many Libyans remain dependent on subsistence agriculture.

The government has a budget for ordinary expenditures and a separate development plan budget. By law, 15 percent of oil revenues must be set aside as reserves each year, and 70 percent of the remainder must be devoted to development. For the fiscal year ending March 21, 1973, the ordinary budget was $7.5 million and the development budget $1.1 billion. The development budget stresses the development of agriculture, educational facilities, transportation, housing, electrification, and industrial projects outside the oil sector. Libya's major trading partners are the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. Libya's main

import from the United States is equipment for use in the oil industry.

Many international oil companies operate in Libya, most of them U.S.-owned. British Petroleum's assets were nationalized in 1971. Since 1973, Libya has nationalized the assets of the remaining companies, some totally and some in part, but Libya is still largely dependent on the foreign companies for exploration, marketing, and management of existing fields and installations.

Although overshadowed by the petroleum sector, agriculture is the second largest sector in the Libyan economy. Libya is not self-sufficient in many kinds of food. As consumption has risen with higher incomes and a growing population, the proportion of food consumption met by imports has risen also and now amounts to about 60 percent. One of the objectives of current development efforts is to make Libya self-sufficient in agricultural production.

Agricultural development is hampered by limited rainfall in most of the country and the increasing shortage of manpower brought on by migration from rural areas to the cities. Development efforts include more efficient use of ground water, storage of seasonally available water supplies, irrigation, and land reclamation.

A large project is being carried out in the Kufra oasis region in southeastern Libya. Large subterranean water reserves are being used to grow crops to feed sheep in an effort to help make Libya self-sufficient in meat.

Libya has relatively rich potential resources for coastal and sponge fishing, but they are as yet undeveloped. Small quantities of tuna, sardines, and other fish are caught in coastal waters.

Industrialization has been limited because of the small domestic market, uneven distribution of population, limited skilled manpower, and limited natural resources other than petroleum. The biggest industrial projects are directly connected with the petroleum sector, including refining and liquefaction of natural gas. A growing number of small manufacturing establishments produce a variety of consumer goods, including processing agricultural and fisheries products. Increasing amounts have been allocated for industrial projects in the development budgets. There are plans for a petrochemical industry based on natural gas, which is currently underutilized.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Libyan Arab Republic strongly supports Arab and Muslim causes throughout the world. It is opposed to Israel and advocates elimination in the Middle East of large power influence, including that of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Libya has opposed the policies of Egypt and most other Arab states of seeking a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute in cooperation with the United States.

Libya has purchased technical services and military equipment from Western and Communist bloc countries, mainly the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and France. It has also sought to widen its contacts with other African countries.

U.S. POLICY

U.S. objectives with respect to Libya include the development of cordial and cooperative relations and promotion of mutually advantageous commercial and economic interests.

The United States supported the U.N. resolution providing for Libyan independence. On the day that Libya proclaimed its independence, the United States recognized the new government and raised the status of its office at Tripoli from a Consulate General to a Legation. Libya opened a Legation at Washington, D.C., in 1954. Both countries subsequently raised their missions to Embassy level.

Principal U.S. Officials

Charge d'Affaires—Robert A. Stein

The U.S. Embassy in Libya is located at Shari' Lidoun Sweti, Tripoli.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7815
September 1974

APPENDIX W
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of Stae, September 1975 (Publication 8015)]

background notes

department of state * september 1975

Malagasy Republic

OFFICIAL NAME: Malagasy Republic

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

The Malagasy Republic (political name) is located in the Indian Ocean 250 miles from the southeast coast of Africa. It includes the fourth largest island in the world, Madagascar (geographic name), and its small island dependencies–Nosy Bé, Nosy Mitsio, Ste. Marie, Iles Barren, and Nosy Faly.

Madagascar's interior is a high plateau with a mean altitude of 2,500-6,500 feet. The highest peak is the 9,450-foot Mt. Tsaratanana in the north. The temperate climate of the highlands is warm and rainy from November to April and cool from May to October. The coastal region is tropical with a hot climate year round. Rainfall is heavier on the east coast, as this area is exposed to trade winds and monsoons. Periodic cyclones cause serious damage. Southern Madagascar is arid.

More than 2 million Merina, the largest ethnic group, live in the high plateau area with the Betsileo and hold important positions in the civil service and the professions. In appearance, language, and culture the Merina closely resemble the first known non-African settlers, presumed to have come from the southwest Pacific some centuries after the birth of Christ. Other notable groups are the Betsimisaraka, the Sakalava, the pastoral Bara, and the Tsimihety. The coastal peoples (*côtiers*) are of Negroid and Asian blood.

The Malagasy language, of Malayo-Polynesian origin, is understood throughout the island. About 40 percent of the Malagasy are Christian, divided almost evenly between Catholic and Protestant. The rest practice a form of animism combined with ancestor worship. Rivalry between the Protestant Merina and the Catholic *côtiers* has caused a serious split in the population. The announced goal of the government is to see nationalism overcome ethnic rivalries.

HISTORY

Arabs settled on Madagascar as early as the 7th century. In the 1500's a Portuguese sea captain, Diégo Días, sighted the island when his ship became separated from a fleet bound for India. In the late 17th century the French established trading posts along the east coast. From about 1774 to 1824 it was a favorite pirate haunt. An

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 228,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Texas). CAPITAL: Tananarive (pop. 400,000). OTHER CITIES: Tamatave (57,000), Majunga (54,000), Antsirabe (57,000).

People

POPULATION: 8.3 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5%. DENSITY: 36 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 18 Malagasy tribes, 40,000 Comoran islanders, 6,000 French, 17,000 Indians, 9,000 Chinese. RELIGIONS: Christian, animist. LANGUAGES: Malagasy (official), French. LITERACY: 40%.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: June 26, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: August 28, 1959.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Military Directory. *Legislative*–suspended. *Judicial*–Supreme Court; Court of Appeals and Labor. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 6 Provinces.

FLAG: Vertical white band on staff side; horizontal red and green bands of equal size.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $1.349 billion (1974). GDP ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 0% (1971-74). GDP PER CAPITA: $169 (1974). PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH RATE: 0% (1971-74).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 4.8%. *Labor* 80%. *Products*–rice, livestock, coffee, vanilla, sugar, cloves, cotton, peanuts, tobacco.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 1.4%. *Products*–processed food, textiles, mining, paper, refined petroleum products.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Graphite, chrome, coal, bauxite, ilmenite, semi-precious stones.

TRADE: *Exports*–$226 million (1974): coffee $63 million, vanilla $18 million, cloves $16 million. *Partners*–France $79 million, US $59 million. *Imports*–$291 million (1974): machinery and equipment, textiles, chemicals, crude petroleum, rice. *Partners*–France $105 million, US $16 million.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE (floating, pegged to French franc): FMG220=US$1 (Sept. 1975).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$151 million (through 1974). *U.S. only*–$18.6 million (less repayments and interest).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU).


Grande Comore
Moroni
COMORO
ILES GLORIEUSES (Fr.)
Anjouan
Moheli
ISLANDS (Fr.)
Mayotte
Cap d' Ambre
Diego-Suarez
Nosy Mitsio
Nosy Be
Ambanja
Mahavavy
ILES RADAMA
Antsohihy
Antalaha
Maroantsetra
Majunga
Mandritsara
Marovoay
Ile Chesterfield
Channel
Mozambique
Ile Juan de Nova (Fr.)
Andilamena
Ile Sainte-Marie
Maningory
Fenerive
Lac Alaotra
Ambatosoratra
Morarano
Indian Ocean
Maintirano
Tamatave
Anjozorobe
ILES BARREN
Tsiroanomandidy
Tananarive
Moramanga
Sakay
Ambatolampy
Tsiribihina
Antsirabe
Sakeny
Mania
Morondava
Ambositra
Mananjary
Fianarantsoa
Mangoky
Morombe
Manakara
Ihosy
Farafangana
Tulear
Onilahy
Mandrare
Ambovombe
Fort-Dauphin
Cap Sainte-Marie
44
48
52
14
18
22
Malagasy Republic
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers

517804 S-75

American buccaneer vessel introduced Malagasy rice to North Carolina.

Beginning in the 1790's the Merina rulers succeeded in establishing hegemony over the major part of the island, including the coastal areas. The Merina ruler and the British Governor of Mauritius concluded a treaty abolishing the slave trade on which much of Madagascar's "wealth" had been based. In return the island received British military assistance. British influence remained strong for several decades, and in 1869 the ruling queen and her court were converted to Anglicanism.

The British accepted the imposition of a French protectorate over Madagascar in 1885 as part of an overall definition of spheres of influence in the area. Absolute French control was established by military force in 1895-96, and the Merina monarchy was abolished. Despite the relative stability French administration brought to the island, the Merina have continued to harbor a strong resentment against France.

Malagasy troops fought in France, Morocco, and Syria during World War I. After the fall of France in 1942, Madagascar was administered first by the Vichy government and then by the British, whose troops occupied the strategically situated island to preclude its seizure by the Japanese. The Free French received the island from the United Kingdom in 1943. In 1947, with French prestige at low ebb, a nationalist uprising spread extensively over the east coast and was suppressed only after several months of bitter fighting.

The French subsequently established reformed institutions in 1956 under the *Loi Cadre* (Overseas Reform Act), and Madagascar moved peacefully toward independence. The Malagasy Republic was proclaimed on October 14, 1958, as an autonomous state within the French Community. A period of provisional government ended with the adoption of a Constitution in 1959 and full independence in 1960.

GOVERNMENT

An 18-member Military Directory was formed on February 11, 1975, to govern Madagascar. Maj. Gen. Gilles Andriamahazo, president of the Directory, is assisted by a cabinet composed of civilian and military ministers, by the Superior Council of Institutions, and by the National Popular Council for Development.

The judicial system consists of two basic jurisdictions—a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeals and Labor. The bicameral Supreme Court has 14 members. The Court of Appeals and Labor includes courts of first instance in each provincial capital and courts of traditional law.

Madagascar's six Provinces are administered directly from the capital through appointed civil service officials.

Principal Government Officials

Head of Government, Chief of State, President of Supreme Revolutionary Council—Cdr. Didier Ratsiraka

Ministers

Economy and Commerce—Justin Rarivoson
Finance and Planning—Rakotovao Razakoboana
Foreign Affairs—Remi Tiandraza
Information—Gaston Laha
Interior—Lt. Col. Jaona Mampila

Ambassador to the U.S.—Henri Raharijaona
Ambassador to the U.N.—Blaise Rabetafika

Madagascar maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2374 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

After gaining power at independence, former President Tsiranana's Social Democrat Party gradually assumed increased authority in national and provincial life. In March 1972 President Tsiranana won reelection without opposition. However, rising political and social tensions resulted in massive demonstrations against the government in May 1972. President Tsiranana resigned and Gen. Ramanantsoa became Head of Government.

On February 5, 1975, after several weeks of tension, Ramanantsoa resigned, handing over full executive powers to Lt. Col. Richard Ratsimandrava who formed a new cabinet. The immediate transition was peaceful. The preceding political unrest was caused by economic stagnation and personal and ethnic rivalries. On the evening of February 11 Ratsimandrava was assassinated. Maj. Gen. Gilles Andriamahazo formed a provisional 18-member Military Directory with representation from all of the Provinces. This government proceeded to suppress an open rebellion by a dissident police unit suspected of responsibility for the assassination. Later a trial was held in which almost 300 persons, including former President Tsiranana, were accused of complicity in the assassination. Most, however, were later released or found not guilty. In June 1975 a new government was formed by former Foreign Minister Didier Ratsiraka.

ECONOMY

In recent years Madagascar's economy has grown slowly or not at all because of its distance from external markets, lack of infrastructure, fluctuating world prices for agricultural commodities, and government policies

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Winter is not as cold and summer is not as hot as Washington, D.C. Wear cottons from October through April; average weight woolens from May through September. Bring rainwear.

Customs—A valid passport, entry visa, and a certificate showing immunizations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are required for entry.

Health—Take reasonable precautions in preparing fruits, vegetables, and meats. Don't drink water from the tap. Don't swim in still waters. The climate seems to encourage colds and bronchitis.

Telecommunications—Long-distance telephone and telegraph service is available.

Transportation—Madagascar's Ivato International Airport is served by several international airlines and the national carrier, Air Madagascar. Travel within the country is difficult by land, but Air Madagascar offers regularly scheduled service to over 50 cities on the island. Taxis are plentiful in the capital.

which have not attracted new private investment. Madagascar's economy is principally agricultural, with rice the country's basic food crop. Although cattle raising is extensive, its potential is only beginning to be explored. Agricultural products (mainly coffee, vanilla, and cloves), meat, fish and shellfish make up 72 percent of Malagasy exports.

France continues to be Madagascar's principal trading partner, supplying it with 48 percent of its imports and purchasing 37 percent of all Malagasy exports. The United States, Madagascar's second best customer, purchased nearly one-quarter of Malagasy exports in 1974. However, U.S. exports to Madagascar have comprised only 7 percent of total Malagasy imports, largely because of customs preferences favoring the European Economic Community (EEC). Since independence the value of Malagasy exports has averaged about two-thirds the value of imports.

Since 1972 the government has pursued a policy of rapidly enlarging its control over and direct participation in the economy. A number of sectors are now reserved exclusively for the state or for state-dominated enterprise. Until recently most industry and commerce was in the hands of the French, Indians, and Chinese, with the latter two groups most prominent at the retail level, but this situation is changing under the impact of the government's new policies of "malagasization."

The Malagasy Republic has received large amounts of aid from France, the World Bank, and the EEC. U.S. aid is a modest supplement to this assistance.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Madagascar, as an island apart from Africa, has had its own history separate from the African continent and thus tends to remain somewhat detached from African affairs. The Malagasy Republic is, however, an active member in the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Since 1972 the Malagasy Government has moved away from its former close political, economic, and cultural ties with France. It maintains diplomatic relations with the leading Communist states. In 1972 the government renounced its previous policy of economic cooperation with the Republic of South Africa.

U.S.-MALAGASY RELATIONS

In the early 1800's an American residing on the west coast conducted considerable trade between the United States and Madagascar. In 1867 the United States and Madagascar concluded a commercial convention and in 1881 a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce.

Relations between the Malagasy Republic and the United States are good. U.S. direct private investment in Madagascar is about $7.3 million, mostly in petroleum refining and distribution. Modest amounts of economic aid have been provided to complement the assistance provided by other countries and to demonstrate U.S. interest in Madagascar.

Principal U.S. Officials

Chargé d'Affaires—Frederick Elfers
Economic/Commercial Officer—Gerald de Santillana
Defense Attaché—Lt. Col. Stanley Luther
Public Affairs Officer—G. Michael Razi

The U.S. Embassy in Madagascar is located at 14 rue Rainitovo, Antsahavola, Tananarive.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8015, Revised September 1975

APPENDIX X
MALAWI
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1976 (Publication 7790)]

background notes

department of state * january 1976

Malawi

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Malawi

GEOGRAPHY

Malawi, located in southeastern Africa, is bordered by Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique.

Part of the Great Rift Valley traverses Malawi from north to south. In this deep trough lies Lake Malawi, the third largest lake in Africa, which encompasses about 20 percent of the total land area. From the south end of the lake flows the Shire River, which joins the Zambezi River 250 miles further south in Mozambique. East and west of the Rift Valley the land rises to form high plateaus, generally between 3,000 and 4,000 feet above sea level. In the north the Nyika Uplands rise as high as 8,500 feet; south of the lake lie the Shire Highlands with an elevation of 2,000-3,500 feet rising to Mts. Zomba (7,000 feet) and Mulanje (10,000 feet). In the extreme south the elevation is only 200-300 feet above sea level.

The climate along Lake Malawi's shore during the wet season (November to April) can be quite humid. Elsewhere, however, the climate varies with the altitude. In the highlands it is equable and healthful, and at altitudes above 3,000 feet extreme heat is unusual. In the Shire River Valley the temperature can reach 120° F in October and November.

PEOPLE

In some parts of the heavily populated southern region, density may exceed 300 persons per square mile. Lilongwe, in the central region, was proclaimed the new capital in 1974 and has grown quickly from a population of 20,000 to more than 70,000. Blantyre remains the major commercial and transportation center and is the largest city. Zomba is Malawi's only other major urban area.

The Chewas constitute 90 percent of the population of the central region; the Nyanja is the major tribe in the south; and the Tumbuka is the predominant tribe in the north.

HISTORY

Malawi derives its name from the Maravi, a Bantu people who crossed Zambia from the southern Congo and entered Malawi centuries ago. On reaching the area north of Lake Malawi the tribe split; the ancestors of the present-day Chewas moved south to the west bank and the forbears of today's Nyanjas moved down the east bank. By 1500 the two divisions of the tribe had established the Maravi Kingdom stretching from the Dwangwa River (north of present-day Nkota Kota) to the Zambezi in the south, and from the lake in the east to the Luangwa River in the west.

Although the Portuguese were the

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 45,747 sq. mi. (about the size of Pa.). CAPITAL: Lilongwe (pop. 70,000). OTHER CITIES: Blantyre (170,000), Zomba (20,000).

People

POPULATION: 5.2 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.6%. DENSITY: 113 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Chewas, Nyanja, Lomwe, Yao, Sena, Tumbuka. RELIGIONS: Traditional African religions, Christianity, Islam. LANGUAGES: Chichewa, English. LITERACY: 25% (Chichewa), 6-8% (English).

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: July 6, 1964. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1966.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Head of Government, Chief of State), Cabinet. *Legislative*–unicameral Parliament (78-member National Assembly, 5-year term). *Judicial*–Magisterial Courts, Traditional Courts.

POLITICAL PARTY: Malawi Congress Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 24 Districts, 3 subdistricts.

FLAG: Black, red, and green horizontal stripes with half a red sun in the center of the black stripe.

Economy

GDP: $640.6 million (1974 prices). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 6.5%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $129 (1974 prices).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 32%. *Labor* 85%. *Products*–tobacco, tea, sugar, peanuts, cotton.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 15%. *Products*–food, beverages, tobacco, footwear, clothing, textiles.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Limestone.

TRADE: *Exports*–$121.8 million (1974): tobacco, tea, sugar, peanuts. *Imports*–$185.4 million (1974): machinery, transportation equipment, manufactured goods, building materials. *Partners*–EC, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Japan, US.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 kwacha=US$1.13 (Nov. 1974, pegged to SDR).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Donors*–UK, Denmark, IBRD, South Africa, US, FRG, and Canada. *US only*–$54 million (1964-75): includes projects in education, transportation, and public health.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth of Nations, associate member of European Communities (EC).



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first Europeans to reach the area now known as Malawi, the first significant contact with the West dates from the arrival of David Livingstone (a Scottish missionary-explorer) at Lake Malawi on September 16, 1859. After his death in 1873 the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland established missions as memorials to him—one at Blantyre (named after his Scottish birthplace, Ballantrae), and the other at Livingstonia, first located at the southern end of Lake Malawi but later moved to the north.

During the latter part of the 19th century Malawi was the scene of constant turmoil as invading tribes ravaged the land in search of slaves.

Missionaries could not obtain supplies or services except by trade. To relieve them of this commercial burden, a number of businessmen, mostly from Glasgow, formed the African Lakes Company in 1878 as a transport and trading concern to work in close cooperation with mission activities. One of their objectives was to help abolish the slave trade by demonstrating its economic unsoundness in the face of legitimate commerce.

These pioneers were followed by other European missionaries, traders, hunters, and coffee planters. In 1883 a consul of the British Government was accredited to "the Kings and Chiefs of Central Africa." In 1891 the British established the Nyasaland Protectorate.

Beginning in 1953 Nyasaland was joined with Northern and Southern Rhodesia to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By the late 1950's pressures were being exerted

within Nyasaland for independence. This movement was spurred by the arrival in July 1958 of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, who in his long absence from Malawi had resided in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ghana. Dr. Banda assumed leadership of the Nyasaland African Congress (shortly thereafter renamed the Malawi Congress Party). On April 15, 1961, a year after a constitutional conference took place at London, elections for a new Legislative Council were held in the protectorate. Under the leadership of Dr. Banda, the Malawi Congress Party won an overwhelming victory and later gained an important role in the new Executive Council as well. Within a year of this election, the Malawi Congress Party ruled Nyasaland in all but name. In a second constitutional conference held at London in November 1962, the British Government agreed that Nyasaland would become self-governing the following year.

After a series of implementing administrative amendments to the existing Constitution, Dr. Banda became Prime Minister on February 1, 1963. Certain powers were retained by the British in the fields of finance, security, and justice. A new Constitution came into effect in May, along with a governmental structure based on the British ministerial system and providing for virtually complete internal self-government. On December 31, 1963, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved, and on July 6, 1964, Nyasaland became fully independent as Malawi and as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Exactly 2 years later, following adoption of a new Constitution, Malawi became a Republic with Dr. Banda as its first President.

Shortly after independence a group of younger Cabinet ministers challenged Dr. Banda's leadership and, failing in their efforts to secure changes in certain of his policies, left the country. Since that time there have been no serious threats to the government of President Banda.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Government of Malawi is a greatly modified version of the British system. Under the 1966 Constitution, the President is to be selected by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) officials and tribal chiefs every 5 years. However, this requirement has been waived in the case of Dr. Banda, who was acclaimed President for life in 1970 by a unanimous resolution of the MCP convention. In the event of the death or resignation of the President, executive powers are exercised by a three-man presidential commission until a successor is chosen by an electoral college of MCP officials and approved by the electorate. Malawi has no vice president. The Cabinet, whose members are either drawn from or become members of the Parliament, is appointed by the President.

Malawi's unicameral National Assembly (usually referred to as Parliament) has 60 elected members and 18 other members who are appointed by the President. In the past, President Banda named representatives of Malawi's small European and Asian minorities and also several women to fill these nominated seats. Indigenous Malawians, including five women, now hold all seats in the National Assembly.

Malawi has essentially two judicial systems: the Magisterial Courts, headed by a three-member Supreme Court, and the Traditional Courts, created in 1970 and based largely on the local courts system introduced by the British before independence. Unlike officials of the earlier local courts, however, a majority of the members of the Traditional Courts are chiefs and they have jurisdiction to hear any type of criminal case, including homicide. There are no appeals allowed from courts in the traditional system to courts in the magisterial line.

Local government is carried out in 24 Districts and 3 subdistricts which are administered, respectively, by District Commissioners and Regional Ministers with Cabinet rank. All are appointed by the central government.

Malawi has only one authorized political party, the Malawi Congress Party. The next National Assembly elections are scheduled for the spring of 1976.

Principal Government Officials

President; Minister of External Affairs; Defense; Works and Supplies; Agriculture and Natural Resources—Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda

Ministers

Finance; Trade, Industry, and Tourism—Dick T. Matenje

Transport and Communication; Labor—Wadson Deleza

Education—R.T.C. Munyenyembe

Health—E.C.I. Bwanali

Justice; Attorney General—Richard A. Banda

Minister of State—A.A. Muwalo Nqumayo

Governor of the Reserve Bank—John Tembo

Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N.—Jacob T.X. Muwamba

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Wear summer clothing from Sept. to April; woolens from May to August. The Malawi Government bans slacks or shorts (except for sports) for women; dresses must cover the kneecap.

Customs and Currency—Travelers must have a valid passport or travel document as well as visas for any of the countries they will be passing through en route to Malawi. A smallpox vaccination certificate and appropriate immunizations for travelers transiting through a yellow fever or cholera area are also required.

There is no limit on importing dollars or travelers checks; however, dollars may not be used as currency. Exportation of Malawi currency is limited.

Health—Medical facilities are few. Malaria is endemic. Tap water in Blantyre and Zomba is safe; in rural areas it must be boiled. Raw fruits and vegetables should be peeled. Do not swim in rivers; most parts of Lake Malawi are safe.

Telecommunications—Long-distance radio-telephone service is available; reception varies. Telegraph services connect all principal Malawian areas with the US and other overseas areas.

Transportation—Blantyre's Chileka Airport has regular service from the US via London, Nairobi, or Johannesburg. Of the 5,000 miles of roads, which connect all parts of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique, the major routes are paved; others have all-weather dirt and gravel. Traffic moves on the left. The Malawi railway system runs between the east coast ports and the lakeshore resorts but is slow. Rental cars and taxis are usually available in the major areas.

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Malawi maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2362 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

ECONOMY

With the exception of limestone, Malawi has no significant exploitable mineral resources. The economy is essentially agricultural; 85 percent of the population is engaged directly or indirectly in that sector, and virtually all exports are agricultural. Light manufacturing has grown twice as fast as the economy as a whole over the last 5 years and now accounts for 20 percent of Malawi's gross domestic product.

From 1964 until 1972 Malawi's budget deficits were covered by loans and grants from the United Kingdom. In each of the years following the end of the budget support, Malawi has run a small surplus in its revenue account. Malawi's visible trade balance widened to $63.6 million in 1974. The continued sharp growth in the import bill and the loss of offsetting factor income began a steady decline in Malawi's external reserves in 1975.

Malawian exports to the United States in 1974 totaled $7.2 million, and imports from the U.S. totaled $5.3 million.

The Office of the President is responsible for national development planning, and Dr. Banda personally heads the National Development Committee. Malawi has a 3-year development plan which is revised every year in light of domestic requirements and changing revenue prospects. At the same time, Malawi has a 10-year program which provides guidelines under which the 3-year plans will continue to operate. The 1975/76-1977/78 program plans a total expenditure of $196 million, of which $152 million is to come from external sources. The first-year program investment is projected at $67 million, of which 37 percent will go into the transportation sector, 24 percent to agriculture, and just over 5 percent each to forestry, posts and communications, and power and government buildings.

The Malawi Government encourages foreign investment, although it reserves the right to judge need and location in granting industrial licenses. Repatriation of capital and profits requires prior approval from the Reserve Bank and the Ministry of Finance, but such approval has not been difficult to obtain. Investment conditions are stable. While Malawi remains a relatively small market and is likely to increase contact and trade with the Common Market, it should continue to provide investment opportunities for U.S. firms in the years ahead.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Under President Banda Malawi's foreign policy orientation has been pro-Western. It maintains diplomatic relations with principal Western countries but eschews contact with Communist nations. It is a member of the U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, the OAU, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the GATT. It is also one of the signatories to the Lomé Convention (1975), which deals with tariff preferences in the EC countries.

Unlike most other African countries Malawi does not believe that policies of isolation, embargo, or violence will be successful in promoting racial equality in southern Africa. Malawi, therefore, maintains full diplomatic relations with South Africa. In 1971 President Banda paid an official state visit to South Africa, the first leader of an independent black African state to do so. The South African President returned the visit in 1972.

States currently maintaining Embassies or High Commissions in Malawi include the U.S., U.K., Federal Republic of Germany, France, Republic of China, Israel, Zambia, India, and South Africa.

U.S.-MALAWI RELATIONS

The United States enjoys cordial relations with Malawi. Since 1964 the U.S. has given $54 million in development funds, concentrated on projects in education, transportation, and public health. It also has a modest Peace Corps program which supplies skilled volunteers to fill specific jobs designated by the Malawi Government. A small U.S. Information Service (USIS) library is maintained in Malawi, and the United States supports an exchange program under which almost 80 Malawians have visited the United States since 1949. President Banda has visited the United States several times, most recently in 1967.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Robert A. Stevenson
Counselor—Herbert A. Hoffman
Economic/Commercial Officer— J. Douglas Koelemay
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—William Pfender
Peace Corps Director—Joseph Hilliard

The U.S. Embassy is located on Victoria Ave., Blantyre. As of April 1976 the Embassy will be in Lilongwe in the new Capital City Development Area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7790, Revised January 1976

APPENDIX Y
MALI
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, June 1976 (Publication 8056)]

background notes

Mali

department of state * june 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Mali

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Mali is located in the interior of West Africa. Its bordering neighbors are all former French territories: Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger.

Most of the country is in the West African savanna region, an area in transition between the coastal rain forest and the desert. The northern part of the country lies within the Sahara Desert. It is broken by rocky hills, but otherwise is flat and dry with virtually no rainfall. Mali's climate becomes more hospitable south of Timbuktu, which is on an ancient caravan route. The south and west have a short but regular rainy season (June-September).

The Niger River (known locally as Djoliba) and its tributaries are vital to the life of Mali. For most of its course within Mali, the Niger is navigable from mid-June to mid-December by large riverboats and by smaller craft throughout the year. The farmland region is along the banks of the Niger.

Only about 10 percent of the Malians live in cities of more than 5,000 inhabitants. The remainder live in small towns and villages and are engaged in traditional pursuits as farmers, fishermen, herdsmen, artisans, and merchants.

There are no accurate statistics on the ethnic composition of the Malian population. Since Mali's location in the savanna region has meant mobility and mingling of the tribes, the population is relatively homogeneous, socially and culturally. The desert nomads, such as the Tuareg, who are related to North African Berbers, are a case apart. In the past, they have traditionally opposed the authority of the Central Government at Bamako, although a *modus vivendi* appears to have been achieved in recent years. European residents number only about 4,000, most of who are French.

Malians are predominantly Muslim or influenced by Islam. There are also 40,000-50,000 Christians. Throughout

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 464,873 sq. mi. (about the size of Calif. and Tex. combined). CAPITAL: Bamako (pop. 200,000). OTHER CITIES: Mopti (pop. 32,400), Kayes (pop. 28,500), Segou (pop. 28,100), Sikasso (pop. 21,800), Gao (pop. 15,400), and Timbuktu (pop. 9,000).

People

POPULATION: 5.63 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.3% (1975). DENSITY: 12 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Mandé (Bambara, Malinké, Sarakollé) 50%; Peul 17.2%; Voltaic 12.2%; Songhai 5.6%; Tuareg and Moors 4.6%. RELIGIONS: 90% Islam, 9% indigenous, 1% Christian. LANGUAGES: French (official), Bambara (spoken by about 80% of the population). LITERACY: Under 5%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 38 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: September 22, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: June 2, 1974.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government), Council of Ministers (under guidance of the Military Committee of National Liberation (MCNL)). *Legislative*–Military Committee of National Liberation (MCNL). *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: Universal over age 21. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 6 Regions.

FLAG: 3 vertical bands–green, yellow, and red–from left to right.

Economy

GDP: $457 million (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 5.2%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $81. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 2%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 50%. *Labor* 90%. *Products*–sorghum, millet, livestock, cotton, fishing, peanuts, rice.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 1%. *Products*–textiles, food processing.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Iron ore, bauxite, uranium, copper, manganese, phosphate, gold.

TRADE: *Exports*–$35 million (1974): meat, livestock, cotton, fish, peanuts and peanut byproducts, tannery products. *Partners*–France and other members of the Common Market, Communist countries, Ivory Coast. (U.S. $200,000.) *Imports*–$100 million (1974): food, machinery, vehicles, petroleum products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, textiles. *Partners*–France and other members of the Common Market, Communist countries, Ivory Coast. (U.S. $5.6 million–mostly food grains.)

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1FF (French Franc)=100MF (Mali Franc); 450-500MF=US$1.

U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: $84 million, 1961-76, including PL 480 commodities.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity, Senegal River Valley Development Organization (O.M.V.S.), Liptako-Gourma Authority, West African Economic Community (CEAO), associate member of the European Communities, Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), African Development Bank, Niger River Commission, Non-Aligned Movement, Permanent Interstate Committee for the Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS).


MALI
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road or track
International airport
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
ALGERIA
El Mreiti
Taoudenni
Bidon Cinq
Tessalit
MAURITANIA
Tidjikja
Oualata
Lac Faguibine
Tombouctou
Niger
Bourem
Gao
Lac Niangaye
Aioun-el-Atrouss
Lac Debo
Nioro
Yélimané
Nioro du Sahel
Mopti
Kayes
Baoulé
NIGER
Dogondoutchi
NIAMEY
Ségou
Bani
San
UPPER VOLTA
Kita
Koulikoro
Volta
OUAGADOUGOU
BAMAKO
Bani
Volta Noire
Volta Blanche
Volta Rouge
Bougouni
Sikasso
Pendjari
Kandi
NIGERIA
GUINEA
Niger
Bobo Dioulasso
BENIN
Mamou
SIERRA LEONE
Kankan
IVORY COAST
GHANA
Sansanné-Mango
TOGO

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the decades Catholic and Protestant missionaries have performed many useful social services in Mali.

About 15 percent of primary-school-age children (6-14 years) attend school.

HISTORY

Mali is partial heir to the succession of ancient African empires that occupied the West African savanna. These empires were well-organized political groupings that engendered considerable security and prosperity. They were in touch with Mediterranean and Near Eastern centers of civilization by way of Saharan trade routes.

Malians take great pride in being descendants of these ancient kingdoms. The Malinké Kingdom of Mali, from which the present republic takes its name, had its origins on the upper Niger River in the 12th century. Expanding rapidly in the 13th century under the leadership of Soundiata Keita, it reached its height about 1325 with the conquest of Timbuktu and Gao. Thereafter the kingdom began to lose hold of its territory and by the 15th century was a shadow of its former self.

The Songhai Empire, centered in Gao, expanded its power during the period 1465-1530. At its peak under Askia Mohammed I, the Songhai Empire encompassed the Hausa States as far as Kano (in present-day Nigeria) and much of the territory that had belonged to Mali in the west. It was finally destroyed by a Moroccan invasion around 1600.

The French military penetration of Soudan (now Mali) began around 1880. Ten years later the French made a serious drive to occupy the interior, the timing and method of their advances being determined by military governors on the spot. A French civilian governor of Soudan was appointed in 1893, but resistance to French control was not eliminated until 1898, when the Malinké warrior Samory Touré was defeated after 7 years of war. In establishing their rule, the French made attempts to rule indirectly, but in many areas they disregarded traditional authorities and and governed instead through appointed chiefs.

As the colony of Soudan, Mali was administered with other French colonial territories as the Federation of French West Africa. In 1946 a Soudanese Territorial Assembly was elected on the basis of a restricted franchise and endowed with power to raise and dispose of territorial revenues. Soudan also acquired the right to elect representatives to the French National Assembly. The French Governor of Soudan, however, retained all executive power.

In early 1957, as a result of France's Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre), the Territorial Assembly obtained extensive powers over internal affairs and was permitted to form a cabinet with executive authority over matters within the Assembly's competence. After the 1958 French constitutional referendum, Soudan became a member state of the French Community with complete internal autonomy.

In January 1959 Soudan joined Senegal to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent within the French Community on June 20, 1960. The Federation collapsed on August 20, 1960, when Senegal seceded. On September 22, 1960, Soudan proclaimed itself the Republic of Mali and withdrew from the French Community.

Mali has been ruled by its army since a bloodless coup d'état on November 19, 1968, which deposed the former regime of Modibo Keita.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Mali's Constitution was suspended at the time of the 1968 coup. A new Constitution was approved by a national referendum in 1974; however, it is not scheduled to come into full effect until 1980. The President is Chief of State and Head of Government. An 11-member Military Committee of National Liberation (MCNL) is the supreme policymaking body in the country. Composed of army officers who have functional responsibilities, it is the executive arm of the government and performs functions of a legislature. Under the executive direction of the MCNL the Council of Ministers (cabinet) carries out and administers the policies of the government.

The legal system of Mali is based on codes inherited from France at the time of independence. New laws have been enacted to make the system conform to Malian life, but those French colonial laws not abrogated still have the force of law. The apex of the judicial structure is the Supreme Court.

Administratively, Mali is divided into six Regions, each under an appointed Governor. Each Region consists of from five to nine districts, or

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing–Summer clothing is suitable for Bamako. Sturdy shoes are needed because of sand, gravel, mud, and unpaved roads. Heavy raincoats, high boots, and umbrellas are needed for the rainy season (June-September).

Communications–Long-distance telephone communication is generally unsatisfactory. Local telegraphic service is not reliable.

Health and Medicine–Several European physicians are available in Bamako. Bring a supply of any needed medication. Local pharmacies do not always carry even simple remedies. Insects are an ever-present problem, as are rats and rabies. Tap water should be boiled and filtered; avoid local milk and cream products. Order meats well done.

Touring–The best time to travel is during the cool season (November-February), when trips up the Niger River are possible. Mali has some of Africa's most photographically interesting sights and a growing tourist business, but most trips are still for the hardy. A visa must be obtained for entry into Mali.

Transportation–Mali has nearly 1,000 miles of paved roads and many laterite roads that are generally passable. Privately owned automobiles are the principal means of transportation within Bamako for Americans. Bus service is irregular and unreliable. Taxis are available at stands and are inexpensive. Depending on the time of year there are between two and four flights weekly from Paris to Bamako. From New York there are connections at Dakar and Casablanca. Passengers transiting Dakar should have a valid Senegalese visa. Air Mali operates from Bamako to Kayes, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, and other points within Mali.

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Rotberg, Robert A. *A Political History of Tropical Africa.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965.

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Zolberg, Aristide R. *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

cercles, administered by commandants. The larger towns elect their own municipal councils.

The MCNL has banned political activity and all political parties for the present, as it strives to mobilize national energies to revive and stabilize the country's economy.

Principal Government Officials

President—Col. Moussa Traoré

Ministers

Plan and Vice President of MCNL—Lt. Col. Baba Diarra

Foreign Affairs—Col. Charles Samba Sissoko

Transport and Public Works—Lt. Col. Karim Dembele

Defense, Interior, and Security—Lt. Col. Kissima Doukara

Justice—Lt. Col. Mamadou Sanogo

Rural Development—Sory Coulibaly

Information and Telecommunications—Yaya Bagayoko

State Companies and Enterprises—Sekou Sangare

Labor and Public Services—Hassim Diawara

Public Health and Social Affairs—Mamadou Keita

National Education—Mustapha Soumare

Finance and Trade—Koundete Keita

Industrial Development and Tourism—Lamine Keita

Youth, Sports, Arts, and Culture—Mahamane Toure

Mali maintains an Embassy at 2130 R Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008, and a Permanent Mission to the United Nations at 111 E. 69th Street, New York City, N.Y. 10020.

ECONOMY

Agricultural products, livestock, fishing, and forestry account for about half the GDP, occupy about 90 percent of the working population, and contribute virtually all of Mali's exports. The GDP declined in 1973 and 1974 due to drought losses. Although there were normal harvests in 1975-76, Mali is a Sahel country and will undoubtedly experience droughts in the future.

Cropland is limited to the southern half of the country where there is sufficient rainfall, where irrigation is possible, or where flooding from rivers takes place. The agricultural sector is dominated by the small-scale traditional farming with subsistence farming undertaken on about 90 percent of the 3.4 million acres under cultivation.

Rice and cotton are grown by the Office du Niger, a large-scale agricultural project established in 1932 to introduce intensive agriculture through irrigation in the "delta" of the Niger River (between Segou and Timbuktu). Most of the land (125,000 acres under cultivation) is farmed by tenant farmers.

Rain-grown cotton comes from south-central Mali, where a French company has successfully encouraged production. Peanuts are grown principally in the west. Fish is an important source of food for people living along the Niger River. The surplus is smoked, salted, or dried, and exported.

Until 1972 Mali's greatest resource was livestock, totaling about 5 million cattle and 10 million sheep and goats. The national herd was seriously depleted by the drought. However, the livestock industry will be important for Mali's future as an area of potential growth for the country's economy.

In the past Mali was self-sufficient in grains—millet, sorghum, rice, and corn. Mediocre harvests, a growing population, and changing dietary habits, however, have resulted in small grain deficits each year since 1965, with major shortages occurring in 1969 and 1971 and a major drought from 1972 to 1974. The United States has helped to fill the gap with sorghum, corn, and wheat flour provided under the Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) program and through special drought recovery projects. The United States and other donors are working with Mali to increase local agricultural production. Soon Mali should return to its traditional position as a net exporter of foodstuffs to neighboring states.

Deposits of bauxite, uranium, iron ore, copper, manganese, and phosphate are known to exist, but are not mined because of the lack of transportation and power facilities. However, a small amount of gold is extracted.

During the colonial period, private capital investment was virtually nonexistent, and public investment was largely devoted to the Office du Niger irrigation scheme and to administrative overhead. Since independence, however, Mali has built some light industries with the help of various aid donors, but industrialization has not advanced far. Manufacturing, consisting principally of processed agricultural products, accounted for some 11 percent of the GDP in 1974.

The People's Republic of China has built a textile factory, tannery, sugar mill, and a cigarette and match factory. Yugoslavia has contributed a cannery, North Korea a ceramics factory, the Soviet Union a cement plant, the Federal Republic of Germany a peanut-oil mill, and the European Development Fund of the European Communities (Common Market) a modern slaughterhouse. Several American firms have petroleum exploration agreements with Mali.

Mali is a member of the franc monetary area.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In Mali as elsewhere in Africa, the vital issues of the 1970's are becoming increasingly economic and less political. Since independence in 1960, Mali has gone from a strong ideological commitment to socialism to a pragmatic military regime which welcomes all aid donors and encourages private investment.

Mali follows a nonaligned foreign policy and seeks a broad range of contacts with both East and West. Although Western embassies at Bamako are outnumbered by missions from Communist countries, Mali's relations with the United States and other Western nations are good.

Mali is a strong advocate of regional economic cooperation. Together with Mauritania and Senegal, it formed the Senegal River Valley Development Organization. Other regional economic organizations with active Malian participation include the Liptako-Gourma Authority which seeks to develop the contiguous area of Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta; the Niger River Commission, and the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). Mali also belongs to the two organizations seeking to reduce trade barriers in West Africa—the West African Economic Community (CEAO) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Mali is active in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies, and takes an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

U.S.-MALI RELATIONS

The United States wishes to see Mali pursue its national goals with a healthy degree of stability, free of outside domination. The principal U.S. interest is to work with the Malian Government to carrry out an effective development program. The objectives are to help Mali become self-sufficient in food production, to increase Mali's livestock exports, to repair the country's transportation network for distribution of vital food imports, and to devise an ecological strategy that makes productive use of the fragile Sahel grasslands. It is hoped that Mali will succeed in its economic stabilization program and that it will join with neighboring states to improve regional economic cooperation.

From 1946 through June 1971 the U.S. allocated about $24 million for bilateral economic aid, including about $9 million for Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) commodities. In 1973-75, the United States, in response to a series of disastrous droughts in Mali, channeled 122,100 tons of emergency food valued at $28.6 million as well as over $5 million in nonfood assistance as drought relief. Under the impetus of the drought, the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) assistance has evolved to a major economic development program amounting to more than $25 million. The Peace Corps program began in April 1971; about 30 volunteers are engaged in various agricultural activities.

There is a small cultural exchange program with Mali through which 167 Malians visited the United States in the period 1949-76.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Vacant
Counselor of Embassy—Stephen P. Dawkins
Political Officer—David Rawson
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Alan L. Gilbert
Consular Officer—Lawrence Rossin

The U.S. Embassy in Mali is located at Rue Testard and Rue Mohamed V, Bamako. The mailing address is B.P. 34, Bamako.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8056, Revised June 1976

APPENDIX Z
MAURITANIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, November 1976 (Publication 8169)]

background notes

Mauritania

department of state * november 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Islamic Republic of Mauritania

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Mauritania is situated in northwest Africa bounded by Mali, Algeria, Senegal, the former Spanish Sahara, and the Atlantic Ocean.

There are three distinct geographic regions in Mauritania: (1) a narrow belt along the Senegal River Valley in the south, where soil and climatic conditions permit settled agriculture; (2) a broad, central east-west band characterized by vast sand plains and fixed dunes held in place by sparse grass and scrub trees; and (3) a large northern arid region shading into the Sahara Desert and characterized by shifting sand dunes, rock outcroppings, and rugged mountainous plateaus with elevations of more than 1,500 feet (456 m.).

The climate throughout Mauritania is hot and, except for certain sections in the south, dry. In most of the country daytime temperatures exceed 100°F (38°C) for more than 6 months of the year, but the cool nights bring relief. In the south it is cooler, but there is little temperature difference between day and night. The limited rainfall is concentrated in the south from July through October.

Mauritania's population is unevenly distributed. The Moors are nomadic herdsmen and warriors. The black Africans are primarily sedentary farmers congregated in the Senegal River Valley. There are approximately 2,000 Europeans, primarily French, and Spaniards from the Canary Islands.

HISTORY

Tens of thousands of years ago, the Sahara regions were verdant and filled with herds of game. Archaeological evidence suggests that Berber and Negroid Mauritanians lived beside one another before the spread of the desert drove them southward. This movement was increased in the third and fourth centuries A.D., when Berber groups arrived seeking pasturage for their herds and safety from political unrest and war in the north. The Berber's use of the camel allowed them to range widely over the expanding desert regions and also supported the development of a caravan trade system throughout the region; this

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 419,229 sq. mi. (1,085,795 sq. km., about four-fifths the size of Alaska); administrates and regards as Mauritanian approximately 34,000 sq. mi. (88,060 sq. km.) of Western Sahara, formerly Spanish Sahara. CAPITAL: Nouakchott (pop. 120,000). OTHER CITIES: Nouadhibou (30,000).

People

POPULATION: 1.4 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1975 est.). DENSITY: 3 per sq. mi. (1.3 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab-Berber, one-third; Arab-Berber-Negroid, one-third; Negroid, one-third. RELIGION: Islam. LANGUAGES: Hassaniya Arabic, French (official), various Niger-Congo languages. LITERACY: 10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 44 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Constitutional republic. INDEPENDENCE: November 28, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: May 23, 1961.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*–National Assembly. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Mauritanian People's Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 12 Regions and 1 District (Nouakchott); plus the Wilaya of Tiris el Gharbia and the Department of la Guera (Western Sahara).

FLAG: Against a green background, a yellow star over a yellow crescent.

Economy

GDP: $241.2 million (1974 projected from 1975 data). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4.5%. ANNUAL RATE OF INFLATION LAST THREE YEARS: 9.4%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $70 (traditional sector), $500 (modern sector). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 2.5%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 5%. *Labor* 90+%. *Products*–livestock, cereal, dates, green arabic.

INDUSTRY: *Labor*–less than 10%. *Products*–iron and copper ore, gypsum, fish processing.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Iron ore, copper, gypsum.

TRADE (1975): *Exports*–$140 million. *Partners*–France, UK, Spain, Italy. *Imports*–$166 million. *Partners*–France, US, UK, Senegal, Fed. Rep. of Germany.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 52.43 ouguiya (um)=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$14.8 million (1973). *US only*–$2 million (1973), $13.7 million (1974–primarily drought relief).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, OAU, Organization for the Development of the Senegal Valley, assoc. mem. of the EEC, and the Interstate Committee to Combat the Sahel Drought.


Mauritania
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International Airport
Partition line as defined in the April 14, 1976, Accord signed by Mauritania and Morocco
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
12
24
20
16
Tarfaya
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
Bir Mogrein
Villa Cisneros
F'derik
Tazadit
Nouadhibou
Cap Blanc
ADRAR
Atar
Ile Tidra
Cap Timiris
Akjoujt
Tidjikdj
Nouakchott
TRARZA
Aleg
Rosso
Boghé
Kaédi
Kiffa
'Ayoûn el 'Atroûs
Néma
Timbédra
Kenkossa
Sélibaby
Dakar
SENEGAL
MALI
THE GAMBIA
Banjul
Tambacounda
Senegal

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trade in turn promoted the Berber's loose Sanhadja Confederation. Trade involved gold, slaves, and ivory going north in exchange for salt, copper, cloth, and other items going south to Timbuktu and beyond. Important trading towns were established, and the Islamic faith spread along the trade routes.

In the 10th century, conquests by warriors of the Sudanese kingdom of Ghana broke up the confederation, which had become weakened by internal strife, and the Ghanaians became the dominant force in the eastern and southern regions. In the 11th century, the conquest of the western Sahara regions by a Berber tribe which later spread into North Africa and Spain destroyed the Ghanaian kingdom and firmly established Islam throughout Mauritania. These people in turn were defeated in the 16th century by Arab invaders led by the Beni Hassan.

The Moorish people who now inhabit Mauritania are thus primarily of Berber stock, with some admixture of Arab and Negroid. The descendants of the Arab warriors became the upper stratum of Moorish society, and Arabic generally displaced Berber dialects as the language of the country. Beneath the Hassan tribes, but often effectively their social equals, came the "Marabout" tribes, whose leading figures served as the repositories and teachers of Islamic tradition. Some of the more important Marabouts (holy men) founded religious brotherhoods whose influence extended well beyond their tribal group. A few of these brotherhoods still have considerable followings as far afield as Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and Maghreb.

French military penetration of Mauritania began early in the 20th century, but the area was not brought fully under French control until about 1934. Until independence, the French governed the country largely by relying on the authority of the tribal chiefs, some of whom, such as the Emirs of Trarza and Adrar, had considerable authority.

Under French occupation, slavery was legally abolished, and the payment of tribute was reduced or eliminated. French occupation also led to a return of sedentary Negroid peoples across the Senegal River into southern Mauritania, an area from which they had been expelled gradually in earlier years by warlike Moorish nomads.

A French protectorate over "the Moorish country" was proclaimed in 1903, and Mauritania became a French colony in 1920. Its area was increased substantially in 1945, when the Hodh region of French Soudan (now Mali) was administratively transferred to Mauritania. Certain parts of this territory were ceded back to Mali in mutual territorial adjustments in 1964. As a member of the French West African Federation, Mauritania participated in the postwar social and political progress of the French colonies. Its elected officals gained wide authority early in 1957 as a result of the Overseas Reform Act (*Loi Cadre*), and Mauritania entered the French Community as an autonomous but not fully sovereign state after the French constitutional referendum in September 1958.

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania was proclaimed in November 1958, and shortly thereafter the process of transferring Mauritania's administrative services from Saint-Louis, Senegal, to the new capital of Nouakchott was begun. Mauritania became independent in 1960. In June 1961 it signed agreements with France defining post-independence relations with the former metropole. Mauritania withdrew from the French Community in 1966.

Since February 27, 1976, Mauritania has administered as its own national territory the southern one-third of the Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Mauritanian Constitution, adopted in 1961, replaced the former parliamentary-type government with a presidential system. The President (Chief of State and Head of Government) is elected by direct universal suffrage for a 5-year term. He chooses the Cabinet, which is responsible only to him. The President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and has the power to sign and ratify treaties.

Legislative power is vested in a unicameral 77-member National Assembly, also elected by direct universal suffrage for a 5-year term (seven Members from the Western Sahara).

Judicial authority is constitutionally independent of the executive and legislative branches. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Conservative summer apparel is suitable year round; however, a lightweight coat or sweater is recommended for chilly winter evenings. Sturdy suede-like shoes are best for Mauritania's sandy terrain.

Communications—There is radiotelephone service between Nouakchott and most regional capitals. Radiotelephone and wireless communications with Europe and the United States are available on the Nouakchott-Paris line.

Customs—An entry visa is required for all Americans. Travelers passing through Dakar need a Senegalese entry visa.

Health—Nouakchott's single government-run hospital is staffed by French-speaking doctors. One pharmacy stocks a complete line of French drugs, but no American drugs are sold. Within Nouakchott, sanitary conditions are fair. Immunization against yellow fever is required for entry.

Transportation—Public transport in Mauritania is by road or air. There is no bus service in Nouakchott, and taxis are plentiful and inexpensive. The main road—Dakar-Nouakchott-Akjoujt—is paved and motorable in all seasons. All other Mauritanian roads are unpaved.

There are three nonstop flights weekly from New York to Dakar, and four flights weekly from Dakar to Nouakchott.

Tourism—Saint-Louis, the former French administrative capital of Mauritania, is in Senegal, about 5 hours by road from Nouakchott. This picturesque colonial town was one of the earliest French settlements in Africa. Atar is the ancient capital of the Almoravide Kingdom. Chinguetti is the seventh holy city of Islam, with houses and mosques dating back to the 13th century. Travel and accommodations in the interior must be planned well in advance of any trip.

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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IBRD. *Mauritania: Guidelines for a Four-Year Development Program.* Washington, D.C., 1968.

Mercer, John. *Spanish Sahara.* London: Allen & Unwin, 1976.

Westebbe, Richard M. *The Economy of Mauritania.* New York: Praeger, 1971.

Zartman, William I. *The Sahara: Bridge or Barrier?* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963.

The Mauritanian People's Party (*Hizb es Sha'b*) was formed in December 1961, uniting all active political groups in the country, and was lawfully established as the sole political party in December 1964. Effective decisionmaking within the party is done by a small Permanent Committee chaired by the party's Secretary General, President Moktar Ould Daddah, although the party is theoretically governed by a 40-man National Political Bureau (BPN). The BPN includes government ministers, party federal secretaries from each Region, and elected representatives. There is no organized opposition party.

The latest National Assembly and presidential elections were held in August 1976. President Ould Daddah was reelected for a fourth term, and seven new members were elected from the Western Sahara.

In early 1969 Mauritania's labor union, the *Union des Travailleurs Mauritaniens* (UTM), split into two factions. One faction continued to accept party control of the labor movement, while the other supported an independent labor movement. The party congress of July 1971 adopted the principle of integration of the UTM into the party and worked to promote the success of this policy during 1972. On August 10, 1973, the First Congress of the integrated UTM was held, supported by the membership of almost 75 percent of the registered workers.

For administrative purposes, Mauritania is divided into 12 Regions (*Wilayas*) and one District (Nouakchott). In addition, Mauritania has also established the *Wilaya* of Tiris el Gharbia and the Department of la Guera as divisions of the Western Sahara, and administers them as Mauritanian territory.

In August 1975, restructuring of ministries organized the government into three sectors: social, economic, and national sovereignty. Each sector is composed of two or more ministries of state, which in turn (Foreign Affairs excepted) is made up of three or more ministries.

Principal Government Officials

President—Moktar Ould Daddah
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Hamdi Ould Mouknass
Minister of Justice—Maloum Ould Braham
Minister of Defense—Abdallahi Ould Bah
Minister of Interior—Cheikh Saad Bouh Kane
Minister of State for Nation Economy—Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi
Minister of Finance—Mohamed Moulaye
Minister of Commerce and Transport—Hasni Ould Didi
Minister of Public Administration and Labor—Abdallahi Ould Cheikh
Ambassador to the U.N.—Moulaye El Hassen Ould Moktar
Ambassador to the U.S.—Mohamed Nassim Kochman

Mauritania maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2129 Leroy Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-232-5700).

ECONOMY

Mauritania has a dual economy, in which there is little interaction between the modern and traditional sectors.

The majority of Mauritania's inhabitants, either nomadic herdsmen or settled agriculturists, live within a subsistence-type economy, supplementing their incomes occasionally by wage employment or sale of produce on local markets. Settled agriculture is confined principally to the north bank of the Senegal River, where millet, sorghum, rice, and other cereals are the main crops. Some 12,000 tons of dates are produced annually from the date palms cultivated in the mountainous regions of Adrar, Tagant, and Assaba, and at the larger oases. Almost all agricultural produce is consumed locally.


Animal husbandry is the most important activity within the agricultural sector, and the herds are estimated at 7 million sheep and goats, 2 million cattle, and 700,000 camels. Cattle and sheep, driven to markets in Senegal and Mali, rank third among Mauritanian exports. However, the serious Sahel drought which struck Mauritania and its neighbors drastically affected the agricultural sector of the economy in 1969-1973. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that cattle herds were depleted by 75 percent. A good recovery began almost 2 years ago.

An innovative long-term multilateral project, the Sahel Development Program, is being planned with the goal of eventual food self-sufficency in Mauritania and the other Sahel States.

Mauritania's most important natural resource is the large deposit of high-grade iron ore in the F'Derick area, which was formerly exploited by a primarily foreign-owned company, MIFERMA, now by COMINOR, an operating subsidiary of the national

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government-holding company, the *Societe Nationale Industrielle et Miniére* (SNIM). MIFERMA was nationalized in 1974. A compensation agreement with the shareholders was reached in early 1976, and an initial payment of $40 million has been made by the Mauritanian Government. The initial cost of the iron ore project was $190 million. SNIM is now developing a major new GUELBS iron ore project, which would supplement and eventually replace the COMINOR operation as its ore is depleted.

Exports of the iron ore began in 1963 and reached a level of 8-9 million metric tons in 1972. The iron ore exports now account for 70 percent of Mauritania's foreign exchange earnings, and 20 percent of the government budget is financed from revenues obtained from the mines.

Exports of copper concentrates from a mine located at Akjoujt began in April 1971. Declining world copper prices and technical difficulties led to the mine's takeover by the government in April 1975. After a brief halt in operations, production was resumed in late 1975 but still amounts to only about one-half estimated capacity. Output in calendar year 1975 was 746,700 tons.

Oil exploration has been carried on by four firms, two of them American.

The shallow waters off the Mauritanian coast provide some of the more prolific fishing grounds in the world. In November 1965 a large fish processing and freezing plant was opened at Nouadhibou, and exports of fish and fish products caught by an international fishing fleet now account for more than 10 percent of recorded exports.

The decline in copper exports and the leveling off of receipts from iron ore had a sharp impact on Mauritania's balance of payments in 1975, and a trade deficit first experienced the previous year worsened somewhat. Although current government expenditures expanded considerably with the taking over of part of the Western Sahara, the Government of Mauritania assesses the outlook for the furture as more favorable, due to expected increases in iron, copper, and fish exports and anticipated inflows of long-term private capital which Mauritania is encouraging. The Third Economic and Development Plan for 1976-1980 was adopted on September 8, 1976, and the investment code was amended to provide greater encouragement for foreign private investment.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mindful of its Islamic religion, history, and traditions, its racially mixed population, and its geographic location, the Mauritanian Government has stated its intention to maintain friendly relations with Arab countries of North Africa and the black countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, Mauritania has placed increasing emphasis on its associations with the Arab countries of North Africa. In 1973 it joined the Arab League. However, this policy does not exclude sub-Saharan countries.

The thrust of Mauritania's foreign policy changed in 1965 from a pro-West stance to one of nonalignment in international affairs. Relations with France, based on friendly cultural and economic ties, have undergone some changes which are directed toward establishing greater autonomy for Mauritanian operations as well as equality as a basis for friendship. On February 15, 1973, five new accords were jointly signed which replace, in part, the original 1961 accords. Further agreements are still in the process of negotiation.

Mauritania withdrew from the African Financial Community (CFA) and introduced its own currency into circulation in July 1973.

Mauritania has long regarded a portion of the former Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara) as its national territory. On September 1969, King Hassan II of Morocco announced a reversal of his government's earlier policy of claiming sovereignty over Mauritanian territority. The two nations later began to work together regarding the question of the future of Western Sahara, and joined with Spain in a joint administration of the territory under the terms of the November 14, 1975, Madrid Accords. Mauritania and Morocco claimed and administered their respective zones upon Spain's withdrawal from Western Sahara on February 26, 1976. On April 14, 1976, Mauritania and Morocco signed a treaty establishing a new common border in the Western Sahara, with the southern one-third of the territory becoming a part of Mauritania and the northern two-thirds becoming a part of Morocco. The treaty also provided for joint exploration of the mineral and ocean resources of the Western Sahara. The Moroccan-Mauritanian action is opposed by Algeria and some other nations and remains the source of a continuing international dispute. Mauritania considers the issue closed and regards its portion of Western Sahara as fully reintegrated into Mauritania.

The Polisario movement, which calls for an independent Western Sahara, continues with the support of Algeria, to carry out guerrilla actions in the Western Sahara and occasionally in Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania regards the movement as a group of mostly Mauritanian dissidents controlled, directed, and supplied by Algeria.

U.S.-MAURITANIA RELATIONS

Prior to June 7, 1967, the United States maintained friendly relations with Mauritania and provided a small amount of economic assistance. To show its solidarity with the Arab world, Mauritania broke diplomatic and consular relations with the United States during the June 1967 war. On December 22, 1969, after discussions between officials of the two governments, diplomatic relations were resumed. This renewal was the result of a common decision not to let differences over the Arab-Israeli issue preclude cooperation on other matters. President Ould Daddah called on President Nixon in September 1971 to present OAU views on southern African issues.

The United States provided more than 40 percent of the emergency aid to Mauritania during the 1973-75 effort to combat the devastating Sahel drought. Mauritania will be one of the

principal beneficiaries of the long-term, multilateral Sahel Development Program in which the United States has announced its intent to participate. There is an AID Country Development Officer and staff, and a Peace Corps Director and staff, in Mauritania.

The U.S. and Mauritania enjoy friendly relations, and both governments have expressed an interest in expanding mutual ties.

Principal U.S. Official

Ambassador—Holsey G. Handyside

The U.S. Embassy in Mauritania is located at Nouakchott (tel. 20-60), postal address: B.P. 222.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8169, Revised November 1976

APPENDIX AA
MAURITIUS
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, October 1974 (Publication 8023)]

background notes

Mauritius

department of state * october 1974

OFFICIAL NAME: Mauritius

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Mauritius is an island about 500 miles east of the Malagasy Republic in the Indian Ocean. Its dependencies are Rodrigues Island (40 square miles, 20,000 people), the Agalega Islands, and Cargados Carajos Shoals (27 square miles, 1,000 people).

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 720 sq. mi. (two-thirds the size of Rhode Island). CAPITAL: Port Louis (pop. 140,000). OTHER CITIES: Beau Bassin and Rose Hill (pop. 71,000), Curepipe (pop. 52,000), Vacoas and Phoenix (pop. 50,000), Quatre Bornes (pop. 45,000).

People

POPULATION: Approx. 855,000 (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.9% (1972). DENSITY: 1100 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Indo-Mauritians (67%), Creole (28%), Sino-Mauritians (3%), Franco-Mauritians (2%). RELIGIONS: Hinduism, Roman Catholic, Islam. LANGUAGES: French, English, Creole, Hindi, Urdu. LITERACY: 80%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 60 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch. INDEPENDENCE: March 12, 1968. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: March 12, 1968.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Queen (Chief of State); Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral Legislative Assembly. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Labor Party, Mauritius Social Democratic Party, Muslim Committee of Action, Mauritian Democratic Union, Independent Forward Bloc, Mauritian Militant Movement.

SUFFRAGE: Universal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 administrative divisions.

FLAG: Four horizontal stripes–red, blue, yellow, and green from top to bottom.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $224 million (July 1972-June 1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.3% (1962-1971). PER CAPITA INCOME: $275. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 0% (1962-1971).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 50%. *Labor* 41%. *Products*–sugar, tea.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 14%. *Products*–sugar cane processing, consumer goods, labor-intensive goods for export.

TRADE: *Exports*–$143 million (1973 est.). *Partners*–U.K., Canada, U.S. *Imports*–$135 million (1973 est.). *Partners*–U.K., South Africa, Australia.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 5.5 rupees=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–unavailable; donors include U.N., IBRD, U.K., India, U.S.S.R., P.R.C. *U.S. only*–$1.1 million.


MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U. N. and most of its specialized agencies; the Commonwealth; the Organization of African Unity; the African, Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM). Mauritius is an associate member of the European Economic Community.

Mauritius is volcanic in origin and almost entirely surrounded by coral reefs. The land rises from the coast to a central plateau which varies in altitude from 900 to 2,400 feet above sea level. The plateau is encircled by mountains which may have formed the rim of an ancient volcano.

The climate of Mauritius is conditioned by southeast trade winds. Tropical conditions prevail in the lowlands. The hot season is from December to April, the cool season from June to September. The island is humid throughout the year with annual rainfall in some areas as high as 200 inches. Mean temperatures vary from 74°F at sea level to 67°F on the high plateau. Devastating cyclones can occur from December to April.

The eradication of malaria during World War II led to a population explosion on Mauritius. Population density is now among the highest in the world. Overpopulation and unemployment are the country's most important socioeconomic problems. Although government efforts to curb population growth have experienced some success, the birth rate is still expected to increase slightly in the coming years as the percentage of people of childbearing age increases.

Twenty-eight percent of Mauritians are of mixed European and African descent, tracing their origins to the plantation owners and slaves who were the first to exploit the island's sugar potential. These Creoles now are clerical, commercial, and professional workers, as well as fishermen and stevedores. Slavery was abolished in 1833 despite strong local opposition, and



indentured labor was brought from India to replace the emancipated Africans. Descendants of the Indian immigrants now comprise 67 percent of the population and remain the principal laborers for the sugar industry. Muslims are traders and industrial workers; Hindus are increasingly entering the civil service. The remaining 5 percent of the population are Mauritians principally of Chinese origin, most of whom are engaged in retail trade. Despite this diversity, the island retains a distinctly French cultur flavor, reflecting French rule during the 18th century. The 20,000 Franco-Mauritians still are an elite class. They own most of the plantations, are law-

yers and bankers, and thus control ıch of the economy.

A Creole *patois*, basically French, is the common language of the island's masses. Almost 90 percent of the primary school-aged children are enrolled in school. The university on the island is growing in size and scope, and each year about 700 students attend universities abroad, principally in Western Europe.

HISTORY

Portuguese sailors first visited ıuritius in the early 16th century, although the island had been known to Arabs and Malays much earlier. Dutch sailors, who named the island in honor of Prince Maurice of Nassau, established a small colony in 1638, but it was abandoned in 1710. The French claimed Mauritius in 1715, renaming it Ile de France. Under the administration of the French East India Company, it became a strong and prosperous colony. The French Government took over control in 1767, and the island served as a naval base during the ''apoleonic wars.

In 1810 Mauritius was captured by the British whose possession of the island was confirmed 4 years later by the Treaty of Paris. The British chose to administer the colony through the existing French establishment. Thus, French institutions, including French law, were maintained, and the French language still is more widely used than English. The importation of Indian indentured laborers brought an additional cultural influence to the island. As the Indian population became numerically dominant and the franise was extended, political power ..ifted from the Franco-Mauritians and their Creole allies to the Hindus. The Mauritian Labor Party, which draws its strength primarily from the Hindus, was successful in the 1947 elections which determined representation in the newly created Legislative Assembly, as Mauritius took the first steps toward independence.

Alone, or in coalition with some of the other political parties, the Labor Party has led the Mauritian Govern- ·ent since 1947. The party's inde- endence campaign gained momentum after 1961 when the British agreed to permit additional self-government and to grant independence eventually. Despite opposition from Franco-Mauritian and Creole supporters of Gaetan Duval's *Parti Mauricien Social et Democrate* (PMSD), a coalition composed of the Labor Party, the Muslim Committee of Action (MCA), and the Independent Forward Bloc (IFB)—a traditionalist Hindu party—won an overwhelming majority in the 1967 Legislative Assembly election in a contest interpreted locally as a referendum on independence.

Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Labor Party leader and Chief Minister in the colonial government, became the first Prime Minister when Mauritius became independent on March 12, 1968. This event was preceded by a period of communal strife which was brought under control with the assistance of British troops.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Benedict, Burton. *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society.* New York: Praeger, 1965.

Meade, J. E., and others. *The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius.* London: Methuen, 1961.

Report on Mauritius, 1967. *Port Louis: Government Printer, 1968.*

Scott, Robert. *Limuria: The Lesser Dependencies of Mauritius.* London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Titmuss, R.M., and B. Abel-Smith. *Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius.* London: Methuen, 1961.

GOVERNMENT

By virtue of its membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, the Chief of State is Queen Elizabeth II, who is represented on the island by a Governor General. The Mauritian Government is parliamentary in form. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) is responsible for the direction and control of the government. It consists of the Prime Minister (Head of Government)—the leader of the majority party in the legislature—and 19 other Ministers.

The unicameral Legislative Assembly is composed of 70 Deputies: 62 are elected by universal suffrage and 8 are appointed by the Prime Minister. Elections are scheduled every 5 years. However, after independence the then ruling coalition agreed to postpone the 1972 elections until 1976.

Mauritian laws are based primarily on the French legal system with some British innovations. The Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and two junior judges, is the highest judicial authority.

Local government is separated into nine administrative divisions with municipal and town councils in urban areas and district and village councils in rural areas.

Principal Government Officials

Governor General—Sir Raman Osman
Prime Minister; Minister of Defense and Internal Security; Minister of External Affairs, Tourism and Emigration; Minister of Information and Broadcasting—Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
Minister of Finance—Veerasamy Ringadoo
Minister of Housing, Lands, and Town and Country Planning—Sir Abdul Razak Mohamed
Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Environment—Satcam Boolell
Minister of Health—Sir Harold Edward Walter
Minister of Works—Abdool Hak Mahomed Osman
Minister of Commerce and Industry—Rajmohunsing Jomadar

TRAVEL NOTES

Transportation–There are regular flights to and from Europe, East and South Africa, India, and Australia. Rental cars and taxis are readily available. Taxi fares should be agreed upon before starting out. Driving is on the left-hand side. Roads are narrow and twisting but paved.

Communications–Reliable international mail, telephone, and telegraph service is available in Mauritius.

Passage–Visas and immunization certificates are required. Visas must be obtained from United Kingdom missions, even in countries were Mauritius maintains missions.

Currency, Exchange and Banking–Travelers may bring in any amount of foreign notes or travelers checks. No traveler is allowed to bring in more than 25 Mauritian Rupees.

Health–Local hospitals and pharmacies are adequate. Mauritius does not have serious endemic diseases or health hazards. Avoid uncooked vegetables and tap water.

Minister of Labour and Industrial Relations–Beergoonath Ghurburrun
Minister of Economic Planning and Development–Keharsingh Jagatsingh
Minister of Communications–Pierre Gerard Raymond Rault
Minister of Reform Institutions–Rameshwar Jaypal
Minister of Youth and Sports–Dayanundlall Basant Rai
Minister of Local Government–Jean Etienne Moi Lin Ah Chuen
Minister of Co-operatives and Co-operative Development–Hurrypersad Ramnarain
Minister of Power, Fuel and Energy–Louis Raymond Devienne
Minister of Social Security–Kistnasamy Tirvengadum
Minister of Employment–Jean Alex Rima
Minister of Fisheries–Ramsoondur Modun
Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs–Louis Regis Chaperon
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice–Emmanuel Marie Laval Bussier
Ambassador to the U.S.–Pierre Guy Girald Balancy
Ambassador to the U.N.–Radha Ramphul

Mauritius maintains an Embassy in the United States at 4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

In December 1969 the *Parti Mauricien Social et Democrate* entered the governing coalition, and the Independent Forward Bloc went into opposition. PMSD leader Gaetan Duval became the country's Foreign Minister, and other PMSD figures received ministerial posts in an enlarged Council of Ministers.

During 1970 a new political party, the Militant Mauritian Movement (MMM), attracted a large cross-communal following with an appeal based on criticism of the government's alleged inefficiency and on advocacy of "third world" solutions to domestic and foreign problems. In September 1970 the MMM won the only parliamentary byelection conducted since independence, and it showed considerable strength in local, municipal, and union elections during subsequent months. In December 1971 a state of emergency was declared when the MMM called for a general strike following legislation banning strikes in industries controlled by MMM affiliates. The MMM's leadership subsequently was imprisoned for several months, and a number of affiliated unions were deregistered.

The PMSD split in 1971 when Maurice Lesage led seven other PMSD parliamentary representatives out of the party following a dispute with PMSD chief Duval. The new group adopted the name Mauritian Democratic Union and replaced the IFB as the official opposition party since it had more members in the Legislative Assembly.

In December 1973 Prime Minister Ramgoolam dismissed Foreign Minister Duval and the four other PMSD Ministers, thus breaking up the coalition. The Labor Party and the Muslim Committee of Action continued in power, their majority increased by several defections from the PMSD.

ECONOMY

Sugar dominates the Mauritian economy. Ninety percent of the country's cultivable land is planted in the crop; more than 60 percent of the work force is engaged in its production, transformation, or transportation; and sugar exports provide more than 90 percent of the country's foreign earnings. In 1973, 700,000 tons were exported. Mauritius receives guaranteed market at stable prices for most of its sugar exports as a result of the marketing arrangements of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Mauritius is hopeful that a similar arrangement can be made with the European Economic Community when the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expires.

To ease dependence on sugar, which is subject to severe price fluctuations and drastic production losses due to Indian Ocean cyclones, the Mauritian Government encourages industrialization and crop diversification. Tea, tobacco, and aloe (a fiber used to make sacks) have been introduced successfully. Some import substitution is taking place in the industrial sector, and by January 1974 the government had attracted 29 new labor-intensive export industries to the Export Processing Zone created in 1970. Tourism is a good foreign exchange earner, and hotel facilities are being expanded.

Unemployment has decreased significantly in recent years as a result of increasing production of sugar, sold at current high prices, and the expansion of the Export Processing Zone and the tourism industry. Unfortunately the rapid economic expansion has been accompanied by high inflation.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Dependence on Western markets and the Mauritian political heritage are responsible for strong ties between Mauritius and the West. These ties are particularly initimate with the United Kingdom, with which Mauritius share

a defense agreement, and with France, which exercises sovereignty over neighboring Réunion. Relations between Mauritius and India are also close. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China maintain Embassies in Mauritius.

U.S.-MAURITIUS RELATIONS

A U.S. Consulate opened on Mauritius in 1794 and closed in 1911. It was reopened in 1967 and elevated to an Embassy at independence in 1968. Since 1970 it has been headed by a resident U.S. Ambassador assisted by a small staff.

The thrust of official U.S. activities on Mauritius has been to assist in the country's development program. The instruments have been the sugar quota, a Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) grant program currently valued at approximately $1 million annually, a small Peace Corps contingent, and a Self-Help program. Total U.S. bilateral aid for fiscal year 1972 amounted to $1.1 million.

U.S. investment in Mauritius is modest but increasing. The Litronix Corporation has opened an electronics assembly plant and the First National City Bank has opened a branch in recent years. The United States exports approximately $5 million annually to Mauritius. Bilateral political relations are excellent, and the United States has had the support of Mauritius on several key issues in international forums. U.S. Naval vessels call periodically at Port Louis and are well received.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Philip W. Manhard
Deputy Chief of Mission—George W. Heatley

The U.S. Embassy on Mauritius is located in the Anglo-Mauritius House, Port Louis.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8023

Revised October 1974

APPENDIX BB
MOROCCO
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, September 1976 (Publication 7954)]

background notes

Morocco

department of state * september 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Morocco

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Morocco lies on the northwest corner of Africa, with nearly 1,200 miles of coastline on the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. It is the closest of all African countries to Europe, separated only by the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco's neighbors are Algeria and, if one accepts the Moroccan claim to the northern two-thirds of the former Spanish Sahara, Mauritania.

Topographically, it is sharply divided into an open, agriculturally rich plains area in the northwest and into economically poor mountains and plateaus in the eastern and southern portions. The coastal plains and plateaus, fronting for some 350 miles on the Atlantic Ocean, are cut off from the interior by the encircling mountains. Peaks of the High Atlas and Middle Atlas ranges rise to 13,600 feet above sea level; peaks of the Rif Massif rise sharply from the coast to heights of 7,000 feet above sea level. The coastal plains are the most densely populated, economically advanced, and Arabized part of the country. Nearly all the major cities are in this area.

Beyond the mountains, eastern Morocco is a series of arid, rolling plateaus that form a continuation of the Algerian High Plateaus in the northeast and gradually drop into the Sahara Desert in the south and southeast. Population in these areas is sparse and concentrated in scattered oases along the Draa and Ziz Rivers. These oases have spawned numerous migrations across the mountains into inner Morocco, and from these migrations have risen several of the ruling dynasties.

On the Atlantic side of the Atlas Mountains the climate is semitropical; on the other side dry steppes merge into the Sahara Desert. The Mediterranean coast has a mild, sunny climate. April through October are usually dry months.

Population distribution is very uneven, with most of the people living west of the Atlas Mountains. Casablanca is the commercial and industrial center and leading seaport. Rabat is primarily the center for government activities. Fez and Marrakech are old walled cities; Tangier is a port city.

Moroccans are descended from indigenous Berbers and Arabs who invaded Morocco in the 8th and 11th centuries, bringing with them the

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 171,953 sq. mi. (about the size of Ore. and Wash. combined). CAPITAL: Rabat (pop. 385,000). OTHER CITIES: Casablanca (2 million), Marrakech (333,000), Fez (322,000), Tangier (188,000).

People

POPULATION: 17.5 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.4% (1972). DENSITY: 100 per sq. mi. URBAN: 35%. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arabs, Berbers, Negroes (99.1%), French (0.7%), Jewish (0.2%). RELIGION: Islam. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), Berber dialects, French. LITERACY: 24% (1974). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 51 yrs. (1972).

Government

TYPE: Constitutional monarchy. INDEPENDENCE: 1956. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: March 1972.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–King (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral Parliament. *Judicial*–Supreme Court (appointive).

POLITICAL PARTIES: Istiqlal, Popular Movement (MP), National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 20. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 19 Provinces, 2 urban Prefectures, 3 Provinces in former Spanish Sahara.

FLAG: 5-pointed green star centered on a red field.

Economy

GNP: $6.9 billion (1975 est.). GROWTH RATE: 34.5% (2-year avg.). PER CAPITA INCOME: $430 (1975). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 5.3%. DEBT SERVICE RATIO: *To exports* 9%; *to total debts* 8.5% (1976).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 35%. *Labor* 69%. *Products*–wheat, barley, citrus, grapes, sugar beets.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*–coal, electric power, phosphates, iron ore, lead, zinc.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Phosphates, iron, manganese, lead, zinc.

TRADE: *Exports*–$1.584 billion (1975): phosphates $836 million; in 1974: citrus $118 million, tomatoes $97 million, canned fish $143 million. *Imports*–$2.515 billion (1975): machinery, fuels, foodstuffs, consumer goods. *Partners*–France, FRG, Communist bloc, US ($11.3 million exports, $200 million imports).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: DH (dirham) 4.25=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID (FY 1976): *Total free world development assistance* $866 million: Eurodollar loans $500 million, IMF $110 million loan, World Bank $115.5 million loan, Arab sources $53 million loans, FRG $30 million loan. *US only*–$57.4 million.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization for African Unity (OAU), Arab League.



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culture that has become dominant. There is a Moroccan Jewish minority of some 30,000. Approximately 112,000 foreign residents live in the country, mostly French and Spanish. The established state religion is Islam.

The principal language is Arabic, although Berber dialects are spoken widely in rural areas. French and Spanish are also used, particularly in government.

Literacy rate is 25 percent for men and 7 percent for women; approximately half of the Moroccan children from ages 7 to 14 attend school. More than half the population is under 20 years of age.

Morocco's most important university, Mohammed V, is in Rabat. Here more than 10,000 students from Morocco and other areas of Africa and the Middle East study medicine, law, liberal arts, and the sciences. Also in Rabat are the Mohammedia School of Engineers and the Hassan II Agronomic Institute, the two most important Moroccan institutions of higher education in engineering and agriculture. At the more than 1,000-year-old Karaouine University in Morocco's religious capital, Fez, Islamic students from around the world study Islamic law and theology. At the secondary school level a large number of Moroccan and French *lycées*, or high schools, offer instructions in both Arabic and French.


Native Moroccan dress is the *djellaba*, a long, hooded robe resembling the robes of the Franciscan monks. Native footwear is the *babouche*, a pointed, open-heeled slipper. Many Arab women wear veils. Berber women go unveiled in their native villages, although they sometimes wear a veil when visiting outside their villages. At social functions Moroccan women wear kaftans, beautifully designed and trimmed robes usually worn with exquisite gold belts. The native dress of southern Moroccan men is characterized by the beautiful blue hues of their robes and a black *chéchia* worn around the head as protection from the searing sun.

HISTORY

Morocco's history has been shaped largely by its strategic location. Beginning with the Phoenicians, a long series of invaders have swept the land. From the first century B.C. until the fifth century A.D. it was a Roman province. Then the Vandals, Visigoths, and Byzantine Greeks successively ruled. Finally, in the eighth century A.D. Islamic Arab forces from the East occupied Morocco. The present Alaouite dynasty, which has ruled Morocco since 1649, claims descent from the prophet Mohammed.

Because of its location and resources, Morocco was involved early in the competition of European powers for influence and control in Africa. France indicated a strong interest in Morocco beginning in 1830. Following recognition by the United Kingdom in 1904 of France's "sphere of influence" in Morocco, the Algeciras Conference (1906) formalized France's "special position" and entrusted policing of Morocco to France and Spain jointly. The Treaty of Fez (1912) made Morocco a protectorate of France; Spain also assumed a protectorate position over the northern and southern zones.

The first nationalist political parties based their arguments for Moroccan independence on such World War II declarations as the Atlantic Charter. A manifesto of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party in 1944 was one of the earliest public demands for independence. That party subsequently pro-



Tangier is a cosmopolitan city with a polyglot population and a charming mixture of Arabic, Berber, and European cultures

vided most of the leadership for the nationalist movement.

The exile of Sultan Mohammed V in 1953 and his replacement by the unpopular Mohammed Ben Arafa provided the spark which set off terrorist opposition to the French protectorate. France allowed Mohammed V to return to Morocco in 1955, and negotiations which led to independence began the following year.

The Kingdom of Morocco recovered its political independence from France on March 2, 1956. By subsequent agreements with Spain (1956 and 1958), control over the Spanish zones of influence was restored to Morocco, and on October 29, 1956, the signing of the Tangier Protocol politically reintegrated the former international zone. Spain, however, retained control over the small enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the north.

King Hassan II succeeded to the throne on March 3, 1961, on the death of his father, the highly respected Mohammed V. He recognized the Royal Charter proclaimed by his father on May 8, 1958, which outlined steps toward establishing a constitutional monarchy.

A constitution providing for representative government under a strong monarchy was approved by referendum on December 7, 1962, and elections were held in 1963. In June 1965 the King invoked article 35 of the constitution and declared a "state of exception" following student riots and civil unrest. He assumed all legislative as well as executive powers and named a new government not based on political parties.

King Hassan submitted to referendum a new constitution in July 1970. Its approval and the subsequent elections formally ended the 1965 "state of exception."

GOVERNMENT


Under the 1970 Constitution the King has wide powers and exercises supreme civil and religious authority. He appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers. He may also dissolve Parliament and—in emergency conditions—declare a state of emergency and rule by decree.

In March 1972 a third constitution, submitted by King Hassan, was approved by popular referendum. The new constitution provides for the increased power of democratic institutions.

The members of the unicameral Parliament are elected to 4-year terms. Two-thirds of the members, as opposed to one-third under the 1970 Constitution, are chosen directly by universal adult suffrage; the remaining one-third is indirectly elected by community councils and business, labor, and farmer groups. However, there have been no elections under the 1972 Constitution to date, and the country is presently without a Parliament, although a series of local, provincial, and national elections is scheduled to begin in autumn of 1976.

The highest court in the independent judicial structure is the Supreme Court, whose judges are appointed by the King.

For administrative purposes Morocco is divided into 19 Provinces and two Prefectures (Rabat and Casablanca). Each is headed by a Governor who is appointed by the King. Morocco has divided its portion of the former Spanish Sahara into three additional Provinces.



The Qasbah of Telouet in the High Atlas

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State—King Hassan II
Prime Minister—Ahmed Osman

Ministers

Justice—Abbas el Kissi
Interior—Mohamed Haddou Echiguer
Foreign Affairs—Ahmed Laraki
Finance—Abdelkader Benslimane
Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdelhadi Boutaleb
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ali Benjelloun

Morocco maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1601 21st St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Istiqlal was the predominant party for the first few years of independence, but other tendencies began to take partisan form during that period. In 1958 the Popular Movement (MP) was organized, with its base of support in the Berber rural areas. Younger and more radical elements of the Istiqlal split away in January 1959 to form the leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which called for more active government direction of social and economic changes and election of a popular assembly to write a democratic monarchical constitution. The UNFP has generally worked closely with the large Moroccan Labor Union (UMT). In the same month the King named a new nonparty government, and the Istiqlal, together with the UNFP, went into opposition status; but the two did not normally cooperate politically. In 1963 the UNFP lost its organizational cohesiveness following arrests and trials of its leaders on charges of plotting against the King.

The party split into two factions in 1972, one led by the UMT-backed Abdallah Ibrahim and the other by the Rabat-based lawyer and former Cabinet Minister Abderrahim Bouabid. The Bouabid faction was temporarily suspended by the Prime Minister because some of its members were implicated in antiregime activities in the spring of 1973.

In March 1963 a strongly royalist coalition, the Front for the Defense of

Constitutional Institutions (FDIC), united the MP and various nonparty supporters of the King in the first elections under the 1962 Constitution, and in parliamentary collaboration thereafter. In April 1964 many non-MP members of the FDIC organized the Socialist Democratic Party (PSD), which was actually a group of modern conservatives. From January 1963 to mid-1965 the various Cabinets consisted largely of MP members and those later identified with the PSD, plus various independents.

During the "state of exception," and particularly after the mysterious disappearance of leftist politician Mehdi Ben Barka in 1965, the UNFP lost much of its dynamism. In July 1970, following approval of the new constitution, the Istiqlal and the UNFP formed the National Front. They boycotted the subsequent parliamentary elections, claiming that the new constitution only served to formalize the powers held by the King and government during the "state of exception."

The latest parliamentary elections were held in two stages in August 1970.

On July 10, 1971, a nearly successful coup d'etat was attempted against King Hassan; a number of senior military officers were implicated and executed. The National Front was not involved. In August King Hassan appointed a new government and charged it with formulating an economic and social reform program.

A second coup d'etat was attempted on August 16, 1972, in which the Minister of Defense, Gen. Mohammed Oufkir, was implicated. The government reported that Gen. Oufkir committed suicide when he was found out. The Moroccan Air Force officers who carried out the coup attempt were executed in January 1973.

Since attaining independence a prime concern of Morocco's leaders has been the formulation and implementation of effective economic development programs; training of administrators, technicians, and professional people; and integration of the northern and southern zones and the city of Tangier. A Moroccan army numbering some 30,000 was formed in May 1956; total military forces now number about 90,000.

ECONOMY

The economy depends heavily on agriculture; nearly 70 percent of the Moroccans derive their living directly or indirectly from the soil.

The plains and uplands of western Morocco between the Atlas ranges and the Atlantic Ocean, together with the intermontane valleys of the Middle Atlas range, constitute the main agricultural region.

Agriculture in Morocco is confronted with a number of difficulties. Predominant among these is the increasing lack of water as one moves from northwest to southeast and the year-to-year unpredictability of rainfall. This basic situation is compounded by historical factors in the traditional sector.

Primitive methods of cultivation, a lack of understanding of the use of fertilizers and insecticides, and the absence of a means to acquire them contribute to low yields on the vast majority of farms. Fragmentation of land among heirs, resulting from the provisions of traditional Muslim inheritance laws, has created large numbers of minute, irregularly shaped, and often widely scattered plots that are inefficient to cultivate.

The physical situation makes difficult the use of modern equipment in the traditional sector and, together with extreme poverty, continues to tie the Moroccan peasant to the hoes, wooden plows, and pointed sticks used by his ancestors. Frequent droughts and insect plagues make the life of the subsistence farmer even more precarious.

The traditional sector accounts for about 85 to 90 percent of the total agricultural area, and a modern sector accounts for the rest. The modern system was introduced by Europeans, primarily *colons* (French settlers), in the first half of the 20th century on land taken over by the protectorate government that was to be colonized or purchased from Moroccans by private owners. The modern sector included an estimated 2.5 million acres of agricultural land, most of which was under field or tree crops.

Although the modern sector comprised only about 10 or 15 percent of total agricultural land, it included some of the most fertile land in the country, and it contributed over 85 percent of commercialized agricultural production, including almost all of the citrus fruit, fresh vegetables, wine, soft wheat, and other export crops. Much of the agricultural land in the traditional sector is devoted to grazing, and the average yields per acre of cropped land are less than half those in the modern sector. The traditional sector supports over 1 million families which, even in good years, consume nearly all that they produce.

Mineral resources make an important contribution to the GNP. By value of production, phosphates are by far the most important and constitute the largest single foreign exchange earner. Significant quantities of cobalt, manganese, iron, lead, zinc, and some petroleum also are produced. Of lesser importance as a source of national income are small textile, cement, and paint industries. Tourism is growing rapidly.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–Morocco is a cold country with a hot sun; sharp drops in temperature occur at night in both summer and winter. Climate along the coastal areas, though temperate, is also damp. Wear clothing similar to that worn in Washington, DC, season by season.

Customs and Currency–Passports and smallpox inoculations are required. U.S. tourists do not need visas for visits of 3 months or less. Dirhams may not be imported or exported.

Health–Public health standards are steadily improving. Avoid tap water, and when outside the large cities and resort areas, tourists should carry water purification tablets or a supply of purified drinking water. Consume only well-prepared fruits and vegetables.

Telecommunications–Local and international telephone and telegraph service is available. A working knowledge of French is essential.


Transportation–Flights are available from New York, often with stops. Rabat's Sale Airport is about 6 miles from the city; Nouasseur Airport is about 25 miles from Casablanca; and Tangier's airport is about 8 miles away. Adequate public transportation–air, rail, and bus–is available among the principal cities. Travelers using it should have a working knowledge of French. The highway system is good; directions are clearly marked.

Although politically united in 1956, economic unification of Morocco was completed only in February 1958 when the Moroccan franc replaced the peseta as the legal currency in the former northern (Spanish) zone. In 1959 the dirham, equivalent to 100 Moroccan francs, became the unit of currency.

Since independence the excellent infrastructure of roads, ports, and other facilities inherited from the protectorate era has been maintained and improved. The government's first 5-year economic development plan for investment (1968-72) placed primary emphasis on agriculture, tourism, and manpower development. Implementation of the plan generally met with success as the GNP growth target of 4.3 percent actually reached 5.6 percent.

The current 5-year plan (1973-77) envisages an average real growth rate of 7.5 percent based largely on some $6 billion of government investment. However, due principally to a substantial decline in the output and selling price of phosphate rock, the average annual increase in GNP has been 5.3 percent.

Morocco's previously favorable balance of payments showed a deficit of



Bab Boujloud in Fez

$170 million in 1975 due to pressure from increased imports and drops in phosphate sales and worker remittances from abroad.

Moroccan manufactured goods enter the European Economic Community under preferential terms based on the Morocco-EEC Agreement for Partial Economic Association, which came into effect in September 1969. This accord was renegotiated in 1976 and now provides for a more comprehensive economic relationship between Morocco and the EEC.

A consultative group composed of Morocco's major aid donors and sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) met for the first time in April 1967. The group seeks to assist Morocco by providing a multilateral framework for foreign assistance and advising on measures to achieve development objectives.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

A principal foreign policy concern of Morocco has been the border problems with Algeria which flared into brief fighting in October 1963. The maintenance and improvement of cooperative relations was given high priority and the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in January 1969.

In June 1972, during an Organization of African Unity Conference, Morocco and Algeria signed two conventions settling the border between the two countries and providing for the joint exploitation of the Tindouf iron deposits in Algeria. In May 1973 Algeria ratified and published the conventions, but Morocco has not yet done either. King Hassan also signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with President Ould Daddah of Mauritania in 1970.

Relations with Algeria have worsened in recent years as a result of what presently is Morocco's major foreign policy preoccupation—its joint attempt with Mauritania to absorb and partition the former Spanish Sahara. Following publication of an ambiguous advisory opinion on the Sahara by the International Court of Justice in October 1975, King Hassan II announced the "Green March" of 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians into the Spanish colony. Spurred on by this development the Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian Governments signed an agreement on November 14, 1975, creating a tripartite administration for the Spanish Sahara with final Spanish withdrawal slated for February 28, 1976.

On April 14, 1976, the two remaining administrators implemented their longstanding claims to sovereignty over the area by dividing the territory between them. The northern two-thirds, including the rich phosphate deposits at Bu Craa, went to Morocco. The division is contested by the guerrilla group known as the Polisario Front and its political arm, the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, which, with Algerian support, is maintaining a small scale guerrilla conflict against Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. The dispute has been considered at various international levels including the OAU, the Non-Aligned Summit, and the U.N. without conclusive result. The United States, which has been neutral on the substance of the issue, has taken no position on Moroccan-Mauritanian claims of sovereignty.

Still outstanding is the Moroccan claim that the northern Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla must be returned to Moroccan sovereignty although, in the wake of the significantly improved relations with Spain which followed the Tripartite Agreement, this issue is of less immediate importance.

U.S.-MOROCCO RELATIONS

Morocco apparently recognized the United States in 1777, and formal U.S. relations with Morocco date to 1787 when the two nations negotiated a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. It was renegotiated in 1836 and is still in force, constituting the longest unbroken treaty relationship in U.S. history.

U.S. Moroccan relations are characterized by mutual respect and friendship. They were strengthened by King Hassan's visits to the United States in March 1963 and February 1967 and by the visit of Secretary of State Kissinger to Morocco in October 1974.

U.S. objectives with respect to Morocco include maintaining friendly and cooperative relations; supporting Moroccan efforts to develop an increasingly effective administration; and aiding its domestic, social, and economic progress. U.S. airbases in Morocco were withdrawn in December 1963 by mutual agreement.

Prior to 1957, American aid to Morocco was channeled through France, which reprogrammed some $50 million in U.S. aid to the French Government as development grants to Morocco. From fiscal year 1956 through FY 76 U.S. aid to Morocco has totaled $855 million—$372 million in grants and $483 million in loans, of which P.L. 480 accounted for 50 percent; supporting assistance and development loans, 40 percent; and technical assistance, 10 percent. However, beginning with FY 76 a revised strategy was introduced for assistance to Morocco which is aimed at improving the quality of life for Morocco's poor, with central focus on those who reside in rural areas and depend on dryland agriculture.

Some 153 Peace Corps Volunteers in Morocco are engaged in English

READING LIST

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Maxwell, Gavin. *Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua.* New York: Dutton, 1966.

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Waterbury, John. *North for the Trade.* Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1972.

language training, architecture, athletic coaching, agricultural development, and social work.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Robert Anderson

Counselor of Embassy—Jay Peter Moffat

Director, U.S. AID Mission—Al Disdier

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—James Rentschler

Consul General, Casablanca—John Monjo

Consul General, Tangier—Harland Eastman

The U.S. Embassy is located at 6 Avenue de Marrakech, Rabat.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7954, Revised September 1976

APPENDIX CC
MOZAMBIQUE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, August 1976 (Publication 7965)]

background notes

Mozambique

department of state • august 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: People's Republic of Mozambique

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Mozambique, located on the southeastern coast of Africa, is bounded on the north by Tanzania; on the west by Malawi, Zambia, and Southern Rhodesia; on the south by the Republic of South Africa and Swaziland; and on the east by the Indian Ocean's Mozambique Channel, which separates the African mainland from the Malagasy Republic. On February 3, 1976, the name of the capital was changed from Lourenço Marques to Maputo.

Lowlands make up 44 percent of the total area and consist of coastal areas with altitudes of up to 600 feet above sea level. The central uplands (17 percent of the area) are formed by plateaus between 600 and 1,800 feet above sea level. The high plateau zone (26 percent of the territory) ranges from 1,800 to 3,000 feet high. A mountainous area lies along the western frontier. Africa's fourth largest river, the Zambesi, divides the country in half.

Climate varies from tropical to subtropical in all areas except the high plateau zone and the mountains. During the rainy season (Nov. into Apr.) warmer temperatures prevail. Rainfall is irregular, and some districts, particularly in the south, are subject to severe droughts and floods. Rivers are numerous; waterflow is highly variable.

The most populous areas are the northern and southern coastal regions. Tribal divisions are quite sharply drawn: each has its own dialect, or in some cases its own language; and no extensive unity exists among them. Of the major groups, the Tsonga (Thonga) and Changones live in the south; the Sena and Manica in the center; the Nianja in the northwest; the Macuas across the north; and the Makondes in the northeast, spilling into Tanzania.

Portuguese is the unifying language; many Africans have also learned some English while on work contracts in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Generally speaking, the northern tribes have been more isolated from European influence; many of them are animists or practice fetishism, although Islam has made considerable inroads. Catholic and Protestant missionaries have been active in Mozambique; the former since its discovery, the latter since the early 20th century.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 303,769 sq. mi. (about twice the size of Calif.). CAPITAL: Maputo (pop. 384,000). OTHER CITIES: Beira (115,000), Quelimane, Tete, Nampula, Nacala.

People

POPULATION: 9.08 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.2%. DENSITY: 29.8 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Many tribal groups of Bantu stock, 50,000 Europeans (mostly Portuguese). RELIGIONS: 65% animist, 22% Christian, 11% Moslem. LANGUAGES: Portuguese, African dialects, English. LITERACY: 20%.

Government

TYPE: People's republic. INDEPENDENCE: June 25, 1975. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: June 25, 1975.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President, Central and Executive Committees of FRELIMO, Cabinet. *Legislative*–none. *Judicial*–based on Portuguese civil law and customary law.

POLITICAL PARTY: Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 10 Provinces.

FLAG: Diagonal green, red, black, and yellow stripes separated by white stripes. The national emblem–a gear wheel surrounding a book superimposed on a crossed weapon and hoe–is at top left.

Economy

GNP: $2.6 billion (1973). PER CAPITA INCOME: $318.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 30% arable, 1% cultivated. *Labor* 80%. *Products*–cotton, cashews, sugar, tea, copra, sisal, subsistence crops.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 5%. *Products*–processed food, textiles, beverages, refined oil, chemicals, tobacco, cement, glass.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, iron ore, tantalite, fluorite.


TRADE: *Exports*–$370 million (1974 proj.): 50% cashews and cotton; sugar, copra, gasoline, tea, wood products. *Imports*–$500 million (1974 proj.): machinery, transportation equipment, metal, petroleum products, cotton textiles. *Partners*–Portugal, South Africa, UK, FRG, USSR, PRC, US.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 26.95 escudos=US$1 (Dec. 1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU).

HISTORY

The history of Mozambique is closely linked to the early voyages of the Portuguese navigators en route to India. In 1468 Vasco da Gama explored the coast and found Arab trading settlements already established. Beginning in 1500, Portuguese


Augusto Cardoso
Rio Lugenda
Porto Amélia
Lichinga
Catur
Rio Lúrio
Furancungo
Fingoé
Cuamba
Nampula
Lumbo
Songo
Zambeze
Rio Lugenda
Tete
Benga
Milange
Dona Ana
Vila de Sena
Quelimane
Marromeu
Vila do Chinde
Chimoio
Vila do Dondo
Beira
Mozambique Channel
Nova Mambone
Rio Save
Bassas da India (Fr)
Vilanculos
Chicualacuala
Rio Changane
Limpopo
Inhambane
Mau-é-ele
Inharrime
Xai-Xai
Lourenço Marques
Goba
Mozambique
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers

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trading posts and forts in Mozambique became regular ports of call on the new route to the East. Later that century, traders, missionaries, and prospectors penetrated the hinterland, and the area came under Portuguese economic and administrative rule. Development lagged for many years, however, while the Portuguese devoted their attention to the lucrative trade with India and to the colonization of Brazil. By international agreement, the practice of slavery ended in the 1800's.

France and Germany recognized Portuguese supremacy in Mozambique following the Berlin West African Congress in 1884-85. At the end of World War I, Portugal added a small piece of German East Africa to the territory.

The history of independent Mozambique began when the territory was granted full independence on June 25, 1975. At that time the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which had been fighting for independence since 1962, became the sole political party in the new state and the nucleus for the new People's Republic of Mozambique Government. Since then the government has been establishing its authority and Marxist-oriented philosophy at all levels of society and planning a post-colonial economy.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Governmental authority is centered in the Presidency and the Executive and Central Committees of FRELIMO. The President heads the government and reports to the two committees. He also serves as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Legislator, and President of FRELIMO. There is no Vice President or Prime Minister. A Council of Ministers reports to the President. Each of the country's 10 Provinces is headed by a governor appointed and directed by the President.

On June 30, 1975, President Machel announced the formation of his government. He named 15 ministers, many of whom were active in the FRELIMO struggle for independence. FRELIMO is the only legal party and exercises its political dominance through local committees, which also serve as disseminators of the central government's Marxist-oriented philosophy.

Principal Government Officials

President–Samora Machel

Council of Ministers

Development and Economic Planning–Marcelino dos Santos
Foreign Affairs–Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Defense–Alberto Joaquim Chipande
Interior–Armando Emibo Guebuza
Information–Jorge Rebelo
Labor–Mariano Matshinhe
Agriculture–Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho
Education and Culture–Graca Simbine Machel
Health–Helder Fernando Brigido Martins
Industry and Commerce–Mario da Graca Machungo
Transportation and Communications–Jose Luis Cabaco
Justice–Rui Baltasar dos Santos Alves
Public Works and Housing–Julio Zamith Carrilho
Finance–Salamao Munguambe
Minister of State in the Presidency–Jose Oscar Monteiro

ECONOMY

Since the period immediately preceding independence, political and economic uncertainties have exacerbated declining economic trends. GNP declined by 20-30 percent in real terms in 1974 and again in 1975. At the end of 1975 GNP was reported below $2 billion, or less than $200 per capita. The economy is suffering from balance of payments deficits, shortages of raw materials, insufficient credit, the exodus of skilled Portuguese technicians and professionals, and a virtual absence of foreign private investment. An influx of foreign aid through both bilateral and multilateral programs has followed the March 1976 closure of the border with Southern Rhodesia and is expected to help offset some of the resulting economic dislocations.

The government's strong stand in favor of a Marxist economic structure, and in opposition to capitalism, has discouraged domestic and foreign private investment. Recent legislation has nationalized all health, legal, educational, and funeral services. A decree issued February 5, 1976, nationalized all rented commercial and private buildings; thus firms legally incorporated in Mozambique may only own those buildings that are necessary for their primary operations, and foreign property owners not residing in Mozambique lose all property and rights without compensation.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Agriculture and Industry

Subsistence agriculture provides a livelihood for most of the population. The production and exportation of cash crops, which account for well over half of the GNP, have declined since 1974. Higher world prices, however, have helped maintain export earnings. The government has been pursuing a vigorous agricultural program calling for the establishment of "communal villages"; its effects on production are not yet clear. Coastal fishing remains relatively undeveloped, apart from some shrimp fishing.

Services contribute about 30 percent of GNP and are a major foreign exchange earner. The government's rails (2,000 miles) and ports (at Maputo, Beira, Nacala, and Porto Amèlia) were designed to serve large sections of central and southern Africa and have no internal north-south links. Rail traffic between Maputo and Beira, for example, must transit Rhodesia. Highways include 1,700 miles of paved roads, and 20,000 miles of dirt and gravel roads. The March closure of the Rhodesia border ended the flow

through Mozambique of Rhodesian, Botswana, Zairian, and Malawian traffic. Much South African traffic, especially mineral exports, continues to pass through Maputo.

Manufacturing accounts for 15 percent of GNP. Some food processing and petroleum refining industries have increased production since independence; however, this sector in general has been hard hit by import restrictions, lack of credit, large pay increases for workers, and declining worker productivity.

Mozambique's potentially significant minerals industry currently produces only modest amounts of coal, beryl, copper ore, and smaller amounts of columbite and tantalite concentrates. A systematic geological study, begun in 1952, has covered about half of the country and has located promising deposits of coal, iron ore, and aluminum. The government has claimed full ownership of the land and subsoil resources.

Repatriated Earnings

Over 100,000 Mozambicans contract to work in the gold mines of South Africa. According to the terms of the workers' contracts, 60 percent of their wages are withheld and sent to the Mozambique Government in the form of gold at the official rate of $42 an ounce. The government can market the gold at about three times the official rate, provide workers with the equivalent of $42 per ounce in escudos on their return home, and retain the difference. Worker remittances provide the government with over $100 million annually in foreign exchange earnings.

Trade With the U.S.

In 1974 U.S. exports to Mozambique totaled $32 million, and imports $45 million. In 1975 U.S. exports to and imports from the new nation were $18 million and $36 million respectively. Exports include earthmoving equipment, aircraft, machinery, agricultural equipment, iron and steel products, chemical products, and communications equipment. Cashew nuts account for most imports.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Since independence Mozambique has been recognized by nearly all countries in the world, and diplomatic relations have been established with some 40 countries, including the United States, who maintain or plan to establish representation in Maputo. Mozambique had not established any diplomatic posts in foreign countries by mid-1976.

Mozambique is represented in the U.N. by a Chargé d'Affaires, pending the appointment of an ambassador. It has also joined a number of specialized U.N. agencies and is in the process of joining others. A member of the OAU, Mozambique hosted that organization's annual Liberation Committee meeting in January 1976.

U.S.-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS

The United States recognized Mozambique upon its independence. Diplomatic relations were established on September 23, 1975, and the U.S. Embassy was opened on November 8. The first U.S. ambassador arrived at Maputo in March 1976.

From the beginning U.S. policy has been to establish working relations with the Mozambique Government based on mutual respect. The United States has offered to study the new nation's needs with a view to possibly providing assistance if both countries wish it. Other U.S. interests include further developing the market for American exports and pursuing cultural and educational contact between the two peoples to increase mutual understanding.

During the first year of its independence the new nation has been preoccupied with domestic matters first, and then with foreign relations, especially with its immediate neighbors. U.S. policy toward Mozambique must then necessarily evolve as the government begins to consider its place in the larger world and begins to identify areas of mutual interest with the United States. The United States has expressed its willingness to deal with such interests as they are identified and to solidify our policy as the relationship matures.

Principal U.S. Official

Ambassador—Willard A. DePree

The U.S. Embassy is located at No. 35 Rua Mesquita, 2d floor, Maputo.

TRAVEL NOTES

Customs and Currency—**Visas can only be obtained by writing or cabling the Foreign Ministry at Maputo. Inoculations against smallpox, cholera, and typhoid are required. Currency is issued at par with Portuguese escudos; in practice it is inconvertible and has legal tender status only in Mozambique.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7965, Revised August 1976

APPENDIX DD

NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA) BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, December 1974 (Publication 8168)]

background notes

Namibia (South West Africa)

department of state * december 1974

GEOGRAPHY

The international territory of Namibia (South West Africa) is bordered on the north by Angola and the Republic of Zambia, on the east by the Republic of Botswana, on the southeast and south by the Republic of South Africa, and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean.

Windhoek is the seat of the administration and the business and cultural center. Other major towns include Walvis Bay, the main seaport and center of the fishing industry; Keetmanshoop, center of the *karakul* (sheepskin) industry; Tsumeb, headquarters of coppermining operations; and Otjiwarongo, center of the cattle farming area.

The 434-square-mile enclave of Walvis Bay, located on the Atlantic coast directly west of Windhoek, is administered as part of South West Africa but in terms of sovereignty is an integral part of the Cape of Good Hope Province of the Republic of South Africa.

The greater part of Namibia consists of a high plateau which is the continuation of the main South African plateau. Its average altitude is 3,600 feet above sea level. The coastal strip comprises the Namib Desert, extending from the Orange River in the south to the Kunene River in the north. This area (approximately 60 miles wide) is for the most part uninhabited. The eastern sector, which forms part of the Kalahari Desert, consists mainly of sandy stretches but provides some grazing ground.

Namibia's climate is hot and dry but generally healthful. Malaria does occur in the northern districts. Annual rainfall averages 22 inches in the north, 6 inches in the south, and about 2 inches in the coastal region. Periods of severe winter drought alternate with excessive summer rainfall (October-centered on the white band.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 318,261 sq. mi. (approx. the size of Texas and Louisiana combined). CAPITAL: Windhoek (pop. 61,369, 1970). OTHER TOWNS: Keetmanshoop, Tsumeb, Otjiwarongo, Swakopmund, Luderitz.

People

POPULATION: 762,184 (1970 census). *ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.9% (1970).* DENSITY: About 2 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Africans and mixed (approx. 88%), Europeans (12%). RELIGIONS: Christian (over 50%, mostly Lutheran), animist. LANGUAGES: Afrikaans, English, German. LITERACY: Whites--about 100%, nonwhites--NA.

Government

TYPE: South Africa administers Namibia, originally under a League of Nations mandate (1920-66), and since 1966 illegally on a *de facto* basis.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Administrator (appointed). *Legislative*–Legislative Assembly (18 members). *Judicial*–Supreme Court, lower magistrate courts, special courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: National Party of South West Africa, United National Party of South West Africa. SUFFRAGE: Adult white.

FLAG: The flag of the Republic of South Africa is flown. It consists of three horizontal orange, white, and blue bands from top to bottom, with the Union Jack and the flags of the two former Boer Republics (the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic) reproduced in miniature and

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $680 million (1972 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: about 10%. PER CAPITA GDP: White $5,525; nonwhite $325 (1972 ests.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: NA.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 30%. *Labor* 58%. *Products*–corn, millet, and sorghum (subsistence); livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 4%. *Products*–canned meat, dairy products, tanned leather, textiles, clothes, mineral concentrates.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, lesser amounts of other minerals, fish.

TRADE: (Export/import statistics for Namibia have been merged with South African statistics since 1966.) *Exports*–$293 million (1966 est.): diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, pilchard fish, beef cattle, karakul (sheep) pelts. *Partners*–South Africa, Western Europe. *Imports*–$217 million (1966 est.): construction materials, fertilizer, grain and other food products, manufactured goods. *Partner*–South Africa.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 South African Rand=US$1.43 (Nov. 1974).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: South Africa supplements South West African revenues to finance development projects in the territory. *U.S. Aid*–None.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Associate Member of U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) and U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (Namibia is represented in these organizations by the U. N. Council for Namibia.)



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March). The most pleasant months of the year are April, May, and June.

As in other parts of southern Africa, climatic temperatures are closely related to the wind systems, the ocean current, latitude, and altitude. Except for the highest mountain areas, the territory's lowest mean temperatures occur in the Namib region and are largely affected by the cold Benguela Current from the south Atlantic. Walvis Bay has a mean daily temperature of 74°F during the region's warmest month (February); during its coldest month (August) the mean daily temperature is 57°F. In the mountainous region around Windhoek, the average monthly temperatures for the warmest month (December) range from 86°F to 63°F. In the coldest month (July) average daytime and nighttime variations range from 69°F to 43°F.

PEOPLE

Linguistically and ethnologically the indigenous African people are of diverse origins. The principal groups (from 1970 population figures) are the Ovambo (352,640), Damara (66,291), Herero (50,589), Okavango (49,512), Nama (32,935), Colored–mixed race–(28,512), East Caprivian (25,580), Bushman (22,830), Rehobeth Baster (16,649), Kaokovelder (6,567), and Tswana and others (19,496).

The Ovambo, Okavango, and East Caprivian peoples, who occupy the relatively well-watered and wooded northeastern part of the territory, are

settled farmers and herders. Historically, they have shown little interest in the central and southern portions of Namibia where conditions are unsuited to their traditional way of life. Until the early 1900's these tribes had relatively little contact with the Nama, Damara, and Herero, who roamed the central part of the territory vying for control of sparse pastureland. German colonial rule destroyed the warmaking ability of the tribes but did not efface their identities or traditional organization. Considerable peaceful interaction among the groups has occurred in recent decades as a result of urbanization, industrialization, and the demand for African labor.

The modern mining, farming, and industrial sectors of the economy, controlled by the white minority, have affected traditional African society without transforming it. Africans residing in urban areas and the many migratory workers have adopted many Western ways, but traditional society remains intact among Africans in the tribal areas—sections of the country reserved for each tribe. Modern education and medical care have been extended in varying degrees to most tribal areas in the last few years. The literacy rate of the Africans is generally low except in sections, such as Ovamboland, where missionary and government education efforts have been concentrated. The Africans speak dialects indigenous to each tribal group.

Some nonwhites follow traditional animist religions, although many Africans have converted to Christianity. Missionary activity, which began in the 1800's, encompasses several denominations including Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, and Dutch Reformed. Most Namibian Christians are Lutherans.

The minority white population is primarily South African, British, and German. About 70 percent of the whites speak Afrikaans (a variation of Dutch), 23 percent German, and 10 percent English.

HISTORY

It is generally assumed that the Bushmen were the earliest inhabitants of the region now known as Namibia. Later inhabitants include the Nama and a Negroid race known as the Damara, or Berg Dama. The Bantu-speaking Ovambo and Herero migrated from the north. The first Europeans to land on the shores of the territory were 15th century Portuguese seafarers.

The inhospitable Namib Desert constituted a formidable barrier to any explorations into the interior until the late 18th century. During the 19th century a succession of travelers, traders, hunters, and missionaries (mostly British and Cape Dutch in origin) explored the area. In 1878 the United Kingdom annexed Walvis Bay on behalf of Cape Colony, and the area was incorporated into the Cape of Good Hope in 1884. In 1883 a German trader claimed the rest of the coastal region from the Orange River to the 26th degree latitude after negotiations with a local chief. Diplomatic negotiations between the United Kingdom and Germany ended in Germany's annexation of the coastal region except for Walvis Bay. The following year the United Kingdom recognized the hinterland up to the 20th degree longitude as a German sphere of influence.

German administration effectively ended during World War I when the territory was occupied by South African forces. Later Germany ceded rights to all its former colonies to the principal Allied and Associated Powers under Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave international status to these former colonies.

Mandate Period

On December 17, 1920, South Africa undertook the administration of South West Africa under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a mandate agreement confirmed by the League Council. It accepted the principle set forth in the covenant that the well-being and development of the people formed a sacred trust of civilization. The mandate agreement gave South Africa full power of administration and legislation over the territory as an

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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integral portion of South Africa and required that South Africa promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the people. The agreement contained other safeguards, including provision for reporting to the League and for international judicial resolution of disputes.

When the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, its supervisory authority for the territory was inherited by the newly formed United Nations. This authority was at least implicitly recognized by South Africa when in 1946 it requested the U.N. General Assembly's permission to annex the territory. The Assembly rejected South Africa's request on the grounds that the indigenous population was not sufficiently advanced to decide its future political status. South Africa refused U.N. requests to place the territory under a trusteeship agreement, arguing that the United Nations was not an automatic successor to the responsibilities of the League of Nations.

In 1950 the United Nations asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa. The ICJ held that, notwithstanding the dissolution of the League of Nations, the international status of the territory and South Africa's obligations under the mandate agreement continued in effect with the General Assembly maintaining the authority to exercise international supervision. The ICJ also held that although South Africa was not obliged to enter into a trusteeship agreement, it could not unilaterally modify the international status of the territory.

During the 1950's various U.N. initiatives failed to resolve the differences between the United Nations and South Africa, although the General Assembly passed numerous resolutions to the effect that South Africa was obligated to put the territory under U.N. trusteeship.

In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia took to the ICJ the question of whether South Africa was in breach of its obligations under the U.N. mandate and covenant by failing to report to the United Nations and by other conduct respecting the sacred trust. In 1962 the ICJ decided that it had jurisdiction by virtue of the U.N. mandate's provision for judicial resolution of disputes. In 1966, however, on completion of the argument on the merits, the ICJ held that it could not decide the matter because Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the requisite legal interest entitling them to such a determination. In the U.S. view the 1966 judgment did not diminish the validity of the ICJ's earlier advisory opinions affirming South West Africa's international status and the U.N.'s supervisory authority.

On October 27, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly decided in resolution 2145 (XXI), which the United States supported, that South Africa's mandate was terminated and that the territory henceforth would come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The basis for the Assembly's decision was its conclusion that South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations under the mandate agreement and had, in effect, disavowed that mandate.

Recent Developments

The period since 1966 has been one of increasingly sharp division between the positions of the United Nations and South Africa. The South African Government disregarded U.N. Resolution 2145 asserting that the United Nations had no right to terminate unilaterally its authority to administer South West Africa. The U.N. General Assembly established a Council for South West Africa in 1967 to take over the administration of the territory. The United States abstained on the resolution establishing the Council on the grounds that the terms of reference of the Council were unworkable in view of South Africa's refusal to remove its administration from the territory. The United States also declined to serve on the 11-member Council (increased to 18 members in 1972). In subsequent resolutions the U.N. General Assembly called for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from South West Africa and in 1968 renamed the territory Namibia after the Namib Desert.

That same year the matter of South Africa's mandate over Namibia was first taken to the U.N. Security Council which, in successive resolutions, supported General Assembly Resolution 2145 and called for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. In particular, the Security Council in Resolution 276 (1970), which the United States supported, declared that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal since the passage of General Assembly Resolution 2145. Security Council Resolution 276 also called on states to deal with South Africa in ways consistent with the illegality of its presence and acts in the territory and established an *ad hoc* Subcommittee of the Council for Namibia to study and recommend ways of effectively implementing the Security Council's resolutions.

On July 20, 1970, the Security Council, on the recommendation of its subcommittee, adopted Resolutions 283 and 284. The first called on states to act in ways consistent with the illegality of South Africa's presence and administration, including taking steps to discourage foreign investment in Namibia. The second referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion the question of the legal consequences of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276.

In the proceedings before the ICJ the United States submitted written and oral statements setting forth the legal considerations underlying its view that South Africa's rights in Namibia had terminated with certain legal consequences for South Africa. On June 21, 1971, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion, stating its conclusions in the following terms:

"133. . . (1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;

"(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of

South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;

"(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia."

By Security Council Resolution 301 (1971) the Security Council endorsed these conclusions, which had also been accepted by the United States. South Africa refused to accept this ICJ advisory opinion just as it had disregarded earlier General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

On February 4, 1972, the Security Council passed two further resolutions. Resolution 309 invited the Secretary General to initiate contacts with all parties concerned with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Resolution 310 called on all states to insure that their nationals and corporations operating in Namibia conform their hiring policies to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States voted for both resolutions.

As requested by Resolution 309 the Secretary General visited South Africa and Namibia in March 1972 and held discussions with South African Government officials and representatives of various groups and parties in Namibia. The Secretary General's personal representative, Dr. Escher of Switzerland, made a more extended visit to South Africa and Namibia during October-November 1972 for further discussions. Meetings between the Secretary General and South African Government officials were also held during the period December 1972-April 1973. These discussions were productive to the extent of eliciting South African Government policy statements on Namibia's future. The South African Foreign Minister stated that his government: (a) would fully respect the wishes of the whole population regarding future constitutional organization of South West Africa and would impose no constitutional system; (b) would permit all political parties to participate fully and freely in the process leading to self-determination and independence; (c) would not delay the act of self-determination and would cooperate with the Secretary General and consult with the people to determine measures to insure the achievement of self-determination; (d) did not envisage individual population groups becoming suddenly independent as separate entities; and (e) anticipated that it might not take longer than 10 years for the population to be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.

The Secretary General, however, concluded that these statements did not provide the complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia required by the Security Council. On the basis of the Secretary General's report and a wave of South African-instigated repression in Namibia later in the year, the Security Council in December 1973 formally terminated the Secretary General's mandate under Resolution 309.

Frustrated by the lack of progress in implementing U.N. decisions regarding Namibia, opponents of South African rule held political rallies and demonstrations, mainly in Ovamboland and in the Windhoek area. Many oppositionists were detained for long periods, some imprisoned and some publicly flogged by tribal authorities in Ovamboland. During the period June-October 1974 an estimated 3,000 persons, mainly young, educated Ovambos, fled Namibia because of repressive political conditions in Ovamboland and rumors of educational opportunities in Zambia. On September 23, 1974, the ruling National Party of South West Africa decided that the various "population groups" (i.e. white, colored, and black tribal groups) should select leaders who would come together to discuss Namibia's future pattern of constitutional development. The South African Ambassador to the U.N. stated in October that the people of Namibia may be ready to exercise their right to self-determination "considerably sooner" than the 10-year prediction made by the Foreign Minister in 1973.

GOVERNMENT

Executive power for the territory rests with the Administrator, appointed by the South African Government. He is assisted by an executive committee of four members chosen by the South West Africa Legislative Assembly from among its own members. The Administrator is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Government and, as the representative of the South African Government, has limited power to issue proclamations with the effect of law.

The South West Africa Legislative Assembly consists of 18 representatives elected for 5-year terms by registered voters. (As in South Africa, the franchise is restricted to whites.) It has authority over all matters not reserved to South Africa and may recommend policies to the Government of the Republic with respect to South Africa's administration of the territory. However, full and final authority in all areas rests with the South African Government.

South West Africa is represented in the South African House of Assembly by six delegates, elected by registered voters of the territory. In the South African Senate it is represented by four members—two elected by members of the territorial Legislative Assembly and two appointed by the South African Government.

The judicial structure in the territory is composed of two overlapping court systems—one for the whites and Westernized nonwhites and one for the indigenous African people. In 1919 Roman-Dutch law was declared the common law of the territory, and a High Court was constituted.

Municipal or town governments usually consist of an elected nine-member town council which selects one of its number to act as chairman or mayor. The town council has the authority to pass municipal regulations and ordinances, but in practice its powers are quite limited.

The territory enjoyed a limited degree of autonomy under the South West Africa Constitution Act, which

was originally passed by the South African Parliament in 1925. Under the terms of the act (as amended) matters of defense, railways and harbors, customs and excise taxes, police, foreign affairs, nonwhite administration, civil aviation, and the courts were specifically reserved as South African responsibilities.

Major changes in the administration of the territory were proposed in the January 1964 report of the Odendaal Commission, which had been created by the South African Government to study means of developing South West Africa. One change recommended was the incorporation of most of the territorial administrative machinery into that of the Republic, and in 1969 the South African Parliament enacted legislation transferring most of Windhoek's remaining powers to Pretoria, virtually reducing the territory to the status of a fifth province.

The Odendaal Commission also proposed the creation of 10 *Bantustans* or exclusive homelands for the various black tribal groups, which could become self-governing and even independent. The Act for Self-Government for Native Nations for South West Africa of 1968 confirmed the land allocations recommended for the 10 *Bantustans* (about 25 percent of the total land area) and permitted the establishment of legislative councils for 6 of them.

Ovamboland (containing almost half the total population of the territory) became the first fully functioning homeland with the establishment of its own legislative council and administrative departments in 1968. Legislative and executive councils have subsequently been established in neighboring Kavango (Okavangoland) and several other homelands. In 1973 both Ovamboland and Kavango were raised to "self-governing" status; however, South African advisers maintain indirect control and assure the day-to-day functioning of these homeland governments.

Principal Government Officials

Administrator–B.J. Van der Walt
Commissioner General of the Native People of South West Africa–J.M. DeWet
Prime Minister's Representative in South West Africa–Billy Marais

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The National Party of South West Africa, an offshoot of South Africa's ruling party, holds all 18 seats in South West Africa's Legislative Assembly. The 10 delegates to South Africa's Parliament from the territory are also members of the National Party. The most recent elections were held in April 1974. The opposition United National Party of South West Africa has not held any seats in the Legislative Assembly since the March 1966 elections.

Political organization among nonwhites in Namibia is subject to many obstacles, including cultural differences and physical isolation as well as official restrictions on political activity.

The application to the territory of South Africa's Terrorism Act–a special law passed in 1967 to cover retroactively with more severe penalties terrorism, sabotage, and certain other political crimes–made a wide range of political activity subject to police discretion and arbitrary penalities. Some 40 Namibians have been convicted under the Act and have received long sentences, many for life. Emergency legislation instituted in Ovamboland in the wake of the 1971-72 labor strike is used by Ovambo tribal authorities to inhibit and repress opponents of South African policies in Namibia. Consequently, much political activity takes place outside Namibia among exiles.

Currently, the most significant nonwhite political groupings are the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Namibian National Convention. Both organizations call for the termination of South Africa's racial policies in the territory and for immediate independence.

SWAPO has received Organization of African Unity (OAU) and U.N. recognition as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. Supported mainly by the Ovambo tribes, it has attracted attention by a combination of political activism within the territory and periodic guerrilla incursions into the Caprivi Strip from Zambia since 1966. Both activities have met strong South African Government opposition. SWAPO organized the large demonstrations in Ovamboland and near Windhoek in 1973 and early 1974 that resulted in detainment, arrest, and public flogging of SWAPO leaders and supporters. In mid-1974 the South African Government announced that South African army forces had replaced police forces in patrolling the Caprivi Strip.

The Namibian National Convention, established in November 1971, is a loose grouping of most of the nonwhite parties within the territory (excluding SWAPO) advocating independence. It seeks OAU and U.N. recognition as the true representative of the Namibian people, as does an organization known as the South West African National United Front (SWANUF), whose leadership is based in New York.

The Anglican Church and the two nonwhite branches of the Lutheran Church have strongly criticized South Africa's application of apartheid and other repressive policies to the territory.

In 1972 the South African authorities established the Prime Minister's Advisory Council for South West Africa, composed of representatives of all the various population groups who meet infrequently with Prime Minister Vorster to make known their views on various issues. The Advisory Council does not enjoy a high standing among nonwhites in the territory because its members tend to support South African policies and do not in most cases represent majority views within their population groups.

ECONOMY

Namibia's economy grew very slowly between 1920 and 1945. Since World War II it has expanded more than tenfold to an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of U.S. $680 million by 1972. During the 1960's and early 1970's GDP increased about 10 percent. Approximately 30 percent of the GDP is repatriated out of the territory as profits or wages by nonresident firms and workers.

Customs Union & Trade

Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland form a common customs union, and consequently no tariffs exist on most goods moving among them. South Africa levies and collects the bulk of the customs and excise duties for the members, paying a share, determined by an established formula, of total customs collections to the other four. Imports from outside the customs union, regardless of ultimate destination, are subject to the same tariff rates. Customs union members also form a common currency and exchange control area known as the South African Monetary Area and use the *rand* as currency.

Because of its membership in this union, trade figures for Namibia have normally been included in the statistics for South Africa since 1966, and hence there are no current figures for the territory. About 90 percent of Namibia's imports originate in South Africa, and about the same percentage if its exports go overseas, either directly or through South Africa. As a result the territory is believed to contribute about 10 percent of the customs union's exports and in 1966 earned about $250 million in foreign exchange for the union.

Mining & Oil

Mining is the most important economic activity in Namibia. It normally contributes almost half of the GDP. Output grew rapidly during the 1960's to an estimated $420 million in 1973. Government income is heavily dependent on the mining industry, particularly the diamond sector, which pays most of the income taxes and special levies.

Namibia's considerable mineral resources provided exports estimated at $200 million in 1967, about 61 percent of all exports compared to 53 percent in 1963. Namibia is one of the world's leading diamond producers. Diamonds normally constitute more than half the value of mineral exports and more than one-third of domestically generated revenue. The major diamond producer is Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, a subsidiary of South Africa's giant Anglo-American Corp. (not U.S. owned or controlled).

Other important mineral resources are copper, lead, zinc, and uranium. The territory is also a source of tin, ore, manganese, cadmium, germanium, silver, semiprecious gemstones, tantalite, phosphate, sulphur, and salt. The U.S.-controlled Tsumeb Corp., established in 1947, accounts for the bulk of base metal production (principally copper, lead, and zinc) and is the only large U.S. investment in the territory. A subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc, Ltd., is scheduled to begin mining substantial uranium deposits at Rossing, near Swakopmund, in late 1975 or 1976.

Large areas of Namibia, including the entire offshore area, have been leased for oil prospecting. Several American companies hold concessions, but no oil deposits have been discovered thus far.

Agriculture

Stockraising and subsistence agriculture occupy most of the labor force. Stockraising generates two principal exports—beef cattle and *karakul* (sheep) pelts.

Most of the arable land is in the north. The remainder of the territory consists of coastal desert and interior highlands which are devoted to cattle ranching in the central area and to sheep-raising in the south. The Bantu-speaking African tribes dependent on subsistence agriculture and cattle-raising are concentrated in the northern half of the territory.

The commercial farming sector is controlled by whites. Commercial agriculture consists of some 5,000 farms or ranches which in 1973 produced exports of cattle worth $80 million (mostly to South Africa) and *karakul* (sheep) wool worth $51 million. Nonwhites own about 25 percent of the territory's 9 million head of sheep, cattle, and goats. Endemic diseases, particularly hoof-and-mouth disease, handicap commercial exploitation of livestock owned by nonwhites, although government inoculation campaigns centered in the northern reserves have had some success.

Fishing

During the last decade, Namibia's fishing industry has attained a position of some importance in the territory's overall economy. Some 730,000 tons of fish (pilchard, anchovy, and mackerel) were landed in 1973, and a portion of this catch (64,000 tons) was processed locally into canned fish, fish meal, and oil. About 62,000 cases of local rock lobster were also processed. Total sales of processed fish and lobster in 1973 reached a record $12 million, up from $8.7 million in 1972.

Labor

Africans of the territory, mainly Ovambos, provide the bulk of the labor force for the mining, agriculture, fishing, and manufacturing industries. They work under a migrant labor policy which restricts residential rights to the native reserves and specific urban locations. Worker dissatisfaction with the contract labor system precipitated a widespread strike in late 1971-early 1972 resulting in increased wages and the removal of some of the harsher aspects of the system.

Budget

Since World War II Namibia has often recorded an annual budget surplus. Budget revenues normally cover operating expenses and most development expenditures. Revenue from Namibian sources accruing to the South West African account of the South African budget in fiscal year 1974 totaled $148.7 million.

Infrastructure

The territory's economic infrastructure, at least in the white area, is relatively well developed. The South African Railways and Harbors Administration maintains 1,453 miles of rail lines connecting the mining and ranching areas with ports at Walvis Bay and Luderitz and with the Republic. Walvis Bay handles 1.5 million metric tons of imports and exports per year. The territory has more than 1,700 miles of paved highways and 19,000 miles of other roads and tracts, an international airport at Windhoek, and a number of paved and unpaved airstrips.

In 1964 the Odendaal Commission devised a major development plan for the territory principally to raise agricultural production. Among the

projects proposed were road construction, irrigation expansion, and livestock improvement. A $280 million project to construct a series of dams, hydroelectric plants, irrigation facilities, canals, and roads along the Kunene River (in both Angolan and Namibian territory) is underway. A network of irrigation canals has been constructed to bring water from the Kunene River into the heart of Ovamboland. A large hydroelectric plant is being constructed at the Ruacana Falls on the Ovamboland border to supply the future power needs of Namibia.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

South African-controlled South West Africa has no separate representation in any international bodies. Given the continued refusal of South Africa to remove its illegal presence from the territory, the U.N. Council for Namibia has represented Namibia in international forums. In 1974 Namibia was elected to associate membership in two U.N. specialized agencies: the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). U.N. Council for Namibia members represented Namibia at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea and several OAU conferences and meetings during 1974.

U.S.-NAMIBIA RELATIONS

In keeping with its support of U.N. resolutions and International Court of Justice advisory opinions regarding Namibia, the U.S. Government believes that the South African Government should promptly comply with applicable U.N. resolutions by ending its illegal administration of Namibia and recognizing the authority of the United Nations over the territory. It advocates a resolution of the Namibian problem by peaceful means and supports practical efforts to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

The U.S. Government seeks to promote and protect the human rights of the Namibian people. It follows developments in the territory closely and expresses to the South African Government its deep concern over South African violations of the rights and well-being of the people.

Since May 1970 the U.S. Government has officially discouraged American investment in Namibia. It has announced that investment rights acquired through the South African Government following the termination of the mandate in 1966 will not be protected against the claims of a future lawful government in the territory. Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities are not available for trade with Namibia. In support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 310 (1972), U.S. firms doing business in the territory have been urged to seek to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The United States maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in Namibia. American Embassy officials stationed in South Africa make short periodic visits to the territory to inquire into the well-being of the people and to observe political, economic, social, and legal developments. In view of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the United States has provided no economic assistance to the territory and does not have Peace Corps or U.S. Information Service (USIS) programs there. However, in 1974 the United States contributed $50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia.

Principal U.S. Officials

The U.S. Government has no official representation in Namibia. The nearest U.S. consular post is the Consulate General located in the Broadway Industries Center, Foreshore, Cape Town, Republic of South Africa. Its consular officers are:

Consul General—David L. Gamon
Consul—John P. Mulligan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8168, Revised December 1974

APPENDIX EE
NIGER
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, July 1976 (Publication 8293)]

background notes

department of state * july 1976

Niger

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Niger

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Niger lies on the southern fringe of the Sahara Desert, 1,200 miles from the Mediterranean coast and nearly 1,000 miles inland from the South Atlantic. It is bordered on the north by Algeria and Libya, on the east by Chad, on the west by Mali and Upper Volta, on the south principally by Nigeria and, for a short distance to the southwest, by Benin.

Four-fifths of Niger is arid desert. The remainder is savannah suitable mainly for livestock and limited agriculture. The Niger River flows for 300 miles along the southwest border permitting the cultivation of rice and truck produce.

Rainfall, which comes in June-September, ranges from 4 to 32 inches. The climate is prevailingly hot, dry, and dusty, especially in April and May.

Because the north is largely mountainous or desert, 90 percent of the people are concentrated in a narrow band along the southern border. Four cities have populations of more than 20,000, but Niger is predominantly a country of small villages.

The two largest ethnic groups are the Hausa (who also comprise the major ethnic group in Nigeria) and the Djerma-Songhai. They are sedentary farmers who live in the arable southern tier. The rest of the Nigeriens are nomadic or seminomadic livestock-raising peoples (Peul, Tuareg, and Toubous).

Despite a high rate of infant mortality, more than 45 percent of the population is under 15 years of age. Only about 12 percent of the children are in school. An innovative but limited educational television program at the primary school level was started in Niamey in 1966. The government hopes eventually to extend the program to other towns.

HISTORY

Considerable evidence indicates that man inhabited what has since become the desolate Sahara of northern Niger some 600,000 years ago. Control of portions of Niger were contested by the Empires of Songhai, Mali, Gao, Kanem, and Bornu, as well as by a number of Hausa states. Its location made it an important economic crossroads. During recent centur-

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 490,000 sq. mi. (larger than Tex. and Calif. combined). CAPITAL: Niamey (pop. 80,000 fluctuates with nomad migrations in dry season). OTHER CITIES: Zinder, Maradi, and Tahoua (pop. 20,000 each).

People

POPULATION: 4.5 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7% (1974 est.). DENSITY: 8.1 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 50% Hausas, 23% Djermas, 15% Fulanis, 12% Tuaregs. RELIGIONS: Predominantly Muslim; some traditional animists and Christians. LANGUAGES: French (official), Hausa, Djerma. LITERACY: 6%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 37 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 3, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: November 8, 1960 (suspended).

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President and Head of Supreme Military Council. *Legislative*—suspended. *Judicial*—four high judicial bodies.

***POLITICAL PARTIES: Suspended.* SUFFRAGE: Suspended. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 7 Departments, subdivided into 32 districts.**

FLAG: Three horizontal bands—orange, white, and green—from top to bottom. An orange orb representing the sun is centered on the white band.

Economy

GDP: $420.5 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: -5.3% (1973-74). PER CAPITA INCOME: $93 (1974 est.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: -7.9% (1973-74).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 3% plus nomad pasturelands. *Labor* 90%. *Products*—millet, sorghum, peanuts, beans, cotton.

INDUSTRY: Textiles, cement, agricultural products.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Uranium, coal, iron.

TRADE: *Exports*—$57.4 million (1974): livestock, peanuts, uranium. *Partners*—France, Nigeria. *Imports*—$105.2 million: fuels, machinery, transportation equipment, consumer items. *Partners*—France, other EEC countries.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: About 220 CFA francs = US$1 (floats with French franc).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$254.9 million (through 1975). *US only*—$53.5 million (through 1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and its specialized agencies; Council of the Entente, West African Economic Community (CEAO), West African Monetary Union (UMOA), Liptako-Gourma Authority, Niger River Commission, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Organization of African Unity (OAU).


NIGER
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
Track
International airport
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
ALGERIA
Tamanrasset
Toummo
Bilma
Vallée de l'Azaouak
Azélik
Agadez
MALI
Gao
Niger
Ayorou
Tahoua
Tânout
Dakoro
Filingué
Tillabéry
Ouallam
Téra
Gothèye
Birni Nkonni
Nguigmi
Gouré
Tessaoua
Zinder
NIAMEY
Maradi
Takieta
Diffa
Goroubi
Say
Dosso
Magaria
LAKE CHAD
CHAD
UPPER VOLTA
Niger
Malanville
Gaya
BENIN
NIGERIA
N'DJAMENA

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ies, the nomadic Tuareg formed large confederations, pushed southward and, siding with various Hausa states, clashed with the Fulani Empire of Sokoto, which had gained control of much of the Hausa territory in the late 18th century. The 19th century saw the beginning of contacts with the West as the first European explorers, notably Mungo Park (British) and Heinrich Barth (German), explored the area searching for the mouth of the Niger River.

Although French military pacification began before 1900, dissident ethnic groups, especially the desert Tuareg, were not subdued until 1922 when Niger became a French colony.

Its colonial history and development paralleled that of other French West African territories. French West Africa was administered from Paris through a Governor General at Dakar, Senegal, and Governors in the individual territories, of which Niger was one. The French Constitution of 1946, in addition to conferring French citizenship on the inhabitants of the territories, provided for a certain decentralization of power and limited participation in political life for local advisory assemblies.

A further revision in the organization of overseas territories began with the passage of the Overseas Reform Act (*Loi Cadre*) of July 23, 1956, which was followed by reorganizational measures voted by the French Parliament early in 1957. In addition to removing remaining voting inequalities, these laws provided for the creation of governmental organs assuring a large measure of self-government to individual territories. On December 4, 1958, after the establishment of the Fifth French Republic, Niger became an autonomous state within the French Community. Following full independence on August 3, 1960, however, membership was allowed to lapse.

GOVERNMENT

• The Constitution of Niger was adopted on November 8, 1960. It was suspended in April 1974 following a coup d'état and the imposition of military rule. While it was in effect, the Constitution granted executive power to a President (Chief of State and Head of Government) who was elected by direct universal suffrage for a 5-year term. The President was assisted by a Cabinet, composed of 15 Ministers and 2 Secretaries of State, which he appointed. Since April 1974 the Supreme Military Council has been the highest organ of government and all basic powers have been vested in it.

Niger's judicial system is, in theory, independent. There are four high judicial bodies—the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, the High Court of Justice, and the Court of State Security.

Niger is divided into seven Departments which are subdivided into 32 districts ("arrondissements"). The chief administrator (Prefect) in each territorial unit is appointed by the government and functions primarily as the local agent of the central authorities.

Principal Government Officials

President of the Republic, Head of the Supreme Military Council—Lt. Colonel Seyni Kountche

Ministers

Education and National Defense—Major Idrissa Arouna
Finance—Intendant Moussa Tondi
Health and Social Affairs—Major Moussa Sala
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation—Captain Moumouni Adamou Djermakoye
Rural Development—Captain Boulama Manga
State for Interior—Alou Karouna
Planning—Annou Mahamane
Mines and Hydrology—Maunkeila Arouna
Economic Affairs, Trade and Industry—Alfidja Abderrahmane
Youth, Sports and Culture—Garba Sidikou
Justice—Mamadou Mallam Aquami
Public Works, Transport and Urbanism—Moussa Bako

Secretary of State for Rural Development—Brah Mamane
Secretary of State for Information and Tourism—Daouda Diallo
Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N.—Andre Wright

Niger maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2204 R Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Until the present military government assumed control, Niger was under constitutional rule with a single party system. The only political party was the *Parti Progressiste Nigerien* (PPN), which was established in 1946 as the local branch of the West African interterritorial *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA), founded and led by Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. The opposition *Sawaba* party, a Marxist-oriented organization formed in 1958 as successor to the *Union Democratique Nigerienne* (1951-58), was banned in 1959. Its founder and leader, Djibo Bakary, went into exile in 1964 and in 1965 organized terrorist attacks from abroad including an attempt on the life of former President Hamani Diori. These were foiled by Nigerien security forces and, with the fall of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966, Bakary and his *Sawaba* party followers lost their principal base of operation. Bakary remained in exile until 1975, when he was permitted to return to Niger by the present government.

Hamani Diori became President of Niger in 1958, when it was still an Overseas Territory of France. He was elected President of the newly independent Republic in 1960 and reelected in 1965 and 1970. In April 1974 Diori was ousted through a military coup led by present President Seyni Kountche, following allegations of corruption and complaints of the Diori government's failure to cope with Niger's urgent economic problems, particularly the devastation caused by the Sahelian drought. In March 1976 there was a coup attempt involving a small number of disgruntled opponents of the military government. It was quickly suppressed.

ECONOMY

Millet and sorghum are the principal staples. Peanuts, sold largely in the EEC area, are the main cash crop and provide more than 50 percent of the export earnings. Stockraising, the main occupation of Niger's nomadic population, accounts for about 20 percent of the GDP. Taking into account the large unrecorded movement of cattle into Nigeria, livestock and derivative products (meat, skins, and hides) comprise an estimated 30 to 40 percent of the country's actual exports.

Because such a high percentage of Niger's commerce is unrecorded, it is difficult to determine actual levels of trade. Foreign aid and grants, however, have more than made up for any balance-of-trade deficit (which may not, in fact, ex-

TRAVEL NOTES

Communications—Niamey has telephone and telegraph facilities. Long-distance calls to the US may be made at certain times of day, and quality of reception is uncertain. A call to New York costs about $12 for 3 minutes.

International airmail letters to or from the US eastern seaboard take 3-6 days and cost about 25¢ a half ounce. Service is fairly regular.

Currency, Weights, and Measures—Local currency is CFA franc, presently exchanged at the rate of 220 CFAF to US $1. The same currency is used throughout ex-French West Africa except for Guinea and Mali.

Weights and measures are on the metric system. Temperatures are in centigrade. There is a 6-hour time difference between New York City and Niamey.

Health—Suggested immunizations are smallpox, yellow fever, tetanus, typhoid, typhus, and polio.

Although Niamey has a filtering plant, the water is unsafe to drink and should be filtered and boiled, or treated with purification pills, before use. Extreme caution must be used in drinking water in other areas of the country.

Transportation—Travel within Niger and to neighboring countries is by air and road. Scheduled air service is available to Niger's important towns (Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder, and Agadez) and to capitals of neighboring countries (Cotonou, Abidjan, Ouagadougou, Bamako, Lagos, and Dakar). Major airlines operating in Niger are UTA and Air Afrique.

Of the three major roads leading from Niamey, one is paved for the first 6 miles, another is paved for 112 miles, and the third is not paved. Other roads in Niger are paved for short distances.

The only adequate public transportation in Niamey is taxi, which is inexpensive and generally obtainable in business areas or near the markets.


ist if unrecorded trade is taken into account); and Niger's foreign exchange position has been improving in recent years.

Niger's single most important problem is the lack of water (from either rainfall or ground sources), which seriously impedes agricultural development. Two-thirds of Niger receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually, and even in the southern part of the country it seldom exceeds 30 inches. Since 1968 there has been less than normal rainfall which has cumulatively brought on drought conditions and caused a sharp decline in agricultural production and heavy loss in livestock.

This extended drought culminated in the 1972-73 rainy season when virtually no rain fell in many areas of the Sahel countries which border the southern edges of the Sahara. A massive international effort was launched to prevent famine, and the international community undertook serious consideration of ways to deal with this recurring problem in the long term.

The economy is fundamentally handicapped by the high cost of transporting goods (in excess of $100 a ton from the coastal ports of Benin or Nigeria) both

Most buildings, like this house in northern Niger, are one-story structures of sun-baked mud brick.





Tuareg honor guard.

into and out of Niger. This is due to its landlocked position, poor roads, and absence of railroads.

Industrial development is seriously inhibited by the high cost of electric power generation.

Economic growth is further retarded by the primitive state of animal husbandry, the lack of a well-developed marketing system, and the reluctance of the Peuls (the main stockraisers) to part with their cattle, which they regard as a symbol of wealth rather than a source of income.

The discovery by the French in 1967 of high-grade uranium ore in the area north of Agadez could lead to some diversification of the economy. A company jointly owned by the French Atomic Energy Commission, private French, German, and Italian interests, and the Niger Government began processing the ore in mid-1971. Production reached 867 metric tons in 1972 and expanded to approximately 1,800 metric tons by 1975. The new planned city of Arlit has been constructed at the site of the mine. A project for the development of a second uranium mine near Arlit by a joint French-Japanese consortium is well advanced. Other potential uranium deposits are currently under prospection by a number of foreign companies and international groups, including American interests.

Three American oil companies have conducted petroleum exploration in Niger without having yet found any oil.

Otherwise, mineral exploitation in Niger is limited to the use of limestone and gypsum for the country's single cement plant and the small-scale mining of cassiterite and salt.

Since independence, Niger has been attempting to become economically viable with considerable assistance from France, the EEC, Canada, the United States, and international organizations. In its development efforts, the government has three basic targets: (1) to diversify foodstuff production, (2) to im-

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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prove its infrastructure, and (3) to develop underground water resources. Industrial development is concentrated exclusively in the processing of primary products and in import substitution aimed at the local market. While pursuing a policy of economic development, the government has consistently maintained fiscal responsibility.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Niger pursues a moderate foreign policy and maintains friendly relations with both East and West. It is a member of the United Nations and its main specialized agencies. It maintains a special relationship with France and has maintained close relations with all neighboring states, especially Nigeria. Niger is a charter member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of the West African Monetary Union. It also belongs to the Niger River and Lake Chad Basin Commissions.

U.S.-NIGER RELATIONS

U.S. relations with Niger have been close and friendly since Niger attained independence. Since 1973 the U.S. has been active in providing emergency food assistance to Niger to help alleviate the effects of the prolonged Sahelian drought. There is a substantial and growing AID program in Niger designed to help the Nigeriens develop an agricultural base which will enable them to weather poor crop years in the future. The U.S. also maintains an active Peace Corps contingent (fluctuating between 80 and 100 volunteers) in the country.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—L. Douglas Heck
Counselor of Embassy—John S. Davison
Economic/Commercial Officer—Mark C. Eaton
Administrative Officer—Douglas J. Harwood
Regional Development Officer (AID)—Albert R. Baron
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Peter N. Synodis
Peace Corps Director—Vacant

The mailing address of the U.S. Embassy in Niger is B.P. 201, Niamey.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8293
Revised July 1976

APPENDIX FF
NIGERIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, May 1975 (Publication 7953)]

background notes

Nigeria

department of state * may 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Federal Republic of Nigeria

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Nigeria, located on the west coast of the African Continent, is bounded on the south by the Gulf of Guinea and on the landward sides by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Dahomey.

Four main topographic areas may be distinguished in terms of vegetation, altitude, and climate: (1) the hot, humid coastal belt of mangrove swamp, 10-60 miles wide; (2) north of this, tropical rain forest and oil palm bush, 50-100 miles wide; (3) the high (6,000-7,000 feet above sea level with no significant mountains), relatively dry central plateau of open woodland and savanna covering the greater part of the northern region; and (4) semi-desert in the extreme north.

Nigeria has several navigable rivers, notably the Niger, the Benue, and the Cross. In addition, the extensive lagoons of the southern coastal area play an important role in transportation and economic activity.

Two seasons, dry and wet, are well marked throughout most of Nigeria. The north's dry season, from October to April, is usually made dusty by Sahara winds, called harmattan. In the south this season extends from November to April, with considerable desert wind and some dust in December and January. Annual rainfall varies from 150 inches on the eastern coast to 25 inches or less in the extreme north.

The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for almost 25 percent of black Africa's people. Its population density is about twice as high as for Africa as a whole and is greater than that of the United States. Although less than 20 percent of Nigerians are urban dwellers, at least 24 cities have populations in excess of 100,000.

The variety of customs, language, and traditions among Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups gives the country a rich heterogeneity.

The Hausa people dwell in the far north and are primarily of the Islamic faith. Smaller ethnic groups of the north include the Fulani, Nupe, Tiv, and Kanuri.

The Yorubas of Western and Kwara States are divided into numerous sub-

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 357,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Calif., Nev., and Ariz. combined). CAPITAL: Lagos (pop. est. 1.5 million). OTHER CITIES: Ibadan (1.3 million), Kano (300,000).

People

POPULATION: 79.8 million (1973 provisional census). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.4%-3% (1973). DENSITY: 224 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 250 tribal groups; Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba are major groups. RELIGIONS: 47% Muslim, 34% Christian, 19% animist and other. LANGUAGES: English (official), Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba. LITERACY: 25%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 39 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Federal Republic (military rule). INDEPENDENCE: October 1, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: October 1, 1963 (suspended and modified March 1967).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Supreme Commander of Armed Forces is Head of Federal Military Government comprising Supreme Military Council and Federal Executive Council. *Legislative*–powers vested in executive since 1966 coup. *Judicial*–Federal Supreme Court, State High Courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Banned since 1966. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 12 States.

FLAG: Three vertical bars of green, white, and green.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $18 billion (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 10%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $210.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 30% cultivated. *Labor* 70%. *Products*–cocoa, rubber, palm oil, yams, cassava, sorghum, millet, corn, rice, livestock.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Products*–cotton, rubber, petroleum, textiles, cement, food products, footwear, metal products, lumber.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Petroleum, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, forests.

TRADE: *Exports*–$9.3 billion (1974): petroleum (92%), tin, coal, columbite, cocoa, palm oil, rubber. *Partners*–U.S., U.K., European Economic Community (EEC). *Imports*–$2.8 billion (1974): machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, manufactured goods. *Partners*–U.K., EEC, U.S.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 naira = US$1.64.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total* $1.5 billion. *U.S. only*–$456.1 million (cumulative through 1974): Food for Peace, Export-Import Bank loans, Peace Corps.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth of Nations, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).



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groups. Many Yorubas are Muslim as a result of the historic influence of the emirate established at Ilorin in the 19th century.

The largest group in the Eastern States is the Ibo tribe, which has historically exercised great influence in trade, the bureaucracy, and the professions. Efiks, Ibibios, and Eastern Ijaws also are sizable groups in this area.

In Midwestern State are found several smaller linguistic groups such as the Benis and Western Ijaws. Ibos and Yorubas are in the minority there.

Communication between persons of varying ethnic backgrounds frequently takes place in English, although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is widespread.

HISTORY

Before the colonial period, the area now known as Nigeria already had a long and eventful history. Over 2,000 years ago, the Nok culture in the present Benue-Plateau State worked iron and produced sophisticated terra cotta sculpture. In the northern cities of Kano and Katsina, recorded history dates back to 1100 A.D. These Hausa Kingdoms and the Bornu Empire near Lake Chad prospered in the centuries that followed as important terminals for trans-Sahara caravan routes. The Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo, founded

about 1400 and at its height from the 17th to 19th centuries, attained a high level of political organization and encompassed a domain extending as far as modern Togo. When Europeans first arrived in Benin in the 15th and 16th centuries, they found another highly organized kingdom with an efficient army, an elaborate ceremonial court, and artisans whose works in ivory, wood, bronze, and brass today are prized throughout the world for their esthetic beauty. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the impact of the slave trade and other factors produced stagnation and political disintegration. However, in the early 19th century the Fulani leader Usman dan Fodio launched an Islamic religious crusade in which he defeated the Hausa States. From Sokoto he controlled an empire that included 100,000 square miles of northern Nigeria.

The early history of European exploration and trade in the region parallels that of other colonies on the coast of West Africa. Following the Napoleonic wars the British expanded their trade with the interior of Nigeria. In 1885 British claims to a sphere of influence in that area received international recognition at a conference at Berlin, and in the following year the Royal Niger Company was chartered. In 1900 the company's territory came under British Government control. It was the government's efforts to suppress the slave trade and to further commercial interests that consolidated the British position in Nigeria. In 1914 the area was formally united as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Administratively, Nigeria remained divided into Northern and Southern Provinces and Lagos Colony.

In 1922 the first elected African legislators were included in a council for the Lagos Colony and the Southern Province. In 1943 three Africans were appointed to the Nigerian Executive Council. (This Council was under the jurisdiction of the British Governor's Cabinet.) Following World War II successive constitutions legislated by the British Government moved Nigeria toward self-government on a representative, federal basis.

Nigeria was granted full independence on October 1, 1960, as a federation of three Regions (Northern, Western, and Eastern) and under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary form of government. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was elected the first Prime Minister. Under the Constitution, each of the three Regions retained a substantial measure of self-government. The Federal Government was given exclusive powers in the fields of defense and security, foreign relations, and commercial and fiscal policy. On October 1, 1963, Nigeria altered its relationship with the United Kingdom by proclaiming itself a Federal Republic and promulgating a new constitution. A fourth Region (the Midwest) was established that same year.

From the outset Nigeria was faced with tribal and regional tensions. Mistrust existed between the south and the north (where modern economic development came later than in the south). The prominence of Ibos throughout the federation aroused fears of Ibo domination. Political corruption and stagnation generated frustration. On January 15, 1966, a small group of army officers, mostly Ibos, overthrew the government and assassinated the Federal Prime Minister and the Premiers of the Northern and Western Regions. A military government assumed power under the leadership of Gen. J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

Clashes in the north in May and September 1966 resulted in the death of several thousand Ibos and promoted the homeward exodus of hundreds of thousands of others. A second military coup occurred on July 29, 1966, and Lt. Col. (now Gen.) Yakubu Gowon emerged as Head of the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

The FMG proposed a constitutional revision to settle Ibo apprehensions and preserve the union, but the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. E.O. Ojukwu, refused anything short of autonomy for that area. On May 27, 1967, Gen. Gowon reorganized the four Regions into 12 States in order to better balance various areas and ethnic groups. Three States were created from the Eastern Region; six superseded the former Northern Region.

These events led Col. Ojukwu to proclaim on May 30, 1967, the independence of the former Eastern Region as the "Republic of Biafra." Fighting broke out between the FMG and Ojukwu's forces on July 6, and Federal forces soon overran the northern part of the secessionist area.

In 1968 Federal forces captured Port Harcourt, Calabar, and Enugu and reduced the rebel territory to one-quarter of its initial area. After a long period of stalemate, FMG forces, driving from the south, broke secessionist defenses and brought about the collapse of the enclave. The surrender was signed at Lagos on January 15, 1970. Since then Nigeria has concentrated on economic rather than political matters, determined to use its oil wealth to broaden the country's development.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree of March 1967 suspended important parts of the previous constitution and formalized to a large extent the governmental arrangements that came into effect with the first coup.

The FMG is composed of a 22-member Supreme Military Council (the top policymaking body) and a Federal Executive Council whose predominately civilian members perform the role of a cabinet. Gen. Gowon heads both councils. In the absence of a parliament, legislative functions are vested in the Federal Military Government, which rules by decree.

Except for placing government decrees beyond judicial review, the advent of military rule did little to alter Nigeria's system of State and Federal courts. The Federal Supreme Court at Lagos, the court of final appeal, has original and appellate jurisdiction. Its members include a Chief Justice and five judges. The High Courts of Justice in the States have wide original jurisdiction and also hear appeals from lower level courts.

Eleven of the 12 States have Military Governors (the exception is the East Central State, which is governed by a civilian administrator). The Governors appoint civilian commissioners who hold portfolios for specific State

TRAVEL NOTES

Customs–Persons arriving in Nigeria must have valid health certificates, visas, and passports. Visas are obtained from the country of normal residence.

Clothing–Tropical wash-and-wear clothing and rainwear are recommended.

Health–Public health facilities, private clinics, dental care, and optical services are available in major cities. Malaria is endemic but preventable. Tap water is not potable; uncooked food should be well prepared.

Telecommunications–Telephone calls to the U.S. and Europe are via satellite. Facilities exist for overseas cables, radio telegrams, and radiotelephone messages to ships at sea.

Transportation–Several international airlines, including Pan American World Airways, provide regular service to Nigeria from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. Nigeria Airways provides domestic service. Surface travel is facilitated by about 10,000 miles of paved roads, including some four-lane highways. Railways are used primarily to transport agricultural and commercial goods. Within cities and towns, taxis and buses are commonly used.

ministries. All States are represented in the Supreme Military Council.

Principal Government Officials

Head of State; Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces–Gen. Yakubu Gowon

Commissioners

Finance–Alhaji Shehu Shagari
External Affairs–Akoi Arikpo
Transport–Olufemi Olumide
Communications–Murtala Mohamed
Works and Housing–Olusegun Obansanjo
Mines and Power–Alhaji Shettima Ali Monguno
Industries–M. I. Wushishi
Trade and Commerce–Gabriel C. Akwaeze
Ambassador to the U.S.–John M. Garba
Ambassador to the U.N.–Edwin W. Ogbu

Nigeria maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2201 M Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20037, and a consulate general at 575 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

After bringing the civil war to a close in January 1970, the FMG extended amnesty to former supporters of the attempted secession and embarked upon an ambitious program of internal reconciliation and reconstruction. An intensified program to provide food, clothing, and drugs to the needy in the war-affected areas was completed in August 1970. During the following year, the FMG implemented the second phase of the relief effort, dealing with the resettlement of displaced persons and the rehabilitation of damaged public facilities. Early in 1972, the FMG estimated that over $180 million had been committed to this rehabilitation program from internal and external sources and termed conditions in the war-affected areas "virtually back to normal."

Since the end of the civil war, the FMG has achieved noteworthy success in bringing about internal reconciliation and reintegrating the Ibo people into the fabric of national life. Government policy has been to avoid recriminations or persecution of any kind. Personnel who supported the secession were reabsorbed into the civil service and police. Enlisted personnel and many former rebel officers were reintegrated into the Federal Armed Forces. Men who played important roles on the rebel side hold prominent positions in the East-Central State Government; and Ibos are represented on the Supreme Military Council and Federal Executive Council and in significant numbers on the staffs of public corporations, private companies, and universities. In an address on October 1, 1971, Gen. Gowon reviewed the FMG's postwar achievements and concluded that "total reconciliation" had been achieved.

Political parties, political activity, and strikes are formally proscribed. In October 1970, on the 10th anniversary of Nigeria's independence, Gen. Gowon outlined a nine-point program for gradually returning the country to civilian rule. Among the essential steps he proposed were a new census and constitution, implementation of the Second National Development Plan, final settlement of the question of the number of States, military reforms, and the eradication of corruption. Gen. Gowon set 1976 as the target date for transferring power to a civilian regime.

In his Independence Day speech on October 1, 1974, Gen. Gowon announced that return to civilian rule would be postponed "indefinitely." Several months before, civilian political debate and competition had increased, largely concerning the then recently announced census which reported that over half the population was located in the Northern States. That debate also contained heated charges and rumors of high-level corruption. The FMG decided that emerging civilian politics were too reminiscent of the pre-coup era when regional/tribal divisions and intemperate debate tore the country apart and that the "apolitical" soldiers would have to continue to govern.

ECONOMY

Nigeria's economy, having recovered impressively from the strains imposed by the 1967-70 civil war, now appears headed toward self-sustaining growth. Buoyed by large oil earnings that provide most of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings, national output and income are soaring. With economic prospects better than ever, the FMG is now concerned with using oil revenues to provide a higher standard of living for its citizens. To reach this goal the FMG has devised a sweeping $50 billion 1975-80 Five-Year Development Plan that will leave no segment of the economy untouched.

Oil is by far Nigeria's most important resource. Current oil production exceeds 2 million barrels per day, mak-

ing Nigeria the world's sixth largest producer and the fifth largest exporter of oil. Petroleum accounts for over 90 percent of exports and foreign exchange earnings and provides the primary source of budgetary support. About 2 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas associated with oil production is presently being flared; it is to be collected and will become another major source of foreign exchange when commercial exploitation begins.

Although Nigeria's exports no longer consist primarily of agricultural products, the agricultural sector provides employment for about 70 percent of the labor force. Cocoa, palm oil products, and rubber remain Nigeria's largest agricultural exports, but the amount of foreign exchange earned by these goods has declined in recent years.

Although Nigeria has been largely self-sufficient in food production, agricultural production for domestic consumption has lagged in recent seasons. Government officials have voiced concern over the need to improve agricultural output.

The manufacturing sector, which contributes only 24 percent of GDP, is growing at an annual rate of 20 percent. Activity centers around primary extraction or processing of export goods, but manufacturing of consumer products for the Nigerian market has greatly increased. Among the larger industrial operations are cement factories, lumber and plywood mills, textile mills, and a petroleum refinery. Peugeot and Volkswagen have signed agreements to establish automobile assembly plants in Nigeria.

Of Nigeria's mineral resources, only tin, coal, and columbite, in addition to petroleum, are presently exported, and hard mineral production constitutes only a small proportion of the nation's income. Coal, iron ore, and limestone deposits have created interest in establishing an iron and steel industry. In early 1969 a $245 million dam and hydroelectric plant at Kainji on the Niger River was opened with a potential of close to 1 million kilowatts. Additional generating facilities are planned.

Petroleum exports dominate Nigeria's export trade. Oil accounted for 92 percent of the $9.3 billion in Nigerian exports during 1974. During that year, Nigeria enjoyed a visible external trade surplus of $6.5 billion. Imports expanded rapidly in 1974 and, spurred by FMG trade liberalization measures, reached a level of $2.8 billion, 40 percent above the previous year. In April 1974 the FMG announced abolition of the 90-day delay in release of foreign exchange to pay for imports. With the exception of certain capital goods, the Central Bank now authorizes payment on sight.

National Development

The 1970-74 Development Plan has terminated, and attention is now focused on the new 1975-80 Third National Development Plan. Funded by vast oil revenues, the plan envisages the expenditure of $50 billion to improve significantly the standard of living of every citizen in the country. Government expenditure of $32 billion will include two liquefied natural gas projects, two or more oil refineries, cement plants, transportation systems, agricultural development, and universal primary education.

Nigeria continues to welcome private foreign investment that promises to make a substantial contribution to national development. The 1975-80 Development Plan envisages private investment of about $8 billion. Nigeria signed a new OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] agreement with the United States in 1974.

Steps are being taken to expand the role of Nigerians in their economy. An "Indigenization Decree" promulgated in 1972 restricts ownership of 22 specified small-scale manufacturing and service enterprises to Nigerians and requires 40-percent Nigerian participation and minimal levels of capital or turnover in 33 other medium-scale activities.

The FMG has assumed minority equity participation of about 40 percent in major commercial banks and has established a National Oil Corporation to develop and hold significant equity positions in petroleum industries. Nigeria has instituted a decimalized currency, has switched from left-hand to right-hand traffic, and is adopting the metric system of weights and measures.

Transportation and Communication

Nigeria's two principal ports are located at Lagos (Apapa) and Port Harcourt. Its 5,331 miles of navigable inland waterways, utilizing principally the Niger and Benue Rivers and their tributaries, constitute an extensive waterway system and provide an important means of transportation. Of 50,000 miles of roads, about 9,500 are paved. There are 2,180 miles of railroad tracks. Nigeria has two airports serviced by international airlines—including one U.S. airline, Pan American.

Nigeria Airways operates a fleet of 12 aircraft, seven of them jets, on an extensive domestic system and on international routes within West Africa and to European capitals.

Main center for telecommunications is at Lagos, and internal service ranges from fair to good. An earth satellite ground station is equipped to relay international television programs. Nigeria has about 26 radio stations transmitting to more than a million radio receivers. The programs of six television stations (including relay transmitters) are currently viewed on an estimated 75,000 receivers. Damaged TV facilities in the war-affected area are being restored, and new TV operations are planned in several other states.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Federal Military Government has resumed diplomatic relations with African countries that had recognized the secessionist regime (Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia), and Gen. Gowon has carried out a series of state visits to African capitals since the end of the war. He has also made state visits to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

Nigeria has increased its efforts to promote regional economic cooperation through its strong support of a proposed Economic Community of West African States. It has also entered into a number of bilateral cooperative economic projects with other West African countries and has provided economic assistance to some African

countries, including the drought-affected states of the Sahel.

Nigeria, like most other independent African states, strongly condemns apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and supports majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

Along with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, Nigeria is a member of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Nigeria supplied police and army units to the U.N. operations in the Congo in the early 1960's.

U.S.-NIGERIA RELATIONS

U.S.-Nigeria relations are based on a variety of cultural and economic ties. Nigeria has the largest number of persons of African descent among its citizens of any country in the world; the United States ranks second. Over 5,000 Nigerians are studying in the United States, and increasing numbers of Americans are studying and touring in Nigeria. In 1974 the United States was the major foreign market for Nigeria's crude oil production, and Nigeria ranked second to Canada as the most important foreign supplier of crude oil to the United States.

U.S. private investment in Nigeria now approaches $1 billion, largely in the joint production of petroleum with the Nigerian Government. U.S. investors are becoming increasingly interested in Nigeria's growing market of nearly 80 million people who had a GDP of $18 billion in 1974 and foreign exchange earnings of over $8 billion (mostly from oil). Nigeria welcomes private U.S. investment as a means of obtaining managerial and technological talent and training. Trade between our two countries has steadily increased; in the first 9 months of 1974, the United States exported $203.6 million of goods and services to Nigeria and imported $2,387.3 million, mostly oil.

The United States took a position of political and military noninvolvement during the Nigerian civil war and continued to recognize the FMG as the Government of Nigeria. It vigorously supported peace efforts by the OAU and the British Commonwealth Secretariat. The United States contributed heavily to wartime and postwar relief efforts. Public and private U.S. contributions during that time totaled more than $140 million.

U.S. economic assistance to Nigeria in 1974 amounted to $5.4 million—$700,000 in development loans and $4.7 million in technical assistance grants for food production and nutrition, population and health, education, and human resources. The latter figure includes the cost of the AID Mission's operations. Current U.S. policy includes phasing out ongoing projects and assisting Nigeria in locating such U.S. technical services and training as the Nigerians may wish to purchase.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Donald B. Easum
Deputy Chief of Mission—Oliver S. Crosby
Counselor for Economic Affairs—Harry A. Cahill
Counselor for Political Affairs—Robert Bruce
Director, U.S. A.I.D. Mission—William R. Ford
Public Affairs Officer, USIS—John Hedges
Consul, Ibadan—Brady Barr
Consul, Kaduna—Thomas Burke

The U.S. Embassy in Nigeria is located at 1 King's College Road, Lagos.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7953
Revised May 1975

APPENDIX GG
RHODESIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, November 1975 (Publication 8104)]

background notes

Southern Rhodesia

department of state * november 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Colony of Southern Rhodesia

GEOGRAPHY

The territory commonly called Rhodesia is known by several names. Legally, it is Southern Rhodesia—a self-governing British colony whose current government is in revolt against the British Government. This designation is also used by the United Nations and the United States. Although the colony calls itself the Republic of Rhodesia, the British Parliament—the only legal authority that can change the name of a British territory—has not changed the name from Southern Rhodesia. African nationalists refer to the country as Zimbabwe. For simplicity, Rhodesia is used here.

Rhodesia is located inland in south-central Africa. It is bordered on the north by Zambia, on the north and east by Mozambique, on the south by South Africa, and on the west by Botswana. It is mostly high plateau country with elevations of 3,000-4,000 feet above sea level. A higher plateau, called the "high veld," crosses the area from southwest to northeast at a height of 4,000-5,000 feet. From the central plateau the land slopes north to the Zambezi River, which forms the boundary with Zambia, and south to the Limpopo River, which forms the border with South Africa. In its eastern districts along the Mozambique border, a range of mountains rises to 6,000-8,000 feet.

Although Rhodesia lies within the tropics, its climate is subtropical. Temperatures vary sharply with altitude. Minimum temperatures range from 37°F to 47°F in the winter season (May-August) and maximums from 80°F to about 100°F in the summer (September-March). The main rainfall occurs from about October into April. Rainfall averages 25-30 inches a year except in certain arid low-lying regions, mainly in the southern part, and in the central plateau where it is considerably higher—as much as 48 inches a year. Floods are rare; cyclones or other catastrophic storms do not occur. The climate of the high veld is similar to that of southern California.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 150,333 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Montana). CAPITAL: Salisbury (pop. 545,000). OTHER CITY: Bulawayo (329,000).

People

POPULATION: 6.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.5%. DENSITY: 41 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 96% African, 3% European, less than 1% coloreds and Asians. RELIGIONS: 51% syncretic (part Christian, part animist), 24% Christian, 24% animist, some Muslim. LANGUAGES: English (official), Shona, Ndebele. LITERACY: African 30%; European and Asian 100%.

Government

Self-governing British colony in revolt against the British Government since its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965.

DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1970.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President, selected for 5-year term by Executive Council (Cabinet), functions in the place of the British Monarch: Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament (23-member Senate; 66-member House of Assembly). *Judicial*—Magisterial courts operate with limited jurisdictions; High Court divided between General and Appellate Divisions.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Rhodesian Front, Rhodesia Party, Rhodesia National Party, African National Council, African Progressive Party. SUFFRAGE: Separate qualified voters' rolls for whites and Africans. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 7 Provinces.

FLAG: Equal-sized vertical bars—green, white, green—with the coat of arms on the white bar.

Economy

GNP: $3.025 billion (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 14% (1970-74 avg.). PER CAPITA INCOME: White, $7,800; African, $716 (avg.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: White, 8.6%; African, 8.5% (1970-74).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 40% arable, 6% cultivated. *Labor* 6% (in addition about 2½ million Africans are engaged in traditional agriculture). *Products*—tobacco, corn, sorghum, wheat, sugar, cotton, cattle.


INDUSTRY: *Labor* 9%. *Products*—transportation equipment, ferrochrome, textiles, processed food.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Chrome, coal, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, iron ore.

TRADE: Since imposition of UN sanctions against Rhodesia, trade figures have not been available.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Rhodesian $0.55=US$1.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: The Smith regime is not recognized by any sovereign state or any international organization.



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PEOPLE

Preliminary data as of December 31, 1974, indicates that the colony has some 5.9 million Africans, 274,000 Europeans (whites), 19,900 coloreds (mixed blood), and 9,900 Asians, with a ratio of 22 Africans to 1 European. With an annual population growth rate of about 3.5 percent, the African population is increasing every 16 months by a number equal to the entire European population. About 82 percent of the Europeans, 91 percent of the Asians, and 84 percent of the coloreds live in urban areas. By contrast, only 16 percent of the Africans live in towns and cities.

The Africans are of Bantu stock, like those of south and central Africa, and are divided primarily into two tribal groups. The Mashona have lived in the area the longest period of time and are the largest of the two groups. The Matabele, centered in the southwestern region around the city of Bulawayo, arrived within the last 150 years. They are an offshoot of the South African warrior Zulu tribe which, prior to European occupation of Rhodesia, had imposed its lordship over the Mashona. The two main African language groups are Shona and Ndebele. A large proportion of the Africans are Christian.

More than half of the European population arrived in Rhodesia since World War II. They are primarily English in origin, although there are also Afrikaners from South Africa and other European nationalities present. The regime encourages white immigration, but with limited success—many immigrants have subsequently left the territory, and the net gain of white population by immigration during the last decade has averaged only 1,000 per year. English is spoken by the white population and is the official language of the colony. The majority of the whites are Protestant.

Almost all of the white, Asian, and colored population are literate. The African literacy rate is estimated at 30 percent. Rhodesia's primary and secondary schools are segregated according to race and are operated under government-formed educational policies. In the mid-1970's over 50 percent of African school-age children

(5-19 years old) were officially listed as attending school (more than 90 percent of them in primary schools). Most African children do not complete primary school; 0.05 percent complete secondary school, compared with 33 percent of all white children. African secondary education has been limited by a shortage of qualified teachers and budgetary cuts since 1965, or the date of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Multiracial higher education is available.

HISTORY

The Rhodesian area has long been inhabited by man; archeologists have unearthed stone-age implements and pebble tools in several areas. The many sites on which ruins of stone buildings have been found provide evidence of early civilization. The most impressive of these sites is world-famous Zimbabwe, located near Fort Victoria. There is evidence that Zimbabwe was built between the 9th and 13th centuries A.D. by people indigenous to Africa who had established trading contacts with commercial centers on Africa's southeastern coast.

The Portuguese in the 16th century were the first Europeans to attempt to open south-central Africa, but the hinterland lay virtually untouched by Europeans until the arrival of explorers, missionaries, and traders some 300 years later. Meanwhile the region was the scene of mass movements of indigenous peoples. Successive waves of more highly developed Bantu peoples from equatorial regions supplanted the original inhabitants and are the ancestors of the present Africans of Rhodesia and the surrounding regions.

British Settlement and Administration

Explorers and missionaries in the 19th century preceded the surge of gold mining and other economic activities spearheaded by Cecil Rhodes. In 1888 Rhodes obtained a concession for mineral rights from local tribal chiefs. In the same year all of the area that became Southern and Northern Rhodesia was proclaimed a British sphere of influence. The British South Africa Company was chartered in 1889 and the settlement of Salisbury, now the capital of Rhodesia, was established in 1890. In 1895 the territory, under the British South Africa Company's administration, was formally named Rhodesia, after Cecil Rhodes.

Following abrogation of the company's charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia's white settlers were given the choice of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The settlers rejected incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom that same year. Since that time Rhodesia has been an internally self-governing colony with its own legislature, civil service, armed forces, and police. Although Rhodesia was never directly administered from London, the United Kingdom has always retained the right to intervene in the affairs of the colony, particularly in matters affecting the African population.

After 1923, European immigrants concentrated on development of Rhodesia's rich mineral resources and agricultural potential. The settlers' demands for more land led in 1934 to passage of the first of a series of Land Apportionment Acts which reserved certain land areas of the colony for Europeans.

In September 1953 Southern Rhodesia was joined in a multiracial federation with the British Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an effort to pool the resources and markets. Although the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland flourished economically, it was opposed by its African population who feared they would not be able to achieve self-government within the federal structure which was dominated by white Southern Rhodesians. The Federation was dissolved at the end of 1963 after a great deal of crisis and turmoil, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the independent states of Zambia and Malawi respectively in 1964.

Constitution of 1961

In 1961 the British Government brought together African nationalist leaders and representatives of the European-led Salisbury government to draft a constitution for Rhodesia. In December a constitution was granted by the United Kingdom and approved by a predominantly European electorate in Rhodesia. It removed most of the remaining legal controls held by the British Government. The Rhodesian Government was headed by a Governor, appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of officials at Salisbury, who had essentially the same limited powers exercised by the British monarch. A Prime Minister, elected by the majority party in a multiracial local Parliament, governed the colony. Except in the fields of foreign affairs and defense, Rhodesia enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.

The significant features added by the 1961 constitution were a bill of rights and a second electoral roll with lower economic and educational franchise qualifications, thus permitting a number of Africans to qualify to vote. The second roll, which was technically nonracial (as was the first roll), in fact consisted almost exclusively of Africans, elected 15 representatives (13 of them black) out of a total of 65 seats in the Legislative Assembly in the elections of April 1965. The first roll, overwhelmingly European because of the higher educational and economic criteria, elected the other 50 representatives. Many hoped that these franchise provisions would allow for increasing African participation in the territory's political life, although there were some who hoped it would serve to blunt the call of African nationalist leaders for immediate transfer of control to the African majority. African leaders, under pressure from their followers, refused to cooperate in the implementation of the constitution, and few Africans voted in the ensuing elections.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)

The European electorate showed little willingness to accede to African demands for increased political participation and progressively replaced more moderate party leaders. In April 1964 Prime Minister Winston Field was replaced by his deputy, Ian Smith, when the former was accused of not moving rapidly enough to obtain

independence from the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Smith led his Rhodesian Front Party to an overwhelming electoral victory in the 1965 elections, winning all 50 of the first roll seats and demoralizing the more moderate European opposition.

While prepared to grant independence to Rhodesia, the United Kingdom continued to insist that the authorities at Salisbury first demonstrate their intention to move toward eventual majority rule. Desirous of maintaining their dominant position, the white Rhodesians refused to give such assurances. On November 11, 1965, after almost 2 years of unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Prime Minister Smith issued a unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom.

Post-UDI Events

The British Government considered UDI unconstitutional and as having no legal validity but at the same time made clear that it would not use force to end the rebellion. On November 12, 1965, the United Nations also determined the Rhodesian Government and UDI to be illegal and called on member states to refrain from assisting or recognizing the Smith regime. The British Government imposed unilateral economic sanctions on Rhodesia and requested other nations to do the same.

In December 1966, Anglo-Rhodesian efforts to find an acceptable solution climaxed in a meeting aboard H.M.S. *Tiger* at Gibraltar between British Prime Minister Wilson and Ian Smith. When the Rhodesians rejected the British terms, the United Kingdom referred the question to the U.N. Security Council. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Security Council, on December 16, 1966, imposed mandatory economic sanctions. Rhodesia's primary exports were placed on the selective sanctions list, as were shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, and petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia. While the sanctions disrupted the colony's economy, the effects were not so serious as to bring about the desired change in the political attitudes at Salisbury.

On May 29, 1968, the Security Council unanimously voted to broaden the sanctions by imposing a virtual total embargo on all trade with, investments in, or transfers of funds to Rhodesia and imposed restrictions on air transport to the territory. Exceptions were made for goods intended strictly for medical or educational use, publications, news material, and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.

In October 1968 Ian Smith and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson met at Gibraltar for a second series of post-UDI talks, this time aboard H.M.S. *Fearless*, to seek a negotiated settlement. The comprehensive sanctions coupled with a severe drought in Rhodesia were straining the colony's weakened economy. The British were prepared to grant independence to a government headed by Mr. Smith, but they insisted on constitutional provisions guaranteeing movement toward eventual majority rule. The Smith forces, while agreeing to a number of concessions, would not accede to British demands for an external check against possible constitutional amendment. The talks recessed in failure.

Buoyed by an upswing in the economy and apparently hoping a complete break with the United Kingdom would lead to international acceptance and a weakening of sanctions enforcement, the Smith regime introduced constitutional proposals in 1969 designed to perpetuate minority rule, redivide Rhodesia's land area between Africans and Europeans, and break the last formal ties with the United Kingdom by establishing a republic. In June 1969 the white electorate gave overwhelming approval to the proposals, winning 72 percent of the votes cast.

The new constitution was passed by the Rhodesian Parliament in November 1969 and came into force on March 2, 1970.

In 1970 and 1971 informal attempts at a settlement were renewed between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian regime. This finally led to the visit of British Foreign Secretary Sir Alex Douglas-Home to Salisbury in November 1971 and the agreement on a set of "Proposals for a Settlement." These agreed terms would have modified the Rhodesian constitution to permit African majority rule at some point in the distant future. They would also have brought about immediate increase in African participation in the white-dominated Parliament, stronger constitutional protection for individual liberties, and British economic aid.

Before it was willing to implement these proposals, however, the British Government (acting on its principle that any basis for independence must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole) carried the plan to the Rhodesian people. A special commission headed by Lord Pearce arrived at Salisbury in January 1972 and spent the next 2 months explaining the proposed terms to the population, including large numbers of Africans in rural areas, and eliciting views on them. Shortly after the Pearce commission began its work, violence broke out in a number of places and for a time threatened completion of the "test of acceptability." The commission was, however, able to complete its survey in mid-March.

Before the test of acceptability began a number of African leaders concluded that the proposals failed to respond sufficiently to African demands for political rights and meaningful participation in the government. They formed a new group, the African National Council (ANC), whose purpose was to urge Africans to oppose the settlement terms. Headed by church leaders and former political detainees, the ANC succeeded in mobilizing African opinion and, as the test of acceptability proceeded, it became increasingly clear that most Africans consulted were against the proposals.

The commission's report, published in May 1972, concluded that while the majority of Europeans favored the proposals, most Africans opposed them. Therefore, they were not acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole as a basis for independence.

The commission's findings were repudiated by the Smith regime, which stated that no further negotiations were possible. The British Government announced that it would maintain sanctions while keeping the door open for a settlement.

Following a coup d'etat in Portugal in April 1974 and the resulting shifts of power in the African territories of Mozambique and Angola, the urgency for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia has been keenly felt by its neighbors, particularly Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and the Republic of South Africa. The leaders of these countries and the President of Mozambique have been active in efforts to bring the ANC and the Smith regime together to negotiate a settlement which could then be endorsed by Britain. Despite several meetings toward this end, as of late 1975 no such settlement had been agreed upon. Efforts to reach a settlement have in fact been complicated by a split in the ANC along the lines of the former ZANU/Frolizi (Zimbabwe African National Union/ Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)-ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union) parties.

GOVERNMENT

According to the present constitution, a President has replaced the Queen of England as Chief of State. He is selected by the Executive Council (Cabinet) for a 5-year term and is eligible for reappointment to one additional term.

The Parliament consists of a Senate (upper house) and a House of Assembly (lower house) whose members may serve up to 5 years. The Senate is composed of 10 Europeans elected by European members of the House of Assembly, 10 African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, and 3 of any race appointed by the President. This body has only delaying powers and functions much in the same way as the British House of Lords. The House of Assembly has 50 non-Africans elected by non-African voters, 8 Africans directly elected by African voters, and 8 Africans elected by tribal electoral colleges.

The judiciary is headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court who is appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The constitution contains a Declaration of Rights but provides that no court may declare any law passed by the legislature invalid because it conflicts or is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights.

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Southern Rhodesia is divided into 7 Provinces, each of which is governed by a Provincial Commissioner appointed by the central government.

Principal Regime Officials

President—Clifford W. DuPont
Prime Minister—Ian D. Smith
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Finance and Posts—John J. Wrathall
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Public Service—John H. Howman
Minister of Justice, Law, and Order—Desmond W. Lardner-Burke

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

While the constitution of 1961 provided for eventual majority rule by the Africans and established two technically nonracial voters' rolls, the present constitution specifically prohibits the African majority from ever gaining a predominant voice in the government and establishes voters' rolls along strict racial lines. Africans and Europeans can no longer qualify for the same roll. Economic and educational criteria still must be met to qualify for either the European or African roll and, in effect, disenfranchise the majority of Africans. The number of representatives directly elected by African voters was reduced from 15 to 8. While representational parity in the Parliament is theoretically possible, the formula under which it may come about, based on income tax payments, effectively assures continued white minority control. When Africans pay income tax equal to that paid by white Rhodesians both groups are to have 50 seats in the House of Assembly; Africans pay less than 1 percent of the income tax at the present time.

Under the Land Tenure Act, which came into force in 1970, Rhodesia's land area is divided "equally" between the 274,000 Europeans and 5.9 mil-

lion Africans; each group is assigned about 45 million acres. The European area contains the major cities, the better farmlands, most of the developed mineral resources, and the transportation system.

In the elections held in 1974 the Rhodesian Front Party won an expected landslide victory and retained all 50 of the European seats in the House of Assembly. The next elections will be held before 1980.

Rhodesia has been under strict emergency measures since before the unilateral declaration of independence. Although the outward calm has been interrupted from time to time by skirmishes with infiltrating liberation groups, these had only limited success in recent years. These groups include the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi). These groups united under the ANC in December 1974 and combined their military forces.

The ANC has officer and training facilities in Zambia and in other friendly African states and is supported by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Although the Rhodesian security forces to date have been able to control insurgent activity, the underlying conflict between African nationalists and the European minority remains one of the territory's most serious problems. It can be expected to intensify gradually if meaningful negotiations between the Smith regime and the ANC are long delayed.

ECONOMY

Rhodesia's wide range of resources should enable it to support sustained economic growth if the country's political difficulties can be successfully resolved without disruptive violence. Rhodesia has two-thirds of the world's known reserves of metallurgical grade chromite. Other commercial mineral deposits include coal, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, and iron ore.

Rhodesia has excellent internal transportation and electrical power networks. Paved roads link most of the country to the major urban and industrial centers, and rail lines tie Rhodesia into an extensive central African railroad network with all its neighbors. It has ample electrical power, much of it generated by the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River.

The manufacturing sector, which was already well developed prior to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, was given a major stimulus by the imposition of U.N. sanctions following UDI. The sanctions obliged Rhodesian industry to further diversify and create numerous import-substitution undertakings to compensate for losses of traditional sources of imports. Rhodesian processing of local raw materials has also grown apace. Major growth industries include steel and steel products, heavy equipment, transportation equipment, ferrochrome, textiles, and food processing.

Agriculture remains a key pillar of the Rhodesian economy. Prior to UDI, tobacco was the main cash crop. Tobacco production has dropped in the decade following UDI, as farmers have expanded production of maize, sorghum, wheat, sugar, cotton, and cattle. Bumper crops in 1974 set new agricultural production records for several key crops and provided many farmers with record earnings.

Although precise figures are not available, foreign trade has reportedly grown rapidly in recent years, and Rhodesia has generally enjoyed a highly favorable balance of trade (nearly $100 million in 1974).

In the early 1970's the economy experienced a modest boom. Agricultural and mineral products rose to near record levels on the world market, and inflation had not yet made serious inroads in Rhodesia. As a result, real per capita earnings for both blacks and whites reached record highs, although the disparity between black and white income remained, with blacks earning only about one-tenth as much as whites.

In 1975, however, the cumulative effect of sanctions, declining commodity prices, port and rail congestion in Mozambique (through which over 50 percent of Rhodesia's foreign trade must pass), record levels of inflation, and increasing political uncertainties have clouded Rhodesia's economic future. Mozambique's independence has added a new factor of crucial importance to the Rhodesian political/economic equation, given the long common border between Rhodesia and Mozambique and Rhodesia's continued heavy dependence on Mozambique's railroads and ports. Rhodesia does have a direct rail link with South Africa and an indirect one via Botswana, but South Africa's railroads and ports are already operating at or near capacity with South Africa's own commerce, and some doubt exists as to how much additional Rhodesian traffic South Africa could handle. Rhodesia thus appears to remain heavily dependent on Mozambique for an access to the sea. Even if Mozambique does not cut the links for the present, the continued port and rail backlogs within Mozambique could result in serious economic dislocations for Rhodesia.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

No country has formally recognized the Smith regime or Rhodesian independence. British sovereignty is recognized and has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the United Nations.

At the time of UDI 21 nations maintained some form of consular representation in Rhodesia. Following the establishment of a republic on March 2, 1970, South Africa and Portugal retained consular missions at Salisbury. The Portuguese, however, withdrew their consul general and made it clear that they continued to recognize the legal sovereignty of the British Crown.

From the beginning of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa and, for a time, Portugal refused to implement them. In the face of African hostility and U.N. condemnation of apartheid, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal for several

TRAVEL NOTES

As a matter of policy the U.S. Government discourages travel to Rhodesia by U.S. citizens. There is no American diplomatic or consular representation in the territory, therefore the U.S. Government is unable to provide any assistance to U.S. citizens in Rhodesia.

years tended to move toward closer cooperation in matters of mutual concern. Since the 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal, however, this tendency has shifted. South Africa has been urging Rhodesia to seek a negotiated settlement. Toward this end, in 1975 it withdrew South African police units which since 1967 had been stationed in Rhodesia to help combat guerrilla activity. Only South Africa retains consular representation in Rhodesia; Rhodesian officials are stationed in South Africa.

U.S.-RHODESIA RELATIONS

At the time of the UDI in November 1965, the United States recalled its Consul General from Salisbury, closed the U.S. Information Service (USIS) library, and withdrew Agency for International Development (AID) and trade promotion officials. After 1965 the small remaining American consular staff continued to operate under authority of exequaturs issued by Queen Elizabeth II. Following the declaration of a republic, the United States closed its Consulate General on March 17, 1970.

The Rhodesian Government maintains an Information Office in the United States. Neither the office nor its employees have consular or diplomatic status, but they are legally registered with the Department of Justice in accordance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

During the Security Council deliberations in March 1970, the United States, for the first time, exercised its veto power when it joined with the United Kingdom to vote against a resolution which, by implication, called for the use of force and which would have required the severance of all postal and telecommunications links with Rhodesia. The United States has consistently opposed the use of force to resolve the Rhodesian dispute and firmly supports the free and unhampered flow of information. On March 18, 1970, the United States supported a resolution, adopted by the Security Council, which called for more stringent enforcement of existing sanctions. The United States supports the United Nations and the United Kingdom in their efforts to influence the Rhodesian authorities to accept the principle of movement toward eventual majority rule, has refused to recognize the illegal Rhodesian regime, and continues to recognize British sovereignty over Rhodesia.

In 1971, despite administration opposition, the U.S. Congress passed legislation which had the effect of permitting the importation of strategic materials (e.g., chrome) from Rhodesia. This legislation took effect on January 1, 1972, and has since led to the importation of limited quantities of strategic materials. This legislation is of little real economic benefit to the Rhodesian economy, and the United States continues to support the balance of the sanctions program and to encourage efforts to strengthen it internationally.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8104, Revised November 1975

APPENDIX HH
RWANDA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, July 1975 (Publication 7916)]

background notes

Rwanda

department of state * july 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Rwanda

GEOGRAPHY

Rwanda is located in central Africa—bounded on the west by Zaire, on the north by Uganda, on the east by Tanzania, and on the south by Burundi.

The country consists mainly of grassy uplands and hills which extend southeastward from a chain of volcanoes in the northwest. It is geologically astride the Congo and Nile drainage systems and has many lakes. Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River Valley, which form the western boundary with Zaire, constitute part of the western portion of the Great Rift Valley.

Although located only two degrees south of the Equator, Rwanda's high elevation makes the climate temperate. The average 24-hour temperature near Lake Kivu, at an altitude of 4,800 feet above sea level, is 73.4°F. Frost occurs at night in the mountainous region where the elevation extends to 14,700 feet above sea level. During the major rainy seasons (February-May and November-December), heavy downpours occur almost daily, alternating with periods of clear, sunny weather. Annual rainfall averages 31.2 inches but is subject to local variation and generally is heavier in the western and northwestern mountains than in the eastern savannas.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 10,169 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Maryland). CAPITAL: Kigali (pop. 50,000).

People

POPULATION: 4 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3% (1975). DENSITY: 400 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 89% Hutu, 10% Tutsi, 1% Twa; 3,000 Asians, 2,000 Europeans (primarily Belgian), about 100 U.S. citizens. RELIGIONS: Animist and traditional beliefs, Christian, Muslim. LANGUAGES: French and Kinyarwanda (official), Kiswahili. LITERACY: 15%.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: July 1, 1962. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: November 24, 1962.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—Committee for National Peace and Unity. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTY: Parmehutu (abolished in 1973). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult (no legislative elections since 1969). POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 10 Prefectures.

FLAG: Three vertical stripes—red, yellow, green—with a black "R" centered on the yellow.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $273 million (1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3-4%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $68. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 2%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 39%. *Labor* 95%. *Products*—coffee, tea, pyrethrum, beans, potatoes.

INDUSTRY: *Labor*—less than 5%. *Products*—small food processing, mining, light consumer goods.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Cassiterite, wolfram.

TRADE: *Exports*—$30 million (1973): coffee $18.6 million, cassiterite $4.7 million, tea $2.1 million, pyrethrum $1.2 million, wolfram $1.1 million. *Imports*—$30.4 million (1973): Textiles, foodstuffs, machinery. *Partners*—EEC countries (mainly Belgium, Luxembourg, and the F.R.G.), Africa, U.S., Japan.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 92.8 RwF=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$33.3 million (1973): Belgium, European Development Fund, U.N. Development Program. *U.S. only* (1974): P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) $700,000; Self-Help Fund $60,000; Peace Corps; Disaster Relief Assistance $1.3 million; AID (new program).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies; Organization of African Unity (OAU); Common Organization for Africa, Malagasy, and Mauritius (OCAM); associate member of European Economic Community (EEC).

PEOPLE

Rwanda's population density is probably the highest in sub-Sahara Africa. Rwanda is a country almost without villages; each family lives in a self-contained compound on a hillside. The only urban concentrations are at the few former Belgian administrative centers.

The indigenous population consists of three ethnic groups. The Tutsis are a pastoral people of Nilotic origin who arrived in the area about 1,000 years ago. Until recently they formed the dominant caste under a feudal system reminiscent of medieval Europe but based on cattle holding. The Hutus are farmers of Bantu origin who displaced the indigenous Twa, pygmies who might be the last survivors of the original population.

HISTORY

As related by traditional folklore, about 1,000 years ago Tutsi cattle



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breeders came to present-day Rwanda from Ethiopia, or even farther north, and subjugated the Hutu inhabitants. The Tutsis established a monarchy headed by a *Mwami* (king) and a feudal caste of nobles and landlords. Through a contract known as *ubuhake*, Hutu farmers pledged their services and those of their descendants to the Tutsi lord in return for cattle and the use of pastures and arable land. The Tutsis reduced the Hutus to virtual serfdom. Some successful Hutus were assimilated into the Tutsi aristocracy, however, and the fortunes of many Tutsis declined to a point where they enjoyed few advantages over the Hutus.

The first European to visit Rwanda was a German lieutenant, Count von Goetzen, in 1894. His party was followed by missionaries, notably the White Fathers. In 1899 the court of the *Mwami* submitted to a German protectorate without offering any resistance. Belgian troops from the Congo occupied Rwanda in 1916. After World War I, the League of Nations mandated Rwanda and its southern neighbor, Burundi, to Belgium as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi became a U.N. Trust Territory with Belgium as the administering authority.

Reforms instituted by the Belgians in the 1950's encouraged the growth of democratic political institutions but ultimately encountered the resistance of Tutsi traditionalists who saw in them a threat to Tutsi rule. Tutsi intimidation and acts of violence against rising leaders of the increasingly restive Hutu population sparked a Hutu revolt in November 1959 resulting in considerable bloodshed. The Tutsi monarchy was overthrown, and the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (Parmehutu) won an overwhelming victory in the U.N.-supervised elections of September 1961. Its founder Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President. More than 160,000 Tutsis fled to bordering countries; but since then many thousands have returned.

The Parmehutu government, formed on the basis of the 1961 elections, was granted internal autonomy by Belgium on January 1, 1962. A June 1962 U.N. General Assembly resolution terminated the Belgian trusteeship and granted full independence to Rwanda (and Burundi) effective July 1. In addition, the resolution recognized the right of Rwanda to make its own security arrangements and provided for the establishment of a U.N. representative in Rwanda to supervise U.N. technical assistance.

Following a period of ethnic and political unrest, the Rwandan Army overthrew the regime of President Gregoire Kayibanda on July 5, 1973, in a bloodless coup d'etat.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

As President of the Second Republic, Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana has attempted to forge a government of national unity. He is assisted by the 11-member Committee for National Peace and Unity, which he appoints. After seizing control in 1973, President Habyarimana completely reorganized the government—dissolving the National Assembly, banning political activity by the Parmehutu, and suspending elections.

However, in November 1974 communal counselors were chosen in the first elections held at any level since the advent of the Habyarimana government. Austerity and discipline have thus far been hallmarks of the present government, and stability has generally prevailed. The government ministries are cautious, and major decisions are passed on to the President.

The Supreme Court is composed of five magistrates appointed by the President. Each of Rwanda's 10 Prefectures is headed by a Prefect appointed by the central government.

Principal Government Officials

President—Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana

Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation—Lt. Col. Aloys Nsekalije

Ambassador to the U.S.—Joseph Nizeyimana

Ambassador to the U.N.—Callixte Habamenshi

Rwanda maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1714 New Hampshire Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

ECONOMY

Although Rwanda's economy is primarily at subsistence level, it has a modest export sector and some light industry. The principal exports are coffee and cassiterite tin ore. In 1973 Rwanda exported 15,478 tons of coffee, and about 60 percent went to the United States. Cash crops with a promising future are tea and flowers, and the U.S. market buys substantial quantities. The country produces about 1.1 percent of the world's tin concentrates; other minerals include tungsten and columbo-tantalite ores, beryl, and amblygonite. Europe buys most of its minerals. Because of economic difficulties, including a lack of capital and low-grade ores, some mines are closed, and even the main ones are operating at far less than potential capacity.

Irregular rainfall in the past has led to famines, resulting in thousands of deaths. In 1952 the Belgians initiated a plan to develop new food crops less susceptible to drought. Reforestation and methods of erosion control were also introduced. In 1974 unseasonable rains destroyed a large percentage of Rwanda's food crops. The United States and other international donors responded with emergency disaster relief assistance.

Small factories produce plastic shoes, furniture, shirts, sugar, and aluminum ware. Rwanda also has a small radio assembly plant and a modern brewery. The hopes for creating a substantial industry hinge in part on the prospect for exploiting the important deposits of methane dissolved in the depths of Lake Kivu. The Rwandan Brewery, on the shores of the lake, is partly fueled by methane, but plans for intensive use of the gas are still in the early stages.

Most fuels and manufactured goods are imported. The normal route for imports and exports is from the port of Mombasa, Kenya, to Kampala, Uganda, by rail, and from Kampala to Kigali by truck. Rwanda conducts a moderate amount of trade with its immediate neighbors, but, so far, regional economic planning has not made much progress.

Rwanda has an investment code designed to attract foreign investment; but little foreign private investment has taken place. The tourist industry and the mines appear to offer some promise to private investors. Foreign aid from Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the World Bank, the U.N. Development Program, and the European Development Fund account for the substantial investment in recent years in electric power distribution, tea and pyrethrum production, swamp drainage, and road improvement. Minimum wage and social security regulations are in force, but no labor organization exists.

The International Monetary Fund sponsored an Economic Stabilization Program in 1966, supported by the United States and Belgium. The United States continues to provide assistance through Public Law 480 (Food for Peace). Belgium continues to be the major donor of economic assistance.

A good coffee crop provided a balanced budget in 1970 and a surplus in foreign exchange. The 1971 coffee crop was not quite as good, and the government ran a deficit. The deficit was nearly $5 million in 1973. In 1974 the Rwandan Government expected to have a balanced budget. However, decreasing coffee prices, poor harvests, and increased expenditures for petroleum products combined to reduce budgetary receipts. It is expected that another deficit will be reported for 1974.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Bring washable clothing, since the air is dusty in the dry seasons. Rainy seasons are often cool enough for jackets and sweaters.

Customs—Visas are required, as are smallpox and yellow fever certificates. No restrictions on importing foreign currency are imposed, but Rwandan francs are used almost exclusively for all transactions.

Health—Several Belgian physicians practice in Kigali, and some medicines are available. Inoculations recommended but not required include tetanus, typhoid, cholera, polio, and hepatitis. Tap water is not potable, and food should be well prepared.

Telecommunications—Cable service is good. Long-distance telephone service is available.

Transportation—Weekly flights are available from some European and African cities; schedules are subject to change and should be reconfirmed at the preceding stopover before going on to Kigali. Kigali has no railways, taxis, or city buses.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Rwandan Government follows a moderate foreign policy and has established diplomatic relations with a number of countries, although it maintains few missions abroad. It has been seeking to intensify relations with English-speaking East Africa. Diplomatic relations were reestablished with Zaire in February 1969 after a break of more than a year as a result of Rwanda's refusal to repatriate mercenaries who had fled to the Congo. In August 1969 Rwanda and Burundi exchanged ambassadors for the first time. Rwanda recognized the People's Republic of China in April 1972 and subsequently exchanged ambassadors.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

American University. *Area Handbook for Rwanda.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

Gibbs, J., ed. *Peoples of Africa.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Lemarchand, René. *Rwanda and Burundi.* London: Pall Mall, 1970.

Louis, William R. *Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1914.* Oxford: Clarendon, 1963.

Segal, Aaron. *Massacre in Rwanda.* London: Fabian Society, 1964.

Following the repression of the Hutus in Burundi in 1972, a war of words erupted between Rwanda and Burundi. In the United Nations, over the radio, and in diplomatic notes, each side accused the other of genocide. At the same time a state visit by President Mobutu of Zaire signalled a strengthening of ties between Rwanda and Zaire. Since 1973 Rwanda has moved to repair its relations with Burundi and other neighbors. The present Government of Rwanda has also sought to play a more activist role in foreign affairs than the previous government.

U.S.-RWANDA RELATIONS

The United States maintains friendly relations with Rwanda. In 1968 it financed an extension of the water supply system and a street-paving project at Kigali. Further U.S. assistance was provided to the National Police and the National University. The United States has contributed to the construction of a road link to Tanzania. Current U.S. assistance to Rwanda includes several projects financed under a modest bilateral AID program. The United States has an active self-help program in Rwanda, and a Peace Corps agreement was signed in 1974. In addition to P.L. 480 food products, the United States has given disaster relief assistance.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Robert E. Fritts
Counselor of Embassy—Peter T. Higgins
Consular Officer—Margaret K. McMillion

The U.S. Embassy in Rwanda is located at 13 Blvd. Central, Kigali.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7916
Revised July 1975

APPENDIX II
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, August 1976 (Publication 8871)]

background notes

Sao Tome and Principe

department of state • august 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

The two islands of Sao Tome and Principe, situated in the equatorial Atlantic about 275 and 125 miles, respectively, off the northern coast of Gabon, combine to make up one of Africa's smallest countries. Both are part of an extinct volcanic mountain range, which also includes the island province of Equatorial Guinea to the north and the towering mass of Mount Cameroon on the west coast of continental Africa.

Oval-shaped Sao Tome is the larger of the two islands, 30 miles long and 20 miles wide, and the most mountainous. Its peaks reach as high as 6,640 feet. Principe is roughly rectangular, about 10 miles long and 4 miles wide. Both islands are crossed by many swift streams, radiating from the center through lush, green forests and cropland to the sea below.

At sea level the climate is tropical—hot and humid with average yearly temperatures of about 80° F and little daily variation except during the rainy season (Oct.-May). At higher altitudes in the interior, the average yearly temperature is 68° F, and nights are generally cool. Annual rainfall varies from as much as 200 inches on the southwestern slopes to as little as 40 inches on the northern lowlands.

Of the total population, about 60,000 people live on Sao Tome and 15,000 on Principe. All are descended from various ethnic groups that have migrated to the islands since 1485. Six groups are identifiable:

1. *mestico*, or mixed-blood, descendants of African slaves brought to the islands during the early years of settlement from such places as Benin, Gabon, the Congo, and Angola—these people are also known as *filhos da terra* (Sons of the Land);

2. *angolares*, reputedly descendants of Angolan slaves who survived a 1540 shipwreck and now are fishermen;

3. *forros*, descendants of slaves freed when slavery was abolished;

4. *servicais*, contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde living temporarily on the islands;

5. *tongas*, children of *servicais* born on the islands; and

6. Europeans, primarily Portuguese.

In the 1970's there have been two significant population movements: The exodus of most of the 4,000 Portuguese residents and the influx of several hundred Sao Tomean refugees from war-torn Angola. The latter movement should reverse itself with the winding down of the Angolan civil war.

The islanders have been absorbed to a large degree into a common Luso-African culture. Almost all belong to one of three churches—Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, or Seventh-Day Adventist—which in turn retain close ties with their mother churches in Portugal.

HISTORY

It is generally agreed that the islands were first discovered by Portuguese navigators between the years 1469 and 1472.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 372 sq. mi. (one third the size of R. I.). CAPITAL: Sao Tome (pop. 4,500). OTHER CITIES: Trindade (2,000), Santo Antonio (750).

People

POPULATION: 75,000 (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.9% (1976). DENSITY: 200 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Mixed Portuguese-African, African. RELIGIONS: 80% Christian. LANGUAGE: Portuguese. LITERACY: 5-10% (est.).

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: July 12, 1975. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Nov. 5, 1975.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Head of Government, 4-yr. term), Cabinet. *Legislative*—unicameral Popular Assembly. *Judicial*—Supreme Tribunal.

POLITICAL PARTY: Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 2 Provinces, 12 counties.

FLAG: Green, yellow, green horizontal bands; two black stars representing the two islands in horizontal line in the yellow band; and a red triangle along the staff side.

Economy

GDP: $13 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: n/a. PER CAPITA INCOME: $175 (1973).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 90%. *Labor* 80%. *Products*—cocoa, coconut palms, coffee, bananas.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 5%. *Products*—beer, soft drinks, palm oil, copra.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Soil, fish.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*—$7 million: cocoa, other agricultural goods. *Imports*—$ unknown. *Major partner*—Portugal.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 27 Sao Tomean escudos = US$1 (June 1976).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$6 million (1976 est.). *US only*—$270,000 (1975-76): scholarship grant and $170,000 in food aid through UN auspices.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), application made as associate member of EEC (Lome Convention).



The first successful settlement of Sao Tome was established in 1493 by Avaro Caminha, who received the land as a grant from the Portuguese crown. Principe was settled in 1500 under a similar arrangement. By the mid-1500's, with the help of slave labor, the Portuguese settlers had turned the islands into Africa's foremost exporter of sugar. Sao Tome and

Principe were taken over and administered by the Portuguese crown in 1522 and 1573, respectively.

Sugar cultivation declined over the next hundred years, and by the mid-1600's Sao Tome had become little more than a port of call for bunkering ships. This situation prevailed until the early 1800's when two new cash crops, coffee and cocoa, were introduced. The rich volcanic soils proved well suited to the new cash crop industry, and it was not long before extensive plantations (*rocas*), owned by Portuguese companies or absentee landlords, occupied almost all of the good farmland. By 1908 Sao Tome had become the world's largest producer of cocoa, still the country's most important crop.

The system of *rocas*, which placed a high degree of authority in the hands of the plantation managers, inevitably led to abuses against the African farm workers. Although Portugal officially abolished slavery in 1876, the practice of forced labor, with remuneration, continued. In the early 1900's an international press controversy arose over charges that Angolan contract workers were being subjected to forced labor and unsatisfactory working conditions. Sporadic labor unrest and dissatisfaction continued well into the century, culminating in an outbreak of riots in 1953 in which several hundred African laborers were killed by their Portuguese rulers. This "Batepa Massacre" remains a major event in the colonial history of the islands, and its anniversary is officially observed by the new government.

By the late 1950's, at a time when other emerging nations across the African Continent were clamoring for independence, a small group of Sao Tomeans had formed the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP), which eventually established its base in nearby Gabon. Picking up momentum during the 1960's, events moved quickly following the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974. The new Portuguese regime was committed to the dissolution of its overseas colonies. In November 1974 their representatives met with the MLSTP in Algiers and worked out an agreement for the transfer of sovereignty. Following a period of transitional government, Sao Tome and Principe achieved its independence on July 12, 1975, choosing as its first President the MLSTP Secretary-General Manuel Pinto da Costa.

GOVERNMENT

Under the Constitution, the Popular Assembly is the supreme organ of the state and the highest legislative body. It is elected for a period of 4 years and meets twice a year.

The President of the Republic is elected by the Assembly from a list of candidates named by the MLSTP. He may appoint and dismiss members of the Cabinet, negotiate and ratify treaties, convoke the Popular Assembly, accredit foreign Ambassadors and appoint his own, commute sentences, and exercise pardon. He may also declare a state of emergency if circumstances so warrant, and thereby becomes invested with special powers. If the President dies or is otherwise incapacitated, he is immediately replaced by the President of the Popular Assembly, who must convoke an emergency session of the Assembly within 7 days in order to elect a new President.

Justice is administered, at the highest level, by the Supreme Tribunal, which is named by and responsible to the Popular Assembly. Lower tribunals are appointed to try ordinary cases.

Administratively the country is divided into two Provinces, which correspond to the two islands, and 12 counties—11 of which are on Sao Tome.

Principal Government Officials

President; Minister of National Defense and Agriculture and Agrarian Reform—Manuel Pinto da Costa

Prime Minister; Minister of Economic Coordination, Cooperation, and Tourism—Miguel Trovoada

President of the Popular Assembly; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Leonel d'Alva

Other Ministers

Education and Culture—Alda do Espirito Santo

Health and Social Affairs—Miguel da Graca

Justice; Labor—Manuel Quaresma Costa

Information—Jose Fret

Secretary of State for Justice—Celestino Rocha da Costa

Ambassador to the U.N.—Maria de Amorin

Sao Tome and Principe does not maintain an Embassy in the U.S.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The MLSTP is the sole political party and plays a key role in the country's political fabric. During the period 1974-75, after the coup in Portugal but prior to independence, the MLSTP worked in cooperation with another group, the Civic Association (AS), to formulate new policies and ease the transition to independence. Disagreement soon developed between the two groups, however, primarily over the issue of how quickly revolutionary changes ought to be implemented. The AS, more radical in outlook, favored immediate nationalization of the plantations, retribution against Portuguese colonials who had allegedly committed abuses, and other drastic measures. The MLSTP, although in basic agreement with the AS on long-term goals, favored a more moderate approach. The MLSTP prevailed and upon independence emerged in a predominant position.

The overriding domestic concern is economic development, particularly in the agricultural sector. In pursuit of its development goals, the new government has achieved a considerable degree of success in mobilizing the population and preserving internal unity.

ECONOMY

Since the 1800's, the economy has been based almost exclusively on plantation

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—**Lightweight, washable clothing is recommended year round. At higher altitudes in the interior, evenings can be cool enough for sweaters.**

Customs—**Visas should be obtained in advance from the Sao Tomean Chargé d'Affaires in nearby Libreville, Gabon, or at any Sao Tomean diplomatic mission abroad. Vaccination certificates against yellow fever, smallpox, and cholera are required.**

Health—**Take normal precautions with regard to food and drink. Malaria pills should be taken, starting 3 weeks in advance of arrival in the tropics. The islands have adequate hospital facilities for common ailments.**

Telecommunications—**Telephone and telegraph link the islands with Europe and more recently with the African mainland at Gabon. A radio network also connects the Sao Tomean Government with its representative in Libreville.**

Transportation—**Air Gabon sends a round-trip flight from Libreville to Sao Tome twice weekly. The Angolan national airline has three flights a week from Luanda. Limited taxi service is available. Fishing boats can be chartered to circle the island.**

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Moser, Gerald M. "African Literature in the Portuguese Language." *Journal of General Education*, vol. 13, no. 4, Jan. 1962.

S. Tome e Principe: A Brief Survey. Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1970.

agriculture. At the time of independence, Portuguese-owned plantations occupied about 90 percent of the total land area. The new government is focusing its efforts on revitalizing the cocoa, copra, and coffee plantations as a means of earning foreign exchange while diversifying the agricultural base to reduce dependence on imported food.

Another sector with potential for expansion is the small fisheries industry. The surrounding waters contain abundant reserves of fish, including tuna and shrimp. In addition, a traditional turtle industry provides both food and turtleshell products. The new government is building a cold storage warehouse at Sao Tome.

Tourism is a third area with potential for modest development. The natural beauty of the islands and their relatively central location along African air routes are seen as valuable assets. Extensive development, however, will have to await the gradual expansion of the overall economic infrastructure. Sao Tome presently has two medium-sized hotels. There is no railroad, but the islands have a fairly extensive network of excellent roads. The harbor at Sao Tome is well protected but only suitable for shallow-draft vessels. Prior to independence there was some investigation into the possibility of building a deepwater port on the northern coast of Sao Tome, where the steep drop-off on the ocean bottom affords better natural conditions. The airport is capable of receiving small jet aircraft and is currently served by two scheduled airlines.

Portugal will probably remain the major trading partner for some time. The islands are also expanding their ties with other countries—Gabon, France, the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., Romania, and the United States. These countries have provided economic aid and are potential trading partners. The U.N. Development Program has a modest technical assistance program, primarily in agriculture, food aid, public health, education, and tourism.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Until its independence, Sao Tome and Principe had few ties abroad except those with Portugal. The new government is now trying to diversify its overseas contacts. Its relations with Gabon, which provided assistance to the liberation movement, are close and cordial. A common language, tradition, and colonial experience has naturally led to close collaboration between Sao Tome and Principe and the other ex-Portuguese colonies in Africa—Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique.

Outside the African Continent, emissaries from Sao Tome and Principe have traveled to Europe and America seeking diplomatic and economic assistance ties. In December 1975 President da Costa paid a state visit to Romania, the P.R.C., and North Korea. Ideologically, the new government has identified itself to a certain degree with the principles of Marxist doctrine; however, as with most so-called Third World countries, its overriding concern is in providing for the welfare of its people through economic development. Among the countries with whom it has established diplomatic ties are: Portugal, France, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Romania, the United States, the P.R.C., Italy, Belgium, and the four other ex-Portuguese colonies in Africa.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

Relations between Sao Tome and Principe and the United States have been characterized by friendship and goodwill on both sides. On the occasion of the islands' independence celebrations in July 1975, the United States sent a delegation to take part in the festivities and extended the offer of a $100,000 scholarship grant for Sao Tomean students. Since that time, the United States has also contributed to a program of food aid administered under U.N. auspices and is currently looking into the possibility of establishing a modest, ongoing program of bilateral economic assistance.

The United States was among the first countries to accredit an Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe. He and his staff are based in nearby Gabon and make periodic visits to the islands.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Andrew L. Steigman

Deputy Chief of Mission—Edmund T. DeJarnette

Economic/Commercial Officer—Cornelia A. Bryant

Public Affairs Officer—Elton Stepherson, Jr.

The U.S. Embassy in Gabon is located on the Boulevard de la Mer, B.P. 400, Libreville.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8871, Released August 1976

APPENDIX JJ
SENEGAL
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, December 1974 (Publication 7820)]

background notes

department of state * december 1974

Senegal

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Senegal

GEOGRAPHY

Senegal is located on the bulge of West Africa, bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. The Gambia penetrates more than 200 miles into Senegal.

The country is mostly rolling plains, with savanna-type vegetation and a low altitude. In the southeast, however, plateaus rise to elevations of 1,640 feet above sea level to form the foothills of the Fouta-Djalon Mountains. Marshy swamps interspersed with tropical rain forest are common in the southwest. The northwestern coast is almost straight; farther south it is marshy and indented by many estuaries. Senegal is drained by four major rivers: the Senegal, Saloum, Gambia, and Casamance, each of which is navigable by oceangoing vessels for a substantial distance inland.

Two well-defined dry and humid seasons are the result of alternating winds from the northeast in winter and from the southwest in summer. Dakar's annual rainfall of about 24 inches occurs between June and October when maximum temperatures average 82°F; December to February minimum temperature is about 63°F. Temperatures in the interior are higher than along the coast, while rainfall increases substantially farther south, exceeding 60 inches a year in some areas.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 76,000 sq. mi. (about the size of S. Dak.). CAPITAL: Dakar (pop. 600,000). OTHER CITIES (1973 est.): Kaolack (pop. 96,000), Thies (pop. 81,000), Saint-Louis (pop. 45,000).

People

POPULATION: 4.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.4% (1973). DENSITY: 55 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS (1971 est.): Wolof 36%, Peuhl 17.5%, Serere 16.5%, Toucouleur 9%, Diola 9%, Mandingo 6.5%. RELIGIONS: Moslem (more than 80%), animists, Christians. LANGUAGES: French (official), Wolof, Peuhl, Diola, Mandingo. LITERACY: 5-10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 37 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: April 4, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: March 3, 1963.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), Parti Democratique Sénégalaise (PDS). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 7 regions.

FLAG: Three vertical stripes–green, yellow, and red–with a green star centered in the yellow stripe.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $905 million (1972). PER CAPITA INCOME: $235.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 57%. *Labor* 74%. *Products*–peanuts, millet, cotton, rice, sorghum.

INDUSTRY: *Products*–peanut oil, textiles, fertilizer, cement, processed food and fish, petroleum refining.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Fish, phosphate.

TRADE: *Exports*–$217 million (1972 f.o.b.): peanuts and products, phosphates and phosphate fertilizers, canned fish. *Partners*–France (about 50%), other EEC. *Imports*–$281 million (1972): rice, sugar, machinery and transport equipment. *Partners*–France (about 50%), other EEC.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Floating with French franc (CFAF50=1FF).

U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: $55 million (since 1946).


MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and associated agencies, Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), Organization of African Unity (OAU), African-Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), franc zone.

PEOPLE

About 70 percent of Senegal's population is rural. Overall density is about 55 persons per square mile, but in rural areas density varies from about 200 per square mile in the west-central region to 5 per square mile in the arid eastern section. About 50,000 Europeans, Syrians, and Lebanese reside in Senegal and are concentrated mainly in the cities. French is the official language but is regularly used only by the literate minority. Most Sengalese use their own tribal language.

HISTORY

Megalithic remains throughout the area indicate that what is now Senegal was inhabited in prehistoric times. In the 13th and 14th centuries the area



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came under the influence of the great Mandingo Empires to the east. The Djoloff Empire of Senegal itself was also founded at this time.

French commercial establishments date from the 17th century. During the 19th century the French gradually established control over the interior regions, which were administered as a protectorate until 1920, and as a colony thereafter. In 1946 a territorial assembly was elected by a restricted franchise and given mainly advisory powers. These were gradually expanded, and the franchise broadened in succeeding years. After the 1958 French constitutional referendum, Senegal became a member of the French Community with virtually complete internal autonomy.

In January 1959 Senegal and the French Soudan merged to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent on June 20, 1960, as a result of the independence and transfer of power agreement signed with France on April 4, 1960. (April 4 is celebrated as Senegal's independence day.) Because of internal political difficulties the federation broke up on August 20, 1960, when Senegal seceded and proclaimed itself the Republic of Senegal. Soudan became the Republic of Mali a month later.

After the breakup of the Mali Federation, President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamdou Dia governed together under a parliamentary system. In December 1962 their political ri-

valry led to an attempted coup d'etat by the Prime Minister. Although this was put down without bloodshed, it resulted in Dia's arrest and imprisonment, and Senegal adopted a new constitution. Dia was released in 1974.

GOVERNMENT

The Constitution of 1963 transformed Senegal's government into an executive-presidential system.

The President is elected by universal adult suffrage to a 5-year term. In February 1970 the Constitution was amended to restore the office of Prime Minister. He is appointed by the President for a 3-year term. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, is also appointed by the President.

The legislature consists of a unicameral National Assembly whose 100 members are elected by universal adult suffrage at the same time as the President.

The highest court in the independent judiciary is the Supreme Court whose judges are presidentially appointed.

For administrative purposes Senegal is divided into seven regions, each headed by a governor appointed by and responsible to the President.

Principal Government Officials

President—Léopold-Sédar Senghor
Prime Minister—Abdou Diouf

Other Ministers

Minister of State for Public Works, Urbanism, and Transport—Diaraf Diouf
Foreign Affairs—Assane Seck
Justice—Alioune Badar M'Bengue
Interior—Jean Collin
Finance and Economic Affairs—Babacar Ba
National Education—Doudou N'Gom
Rural Development—Adrien Senghor
Industrial Development—Louis Alexandrenne
Cooperation and Planning—Ousmane Seck
Culture—Alioune Sene
Information—Daouda Sow
Public Health and Social Affairs—Coumba N'Doffene Diouf
Labor and Civil Service—Amadou Ly
Ambassador to the U.S.—André Coulbary
Ambassador to the U.N.—Medoune Fall

Senegal maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2112 Wyoming Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Senegal's governing political party is the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), founded in 1949 and led by President Senghor. Presidential and legislative elections since 1963, including the most recent (January 28, 1973), have returned President Senghor to office and given the UPS all 100 seats in the National Assembly.

The UPS is a moderate party which advocates a form of socialism based on traditional African communal institutions. The one-party regime, in practice, leaves considerable scope to private enterprise, including foreign investment in commerce and light industry, and tolerates some political opposition. In 1974 a second political party, the Parti Democratique Sénégalaise, was formed by Abdoulaye Wade.

ECONOMY

Senegal is primarily an agricultural country, whose harvests have been badly damaged due to irregular weather and climatic conditions from 1966 on, culminating in severe drought throughout the country during the 1972 normal rainy season. Although the 1974 harvest saw improvement, Senegal is a Sahelian country that will undoubtedly suffer recurrent droughts.

Peanuts are the principal crop, accounting for about half of the total agricultural production and providing 80 percent of the total export earnings. Cereals, mainly millet and sorghum, are important food crops. Of the new cash crops being developed to diversify agricultural production, cotton has proved the most successful. Cultivation of rice, a staple food, has so far met with less satisfactory results, and large quantities still must be imported. Commercial fishing, which received a boost recently in the acquisition of several modern fishing boats, is expanding rapidly. The productive use of livestock, also severely affected by the drought, remains relatively low.

Senegal, one of the most industrialized states of former French West Africa, processes its raw materials, such as peanut oil, canned fish, and

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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phosphates, into finished products for export. The production of phosphates, the major mineral resource, has more than tripled since 1961.

With an ever-expanding population and during a period of increasingly poor harvests, Senegal is experiencing difficulty in achieving an adequate economic growth rate. The fourth development plan (1973-77) emphasizes agricultural and large industrial projects. Senegal is eager to attract foreign investment, and its 1972 investment code offers attractive incentives. Aid for Senegal's economic development has come largely from France and the European Economic Community (EEC), of which Senegal is an associated state. Lesser amounts of assistance are supplied by the United States, several other countries, and the United Nations. A multilateral donor group is assisting Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali in planning the joint development of the Senegal River basin.

In 1972 Senegal had roughly 1,300 miles of paved roads. Dakar is the terminal point of the Senegal Railways, the main line of which provides service to Bamako, Mali, and is the principal route for Mali's export-import trade. Dakar also is one of the most important West African ports, and the Dakar-Yoff airfield is a major stop on routes between Africa and Europe or the Western Hemisphere.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

President Senghor is an advocate of regional West African cooperation and of African unity in a broader context.

Senegal advocates a formal policy of maintaining relations with both East and West and has particularly close and friendly relations with France on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

Because of their geographic location Senegal and The Gambia need to maintain especially close relations. A High Commissioner from each country resides in the capital of the other to facilitate regular consultations. Despite an occasional strain in relations due to conflicting economic policies, leaders of the two countries meet regularly. An Inter-Ministerial Committee and Sene-Gambian Permanent Secretariat have been established to resolve technical questions.

U.S.-SENEGAL RELATIONS

The United States desires to maintain friendly relations with Senegal and is providing modest economic and technical assistance. Trade between the two countries, however, is relatively limited, and U.S. investment in Senegal, although growing, is not large.

Since 1946 American assistance to Senegal has totaled $48 million in capital and technical assistance, loans and donations of food under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace). In addition, the United States furnished over $5 million in emergency drought assistance, mainly in P.L. 480 foodstuffs, and has programmed $1.4 million for a short-term relief and rehabilitation program to relieve some of the problems and suffering created by the Sahel Region drought. For middle and longer term development solutions to conditions created by the drought, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) will work with Senegal on livestock and cereals programs and in the regional Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS).

The Export-Import Bank has taken an active role in Senegal. During 1974 the Exim Bank has extended credits for the purchase of fishing boats and has established a cooperative financing facility (CFF) credit line with a Dakar bank. A successful Peace Corps program involves about 90 volunteers. The current cultural exchange program consists of one Fulbright professor and about 10 International Visitor grants a year.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—O. Rudolph Aggrey
Deputy Chief of Mission—Allen Davis
Political Officer—Alan M. Hardy
Economic Officer—Shaun E. Donnelly
Consular Officer—James E. Blanford
AID Area Development Officer—M. Norman Schoonover

The U.S. Embassy in Senegal is located at the BIAO Building, Place de l'Independence (P.O. Box 49), Dakar.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—**For Dakar's hot, humid summer (June-November), dress as you would during Washington's heat. In winter (December-May), dress is comparable to early fall in Washington—warm days and cool to cold evenings.**

Health—**The general level of health in modern Dakar is good, however, city water is not safe for drinking, meats should be well cooked, and vegetables well prepared.**

Malaria is endemic in Senegal and hepatitis is prevalent. A valid certificate of yellow fever immunization is required throughout West Africa, and cholera, smallpox, tetanus, polio, and typhoid immunizations are advisable.

Transportation—**Dakar has excellent and frequent worldwide airline connections. In the city, metered cabs are available and rates are reasonable.**

Telecommunications—**Long-distance telephone service is via radio link. Cable and telex services are available.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7820
Revised December 1974

APPENDIX KK
SEYCHELLES
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, February 1976 (Publication 8246)]

background notes

Seychelles

department of state * february 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Seychelles

GEOGRAPHY

The British Crown Colony of the Seychelles is located in the Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles east of Kenya. Consisting of an archipelago of some 85 islands, it is a beautiful tropical paradise largely isolated from the rest of the world.

The islands in the Seychelles group are composed of either granite or coral; the latter are virtually incapable of sustaining human life. The 40 granite islands are predominantly mountainous, while the 45 coral islands are flat with elevated coral reefs at different stages of formation. There are, in addition, a number of tiny cays and rocks.

Mahe, the largest island, has an area of about 55 square miles and is encircled by a narrow coastal belt from which a mountainous mass rises abruptly to heights of almost 3,000 feet above sea level. The smaller islands, insignificant in size, are widely scattered.

The climate is equable and healthy, although quite humid, since the islands are small and subject to marine influences. Temperatures on Mahe vary from 75° to 85°F, and rainfall ranges from 90 inches per year at Victoria to 140 inches per year on the mountain slopes. Precipitation is somewhat less on the other islands. The cooler season occurs during the southeast monsoon period beginning about the end of May and continuing until September. The Colony lies outside the cyclone belt, so high winds are rarely encountered.

PEOPLE

The population density is uneven with four-fifths of the people living on Mahe. Most others live on the islands of Praslin and La Digue. The smaller islands are either sparsely populated or uninhabited.

Most Seychellois are descendants of early French settlers and their African slaves. Indian and Chinese merchants (1.1 percent of the total population) account for the remainder of the permanent inhabitants. Approximately 250 British private citizens and officials, together with some U.S. citizens connected with a U.S. space tracking station on Mahe, make up the majority of the nonpermanent population.

Despite British rule since 1814, the culture of the islands is essentially Creole (an admixture of French and Africans). Creole is the native language of 94 percent of the people; however, French or English is fairly common. Approximately 60 percent of the adult population is literate, and the literacy rate of school-aged children has risen to about 75 percent. Further increase may be expected, since 95 percent of children of primary school age are attending school.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: About 85 islands totaling 100 sq. mi. of land area. CAPITAL: Victoria (pop. 14,000).

People

POPULATION: 59,000 (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.4%. ETHNIC GROUPS: Seychellois or Creole (admixture of Asians, Africans, and Europeans). RELIGION: 91% Roman Catholic. LANGUAGES: English (official), Creole. LITERACY: 60%.

Government

TYPE: British Crown Colony. CONSTITUTION: Final draft has not yet been adopted; the interim government went into effect October 1, 1975.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–the Queen (Chief of State) represented by the Governor (appointed by the Queen), Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*–Legislative Assembly. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, 2 magistrates' courts.

FLAG: As a British Crown Colony, the Seychelles flies the Union Jack.

Economy


GNP: $31 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: About 4.6% (1974 est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: na.

AGRICULTURE: *Labor*–27%. *Products*–copra, cinnamon, vanilla.

INDUSTRY: *Labor*–55%. *Products*–tourism, copra and vanilla processing, coconut oil, construction.

TRADE: *Exports*–$2.58 million (1973 est.): mostly cinnamon and coconut products. *Partners*–India 45%, US 27%, UK 12%. *Imports*–$28 million (1973 est.): food, tobacco, manufactured goods, machinery, transport equipment, petroleum products, textiles. *Partners*–UK 44%, Kenya 17%, US 2%.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 rupee=US$0.18. AID RECEIVED: *Total*–UK $32 million (1974-76 est.). *US only*–$0.5 million (FY 1953-73 est.), P.L. 480 $50,000.



HISTORY

The Seychelles remained uninhabited for more than a century and a half after they became known to Western explorers. The islands appeared on Portuguese charts as early as 1505, although there may have visitors from Arabia much earlier. In 1742 the French Governor of Mauritius, Mahe de Labourdonnais, sent an expedition to the islands. A second expedition in 1756 reasserted formal possession by France and bestowed upon the islands their present name in honor of the French Finance Minister under King Louis XV. The French maintained control for a 50-year period. France's new colony barely survived its first decade and did not really begin to flourish until 1794, when the astute Queau de Quincy became commandant.

After being captured and freed several times during the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon, the islands passed officially to the British under the Treaty of Paris in 1814.

From the date of its founding by the French until 1903, the Seychelles was regarded as a dependency of Mauritius. However, in 1888 a separate Administrator and Executive and Legislative Councils were established for the archipelago. Nine years later the Administrator was given the full powers of a Governor, and on August 31, 1903, the Seychelles became a separate British Crown Colony.

In March 1970 colonial and political representatives of the Seychelles met at London for a constitutional convention. The result was a new Constitution, providing for limited internal self-government. It was promulgated later in the year, coming into full effect with the general elections held in November 1970.

GOVERNMENT

The interim autonomous government that was established on October 1, 1975, is comprised of a Governor appointed by the Queen who remains Chief of State, a Prime Minister who is Head of Government and of the Cabinet, and the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly consists of 15 elected members and 10 members who were appointed by the two parties which comprise the government coalition. The officers of this body are the speaker and three ex officio members.

The current government is a mix of native Seychellois ministers and British-appointed Permanent Secretaries serving under those ministers. Only a temporary arrangement, the new Constitution is to be decided upon before independence in June 1976.

The highest court in the Seychelles is the Supreme Court. There is currently appeal to the Prime Council in London. Although the Colony's criminal code is based on British law, its legal system is otherwise based on the French Code Napoleon as amended by local ordinance.

Principal Government Officials

Monarch—Queen Elizabeth II
Chief Minister—J.R. Mancham
Governor—Colin Allan
Deputy Governor—D. Dale
Attorney General—J.A. O'Brien Quinn
Financial Secretary—A.C. Mac Kellar

Council of Ministers

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—C. Chetty
Labour and Social Security—J.D.M. Ferrari
Tourism and Aviation—D.G. Joubert
Port and Marine Services—P. Moulinie
Health and Welfare—J. Pragassen
Works and Land Development—F.A. Rene

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

By 1963 political parties had developed, and, for the first time, the elections that year were contested on party lines. The following year the existing parties were replaced by two new parties, the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP).

Although the leader of the SDP, James Mancham, had originally opposed independence, and the leader of the SPUP, Albert Rene, had supported the idea, both parties now favor independence. A coalition government was established in 1975 with four SPUP members joining the government, including Rene, who is now Minister for Works and Land Development.

Despite this new coalition, the two parties have not agreed on the idea of holding new elections before independence. The last elections held in 1974 produced a 13 to 2 majority for Mancham's party in the then 15-member Legislative Assembly. Because of the divisions of the constituencies at the time, this lopsided majority was accomplished with only 52 percent of the vote. The SPUP won 48 percent and gained only 2 seats.

ECONOMY

The primary problem in the Seychelles is economic. Most people are engaged in agriculture or fishing at the subsistence level. The birth rate is very high, and poverty is widespread although reduced in severity by the benign climate. The efficient production of plantation crops is requiring less and less labor. Thus, the increasing population requires considerable development expenditure. Historically, emigration has been a safety valve, and today the United Kingdom and Australia are the principal outlets.

Although the Colony is promoting agricultural development, its principal hopes lie in tourism. Since it opened in December 1971, the islands' first commercial airport has attracted many tourists. There was considerable investment in hotels and tourist facilities in the Seychelles prior to this event, and investment continues as increasing numbers of tourists visit the islands' beautiful beaches and enjoy its fine climate.

The Seychelles Government has made considerable effort to assure that the expansion of tourism neither disrupts the islands' cultural life nor spoils the natural beauty on which tourism is based. Most visitors have been impressed by the subtle manner in which tourism has been developed. Beaches are not "walled off" by hotels and condominiums, but are well spaced and secluded.

Otherwise, the economy depends almost entirely on agriculture, most of which is based on the plantation system. Production is predominantly for export, and many foodstuffs are imported despite soil and climatic conditions that favor the production of an extremely wide variety of agricultural products.

The two most important crops are copra and cinnamon. Copra accounted for 45 percent of the Colony's exports in 1971. (Copra is the dried kernel or meat of the coconut.) After processing, copra is separated into coconut oil (used largely in soap and margarine) and mealy residue (used as a livestock feed.) India is the recipient of virtually all copra exports from the Seychelles.

Cinnamon products accounted for 46 percent of total exports in 1971. Other exports included vanilla, patchouli (an essential oil used in the manufacture of soap and perfume), and dried fish.

The main industries prepare copra and vanilla pods and extract essential oils for export. Coconut oil for

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and clothing—Light, tropical clothing is recommended year round.

Customs—U.S. citizens entering the Seychelles need a passport (no visa is required) and up-to-date health certificate showing immunizations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera.

Health—Public health and sanitation facilities are not up to U.S. standards, but the pleasant climate reduces the risk of contracting tropical diseases.

Telecommunications—The Seychelles have adequate cable and wireless service to Asia and Africa.

Transportation—Inter-island transportation from Mahe to the other main islands of Praslin and La Digue is by Air Mahe which has daily service to Praslin. The outlying islands are served by privately owned schooners that call at occasional and irregular intervals. Steamers make regular but infrequent stops on runs from Karachi, Bombay, Mombasa, and Durban.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

Benedict, Burton. *People of the Seychelles*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966.

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cooking, coconut cake for stock feed, soap, coir (coconut fiber) rope, and mattress fiber are produced in small quantities for local consumption.

Until 1958 the Seychelles was able to balance its budget with little external assistance. Since then, the combination of near static agricultural growth and rising popular expectations has changed the situation. For the period 1962-66 the Seychelles received grants-in-aid from the British treasury which averaged 7 percent of recurrent expenditures. By 1971 the grant-in-aid contribution to the recurrent budget had risen to $10 million, or about 15 percent of the recurrent budget. In addition, virtually all public capital expenditure is financed by loans or grants from the United Kingdom, which in 1968 were approximately $2 million and rose to $7.2 million in fiscal year 1973.

Under the stimulus of development and tourism, the Seychelles has virtually obtained full employment for its work force. But even paradise must pay a price, and in the Seychelles, like elsewhere, progress has brought inflation.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The British Government is responsible for conducting the foreign relations of the Crown Colony at this stage in its constitutional development.

Contacts between the U.S. Government and its citizens and the people and Government of the Seychelles were infrequent until 1963 when construction began on the U.S. space tracking station on Mahe. Due to the isolation of the Seychelles, U.S. personnel connected with the station have had, and continue to have, a greater effect on the Colony than their small numbers would indicate. However, the Seychellois are friendly and hospitable to visitors. The U.S. Air Force, which is in charge of the station, and the civilian contractors, who maintain the station, have made a major effort in having themselves accepted as part of the Seychelles scene. As a result, relations between the station and the people and Government of the Seychelles are good.

Although there is no U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) program in the Seychelles, the U.S. Government does offer the islands other assistance. Currently six Peace Corps Volunteers live on the islands assisting in educational and agricultural projects. The United States contributes about $50,000 worth of P.L. 480 foods to a school feeding project under the Food for Peace program. Another $15,000 was given during the 1975 fiscal year for small self-help projects.

Principal U.S. Officials

The United States has never maintained permanent representation in the Seychelles. The Colony is within the consular district of the U.S. Embassy at Nairobi, Kenya. The principal officer in Nairobi is the Ambassador, Anthony D. Marshall.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8246, Revised February 1976

APPENDIX LL

SIERRA LEONE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, June 1976 (Publication 8069)]

background notes

Sierra Leone

department of state • june 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Sierra Leone

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Sierra Leone, located in West Africa, has a 210-mile-long coastline on the Atlantic Ocean and shares borders with Liberia (southeast) and Guinea (north and northeast).

The three main geographical regions are: a coastal belt of mangrove swamps, 60 miles wide; stretches of wooded hill country; and an upland plateau, with mountains near the eastern frontier rising from 4,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. Bintimani is the tallest peak, at 6,029 feet.

Sierra Leone is within the tropics; temperatures and humidity are high, and rainfall is heavy. Average temperature is 80°F, with a range of 10 degrees on the coast and 20 degrees inland. Rainfall is greatest along the coast, especially on high ground, and amounts to more than 125 inches annually in most parts of the country. The two distinct seasons are: the dry season, from November to April, and the wet season, which lasts the rest of the year, with maximum precipitation in July-September.

The indigenous population is divided into about 20 tribes, of which the Temne (in the north) and the Mende (in the south) are the largest. About 80,000 persons are settlers or descendants of settlers from other African territories. Some 5,000 Europeans and Asians live in the country.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 27,925 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than S.C.). CAPITAL: Freetown (pop. 214,000). OTHER CITIES: Bo (45,000), Kenema (30,000).

People

POPULATION: 3 million (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.5% (1974). DENSITY: 107 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 30% Temne, 30% Mende, other tribes. RELIGIONS: 70% animist, 25% Muslim, 5% Christian. LANGUAGES: English (official), Krio, indigenous languages. LITERACY: 10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 35 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: April 27, 1961. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: April 19, 1971.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral House of Representatives. *Judicial*–Court of Appeals (judges appointed by President), lesser courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: All People's Congress (APC), Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 21. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 3 Provinces comprising 12 districts and a western region including Freetown.

FLAG: Green, white, and blue horizontal bars.

Economy

GDP: $493 million (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 22% (1973-74). PER CAPITA INCOME: $180.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 65 arable, 6% cultivated. *Labor* 80-85%. *Cash crops*–palm kernels, coffee, cocoa, rice, yams, millet, ginger, cassava.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 10%. *Types*–diamond and bauxite mining; beverage, textile, cigarette, and construction goods manufacture.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, rutile.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*–$141.4 million: 60% diamonds; iron ore, palm kernels, cocoa, coffee. *Partners*–UK 61%, US 6%, Japan, FRG. *Imports*–$215.8 million: machinery and transportation equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs, petroleum products. *Partners*–UK 22%, Japan, US 10%, FRG.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE: Leone 0.90 = US$1.

US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: $70.2 million (1961-75): Peace Corps $20.5 million, Food for Peace $16.8 million, AID $12.1 million, Exim Bank loans $20.8 million.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and its specialized agencies, Commonwealth of Nations, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Mano River Union, African Development Bank (AfDB).

HISTORY

Sierra Leone can claim a certain historical seniority in British West Africa. Following a visit in 1460, Portuguese explorer Pedro de Cinta gave the territory its name, which means "lion mountain." The first Englishman to arrive, John Hawkins, came in search of slaves in 1562. Sir Francis Drake arrived in 1580.

The first foreign settlements were planned as a haven within the British Empire for freed slaves. In 1787 a number of freedmen and a group of Negroes who fled from the rebellious U.S. colonies arrived at the site of Freetown. They were virtually wiped out by disease and tribal attacks. In 1791 another group arrived under the auspices of the newly formed (British) Sierra Leone Company, which exercised administrative power over the settlement. In 1808, when financial



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burdens became too great for the company, the coastal area was annexed as a British Crown Colony.

In the following years thousands of slaves were liberated at Freetown, and most of them chose to remain in Sierra Leone. These liberated Africans, or Creoles as they came to be called, came from all parts of Africa. Cut off from their homes and traditions, they assimilated the English style of living and built a flourishing trade.

In the early 19th century Freetown was the residence of the British Governor, who also ruled over The Gambia and the Gold Coast settlements. Sierra Leone was also the educational center of British West Africa. Fourah Bay College, established in 1827, became the mecca for English-speaking Africans on the west coast.

Sierra Leone's journey to independence was a peaceful one. The constitution of 1951 provided the framework

for decolonization. Ministerial responsibility was introduced in 1953 when Sir Milton Margai was appointed chief minister. He became Prime Minister after successful constitutional talks at London in 1960. Sierra Leone received its independence in April 1961, with a parliamentary form of government within the Commonwealth of Nations. In April 1971 it adopted a republican Constitution.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Under the 1971 Constitution, Sierra Leone is a republic with an executive form of government. Executive authority is exercised by the President and his Cabinet. The President is elected by the House of Representatives (Parliament) for a 5-year term. He appoints as Prime Minister the leader of the party that commands a majority in the House. He also appoints Cabinet Ministers.

The unicameral House consists of 100 authorized seats: 85 popularly elected members; 12 paramount chiefs elected by tribal councils from their respective districts; and three members appointed by the President. The House is elected to a 5-year term, but elections may be called earlier.

A paramount chief and a council of elders constitute the basic unit of local government. Each of the three Provinces is governed by a minister with Cabinet rank. The Freetown area has a separate council.

Sir Milton Margai's Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) guided the country through independence to the first general elections under universal adult franchise in May 1962. Sir Milton died in 1964 and was succeeded as Prime Minister by his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai. Sir Albert attempted to establish a one-party political system in Sierra Leone, but the opposition All People's Congress (APC) fiercely resisted and the effort ultimately was abandoned.

In close elections on March 17, 1967, the APC won a plurality of the parliamentary seats. The Governor General declared Siaka Stevens, leader of the APC and Mayor of Freetown, as Prime Minister. Three days later Brig. David Lansana, Force Commander of the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces, placed the leaders of both parties under house arrest pending the election of the tribal representatives to the House. On March 23 a group of senior army officers seized control of the government, arrested Brig. Lansana, and suspended the Constitution. This group constituted itself as the National Reformation Council (NRC), with Brig. A.T. Juxon-Smith as Chairman. Late in 1967 the NRC agreed to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule and named a Civilian Rule Committee to decide on the means of bringing about the change. However, a "sergeants' revolt" in April 1968, which saw the NRC members imprisoned and army and police officers deposed, paved the way for Stevens to assume the office of Prime Minister.

Following a return to civilian rule, byelections were begun in the fall of 1968, and an all-APC Cabinet was appointed. In March 1971 and again in July 1974 the government uncovered alleged military coup d'etat plots. The leaders of these plots were tried and executed.

The House appointed Siaka Stevens President of the Republic in April 1971, and he was inaugurated for a second 5-year term in April 1976. National elections were last held in May 1973, and the APC won all seats in the House following the opposition SLPP's decision to withdraw its candidates because of alleged election irregularities. Under the present Constitution, new elections must be held no later than May 1978.

Principal Government Officials

President, Minister of Defense—Siaka P. Stevens
Vice President, Minister of Finance—S.I. Koroma
Prime Minister, Minister of Interior—C.A. Kamara-Taylor

Other Ministers

Agriculture and Natural Resources—S.A. Fofanah
Education—A.J. Sandy
Energy and Power—Sahr W. Gandi-Capio
External Affairs—Francis M. Minah
Health—Joseph Hadson-Taylor
Information and Broadcasting—N.A.P. Buck
Labor—George G. Lamin
Mines—S.B. Kawusu-Konte
Tourism and Cultural Affairs—B.A.G. Sembu-Forna
Trade and Industry—Bangali Mansarah
Transport and Communications—Formeh Kamara
Works—A.B.M. Kamara

Ambassador to the U.S.—Philip J. Palmer
Ambassador to the U.N.—Edward W. Blyden

Sierra Leone maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1701 19th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Cox, Thomas S. *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976.

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Spitzer, Leo. *The Creoles of Sierra Leone.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1974.

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ECONOMY

Mining, the most important foreign exchange earner, sustains the vitality of the economy. In early 1976 the mining industry was in a slump, and Sierra Leone was suffering from acute budgetary and balance-of-payments problems. In 1975 the British-owned Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO), which once extracted iron ore at the rate of about 2.5 million tons annually, shut down operations. This development, combined with a drop in diamond prices and a rise in

prices of key imports, such as oil, have left the economy stagnant. Projected and proposed new mining investments, however, are expected to increase the production of minerals within the next 5 years and improve the economic situation.

Major export minerals are diamonds of gem and industrial quality. Mining rights are divided between the concession area of the National Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO—51 percent government-owned) and private prospectors. In 1974 diamond production was valued at almost 1.7 million carats. Nearly all diamonds are exported to the U.K.

Other minerals scheduled for increased exploitation include rutile and bauxite. The major U.S. investment is the Sierra Rutile Company, which is to resume mining of rutile ore in 1978 at a site originally begun by another firm. Rutile is a form of titanium oxide used in paints and high-quality metal alloys, and Sierra Leone's deposits are believed to be among the richest in the world. Almost 700,000 tons of bauxite were produced in 1974. A Swiss firm is planning to establish a new bauxite mine.

Agriculture, the backbone of the economy, is the focus of increased government attention. To reduce costly imports of foodgrains, which totaled $24 million in 1974, Sierra Leone has raised farmgate prices and channeled public resources into a crash program to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production. Sierra Leone hopes to develop new agro-industries for the production of commodities such as tomatoes and pineapples.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Sierra Leone has followed a foreign policy of nonalignment, though it historically has been oriented toward cordial relations with the United Kingdom and the United States. It also maintains diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and several East European countries. The Government of Sierra Leone recognized the P.R.C. in 1971.

President Steven's government has sought closer relations with neighboring Guinea and Liberia. Like other independent African states, Sierra Leone condemns the apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa and supports self-determination for Portugal's African territories.

U.S.-SIERRA LEONE RELATIONS

U.S. relations with Sierra Leone began with American missionary activity during the 19th century. In 1959 the United States opened a consulate at Freetown, which was elevated to embassy status when Sierra Leone became independent.

U.S.-Sierra Leone relations today are cordial, though historic and other ties between the two countries are limited. U.S. aid to Sierra Leone has been concentrated on projects in education, agriculture, rural development, health, and human resources development. Presently the U.S. assists Sierra Leone through a P.L. 480 Title II program implemented through CARE and Catholic Relief Services; support of the regional West Africa Rice Development Association; a grant of $4 million to CARE to construct 900 miles of feeder roads; a Peace Corps program averaging 200 volunteers at any given time; and various other projects. Anticipated for the future are major projects to develop agricultural research and to establish a rural development policy unit.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Michael A. Samuels
Deputy Chief of Mission—Jerrold M. North
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Mary F. Cowan
Peace Corps Director—Howard Grey

The U.S. Embassy is located at Walpole and Siaka Stevens Sts., Freetown.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Summer clothing is suitable for all seasons. Bring light raincoats and overshoes for the rainy season.

Customs—Visas, passports, and inoculations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are required.

Health—Most basic medical supplies are available in Freetown. Intestinal upsets are not unusual. Avoid tap water. Mosquitoes and tumba flies are common.

Telecommunications—Telephone service is adequate; appointments for overseas calls must be arranged in advance. Cable is usually reliable, though sometimes delayed.

Transportation—Lungi Airport is 75 minutes from Freetown. Four weekly direct flights connect Freetown with London. Several African and international airlines provide service to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Most Freetown streets are narrow, without sidewalks, and congested with pedestrians. Taxis are available but cannot be summoned by phone; agree on the fare before entering.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8069, Revised June 1976

APPENDIX MM
SOMALIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, May 1976 (Publication 7881)]

background notes

Somalia

department of state • may 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Somali Democratic Republic

GEOGRAPHY

The Somali Democratic Republic is located on the east coast of Africa north of the Equator and, together with Ethiopia, is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. It comprises Italy's former Trust Territory of Somalia and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. It has a 1,700-mile coastline and is bounded on the north by the Gulf of Aden, on the east and south by the Indian Ocean, and on the west by the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (F.T.A.I.), Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The northern part of the country is hilly, and in many places the altitude ranges between 3,000 and 7,000 feet above sea level. The central and southern portions are flat, with an average altitude of less than 600 feet. The Giuba and the Uebi Scebeli Rivers rise in Ethiopia and flow south across the country toward the Indian Ocean. The Uebi Scebeli, however, does not reach the sea.

The prevailing climatic factors are monsoon winds, a hot climate, and scarce, irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 85°F to 105°F, except at higher elevations and along the east coast. Mean daily minimums usually vary from the mid-60's to the high 80's. Mogadiscio and the east coast usually are quite agreeable. The southwest monsoon, a cool sea breeze, makes the period from about May to Oct. the most pleasant season at Mogadiscio. The Dec.-Feb. period of the northeast monsoon is also pleasant. The so-called "Tangambili" periods intervening between the two monsoons (Oct.-Nov. and Mar.-May) are hot and humid, the latter being especially oppressive.

PEOPLE

The Somali people share a culture and identity which is remarkably homogeneous by contemporary African standards. As early as the seventh century A.D., indigenous Cushitic peoples began to mingle with Arab and Persian traders who had settled along the coast. The process of interaction over the centuries led to the emergence of a Somali culture bound by common traditions, a single language, and the Islamic faith.

Even today about 60 percent of all Somalis are nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists dependent for their liveli-

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 246,155 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex.). CAPITAL: Mogadiscio (pop. 400,000–1973 est.). OTHER CITY: Hargeisa (500,000–1968 est.).

People

POPULATION: 3.2 million (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.3%. DENSITY: 13 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 98.8% Somali, 1.2% Arab and Asian. RELIGION: 99% Muslim. LANGUAGES: Somali (official), Arabic, English, Italian. LITERACY: 20% (est.).

Government

TYPE: Independent republic; presently under revolutionary military regime installed Oct. 21, 1969. INDEPENDENCE: July 1, 1960. CONSTITUTION: Dissolved 1969; rule by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government), SRC, Council of Secretaries of State (Cabinet). *Legislative*–dissolved in 1969. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, National Security Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Banned in 1969. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 15 Regions.

FLAG: Five-pointed white star in field of azure blue. Each of the five points represents a Somali-inhabited territory: former British Somaliland, former Italian Somalia, French Territory of the Afars and Issas, Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and northeastern region of Kenya.

Economy

GNP: $220 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: na. PER CAPITA INCOME: $70.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 13% arable, 32% grazing. *Labor* 60%. *Products*–livestock, bananas, sorghum, maize, beans, peanuts, sesame, sugarcane, cotton.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 3.4%. *Products*–textiles, meat, fish, and fruit juice canning.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Some timber and uranium.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*–$55 million: livestock, skins and hides, bananas. *Partners*–Saudi Arabia, Italy. *Imports*–$175 million: machinery, manufactured goods, transportation equipment. *Partners*–Italy, USSR, PRC.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 6.295 Somali shillings=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$619 million (1953-75 est.): Italy $190 million, other Western countries $64 million, USSR $152 million, other Eastern Europe $5 million, PRC $133 million. *US only*–$75 million (1953-75 est.).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab League, associate member of EC.


GULF OF ADEN
YEMEN (ADEN)
ADEN
Asab
Bab el Mandeb
Obock
F.T.A.I. (France)
Golfe de Tadjoura
DJIBOUTI
Zeila
Lac Abbe
Aysha
Berbera
Borama
Dire Dawa
Jijiga
Harer
Hawash
Awash
Webi
Dagahabur
Hargeysa
Burao
Las Anod
Garoe
Mait
Erigavo
Candala
Alula
Bender Cassim
Hordio
Scusciuban
Eil
ETHIOPIA
Galcaio
Scillave
Webi Shebeli
Obbia
El Bur
Belet Weyne
Oddur
Dolo
Daua
KENYA
Lugh Ganane
Bulo Burti
Baidoa
Bur Acaba
Giohar
Itala
Galad
Bardera
MOGADISCIO
Merca
Giuba
Uebi Scebeli
Brava
INDIAN OCEAN
Lacs Dera
Gelib
Giamama
Chisimayu
SOMALIA
International boundary
National or colonial capital
Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
International airport
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
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hood on raising camels, sheep, and goats. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the population consists of settled cultivators living mainly in the fertile agricultural zone between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers in southern Somalia.

Sizable ethnic groups in the country include some 35,000 Arabs, about 2,000 Italians, and 1,000 Indians and Pakistanis. The Somali language is spoken by the majority of the inhabitants. Until October 1973, there was no generally accepted written form of Somali. At that time, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) proclaimed Somali the official language and decreed an official Somali orthography using Latin letters. Somali is now the language of instruction in all schools. Arabic, English, and Italian, the former official languages, are still used extensively.

HISTORY

An Arab sultanate was founded in the seventh century A.D. by Koreishite immigrants from Yemen. During the 15th and 16th centuries the Portuguese landed in the Somali territories to carry out trade activities and for a while ruled some of the towns on the coast. Later the Sultan of Zanzibar took control of certain coastal towns and the surrounding territory.

Somalia's modern history may be said to begin in the late 19th century when the various European powers began to seek trade and otherwise establish themselves in the area. British interest stemmed largely from the desire of the East India Company for a place to harbor its vessels without restriction. With this object in view, treaties were concluded with the Sultan of Tajura as early as 1840. It was not until 1884, however, when Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn from the area, that the British initiated treaties with various Somali chiefs guaranteeing British protection. The boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland was established by treaty in 1897.

In 1885 Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the Sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the Sultans of Obbia and Mijertein, who placed their territories under Italy's protection. In 1905, by agreement with the British Government, Italy purchased the coast from Warshek to Brava. The Italian Government assumed direct administration which gave the territory colonial status.

From that time on, the Italians gradually extended their occupation inland. In 1924 the Jubaland Province of Kenya, including the town and port of Chisimayu, was ceded to Italy by the U.K. The subjection and occupation of the hitherto independent Sultanates of Obbia and Mijertein, begun in 1925, were completed in 1927 and brought direct Italian administrative control over the whole territory. This control continued until World War II.

Following Italy's declaration of war on the United Kingdom in June 1940, British forces began operations against the Italian East African empire, and by February 1941 the greater part of Italian Somalia was under British control. From 1941 to 1950 Somalia was under British administration, and the transition toward self-government was begun.

By article 23 of the peace treaty of 1947, Italy renounced all rights and titles to Italian Somalia. In accordance with treaty stipulations, the Four Powers, on September 15, 1948, referred the question of disposal of the former Italian colonies to the U.N. General Assembly. On November 21, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somalia be placed under the international trusteeship system for a period of 10 years with Italy as the administering authority followed by independence for Italian Somalia. In 1959, at the request of the Somali Government, the U.N. General Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1, 1960.

Meanwhile, rapid progress toward self-government was being made in British Somaliland. Elections were held in February 1960, and one of the first acts of the new legislature was to request the United Kingdom to give the area its independence so that it could be united with Italian Somalia when the latter became independent. The U.K. agreed, and the protectorate became independent on June 26, 1960. Five days later, on July 1, it joined Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.

TRAVEL NOTES

Since its primary task is nation-building, Somalia has not made extensive efforts to develop the foreign tourist industry. Most foreign visitors are on official business. Nonetheless, Somalia has lovely beaches, excellent skindiving, and numerous species of East African wildlife.

International air flights arrive at the Mogadiscio Airport. Although accommodations outside the capital are somewhat rustic, very modern accommodations are available at the Giuba Hotel and others in Mogadiscio. Prices can be high and consumer goods are often scarce. If the traveler has a visa (a must before one arrives in Somalia), customs procedures are not difficult. Dollars and travelers checks are easily exchanged for Somali shillings at the airport and local banks.

While not an unhealthy climate, Somalia can be hot and dry or hot and humid, depending on the time of year. The country has only minimal health facilities outside of the capital and major cities.

In June 1961 Somalia adopted its first national constitution in a countrywide referendum which provided for a democratic state with a parliamentary form of government based on European models. In the early post-independence period a number of political parties emerged reflecting clan loyalties and a basic cleavage between the regional interests of the former British-controlled north and Italian-controlled south. There was also substantial conflict between pro-Arab, pan-Somali militants intent on national unification with the Somali-inhabited territories in Ethiopia and Kenya, and the "modernists" who wished to give priority to economic and social development and improving relations with other African countries. Gradually one political party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), assumed a position of dominance and succeeded in cutting across regional and clan loyalties. Under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Prime Minister in 1967 and 1969, Somalia greatly improved its relations with Kenya and Ethiopia. The process of modernization within a democratic framework came to an abrupt end, however, on October 21, 1969, when the army and police, led by Maj. Gen.

hood on raising camels, sheep, and goats. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the population consists of settled cultivators living mainly in the fertile agricultural zone between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers in southern Somalia.

Sizable ethnic groups in the country include some 35,000 Arabs, about 2,000 Italians, and 1,000 Indians and Pakistanis. The Somali language is spoken by the majority of the inhabitants. Until October 1973, there was no generally accepted written form of Somali. At that time, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) proclaimed Somali the official language and decreed an official Somali orthography using Latin letters. Somali is now the language of instruction in all schools. Arabic, English, and Italian, the former official languages, are still used extensively.

HISTORY

An Arab sultanate was founded in the seventh century A.D. by Koreishite immigrants from Yemen. During the 15th and 16th centuries the Portuguese landed in the Somali territories to carry out trade activities and for a while ruled some of the towns on the coast. Later the Sultan of Zanzibar took control of certain coastal towns and the surrounding territory.

Somalia's modern history may be said to begin in the late 19th century when the various European powers began to seek trade and otherwise establish themselves in the area. British interest stemmed largely from the desire of the East India Company for a place to harbor its vessels without restriction. With this object in view, treaties were concluded with the Sultan of Tajura as early as 1840. It was not until 1884, however, when Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn from the area, that the British initiated treaties with various Somali chiefs guaranteeing British protection. The boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland was established by treaty in 1897.

In 1885 Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the Sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the Sultans of Obbia and Mijertein, who placed their territories under Italy's protection. In 1905, by agreement with the British Government, Italy purchased the coast from Warshek to Brava. The Italian Government assumed direct administration which gave the territory colonial status.

From that time on, the Italians gradually extended their occupation inland. In 1924 the Jubaland Province of Kenya, including the town and port of Chisimayu, was ceded to Italy by the U.K. The subjection and occupation of the hitherto independent Sultanates of Obbia and Mijertein, begun in 1925, were completed in 1927 and brought direct Italian administrative control over the whole territory. This control continued until World War II.

Following Italy's declaration of war on the United Kingdom in June 1940, British forces began operations against the Italian East African empire, and by February 1941 the greater part of Italian Somalia was under British control. From 1941 to 1950 Somalia was under British administration, and the transition toward self-government was begun.

By article 23 of the peace treaty of 1947, Italy renounced all rights and titles to Italian Somalia. In accordance with treaty stipulations, the Four Powers, on September 15, 1948, referred the question of disposal of the former Italian colonies to the U.N. General Assembly. On November 21, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somalia be placed under the international trusteeship system for a period of 10 years with Italy as the administering authority followed by independence for Italian Somalia. In 1959, at the request of the Somali Government, the U.N. General Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1, 1960.

Meanwhile, rapid progress toward self-government was being made in British Somaliland. Elections were held in February 1960, and one of the first acts of the new legislature was to request the United Kingdom to give the area its independence so that it could be united with Italian Somalia when the latter became independent. The U.K. agreed, and the protectorate became independent on June 26, 1960. Five days later, on July 1, it joined Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.

TRAVEL NOTES

Since its primary task is nation-building, Somalia has not made extensive efforts to develop the foreign tourist industry. Most foreign visitors are on official business. Nonetheless, Somalia has lovely beaches, excellent skindiving, and numerous species of East African wildlife.

International air flights arrive at the Mogadiscio Airport. Although accommodations outside the capital are somewhat rustic, very modern accommodations are available at the Giuba Hotel and others in Mogadiscio. Prices can be high and consumer goods are often scarce. If the traveler has a visa (a must before one arrives in Somalia), customs procedures are not difficult. Dollars and travelers checks are easily exchanged for Somali shillings at the airport and local banks.

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat.

GOVERNMENT

Executive and legislative power is vested in a 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council which was established following the military takeover in 1969 and is comprised of the original revolutionaries. The SRC, led by a President (Chief of State and Head of Government) and three Vice Presidents, is comprised entirely of military and police officers and exercises authority over all ministries of the National Government, as well as provincial and local governmental bodies. By 1976 there were 20 ministries headed by Secretaries of State. These officials constitute a Council of Secretaries which performs functions similar to a cabinet in other states and meets as a body at irregular intervals.

Much of Somalia's judicial system is based on Islamic law and was not significantly changed following the coup d'etat. At the apex of the judicial system is a Supreme Court presided over by civilian justices with jurisdiction over civil, penal, administrative, and financial affairs. In 1970 the SRC established a National Security Court responsible for cases involving state security.

For administrative purposes Somalia is divided into 15 Regions, each governed by a Regional Revolutionary Council whose members are appointed by the SRC.

Principal Government Officials

President, SRC—Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre

Vice Presidents, SRC—Maj. Gen. Hussein Culmie Afrah, Brig. Gen. Mohamed Ali Samantar, Col. Ismail Ali Abokar

Council of Secretaries of State

Agriculture—Brig. Gen. Mohamed Ibrahim "Liqliqato"

Culture and Higher Education—Sharif Saleh Mohamed

Defense—Brig. Gen. Mohamed Ali Samantar

Education—

Finance—Abdurahman Nur Hersi

Fisheries and Sea Transport—Osman Jama

Foreign Affairs—

Health—Mohamed Ali Nur

Industry—Abdi Kassim Salad

Information and National Guidance—Abdullahi Mohamed Hassan

Interior—Maj. Gen. Jama Mohamed Ghalib

Internal and External Trade—Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud

Justice and Religion—Abdisalam Sheikh Hussein

Labor and Sports—Adan Mohamed Ali

Livestock, Forestry, and Range—Yusuf Ali Osman

Mining—Hussein Abdulkadir Gassim

Posts and Telegraph—Abdullahi Ossoble Siyad

Public Works—Mohamed Hawad

Tourism and National Parks—Jama Rabile God

Transport—Mohamed Burale

Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdullahi Ahmed Addou

Ambassador to the U.N.—Abdirizak Haji Hussen

The Somali Democratic Republic maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 600 New Hampshire Ave., NW., Suite 710, Washington, D.C. 20037.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

All political parties have been abolished and organized opposition is not tolerated by the SRC. The SRC has proclaimed Somalia a Socialist state guided by "the principles of scientific socialism." Somalia's internal policy as stated by the SRC is to:

1. Constitute a society based on the right to work and social justice;
2. Promote rapid progress in the economic, social, and cultural fields;
3. Eliminate illiteracy and develop an enlightened cultural heritage;
4. Abolish all forms of corruption, anarchy, nepotism, and tribalism.

The SRC has inaugurated grassroots self-help projects to speed economic development and national integration. These projects are led by the Somali youth organization—*Gulwaadayal*—and are part of the program of the National Political Office to increase the economic and political awareness of the Somali people. Many of these projects, such as newly paved roads, schools, and widespread urban electrification, are significant accomplishments which are viewed with great pride by the Somalis.

ECONOMY

Somalia is poor in natural resources and faces major development problems.

Its economy is pastoral and agricultural, the main form of wealth being livestock—principally camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. Because of the scanty and irregular rainfall, agriculture is generally restricted to the



Mogadiscio Center and Port

vicinity of the rivers, certain coastal districts, and the dry farming area between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers and around Hargeisa. The modern sector of the agricultural economy consists primarily of plantations along the rivers utilizing widespread irrigation and up-to-date farm machinery.


Frequent droughts are characteristic of the area and cause many hardships for the inhabitants. The 1973-74 drought particularly hurt the livestock industry, which normally accounts for 70 percent of exports. During the trusteeship period Somalia depended on grants-in-aid from the Italian Government; the protectorate required similar assistance from the United Kingdom. External financial assistance will be required for some time to permit Somalia to meet its budgetary deficit and economic development needs.

A small fishing industry has begun in the north where tuna, shark, and other warm-water fish are caught. Aromatic woods—frankincense and myrrh—from a small forest area also contribute to the country's exports. Minerals, including uranium, are found throughout the country, but none have been exploited commercially. Several oil companies are currently carrying on exploration activities. With the help of foreign aid, small industries, such as textiles, fish and meat canning, and printing, are being established.

The country has no railways; internal transportation is by truck and bus. There are about 9,000 miles of roads, including 700 miles of all-weather roads. An important addition to the road system will be a 600-mile all-purpose road, financed by the P.R.C. and now half completed, from Belet Wen to Burao along the Somalia-Ethiopia border.

Air transportation is provided by Alitalia, United Arab Airline, East African Airways, and Somali Airways. They provide service to Aden, Khartoum, Cairo, Nairobi, Rome, Sana, Abu Dhabi, and Jidda. The Somali National Airline also provides internal service.

The European Economic Community and the World Bank are jointly financing the construction of a deepwater port at Mogadiscio. The Soviet Union completed Somalia's most important deepwater port at Berbera in 1969. The United States constructed a deepwater port at Chisimayu which serves the fertile Giuba River basin and is vital to Somalia's banana export industry. Smaller ports are located at Merca, Brava, and Bosaso.



The Somali National Musem, housed in the former palace of the Sultan of Zanzibar

Radio-telephone service is available to Aden, Zanzibar, and Nairobi, as well as Rome and London. Most small towns and villages are linked to the capital by telephone and telegraph wires. Radio broadcasting stations operate at Mogadiscio and at Hargeisa with programs in Somali, English, Italian, Swahili, and Arabic.

The Siad government has assumed a greater direct role in the development of the Somali economy. In 1970 foreign banks and several other foreign-controlled firms were nationalized. Officially, however, foreign private investment is welcomed, provided it conforms to the Somali Government's plans for social and economic development.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Since independence Somalia has followed a foreign policy of nonalignment. It has received major economic assistance from the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Though still professing a policy of neutrality, the current government has sought closer ties with many Arab and Communist countries while relations with some major Western countries have deteriorated.

Somalia depends increasingly on the Soviet Union both to finance its economy and to supply military aid. The P.R.C. remains a major contributor of economic assistance; North Korea is also a prominent aid source.

An important issue on the foreign and domestic policy levels is the question of the Somalis who reside outside the Republic. It is the goal of Somali nationalism to unite the other Somali-inhabited territories and their 1 million Somalis with the 3 million in the Republic. The former constitution specified that this be accomplished by "peaceful and legal means." This issue has been the main cause for crises between Somalia and its neighbors, the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

In March 1963 Somalia severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over Kenya's northeastern region (Northern Frontier District), an area inhabited mainly by Somalis. Somalia urged self-determination for the people of the area, while Kenya refused to consider any steps which might threaten its territorial integrity. Related problems concern the undemarcated boundary with Ethiopia and the large-scale migrations of Somali nomads between Ethiopia and Somalia. The Somali Governments elected in 1967 and 1969 made a concerted effort to normalize Somalia's relations with its neighbors. In January 1968 Somalia reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.K. and established relations with Kenya.

Since 1972, tension along the de facto Somali-Ethiopia border has increased. Attacks by small groups of Somali tribesmen on government forces and on civilians have been increasingly reported in eastern Ethiopia. In addition, the French decision announced in December 1975 to grant independence to the F.T.A.I. has stimulated the concern of the Somali Government for the future of the territory, the majority of whose inhabitants are ethnic Somalis. Developments in the F.T.A.I. also vitally concern Ethiopia since Djibouti is the major port and railhead for Addis Ababa.

U.S.-SOMALI RELATIONS

After a long period of close cooperation (beginning in 1954), during which almost $80 million in U.S. aid was extended to Somalia, the U.S. Government in 1970 was obligated to terminate its development aid program under the provisions of Article 620(n) of the Foreign Assistance Act because of the continued trade of Somali-flag vessels with North Viet-Nam. Substantial humanitarian assistance to relieve the drought has been provided, however.

Since the October 1969 coup, relations between the United States and Somalia have remained somewhat strained. U.S. policy seeks to improve relations with the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic and to find grounds for mutual respect and cooperation in the future.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—John L. Loughran
Deputy Chief of Mission—Samuel J. Hamrick, Jr.
Public Affairs Officer—Clathan Ross

The U.S. Embassy is located at Corso Primo Luglio, Mogadiscio.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7881, Revised May 1976

APPENDIX NN

SOUTH AFRICA (Republic)
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, June 1977 (Publication 8021)]

background notes

South Africa

department of state * june 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of South Africa

PEOPLE

South Africa has a heterogeneous, multiracial population, traditionally grouped according to four major categories: Africans, whites, coloreds, and Asians. The Africans (71 percent of the population) are mainly descendants of Sotho and Nguni peoples who migrated southward centuries ago. Of the number of African ethnic groups, the largest, according to 1976 estimates, are: Zulu (5,029,000) and Xhosa (4,897,000).

Whites are primarily the descendants of Dutch, French, English, and German settlers, with smaller admixtures of other European peoples, and comprise about 17 percent of the population.

Coloreds are, for the most part, the descendants of indigenous peoples and the earliest European settlers in the area. Living primarily in the Cape Province, coloreds constitute about 9 percent of the population.

Asians are descendants of the Indian workers brought to South Africa in the middle of the 19th century to work as indentured laborers on sugar estates in Natal. They constitute about 3 percent of the population.

PROFILE

People

POPULATION: 26.1 million (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5%. DENSITY: 53 per sq. mi. (20 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Africans–18.6 million; whites–4.3 million; coloreds–2.4 million; Asians–746,000. RELIGIONS: Traditional African, Christian. LANGUAGES: English and Afrikaans (official), Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, North and South Sotho, and others. LIFE EXPECTANCY: Africans 58 (f.), 51 (m.); whites 72 (f.), 64 (m.); coloreds 56 (f.), 49 (m.); Asians 64 (f.), 59 (m.).

Geography

AREA: 472,359 sq. mi. (1,233,404 sq. km.); includes the enclave of Walvis Bay, 434 sq. mi. (1,124 sq. km.); about twice the size of Tex. CAPITALS: *Administrative*–Pretoria (pop. 563,000); *Legislative*–Cape Town (1,108,000); *Judicial*–Bloemfontein (182,000). OTHER CITIES: Johannesburg (1,441,000), Durban (851,000).

Government

TYPE: Republic–parliamentary in form with franchise limited to white adults. INDEPENDENCE: May 31, 1910 (Union of South Africa was created); became a sovereign state within the British Empire in 1934. On May 31, 1961, South Africa became a republic and, in October 1961, left the British Commonwealth. CONSTITUTION: May 31, 1961.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–State President (Chief of State), elected to a 7-year term. Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*–bicameral House of Assembly consisting on 171 Members (including 6 Representatives from Namibia), elected for maximum of 5 years, and Senate consisting of 55 Members–45 elected by Provincial electoral colleges, the remainder appointed–who serve for 5 years. *Judicial*–Supreme Court, consisting of the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein and 4 provincial divisions.

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES: National Party, United Party, Progressive Reform Party. SUFFRAGE: Whites over 18. FIRST LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Provincial Governments of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and separate "homelands" administered in areas set aside for Africans.

FLAG: Three horizontal bands–orange, white, and blue (from top to bottom)–with the Union Jack and the flags of the two former Boer republics (the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic) reproduced in miniature and centered on the white band.

Economy

GDP: $35.3 billion (1975 est.).

AGRICULTURE: *Products*–corn, wool, dairy products, wheat, sugarcane, tobacco, citrus fruits (self-sufficient in foodstuffs).

INDUSTRY: *Products*–mined products, automobiles, fabricated metal, machinery, textiles, chemicals, fertilizer, fish.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Nearly all essential minerals except oil.

TRADE: *Principal trading partners*–UK, US, Japan, FRG. *Exports*–$5.3 billion (1975 est.): wool, diamonds, gold, corn, uranium, sugar, fruit, hides, skins, metals and metallic ores, metal products, asbestos, and fish products. *Imports*–$7.6 billion (1975 est.): machinery, electrical equipment, transportation equipment, base metals, and metal products.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: South African rand, *R1=US$1.14*.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and many related agencies, Intelsat, and GATT.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: South Africa has received no economic assistance from any country. Export-Import Bank transactions with South Africa are limited essentially to insurance and guarantees for the US exporter.



Of South Africa's 15 universities, 10 are designated for whites, 3 for Africans, and 1 each for coloreds and Asians. The literacy rate over 15 years of age for the various groups has been estimated as follows: whites 100 percent, Africans 50 percent, coloreds 75 percent, and Asians 85 percent.

Christianity is the predominant religion, and a diversity of Christian groups exists.

Geography

The Republic of South Africa lies at the southern tip of the African Continent. The independent Kingdom of Lesotho is an enclave located within the east-central part of South Africa. The territory of Walvis Bay, located on the Atlantic coast directly west of Windhoek, Namibia, is administered as part of Namibia but in terms of sovereignty remains an integral part of the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa.

The country has a narrow coastal zone and an extensive interior plateau with altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 feet (1,000–2,000 m.) above sea level. There are no arterial rivers or lakes of importance, and extensive means of water conservation and control are necessary. The coastline is

about 2,700 miles (4,300 km.) long.

South Africa's climate is generally moderate with sunny days and cool nights. The seasons are reversed, since the country is in the Southern Hemisphere. The average mean temperature is remarkedly uniform, the most southerly point having a mean yearly temperature of 61.8° F. (16.5°C.) while Johannesburg, about 1,000 miles (1,600 km.) to the northeast and 5,700 feet (1,700 m.) higher, has an annual mean temperature of 60.8°F. (16°C.). Mean annual precipitation ranges from less than 5 inches (12.7 cm.) along the west coast to 40 inches (102 cm.) or more in the east.

HISTORY

Man has inhabitated southern Africa for countless thousands of years, but of the present inhabitants the earliest are the peoples whom the European settlers called Bushmen and Hottentots (both members of the Khoisan language group of which only small numbers survive).

Members of the Bantu language group, to which most of the present-day Africans of South Africa belong, migrated slowly southward from central Africa and began to enter the Transvaal sometime before 1000 A.D. The Nguni ancestors of the Zulus and Xhosas had occupied most of the east coast by 1500.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Cape of Good Hope (in 1486). Permanent white settlement began to take place when the Dutch East India Company established a provisioning station there in 1652. In subsequent decades additional Dutch and Germans and Huguenot refugees from France settled in the Cape area to form the Afrikaner segment of today's population. By the end of the 18th century, European settlement had extended through the southern part of the Cape westward to the vicinity of the Great Fish River, where the whites first came into serious conflict with the Xhosa branch of the Nguni.

Britain seized the Cape of Good Hope at the end of the 18th century, and subsequent British settlement and rule marked the beginning of a long history of conflict between Afrikaner and English. Partly to escape British political rule and cultural hegemony, many Afrikaner farmers (Boers) undertook a northern migration (the Great Trek) beginning in 1836. This movement brought them into contact with several African groups. Their most formidable opponents were the Zulus. Under their powerful leader Shaka (1787-1828), the Zulus had brought most of the territory between the Drakensburg Mountains and the sea (present-day Natal and KwaZulu) under their control. The Zulus were decisively defeated by the whites and their power dealt a severe blow at the Battle of Blood River in 1838. The Zulus, however, remained a formidable force in northern Natal until 1879 when, following an initial Zulu victory, British troops destroyed the Zulu military force and occupied Zululand.

The independent Boer republics of the Transvaal (the South African Republic) and the Orange Free State were created in 1852 and 1854 respectively. Relations between these two independent republics and the British Government continued to be strained. The famous diamond strike at Kimberley in 1870 and, 16 years later, the discovery of extensive gold deposits in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal, resulted in an influx of European (mostly British) investment and immigrants. The Boer reaction to this "invasion" and to British political intrigues against the two republics, led to the Anglo-Boer wars between the British and the two Boer republics (1880-81 and 1899-1902). After a bitter struggle, the British forces conquered the Boer republics and incorporated them into the British Empire. The two former republics and the two British colonies of the Cape and Natal were joined on May 31, 1910 to form the Union of South Africa, a dominion of the British Empire, with control over most domestic matters in the hands of its white population. In 1934, under the Statute of Westminster, the Union achieved status as a sovereign state with the British Empire.

The conflict between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking groups continued to have a major impact on political developments. A strong resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in the forties and fifties led to a decision, through a referendum in the white community in 1960, to give up dominion status and establish a republic. This decision took effect on May 31, 1961. In October 1961, South Africa withdrew its application for continued membership in the British Commonwealth.

GOVERNMENT

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the former Boer republics and the principal British colony had all wanted their capitals—Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and Cape Town, respectively—to be selected as the capital of the new Union. They compromised by making Pretoria the administrative capital, Cape Town the legislative capital, and Bloemfontein the judicial capital.

Present-day South Africa has retained a parliamentary system of government similar in form to that of Great Britain. Suffrage, membership in Parliament, and all key government positions are held by whites. A number of subordinate systems have been developed for Africans, coloreds, and Asians.

The legislature is supreme under law, but in fact it is controlled by the all-powerful Executive Council (Cabinet) and a judiciary which, though generally independent, has no power to review parliamentary acts.

Executive power is vested in the Chief of State, the State President, who is elected by an electoral college of both Houses of Parliament for a term of 7 years. He is advised by a Cabinet which consists of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State. All Ministers and Deputy Ministers are Members of Parliament and are affiliated with the governing party.

The Senate side of Parliament has 55 Members, 10 appointed or selected by the Executive and 45 elected by the House of Assembly and the Provincial Councils. The House of Assembly has 171 elected Members.

Judicial authority is vested in the Supreme Court of South Africa, which consists of an Appellate Division at Bloemfontein and a number of provincial and regional divisions.

South Africa's four Provinces have governments consisting of an Administrator appointed by the State President and a unicameral legislature elected on the same franchise as the House of Assembly.

Governmental Institutions for Minorities

Following the elimination in 1969 of representation (by whites) for the coloreds in the national Parliament, a Colored Persons Representative Council was created in 1969. Two thirds of its members are elected by the colored population, and one-third are appointed by the State President, who must approve any legislation proposed by the council.

Political Institutions for Africans

The policy of separate development has led to the partial consolidation of the "native reserves" previously set aside for Africans in the colonial period into nine separate "homelands" whose constitutional development is designed to lead through self-government to independence. Of these, one, the Transkei, was granted independent status effective October 26, 1976, and the same is planned for Bophuthatswana in December 1977. Six others—Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwa Qwa, and KwaZulu—have been designated self-governing territories, and the Swazi homeland has achieved less autonomous "legislative assembly status." In 1970, fewer than half of the African inhabitants of South Africa were living in such areas, which constitute only 13 percent of the country's total land area. The South African Government anticipates that ultimately all Africans will become citizens of the homelands and will lose their South African citizenship. Most homelands leaders have rejected this approach to the future lot of urban Africans.

Principal Government Officials

State President—Nicolaas Diederichs
Prime Minister—Balthazar Johannes Vorster
Minister of Defense—Pieter Willem Botha
Minister of Finance—Owen Horwood
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Roelof Frederik Botha
Minister Labor and Mines—Stephanus Petrus Botha
Minister of Information and Interior—Cornelius P. Mulder
Minister of National Education, Sports, and Recreation—Pieter Koornhof
Minister of Agriculture—Hendrik Schoeman
Minister of Economic Affairs—J. Chris Heunis
Minister of Justice, Police, and Prisons—James T. Kruger
Minister of Bantu Affairs—Michiel Coenraad Botha

The Republic of South Africa maintains an Embassy in the United States at 3051 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-232-4400).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Historical circumstances and the policies of the present government have led to the development of separate forms of political expressions for the different racial groups.

The White Community. Three political parties are presently represented in the South African Parliament:

The National Party, led by Mr. Balthazar Johannes Vorster, has controlled Parliament and the government since 1948, receiving most of its support from the majority Afrikaners (people of Dutch/French/German descent). The National Party strongly supports the retention of political control in most of South Africa exclusively in white hands. Considerable legislation has been created by Parliament to achieve this end. A related aspect of the party's traditional political philosophy is apartheid (apartness), a belief that each racial and cultural group should follow its own path of development. From this principle has come the present policy of "separate development" or of "multinational development," under which the various African ethnic groups have been allocated separate "homelands" which will be offered the possibility of eventual independence.

The United Party, the principal opposition party since 1948, proposes that all racial groups should be represented, on a racial basis, in a central federal Parliament, although it too stands essentially for white supremacy in the foreseeable future. It draws its main support from the English-speaking sector of the white population. The leader of the United Party and official leader of the opposition is Sir de Villiers Graaff.

The Progressive Reform Party was founded in July 1975 as a result of a merger between the Progressive Party and a number of former United Party representatives. This party has called for a "more equitable sharing of power" between white and other racial groups within the context of a federation of self-governing states and the extension of the franchise to the Asian, African, and colored communities. The leader of the party is Mr. Colin Eglin.

The Colored Community. The colored community has two main parties—the Labor Party, headed by Mr. Sonny Leon, and the Federal Party. The central political issue in the colored community is whether to accept separate political institutions, such as the Colored Persons Representative Council, or to demand full participation in the political institutions now reserved for whites. The Labor Party, which opposes in principle working within the council, won a majority of votes for council seats in 1975. However, the government subsequently dismissed Leon from the council because of his opposition to the level of the council's budget as set by the government. The Federal Party has taken a more positive stand toward the council.

The African Community. Modern-style political organizations promoting African interests were in existence in South Africa by the early part of the 20th century. The most important such organization in this century has been the African National Congress, founded in 1912. With the resurgence of African nationalism throughout the continent in the post-World War II period, African political activity in South Africa intensified. The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, which was formed in 1959, turned increasingly to the tactics of passive resistance in an effort to oppose the separate development policies of the government. In the course of a passive resistance campaign in March 1960 against the unpopular "pass laws" by means of

which the movements of Africans outside the African homelands are tightly controlled, white police opened fire on an African crowd in the town of Sharpeville, killing 69 people. The two organizations were banned, and tightened security and other measures taken subsequently have severely restricted efforts at political organization on a national basis since the mid-'60's. In recent years political parties have been established in the various homelands. These have been limited for the most part to individual ethnic groups. A major issue in the politics of the homelands is whether to agree to independence from the South African Government.

In the summer of 1976 severe rioting broke out in the urban residence areas for Africans. The riots, which began in June in Soweto, an African suburb of Johannesburg, in protest against the use of Afrikaans as a language of instruction in African schools, presented the government with the most serious challenge yet to its racial policies. Several hundred Africans were killed in confrontations with police, and many more have been arrested. A number of whites, including some journalists and organizers of black trade unions, were also arrested or have been "banned." ("Banning" in South Africa means essentially prohibition against engaging in any social or political activities.) The disturbances have resulted in increased militancy and impatience for change among urban Africans as well as some rethinking of racial questions by the white community, although government leaders have indicated that they contemplate no change in the basic principles of the government's separate development policies.

ECONOMY

Until well into the 19th century, most South Africans—black and white—lived primarily by herding or farming. However, the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 ushered in South Africa's industrial age. Rapidly growing mineral industries promoted the development of cities, of which an important part were concentrations of African workers by the hundreds of thousands. Johannesburg grew rapidly out of uninhabitated grssslands into the country's largest urban and industrial center.

South Africa's industrial activity was further stimulated by the import shortages caused by both world wars. Since World War II, the South African Government has strongly endorsed the concept of national self-sufficiency, to the maximum possible extent, in all key sectors of the economy, and as a result, manufacturing has become the largest contributor (22 percent) to the country's gross domestic product (GDP), which in 1975 had reached $35.3 billion. The mineral industries and agriculture remain, however, the basic pillars of the South African economy, providing the country with most of its exports and with the raw materials for the bulk of its manufacturing activities. In 1975, the minerals industries accounted for 15 percent of the country's GDP, and agricultural activities contributed another 9 percent.

The surge in world oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974 was cushioned in South Africa by an almost equally sharp rise in the price of gold, for which South Africa is by far the world's largest producer. However, while oil prices continued to edge upwards in 1975 and 1976, gold prices peaked in January 1975 at almost $200 per ounce and subsequently dropped sharply in mid-1975 and again in mid-1976 before rising again to slightly above $150 per ounce in March 1977.

The sharp 1975 gold price decline was probably the single most important cause of the 18-percent devaluation of the South African rand in September 1975. The devaluation exacerbated the double-digit inflation which had plagued South Africa for the previous 3 years; inflation registered 13.5 percent in 1975.

The drop in the price of gold and the persistence of high inflation, combined with the effects on South Africa of worldwide recession, have at least temporarily slowed the country's economic growth. After impressive real growth which averaged about 5 percent annually for the decade 1965-75 (reaching 7 percent in 1974), the country suffered a plunge in the growth rate to 2 percent in 1975 and to nearly zero in 1976. However, major infrastructure, mining, and manufacturing undertakings, which are expected to be completed in the near future, should aid the country's economic recovery. Nevertheless, the unsettled political situation in southern Africa has had and may continue to have a dampening effect on economic prospects.

Investment

Foreign private investment continues to play a significant role in South Africa's economic development, currently accounting for about 20 percent of the total value of all private investment in the country. Approximately 55 percent of the total direct foreign private investment in the country is from the sterling area (mostly from the United Kingdom), while the U.S. share is about 17 percent. Approximately 350 American companies have direct investments, with a book value of more than $1.5 billion, which is equivalent to about 40 percent of all American investment in Africa and to 1.2 percent of the total American private investment abroad.

The U.S. Government neither encourages nor discourages private U.S. investment in South Africa. The prospective investor is informed about investment conditions in South Africa, including the economic and political considerations resulting from that country's apartheid policies. The U.S. Government does encourage those American firms with investments in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices toward their workers of all races and to improve channels of communications with their black South African work force, including contacts with representatives of black labor organizations.

We have maintained the same posture, neither encouraging nor discouraging, toward investment in the Transkei. Americans considering investment there should be aware, however, that the United States can offer no diplomatic or consular facilities there.

To foster economic growth and to offset a large negative trade and services deficit, South African officials

estimate their country will need approximately $1 billion annually in foreign private direct investment. Foreign investment continues to be concentrated in mining, manufacturing, and petroleum processing and distribution.

Trade

Despite the development of a diversified manufacturing sector, South Africa retains its historic foreign trade pattern of importing manufactured goods and exporting raw and semiprocessed mineral and agricultural products.

Recent merchandise figures (excluding exports of gold bullion and imports of arms and petroleum) are shown in the following table.

South African Foreign Trade
(in billions of U.S. dollars)

	1970	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
Total Exports*	2.1	2.3	3.2	3.7	4.9	5.3
Exports to the U.S.	.3	.3	.3	.4	.6	.8
Total Imports*	4.0	4.3	4.1	5.1	7.1	7.6
Imports from the U.S.	.6	.7	.6	.7	1.2	1.3

*These figures include the customs areas embracing Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia (South West Africa), and Swaziland as well as South Africa, but South Africa alone accounts for at least 90 percent of the total. The figures for imports exclude arms and petroleum products.

Major suppliers in 1975 were the United Kingdom (19.7 percent), the Federal Republic of Germany (18.6 percent), the United States (17.7 percent), and Japan (11.0 percent). Various African countries provided 4.6 percent of South African imports. The U.S. share of the South African market has remained remarkably stable over the past 5 years (16-18 percent of total imports).

The principal customers for South African imports in 1975 were the United Kingdom (23.1 percent), the United States (15.9 percent), Japan (12.5 percent), and the Federal Republic of Germany (10.9 percent). Various African countries purchased a total of 11 percent of South Africa's exports.

Minerals

South Africa, one of the ten major minerals-producing countries in the world, is the world's leading producer of antimony, gold, gem diamonds, and vanadium and one of the three leading producers of asbestos, chromite, industrial diamonds, manganese, platinum-group metals, uranium, and vermiculite. South Africa is likely to remain a major minerals-producer for the foreseeable future. South African reserves of gold and chromite alone constitute about two-thirds of the world's known supplies of these commodities, and the country is blessed as well with extensive deposits of coal, copper, fluorspar, lead, nickel, titanium sands, and zinc.

The lack of any known petroleum deposits is a cause of considerable concern to this otherwise mineral-rich country. Despite continuing extensive exploration efforts, no commercial petroleum deposits have been uncovered in South Africa or in the adjacent off-shore areas. South African officials have long been aware of the potential vulnerability of their country to a petroleum boycott and have consequently stressed the necessity of using coal for energy. Domestic coal already provides over 70 percent of the country's energy needs and will provide even more in the future. South Africa has developed a coal gasification/liquefaction plant which converts coal into petroleum products. While only 4 or 5 percent of South Africa's total petroleum needs are currently being met by this process, the construction of a second, much larger, facility is under way which, when completed, will provide an additional 25 percent of the country's petroleum requirements.

Manufacturing

South Africa has the most extensive and diversified manufacturing sector in all of Africa. Most of the goods produced by South African factories are destined for the domestic market; however, modest but growing quantities of South African manufactured products are entering into international trade.

The industrial sector provides jobs for over 1.2 million persons, of whom half are Africans, a quarter are coloreds and Asians, and the remaining quarter are whites. Manufacturing accounts for 22 percent of the country's GDP.

Racial Problems and the Economy

The question of race relations pervades every aspect of South African life and has a considerable impact on the country's economic activities. The South African economy will unquestionably continue to be heavily dependent upon African, colored, and Asian workers. According to recent estimates, South Africa will need about 4 million skilled workers in the early 1980's, of whom substantially less than half will be white.

In order to curb the influx of African workers into the urban areas, the South African Government offers substantial incentives to companies to locate plants in the black homelands or in the industrial "growth points" adjacent to the homelands. However, only a small number of firms, most of which are South African, have as yet taken advantage of these incentives. Most firms continue to prefer to establish operations in or near the large urban centers where major markets are close at hand.

The government apparently believes that even if the African homelands do achieve independence or some form of autonomy, African workers from these areas will still be available to the South African labor market on a contractual basis.

Even if most of the Africans could be accommodated in the homelands, which is a most doubtful assumption, the question of the status of the 3 million increasingly detribalized and politically conscious Africans who have lived in urban areas remains unsettled. The impact of the apartheid policy falls most heavily on this group. The large urban riots in the summer of 1976 originated in and were concentrated in these African townships. The South African Government and a number of municipal administrations, notably in Johannesburg, have made some efforts to improve housing and general living conditions in the townships, but many of the township inhabitants feel the improvements are insufficient.

Asians and coloreds receive higher wages than Africans and are generally better off economically. Like the Africans, they are segregated by law and are subject to discriminatory treatment in employment, housing, and

education. Unlike Africans, however, they may participate in registered trade unions with white workers.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

South African forces fought in World War I on the side of the Allies, and her diplomats were active at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. South Africa was a founding member of the League of Nations and was given a League mandate to govern South West Africa, now Namibia, which prior to the war had been a German colony. South Africa created a Department of External Affairs in 1927 and later that year established diplomatic missions in the main Western European countries and in Washington. South African forces also fought on the side of the Allies in World War II, took part in the Berlin Airlift, and participated in the postwar U.N. force in Korea. A desire to cooperate with the West in combatting communism remains an important part of South African foreign policy.

The foreign relations of South Africa have been affected to an ever-increasing extent in the period since World War II by growing international criticism of the country's apartheid policies, particularly in the United Nations. International concern over South Africa's administration of the mandated territory of Namibia has also been a particular cause of friction with most of the rest of the world.

South Africa ignored an advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1950 that any change in the status of the territory would have to receive the assent of the United Nations as successor to the League. A proceeding later brought in the ICJ by Ethiopia and Liberia charging South Africa with violating its mandate was dismissed on technical grounds in 1966, but the United Nations later the same year declared, with U.S. support, that the mandate was terminated and that responsibility for the territory had passed to the United Nations. This position was upheld in an advisory opinion of the ICJ in 1971. (See *Background Notes* for Namibia)

U.N. insistence that South Africa give up the territory continued to grow. In 1974, the 29th General Assembly voted to deprive South Africa of its seat in that Assembly (although South Africa was not expelled from the organization as such) in reaction to its refusal to comply with U.N. and court rulings on Namibia. In January 1976, the Security Council voted unanimously to demand that elections leading to independence be held in Namibia under U.N. supervision.

Partly as an effort to counter this hostility, South Africa attempted in the sixties to improve relations with the rest of Africa, emphasizing the role that its economic and technological resources might play in the future of African development efforts. Exchanges of visits between South African leaders and those of other African states began in the late sixties, and relationships were established with a number of countries, although diplomatic relations were established only with Malawi.

The end of Portuguese rule in the neighboring territories of Angola and Mozambique deprived South Africa of the support of their white-ruled colonial governments. South Africa took a flexible approach in responding to this new situation; its leaders stressed their wish to maintain friendly relations with the militant African nationalist government newly in power in Mozambique. Moreover, the urgings of the South African Government were a major factor in the decision of Prime Minister Smith of the breakaway British colony of Southern Rhodesia to negotiate with African nationalist leaders for a peaceful transition to majority rule within 2 years.

South Africa's efforts to win acceptance by a significant number of African states have been set back by its intervention in the Angolan civil war in late 1975 and by the serious riots which erupted in South Africa's urban areas beginning in June 1976. South Africa has contended that it entered Angola only to counter Soviet and Cuban influence and to protect hydroelectric and irrigation projects inside the Angolan border. Many African countries agreed with the need to oppose Communist involvement, but few could accept that as a justification for South Africa's armed intervention.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material available on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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The riots in South Africa, with their heavy death toll and high number of arrests, have led to greatly increased pressure on South Africa from other African states and the international community generally to effect fundamental changes in its racial policies. Moreover, the opposition in the world to South Africa's "homelands" policy

was starkly demonstrated when no other nation recognized the independent status granted to the Transkei in October 1976.

U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

The United States has long maintained an official presence in South Africa. An American consulate, our fifth on the African continent, was opened in Cape Town in 1799. We now have consulates in Johannesburg and Durban and an Embassy in Pretoria; the Embassy moves to Cape Town during parliamentary sessions. In addition to official relationships, there are also many nongovernmental ties between Americans and South Africans. For example, American missionaries, black and white, have a long history of activity there, and the United States is an important trading partner of South Africa.

During the past 20 years, however, U.S.-South African relations have been increasingly affected by South Africa's racial policies, which are antithetical to our fundamental commitment to racial justice and human rights. We believe that the denial of all political rights and equal economic opportunity to the black majority of South Africa is a major factor of instability in contemporary Africa. We attach importance to good relations with other African countries, a large majority of which make opposition to South Africa's racial policies a key element of their foreign policies. If South Africa's policies are unaltered, we foresee progressively more violent racial confrontation and the introduction of great-power rivalry into the region, to the detriment of all of its inhabitants.

In order to demonstrate our opposition to apartheid and our support for nonviolent evolution toward racial justice, the United States has imposed restraints on its relations with South Africa. Among these is an embargo on arms sales. At first the ban was only applied on arms which might be useful in enforcing apartheid. However, in 1963 Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai E. Stevenson announced in the Security Council that the United States would terminate, by the end of 1963, the sale of all military equipment to the South African Government, in order to contribute further to a peaceful solution of the problem and to avoid any steps which might contribute to international friction in South Africa. Exceptions to the ban were to be made only in the case of existing contracts or, if required, for a common defense effort necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The elements of restraint also include a ban on U.S. naval ship visits to South Africa, in effect since 1967, and in the commercial field, a prohibition on direct Export-Import Bank loans to finance U.S. sales and limits on our trade promotion activities. Most recently, we have demonstrated our opposition to the apartheid system by not recognizing South Africa's bestowal of independence upon the Transkei homeland. Not only will this development have the effect of expatriating many South African-born blacks who have Transkei family origins but it is also the logical extension of the system of separate development, with which we strongly disagree.

In addition to these restraints, the U.S. Government has sought to use its influence to encourage a peaceful evolution in South Africa toward the attainment of basic human rights by all of that country's citizens regardless of race. We have sought to maintain contact with leaders of all of South Africa's racial groups. The U.S. Government has also pursued a program of actively encouraging and supporting the efforts of private American firms operating in South Africa to upgrade the pay, conditions of work, job opportunities, and fringe benefits of their black employees.

South Africa does not receive economic or developmental assistance from the United States, nor has it received such assistance in the past.

Despite our differences with South Africa, we agree on the need to find peaceful solutions to the urgent problems of southern Africa. South Africa can play a vital role in resolving the Rhodesian issue and holds the key to a peaceful end to the Namibian dispute. The United States is prepared to work with South Africa and other countries to bring peace to the region—a peace founded on justice and equal rights. We look forward to the day when, its racial problems solved and the rights of all its citizens protected, South Africa will play an increasingly important part in the economic development of southern Africa and be respected among the nations of Africa and in the world generally.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William G. Bowdler
Counselor of the Embassy—Harvey F. Nelson, Jr.
Chief, Political Section—Robert H. Munn
Chief, Economic Section—Jean R. Tartter
Public Affairs Officer—Harry L. Hughes
Defense Attaché—Col. William V. Bournes
Agricultural Attaché—Rado J. Kinzhuber
Administrative Officer—Virgil L. Moore
Consul General, Johannesburg—William M. Johnson, Jr.
Consul General, Cape Town—Ray E. White, Jr.
Consul General, Durban—James P. Farber

The U.S. Embassy in Pretoria is located at 225 Pretorius St. (tel. 48-4266); in Cape Town, on the 4th floor, Broadway Industrial Centre, Heerengracht (tel. 47-1280/87); in Johannesburg, at Kine Center, corner of Commissioner and Small Streets (tel. 21-1688); and in Durban, on the 29th floor, 333 Smith St. (tel. 32-4737).

Department of State Publication 8021, Revised June 1977
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

☆U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977 O—210-847 (2396)


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Price 50 cents (single copy). Subscription price: $24 per year; $6 additional for foreign mailing.

APPENDIX OO
SPANISH SAHARA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, May 1974 (Publication 7905)]

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background notes

Spanish Sahara

department of state * may 1974

OFFICIAL NAME: Province of Spanish Sahara

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Spanish Sahara is situated on the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa just south of Morocco, which borders it for 275 miles. The coastline is 690 miles long. Spanish Sahara has a very short border with the western tip of Algeria and a long border (about 1,000 miles) with Mauritania to the east and south.

The country is mostly rocky or sandy desert, which rises gradually to two ranges of small mountains. In the south the Adrar Sutuf reaches elevations of 1,700 feet. In the northeast the Daalet el Admia, a more extensive range, rises to heights of 2,700 feet.

The climate is hot and dry; rain occurs only rarely. In the interior daily temperatures range from 52°F. to 112°F. Along the coast it is more temperate due to the influence of the sea and the northeasterly trade winds.

The people are largely nomadic and roam freely from Spanish Sahara into adjacent areas of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. The settled population includes about 35,000 Spaniards, half of whom are soldiers.

El Aaiún, the capital, lies in the northern part of the Province, and Villa Cisneros, its second largest population center, lies in the south. Populations of both cities are approximately half Spanish and half Arab.

The indigenous population is a mixture of Arab, Berber, and Negro elements and belongs to four major groups: the Oulad Delim, the Tekna, Regeibat, and various coastal tribes.

Children of nomadic tribes are not required to attend school. Many of the Spanish Saharans are Muslim; there are also adherents to Catholicism, especially among the Europeans. Unity of the Spanish State and the Catholic Church does not apply to the Muslim population. Muslim laws, customs, and practices are respected by the Spaniards.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 102,703 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Colorado). CAPITAL: El Aaiún (pop. 25,000). OTHER CITIES: Villa Cisneros (pop. 7,000).

People

POPULATION: 76,000 (1970 census). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: Not available. DENSITY: 1.5 per sq. mi. (42% urban). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab, Berber, Negro, Spanish. RELIGIONS: Muslim, Catholic. LANGUAGES: Spanish (official), Arabic. LITERACY: Nomads 5%; Europeans 98%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: Unknown.

Government

TYPE: Overseas Province of Spain. INDEPENDENCE: None. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: No independent constitution.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Governor General of the Province. *Legislative*–General Assembly (Yemáa). *Judicial*–administered by commanding officer of the Canary Islands. Legal system based on Spanish civil law and customary law.

POLITICAL PARTIES: National Movement. SUFFRAGE: Adult male only. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 2 sectors, 4 districts.

FLAG: Spanish flag. Two red horizontal bands separated by a wider yellow band; the national coat of arms, centered on the flag, shows an eagle flanked by the Pillars of Hercules.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): N/A. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: N/A. PER CAPITA INCOME: N/A.

AGRICULTURE: *Products*–fish, livestock, barley, fruits, vegetables.

INDUSTRY: *Products*–phosphate.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Phosphate, iron ore.


TRADE: *Exports*–$64,280 (1970): phosphates (700,000 tons in 1973), oil cakes, goatskins, fish products. *Partners*–Spain and Spanish possessions. *Imports*–foodstuffs, manufactured goods. *Partners*–Spain and Spanish possessions.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: About 64 pesetas (ptas) = US$1.

HISTORY

In 1476 Spaniards from the Canary Islands established a fort at Santa Cruz de la Mar Pequeña, but this was abandoned in 1524 and the area remained untouched until the 19th century. Spanish claims to the territory remained dormant until the war with Morocco in 1859-60.

In 1878 the British established a trading post at Cap Juby, which was surrendered to the ruler of Morocco in 1895. (This area is now included in the Tarfaya Province of Morocco.) The Spanish proclaimed a protectorate in 1885 over the coastal zone from Cabo



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Bojador to Cabo Blanco, to be administered from the Canary Islands. In the same year a factory (trading post) was established at Villa Cisneros, but this was soon abandoned in the face of native attacks.

Later the French claimed a protectorate over the entire Sahara, but in a Franco-Spanish convention of June 27, 1900, a landward frontier was established. In conventions of 1900 and 1912 the French extended the recognized area of Spanish rule from Cabo Bojador north to the mouth of the Draa River, now part of Morocco. By 1916 Spain was exercising control over Cap Juby and in 1920 founded Güera.

Spanish Sahara, the last of Spain's major territories, became an Overseas Province in January 1958.

GOVERNMENT

Spanish Sahara achieved representation in the Spanish Cortes (Parliament) under a 1961 law. Two deputies are elected to that body by heads of families for 4-year terms. Concomitantly, the Provincial Governor General was made directly responsible to the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency. He is also the Commander in Chief of all Provincial military forces, including the legion and the police.

The Spanish Government provides for a General Assembly, or *Yemáa*, of about 85 representatives. This Assembly can propose to the Spanish Government measures it considers to be in the general interest of the Province. About half of its members are chieftains of the traditional tribal assemblies; the other half are elected. The Yemáa is entitled to be formally heard prior to the enactment of laws. It is further empowered to present proposals relating to the constitutional development of the Province.

In 1973 the Yemáa petitioned the Spanish Government for eventual self-determination, indicating a desire at the same time to retain a special relationship with Spain.

The legal system of Spanish Sahara is based on Spanish civil law and customary law. Administratively, Spanish Sahara is under the jurisdiction of the commanding officer of the Canary Islands.

Where Spanish interests are concerned, justice is administered by the Spanish courts. The Spanish Court has two levels of jurisdiction at Villa Cisneros. The Supreme Court at Madrid constitutes the third level of Spanish jurisdiction.

All other cases are adjudicated in the local Muslim courts. There are three levels of jurisdiction in the Muslim court system: 12 communal courts, three district courts, and one Provincial court. On the trial level, adjudication is by one communal judge; on the second level, by four district judges; and on the third level, by 12 Provincial judges. The exclusive source of Muslim jurisprudence is the Koran. Judges are appointed by the Spanish Governor General and receive their emolument from the administration headed by him. Saharan attorneys are not admitted to practice in Muslim courts.

By a decree of November 1962 the following organs of local government were established or recognized: (a) village councils; (b) Yemáas, or councils of nomadic sections; (c) municipal councils, representing the people and economic, professional, and cultural organizations; and (d) a Provincial Council, representing the municipal and village councils, the nomadic sections, and the industrial, commercial, cultural, and professional organizations.

The Province is divided into a small (31,000 square miles) northern sector called Sakiet (or Saquiet) el Hamra and a large (72,000 square miles) southern sector called Río de Oro. The latter name was given to the bay behind Cabo Blanco—the territory's southernmost tip—by its Portuguese discoverers, who mistook it for a river in the 15th century. A 1958 decree created the three districts of El Aaiún, Güera, and Villa Cisneros. Semara district was added later.

Principal Government Officials

Governor General and Commanding Officer—Brig. Gen. José Maria Perez de Lema TEJERO

Secretary General—Fernando Sandoval y COIG

Spain maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2700 15th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Political power is concentrated in the hands of the Spanish Governor General. The National Movement is the only political party in the Province. The Communist Party is outlawed.

The Saharans are not subject to mandatory military service, nor is the Spanish social-insurance legislation applicable to them.

Spain has informed the United Nations that the object of the present administrative structure of the Province, as embodied particularly in the 1962 decree, is "to create some solid basis to support legal representative organs; this will lead to the establishment of a system culminating in other representative organs which will be called upon to assume responsibilities whose possible future scope will be unlimited."

In September 1966 the Spanish Government informed the United Nations that it favored the application of the principle of self-determination in Spanish Sahara, and was contacting the people of the Province to make necessary preparations for them to express their will without any form of pressure. The U.N. General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1966, requested Spain "at the earliest possible date" to determine procedures for a referendum under U.N. auspices in the Sahara for self-determination. Similar resolutions have been passed by each succeeding U.N. General Assembly, with the exception of the 26th (1971) Assembly.

ECONOMY

The economy of Spanish Sahara is based on the funds provided by Spain for the administration of the Province and the support of its military forces, as well as by the State Industry Institute (INI) for the development of the country. The 1971 budget appropriated $12.9 million for the administration. (No figures are available for the GNP and per capita income.)

Fishing and livestock raising (camels, goats, sheep) constitute the basis of the native economy. Because Spanish Sahara is almost completely arid, the only crop that can be grown successfully is barley—and only in low-lying areas after rain. Some fruit and vegetables are grown in the few oases. Recent discoveries of underground sources of water have led to some farming and an end to the importation of water from the Canary Islands. In early 1965 discovery of a vast underground lake in the Villa Cisneros area raised hope of substantial agricultural developments. With the new water resources, it may be possible that sizable areas could be devoted to

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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pasturage, which, with the introduction of strains of cattle adapted to the climate of the area, may improve livestock production in Spanish Sahara. At present, however, efforts to utilize this resource have not been effective.

A number of West European and U.S. oil companies have prospected onshore without success. Some exploration of offshore concessions held by these companies is continuing.

High-grade phosphate deposits, considered the richest in the world and totaling more than 1.5 billion tons, were discovered in 1963 near Bu-Craa and Izic in the northern part of Spanish Sahara.

A Spanish-owned company, Fosfatos Bucraa, is handling the mining operation. Full-scale operation began in 1973, despite recurring technical difficulties with some of the equipment. Eventual exports are expected to reach 10 million tons a year by 1979.

Also of potential benefit to the economy is a rich iron ore lode of some 70 million tons, which has been located in the southern part of the territory.

Spanish Sahara must import most of its food and all of its needed manufactured goods. There are no available import figures. Spanish Sahara exported 700,000 tons of phosphate in 1973 and plans to export 3 million tons by 1975. Monetary trade is mostly with Spain and Spanish possessions.

Transportation and communications infrastructures in the Province are not extensive. It has two air connections, El Aaiún-Villa Cisneros, twice weekly; Villa Cisneros-Güera, once weekly; and two bus connections, El Aaiún-Moroccan border at Tah, twice weekly, and as far as Daora, twice daily; and El Aaiún-Semara, twice weekly.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Attitudes toward Spanish Sahara are influenced by a general African desire to eliminate vestiges of European colonialism. This sentiment is broadly expressed through the United Nation's Committee on Trusteeships and Non-Self Governing Territories, which has been the author of resolutions brought before the U.N. General Assembly from 1966 through 1973 calling for self-determination in Spanish Sahara.

Spain repeatedly has said it is ready to grant self-determination to Spanish Sahara subject to a plebiscite to be conducted under the supervision of the United Nations but has not yet specified a definite date.

Morocco, upon independence in 1956, laid claim to all of Spain's holdings in northwest Africa, basing its case on history (the extent of past Moroccan empires) and religion (the longstanding acceptance by the Muslim population of Sahara of the Moroccan monarch as Imam). Spain has relinquished most of the contested territories but retains Spanish Sahara.

Mauritania staked its own claim to Spanish Sahara in the early 1960's, and Algeria asserted its right, as a state bordering Spanish Sahara, to have a voice in the disposition of the territory.

Since 1963 the U.N.'s Special Committee on Independence for Colonial Territories and the General Assembly have considered the question. The General Assembly has called upon the "administering power," in consultation with the Mauritanian and Moroccan Governments and other interested parties, to set a date and procedures for a referendum of the people of Spanish Sahara under U.N. auspices.

At the Nouadhibou (Mauritania) meeting held in September 1970, the Chiefs of State of the three interested bordering countries agreed to work together to find an acceptable solution to Spanish Sahara's future. Three years later at Agadir, Morocco, a follow-up meeting was convened. The group had difficulties in formulating a common position.

Much of Spanish Sahara's future depends on the question of exploiting its mineral resources. Morocco is particularly aware of the competition Spanish Saharan phosphate deposits provide to its own phosphate production.

There is no U.S. representation in Spanish Sahara. The U.S. Embassy at Madrid, Spain, is responsible for any necessary consular services. However, there is a U.S. consular agent at Las Palmas in the nearby Canary Islands.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador (Madrid)—Horatio Rivero
Consul (Madrid)—Harvey Cash
Consular Agent (Las Palmas)—Manuel Martin

The U.S. Embassy in Spain is located at Serrano 75, Madrid. The consular office in the Canary Islands is located at Las Palmas.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATIONS 7905
Revised May 1974

APPENDIX PP
SUDAN
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, April 1975 (Publication 8022).]

background notes

Sudan

department of state * april 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Democratic Republic of the Sudan

GEOGRAPHY

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, lies across the middle reaches of the Nile River and is bounded on the north by Egypt; on the west by Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic; on the south by Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya; and on the east by Ethiopia and the Red Sea.

From south to north, Sudan's terrain has tropical forests and savanna; vast swamplands, open semitropical savanna, and scrublands; and sandy and arid hills which lie between the Red Sea and the Libyan and Sahara Deserts. Through these diverse regions the White Nile, the main artery of the Nile River, flows from south to north for some 2,340 miles. Extreme desert conditions in the northwest give way to sandy steppes north of Khartoum. Most cultivation in this area is dependent on irrigation from the Nile, while in many areas of the south there is sufficient rainfall for cultivation or grazing.

The climate varies with the terrain and latitude. Khartoum, situated at the junction of the White and Blue Niles, has a desert climate. Average maximum temperatures of 100°F and more prevail for 10 months of the year (February through November), while an average maximum of 94°F prevails for the remaining 2 months. The heat usually is accompanied by low humidity, and the nights are noticeably cooler.

PEOPLE

Sudan's most recent completed census was in 1955. Population distribution is uneven, with more than 2 million people concentrated in a 64,000-square-mile area at the juncture of the White and Blue Niles. The principal cities of Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North form a single metropolitan area.

Sudan's population is composed of two distinct cultures, and their effective collaboration poses one of the

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 967,500 sq. mi. (almost one-third the size of the continental U.S.). CAPITAL: Khartoum (pop. 250,000). OTHER CITIES: Omdurman, Khartoum North, Port Sudan, Juba (capital of Southern Region).

People

POPULATION: 16 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1974). DENSITY: 17 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab-African, Nilotic-African. RELIGIONS: Islam (70%), indigenous beliefs (25%), Christianity (5%). LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English, tribal dialects. LITERACY: 15-20%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 50 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic, single party with military rule. INDEPENDENCE: Jan. 1, 1956. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: May 8, 1973.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Head of Government, Prime Minister, Secretary General of SSU). *Legislative*–People's Assembly (250 members). *Judicial*–Supreme Court; civil, criminal, and tribal courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU, official). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 15 provinces, Southern Regional government.

FLAG: Horizontal red, white, and black stripes, with a green triangle extending from the staff to one-third of the flag's length.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $1.9 billion (1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $120. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 1.8%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land*–20% arable, of which 15% cultivated. *Labor* 86%. *Products*–cotton, peanuts, sesame seed, gum arabic, sorghum, wheat, sugarcane.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 6%. *Products*–cement, textiles, pharmaceuticals, shoes.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Modest reserves of iron ore, copper, chrome, and other industrial metals.

TRADE: *Exports*–$358.7 million (1973): cotton (50%), peanuts, gum arabic, livestock. *Partners*–European Economic Community (EEC), P.R.C., U.S. (2%), Japan, Egypt, India. *Imports*–$417.2 million (1973): manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, food, livestock. *Partners*–U.K., India, F.R.G., U.S. (7%), P.R.C., U.S.S.R.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 pound Sudanese (£Sd)=US$2.87 (1 £Sd=US$2.50 for most transactions).

ECONOMIC AID: *U.S. only*–$124.6 million (since 1956): P.L. 480, $39.1 million; AID, $85.5 million.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, Organization of African Unity (OAU).


SUDAN
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
RED SEA
LAKE NUBIA
Wadi Halfa
Halā'ib
Karmah
Abū Ḥamad
Port Sudan
Sawākin
Dunqulah
Kuraymah
Kūrtī
Barbar
'Aṭbarah
Ad Dāmir
Al 'Ajrūn
Wādī Howar
NILE
Nahr 'Atbara
Omdurman
Khartoum North
KHARTOUM
Halfā'al Jadīdah
Wad Madanī
Al Qadārif
Al Junaynah
Al Fāshir
Bārah
Al Ubayyiḍ
Kūstī
Sannār
Blue Nile
An Nuhūd
Nyala
Ar Rank
Ar Ruṣayriṣ
Rahad al Bardī
Sahanūsah
Kāduqlī
White Nile
Malūṭ
Buram
Umm Rawq
Bahr al 'Arab
Malakāl
Uwayl
Jur
Bahr al Jabal
Wāw
Rumbek
Sobat
Bor
Tambura
Yei
Juba

517557 3-75

country's principal internal problems. The 12 northern provinces cover almost two-thirds of Sudan and include most of the urban centers. The 12 million Sudanese who live in this area are largely Arabic-speaking Muslims. Among these are several distinct tribal groups: the *Kababish* of northern Kordofan, a camel-raising people; the *Jaaliin* and *Shaiqiyya* groups of settled, riparian tribes; the seminomadic *Baqqara* of Kordofan and Darfur; the Hamitic *Beja* in the Red Sea area and *Nubians* of the northern Nile area, some of whom have been resettled on the Atbarah River; and the Negroid *Nuba* of southern Kordofan and *Fur* in the western reaches of the country.

The three southern provinces have a population of about 4 million and a predominantly rural subsistence economy. Here the Sudanese are mostly animist, although Christian missionaries have converted some. The south contains many more tribal groups and languages than the north. The largest among the many Negro tribes in the south are more than 1 million *Dinka*. Other Nilotic tribes include the *Anuak, Nuer,* and *Shilluk*—in central-southern Sudan—who extend into Ethiopia. The *Azande, Bor,* and *Jo Luo* are "Sudanic" tribes in the west, and the *Acholi* and *Lotuho* live in the extreme south and extend into Uganda.

HISTORY

Sudan was a collection of small independent states from the beginning of the Christian era until its conquest and unification by Egypt in 1820-21. A religious leader proclaimed himself the *Mahdi*, or messianic figure, in 1881 and began to unify the various tribes. Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the *Mahdi* led a nationalist revolt which culminated in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. The Mahdist state lasted for the next 13 years.

Following its conquest by an Anglo-Egyptian force in 1896-98, Sudan was proclaimed a Condominium in 1899 under joint British-Egyptian administration. From 1899 until 1954 the United Kingdom dominated Sudanese administration, formulated policies, and supplied most of the administrative personnel, although the appearance of joint administration was maintained.

Independence

In February 1953 the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The first Sudanese self-government parliament was inaugurated on January 9, 1954, and the transitional period toward independence was begun. With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state.

The National Unionist Party under Prime Minister Ismail el Azhari dominated the first cabinet of independent Sudan. It was soon replaced by a coalition of conservative political forces.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Lightweight fabrics and conservative styles are recommended year round for Sudan's desert climate.

Customs—Visas are required, as are cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever immunizations. Travelers must complete a currency declaration listing all currency and other valuables in their possession. Exchange money at official exchange offices or banks only and obtain a receipt for each such transaction. Photography permits are required.

Health—Facilities are limited. In areas outside Khartoum, and in the city during the summer flood season, water should be purified before drinking. Food should be well-cooked.

Telecommunications—International telephone and telegraph services are available.

Transportation—Sudan is connected by international airlines with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. A good domestic air service is operating, but bookings must be made in advance. Travel by road or train is limited. Taxis are available in Khartoum.

On November 17, 1958, following a period of economic difficulties and political maneuvering which paralyzed public administration, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime in a bloodless coup d'etat.

Gen. Abboud did not carry out his promises to return Sudan to civilian government, however, and popular resentment against army rule led to a wave of riots and strikes in late October 1964 which forced the military to relinquish power.

The Abboud regime was followed by a provisional civilian government until parliamentary elections in April 1965 led to the formation of a coalition government of the Umma and National Unionist Parties under Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub. Between 1966 and 1969 Sudan had a series of civilian coalition governments which were unable to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with major problems of factionalism, economic stagnation, and ethnic dissidence.

Dissatisfaction culminated in a second military coup on May 25, 1969. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed and initially consisted of nine military officers and a civilian Prime Minister. The leader of the coup and chairman of the RCC, Maj. Gen. Jafar Muhammed Nimeri, subsequently was appointed Prime Minister. Upon assuming power, the new regime abolished the parliament and outlawed all political parties.

The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was tolerated, however, and several members of the original RCC were or had been SCP members. Disputes between Marxist and non-Marxist elements within the ruling military coalition during spring and early summer 1971 resulted in a briefly successful coup in July 1971 led by the SCP. Anti-Communist military elements loyal to Gen. Nimeri led a successful counter-coup which brought him back to power several days later.

Southern Region

Latent southern suspicion of northern domination culminated in 1955 with a mutiny among southern troops

in Equatoria Province. For the next 17 years the Southern Region experienced much civil strife, and various southern leaders agitated for regional autonomy or outright secession.

This chronic state of insurgency against the central government ended early in 1972 when a peace agreement was signed which provided autonomy on most internal matters to the Southern Region.

GOVERNMENT

General Nimeri was elected President of Sudan in a referendum held in October 1971. He subsequently dissolved the Revolutionary Command Council, transferring many of its members and its powers to the General Secretariat of the newly created Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), Sudan's only legal party. President Nimeri serves as President and Secretary General of the SSU. Committees of the Secretariat parallel the structure of the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and the same person frequently serves as both Minister and head of the SSU Committee for a given administrative function.

A People's Assembly of 207 members was elected in 1972 to draft a constitution for the Sudan. A permanent constitution was promulgated on May 8, 1973, under which a new People's Assembly was elected. Half of its 250 members were elected on the basis of geographical representation, 100 were selected by various worker groups and mass organizations, and 25 were appointed by the President.

The Constitution protects the independence of the judiciary; however, like all government activity, it is subordinate to the SSU. Separate systems administer civil, criminal, and tribal courts as distinct from cases of personal status involving Muslims. The Supreme Court is a custodian of the Constitution and the rights and freedoms conferred therein.

Administration is formally decentralized. Since 1974 the Nimeri government has made efforts to alter the previous highly centralized administration by breaking up the 6 northern provinces into 12, by conferring more power to provincial governors, and by greatly expanding the establishment of local people's councils, which now number almost 4,500. Under the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, a Southern Region comprising the three southern provinces was established, and the 1973 Constitution provides for its continuation. The governmental structure, headquartered in Juba, includes a representative assembly and deals with internal regional matters.

Principal Government Officials

President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister—Gen. Jafar Muhammed Nimeri
First Vice President, Minister of Interior—Maj. Gen. Muhammed al-Baghir Ahmed
Vice President, Chairman of High Executive Council for the South—Abel Alier

Ministers

Finance and National Economy—Mamoun Biheiry
Agriculture—Maj. Abul Gassim Muhammed Ibrahim
Industry and Mining—Badr al-Din Suleiman
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—Jamal Muhammed Ahmed
Minister of State for Special Affairs, Office of the Presidency—Baha al-Din Muhammed Idris

Ambassador to the U.N.—Mustafa Medani
Ambassador to the U.S.—Francis Mading Deng

Sudan maintains an Embassy in the United States at Suite 400, 600 New Hampshire Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20037.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Since May 25, 1969, the Sudanese Armed Force has replaced the previous mass political parties as primary supporters of the government. The success of the military takeover was due partly to the cooperation of an army group known as Free Officers who have supported Gen. Nimeri and have retained considerable influence in the decision-making process.

Although the radical ideology and socialist orientation of some SSU members have generated criticism from members of the conservative Ansar and Khatmiyyah religious sects, these groups have posed no lasting challenge to the present government. Following the revolution, supporters of the Ansar spiritual leader, Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, assembled at Aba Island south of Khartoum and instigated an abortive uprising in March 1970 and the Imam was killed. Since that time they have offered little organized resistance.

All traditional political parties have been disbanded, although the Communist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood continue to exist underground. The only legal party is the SSU, which now claims 2.25 million members. It is hierarchically organized in the manner of other single-party states.

Sudan has a tradition of strong labor unions, which are now organized under the Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation. Gen. Nimeri has encouraged support from the dominant Railway Workers' Union and from the Federation, but some opposition to the regime can be found among labor, as well as student, groups.

Since 1972 a major source of instability in the south has been dealt with through a phased program of integration of former guerrilla fighters into the regular Sudanese Army. Southern politics now focus on regional affairs and the performance of the southern government. Most southern refugees have now returned to Sudan and resettled.

ECONOMY

Sudan's principal resources are agricultural. Although efforts are being made to diversify its cash crops, cotton and cottonseed account for approximately 50 percent of the export earnings. Another large export crop, sold almost exclusively to the United States, is gum arabic, with Sudan producing four-fifths of the world's supply. Grain sorghum (*dura*) is the principal food crop, and wheat is

grown for domestic consumption. Other crops, such as sesame seeds, peanuts, and castor beans are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. There is vast livestock-producing potential, and large numbers of live animals, particularly camels and sheep, are exported to Egypt and other Arab countries.

The inadequate transportation system and the high cost of hauling agricultural products over great distances are major hindrances to economic development. Presently, the country's transportation facilities consist of one railroad with a feeder line, supplemented by river steamers, the Sudan Airways, and some 900 miles of paved or graveled roads.

Sudan has experienced large investments and considerable success in growing cotton under various irrigation and pump plans, particularly the well-known Gezira Scheme, located south of Khartoum between the White and Blue Niles. Success has been uneven with respect to rainland agriculture. However, the government is making some progress in developing tracts of such land for mechanized agriculture. It is on rainlands that much of the millet, sesame seeds, peanuts, and short-staple cotton are grown. These offer a promising future if the problems of water development and transportation can be solved.

Industrial development is limited and consists principally of the processing of agricultural products and various light industries located at Khartoum North.

No exploitable minerals have been discovered in significant quantities. Intensive explorations for oil along the Red Sea coast and in a 500,000 sq. km. inland area is just getting underway, but so far none has been found. Pending electrification of various dams, there is no source of cheap power.

Until 1969 the United States, certain West European countries, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait supplied the major share of economic assistance to Sudan. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has been the largest single source of development loans.

Between 1969 and 1971 Sudan relied heavily on Communist assistance, receiving substantial military deliveries from the Soviet Union and greatly expanding its trade with Eastern Europe, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), and the Soviet Union. In 1970 the P.R.C. extended an aid credit of $42 million, which was used mainly for road construction and a textile mill, and North Korea agreed to a modest credit to Sudan.

After the failure of the SCP-led coup in July 1971, Sudan's domestic and foreign policies began to change. Trade with the United States, as with other market economies, increased substantially, while trade with Communist countries (except the P.R.C.) decreased.

Wide-scale government confiscation of private businesses occurred during 1970. Since July 1971 the government has returned most of the locally owned businesses to their former owners and negotiated compensation agreements with foreign-owned businesses which were nationalized. Sudanese authorities are now attempting to encourage the private sector of the economy and to obtain foreign investment and technology. The government recently passed a new Investment Act designed to attract foreign companies, particularly in agribusiness and mineral exploration. Current investment by U.S. companies totals approximately $9 million and is growing.

The government continues to have very limited foreign exchange reserves. Since March 1972 it has entered into several standby arrangements with the International Monetary Fund and received a number of cash loans from the Arab states. The IBRD and other possible donors are participating in the Rahad Project, one of the large irrigated farming schemes which promises to increase significantly Sudan's agricultural exports.

In the past year Sudan's attractiveness to foreign traders and investors has improved due to capital surpluses in nearby oil-rich countries. Loans and investment from Arab countries, complemented by Western technology, should help Sudan realize its agricultural potential and expand related industry. Sudan's role as an economic link between Arab and African countries is demonstrated by the location in Khartoum of the Arab Bank for African Economic Development.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS

Solidarity with other Arab countries has generally been a major feature of Sudan's foreign policy. When the Arab-Israeli war began in June 1967, Sudan declared war on Israel and broke relations with the United States.

Since mid-1971, however, Sudan has disengaged itself somewhat from active involvement in the Middle East conflict and has assumed a more active role in African affairs.

Sudan's close relations with the U.S.S.R. deteriorated following the July 1971 Communist coup attempt, and the ambassadors of both countries were recalled. The recent exchange of new ambassadors suggests that relations are beginning to improve. Sudan has good relations with the P.R.C., which has become an important aid donor.

U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS

Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States on June 6, 1967, following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. U.S.-Sudan relations improved prior to events of July 1971, and with those events the pace increased. Further impetus came from U.S. responsiveness to Sudanese appeals for humanitarian assistance in refugee resettlement, which became an urgent need after the peace settlement in the south in February 1972. As a result of these developments and various meetings between U.S. and Sudanese officials, the Nimeri regime resumed relations with the United States on July 25, 1972. Ambassadors were exchanged in December 1972.

On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the Black September Organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Curtis G. Moore in Sudan. The assassinations occurred despite the most strenuous efforts by the Government of Sudan to obtain the safe release of the diplomats being held as hostages. After the murders, Sudanese officials refused to permit the terrorists safe passage to another country, arrested them, and announced that they would be tried for murder.

Following restoration of relations in 1972, Sudan requested the United States to resume financial and economic assistance, with emphasis on agriculture and transportation. The U.S. Agency for International Development agreed to participate in the multidonor Rahad Project with a loan of $11 million. The U.S. Ambassador was recalled in June 1974 after the Sudanese released to detention in Egypt the convicted murderers of Ambassador Noel and DCM Moore. He returned to Khartoum in November 1974, but cooperation in various fields remains circumscribed. Since July 1974 U.S. assistance has been limited to meeting humanitarian needs.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William D. Brewer
Deputy Chief of Mission—Alan Berlind
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Sterlyn Steele

The U.S. Embassy address in Khartoum is Gamhouria Ave., P.O. Box 699.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8022
Revised April 1975

APPENDIX QQ
SWAZILAND
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, April 1977 (Publication 8174)]

background notes

Swaziland

department of state * april 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Swaziland

PEOPLE

Most Swazi are subsistence farmers. About 29,000 are employed outside the country, principally in South Africa. The whites consist of English, Afrikaans, and Portuguese-speaking groups and are engaged mainly in agriculture, commerce, construction, and mining. The chief occupation of the Eurafricans is farming, although a few are engaged in skilled and semiskilled occupations.

There is considerable mixing of Christian and traditional belief and practice. Most Swazi ascribe a special spiritual role to His Majesty, King Sobhuza II, the Head of the Nation.

The country's official languages are siSwati (a Nguni language related to Zulu) and English. Government and commerce are largely conducted in the latter.

GEOGRAPHY

Swaziland is all but surrounded by the Transvaal and Natal Provinces of the Republic of South Africa; it also shares a 70-mile (112 km.) border with Mozambique.

Swaziland is divided geographically into four well-defined regions of roughly equal breadth running from north to south. The mountainous highveld in the west has a humid, near-temperate climate with 40-90 inches (100-230 cm.) mean annual rainfall. The middleveld and Lubombo Plateau (the central and extreme eastern sections, respectively) are subtropical and somewhat drier (35-45 inches (90-115 cm.) mean annual rainfall), while the lowveld (a broad area running from north to south) is subtropical and semiarid with 20-30 inches (50-76 cm.) mean annual rainfall concentrated mainly in a few heavy storms. Mean annual temperatures vary between 60°F (16°C) in the highveld and 72°F (22°C) in the lowveld.

HISTORY

According to tradition, the people of the present Swazi nation migrated south before the 16th century to what is now Mozambique. Following a series of conflicts with people living in what

PROFILE

People

POPULATION: 494,000 (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3%. DENSITY: 74 per sq. mi. (29 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Swazi, Zulu, non-African (approx. 3%). RELIGIONS: Christian, animist. LANGUAGES: English, siSwati (both official), Zulu. LITERACY: 36%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 43 yrs.

Geography

AREA: 6,704 sq. mi. (17,366 sq. km.); slightly smaller than N.J. CAPITAL: Mbabane (pop. 22,000). OTHER CITY: Manzini (26,000).

Government

TYPE: Monarchy. INDEPENDENCE: September 6, 1968. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: None in effect.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–King (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Cabinet, Swazi National Council. *Legislative*–None. *Judicial*–Court of Appeal, High Court, subordinate and traditional courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: None. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 4 Districts, 2 municipal governments.

FLAG: Five horizontal stripes–blue, yellow, crimson, yellow, and blue–with shield, two spears, and staff centered on wide crimson band.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $218 million (1975). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 9.8%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $440 (1975). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 0.9%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 8%. *Labor* 85%. *Products*–corn, livestock, sugarcane, citrus fruits, cotton, rice, pineapples.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 5%. *Products*–milled sugar, ginned cotton, processed meat and wood, tourism, chemicals, machinery, beverages, consumer goods.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Iron ore, asbestos, coal.

TRADE: *Exports*–$152 million (1975): sugar, wood products, iron ore, asbestos, citrus fruits, canned fruits, meat products. *Partners*–UK, US, South Africa, Japan. *Imports*–$151 million (1975): motor vehicles, fuels and lubricants, foodstuffs, clothing. *Partners*–South Africa, UK.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 lilangeni (pl. emalengeni)=1 South African rand=US$1.15 (Jan. 1977).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$221 million (1961-73). *U.S. only*–ca. $10 million (1968-75): Food for Peace, development projects, Peace Corps.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth of Nations, Southern African Customs Union.


Swaziland
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 10 20 Miles
0 10 20 Kilometers
South Africa
Mozambique
Komatipoort
Malelane
Havelock
Piggs Peak
Tshaneni
Komati
Umbuluzi
Ka Dake Station
Black Umbuluzi
White Umbuluzi
Mbabane
Usutu
Manzini
Siteki
Great Usutu
Bhunya
Mankayene
Siphofaneni
Mkondo
Big Bend
Ndhlozane
Hlatikulu
Mhlanga
Nhlangano
Lavumisa
Golela
South Africa
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is presently the area of Maputo, the Swazi settled in northern Zululand in about 1750.

Unable to match the growing Zulu strength there, the Swazi moved gradually northward in the early 1800's and established themselves in an area including what is now known as Swaziland. They consolidated their hold in this area under several extremely able leaders. The most important of these was Mswati, from whom the Swazi derive their name. Under his leadership in the 1840's, the Swazi expanded their territory to the northwest and stabilized the southern frontier with the Zulu.

The firs Swazi contact with the British came early in Mswati's reign when he asked Her Majesty's Agent General in South Africa for assistance against Zulu raids into Swaziland. Through the good offices of the Agent General, amicable relations were established between the two nations. It was also during Mswati's reign that the first whites settled in the country.

In the years following Mswati's death, the Swazi struggled to guarantee their independence. Agreements between the British and the Transvaal (South Africa) Governments in 1881 and 1884 provided that Swaziland should be independent. During this period, however, many concessions for farming, mining, and commerce were granted to whites by the Swazi ruler, Mbandzeni. A number of confusing claims stemming from these many concessions were pressed on the Swazi Government at that time. In an effort to bring some order to the chaotic situation a provisional administration for the territory was established in 1890, representative of Swazi, British, and South African (Transvaal) Government interests.

In 1894, under a convention between British and South African Governments, the South African Republic assumed the powers of protection and administration. Swaziland continued under this form of government until the conquest of the Transvaal during the Anglo-Boer War, when the rights and powers assumed by the South African Republic in the country passed to the British Government. In 1903, Britain formally took over the administration of Swaziland.

In 1907, the British Government made an effort to settle the land concession question by defining farm concession boundaries and returning about one-third of all contested land to the Swazi in return for the grant of freehold titles to the concessionaires. The boundaries of mineral concessions were also defined and all monopoly concessions were cancelled. The Swazi bitterly opposed the British settlement, and the land question remains controversial to this day.

In 1921, Swaziland's first legislative body, an advisory council of elected white representatives, was established. Its purpose was to advise the High Commissioner on purely non-Swazi affairs. In 1944, the High Commissioner recognized the council as having official status. At the same time the High Commissioner recognized the paramount chief as the Native Authority for the territory, empowering him to issue to the Swazi legally enforceable orders on various subjects.

The present King, Sobhuza II, became *Ngwenyama* (The Lion) or head of the Swazi Nation in 1921, after 20 years of rule by a regent, the Queen Mother, Lobatsibeni. Before coming to the throne, the King studied for several years at Lovedale in South Africa, in addition to being given special education by royal tutors. Shortly after becoming *Ngwenyama*, he traveled to London with his advisors to argue unsuccessfully the Swazi side of the land concession question before the Privy Council.

In the early years of colonial rule, the British Government expected

TRAVEL NOTES


Climate and Clothing–Swaziland's climate is moderate, similar to that of Washington, D.C., but with the seasons reversed.

Customs–U.S. citizens do not need visas to enter Swaziland. Immunizations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are recommended.

Health–Adequate medical care is available in Swaziland; the water is potable; and the climate is basically healthy.

Telecommunications–International and local telephone and telegraph facilities are available.

Transportation–Regular air service to and from Matsapa Airport, near Mbabane and Manzini, links Swaziland with major international routes. Taxis and rental cars are available in Mbabane.



Swazi traditional beehive hut.

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These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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Swaziland to eventually be incorporated into South Africa. After World War II, however, South Africa's intensification of racial discrimination induced Britian to prepare Swaziland for independence. Development of educational and medical facilities and investment in agricultural projects were markedly increased.

Political activity intesified in the early 1960's. Partially in response to events elsewhere in Africa, a number of modern-style political parties were formed. These parties, which agitated for independence and economic development, were largely urban-based however, and had few ties to the rural areas where 80 percent of the Swazi live. The traditional Swazi leaders, including the King and the Swazi National Council, formed the *Imbokodvo* National Movement, a political group which capitalized on its close identification with the traditional Swazi way of life. Responding to pressures for political reform, the colonial government scheduled an election in mid-1964 for the first Legislative Council in which the Swazi would participate. In the election, the *Imbokodvo* won all 24 elective seats.

Four other parties, most of them having more radical platforms, also contested the election. The largest of these the *Ngwane* National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), received 9 percent of the vote but won no seats.

Having solidified its political base, the *Imbokodvo* then incorporated many of the demands of the more radical parties, especially that of immediate independence. In 1966, the British Government agreed to hold talks on a new Constitution. A number of conservative whites resident in the territory made an unsuccessful attempt to establish the principle of separate elections for white-reserved seats in the new national assembly. The constitutional committee, which consisted of representatives of the King and the Swazi National Council, other political parties, and the British Government rejected this suggestion, however. The committee agreed on a constitutional monarchy for Swaziland, with self-government to follow parliamentary elections in 1967. Swaziland became independent on September 6, 1968.

Although Dr. Ambrose Zwane's NNLC received 20 percent of the vote in the April 1967 elections, his party was weakened before then by the extensive defections of its younger and more dynamic leaders to the *Imbokodvo* Movement. The delimitation of electoral districts and the method adopted of electing three Members from each district enhanced the ability of the *Imbokodvo* to win all of the elective seats in Parliament.

Swaziland's first post-independence elections were held in May 1972. The *Imbokodvo* gained about 75 percent of the vote and carried 21 of the elective seats in Parliament. Dr. Zwane's NNLC received just over 20 percent of the vote and narrowly won a single constituency. His party thereby gained three seats in the House of Assembly.

On April 12, 1973, King Sobhuza repealed the 1968 Independence Constitution, suspended meetings of Parliament, and assumed all governmental powers. On March 22, 1977, he announced the expiration of terms of office on Members of Parliament.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Swaziland's Constitution, now abolished, had established the *Ngwenyama* as Chief of State. Executive authority was exercised by the Cabinet presided over by a Prime Minister (Head of Government) who was appointed by the King from the Members of Parliament.

The judiciary consists of a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and various subordinate and traditional courts. Members of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Justice of the High Court are appointed by the King with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

For local administration, Swaziland is divided into four Districts, whose Commissioners are appointed by the central government. Manzini and Mbabane have municipal governments.

In September 1973 the King announced the formation of a Royal Constitutional Commission to travel throughout Swaziland and consult the Swazi preparatory to writing a new Constitution more in keeping with Swazi traditions. In the meantime, opposition political parties, meetings, and demonstrations are banned, and the 75-year-old monarch rules the country as King-in-Council, with advice from the former Cabinet and the traditional Swazi National Council.

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State—King Sobhuza II

Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Police—Col. Maphevu Dlamini

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Immigration; Information and Broadcasting; Labor—A. Zonke Khumalo

Other Ministers

Agriculture—Abednigo K. Hlophe

Commerce and Cooperatives—Prince Mfanasibili Dlamini

Minister of Health and Education—Dr. P.S.P. Dlamini

Finance—Robert P. Stephens

Industry, Mines, Tourism—Dr. Simon Sishayi Nxumalo

Justice—Polycarp L. Dlamini

Local Administration—Prince Masitsela Dlamini

Works, Power, and Communications—Dr. Allen Nxumalo

Minister of State for Establishments and Training—H.K. Dlamini

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—Stephen M. Matsebula

Minister of State for Health and Education—Elias D. Dladlah

Ambassador to the U.S.—S.M. Kunene
Ambassador to the U.N.—Norman M. Malinga

Swaziland maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at Suite 441, Van Ness Center, 4301 Connecticut Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (202-362-6683). Swaziland's Mission to the U.N. is at 866 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

ECONOMY

Swaziland ranks among the more prosperous new countries in Africa. Most of the high-level economic activity, however, is in the hands of non-Africans. Although some 75 percent of the Swazi are supported by subsistence farming, the number working at skilled or unskilled jobs in the industrial sector is increasing steadily, and a growing percentage of the labor force is employed for wages.

About 57 percent of the land is held by the *Ngwenyama* in trust for the Swazi nation. The remaining 43 percent is privately owned, much of it by nonresidents. The question of land use and ownership is a political problem.

Cattle are the main evidence of Swazi wealth; although they have always been valued for their own sake, they increasingly are being used for milk, meat, and profit. Beef, hides, and skins are important export items. Dairying is increasing in importance.

The South African-owned Anglo-American Corporation's iron mine at Ngwenya necessitated the Swaziland railway, which crosses the country from east to west and is a vital transportation link to the rest of the world via the port of Maputo, Mozambique.

The sugar industry, centered on two mills, is the leading export earner. Based solely on irrigated cane, it has transformed large parts of the lowveld that were formerly bush. Other important agricultural activities are extensive pine plantations, which supply a pulp mill, and pineapple and citrus farms, which feed a processing and canning factory.

Formerly the leading export, asbestos mined at Havelock is now fourth in importance. There is some coal, exported to Kenya and Mozambique, and used by Swaziland railroad locomotives. Tin, barites, diaspore, pyrophyllite, and kaolin are also mined in small quantities.

In recent years a number of small-scale secondary industries have been established, many of them in the two new industrial estates at Matsapa, near Manzini, and at Nhlangano, in the south. In addition to processed agricultural and forestry products, the fast-growing industrial sector also manufactures machinery and transport equipment, iron pipe fittings, structural steel parts, plastic containers, cardboard packaging, furniture, beer, liqueurs, soft drinks, candles, paint, resins, fertilizers, insecticides and other chemicals, and knitted and woven clothing.

The National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland has played an important role in bringing these industries to the country. The government has also encouraged Swazi entrepreneurship through the establishment of small-scale industries and businesses. The Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO), assisted by the U.N. Development Program, has aided in the creation of many new small firms owned and managed by local Swazi businessmen.

Tourism is a new and growing industry. The country's beautiful scenery and well-developed tourist facilities attract more than 250,000 visitors annually. New hotels and other facilities are planned.

Swaziland has consistently maintained a favorable balance of trade and is one of the few net earners of foreign exchange in southern Africa. The United States bought more than 40,000 metric tons of sugar from Swaziland in 1976, as well as small amounts of canned fruit, asbestos, and textile fabrics. Although official statistics show more than 90 percent of Swaziland's imports coming from South Africa, only about half actually originate there.

Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana are joined with the Republic of South Africa in a customs union. Import duties apply uniformly to the member countries. Swaziland, Lesotho, and South Africa are also joined in an informal currency union. A formal agreement governing currency controls and monetary affairs among the three countries was signed by South Africa in December 1974. The South African *rand* remains legal tender in the three countries but Lesotho and Swaziland are permitted to issue their own currencies, provided that they are fully backed by *rand* deposits. Swaziland issued its own currency, the *lilangeni*, in September 1974.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Swaziland continues to seek to expand its diplomatic relations with other states. Some 30 countries have accredited ambassadors to the kingdom, although only 4 have resident representatives. They are the Republic of China, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Swaziland maintains offices in Brussels, London, Maputo, Nairobi, New York (U.N.), and Washington.

Owing to its geographic position, Swaziland, like Botswana and Lesotho, has close economic links with South Africa. Over 29,000 Swazi laborers work in the mines, industries, and farms of that country. It continues to rely on South Africa as its largest supplier of essential goods and services and also as a customer for some export products. There is close contact between the governments at the working level, although there has been no exchange of diplomatic representatives.

U.S.-SWAZILAND RELATIONS

The United States seeks to maintain and strengthen the good relations that have existed between the United States and the Kingdom of Swaziland since independence in 1968. It admires and respects Swaziland's nonracial policy and wishes to encourage the continued economic and political development of Swaziland.

The United States has provided assistance in Swaziland's rural development areas program, a loan to make possible a credit system for small farmers, and personnel and equipment to improve the effectiveness of the country's small cooperatives. The United States has also assisted the

regional University of Botswana and Swaziland, as well as making contributions to Swazi educational curriculum development, health, and family planning programs. Some 125 Peace Corps volunteers work in Swaziland in a wide range of activities.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–Donald R. Norland (resident in Botswana)
Charge d'Affaires ad interim–James R. Wachob
Director, Office of Southern Africa Regional Activities Coordination–John Kean
Director, Peace Corps–John L. Harrison, Jr.

The U.S. Embassy in Swaziland is located in Embassy House, Allister Miller Street, P.O. Box 199, Mbabane.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8174, Revised April 1977
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977 O-210-847 (2389)

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 50 cents (single copy). Subscription price: $23.10 per year; $5.80 additional for foreign mailing

APPENDIX RR
TANZANIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, November 1976 (Publication 8097)]

background notes

Tanzania

department of state • november 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: United Republic of Tanzania

GEOGRAPHY

The United Republic of Tanzania is comprised of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Tanganyika, now often referred to as mainland Tanzania, is located on the east coast of Africa between the great lakes of the central part of the continent—Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Nyasa—and the Indian Ocean. Of its total area, more than 23,000 square miles (59,547 sq. m.) consist of inland water, including nearly half of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika.

Climatically, the mainland may be divided into four areas: (1) the hot and humid coastal plains, (2) the hot, arid zone of the central plateau, (3) the high, moist lake regions, and (4) the temperate highland areas. The highest point in Tanzania—as well as in Africa—is Mt. Kilimanjaro, located along the Kenya border, which rises 19,340 feet (5,879 m.) above sea level. Almost two-thirds of the country has virtually no agriculture because of tsetse fly infestation and lack of water. Most of the arable land is in the northern and southern highlands, along the coast, and in the western lake region.

Zanzibar, located about 20 miles (32 km.) off the coast, has an area of 640 square miles (1,656 sq. km). Pemba, lying 25 miles (40 km.) northeast of Zanzibar, has an area of 380 square miles (983 sq. km.).

The climate of much of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is governed by two monsoons. The northeast monsoon from December to March brings the hottest temperatures of the year; when the winds shift to the south from March through May, they bring heavy intermittent rains. The southwest monsoon extends from June through September bringing relatively cool weather. Light showers can be expected in November and December.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: *Mainland*—363,950 sq. mi. (942,623 sq. km.), slightly smaller than N. Mex. and Tex. combined; *Zanzibar*—640 sq. mi. (1,658 sq. km.). CAPITAL: Dar es Salaam (pop. 500,000). OTHER CITIES: Dodoma (future capital, 35,000), Zanzibar Town (80,000), Tanga (60,000), Mwanza (35,000).

People

POPULATION: 15 million (mainland), Zanzibar (400,000, 1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7% (1975). DENSITY: 44 per sq. mi. (16 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Over 130. RELIGIONS: Christian 35%, Moslem 35%, animist 30%. LANGUAGES: Swahili, English. LITERACY: 40-50%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 45 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: Tanganyika, 1961; Zanzibar, 1963—Union, 1964. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1965.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State, Commander in Chief), First Vice President (also Chairman of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council), Second Vice President (Prime Minister). *Legislative*—unicameral National Assembly (parliament). *Judicial*—Mainland: High Court, District Courts, Primary Courts; Zanzibar: People's Courts (no appeal).

POLITICAL PARTIES: *Mainland*—Tanganyika African National Union (TANU); *Zanzibar*—Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18.

ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 25 Regions (20 on mainland, 5 on Zanzibar).

FLAG: Diagonal black band edged with yellow, from lower left to upper right; field at upper left is green, at lower right, blue.

Economy

GDP: $2.3 billion (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 4.5% (constant 1966 prices). PER CAPITA INCOME: $155. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: na.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 15%. *Labor* 90%. *Products*—sugar, maize, rice, wheat, cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew nuts, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum, cloves.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 15%. *Products*—textiles, agricultural processing, light manufacturing, refined oil, cement.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Hydroelectric potential, unexploited iron and coal, dwindling gem stone and gold mines.

TRADE: *Exports*—$387 million (1975 f.o.b.): cotton, coffee, petroleum products, sisal, diamonds, cloves, coconuts. *Partners*—East African community (EAC), UK, India, Zambia, China. *Imports*—$797 million (1975 c.i.f.): manufactured goods, textiles, machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, tobacco. *Partners*—EAC, UK, Fed. Rep. of Germany, China, US.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Tanzanian shillings 8.40=US$1.

US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: $175 million (since 1960).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several specialized agencies, EAC, OAU, Commonwealth.

PEOPLE

Population distribution is extremely uneven. Density varies from three persons per square mile in arid



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areas to 133 per square mile in the well-watered highlands of the mainland and 347 per square mile on Zanzibar. More than 90 percent of the total population is rural. Dar es Salaam is the capital and largest city. Dodoma, located in the center of Tanzania, has been designated to become the new capital within 10 years.

The African population consists of more than 130 ethnic groups, only one of which (the Sukuma) exceeds 1 million members. The majority of Tanzanians, including such large tribes as the Sukuma and the Nyamwezi, are of Bantu stock. Groups of Nilotic or related origin include the nomadic Masai and the Luo, both of which are found in greater numbers in neighboring Kenya. There are two small groups that speak languages of the Khoisan family peculiar to the Bushmen and Hottentot peoples. There are also a few pockets of Cushitic-speaking peoples originally from the Ethiopian highlands who now reside in Tanzania.

Although much of Zanzibar's African population came from the mainland, one group known as Shirazis traces its origins to the island's early Persian settlers. The non-Africans residing on the mainland and Zanzibar—approximately 1 percent of the total—include an estimated 70,000 Indo-Pakistanis, 70,000 Arabs, and 10,000 Europeans.

All ethnic groups have their own language, but the national language is Swahili, a Bantu-based tongue with strong Arabic borrowings.

HISTORY

Tanganyika

Northern Tanganyika's famed Olduvai Gorge has provided rich evidence of the area's prehistory, including some of the oldest known fossil remains of man's early ancestors. The discoveries made by Dr. and Mrs. L.S.B. Leakey suggest that East Africa rather than Asia may have been the cradle of early man.

Little is as yet known of the history of Tanganyika's interior during the early centuries of the Christian era. The area is believed to have been originally inhabited by ethnic groups using a click tongue similar to that of southern Africa's Bushmen and Hottentots. While remnants of these early tribes still exist, most were gradually displaced by Bantu agriculturalists migrating from the west and south and by Nilotes and related peoples coming from the north. A number of these groups had well-organized societies and controlled extensive areas by the time the Arab slavers and European explorers and missionaries penetrated the interior in the first half of the 19th century.

The coastal area, in contrast, first felt the impact of foreign influence as early as the 8th century, when monsoon winds brought the ships of Arab traders. By the 12th century traders and immigrants came from as far away as Persia (now Iran) and India. They built a series of highly developed city-trading states along the coast, the principal one being Kilwa, a settlement of Persian origin that held ascendancy until it was destroyed by the Portuguese in the early 1500's.

The Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama touched the East African coast in 1498 on his voyage to India. By 1506 the Portuguese claimed control over the entire coast. This control was nominal, however, for the Portuguese did not attempt to colonize the area or explore the interior. By the early 18th century, Arabs from Oman had assisted the indigenous coastal dwellers in driving out the Portuguese from the area north of the Ruvuma River. They established their own garrisons at Zanzibar, Pemba, and Kilwa and carried on a lucrative trade in slaves and ivory.

European exploration of Tanganyika's interior began in the mid-19th century. Two German missionaries reached Mt. Kilimanjaro in the 1840's. The British explorers, Richard Burton and John Speke, crossed the interior to Lake Tanganyika in 1857. David Lingstone, the Scottish missionary-explorer who crusaded against the slave trade, established his last mission at Ujiji, where he was subsequently "found" by Henry Stanley, an American journalist-explorer, in 1871.

German colonial interests were first advanced in 1884. Karl Peters, who formed the Society for German Colonization, concluded a series of treaties by which tribal chiefs in the interior accepted German protection. Prince Otto von Bismark's government backed Peters in the subsequent establishment of the German East Africa Company. In 1886 and 1890, the Anglo-German agreements that delineated the British and German spheres of influence in the interior of East Africa and along the coastal strip previously claimed by the Omani Sultan of Zanzibar were negotiated. In 1891 the German Government took over the direct administration of the territory from the German East Africa Company and appointed a governor with headquarters at Dar es Salaam.

Although the German colonial administration brought cash crops, railroads, and roads to Tanganyika, its harsh actions provoked African resistance, culminating in the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-07. The rebellion, which temporarily united a number of tribes in the southern part of the country and ended only after an estimated 120,000 Africans had died from fighting or starvation, is considered by Tanzanians today to have been one of the first stirrings of nationalism.

German colonial domination of Tanganyika ended with World War I. Control of most of the territory passed to the United Kingdom, under a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, Tanganyika became a U.N. trust territory also administered by the United Kingdom. In the following years Tanganyika moved gradually toward self-government and independence. In 1954 Julius K. Nyerere, a school teacher who was at the time one of two Tanganyikans to have been educated abroad at the university level, organized a political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU-supported candidates were victorious in the Legislative Council elections of September 1958 and February 1959. In December 1959 the United Kingdom agreed to the establishment of internal self-government following general elections to be held in August 1960. Nyerere was named Chief Minister of the government subsequently formed.

In May 1961 Tanganyika became autonomous, and Nyerere became Prime Minister under a new Constitution. Full independence was achieved on December 9, 1961. Mr. Nyerere was elected President when Tanganyika became a Republic within the Commonwealth of Nations one year after independence.

On April 26, 1964, Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania on October 29.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Tropical clothing is worn year round, although in the cooler season (June-September) a light wrap is useful in the evenings. High fashion or trendy clothing (e.g., bell bottoms) is not favored in Tanzania. Extremely short, low-cut dresses or tight fitting clothing should not be worn.

Customs—Visas are required, as are immunizations against smallpox and yellow fever.

Health—Community sanitation controls are fairly well-enforced. Water should be boiled and filtered, and fruits and vegetables well-prepared.

Telecommunications—Radiotelephone and cable services are available to the U.K., U.S., and other parts of the world.

Transportation—Air service to Dar es Salaam is provided from New York via connections. Taxis are available at certain locations 24 hours a day; agree on the fare in advance. Buses are generally overcrowded. Traffic moves on the left.

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the type of work published on Tanzania. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Zanzibar

An early Arab/Persian trading center, Zanzibar fell under Portuguese domination in the 16th and 17th centuries but was retaken by Omani Arabs in the early 18th century. The height of Arab rule came during the reign of Sultan Seyyid Said (1804-56). He encouraged the development of clove plantations, using the forced labor of the island's African population. Zanzibar also became the base for the Arab slavers whose raids depopulated much of the Tanganyikan interior. By 1840 Said had transferred his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar and firmly established a ruling Arab elite. The island's commerce fell increasingly into the hands of traders from the Indian subcontinent who were encouraged by Said to settle on the island.

Zanzibar's spices attracted ships from as far away as the United States. A U.S. consulate was established on the island in 1837. The United Kingdom's early interest in Zanzibar was motivated by commerce and British determination to end the slave trade. In 1822 the British signed the first of a series of treaties with Sultan Said to curb this trade, but it was not until 1876 that the sale of slaves was finally fully prohibited.

In carrying out its policies, the United Kingdom gained a paramountcy that was formally recognized in the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, which made Zanzibar and Pemba a British protectorate. British rule through the Sultan remained largely unchanged from the late 19th century until after World War II.

Zanzibar's political development began in earnest after 1956, when provision was first made for the election of six nongovernment members to the Legislative Council. Two parties were formed: the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), representing the dominant Arab and Arabized minority, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), led by Shaikh Abeid Karume and representing the Shirazis and the more numerous Africans.

In the first elections (July 1957) the ASP won three of the six elected seats, with the remainder going to independents. The ZNP polled only a small percentage of the total votes. Four Arabs and two Asians were appointed to the government seats on the Legislative Council. Following the election, the ASP split; some of its Shirazi supporters left to form the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). The January 1961 election resulted in a deadlock between the ASP and a ZNP/ZPPP coalition.

The elections that followed the granting of self-government in June 1963 produced similar results. Zanzibar received its independence from the United Kingdom on December 19, 1963, as a constitutional monarchy under the Sultan. On January 12, 1964, the African majority revolted against the Sultan, and a new government was formed, with the Afro-Shirazi party leader, Shaikh Karume, as President of Zanzibar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Under the terms of its political union with Tanganyika in April 1964, the Zanzibar Government retained considerable local autonomy.

Shaikh Karume was named First Vice President of the union government, a post he held until his assassination in a coup attempt in April 1972. The coup failed to overthrow the Zanzibar Government. Karume was succeeded by a fellow member of the Afro-Shirazi Party and of the Revolutionary Council, Aboud Jumbe.

GOVERNMENT

Tanzania is a *de jure* single-party state with a strong central executive. The President is assisted by two Vice Presidents, one of whom is also designated Prime Minister. The President of Zanzibar has traditionally been the First Vice President of Tanzania. The Second Vice President and Prime Minister carries an administrative portfolio and is the leader of government business in the National Assembly, from among whose members he must be chosen. The President and the National Assembly are elected concurrently by direct popular vote for 5-year terms. If the President dissolves the Assembly, he too must stand for election. The President must select his Cabinet from among the members of the National Assembly, but his power to appoint up to 10 members of that body gives him some flexibility.

The unicameral National Assembly has 219 members, 96 of whom are elected from mainland constituencies. Two candidates, both approved by the TANU Party, compete in each district. The remaining members are *ex officio*, appointed by the President, or coopted by the Assembly from candi-

dates proposed by national institutions and regional development councils. Fifty-seven members, none elected, are from Zanzibar. The Assembly is the legislature for Zanzibar only in matters specifically designated as Union matters.

Mainland Tanzania has had, since 1964, a 3-tiered judiciary which combines the jurisdictions of tribal, Islamic, and British common law. Appeal is from the primary courts through the district courts to the High Court. All magistrates and judges, including the Chief Justice and eight puisne judges of the High Court, are appointed by the President. Zanzibar had a similar system until January 1970, when it replaced the primary and district courts with 12 people's courts consisting of a chairman and two members appointed by the President of Zanzibar. The procedures of the people's courts do not provide for defense counsel, juries, or appeal to the High Court.

For administrative purposes, Tanzania is divided into 25 Regions—20 on the mainland and 5 on Zanzibar. The mainland Regions are further divided into 96 Districts. There are no longer any municipal governments, but most major towns have been designated as Districts. Each Region is headed by an appointed Regional Commissioner, who on the mainland is also the TANU Party Regional Secretary, and is an *ex officio* member of the National Assembly. In the Districts, the District TANU Party Secretary is also the Area Commissioner. The Regional and District Commissioners are assisted by appointed Development Directors and other officials, who form a development council charged with administering the Region or District in close collaboration with TANU Party officials. Since 1972 a decentralization program on the mainland has increased the authority of the Regional Commissioners.

Principal Government Officials

President—Julius K. Nyerere
First Vice President—Aboud Jumbe
Second Vice President; Prime Minister—Rashidi M. Kawawa

Cabinet Ministers

Agriculture—John W.S. Malecela
Communications and Transport—Alfred Tandau
Defense and National Service—Edward Moringe Sokoine
Finance and Planning—Amir Jamal
Foreign Affairs—Ibrahim Mohamed Kaduma
Health—Dr. Leader Stirling
Home Affairs—Ali Hassan Mwinyi
Industries—Cleopa Msuya
Information and Broadcasting—Daudi Mwakawago
Justice—Ms. Julie Manning
Labor and Social Welfare—Crispin Tungaraza
Land, Housing, and Urban Development—Ms. Tabitha Siwale
Manpower Development—Nicholas Alfred Kuhanga
National Culture and Youth—Mirisho Sarakikya
National Education—Isael Elinawinga
Natural Resources and Tourism—Soloman A. Ole Saibul
Trade—Alphonce Marianus Rulegura
Water, Energy, and Minerals—Wilbert Chagula
Works—Louis A. Sazia

Ambassador to the U.S.—Paul Bomani
Ambassador to the U.N.—Salim Ahmed Salim

Tanzania maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2010 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20036 (tel. 202-872-1005).

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The locus of political power in mainland Tanzania lies within the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the dominant political organization since before independence. Constitutionally recognized as the only political party of the state, it is also the primary instigator of policy in the social, political, and economic fields. TANU functions as the bridge between the government and the people, provides nearly all top government leaders, and plays a leading role in the government scheme of nation-building. President Nyerere is president of TANU, and the party's control structure is closely interwoven with that of the government. Regional and district commissioners also serve as regional and district secretaries of the party.

Zanzibar has a separate but similarly overlapping government and party hierarchy. The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) has been the single legally recognized political party on the island since the revolution in 1964. The President of the Zanzibar executive branch is also Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (the island's powerful self-appointed legislative body), President of the ASP, as well as First Vice President of Tanzania. Within the last year, discussions on the merger of the ASP and TANU have reached an advanced stage of amalgamation, and the two parties are expected to unite soon.

Under President Nyerere's leadership, Tanzania is seeking to achieve political and economic development within an egalitarian framework appropriate to the rural character and African traditions of its people. In 1962 Nyerere used the Swahili word *ujamaa* ("familyhood") to describe the type of communal cooperation his government seeks to foster.

Tanzanian goals were set forth in more conventional Socialist terms in the TANU constitution and reaffirmed in February 1967 in a party document known as the Arusha Declaration. The latter requested the government to consolidate its control over the means of production, prepare development plans that Tanzania could carry out without being heavily dependent on foreign assistance, and place greater emphasis on improving the living standard of the rural community.

To insure consistency between precept and practice, the declaration prescribed a code of conduct for party and government leaders, which prohibited, among other things, the receipt of more than one salary, holding directorships in private firms, or owning rental properties or shares in any company. Ministerial and civil service salaries had been reduced earlier in a move toward the more equitable distribution of income.

Shortly after the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere announced the full or partial nationalization (with compensation) of a variety of private interests, including all commercial banks, a number of food processing, manufacturing, and trading firms, and some of Tanzania's leading sisal estates. On the third anniversary of the declaration, the President nationalized Tanzania's privately owned, English-

language newspaper and began transferring the remaining private import-export firms and all wholesale businesses to the public sector. In 1971 the government nationalized all rental property valued at more than US$14,000. On Zanzibar, which moved more rapidly toward public ownership, government control of the commercial sector is virtually complete, while production in agriculture and fishing remain largely in private hands.

TANU has become the principal instrument for the political mobilization of mainland Tanzania's people behind the government's socioeconomic objectives. President Nyerere envisions the party as a "two-way street" for the flow of ideas and policy directives between the village level and the government. Local TANU officials are expected to take the lead in setting up *ujamaa* villages—communal units which the government hopes will eventually become the backbone of Tanzanian agriculture. Cooperatives, which have tripled since independence and now exceed 2,000, are also being given an expanded role in Tanzania's rural development. The country's education system is being revamped to provide the many primary schoolchildren who are unable to go on with their education with the basic agricultural training needed to make them productive citizens.

Public participation in mainland Tanzania's political development has also been encouraged through the electoral process. The last general elections were held in October 1975, and all but 4 of the 96 elective constituencies were contested by two TANU candidates. Twenty-two incumbents, including one Minister, were defeated, and others dropped out during the nomination process. President Nyerere, nominated jointly by the TANU and ASP Parties, was endorsed by 93 percent of the 4.5 million voters who went to the polls. Zanzibar participated in the presidential referendum but has had no election for its own representatives since the 1964 revolution.

In 1975 the Constitution was amended to make the TANU Party the supreme policymaking authority for the mainland. In 1976 negotiations between the ASP and TANU, looking toward the merger of the two parties, were begun.

ECONOMY

Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of the mainland's gross domestic product (GDP) and 75 percent of its total exports. Three crops—cotton, coffee, and sisal—represent 40 percent of all exports. The government has had some success in diversifying the country's agricultural base, which now includes cashew nuts, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum, and sugar. Livestock production is also expanding.

Tanzania's small manufacturing sector has had an impressive annual growth rate since independence but still produces only about 10 percent of the GDP. Tanzania has attracted relatively little foreign investment, despite its record of political stability. U.S. private investment has been limited primarily to petroleum marketing facilities, although a U.S. company has entered into minority partnership with the government to manufacture tires in northern Tanzania.

Transportation plays a particularly important role in a country the size of Tanzania, where the population centers are scattered around the periphery. The country currently has an estimated 21,000 miles (33,795 km.) of roads; about 4,000 miles (6,400 km.) are improved, and the remainder are dirt. There are 1,638 miles (2,636 km.) of railroads, excluding the 1,150 mile (1,850 km.) long TanZam railway.

Internal air transportation helps offset the shortage of ground transportation. A number of national carriers provide service to Dar es Salaam. A new international airport has been completed near Arusha to facilitate tourist access to northern Tanzania's famed game parks.

Following 1973, a year when foreign exchange reserves attained record levels, Tanzania's economy was staggered by the rapid rise in the cost of energy imports and a drought, which has required the government to initiate a substantial grain-import program. Consequently, Tanzania is confronted with a severe balance-of-payments problem. Declines in agricultural activity in recent years, quite apart from the drought, suggest that Tanzania may be entering a period of being a net importer of foodstuffs and, consequently, even more dependent on foreign assistance.

Elsewhere in the economy consumption continues to climb, and prospects are that it will continue to do so, because of a substantial boost in the minimum wage. The industrial sector, apart from those companies feeling the pinch of worldwide shortages of certain essential materials, had a sluggish year in 1975. The government's decentralization program has been completed and judged a success, but its communal agriculture program has yet to prove itself.

With the economy in the throes of a severe foreign exchange crisis, imports are being cut back sharply, including the market for U.S. products. These cutbacks are likely to restrict economic activity later in the year and be yet another constraint on economic growth. Long-term development projects, however, are assured of foreign assistance.

Foreign Assistance

Until 1965, the United Kingdom was Tanzania's principal aid donor, but this assistance decreased following the break in relations between the two countries over Southern Rhodesia in 1965. British assistance has not yet returned to its former level since the renewal of diplomatic relations in 1968. The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) gained primacy in the assistance field in 1970 with its $400 million loan to Tanzania and Zambia for the construction of a railroad between Dar es Salaam and Zambia's copperbelt. The two countries turned to the P.R.C. for assistance in this project after failing to obtain Western financial backing. Other major aid donors include the Scandinavian countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the United Nations, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Zanzibar

Zanzibar's economy is based primarily on cloves, which are the principal foreign exchange earner. Production of cloves (90 percent are grown on Pemba) fluctuates, but exports are kept relatively constant by drawing on stocks. Export earnings

have been high in recent years, resulting from a clove shortage that tripled world prices. Indonesia is Zanzibar's leading clove buyer.

Zanzibar has set a goal of reducing its dependence on cloves and has sought assistance in diversifying export crops and lessening its reliance on imported food. It still imports much of its staple requirements, as well as petroleum products and manufactured articles. Manufacturing on the island is limited to import substitution, such as cigarettes and shoes, and the processing of agricultural products. All industries are government-owned. The government took over the large estates owned before the revolution by Arabs and distributed the land in small plots to Africans.

East African Community

Tanzania is a partner with Kenya and Uganda in the East African Community (EAC). Established in December 1967, the EAC is the successor to the economic institutions inherited by the three countries from the British colonial administration. These included a jointly operated railway and harbor administration, the East African Airways, and postal and telegraphic services. The EAC retained these services and also provided the framework for an East African common market involving not only Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda but eventually, it is hoped, neighboring countries as well.

In 1969 the EAC members signed an agreement with the Common Market providing preferential treatment for their exports to Europe in return for similar treatment for selected Common Market products.

The EAC is headed by a triumvirate consisting of the President of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, who form the East African Authority (EAA), the chief policymaking body. With the establishment of the EAC, the portfolio of East African Minister was created for each country. The three Ministers are responsible for the day-to-day policy decisions of the EAC under the overall direction of the EAA. The treaty establishing the EAC sought to correct certain inequities in the earlier relationships of the three partners by decentralizing the common services headquarters—which had been at Nairobi, Kenya—and setting up an East African Development Bank to improve the region's industrial balance, currently in Kenya's favor. Under the terms of the treaty, a member state can impose a transfer tax on the products of another member with which it has a trade deficit. Tanzania and Uganda are the principal beneficiaries of this provision. The new EAC headquarters is at Arusha, Tanzania.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In common with many independent African nations, Tanzania bases its foreign policy on the concept of nonalignment with any major power bloc. President Nyerere is one of Africa's more active nonaligned leaders. He defines nonalignment as the right of small nations to determine their own policies in their own interests and to have an influence in world affairs which accords with the right of all peoples to live equally. He believes that all peoples have the right to freedom and self-determination and opposes colonialism and international domination of one people by another.

Tanzania cooperates with Uganda in the context of the EAC. Relations with Kenya are good, and Tanzania enjoys particularly close ties with neighboring Zambia and Mozambique. Tanzania firmly supports the principles of majority rule and self-determination for Africans in the southern portions of the continent. It therefore has no relations with the white minority governments in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.

U.S.-TANZANIA RELATIONS

The United States enjoys friendly bilateral relations with the United Republic of Tanzania. In addition to furthering the spirit of respect and cooperation that exists between the two countries, the United States seeks to assist Tanzania's economic and social development through bilateral and regional programs administered by the Agency for International Development (AID). U.S. bilateral assistance, which in the past has involved such areas as education, public administration, and agriculture, is focusing increasingly on the important area of agricultural production through new agricultural credit and livestock and seed multiplication programs.

Total U.S. bilateral aid to Tanzania for fiscal year 1976, including loans, grants, and Public Law 480 funds (Food for Peace), amounted to $8.8 million.

Under a regional program, the United States has helped the Tanzanian Government reconstruct and pave more than 250 miles (402 km.) of the highway that serves southwestern Tanzania and landlocked Zambia.

The United States Information Service (USIS) maintains a library at Dar es Salaam. Until its phaseout in 1968-69, Tanzania was host to one of the earliest Peace Corps projects in Africa.

An estimated 1,450 U.S. citizens, many of whom are missionaries and their families, reside in Tanzania, and increasing numbers of American tourists visit Tanzania's game parks.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—James W. Spain
Deputy Chief of Mission—Herbert Levin
Director, U.S. AID Mission—Vernon C. Johnson
Public Affairs Officer (USIA)—Frederic Mabbatt III
Consul, Zanzibar—David Halsted

The U.S. Embassy in Tanzania is located in the National Bank of Commerce Bldg., City Drive, Dar es Salaam. The Consulate is at 83 A Tuzungumzeni Square, Zanzibar.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8097, Revised November 1976

APPENDIX SS
TOGO
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washingon, Department of State, January 1976 (Publication 8325)]

background notes

department of state * january 1976

Togo

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Togo

GEOGRAPHY

Togo, in West Africa, is bounded by the Gulf of Guinea on the south, Ghana on the west, Upper Volta on the north, and Benin on the east. It stretches 360 miles north from the gulf and is only 100 miles wide at the broadest point.

The country consists primarily of two savanna plains regions separated by a southwest-northeast range of hills (the Chaine du Togo).

Togo's climate is tropical. The south is humid with temperatures ranging between 70°F and 80°F. The coastal belt is exceptionally dry. Humidity is less severe in the north but temperature fluctuations are greater—from 65°F to more than 100°F.

PEOPLE

Population distribution is very uneven due to soil and terrain variations. Togo has 18 major ethnic groups. The tribal groups of the coastal region, particularly the 140,000 Ewes, are culturally dominant, although they are a distinct minority. The major northern tribe in the Kabyè, numbering about 210,000, who live on land too poor to support its inhabitants adequately. The Kabyè traditionally have emigrated from their home area in the Lama-Kara region to seek employment, including military service. The southern Ewe and Mina tribes have more representation in public administration and commercial activities.

Most of the coastal peoples use the Ewe language and many have cultures similar to that of the Ewes. French is the official language and is used in commerce, government, and public schools.

HISTORY

The Ewes moved into the area which is now Togo from the Niger River Valley between the 12th and 14th centuries. During the 15th and 16th centuries Portuguese explorers and traders visited the coast. For the next 200 years the coastal region was a major raiding center for Europeans in search of slaves, earning Togo and the surrounding region the name "The Slave Coast."

In 1884 Germany declared a protectorate over a stretch of territory along the coast. The Germans extended their control inland and worked energetically developing the economic and social infrastructure. Because it became Germany's only self-supporting colony, Togoland was

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 21,853 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than W. Va.). CAPITAL: Lomé (pop. 130,000).

People

POPULATION: 2.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7% (1966-72). DENSITY: 93 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Ewe, Mina, Kabyè. RELIGIONS: 75% animist, 20% Christian, 5% Muslim. LANGUAGES: French (official), local. LITERACY: 10% est. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 40 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: April 27, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Suspended.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State, head of sole political party). *Legislative*—disbanded. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Rassemblement de Peuple Togolias (RPT). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 21 circumscriptions.

FLAG: Alternating horizontal green (3) and yellow (2) stripes with a white star on a red field in the upper left corner.

Economy

GNP: $365 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 5-8%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $170. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 4-5%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 96%. *Labor* 78%. *Products*—yams, manioc, millet, sorghum, cocoa, coffee, rice.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 22%. *Products*—phosphates, textiles, agricultural products.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Phosphates, limestone.

TRADE: *Exports*—$80.5 million (1972): phosphates, cocoa, coffee. *Imports*—$115.2 million (1972): consumer goods, fuels, machinery, foodstuffs. *Partners*—France, UK, FRG, Netherlands, PRC.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Approx. 220 CFA francs=US$1 (floats with French franc).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$172 million (1966-73). *U.S. only*—$23 million (1946-74).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM).



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known as their model possession. In 1914 it was invaded by French and British forces from Dahomey (now Benin) and the Gold Coast and fell after a brief resistance. Following the war, Togoland became a League of Nations mandate, divided between France and the United Kingdom for administrative purposes.

After World War II the mandates became U.N. trust territories and continued to be administered by the U.K. and France. During the mandate and trusteeship periods, western Togo was administered as part of the British Gold Coast, and French Togo was given its own governmental structure.

On October 28, 1956, the inhabitants of French Togo voted in a plebiscite to become an autonomous republic within the French Union. The arguments of the French Government notwithstanding, the United Nations refused to end the trusteeship status of the territory at that time because, although the new Republic of Togo had internal autonomy, control of defense, foreign affairs, and currency remained a responsibility of France. In 1957 the residents of British Togoland voted to join the Gold Coast and neighboring British-administered territories in becoming the new independent nation of Ghana.

On April 27, 1960, in a notably smooth transition marked by a spirit of goodwill, Togo severed its juridical ties with France, shed its U.N. trusteeship status, and emerged fully independent.

Nicholas Grunitzky had become Prime Minister of the autonomous Togolese Republic on September 10, 1956. He was defeated in the 1958 election, which brought Sylvanus Olympio to power. Grunitzky was unable to run again for the Assembly in 1961 because his party was disqualified from competing in the elections of April 9. Olympio's *Unité Togolaise* (UT) party won 90 percent of the vote and all 51 Assembly seats. Grunitzky went into exile after the 1961 elections but returned on January 15, 1963, 2 days after the assassination of President Olympio, to head the provisional government with the title of Prime Minister. On May 5, 1963, the Togolese adopted a new constitution, chose deputies from all political parties to the National Assembly, and elected Nicholas Grunitzky President and Antoine Meatchi Vice President. Nine days later, President Grunitzky announced the formation of a government in which all parties were represented.

The Grunitzky government became increasingly plagued by insecurity. On November 21, 1966, there was an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Grunitzky, inspired principally by civilian political rivals in the UT party. An uneasy period that followed ended on January 13, 1967, with the ouster of Grunitzky by then-Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema (now Gen. Gnassingbe Eyadema) in a military coup d'etat. The Committee of National Reconciliation ruled the country until April 14 when Col. Eyadema assumed the office of President. His mandate was affirmed in 1971, when he was reelected President without opposition.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The present Togolese Government rules by decree and ordinance. It is a highly centralized system, and all cabinet ministers are appointed by the President. There is no legislative branch.

The Togolese judicial system is modeled on the French pattern. The highest review court is the Supreme Court, headed by a presidential appointee. For administrative purposes, Togo is divided into 21 circumscriptions, each having a director appointed by the President.

Before January 1962, there were four principal political parties in Togo: (1) the leftist *Juvente* (Togolese Youth Movement); (2) the *Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises* (UDPT); (3) the *Parti Togolais du Progrès* (PTP), founded by Mr. Grunitzky but having only limited support; and (4) the *Unité Togolaise* (UT), the party of former President Olympio. In January 1962 President Olympio dissolved the opposition parties. There was and is no legal Communist party organization in the country.

When President Eyadema assumed control, political parties were prohibited and all constitutional processes were suspended. With a mixed civilian and military cabinet, President Eyadema embarked on an ambitious program to unify Togo, which was split by party disputes, and to promote economic development.

The country took a step toward resuming party rule in late 1969, when a single national political party, the Assembly of the Togolese People (RPT) was formed. President Eyadema was elected National President of the party on November 29, 1969. The RPT has the support of many of the leaders of the former political parties, and all ministers have been integrated within the party. Since 1969 the party has taken control of women's, youth, and labor groups by creating party organs to replace or supervise existing groups.

Principal Government Officials

President; Minister of National Defense–Gen. Gnassingbe Eyadema

Ministers

Interior–Yao Kunale Eklo
Foreign Affairs–Ayi Houenou Hunlede
Health and Social Affairs–Col. Manveyinoyu Alidou Djafalo
Plan, Commerce, Industry and Transport–Koudjolou Dogo
Justice–Nanamale Gbegbeni
Information, Press, Radio, TV, Posts and Telecommunications–Kwaovi Benyi Johnson
Finance and Economy–Edem Kodjo
Ambassador to the U.S.–Messanvi Kokou Kekeh
Ambassador to the U.N.–Dabra Togbe

Togo maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2208 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

ECONOMY

Subsistence agriculture is the dominant economic activity in Togo, with most Togolese participating only marginally in the cash economy. Cocoa and coffee, the only significant export crops, are grown in the southern rain forests. New crops and techniques are expected to expand agricultural production and increase productivity. The process will be gradual; no radical improvement can be expected in the living standards of Togo's farmers.

Import substitution has prompted some capital investment in manufacturing, textiles, beverages, etc. However, the limited market and sparse local resources severely restrict the potential growth of Togolese industy. Aside from trade, the most significant nonagricultural economic activity is mining. Up to 2 million tons of phosphates are shipped each year from a large deposit and processing facility near the coast. Togo has substantial limestone deposits, and the government hopes to mobilize the financing required for a mammoth clinker plant, which would supply the needs not only of Togo but of other nearby nations. Offshore oil exploration has been unsuccessful. Construction of an oil refinery near the recently expanded port of Lomé has begun.

Foreign investment is now concentrated in the trade and service sectors. However, Togo is actively seeking more capital investment, particularly in industry, and is prepared to participate in joint ventures with foreign investors. There has been some American activity in oil exploration, and an American company is examining the feasibility of a pineapple and tomato paste cannery. American firms are also interested in proposals for a fertilizer project, a waste treatment system for Lomé, and a hydroelectric dam on the Mono River.

A substantial portion of Togo's trade with its neighbors is unrecorded, but imposition of tighter border controls by Ghana since 1972 has served to reduce this traffic. Togo has been a primary supporter of economic cooperation among west African states. Data for recorded exports and imports indicate that France is Togo's principal trading partner and other Common Market countries are both important suppliers and customers. U.S. exports to, and imports from, Togo are modest.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing–Bring warm-weather clothing and a light wrap.

Currency–The CFA (African Financial Community) franc is legal tender, and no ceiling is imposed on the number of CFA francs which may be brought into the country. The CFA franc is freely convertible into French francs. However, for conversion into US dollars, permission must be obtained from the government agency handling foreign exchange. Dollars and travelers checks can be exchanged in Lomé.

Customs–Americans must have visas, which may be obtained from French consular offices in countries where Togo does not have its own diplomatic mission. Ordinarily, when issued abroad, visas are valid for a maximum of 3 months. Inoculations against smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera are also required.

Health–Typhoid inoculations, although not required, are recommended. Avoid unwashed fruits and vegetables and water from the tap. Local medical services are limited.

Telecommunications–A radio-telephone system operates between Lomé, Europe, and the US; calls must be arranged in advance. Cable service is adequate. Both services are limited to certain hours during the day.

Transportation–Air travel is the best way to get to Lomé. This can be done from the US or Europe via Accra, Lagos, Abidjan, Cotonou, or Niamey. Uncertain road conditions or frontier difficulties complicate automobile transportation. Local transport facilities that are unscheduled are not recommended. Taxis are available.

Although the government budget was balanced from 1968 to 1971, a decline in business activity produced a deficit in 1972-73. Development expenditures have mostly been financed by foreign grants and the Togolese development budget, leaving Togo with a modest debt-service ratio. Following the nationalization of the phosphate mining company in 1974 and the sudden rise in the world price of phosphate, anticipated government revenues rose 88 percent between 1974 and 1975. A significant portion of these phosphate revenues was spent on development projects.

President Eyadema's government has improved Togo's infrastructure. Within recent years the country's highway network has been improved, the port expanded, an impressive public building program undertaken in Lomé, tourist facilities expanded, and a new university created. With some help from Peace Corps volunteers, many new rural schools and wells have been built.

Togo's principal sources of development assistance have been France, the European Development Fund, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and the World Bank. In 1972 it was announced that $46 million in assistance would be received from the P.R.C. There has been no statement of the terms or prospective uses of this aid. The volume of foreign assistance available to Togo has kept pace with feasible public investment opportunities. In 1974 it totaled $33 million.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although there are strong historic and cultural ties between Togo and Western Europe, Togo's foreign policy is nonaligned. In recent years Togo has sought a closer identification with the Third World. As a former trust territory, Togo takes a special interest in U.N. activities. Through its membership in the *Entente*, a regional grouping, Togo participates in several multinational development schemes.

Togo recognizes the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and both West and East German Governments. Togo broke relations with Israel in 1973. It maintains close relations with Nigeria. Although subject to occasional disturbance, relations between Togo and Ghana are friendly.

U.S.-TOGO RELATIONS

The United States and Togo have enjoyed excellent relations since Togolese independence. American activities in Togo include an 85-member Peace Corps contingent, a Regional Road Maintenance Training Center supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, a Public Law 480 Title II program, and a self-help program. There is an active cultural exchange program, and several private American institutions are assisting Togo's new university.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Nancy V. Rawls
Deputy Chief of Mission—William Young
Director, Peace Corps—Robert Iglehart
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—David G. Smith

The U.S. Embassy is located at Rue Pelletier and Rue Victor Hugo, Lomé. The mailing address is B.P. 852, Lomé, Togo.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8325, Revised January 1976

APPENDIX UU
TUNISIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, November 1976 (Publication 8142)]

background notes

Tunisia

department of state * november 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Tunisia

GEOGRAPHY

Situated on the northern coast of Africa, between Algeria and Libya, Tunisia has a 1,000-mile (1,600 km.) coastline on the Mediterranean.

Tunisia is subdivided by climate into a wooded, fertile northern area, which is the source of most of the country's agricultural production; the central coastal plains, which are noted for livestock grazing and olive groves; and a southern region, which borders the Sahara Desert and lacks sufficient rainfall to support more than grazing herds and seminomadic peoples. In the north and coastal regions, the rainy season lasts from December to March, and the summers are hot and dry.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY

Tunisia's population is concentrated along the coast and in the larger cities. Ethnic Tunisians are an admixture of Arab and Berber. Europeans and fewer than 1,000 U.S. citizens constitute less than 1 percent of the total population.

Tunisia's written history dates from the 12th century B.C., when Phoenician traders established permanent settlements, the most famous of which was the city of Carthage. After being occupied by the Romans, and during the fifth century A.D. by the Vandals, Tunisia was conquered in the seventh century by the Arabs and became a major center of western Islamic cultural and political power. The Turks invaded Tunisia in 1574. For three centuries the country paid nominal allegiance to Constantinople; in actuality, the local regime of the Bey of Tunis was largely autonomous through most of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and Barbary piracy flourished along the coast of Tunisia as well as in other parts of North Africa.

The vestiges of Turkish rule gave way to a French protectorate, established in 1881 during western Europe's period of colonial expansion.

As in other Arab countries, the first half of the 20th century was characterized by the rise of an Arab nationalist movement. The reformist Destour Party was succeeded by the Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party in 1934, and Habib Bourguiba became the recognized leader of Tunisia's drive for national autonomy. The process of decolonization was interrupted by World War II, when Tunisia, under Vichy French rule, was occupied by German and Italian forces. In 1942-43 it became the battleground for the final struggle between Allied and Axis forces in North Africa.

In March 1952, following the breakdown of renewed, postwar negotiations with France, Tunisian guerrilla

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 63,378 sq. mi. (164,149 sq. km., about the size of Ga.). CAPITAL: Tunis (pop. 1,000,000). OTHER CITIES: Sfax (171,000), Bizerte (104,000).

People

POPULATION: 6 million. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.3%. DENSITY: 94 per sq. mi. (36 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab, Berber. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), French. LITERACY: 55%. RELIGION: Islam 99%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 55 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: Mar. 20, 1956. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: June 1, 1959.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral National Assembly (popularly elected, 101 members). *Judicial*–Independent. Judges of the highest court are appointed by the President.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Destourian Socialist Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 18 Governorates.

FLAG: Red star in a red crescent in a white circle centered on a red background.

Economy

GDP: $4.4 billion. GROWTH RATE (in real terms): Approximately 7.5% annually since 1970. PER CAPITA INCOME: $750.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 47%. *Labor* 48%. *Products*–wheat, olives, citrus fruits, grapes, truck crops, and fish.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 20%. *Products*–crude oil, phosphates, olive oil, textiles, construction, etc.


NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, phosphates, iron ore, lead, zinc.

TRADE (1975): *Exports*–$880 million. *Products*–petroleum, phosphates, olive oil. *Partners*–France 19%, Italy 19%, U.S. 14%, Germany 13%, Libya 10%. *Imports*–$1.3 billion (f.o.b.). *Products*–semifinished goods, machinery and equipment, consumer goods, foodstuffs. *Partners*–France 36%, Italy 9%, Germany 7%, U.S. 6%.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Tunisian dinar=US$2.40.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Arab League, Organization of African Unity.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$2.2 billion. *U.S. only* (1956-76): $850 million.


Mediterranean Sea
Bizerte
Tabarqah
Mātir
Tūnis
Bājah
Jundūbah
Al Kāf
Makthar
Sūsah
Al Qayrawān
Al Qaşrayn
Algeria
Şafāqis
Juzur Qarqannah
Qafşah
Khalīj al Hammāmāt
Nābul
Pantelleria (Italy)
Gulf of Gabes
Tawzar
Qābis
Jazirat Jarbah
Causeway
Jarjis
Madaniyin
Zuwarah
Libya
Tunisia
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 50 100 Miles
0 50 100 Kilometers

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fighters stationed themselves in the hills, and France fought to restore control and order. In July 1954 France promised the Tunisians full internal autonomy.

France recognized Tunisian independence in a protocol signed on March 20, 1956. The protocol specified that Tunisia and France would negotiate new "interdependence" relations, particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defense. However, continued French military presence and Tunisian support of Algerian liberation blocked normalization. Tensions continued for the next few years over the scheduling of French withdrawal from the naval base at Bizerte, and in July 1961, bloody clashes between French and Tunisian forces took place. Resolution of the Bizerte issue led to the resumption of diplomatic relations in September 1962; however, with Tunisia's nationalization of all foreign-owned lands in 1964, relations again deteriorated. Not until 1968 did Tunisia and France begin to reestablish close cooperation.

On July 25, 1957, the Tunisian Constituent Assembly voted to abolish the titular monarchy and establish a republic. It named the Neo-Destour Party leader, Habib Bourguiba, President and drafted a Constitution which was promulgated on June 1, 1959. Tunisia held its first elections under the new Constitution on November 1. President Bourguiba was unopposed, and Assembly candidates, backed by the Neo-Destour Party and affiliated labor and professional groups, had only token opposition. In October 1964 the Neo-Destour Party was renamed the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD).

GOVERNMENT

The President (Chief of State and Head of Government) is elected to a 5-year term with unlimited reelection permitted. He is assisted by a Cabinet, which he appoints, headed by a Prime Minister. The President has full responsibility for determining national policy, and his bills have priority before the Assembly. He may legislate by decree when the Assembly is not in session. The Prime Minister, designated by the President, is responsible for executive policy and succeeds to the presidency in case of the President's death or disability. The 112-member unicameral National Assembly, elected concurrently with the President, meets biannually.

At the apex of the independent judiciary is the Court of Cassation, whose judges are appointed by the President. For administrative purposes, Tunisia is divided into 18 Governorates. Governors are Presidential appointees.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), which conducted the struggle for independence, continues to be the governing party of Tunisia. There are no opposition parties. The PSD has no rigid ideology, and members are expected to discuss issues with considerable freedom and to reflect public opinion. It also influences the major national organizations, such as those for labor and students. At this stage in Tunisian history, the PSD conceives its role as a catalyst and mobilizer for economic and social development. Women are permitted to vote. The tiny Communist Party was banned in 1963.

Under PSD leadership Tunisia has enjoyed prolonged political stability. There have been periodic disturbances at the university since the late 1960's, but Tunisia has been relatively free from internal strife and dissidence. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1964, 1969, and 1974. On each occasion, President Bourguiba was reelected by near-unanimous majorities, and in 1974 a constitutional amendment was passed making him President for Life.



TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing–Seasonal. Take items you would need in mid-Atlantic area (e.g., Washington, D.C.) during same season.

Customs and Currency–Firearms are carefully controlled, but there are no unusual customs restrictions. Tunisian dinars may not be imported or exported. Foreign currency, including dollars, may be imported; departing travelers can take out the amounts brought in and any other foreign currency certified to have been legally acquired in Tunisia.

Health–No particular hazards, but drinking tap water is not recommended at certain seasons in Tunis, and at all times in other regions. Adequate medical care is available.

Telecommunications–Telephone and telegraph services are available to all countries but are relatively expensive.

Transportation–Direct flights daily to Paris, Rome, Marseilles. Regular flights to other European cities and to North African countries. No direct flights to US. Car ferries cross Mediterranean to and from Italy and France. Local transportation within Tunisia is good, with a variety of means available.

ECONOMY

The Tunisian economy is divided into three sectors: state, cooperative, and private. Economic development is state-planned and given highest priority in government policy.

Progress in economic development has accelerated markedly in the past few years. In the early 1960's gross domestic product (GDP) rose 5.5 percent annually, but for a variety of reasons, it slowed to a 3 percent annual rate from 1965 through 1968. By 1971 the growth rate quickened under the stimulus of favorable agricultural conditions and government efforts to assist and encourage the private sector, and from 1973 to 1976 the GDP rose at an annual rate of about 7.5 percent in real terms.

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In the final year of Tunisia's 1973-76 development plan period, $1.3 billion, or 28 percent of planned 1976 GDP, is projected for investment. A new development plan for 1977-81 is being drafted. Total private and public investments in Tunisia are projected at nearly $10 billion for the period, tripling the investments for 1973-76.

Despite the pace of development, Tunisia continues to face difficult economic conditions, substantial unemployment, a balance-of-payments deficit, and an increasing foreign debt burden. The government is continuing to develop and implement new policies designed to encourage foreign investment and create new jobs.

Tunisia's primary industries include fertilizer and textile production and food processing. Olive oil is an important export, but agriculture in general suffers from water shortages in many parts of the country. Emphasis is given in the forthcoming 5-year plan to increasing production of sugar beets, livestock, and cereals in agriculture and to establishing industries to create new employment and to process domestic raw materials.

Oil from deposits discovered in 1964 takes care of domestic needs, and oil sales account for one-third of export revenues. Sales of phosphates, the only other natural resource, provide significant export earnings. However, tourism has become a major source of foreign exchange, with receipts totaling about $300 million from more than 1 million visitors to Tunisia in 1975.

Tunisia's leading trade partner is France, which received 19 percent of Tunisian exports and provided 36 percent of the country's imports in 1975. U.S. exports to Tunisia have risen slightly in recent years, but the U.S. share of the Tunisian market has declined relatively, from 10 percent in 1973 to 6.5 percent in 1975. Tunisia's exports to the United States rose sharply in value in the first half of 1976, principally because of U.S. demand for petroleum products.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Tunisia, a nonaligned nation, maintains friendly relations with both West and East. However, the government has placed particular emphasis on its relations with the West.

Tunisia has played an active diplomatic role in seeking a resolution of the problems in the Middle East. It has stressed the need for a resolution of the Palestinian problem as part of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement and, at the same time, has called for moderation on the part of other Arab governments.

Since January 1974, when a unity plan with Libya was annulled by Tunisia, relations with Libya have been strained. Libyan terrorists were arrested in Tunis in March 1976, producing a further deterioration of relations between the two countries. Some limited steps toward a rapprochement were taken in the late summer of 1976. Tunisia's relations with its other neighbor, Algeria, are civil.

U.S.-TUNISIA RELATIONS

The United States has maintained official representation in Tunis almost continually since the arrival of the first American Consul there in 1797. The first American treaty with Tunisia was signed in 1799.

Although the two governments are not linked by any security treaties, relations have been close and cordial since independence. U.S. executive support for President Bourguiba's regime has been paralleled by strong congressional support, as exemplified by a Senate resolution of August 3, 1976, Bourguiba's birthday, praising the Tunisian President for two decades of "wise and courageous leadership" and calling for the continuation of appropriate levels of U.S. economic and military assistance to Tunisia.

U.S. policy is to encourage Tunisia in its policy to make social and economic progress within a framework of political stability. American economic and technical assistance to Tunisia was first provided under a bilateral agreement signed on March 26, 1957. Direct bilateral assistance since that time has amounted to over $850 million, or about one-third of all foreign assistance received by Tunisia. Additional American assistance has been liberally provided over the post-independence era by several foundations, religious groups, universities, and philanthropic groups.

American private investment in Tunisia is over $80 million and is growing as American firms conduct oil explorations and as new industrial firms and banks are attracted by the favorable investment laws and climate.

The major components of U.S. assistance are the Agency for International Development (AID), the Peace Corps, and a small military assistance mission. Using Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) commodities, development loans, and technical assistance, AID is working with the Tunisian Government to: (1) modernize and expand agriculture in a number of projects, bringing in private capital from abroad wherever possible; (2) promote rural

development; (3) maintain and expand a successful family-planning program; (4) enhance health standards and nutrition levels; and (5) develop scientific and technological resources.

The Peace Corps has been active in Tunisia since 1961. The present contingent of about 100 volunteers has focused on rural development, vocational education, public health, and teaching English.

The military liaison office, established in 1967 and attached to the Embassy, is providing the Tunisian Armed Forces with training programs directed at improving Tunisia's self-defense capability and advising them on acquisition of equipment for defense. There are no U.S. military facilities in Tunisia.

Principal Government Officials

President—Habib Bourguiba
Prime Minister—Hedi Nouira
Minister for Foreign Affairs—Habib Chatty
Minister of Defense—Abdallah Farhat
Minister of Interior—Tahar Belkhodja
Minister of National Economy—Abdelaziz Lasram
Minister of National Economy—Abdelaziz Lasram
Minister of National Education—Mohamed Mzali
Ambassador to the U.S.—Ali Hedda
Ambassador to the U.N.—Mahmoud Mestiri

Tunisia maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2408 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. (202) 234-6644).

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Edward W. Mulcahy
Deputy Chief of Mission—Barrington King, Jr.
Director, U.S. AID Mission—Hermon S. Davis
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—William F. Gresham
Director, Peace Corps—Samir M. Zoghby

The U.S. Embassy in Tunisia is located at 144 Avenue de Liberté, Tunis (tel. 282-566).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8142, Revised November 1976

APPENDIX VV
UGANDA
BACKGROUND NOTES

[Washington, Department of State, March 1976 (Publication 7958)]

background notes

Uganda

department of state * march 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Uganda

GEOGRAPHY

Uganda lies astride the Equator in east central Africa. It is bounded on the east by Kenya, on the south by Tanzania and Rwanda, on the west by the Republic of Zaire, and on the north by Sudan. Water and swamp cover about 16,000 miles of Uganda's total land area.

Most of Uganda is on a plateau at about 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. The country has several important lakes, the largest of which is Lake Victoria, the source of the White Nile. The famous Mountains of the Moon (the Ruwenzori) form part of the border with Zaire. Here is the highest mountain in the country, Mt. Margherita, at 16,750 feet above sea level. Mt. Elgon, an isolated peak on the Kenya border, is more than 14,000 feet high. In addition to magnificent scenery, Uganda has three major National Parks abounding in wildlife—elephants, lions, rhinos, hippos, crocodiles, buffalos, many species of antelope, and a variety of birdlife.

Uganda's altitude moderates the tropical climate. Rainfall varies considerably within the country. The northeast has an arid climate with an average annual rainfall of less than 20 inches. The regions receiving the most rainfall are in the southwest and west where average precipitation is 50 inches or more. The seasons are not well defined, but there are normally two dry spells per year—one from Dec. to Feb., the other in June and July.

PEOPLE

The population is predominantly rural; density is highest in agricultural areas, particularly south of Lake Kyoga.

Africans of four racial groups—Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic—constitute most of the populace. Of the four, the Bantu are most numerous and include the Baganda, the largest single ethnic group, with more than one million members. The Iteso is the second largest group, followed by the Banyankore and the Basoga.

Until late 1972 some 45,000 Asians, mostly of Indian extraction and possessing British citizenship, were living in Uganda. They were engaged mainly in shopkeeping, industry, and the professions. As part of President Idi Amin's overall efforts to put the country's economy in the hands of the indigenous people, the Ugandan Government decreed the expulsion of all noncitizen Asians. Today less than 500 Asians remain.

There are about 3,500 Europeans, mainly British, and more than 3,000 Arabs in Uganda. About 73,000 refugees from Rwanda, 30,000 from

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 91,070 sq. mi. (almost the size of Oregon). CAPITAL: Kampala (pop. 331,900 in 1970). OTHER CITY: Jinja.

People

POPULATION: 11.7 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.4%. DENSITY: 120 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Bantu, Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic. RELIGIONS: 50% Christian, 6% Muslim, animist. LANGUAGES: English (official), Swahili (national), Luganda. LITERACY: 30%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 47 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic (military). INDEPENDENCE: Oct. 9, 1962. CONSTITUTION: Suspended.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President. *Legislative*—State Supreme Council and Cabinet advise President. *Judicial*—High Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: None. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 10 Provinces, 26 districts.

FLAG: Six horizontal stripes—black, yellow, red, black, yellow, red—with national emblem, the crested crane, in a central white circle. Black symbolizes Africa, yellow represents sunshine, red denotes brotherhood.

Economy

GDP: $1.1 billion (1972). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.2% (1972). PER CAPITA INCOME: $100. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: -1%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 30%. *Labor* 90%. *Products*—coffee, tea, cotton.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 4%. *Products*—processed agricultural goods, copper, cement, shoes, fertilizer, steel, beverages.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Copper, miscellaneous minerals.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*—$315 million ($67 million to US): coffee, cotton, copper, tea. *Imports*—$213 million ($8 million from US): petroleum products, machinery, transportation equipment. *Partners*—UK, US, Kenya, FRG, Japan, Eastern Europe.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 7.143 Uganda shillings=US$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED (1972): *Total*—$25 million. *US only*—$2 million.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, British Commonwealth, Organization of African Unity (OAU), East African Community (EAC).



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Sudan, and 34,000 from Zaire reside in the country. In addition, a significant number of nationals from neighboring Kenya live and work in Uganda. Some 300 Soviet technicians, mostly military, presently live in the country.

Luganda, the language of the Baganda people, is the vernacular most often heard around Kampala, but its use elsewhere is restricted to certain geographic areas. The official language, English, is commonly spoken, particularly among educated Ugandans. Swahili, now the national language, is scheduled to eventually become the country's official language, but it is not widely used at present.

HISTORY

Arab traders, moving inland from their enclaves along the east African coast, first reached the interior of Uganda in the 1830's. They were followed in the 1860's by British explorers searching for the headwaters of the Nile River. The first to reach Uganda and what was to become Lake Victoria was Capt. John Speke in 1862. Protestant missionaries entered the area by 1877, followed by Catholic missionaries in 1879. They found several African Kingdoms with well-developed political institutions dating back several centuries. In 1888 control of the nascent British sphere in east Africa was assigned by royal charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company, an arrangement strengthened in 1890 by an Anglo-German agreement confirming British dominance over Kenya and Uganda.

Religious animosities complicated by political rivalries led to martyrdom of a number of early African Christian

converts before the United Kingdom succeeded in exercising full control over the area. A major role in the conquest was played by an army captain who later became Lord Lugard, one of the United Kingdom's best-known colonial officials. The high cost of occupying the territory caused the Imperial British East Africa Company to withdraw in 1893, and its administrative functions were taken over by a British commissioner. In 1894 the local Kingdom of Buganda was placed under a formal British protectorate, which was extended in 1896 to cover most of what is now Uganda. There were subsequent minor boundary adjustments, including the transfer in 1902 of a part of the territory to what is now Kenya.

Constitutional changes leading to Uganda's independence began in 1955 with the establishment of a ministerial system of government, and an increase in the number of African members of the Legislative Council took place in 1958. Special reports on constitutional development preceded the convoking of the London Constitutional Conference of September 1961, which established the timetable for independence.

A major political problem in Uganda arose because under British rule the former Kingdom of Buganda had become somewhat more advanced economically and socially than other parts of the country. Buganda was fearful that its predominant role would be submerged in any type of independent state that did not provide safeguards for its traditional position. A temporary solution to the problem was achieved through the 1962 independence constitution which created a special federal relationship between Buganda and the national government. Under it Buganda retained much autonomy and many of its traditional prerogatives. The smaller Kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole had a somewhat similar relationship with the central government.

The United Kingdom granted full internal self-government on March 1, 1962. National elections were held in April 1962. Dr. A. Milton Obote's party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), won the largest number of parliamentary seats, although not an absolute majority. Dr. Obote became Prime Minister and formed a cabinet in coalition with the Buganda traditionalists Kabaka Yekka (KY) Party.

Under this coalition government, the independence constitution was amended in September 1963 to allow for the election by Parliament of a President and Vice President. While remaining within the Commonwealth of Nations, Uganda's new President replaced Queen Elizabeth II as Chief of State. Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa II, hereditary King (Kabaka) of Buganda, was elected President of Uganda.

In succeeding years, the UPC-KY coalition deteriorated, and the UPC gained strength in Parliament by virtue of defections from the KY and the opposition Democratic Party. Supporters of the unitary state concept and those in favor of a loose federation disputed over the proper role of the central government. Complicated political maneuvering in late 1965 and early 1966 came to a head in February 1966 when Prime Minister Obote suspended the independence constitution, assumed all powers of government, and deposed the President and Vice President. In April of that year a new constitution came into force. Under it Prime Minister Obote became an executive President with wide powers, and the Kingdom of Buganda was deprived of its semiautonomous powers.

The 1966 constitution was superseded by one adopted in September 1967. Uganda was proclaimed a Republic, and wide powers were given to the President. All of the traditional kingdoms, including Buganda, were abolished. Moreover, that kingdom was divided into four districts.

On January 25, 1971, the Second Republic of Uganda was created following a military coup d'etat. Gen. Idi Amin Dada became President, and the Parliament was dissolved. On February 14 the new government proclaimed an 18-point program as a temporary replacement for the constitution.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The present government is highly centralized under a President (Chief of State and Head of Government). Legislative powers are vested in the President. The Cabinet is composed essentially of military and some technicians who advise the President on executive and legislative matters.

As Commander in Chief, the President is Chairman of the State Supreme Council and the Defense Council, which are responsible for general control and administration of the armed forces and for important policy decisions affecting the country.

The judiciary is headed by a High Court consisting of a Chief Justice and a variable number of puisne judges all appointed by the President. Chief Magistrates' Courts are located throughout the country.

On March 17, 1971, Gen. Amin issued a decree which suspended political activities for the stated purpose of allowing the military government time to reconstruct the economy, reorganize the administration, and re-

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store public order and tranquillity. No definite time has been set for the return to civilian government.

Principal Government Officials

President—Gen. Idi Amin Dada

Ministers

Defense—Maj. Gen. Mustafa Adriki
Education—Brig. Gen. B. Kili
Foreign Affairs—Lt. Col. Juma Oris Abdallah
Provincial Administration—Brig. Gen. Moses Ali
Internal Affairs—G.S. Lule
Industry and Power—Col. D. Sabuni
Finance—Charles Oboth-Ofumbi
Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim, to the U.S.—S.M. Nsubuga
Ambassador to the U.N.—K.Y. Kinene

Uganda maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 5909 16th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20011.

ECONOMY

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing account for more than half of Uganda's GDP. Although manufacturing continues to expand, it still accounts for less than 15 percent of the GDP. Mining, mostly copper, provides about 3 percent of the GDP.

Uganda maintains a favorable trade balance with countries outside east Africa, although this balance is reduced somewhat by Uganda's deficit within the East African Community (EAC).

In August 1972 the military government initiated an economic war designed to put the country's economy in indigenous Ugandan hands. To date the program has resulted mainly in government takeover of the expelled noncitizen Asians' enterprises and allocation of the Asian-owned shops and small businesses to Ugandan entrepreneurs. The government itself is operating these confiscated industries; it now owns nearly all industrial and large manufacturing concerns in the country. The government also has nationalized some two dozen British agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial enterprises, as well as one American-owned importing and manufacturing concern. It has repeatedly stated its intention to pay compensation to all foreign companies and individuals whose property has been nationalized (including the Asians) and officially continues to maintain a policy of welcoming private, foreign investment in enterprises which have a substantial element of Ugandan participation.

Uganda has about 30,000 miles of roads, of which about 1,200 miles are paved. Most of the roads radiate from Kampala. A railroad stretches from Mombasa, Kenya, on the Indian Ocean to Tororo, Uganda, where it branches westward to Jinja, Kampala, and Kasese and northward to Mbale, Soroti, Lira, Gulu, and Pakwach. An international airport is located at Entebbe, which is near Kampala, and 11 other airfields have scheduled internal service. Entebbe is served regularly by about 12 international carriers in addition to East African Airways, a self-financing corporation of the EAC. Boat traffic on Lake Victoria serves Kampala, Kinja, Entebbe, the islands in the lake, and ports in Kenya and Tanzania.

Uganda is a partner with Kenya and Tanzania in the EAC which, in addition to continuing most of the common services the three shared before independence, provides the framework of a common market. An East African Development Bank has also been established under the auspices of the EAC. The EAC may eventually expand to include other adjacent countries. In 1969 the three east African countries signed an agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) providing preferential treatment for their exports to Europe in return for similar treatment for selected EEC products.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Like many independent African nations, Uganda bases its foreign policy on nonalignment and anticolonialism. For 2 years following 1971 coup, Uganda had strained relations with Tanzania. They are now correct but cold. Thirty-three countries have resident diplomatic or counsular missions in Kampala.

Uganda condemns the apartheid policy practiced in South Africa and strongly opposes the white minority regime there, as well as in Rhodesia, and elsewhere in Africa. It supports the activities of African liberation groups which advocate force to bring about majority rule.

U.S.-UGANDA RELATIONS

As a result of persistent internal security problems in the country in 1973 and because of increasing difficulty in effectively carrying out their jobs, the U.S. Peace Corps volunteers were withdrawn and assigned to other countries. For similar reasons bilateral economic assistance programs in Uganda were phased out in mid-1973.

In November 1973, following repeated public threats against U.S. Embassy officials and other Americans in the country by high Ugandan officials, and the abrupt and unjustified expulsion of the U.S. Marine Security Guard responsible for the protection of American Government property and personnel, all remaining official U.S. employees were withdrawn from Uganda and the Embassy closed. The Federal Republic of Germany has assumed the protection of U.S. Government interests in Uganda.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7958, Revised March 1976

APPENDIX WW
UPPER VOLTA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, March 1976 (Pubication 8201)]

background notes

Upper Volta

department of state • march 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Upper Volta

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Landlocked Upper Volta is bordered on the south by Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin; on the east by Niger; and on the north and west by Mali. The country is situated in the West African savanna on a plateau 650-1,000 feet above sea level. In the east, low hills separate the White Volta River and Niger River basins.

Annual rainfall varies from about 40 inches in the south to less than 10 inches in the extreme north and northeast, where hot desert winds accentuate the aridity of the region. The country's main rivers are not navigable.

Most of the 5.7 million people are concentrated in the south and center of the country at densities sometimes exceeding 125 persons per square mile. This population pressure, rare in Africa, causes the annual migration of hundreds of thousands of Upper Voltans to Ivory Coast and Ghana for seasonal agricultural work.

Nearly two-thirds of the people in the center of the country are Mossi, descendants of a several-hundred-year-old empire. Predominantly farmers, the Mossi still are bound by the traditions of their Emperor, the Moro Naba, who holds court at Ouagadougou. The 800,000 Bobo live in the western part of the country around Bobo Dioulasso.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 106,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Colo.). CAPITAL: Ouagadougou (pop. 115,000). OTHER CITIES: Bobo Dioulasso (90,000), Koudougou (40,000).

People

POPULATION: 5.7 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1% (1973 est.). DENSITY: 53 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Voltaic (Mossi, Bobo), Mande. RELIGIONS: Animist, Moslem, Christian. LANGUAGES: French (official), More, numerous tribal tongues belonging to Sudanic family. LITERACY: 5-10%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 37 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: 1960. CONSTITUTION: Suspended.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State). *Legislative*–disbanded. *Judicial*–Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Disbanded. SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 10 Departments.

FLAG: Black, white, and red horizontal stripes (from top to bottom) representing Black, White, and Red branches of Volta River.

Economy

GNP: $360 million (1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: -3.2% (1972-73). PER CAPITA INCOME: $60. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: -20%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 70%. *Labor* 80%. *Products*–food crops: sorghum, millet, cowpeas, rice, corn, yams, cassava, sweet potatoes; cash crops: sisal, sesame, peanuts, *karite* (shea nuts), cotton.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 1%. *Products*–processed fats and oils, cotton ginning, sisal twine, textiles, soap, beverages.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Manganese, limestone, bauxite, gold, copper, tin, graphite.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*–$20 million: livestock 50%, cotton. *Partners*–Ivory Coast, France, Ghana. *Imports*–$78 million: manufactured goods, machinery. *Partners*–France, Ivory Coast, FRG.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Approx. 220 CFA francs=US$1 (floats with French franc).


ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$334.2 million (France, EC, UNDP). *US only*–$38.1 million (through 1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN; Organization of African Unity (OAU); Common Organization of African, Malagasy, and Mauritian States (OCAM); Council of Entente; West African Economic Community (CEAO).

HISTORY

Until the end of the 19th century the history of Upper Volta was one of the empire-building Mossi, who are believed to have come from Central or East Africa sometime in the 11th century. For centuries the Mossi peasant was both farmer and soldier; and although the Mossi suffered defeats at the hands of the Muslim peoples to the northwest, they were able to defend their religious beliefs and feudal structure against forcible attempts to convert them to Islam.

When the French arrived and claimed the area of present-day Upper Volta in 1896, Mossi resistance to the French ended with the capture of their capital at Ouagadougou. In 1919 certain provinces were detached from Ivory Coast and united into a separate colony in the French West Africa Federation called the Upper Volta. In 1932 the new colony was dismembered as an economy move, only to be reconstituted in 1937 as an administrative division called the Upper Coast. After World War II the Mossi renewed their claim for separate territorial status, and on September 4,


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
MALI
NIGER
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
Mopti
Niger
Bani
San
Dori
NIAMEY
Ouahigouya
Tougan
Yako
Kaya
Sirba
Nouna
Sourou
Dédougou
Koutiala
Koudougou
OUAGADOUGOU
Volta Noire
Volta Blanche
Volta Rouge
Koupéla
Fada Ngourma
Tenkodogo
Mékrou
Pendjari
Sikasso
Bobo Dioulasso
Pô
Léo
Diébougou
Orodara
Bawku
Dapango
Bolgatanga
Banfora
Kompié
Gaoua
Black Volta
We
White Volta
Léraba
Tamale
Férkessédougou
14
10
UPPER VOLTA
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

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1947, the Upper Volta again became a territory in its own right.

A revision in the organization of French Overseas Territories began with the passage of the Overseas Reform Act (*Loi Cadre*) of July 23, 1956. This act was followed by reorganizational measures voted by the French Parliament early in 1957, which assured a large measure of self-government to individual territories. Upper Volta became an autonomous republic in the French Community on December 11, 1958.

Independence was achieved on August 5, 1960. Upper Volta's membership in the French Community was allowed to lapse, and accords were signed with France on April 24, 1961, defining the relations between the two countries.

The 1960 constitution provided for election by universal suffrage of a President and a National Assembly for 5-year terms. The first President, Maurice Yameogo, was forced to resign on January 3, 1966, following a general strike and several days of street demonstrations instigated by the labor unions and sparked by an announcement of salary cuts at a time when criticism of the government for waste and corruption was widespread.

He was succeeded by Lt. Col. (now Maj. Gen.) Sangoule Lamizana, Chief of Staff of the Army. President Lamizana suspended the constitution of 1960, dissolved the National Assembly, and formed a new Cabinet with civilian and military members. Although initially intending to return the country to civilian rule in a short time, President Lamizana decided that Voltan political leaders lacked the consensus necessary to cope with the country's severe political and economic difficulties. He announced on December 12, 1966, that the army would remain in power under his leadership for 4 years.

On June 14, 1970, the Voltans ratified a new Constitution which established a 4-year transition period toward complete civilian rule. During this period the office of President and 5 of the 15 Cabinet posts were to be retained by military officers.

In February 1974, acting in the face of virtual government paralysis, President Lamizana reversed the trend toward increased civil participation in government, suspended the 1970 Constitution, and dismissed the Cabinet and the National Assembly. A new Cabinet was formed, with a mix of military officers and civilians; but the post of Prime Minister was not filled. No date was announced for a full return to civil rule. In June 1974 President Lamizana decreed the formation of a National Renewal Consultative Council to replace the defunct National Assembly, and he formally abolished political parties.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Climate is uniformly hot and dry (90° to over 100° most of the year, dropping 20° at night). The rainy season is from May to October. Light, wash-and-wear clothing is recommended.

Currency—The CFA (African Financial Community) franc is legal tender. No ceiling is imposed on the number of CFA francs visitors may bring into the country. The CFA franc is freely convertible into French francs. However, for conversion into U.S. dollars, permission must be obtained from the government agency handling foreign exchange. Dollars and travelers checks can be exchanged in Ouagadougou.

Customs—Americans must have visas, which generally are valid for a period of 3 months. In countries in which Upper Volta does not have its own resident diplomatic mission, visas usually may be obtained either from French consular offices or from consular offices of countries which are members of the Council of the Entente (Ivory Coast, Niger, Benin, or Togo). Inoculations against smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever are required.

Health—Typhoid inoculations and gamma globulin, though not required, are recommended. Anti-malarial suppressants should be taken regularly. Avoid unwashed fruits and vegetables and tap water (bottled mineral water is readily available at hotels and restaurants). Local medical services are limited.

Telecommunications—Radio-telephone service is available between Ouagadougou and Europe or the U.S. (via Paris). Telephone and cable service are adequate, but limited to certain hours.

Transportation—Ouagadougou can be reached by air from Paris, Abidjan, Niamey, and Dakar (via Bobo Dioulasso); by paved road from Accra and Abidjan; and by rail from Abidjan. Uncertain road conditions complicate transportation elsewhere. Taxis are available.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The government is (in theory) a republican one divided into three branches. The executive branch is composed of the President (Chief of State) and a Council of Ministers (Cabinet). The President fulfills the role of arbiter in the present transitional government and is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Until the 1970 Constitution was suspended, the President appointed a Prime Minister, who had to be approved by an absolute majority of the National Assembly. The President appoints the Council of Ministers, presides over the Cabinet, and is responsible for government policy and its day-to-day operation.

Until its suspension, the unicameral National Assembly was elected every 4 years on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Its 57 members held legislative sessions twice a year.

The apex of the independent judicial system is the Supreme Court.

Upper Volta's Government is centralized. For ease of administration, the country is divided into 10 Departments and 10 economic development zones.

Principal Government Officials

President and Prime Minister—Maj. Gen. Aboubakar Sangoule Lamizana

Ministers

Interior and Security—Maj. Yorian Gabriel Some
Justice—Francois Xavier Zongo
Foreign Affairs—Alfred Kabore
Defense—Gen. Baba Sy
Finance—Maj. Mamadou Sanfo
Planning—Capt. Leonard Kalmogo
Rural Development—Salia Sanon
Commerce, Industry and Mines—Emmanuel Zoma
Public Works, Transport and Urbanism—Capt. Mahamoudou Ouedraogo

READING LIST

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Health and Social Affairs–Dr. Tinga Douamba

Civil Service and Labor–Zoumana Traore

Information, Postal Services and Telecommunications–Emile Bassono

Youth and Sports–Adama Pierre Traore

Tourism and Environment–Boubakar Soumana

Secretary of State for Social Affairs–Mme. Moise Alassane Traore

Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N.–Télésphore Yaguibou

Upper Volta maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 5500 16th St. NW., Washington, D.C. 20011.

ECONOMY

Upper Volta is one of the poorest countries in Africa. Aridity and erosion have seriously hampered agriculture. Industry, still in an embryonic stage, is centered in Bobo Dioulasso. There is no mineral production in Upper Volta at the present time. A deposit of high-grade manganese ore has been discovered at Tambao, in the northeast. However, financing has not yet been arranged to construct a railroad extension from Ouagadougou to permit evacuation of the ore.

The Abidjan-Upper Volta railroad, completed in 1954, connects Ouagadougou with the excellent deep-water port at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, a distance of 712 miles, of which 341 miles lie in Upper Volta. The country has a fairly extensive road network of about 10,000 miles in length; about one-fourth consists of all-weather roads.

Upper Volta's overriding objective is the improvement of economic conditions. Although prospects for major improvements in the near future are not encouraging, the country is aiming presently at developing its mineral resources, improving its infrastructure, making its agricultural and livestock sector more productive and competitive, and stabilizing supplies and prices of food grains.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Upper Volta has pursued a moderate foreign policy. It maintains a special relationship with France and has cordial relations with both Communist and non-Communist countries.

Upper Volta maintains close relations with all neighboring states. Relations with Mali, however, were severely strained in December 1974, when fighting erupted over disputed territory along the northern border of Upper Volta. Since then, tensions have subsided and the dispute is being mediated by the OAU.

In addition to being a member of the U.N. and the OAU, Upper Volta is a member of the Council of the Entente, a loose association with Ivory Coast, Niger, Benin, and Togo, based on mutual political and economic interests; OCAM, a group of 15 French-speaking sub-Saharan nations; and the Liptako-Gourma Authority, a joint developmental effort with Mali and Niger.

U.S.-UPPER VOLTA RELATIONS

The United States seeks to continue its friendly relations with Upper Volta and to encourage and support Voltan efforts toward economic development. The United States supports Voltan desires to increase political and economic regional cooperation in Africa. Upper Volta was a major recipient of U.S. emergency food assistance to the seven drought-stricken states of the Sahel between 1973 and 1975. Since then the United States has participated in both regional and bilateral assistance projects in Upper Volta with the goals of increased livestock production, improved marketing, grain stabilization, and integrated rural development.

The United States maintains an active Peace Corps program of about 90 volunteers in Upper Volta, working in such fields as education, agriculture, and public health.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–Pierre R. Graham

Counselor of Embassy–Roburt Dumas

Economic and Consular Officer–Daniel H. Sanders, Jr.

Administrative Officer–Max Walton

Country Development Officer (AID)–John A. Hoskins

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)–Paul B. Altemus

Peace Corps Director–Ronald J. Robichaud

The U.S. Embassy is located on Ave. J.F. Kennedy in Ouagadougou.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8201, Revised March 1976

APPENDIX XX
ZAIRE
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, January 1975 (Publication 7793)]

background notes

Zaire

department of state * january 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Zaire

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 905,063 sq. mi. (about the size of the U.S. east of Mississippi River). CAPITAL: Kinshasa (pop. 1.3 million, 1970). OTHER CITIES: Kananga, Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi, Kisangani (more than 200,000 in each).

People

POPULATION: 23.9 million (1973 *est.*). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.2-2.9%. DENSITY: 26 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Bantu tribes (80%), over 200 African tribal groups in all. RELIGIONS: Catholic and Protestant (50%), Kimbanguism, other syncretic sects, traditional religions. MAJOR LANGUAGES: French, Lingala, Kingwana, Kikongo, Tshiluba. LITERACY: 35%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 43 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Presidential, one-party. INDEPENDENCE: June 30, 1960. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: June 24, 1967 (amended Aug. 15, 1974).

BRANCHES: The Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) is the "sole" political institution; its organs include the Political Bureau, the Party Congress, the Executive Council (Council of Ministers), the Legislative Council (unicameral), and the Judiciary. The President of the Party is automatically President of Zaire. SUFFRAGE: Compulsory over 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 8 Regions.

FLAG: Green with gold ball in center; inside ball is a hand-held torch of brown and red.

Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): $2.643 billion (1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 6.4% (1973, constant prices). PER CAPITA INCOME: $100-$120. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 2-3%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 2% cultivated or pasture, 20% unused cropland. *Labor* 70-80%. *Products*—coffee, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa (cash crops); manioc, bananas, plantains, corn, rice, vegetables, fruits, sugar (food crops).

INDUSTRY: *Products*—processed and unprocessed minerals, consumer products, metal and chemical products, construction materials, steel.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Copper, cobalt, zinc, industrial diamonds, manganese, tin, gold, columbium-tantalum, rare metals, bauxite, iron, coal, 13% of world hydroelectric potential.

TRADE: *Exports*—$1.005 billion (1973 f.o.b.): copper (65%), cobalt, diamonds, gold, manganese, coffee, palm oil, wood. *Partners*—Belgium (44%, 1971), Italy, France, F.R.G., U.S., U.K. *Imports*—$700 million (1973 c.i.f.): foodstuffs, textiles, chemicals, machinery, transportation equipment. *Partners*—Belgium (23%, 1971), France, F.R.G., Italy, U.S., Japan. Zaire's principal imports from the U.S. are construction and mining machinery, mechanical handling equipment, engines, and pumps.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 zaire =US$2.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—$85 million (1970-72 avg.). *U.S. only*—$11 million (1970-72 avg.), $2 million (1975 est.).


MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), African Development Bank (AfDB), African countries associated with the EC (EAMA).

GEOGRAPHY

The Republic of Zaire (Zy-EAR), formerly the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is located in the south-central part of the African Continent. It includes the greater part of the Zaire (formerly Congo) River Basin. The country's only outlet to the Atlantic Ocean is a narrow strip of land on the north bank of the Zaire estuary along the south Atlantic coast. Zaire is bounded on the west and north by Cabinda (an Angolan enclave on the coast), the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, and Sudan; on the east by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; and on the south by Angola and Zambia.

The vast, low-lying central area is a basin-shaped plateau sloping toward the west and covered by tropical rain forest. This area is surrounded by mountainous terraces in the west, plateaus merging into savannas in the south and southeast, and dense grasslands extending toward the Zaire River in the northwest. High mountains are found in the extreme eastern region.

Zaire lies on the Equator, about one-third of the country to the north and two-thirds to the south. The area, therefore, is hot and humid. In the western region, south of the Equator, the rainy season lasts from October to May, while north of the Equator it lasts from April to November. In the central region, however, rainfall is more or less regular throughout the year. During the October-May wet season the storms often are violent but seldom last more than a few hours.



517361 9-74

The average annual rainfall for the entire country is about 42 inches.

On June 30, 1966, several cities with names of European origin were Africanized; among these are: Kinshasa (Léopoldville), Kisangani (Stanleyville), Katanga (Luluabourg), Lubumbashi (Elisabethville), and Isiro (Paulis).

PEOPLE

The official Zairian Government estimate of population as of January 1, 1973, was 23.9 million, but other estimates put the total as low as 20 million. A partial census carried out in 1970 showed a resident alien population of roughly 900,000, of whom about 80,000 were non-Africans. Since 1970 the non-African population has declined. About 2,200 U.S. citizens now reside in Zaire.

Three major ethnic groups from among 200 tribal groups are:

(1) Pygmies—in the west and northwest (50,000), in the northeast (30,000); probably the first inhabitants of the Zaire River Basin.

(2) Negroes—represented by (a) Bantus, predominant (80 percent of total population), except in the extreme north (no one Bantu tribe is more than 12% of the population); (b) Sudanese, north and northeast; (c) Nilotics, northeast.

(3) Hamites—eastern frontier; includes several groups of Bahima shepherds.

The Belgians introduced French,

the language spoken countrywide by the educated. About 700 local languages and dialects are also spoken. Four serve as linguas franca:

(1) Lingala developed along the Congo River in the 1880's in response to the need for a common commercial language. In time it was given written form, and it is now used extensively along the Zaire River from Kinshasa to Kisangani and in the north and northwest. It is the common language of the Zairian National Army, and its use as a national lingua franca is growing.

(2) Kingwana, a dialect of Kiswahili, was introduced into the country by Arabs and especially the Zanzibari Swahilis in the course of 19th-century slaving operations. It is spoken extensively in the northeast, east, and south.

(3) Kikongo is the language used primarily in the narrow neck of territory between Kinshasa and the Atlantic Ocean. A modified form is spoken in the region immediately east of Kinshasa. Most of the languages of western Zaire belong to the Kikongo language group.

(4) Tshiluba is spoken primarily by the tribal groups of the south-central area of Zaire.

It is estimated that about half of the Zairians are Christian. Of these, about three-quarters are Catholic and one-quarter Protestant. Most of the non-Christian population is comprised of adherents of traditional religions or syncretic sects. The traditional religions vary widely among ethnic groups; none is formalized. They embody such concepts as monotheism, animism, vitalism, spirits, ancestor worship, witchcraft, and sorcery. The syncretic sects are a mixture of Christianity and traditional beliefs and rituals. They often use Christian sources; their prophets promised to lead people to a new way of life and a black Christ. Two of the most popular of these sects were seen as threats to the colonial regime and banned by the Belgians. One of these, Kimbanguism (formally the "Church of Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu"), now has about 3 million members and in 1969 became the first independent African church to be admitted to the World Council of Churches.

HISTORY

Prior to 1960

Zaire is believed to have been populated as early as the Stone Age and settled in the 7th and 8th centuries by Bantus from present-day Nigeria. These people brought with them the knowledge of the manufacture and use of metal. In 1482 Portuguese navigator Diego Cao arrived at the mouth of the Congo River. Early seafarers did not penetrate far inland but stayed near the mouth of the river, where they found an organized society—the Bakongo Kingdom, including parts of what are now Congo (Brazzaville), Cabinda, Zaire, and Angola. The Portuguese named the area Congo (its name until late 1971) after this kingdom. The modern name Zaire, derived from a Kikongo word meaning "river," also dates from the era of Portuguese exploration.

Christianity was introduced by these explorers, and the churches and artifacts of this period still exist. The area remained practically unknown to most Europeans until Henry Morton Stanley's dramatic voyage from East Africa across the continent to the mouth of the Congo River in 1874-77. Stanley explored the area on behalf of Belgian King Leopold II, who quickly realized its potential value. Other nations responded by putting forward their claims to it, thus precipitating the Berlin conference of 1885 at which King Leopold's claim was recognized. The country remained his personal possession until he ceded it to the Belgian State in 1907.

Although Kimbanguism, Kitawala, and other syncretic religious sects were early manifestations of opposition to colonial dominance, it was not until the 1950's that the push for independence gained significant momentum. In a 1958 speech at Brazzaville, Gen. Charles de Gaulle gave the French African colonies a choice between complete and partial independence, and the Congolese independence movements could no longer be suppressed by the Belgians. Following January 1959 riots at Léopoldville, Belgian King Baudouin announced that the colony could look forward to independence "without undue delay." The next year roundtable conferences were convened at Brussels to discuss the modalities of independence with the Congolese. Belgium agreed to grant independence on June 30, 1960.

Parliamentary elections were held in April 1960. The Congolese National Movement (MNC) obtained a majority of the seats, and Patrice Lumumba was named Prime Minister. After much maneuvering the Alliance of the Bakongo (ABAKO) party leader Joseph Kasavubu was named President.

Independence

Peaceful independence lasted only 1 week. On July 5 the army mutinied, public authority broke down, and on July 10 Belgian troops intervened to protect Belgian nationals. On July 11 Moise Tshombe, Governor of Katanga (now Shaba), declared his Province an independent country, while the central government requested U.N. assistance to maintain order and restore the territorial integrity of the country. The United Nations sent a peacekeeping force, but when it refused to place this force under the central government's orders, Prime Minister Lumumba requested and received direct Soviet aid.

Relations deteriorated rapidly between Prime Minister Lumumba and the United Nations and between the Prime Minister and President Kasavubu. On September 5, 1960, Lumumba was dismissed by Kasavubu. He refused to accept this and in turn attempted to dismiss Kasavubu. Col. Joseph Mobutu (now Mobutu Sese Seko) took over the government, expelled Soviet and Communist-bloc diplomats and technicians, and eventually imprisoned Lumumba. Lumumba attempted to escape, was apprehended, and died under mysterious circumstances in February 1961. His former Vice Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga, proclaimed himself head of the legitimate government and set up a rival administration at Stanleyville. That same month Mobutu returned the reins of government to Kasavubu, and four groups then contended for power: the central government under Kasavubu; Gizenga at Stanleyville; Tshombe at Katanga; and another separatist group in Kasai under Albert Kalonji, a Baluba chieftain.

The Kalonji and Gizenga groups were reintegrated into the central gov-

ernment by August 2, 1961, at which time Cyrille Adoula was appointed Prime Minister. Tshombe, however, held out at Katanga. U.N. Secretary General U Thant devised a plan in 1962 to reintegrate Katanga, and Tshombe and the central government finally reached agreement in mid-January 1963. U.N. troops remained in the country until June 30, 1964, but played little role in subsequent security difficulties.

Shortly after the end of the Katanga secession, rebellion against the central government broke out in the Province of Kwilu. This rebellion, which originated in traditional tribal rivalries, was turned into an antigovernment revolt by Pierre Mulele, an early collaborator of Lumumba who had spent some months in the People's Republic of China.

The Simba Rebellion

Similar tribal discontent erupted into open rebellion in Kivu Province in April 1964. The rebels in this area were led by followers of Lumumba who had gone to Brazzaville in November 1963 and set up a Committee of National Liberation dedicated to the overthrow of the central government. Through the exploitation of tribal hatred and unhappiness over the fruits of independence, leftist rebel leaders extended the rebellion over much of the northern and eastern part of the country by June 1964. In July former Katangan leader Tshombe was named Prime Minister of the central government.

On August 5 Stanleyville fell to the rebels, who called themselves *Simbas*, Swahili for "lion." By the end of the month rebel forces controlled about two-fifths of the country. On September 5 Christophe Gbenye, another Lumumbist, arrived at Stanleyville and proclaimed himself President of the "People's Republic of the Congo."

Rebel fortunes soon began to wane, however, as central government forces began to recapture rebel-held cities. On November 24 Belgian airborne troops, transported in U.S. Air Force planes, parachuted into Stanleyville and captured it from the rebels. Between November 24 and 28, a Belgian-U.S. rescue mission evacuated some 1,900 hostages who had been held at Stanleyville and Paulis. Central government forces gradually reclaimed control over more rebel-held areas, until by the middle of 1966 only a few isolated bands of rebel terrorists were still holding out in the bush. The rebellion, however, had seriously damaged the administrative and economic infrastructure of the country. Educated Zairian administrators were often considered by the rebels as enemies and became particular targets for rebel attention. Vast agricultural areas were damaged or allowed to disintegrate during the rebellion.

Return of Mobutu and Security

A period of intense political activity occurred prior to the spring 1966 Presidential elections. President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Tshombe in October and asked Evariste Kimba to form a government. Political infighting and public quarrelling followed briefly and ended when Lt. Gen. Mobutu, Commander in Chief of the National Army, seized control of the government on November 25, 1965, and cancelled elections. He declared that he would be President for 5 years and disclaimed any intention of establishing a military regime.

Challenged by a revolt of former Katangan gendarmes in the National Army in July 1966, Mobutu defeated the rebels and further strengthened the control of his government over the country. A similar challenge from the remaining white mercenaries broke out in July 1967. After several difficult months and under pressure from the army, the mercenaries and their Katangan allies withdrew into Rwanda. At about the same time another mercenary group intruded into Zaire in southwest Katanga but withdrew after a relatively few days of inconclusive fighting.

Since November 1967 Zaire has enjoyed internal peace and political stability. Only a small mountainous area at the northern end of Lake Tanganyika remains a haven for bandits and former rebels. Strengthened administrative control has resulted in considerable improvement in the overall security situation and has provided the base for economic recovery.

Centralization of Authority

A key political issue in Zaire following independence was the question of whether the country was to have a federal system of government or a unitary system with a strong central government. From 1960 to 1966 a modified federal system existed which gave a degree of political power to the provincial governments. In 1965 President Mobutu began to reduce that provincial power.

A 1967 constitution, proposed by Mobutu and approved by popular referendum, eliminated the independent political power of the provincial governments and brought their administration under the direct control of the central government. Mobutu founded the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in 1967 as a political arm of his government. The MPR has been designated successively the country's "first," "supreme," and now—by virtue of August 1974 constitutional amendments—its "only" political institution. The Executive Council (Council of Ministers), the legislature, the judiciary, the labor movement, and the military now find their places in the Constitution, alongside the Party Congress and the Political Bureau, as organs of the MPR.

Personalization of Authority

Centralization has been accompanied by personalization of authority. In November 1970 President Mobutu, who had ruled by decree from the time of his assumption of power in 1965, was elected to a 7-year term of office. He is publicly referred to as the "Guide" or the "Founder-President"—his picture alone is permitted to hang in public places, and locations connected with his life have been made places of meditation. In 1974 "Mobutism"—the writing, teaching, and living example of President Mobutu—was made Zaire's official philosophy. November 25, the anniversary of Mobutu's seizure of power and of the establishment of the "Second Republic," as it is now called, is Zaire's principal public holiday.

Authenticity

As part of his effort to create a sense of national identity, Mobutu has called upon Zairians to draw upon their own heritage in shaping their nation's future and to reject foreign models. His campaign for "authenticity" has included Africanization of

the symbols of national and personal identity. Colonial place names have been replaced, and on October 27, 1971, the country's name was changed to the Republic of Zaire. A new flag and a new national anthem were also adopted. Individuals have been required by law to replace their Christian or other foreign names with African ones, and references to ancestors are now a part of all public ceremonies.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Zaire has a strong centralized presidential/party government. By virtue of the August 1974 constitutional changes, the President of the MPR is automatically President of Zaire. He is elected for a 5-year term, renewable for one term only. This article of the Constitution does not, however, apply to President Mobutu.

The President presides over the MPR Political Bureau, the Party Congress (which meets every 5 years), and the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Councils. He is empowered to legislate "with the consent of the Legislative Council" and renders accounts directly to the people by means of an annual policy statement and interim messages. He appoints and recalls all Political Commissioners (members of the MPR Political Bureau), Regional Commissioners (administrators of Zaire's eight administrative Regions), and judges. He is commander in chief of the armed forces and has full power to declare war and to conclude treaties, without reference to any other body. He can also declare a state of emergency and take such measures "as circumstances warrant" for as long a period as he may deem necessary.

After the President, the main locus of power is the 31-member MPR Political Bureau. Its decisions are binding upon both the legislative and executive branches, having the force of law as soon as they are published. The Political Bureau was enlarged in 1974 to include representatives of the military, the judiciary, and academia, as well as politicians. After President Mobutu's tenure, a president will be permitted to change only one-third of the membership of the Political Bureau during his term of office. The oldest member of the Political Bureau provides the interim succession in the event a president dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The Political Bureau may remove a president for "deviation" from MPR party doctrine, but President Mobutu is exempt from such removal. Permanent succession to an outgoing president is by way of popular election, the single MPR candidate being chosen by the Political Bureau.

The Legislative Council drafts laws as directed by the President and the Political Bureau. Its electoral mandate is for 5 years. A new Council is to be elected in 1975. The electorate votes on a single slate chosen by the Political Bureau. The unicameral body presently has 420 members but will be reduced by half this year.

The executive departments of the government are administered by State Commissioners, who are chosen by the President and together with him comprise the National Executive Council. State Commissioners are subject to the policy guidance of the Political Bureau.

The large Catholic Church and smaller Protestant and Kimbanguist organizations are the only national institutions which remain independent of the party/government structure. Freedom of religion was reaffirmed in the August 1974 revision of the Constitution. As of December 30, 1974, however, religious instruction was forbidden in the schools, including church schools, and was to be replaced by civic and political education. The church education offices, which have managed the large church school systems in Zaire, were abolished as of the same date. All theology faculties were to be eliminated at the end of the 1974-75 academic year.

Principal Government Officials

President, State Commissioner for Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Planning—**Mobutu** Sese Seko

Political Director of the MPR—**Nguza** Karl-I-Bond

State Commissioner for Political Affairs and Coordinator of Party Activities—**Engulu** Baangampongo Bakokela Lokanga

State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation—**Mandungu** Bula Nyati

Captain General of the Zairian Armed Forces—**Bumba** Moaso Djogi

Director of the Office of the Presidency—**Bisengimana** Rwema

Ambassador to the U.S.—**Mbeka** Makosso

Permanent Representative to the U.N.—**Mutuale** Tshikankie

Zaire maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1800 New Hampshire Ave., NW. 20009.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—**In general, wardrobes suitable for Washington summers are suitable in Zaire. Sweaters are advisable for Bukavu and Lubumbashi, where evenings are cool. Overcoats are not needed but rainwear is.**

Health—**Malaria is prevalent in Zaire and malarial suppressants should be taken. Tap water is not potable. The advice contained in "Health Hints for the Tropics," published by the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, is generally applicable.**

Telecommunications—**International telegraph and telephone services are fairly reliable.**

Transportation—**Flights occur twice weekly from New York to Kinshasa, with a 24-hour stop in Monrovia or Dakar. Connections can also be made via Brussels, Paris, Athens, Madrid, Frankfurt, or Rome.**

Local public transportation facilities are crowded. Taxis are usually available in towns; rates vary and the fare should be established before the ride. Main streets within the cities are usually paved. Intercity roads are generally gravel or dirt. All automobiles driven in Zaire must be covered by liability insurance with SONAS, the national insurance company. Drivers licenses are required; however, international licenses issued by the AAA in the U.S. can be validated for use in Zaire.

Special Requirement—**All tourists and unofficial visitors are required to spend at least 20 zaire (US$40) a day while in Zaire. Proof of this expenditure is required upon departure.**

ECONOMY

At the time of its independence Zaire had one of the most highly developed and diversified economies in sub-Sahara Africa. However, in the period 1960-67 it suffered severe eco-

nomic and financial disorders—insecure and disrupted transportation facilities and trade service, a breakdown of civil administration, and a decline in export earnings. Large budgetary deficits added to inflationary pressures and balance-of-payments problems, which were reflected in a depreciation of the national currency on the black market and in clandestine exports.

In 1967 the government, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, initiated a program of monetary and economic reform. This included a major currency devaluation, liberalization of previous import restrictions, increases in import and export taxes, centralization of the government budget, and tightened control by the Bank of Zaire over foreign transactions and the banking system. Within 2 years this program, combined with the return of political tranquillity and increased world copper prices (Zaire is a leading copper producer) succeeded in substantially increasing exports, stabilizing the currency, and raising foreign exchange reserves. From 1967 to 1970 GDP grew by 10-11 percent annually; it continued to grow at an average rate of 5.5 percent from 1970 through 1973.

Beginning in 1973 new stresses appeared in the economy. Large budget deficits, financed by borrowing from the Central Bank, have weakened the currency. The cost of living rose rapidly—40 percent in 1974 alone—while the government held a firm lid on wages. Rapid new borrowing is estimated to have raised Zaire's public direct and guaranteed external debt from $763 million at the end of 1972 to over $2 billion at the end of 1974. Servicing of this debt is predicated upon planned rapid growth in the extractive field, but by the end of 1974 a precipitous decline in the price of copper, Zaire's principal export, together with increased foreign expenditures, had put Zaire in a tight foreign exchange position. To meet the situation, the government declared its intention to control foreign borrowing more closely, to restrict imports of consumer goods, and to take steps to reverse the trend toward ever greater agricultural imports. A planning team, recruited by the World Bank, was established in the Office of the Presidency to improve overall management of the economy.

On November 30, 1973, President Mobutu announced measures to place the economy more firmly in national hands. These included the transfer of most commercial and agricultural enterprises from foreign (primarily Belgian, Greek, Portuguese, Indian, and Pakistani) to Zairian ownership; American-owned businesses were spared. Some disruption of trade followed, particularly in rural areas, and the departure of large numbers of skilled foreigners has posed a management problem. At the end of 1974 the government announced that it would take control of large production, distribution, transportation, and construction enterprises.

Natural Resources

Exploitation of Zaire's varied natural resources has been the main spur to economic development and, assuming sufficiently rapid expansion of trained workers, should continue as such through the next decade. Rich mineral deposits in the southern Shaba Region are an important source of copper and zinc and the principal source of the world's cobalt. Industrial diamonds mined in the Kasai account for about half of the total produced outside the Communist countries. Large quantities of tin, columbium-tantalum, manganese, and several rare metals are extracted in other regions. There is renewed interest in mining Zaire's uranium and its as yet unexploited iron deposits. Extensive tropical forests, now being developed gradually, are a source of valuable hardwood.

Zaire's hydroelectric potential represents about 13 percent of the world's total. Most of this is in the lower Zaire River, where a staged development program is underway. The first stage of the Inga dam and hydroelectric plant was completed in 1972. A 1,800-kilometer powerline to carry Inga power to the copper belt in Shaba is now under construction and is to be completed in 1977. Bauxite deposits near the Inga site create the potential for economic production of aluminum in Zaire; preliminary agreement for development of this potential has been reached between the Government of Zaire and the Reynolds Aluminum Company.

Oil has been discovered offshore, and production by an American (Gulf)-Japanese-Belgian consortium is scheduled to begin in 1975. This production is expected fully to replace or offset Zaire's petroleum imports. Onshore oil concessions are also being explored, as are deposits of methane gas in Lake Kivu.

Expanding minerals production, particularly copper, will continue to be the primary motive force in Zaire's economic development for at least the next decade. Copper production, which in 1973 generated 65 percent of Zaire's export earnings and was the principal source of government revenue, is expected to rise from about 500,000 metric tons in 1974 to over 800,000 tons in 1980 and to account for 70 percent of exports. Production is now in the hands of two companies—the state company GECAMINES (*Générale des Carrières et des Mines*), formed in 1967 upon nationalization of the Belgian-owned *Union Minière de Haute Katanga*, and SODIMIZA (*Société de Développement Industriel et Mines du Zaire*), a Japanese company which began production in 1972. A third company, SMFT (*Société Minière de Tenke-Fungarume*), partly American-owned, plans to go into production in 1977.

Agriculture

Zaire's differing climatic zones permit cultivation of a wide variety of crops. Some 85 percent of the Zairians live a rural life, cultivating the land by traditional methods. These farmers, usually working small plots, mainly produce staples for local markets and provide some palm oil, rubber, coffee, and cotton for export. Since the end of 1973 most foreign-owned plantations have been expropriated, with ownership transferred to private Zairians or state companies.

Agriculture has lagged behind other sectors of the economy. Exports are generally falling and net food imports are increasing. There has been relatively little investment in agriculture since independence, and essential river and road transportation, severely disrupted by civil disturbances in the 1960's, has not yet been fully re-

stored. The government has now declared agricultural development to be its top economic priority.

Trade and Industry

Zaire's export earnings depend principally upon fluctuations in the world price for copper. There was a $305 million balance-of-trade surplus and a $61 million balance-of-payments surplus in 1973. However, as the price of copper fell sharply in the second half of 1974, Zaire's foreign trade and foreign exchange balances fell into deficit.

In comparison with other sub-Saharan African countries, Zaire has a large and diversified manufacturing base, with activities centered principally at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. These areas have substantial sources of electric power, benefit from sizable urban manpower resources, and are located on main transportation arteries.

The largest production gains since 1958 have occurred in consumer goods, particularly processed food and clothing. This has been brought about by increasing consumer demand reflecting the inflationary pressures of recent years, the growing urban population, and the relatively high consumption patterns of an emerging money-income middle class. Also, the earlier decline in export earnings, which had forced a reduction in imports and the imposition of import restrictions, was a stimulus to local production of some industrial and consumer items. A steel mill is soon to go into production, and government policy prescribes increased emphasis on heavy industry.

Foreign Investment

During the colonial period Belgians and other foreigners established plantations, mining complexes, industrial plants, and supporting transportation and trade facilities. Total foreign investment in 1971 was estimated at more than $3.5 billion.

To encourage foreign investment, the Government of Zaire in June 1969 published a new investment code which provides a tax holiday and other benefits for new investors. In the 1970-72 period, direct foreign investment averaged about $80 million a year. Foreign investment covered by the new code was exempted from the Zairianization measures announced by President Mobutu in November 1973 and from new nationalization measures outlined by the government at the end of 1974. New private investment is welcomed. The government has declared its intention, however, to take 50 percent of the equity in all new mining ventures and has set standards for the progressive Zairianization of management in foreign-owned companies.

U.S. investment in Zaire rose from about $25 million in 1970 to between $100 and $200 million in 1974. The principal U.S. investments are in oil exploration and production, copper mining, flour milling, auto assembly, textiles, tire and battery production, and tourist facilities. Planned additional investment is primarily in the mining and tourist sectors. U.S. petroleum marketing companies, which were not covered by the investment code, were affected by the nationalization of that industry in 1973-74. Negotiations for compensation were in progress at the beginning of 1975.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Since President Mobutu's assumption of power in 1965, Zaire has made peace with its neighbors and has assumed a significant role in African politics. It is an active member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in September 1967 hosted that organization's Chiefs of State conference. Zaire has given diplomatic and material support to liberation groups in non-self-governing territories in Africa, particularly to the Front for the National Liberation of Angola. Following the April 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal, it assumed a major part in negotiations among the Portuguese, the competing Angolan nationalist movements, and independent African states to facilitate a peaceful transition to independence in Angola.

In the fall of 1973 President Mobutu acted as pointsman in the swing of black African support from Israel to the Arabs. He continues to promote African-Arab solidarity but has called upon the Arab oil producers to give more financial support to African countries, particularly those most seriously affected by increased oil prices. Zaire itself has received loans from a number of Arab countries.

Through a formal tripartite organization, Zaire seeks increased cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere, with the other two former Belgian colonies on its eastern border, Rwanda and Burundi. President Mobutu also has periodic tripartite meetings with the Presidents of Zambia and Tanzania to discuss issues of mutual interest. The Zairian Armed Forces have provided military training assistance to a number of smaller African countries. Zaire has contributed to drought relief in the Sahel and has urged other African countries to do the same.

Internationally Zaire pursues a policy of nonalignment between East and West and seeks to promote the economic interests of the developing countries. President Mobutu has normalized relations with the Communist countries, from which rebellious groups in Zaire once received substantial support. As a result, Zaire now receives a significant amount of economic assistance from the People's Republic of China and Romania, as well as from the United States, Canada, and Western European countries.

President Mobutu has called for an economic "alliance of the oppressed" against the developed countries. Zaire has welcomed the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in raising the price of oil and favors similar cartel action by producers of other raw materials, as well as broader cooperation among producer-country associations and a greater say for developing countries in international economic and financial organizations. Zaire is one of four members of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). In late 1974 it joined in the CIPEC effort to raise the depressed price of copper by reducing member countries' exports.

Zaire's relationship with Belgium remains important to both countries. Belgium is Zaire's principal trading partner and source of technical assistance, and mutually beneficial cooperation continues between Zaire and Belgium's Société Générale in the copper industry. In 1974 the Government of Zaire and Société Générale reached final agreement on compensation for nationalization of the former mining

giant *Union Minière de Haute Katanga*, as well as agreement on future cooperation between Société Générale and Zaire in copper production and marketing. At the end of 1974 claims for compensation of other nationalized Belgian interests remained to be settled.

U.S.-ZAIRE RELATIONS

Relations between Zaire and the United States have been excellent since Zaire's independence. The two countries share an interest in promoting economic growth and peaceful political development in central Africa. The United States has sought to assist Zaire in its efforts to build a nation and to achieve economic and social progress. Total U.S. bilateral economic and military aid to Zaire through fiscal year 1974 was about $500 million. Current aid programs are concentrated in the fields of transportation, health, nutrition, and agriculture. About 240 Peace Corps volunteers in Zaire work primarily in education, health, road maintenance, and agriculture. About a half billion dollars in direct loans and guarantees have been made available by the Export-Import Bank in support of U.S. trade and investment in Zaire.

Each year the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Zairian Government, invites prominent government officials, media representatives, educators, and scholars to visit the United States to become better acquainted with the American people and to exchange ideas and views of mutual interest with their American colleagues. This cooperative effort in mutual understanding is furthered through frequent visits to Zaire by representatives of American business and educational institutions, as well as by visits of Fulbright-Hays scholars and specialists in a variety of fields.

Former Secretary of State William P. Rogers visited Kinshasa in February 1970. In August 1970 President Mobutu Sese Seko made an official visit to the United States. He met with then-President Richard Nixon in Washington once again in October 1973. During President Mobutu's official visit, President Nixon made the following observation: "The Congo is a good investment, not only because of its natural wealth but because of a wealth even more important than its natural resources—a strong and vigorous and progressive people and a stable leadership."

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Deane R. Hinton

Counselor of Embassy—Michael H. Newlin

Director, U.S. AID Mission—Fermino J. Spencer

Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—James Tull

Peace Corps Director—William H. Crosson

Chief of Military Assistance Mission (ZAMISH)—Col. John P. Geraci

Principal Officer, Lubumbashi—Edward Marks

Principal Officer, Bukavu—David W. Loving

The U.S. Embassy in Zaire is located at 6 Avenue des Aviateurs, Kinshasa.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7793
Revised January 1975

APPENDIX YY
ZAMBIA
BACKGROUND NOTES

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[Washington, Department of State, April 1976 (Publication 7841)]

background notes

Zambia

department of state * april 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Zambia

GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, is in south-central Africa. It is bordered by Zaire (formerly Congo, Kinshasa), Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia (South West Africa), and Angola.

Zambia is a high plateau country with an elevation of 3,000-4,000 feet above sea level. A watershed crosses the north and contains streams which flow into two great rivers of Africa, the Zambezi in the south and the Zaïre (Congo) in the north. Northeast Zambia is drained by the Chambezi, which flows south into the great swamps of Lake Bangweulu. Although navigable for considerable distances, these two rivers are broken by many waterfalls. Victoria Falls on the Zambezi River near Livingstone is one of the world's greatest waterfalls.

The climate, modified by altitude, is considered subtropical. Minimum temperatures range from 43°F to 53°F in winter (May–August) and maximums from 80°F to about 100°F in summer (September–March). The main rainfall is concentrated from about October into April with an average of 25–30 inches a year.

Most Zambians are subsistence farmers; however, an increasing number are moving to urban areas. The majority adhere to traditional African religions, but there is a significant and growing Christian minority.

Europeans (43,390 in 1969, the most recent statistics available), largely of British or South African origin, live mainly in Lusaka and in the Copper Belt in northern Zambia where they are employed in mines and related activities. There is also a small Asian community in the country.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 290,724 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Tex.). CAPITAL: Lusaka (pop. 415,000). OTHER CITIES: Kitwe (310,000), Ndola (222,000).

People

POPULATION: 5 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.9%. DENSITY: 15 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 98% African (mainly Bantu). RELIGIONS: Animist, Christian. LANGUAGES: English (official), about 70 local languages and dialects. LITERACY: 20%.

Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: October 24, 1964. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1973.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State), Central Committee of Party, Cabinet. *Legislative*–unicameral parliament (National Assembly). *Judicial*–High Court, magisterial courts.

POLITICAL PARTY: United National Independence Party (UNIP). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Provinces subdivided into districts.

FLAG: Green field with small vertical stripes (red, black, orange) in lower right corner and orange eagle above stripes.

Economy

GDP: $1.389 billion (1975). GDP GROWTH RATE: –3% in constant 1965 prices; –20.4% in current prices. PER CAPITA INCOME: $360.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 30% (est.). *Labor* 85% (est.). *Products*–maize, tobacco, cotton, groundnuts, sugar cane.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 15% (est.). *Products*–foodstuffs, beverages, chemicals, textiles, fertilizers.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Copper, zinc, lead, cobalt, coal.

TRADE (1974): *Exports*–$1.410 billion: copper, zinc, lead, cobalt, tobacco. *Partners*–Japan, UK, FRG. *Imports*–$785 million: manufactured goods, machinery, transport equipment, foodstuffs. *Partners*–UK, Japan, South Africa, US, FRG.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 kwacha=US$1.56.


ECONOMIC AID: *Donors*–PRC, UK, Italy, Yugoslavia, FRG. *US only*–$21 million (1964-73).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, OAU, Commonwealth of Nations, Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC).

HISTORY

Some of the ancestors of the present-day Zambians probably began to arrive in the area about 2,000 years ago and eventually displaced or absorbed the indigenous stone age hunters and gatherers. The major waves of Bantu-speaking immigrants began to arrive in the 15th century with the greatest influx in the period from the late 17th to the early 19th centuries. They came primarily from among the Luba and Lunda tribes of southern Zaire and northern Angola but were joined in the 19th century by Ngoni peoples from the south. By the latter part of that century the various peoples of Zambia were largely established in the areas they occupy today.

With the exception of an occasional Portuguese explorer, the area that is now Zambia lay untouched by Euro-



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peans for centuries. After the mid-19th century it was penetrated by Western explorers, missionaries, and traders. David Livingstone first saw Victoria Falls in 1855.

In 1888 Cecil Rhodes, spearheading British commercial and political interests in central Africa, obtained a mineral rights concession from indigenous chiefs. In the same year Northern and Southern Rhodesia were proclaimed a British sphere of influence. Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed and granted self-government in 1923; the administration of Northern Rhodesia transferred to the British Colonial Office in 1924 as a protectorate.

The two Rhodesias were joined in 1953 with Nyasaland (now Malawi) to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia was the center of much of the turmoil and crises which prevailed in the Federation in its last years. At the core of the controversy were the insistent African demands for greater participation in government and the fears of the Europeans for their future if they yielded government control to the Africans.

A two-stage election was held in October and December 1962 resulting in an African majority in the Legislative Council and an uneasy coalition between the two African nationalist parties. The council passed resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the Federation and demanding full internal self-government under a new constitution and a new parliament based on a broader, more democratic franchise. On December 31, 1963, the Federation was dissolved. The nationalist demand for independence was achieved on October 24, 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia.

GOVERNMENT

Zambia was the first British territory to become a republic immediately upon attaining independence. The constitution promulgated on August 25, 1973, abrogated the original 1964 constitution. The new Constitution and the national elections which followed in December 1973 were the

final steps in the movement which had been underway formally and informally for several years to what is now called a "one-party participatory democracy."

The 1973 Constitution provides for a strong President and a unicameral parliament (National Assembly). Under the new system, the 25-member Central Committee of the sole legal party in Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), formulates national policy and the Cabinet executes the policy.

In accordance with the intention to formalize UNIP supremacy in the new system, the Constitution stipulates that the sole candidate in elections for the office of President of the Republic of Zambia is the person selected to be the President of UNIP by the party's general conference. The second-ranking person in the Zambian Government hierarchy is the Secretary General of the UNIP rather than the Prime Minister.

The President is elected by popular mandate to a 5-year term. He may exercise a veto over any piece of legislation. If the National Assembly passes a previously vetoed bill by a two-thirds vote, the President may either assent to the legislation within 21 days or dissolve the Assembly. The Secretary General of UNIP is appointed by the President of the party (and the nation) from the membership of the party's central committee. Members of the Zambian Cabinet, including the Prime Minister (but not the party Secretary General, an ex-officio member of the Cabinet), must be appointed by the President from the membership of the National Assembly. Zambia is divided into nine Provinces, each administered by a Cabinet Minister.

The unicameral National Assembly is composed of a maximum of 136 members, of whom 125 are elected to 5-year terms. The President may appoint as many as 10 additional members to enhance the representative character of the Assembly. A Speaker is elected by the members of the National Assembly from outside their own ranks. Candidates for National Assembly seats are elected on a universal adult suffrage basis. However, they must be members of UNIP and selection of candidates (up to three per constituency) is further controlled by the party through a primary election system in which only party officials may vote.

A House of Chiefs represents the interests of the traditional tribal authorities of the country and is purely an advisory body.

The judiciary is independent, although appointed by the President. The highest court is the High Court.

Principal Government Officials

President; Minister of Defense—Kenneth David Kaunda
Secretary General, Central Committee of UNIP—Alexander Grey Zulu
Prime Minister—Elijah Mudenda

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Rupiah Banda
Finance—Luke Mwananshiku
Home Affairs—Aaron Milner
Mines and Industry—Axon J. Soko
Commerce—Clement Mwananshiku
Education—F.M. Mulikita
Health—Dr. Mutumba Bull

Ambassador to the U.S.—Siteke G. Mwale
Ambassador to the U.N.—Dunstan Kamana

Zambia maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2419 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing—Summer clothing is worn mid-Aug. to mid-May. Light woolen or wool-blended clothing is useful for winter (mid-May to mid-Aug.).

Customs and Currencies—Travelers from the US must obtain entry visas from the Zambian Embassy in Washington, D.C., or from the Zambian Mission to the UN in New York. A valid passport and records of inoculations for smallpox and cholera are also required. Travelers may be asked to declare the currencies they hold at the time of entry. Restrictions have been placed on the export of Zambian kwacha and other currencies.

Health—Standards in Lusaka and other urban areas are good. Water from the municipal system is safe. In general there need be little concern about health problems, except in remote areas. Malaria has been eliminated from most urban areas, but malaria suppressives are recommended for travel into the bush. A local infection can be contracted by bathing in certain streams, lakes, and ponds. Vaccinations against yellow fever, typhoid, and paratyphoid, although not required, are recommended.

Telecommunications—Direct dialing within Zambia is available from Lusaka only to a few cities. The Zambian Government is making a major effort to improve domestic service. International communications by telephone and telegraph are adequate but expensive. An INTELSAT ground station was opened in 1974.

Transportation—Airlines connect Lusaka with Athens, Rome, Paris, London, Nairobi, and other cities in Europe and Africa. Scheduled domestic service by Zambian Airways provide direct connections to the larger provincial towns. Zambia Railways provides passenger service within the country and to Dar es Salaam, but service is slow.

Paved roads lead from Lusaka to the Tanzanian and Malawian borders. Driving is on the left. Rental cars are available but expensive, as is gasoline. An inter-urban "luxury" bus service is available. Urban taxis and buses are few in number, very crowded, and schedules are erratic.

Sightseeing—Victoria Falls is becoming the center of a modern resort area with a variety of accommodations available. The Zambian National Tourist Bureau offers an all-expense-paid weekend tour from Lusaka to the Falls. Kafue and Luanga Valley National Parks are among the largest in Africa. Both parks are abundantly stocked with native wildlife and offer full accommodations to visitors. Several smaller parks near Lusaka offer one-day trips.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The major figure in Zambian politics is President Kenneth Kaunda. He has wide popular support and has proven himself capable of bridging the rivalries that have existed among the country's various regions and ethnic groups. He advocates government according to his philosophy of "humanism," a loosely structured African Socialist doctrine which stresses the tradition of cooperation among the people but not at the expense of the individual.

President Kaunda is President of the UNIP, which was founded in 1959 and has ruled Zambia since independ-

ence. The former opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), was formed in 1948 and was headed by Harry Nkumbula. It was formally dissolved in 1973. The United Progressive Party (UPP) was founded in 1971 by Simon Kapwepwe to oppose UNIP but was banned in February 1972 on charges of threatening the security of the state.


The ANC, which began the Zambian independence movement but eventually lost most of its leaders and adherents to UNIP, found its main support among the Tonga tribe in the south and to a lesser extent the Lozi and Lunda peoples in the west. The UPP drew its support from the Bemba-speaking people in the north. Only UNIP had a nationwide following, though it was weak in some areas.

In February 1972 President Kaunda announced that Zambia would become a one-party democracy after a special national commission had studied the constitutional and legal changes required to convert to the new system. The national commission undertook extensive consultations throughout Zambia in which representatives of virtually every group were able to state their views about the way the new system should function. Subsequently, the commission published a detailed report of its findings upon which the drafters of the new constitution drew extensively.

ECONOMY

The Zambian economy is based primarily on copper, of which Zambia traditionally has been the world's third largest producer (after the United States and Canada) and the leading exporter. Copper accounts for 50 percent of Zambia's gross national product (GNP), 96 percent of the value of its exports, and one-third to one-half of government revenue. In 1975 Zambia produced 636,000 metric tons of copper with a value of approximately $705 million. A sharp fall in world demand for copper from the high point of mid-1974 has had serious repercussions on the Zambian economy. Copper revenues in 1975 were only 52 percent of what they had been the year before when copper prices hit an all-time high of $3,050 per metric ton. This in turn has generated serious balance-of-payments problems and led to a decline in imports.

Traditionally, the most important elements of the Zambian economy were foreign owned. In recent years



The National Assembly building in Lusaka.

the government has adopted a policy of acquiring majority interest in the country's major industrial firms and has restricted commerce by non-Zambians to a prescribed list of commodities. This effort has been accompanied by a drive to "Zambianize" important positions in the economy previously held by expatriates. In January 1970 the government acquired 51 percent interest in the two major copper companies, one of which was predominately U.S. owned, and agreed to compensate the owners out of future earnings. In September 1973 the government announced further measures designed to obtain greater control of the key copper mining sector. The most important of these measures were the redemption for cash of the bonds issued to the companies in 1970 in compensation for the 51 percent interest taken over by the government, further Zambianization of management and board-of-director-level positions, abrogation of previously favorable tax and foreign exchange treatment, and abrogation of sales and management contracts. By mid-1974 agreement on all these measures had been reached between the Zambian Government and company officials.

A major objective of the Zambian Government is to use the country's mineral wealth to advance the economic and social welfare of the entire country. Economic development has been confined largely to the area along the rail line from the Copper Belt in the north to Livingstone in the south. In view of the current low price of copper the government hopes particularly to encourage agricultural development in a bid to become self-sufficient in food production, establish new industries based on agricultural products, and reverse the drift of rural unemployed into the cities.

The Zambian GNP rose from $1.3 billion in 1967 to an estimated $1.8 billion in 1975. Zambia had trade surpluses of over $600 million in 1973 and 1974, respectively. However, low world copper prices caused a trade deficit in 1975.

Because of Zambian opposition to the racial policies of South Africa and Rhodesia, Zambia has reduced and is seeking to end its trade with South Africa and has virtually ended its trade with Rhodesia.

In early 1973 Southern Rhodesia closed its border with Zambia. A month later the Salisbury regime realized it had made a political error in this action and reopened the border. However Zambia, citing the demonstrated vulnerability of its transit routes to the sea through Southern Rhodesia due to Rhodesian political pressures and its desire to fully implement U.N. economic sanctions against the Salisbury regime, announced that it would keep the border closed. This necessitated a trade-route reorientation away from the traditional Zambian route to the sea through Southern Rhodesia for about half of its vital copper exports and two-thirds of all imports. The abrupt shift in import-export route patterns proceeded smoothly during 1973-74 with the bulk of inbound Zambian freight, formerly transited across Rhodesia, coming through the ports of Lobito in Angola and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Smaller amounts were also routed through Mombasa in Kenya and Mozambique's ports of Nacala and Beira. However, in mid-1975 civil conflict in neighboring Angola caused prolonged interruption in operation of the Benguela Railway to Lobito. This route had been accounting for 55 percent of Zambia's copper exports and for 45 percent of its imports. The Tan-Zam Railway, which runs from the Zambian line of rail to Dar es Salaam, was essentially completed about this same time and was thus able to absorb some of the traffic. Congestion in the port of Dar es Salaam, however, has limited total exports over this route, adding a further burden to Zambia's faltering economy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Zambia follows a policy of nonalignment in foreign affairs and has taken a leading role in the nonaligned nations movement. Its major foreign policy concern is to promote majority rule in South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), and Rhodesia, all of which are controlled by white minorities. Since the Portuguese coup of April 1974 opened the way to independence for the neighboring Portuguese possessions of Angola and Mozambique, Zambia has been active in efforts to try to effect peaceful change in these countries and in those still under white rule. Zambia has taken a leading role in working for a merger of black nationalist movements in Rhodesia and in encouraging them to seek a political settlement with that country's white rulers.

In keeping with its nonaligned policy, Zambia accepts aid from East and West. The largest foreign assistance project has been the construction of the 1,056-mile Tan-Zam Railway from Kapiri Mposhi in northern Zambia to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The railway was financed by a $400 million, interest-free loan from the People's Republic of China. Construction began in October 1970 and was substantially completed by October 1975.

U.S.-ZAMBIA RELATIONS

Although the United States and Zambia have differing viewpoints on some international issues, relations

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between the two countries are good. The United States shares Zambia's concern for the promotion of self-determination and majority rule in the white-controlled areas of southern Africa. In support of these goals, the U.S. Government bans the sale of arms for use in South Africa, enforces economic sanctions against Rhodesia (except for exemptions from the sanctions for strategic minerals), and discourages new American investment in Namibia (South West Africa). Zambia, however, would prefer that the United States take even more vigorous action. Zambia also shares the U.S. concern over the intervention of Soviet and Cuban forces in the Angolan civil conflict and has called for their withdrawal.

The United States provided more than $21 million in bilateral economic aid to Zambia in the period from independence in 1964 through 1973. Through a number of emergency measures, the United States also assisted Zambia in meeting the adverse economic effects resulting from the Southern Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Most recently, in 1973, the United States made a $5 million program loan to Zambia which was designed to help the country cope with the economic consequences of the Trade Route Reorientation Program. In addition, the United States is currently assisting in constructing highways in Malawi and Botswana that will help link Zambia with its neighbors.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–Jean M. Wilkowski
Deputy Chief of Mission–Peter P. Lord
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)–John T. Burns
Economic/Commercial Officer–Raymond C. Jorgenson

The U.S. Embassy is located at Independence Ave. and United Nations Rd., Lusaka.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7841, Revised April 1976

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
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
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
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
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


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

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

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Faya-Largeau
Al Junaynah
Al Fāshir
JABAL MARRAH
3087
Al Ubayyiḍ
An Nuhūd
Umm Ruwābak
Abū Zabad
Nyala
Babanūsah
Ar Rank
Ar Ruṣayrīṣ
White Nile
Blue Nile
AL JAZĪRAH
Nahr Atbarah
Lake Nasser
NUBIAN DESERT
SUDAN
CHAD
NIGER
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
CAMEROON
NIGERIA
CONGO
Douala
Yaoundé
Edéa
Eséka
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ERG DU TÉNÉRÉ
GRAND ERG ORIENTAL
HAMADA
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1800
Ghāt
Ghadāmis
Nālūt
Mizdah
Gharyān
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TUNISIA
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TRIPOLITANIA
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GULF OF SIDRA
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867
Tobruk
As Sallūm
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ALEXANDRIA
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Mt. Margherita 5119
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Administrative line



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Mosul
Irbīl
Kirkūk
Dayr az Zawr
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Damascus
Israeli occupied
Jerusalem
Amman
Beersheba
JORDAN
Ma'ān
Ra's an Naqb
Al 'Aqabah
Elat
Gulf of Aqaba
Tabūk
Al Ṭur
Tabrīz
Mīāneh
Rasht
CASPIAN SEA
Qazvin
ELBURZ MTS.
TEHERAN
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Khānaqīn
Kermānshāh
Qom
Baghdad
IRAQ
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Eşfahān
IRAN
Yazd
Al Basrah
Abādān
KUWAIT
Kuwait
Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone
Bushehr
Shīrāz
Kermān
DASHT-E LŪT
Ashkhabad
U. S. S. R.
Mary
Dushanbe
Bandar-e Shāh
Mashhad
Shārūd
Mazār-i-Sharīf
Kushka
Herāt
5143
Kābul
AFGHANISTAN
Farah
Kandahār
Chaman
Quetta
Zāhedān
PAKISTAN
Bandar 'Abbās
PERSIAN GULF
Dhahran
BAHRAIN
Manama
Doha
QATAR
Al Ḥufūf
Riyadh
Al Kharj
Ḥaraḍ
Ash Shāriqah
To Oman
Al Fujayrah
Gwādar
GULF OF OMAN
Abu Dhabi
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Al Buraymī
Muscat
Al Ḥadd
Al 'Ulá
Medina
Aswān
HEJAZ
NEJD
SAUDI ARABIA
Juddah
Mecca
TIHAMA
RED SEA
NUBIAN DESERT
Port Sudan
Abū Ḥamad
Al Qunfudhah
Ṭawkar
Barbar
'Aṭbarah
Ad Dāmir
Shandī
Khartoum North
Kassalā
Ak'ordat
Keren
Mits'iwa
Āsmera
Decamere
Blue Nile
Wad Madanī
Al Qaḍārif
Sannār
Gonder
Gorgora
Ar Rank
Ar Ruṣayriṣ
White Nile
Lake Tana
Waldeyā
Dasē
Debre Mark'os
Malakāl
Nek'emtē
Addis Ababa
Mojo
Gambēlā
Gorē
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Kapoeta
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Namuruputh
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Moyālē
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UGANDA
Lodwar
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Moroto
Atura
Soroti
Butiaba
Marsabit
KENYA
Wajir
Maralal
Kitale
ELGON 4321
Jīzān
YEMEN (Ṣanā)
Ṣan'ā'
KAMARAN
(Yemen-A)
Al Ḥudaydah
Mocha
Ta'izz
3666
Mek'elē
4620
Āsēb
Aden
YEMEN (Aden)
Say'ūn
Al Mukalla
SOCOTRA (Yemen-A)
Ṣalālah
OMAN
RUB' AL KHALI
AL MAŞIRAH
ARABIAN SEA
GULF OF ADEN
Bab el Mandeb
QENAKIL
F.T.A.I. (Fr.)
Tadjoura
Djibouti
Zeila
Ayshā
Dagahabur
Dirē Dawa
Dabra Berhān
Jijigā
Harer
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Mojo
Ajula
RAS ASĒR
Candala
Bender Cassim
Mait
Scusciuban
Borama
Berbera
Hargeysa
Burao
Gardo
Bender Beila
Las Anod
Eil
OGĀDĒN
Administrative line
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

River Cess
Greenville
Harper
Sassandra
Abidjan
Tarkwa
Cape Coast
Sekondi
Port Harc
GULF OF GUINEA
EQU
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SAO TOME AND PR
SÃO TOM
Equator
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ANNOBON
(Equat. Guinea)
SOUTH
ASCENSION
(U.K.)
10
ATLANTIC
SAINT HELENA
(U.K.)
OCEAN
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AFRICA
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Sinusoidal Equal-Area Projection
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KILOMETERS



Sokoto
Maradi
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Katsina
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Benin City
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Warri
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Port Harcourt
Mamfe
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Yabassi
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Edéa
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Malabo
FERNANDO PO
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PRÍNCIPE
AND PRINCIPE
SÃO TOMÉ
São Tomé
Libreville
Port-Gentil
GABON
Mouila
Lambaréné
Franceville
Owando
CONGO
Gamboma
Djambala
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Loubomo
Brazzaville
Kayes
Pointe-Noire
Dolisie
Tshela
Cabinda
Matadi
Boma
Santo António do Zaire
Maquela do Zombo
Ambrizete
Carmona
Luanda
Salazar
Dondo
Malanje
Porto Amboim
Novo Redondo
ANGOLA
Lobito
Benguela
Teixeira da Silva
Huambo
Silva Porto
Vila Mariano Machado
Vila da Ponte
Matala
Serpa Pinto
Cuchi
Moçâmedes
Sá da Bandeira
Chiange
Roçadas
Pereira de Eca
Tsumeb
Otavi
Grootfontein
NAMIBIA
(SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)
Karibib
Okahandja
Swakopmund
Walvis Bay
WALVIS BAY
(South Africa)
Windhoek
Gobabis
2483
Rehoboth
Mariental
Keetmanshoop
Lüderitz
NAMIB DESERT
KALAHARI DESERT
BOTSWANA
Francistown
Tshane
Gaborone
Lobatse
Mafeking
JOHANNESBURG
Vryburg
Pretoria
Germiston
Springs
Mbabane
Maputo
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Krugersdorp
Pietersburg
Mahalatswe
Serowe
Messina
Beitbridge
Chicualacuala
Vilanculos
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Xai Xai
Guijá
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Fort Victoria
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Plumtree
West Nicholson
Rutenga
Gwelo
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Wankie
Gatooma
Umtali
Vila de Manica
Vila do Dondo
Beira
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
(U.K.)
Salisbury
Sinoia
Shamva
Dona Ana
Vila Fontes
Marromeu
Mulobezi
Kalomo
Sesheke
Livingstone
Victoria Falls
Lake Kariba
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Chipata
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Vila Manica
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Popokabaka
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GABON
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AND PRINCIPE
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Bozoum
Bossangoa
Bria
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1038
Oyem
Mekambo
Makokou
Mbandaka
Boende
Ubundu
Lubutu
Lisala
Bumba
Aketi
Buta
Isiro
Mungbere
Bondo
Niangara
Faradje
Arua
UGANDA
Gulu
Pakwach
Atura
Moroto
Soroti
Butiaba
Lake Albert
Lake Kyoga
Komanda
Mambasa
Bafwasende
Fort Portal
Kasese
Mubende
Mityana
Kampala
Beni
Kisangani
MT. MARGHERITA
5119
Jinja
Kitale
Eldoret
Tororo
Nyahururu Falls
Nakuru
Kisumu
Naivasha
Kisii
Lake Victoria
Masaka
Mbarara
Entebbe
Kabale
Rutshuru
Goma
Bukoba
Kigali
RWANDA
Musoma
Magadi
Arusha
Bukavu
Mwanza
Shabunda
Bujumbura
BURUNDI
Uvira
Gitega
Kahama
Shinyanga
Kindu
Kibombo
Kasongo
Fizi
Kigoma
Uvinza
Kabambare
Tabora
Singida
Itigi
TANZANIA
Dodoma
Kongwa



Barbar
'Aṭbarah
Ad Dāmir
Nahr 'Aṭbarah
Shandī
Khartoum North
Kassalā
Ak'ordat
Keren
Mits'iwa
Asmera
Decamere
Wad Madanī
Al Qaḍārif
Sannār
AL JAZĪRAH
Blue Nile
White Nile
Adigrat
Mek'elē
4620
Gonder
Gorgora
Ar Rank
Ar Ruṣayriṣ
Waldeyā
Dasē
Debre Mark'os
Malakāl
Nek'emtē
Addis Ababa
Mojo
Gambēlā
Gorē
Jimā
Pibor Post
Bor
Kapoeta
Admin line
Namuruputh
Nimule
Mēgā
Movālē
UGANDA
Gulu
Pakwach
Atura
Moroto
Soroti
Butiaba
Lodwar
Lake Rudolf
Marsabit
KENYA
Wajir
ELGON 4321
Kitale
Maralal
Tororo
Mityana
Nyahururu Falls
Nanyuki
Isiolo
KENYA 5199
Jinja
Eldoret
Entebbe
Nakuru
Kisumu
Murang'a
Garissa
Naivasha
Kisii
Nairobi
Machakos
Magadi
Musoma
Mwanza
KILIMANJARO 5963
Moshi
Voi
Malindi
Arusha
Shinyanga
Same
Mombasa
PEMBA
Chake Chake
Singida
Tanga
Korogwe
Handeni
Tabora
Itigi
TANZANIA
Dodoma
Kongwa
Bagamoyo
Zanzibar
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
Rungwa
Kilosa
Morogoro
Kidatu
Iringa
MAFIA I.
Rufiji
Lake Rukwa
Sumbawanga
Ifakara
Chunya
Mahenge
Kilwa Kivinje
Mbeya
2961
Njombe
Nakonde
Chitipa
Lindi
Mtwara
Nachingwea
Songea
Masasi
Tunduru
Vila de Mocímboa da Praia
Mzimba
Nkhotakota
Kota Kota
MALAWI
Lilongwe
Lichinga
Marrupa
Pemba
Salima
Mangochi
Cuamba
Nacala
Zomba
Nampula
Lumbo
Vila Manica
Blantyre
Milange
Tete
Angoche
Vila de Mocuba
Pebane
Dona Ana
Vila Fontes
Quelimane
Marromeu
Vila de Manica
Vila do Dondo
Beira
MOÇAMBIQUE
CHANNEL
BASSAS DA INDIA
(Fr.)
Beroroha
Morombe
Fianarantsoa
Ambohimahasoa
Ambositra
Morondava
Antsirabe
Ambatolampy
Tananarive
Maintirano
Ambatosoratra
Maevatanana
Majunga
Analalava
2879
Antalaha
Mananara
Tamatave
Moramanga
Mahanoro
ÎLE CHESTERFIELD
(Madagascar)
ÎLES BARREN
(Madagascar)
ÎLE JUAN DE NOVA
(Fr.)
MADAGASCAR
ÎLE SAINTE-MARIE
(Madagascar)
ÎLE TROMELIN
(Fr.)
CARGADOS CARAJOS SHOALS
(Mauritius)
Port Louis
MAURITIUS
Saint-Denis
REUNION
(Fr.)
RODRIGUES
(Mauritius)
MASCARENE ISLANDS
Canal des Pangalanes
ALDABRA ISLANDS
COSMOLEDO GROUP
FARQUHAR GROUP
AGALEGA ISLANDS
(Mauritius)
ÎLES GLORIEUSES
(Fr.)
CAP D'AMBRE
Diégo-Suarez
COMOROS
Moroni
Dzaoudzi
NOSY BE
(Madagascar)
SEYCHELLES
MAHE
Victoria
AMIRANTE ISLES
COETIVY I.
INDIAN OCEAN
Şalālah
YEMEN
(Sana)
San'ā'
Say'ūn
KAMARAN
(Yemen-A)
Al Ḥudaydah
YEMEN
(Aden)
Al Mukallā
Ta'izz
Mocha
Aden
Aseb
SOCOTRA
(Yemen-A)
GULF OF ADEN
Bāb el Mandeb
DENAKIL
F.T.A.I.
(Fr.)
Tadjoura
Djibouti
Zeila
Alula
RAS ASĒR
Candala
Bender Cassim
Mait
Ayshā
Scusciuban
Berbera
Borama
Dirē Dawa
Dabra Berhān
Jijiga
Hārer
Āwash
Hargeysa
Burao
Gardo
Bender Beila
Dagahabur
Las Anod
Eil
ETHIOPIA
OGĀDĒN
Dilla
4307
Omo
Wabī Shebelē
Administrative line
SOMALIA
Nagēlē
Belet Weyne
Obbia
Dolo
Ganane
Baidoa
Bardera
Mogadiscio
Brava
Gelib
Giamama
Chisimayu
Lainu
Tana
Webi Shebeli
Juba
Lake Victoria
Lake Nyasa
Lake Rukwa
Lake Rudolf
Lake Turkana
Lake Chilwa
Lake Amaramba
Tunduru
Ruvuma
Rufiji
Zambezi
Shire
Tana
Omo
Juba
Webi Shebeli
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Nahr 'Aṭbarah
Wadi Hadramaut
Wadi Mandeb
Lake Rudolf
Lake Victoria
Lake Nyasa
Lake Rukwa
Lake Chilwa
Lake Amaramba
Tunduru
Ruvuma
Rufiji
Zambezi
Shire
Tana
Omo
Juba
Webi Shebeli
Nile
Blue Nile
White Nile
Nahr 'Aṭbarah
Wadi Hadramaut
Wadi Mandeb
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10
20



S O U T H
ASCENSION
(U.K.)
10
A T L A N T I C
SAINT HELENA
(U.K.)
O C E A N
20
Tropic of Capricorn
30
AFRICA
Elevations in meters
Scale 1:15,000,000
Sinusoidal Equal-Area Projection
0 200 400 600 800
KILOMETERS
0 200 400 600 800
STATUTE MILES
30
20
10
0



Pointe-Noire
Cabinda
Santo António do Zaire
Matadi
Boma
Tshela
Luozi
Mbanza-Ngungu
Kenge
Kikwit
Popokabaka
Gungu
Maquela do Zombo
Kasongo-Lunda
Ambrizete
Carmona
Kahemba
Portugália
Luanda
Salazar
Dondo
Malanje
Henrique de Carvalho
Rio Cuango
ANGOLA
Porto Amboim
Novo Redondo
Lobito
Benguela
Teixeira da Silva
2619
Silva Porto
Huambo
Vila Mariano Machado
Cazombo
Luso
Balovale
Vila da Ponte
Matala
Serpa Pinto
Cuchi
Moçâmedes
Sá da Bandeira
Chiange
Roçadas
Pereira de Eça
Rio Cunene
Rio Cubango
NAMIBIA
(SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)
Tsumeb
Otavi
Grootfontein
Karibib
Okahandja
Windhoek
Gobabis
2483
Swakopmund
Walvis Bay
WALVIS BAY
(South Africa)
Rehoboth
NAMIB DESERT
Lüderitz
Keetmanshoop
Seeheim
Karasburg
Port Nolloth
Springbok
Bitterfontein
Calvinia
Saldanha
Malmesbury
Paarl
Cape Town
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
Worcester
Bredasdorp
CAPE AGULHAS
Swellendam
Mosselbaai
George
Oudtshoorn
Beaufort West
GREAT KAROO
Victoria West
Middelburg
Queenstown
Uitenhage
Port Elizabeth
Humansdorp
Port Alfred
East London
King William's Town
Aliwal North
Umtata
Kokstad
Port Shepstone
Durban
Richard's Bay
Pietermaritzburg
Lesotho
Maseru
Leribe
Bloemfontein
Prieska
SOUTH AFRICA
De Aar
Kimberley
Upington
Warrenton
Bethlehem
Ladysmith
Vryheid
Volksrust
Kroonstad
Potchefstroom
Vereeniging
Vryburg
Kuruman
Piet Retief
Springs
Germiston
JOHANNESBURG
Mafeking
Krugersdorp
Pretoria
Mbabane
SWAZILAND
Gollel
Maputo
Ermelo
Lobatse
Tshane
Gaborone
KALAHARI DESERT
Mariental
Serowe
Mahalatswe
Limpopo
Pietersburg
Francistown
Plumtree
West Nicholson
Rutenga
Fort Victoria
Bulawayo
Shabani
Beitbridge
Messina
Chicualacuala
Guijá
Xai Xai
Inharrime
Inhambane
Vilanculos
BASSAS DA INDIA
(Fr.)
BOTSWANA
Maun
Gwelo
Gatooma
Wankie
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
(U.K.)
Umtali
Vila de Manica
Vila do Dondo
Beira
Marromeu
Quelimane
Pebane
Vila Fontes
Dona Ana
Vila Pery
Sinoia
Shamva
Salisbury
Lake Kariba
Kariba Falls
Livingstone
Sesheke
Mulobezi
Kalomo
Kafue
Lusaka
Mongu
Zambezi
Songo
Tete
Vila Manica
Blantyre
Milange
Vila de Mocuba
MOZAMBIQUE
Mumbwa
Kabwe
Balovale
Ndola
Kapiri Mposhi
Chipata
ZAMBIA
Solwezi
Chingola
Sakania
Serenje
MUCHINGA MTS
Luangwa
Lubumbashi
Likasi
Kolwezi
Dilolo
Mwinilunga
Mansa
Mpika
Kasama
Lake Mweru
Lake Tanganyika
Bukama
Lubudi
Sandoa
Kamina
Kabongo
Manono
Mbuji-Mayi
Tshikapa
Kananga
Kabinda
Kabalo
Kongolo
Pweto
Mitwaba
Virungu
Kalemie
Mbala
Nakonde
Chitipa
Mbeya
2961
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Sumbawanga
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Kilosa
Morogoro
Kidatu
Ifakara
Mahenge
Chunya
Tabora
Iloi
Handeni
Bagamoyo
TANZANIA
Lake Rukwa
Ruaha
Rufiji
Lake Nyasa
Ruvuma
Nkhota Kota
MALAWI
Lilongwe
Mzimba
Tunduru
Songea
Nachingwea
Masasi
Lichinga
Marrupa
Salima
Mangochi
Zomba
Cuamba
Nampula
Lin
Kota Kota
Lake Malawi
Shire
Zambezi
Lake Kariba
Kariba Falls
Livingstone
Sesheke
Mulobezi
Kalomo
Kafue
Lusaka
Mongu
Balovale
Ndola
Kapiri Mposhi
Chipata
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Solwezi
Chingola
Sakania
Serenje
MUCHINGA MTS
Luangwa
Lubumbashi
Likasi
Kolwezi
Dilolo
Mwinilunga
Mansa
Mpika
Kasama
Lake Mweru
Lake Tanganyika
Bukama
Lubudi
Sandoa
Kamina
Kabongo
Manono
Mbuji-Mayi
Tshikapa
Kananga
Kabinda
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Kilosa
Morogoro
Kidatu
Ifakara
Mahenge
Chunya
Tabora
Iloi
Handeni
Bagamoyo
TANZANIA
Lake Rukwa
Ruaha
Rufiji
Lake Nyasa
Ruvuma
Nkhota Kota
MALAWI
Lilongwe
Mzimba
Tunduru
Songea
Nachingwea
Masasi
Lichinga
Marrupa
Salima
Mangochi
Zomba
Cuamba
Nampula
Lin
Kota Kota
Lake Malawi
Shire
10
20
30
40


ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
MAFIA I.
Rufiji
Kilwa Kivinje
Lindi
Mtwara
Vila de Mocímboa da Praia
Pemba
Nacala
Nampula
Lumbo
Angoche
Moroni
COMOROS
Dzaoudzi
NOSY BE (Madagascar)
Diégo-Suarez
CAP D'AMBRE
ÎLES GLORIEUSES (Fr.)
ALDABRA ISLANDS
COSMOLEDO GROUP
SEYCHELLES
COETIVY I.
FARQUHAR GROUP
AGALEGA ISLANDS (Mauritius)
Analalava
2879
Antalaha
ÎLE CHESTERFIELD (Madagascar)
Majunga
MADAGASCAR
Mananara
ÎLE TROMELIN (Fr.)
CARGADOS CARAJOS SHOALS (Mauritius)
ÎLE JUAN DE NOVA (Fr.)
Maevatanana
ÎLE SAINTE-MARIE (Madagascar)
Ambatosoratra
Tamatave
Maintirano
ÎLES BARREN (Madagascar)
Tananarive
Morámanga
Ambatolampy
Antsirabe
Mahanoro
RODRIGUES (Mauritius)
Port Louis
MAURITIUS
Morondava
Ambositra
Saint-Denis
REUNION (Fr.)
Ambohimahasoa
Fianarantsoa
Beroroha
Morombe
Ambalavao
Manakara
Ihosy
ÎLE EUROPA (Fr.)
Farafangana
Tulear
Betroka
Ambovombe
Fort-Dauphin
CAP SAINTE-MARIE
MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL
MASCARENE ISLANDS
INDIA
Canal des Pangalanes
10
20
30
50
60
70
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE


30°
15°W
0°
10:00 AM
1000
HOURS
11:00 AM
1100
HOURS
12:00
NOON
1200
HOURS
PEARY
LAND
Wandels Hav
Independence Fjord
Denmarks Fjord
VIII LAND
Nørske Øer (Islands)
A
R
C
G R E E N L A N D



15°E
30°
45°
1:00 PM
2:00 PM
3:00 PM
1300
1400
1500
HOURS
C T I C O
Nordkapp
Sjuøyane
NORDAUSTLANDET
Storøya
Kvitøya
Ostrov Viktoriya
(Island)
Zemlya Aleksandry
(Land)
Ostrov Solsberi
Ostrov Karla-Aleksa
Ostrov Dzheksona
Zemlya Georga
Proliv Britanskiy Kanal
Ostrov Gukera
Ostrov Mak-R
ZEMLYA FRA
(USSR)
S V A L B A R D
(Norway)
Kong Karls Land


60°
75°
90°
84°
4:00 PM
5:00 PM
6:00 PM
1600 HOURS
1700 HOURS
1800 HOURS
C E A N
SAVATYAYA
VORONIN
TROUGH
ANNA TROU
Ostrov Greem-Bell
Zemlya Vil'cheka
Ostrov Gallya
Ostrov Sal'm
Ostrov Ushakova
Ostrov Vize
Ostrov Shmidta
ARKHIPELAG (ARCHIPELAGO) SEDOVA
Mys Mednyy
ITSA IOSIFA



GRØNLAND
(DENMARK)
KONG FREDERIK
KONG CHRISTIAN DEN X LAND
Île de France
Skærfjorden
Store Koldewey
▲2145
Shannon Ø (Island)
75°
GREENLAND
SEA
OF GREENWICH
MERIDIAN
MOHNS RIDGE
Danmarksund
Scoresby Sund
Jan Mayen
(Norway)
NEW YORK – MURMANSK 3,844 – ARKHANGEL'SK 4,216
NORWEGIAN
BASIN
Denmark Strait
NORWEGIAN
SEA
ICELAND
1795
2043
Akureyri
Höfn
VESTFJORD


Isfjorden
Edgeøya
Storfjorden
Beltsund
VALLEY
BELLSUND
HORNSUND
Hopen
Sørkapp
STORFJORDRENNA
SPITSBERGEN BANK
TROUGH
B A R E N T S
S E A
Bjørnøya
(Norway)
BARENTS
RIDGE
MURMANSK
WESTERN NOVAYA ZEMLYA TROUGH
Nordkapp
Ostrov Mezhdusharskiy
Varangerfjorden
Vardø
Ostrov Kolguyev
Vesterålen
Lofoten
Vestfjorden
VALLEY
VESTFJORD
Murmansk
Polyostrov Kanin
Cheshskaya Guba
KOL'SKIY POLUOSTROV
Belomorsk
Arkhangel'sk
Beloye More
(White Sea)
ARCTIC


KARA
SEA
Mys Zhelaniya (Cape)
ZEMLYA NOVAYA ZEMLYA TROUGH
EAST NOVAYA ZEMLYA TROUGH
OSTROVA SERGEYA KIROVA
Ostrov Slozhnyy
OSTROVA TSIVOL'KI
Ostrov Makarova
ARKHIPELAG
Ostrov Nansena
NORDENSHEL'DA
ARKHANGEL'SK–MYS CHELYUSKIN 1,469
OSTROVA IZVESTIY TSIK
OSTROVA ARKTICHESKOGO INSTITUTA (ISLANDS)
75°
BYRRANGA
Ostrov Sverdrup
Pyasinskiy Zaliv
Ostrov Zapadnyy Kamennyy
GORY (MOUNTAINS)
Ostrov Vil'kitskogo
Ostrov Dikson
Ostrov Belyy
Ostrov Shokal'skogo
Ostrov Sibiryakova
Ostrov Oleniy
Yeniseyskiy Zaliv (Gulf)
Gol'chikha
Volochanka
POLUOSTROV YAMAL
Obskaya Guba (Bay)
▲106
GYDANSKIY POLUOSTROV (PENINSULA)
Pролiv Karskiye Vorota (Strait)
Ostrov Vaygach
Dudinka
Yenisey
PUTORANA
Novyy Port
Nyda
Taz
Igarka
ARCTIC CIRCLE
▲500
Krasnoselkup
Turukhansk
Ob'
Nadym
▲158
Tarko-Sale
SIBIR'


60°
45°
30°
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
REYKJANES RIDGE
FAEROE ISLANDS (Denmark)
Sudhuroy
Eysturoy
Streymoy
FAEROE BANK
BILL BAILEY'S BANK
SHETLAND ISLANDS (UK)
ROSEMARY BANK
ORKNEY ISLANDS
Pentland Firth
QUEBEC
GEORGE BLIGH BANK
ROCKALL BANK
OUTER HEBRIDES
Moray Firth
SCOTLAND
NORTH SEA
UNITED KINGDOM
DENMARK
Firth of Forth
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Inishtrahull Island
Newcastle
NORTHERN IRELAND
Donegal Bay
Belfast
IRELAND
DUBLIN
Irish Sea
Liverpool
Leeds
Hull
Sheffield
Manchester
ENGLAND
Birmingham
WALES
LONDON
Cardiff
Bristol
Fastnet Rock
St George's Channel
Plymouth
Lands End
English Channel
Bishop Rock
Hamburg
Bremen
NETHERLANDS
AMSTERDAM
Hannover
FED REP OF GERMANY
Dortmund
Rotterdam
Antwerpen
GERMANY
Köln
BONN
BRUXELLES
BELGIUM
Frankfurt
Mannheim
Stuttgart
PARIS
FRANCE
Strasbourg
München
Nantes
Loire
Bay of Biscay
SWITZERLAND
Milano
Torino
Bologna
Genova
MONACO
Ligurian Sea
Bordeaux
Toulouse
PYRENEES
ANDORRA
Bilbao
Corse (France)
ROMA
Barcelona
MADRID
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Valencia
Mallorca
Menorca
SARDEGNA (Italy)
ISLAS BALEARES (Spain)
ARQUIPELAGO DOS AÇORES (Portugal)
LISBOA
São Miguel
Pico
Terceira
AZORES GIBRALTAR
Cabo de São Vicente
Sevilla
Málaga
Cartagena
Alicante
Strait of Gibraltar
ALGER
Constantine
TUNIS
TUNISIA
ARQUIPELAGO DA MADEIRA (MADEIRA ISLANDS) (Portugal)
Madeira
Porto Santo
Casablanca
RABAT
ATLAS MTS
MOROCCO
ERIMUSA TABLEMOUNT
DACIA SEAMOUNT
ILHAS CANARIAS (CANARY ISLANDS) (Spain)
Lanzarote
Fuerteventura
Las Palmas
Tenerife
Gran Canaria
Palma
GREAT METEOR TABLEMOUNT
ALGERIA
CANARY


Gulf of Bothnia
FINLAND
Gulf of Finland
HELSINKI
STOCKHOLM
Leningrad
ESTONSKAYA SSR (ESTONIA)
Tallinn
Hiiumaa
Saaremaa
Gulf of Riga
LATVIYSKAYA SSR (LATVIA)
Riga
Gotland
Oland
BALTIC SEA
KØBENHAVN
Malmö
LITOVSKAYA SSR (LITHUANIA)
Kaunas
Vilnius
Gulf of Danzig
RSFSR
Kaliningrad
Gdańsk
POLAND
Bydgoszcz
Poznań
Łódź
Wrocław
Lublin
Kraków
Katowice
Częstochowa
Ostrava
BERLIN
Dresden
Leipzig
Magdeburg
PRAHA (PRAGUE)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Brno
WIEN
Bratislava
AUSTRIA
Salzburg
Innsbruck
BUDAPEST
Debrecen
HUNGARY
Szeged
Cluj
ROMANIA
Timişoara
Zagreb
Venezia
BEOGRAD
YUGOSLAVIA
Trieste
Ravenna
SAN MARINO
ITALY
Napoli
Palermo
Catania
SICILIA
MALTA
Tyrrhenian Sea
Adriatic Sea
Ionian Sea
Aegean Sea
Gulf of Taranto
Gulf of Corinth
GREECE
ATHINAI
Thessaloniki
Sea of Crete
Crete (Greece)
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Strait of Gibraltar
Khalij Qābis (Gulf of Gabes)
TARĀBULUS
BANGHAZI
Khalij Surt (Gulf of Sidra)
LIBYAN DESERT
Jalo (Oasis)
Siwa Oasis
Alexandria
CAIRO
EGYPT
Nile
Suez
Port Said
JORDAN
AMMAN
Haifa
TEL AVIV-YAFO
ISRAEL
Yerushalayim (Jerusalem)
LEBANON
BEYROUTH (BEIRUT)
CYPRUS
SYRIA
DIMASHQ (DAMASCUS)
IRAQ
BAGHDAD
AN NAFŪD (DESERT)
Neutral Zone
KUWAIT
AL KUWAYT (KUWAIT)
Persian Gulf
BAHRAIN
AL MANAMAH
QATAR
AD DAWHAH
AR RIYAD (RIYADH)
AD DAHNĀ (DESERT)
EMIRATES
Strait of Hormuz
IRAN
TEHRAN
Dasht-e Kavir
Kashk-e Kavir
Alborz
Esfahan
Kermān
Zāhedān
Bandar
Khorramshahr
Shatt al Arab
Abadan
Ahvāz
Kūh-e Dinārkūh
Kūh-e Zardeh
Kūh-e Hazār Masjed
Kūh-e Sabalān
Kūh-e Sahand
Kūh-e Alvand
Kūh-e Binālūd
Kūh-e Shīr Kūh
Kūh-e Jupār
Kūh-e Taftān
Kūh-e Bazmān
Kūh-e Mīānkūh
Kūh-e Sīāh Kūh
Kūh-e Lālezār
Kūh-e Hazārān
Kūh-e Kūhbanān
Kūh-e Jebāl Bārez
Kūh-e Rūdbār
Kūh-e Kerman
Kūh-e Lālehzār
Kūh-e Shahsavārān
Kūh-e Dālāhū
Kūh-e Kūhpāyeh
Kūh-e Kūhestān
Kūh-e Kūhsorkh
Kūh-e Kūhsefīd
Kūh-e Kūhsiāh


9
ON OF SOVIET SOCIALI
ST REPUBLICS
ROSSIYSKAYA SOVETSKAYA FEDERATIVNAYA SOTSIALISTIC
HESKAYA RESPUBLIKA
ZAPADNO-SIBIRSKAYA NIZMENNOST
PODKAMENNAYA TUNGUSKA
60°
Sverdlovsk
Tyumen
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Kemerovo
SAYAN MOUNTAINS
Prokop'yevsk
Barnaul
Novokuznetsk
Orsk
Yenisey
Semipalatinsk
Ust'-Kamenogorsk
ALTAY MOUNTAINS
KAZAKHSKAYA SSR
Karaganda
Bukhtarminskoye Vodokhranilishche
OZERO BALKHASH (LAKE)
MONGOLIA
4226
45°
ARAL'SKOYE MORE (SEA)
Kzyl-Orda
Alma-Ata
TIEN SHAN
Pik Khan-Tengri 6995 (Peak)
4925
UZBEKSKAYA SSR
Chimkent
Frunze
KIRGIZSKAYA SSR
Tashkent
Samarkand
TADZHIKSKAYA SSR
Dushanbe
PAMIRS
T'A-K'O-LA-MA-KAN SHA-MO (DESERT)
5400
K'UN-LUN SHAN
HINDU KUSH
Mt Godwin Austen 8611
AFGHANISTAN
KABUL
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
PLATEAU OF TIBET
Lahore
Lyallpur
Multan
Ludhiana
Amritsar
Ko-erh-ya-shan (Gertek)
HIMALAYAS
Ya-lu-tsang-po
Mamo Kang Ka-erh-wa (Namcha Barwa) 7756
30°
PAKISTAN
Delhi
NEW DELHI
Meerut
Bareilly
NEPAL
Mt Everest 8848
THAR DESERT
Jodhpur
Jaipur
Gwalior
Kanpur
Lucknow
Allahabad
Brahmaputra
Amu Dar'ya
Syr Dar'ya
Irtysh
Ob
Yenisey
Tobol
Ishim
Ural
Helmand
Indus

Germany, Poland ... as on 8 mile Armistice

International boundaries hereon represent available information as to limits of administering authorities. Recognition of sovereignty by the United States Government is not implied.
Information as of December 1972.


POPULATION (Approximate)

Less than 200,000	200,000 to 500,000	500,000 to 1,000,000	1,000,000 and over	Capitals of Countries
				Veracruz
				Nagasaki
				Genova
				New York
				LONDON

Selected shipping lanes with distances in nautical miles


4,907

Geographic names or their spellings do not necessarily reflect recognition of the political status of an area by the United States Government.





SHEET 3


30°
15°
0°
15°
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
CANARY BASIN
GREAT METEOR TABLEMOUNT
LAS CANARIAS (CANARY ISLANDS) (Spain)
La Palma
Tenerife
Gomera
Ferro
Gran Canaria
Lanzarote
Fuerteventura
Agadir
Sidi Ifni
Tarfaya
Aaiún
Tindouf
ALGERIA
SPANISH SAHARA
Villa Cisneros
Fdérik
Cap Blanc
Nouadhibou
Ater
MAURITANIA
MALI
Tombouctou
Gao
NOUAKCHOTT
St Louis
Sénégal
ISLAS DE CABO VERDE (CAPE VERDE ISLANDS) (Portugal)
CAPE VERDE TERRACE
Santo Antão
São Vicente
São Nicolau
Sal
Boa Vista
Maio
Brava
Fogo
Santiago
DAKAR Cap Vert
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
BATHURST
Gambia
Niger
Bani
Ségou
BAMAKO
UPPER VOLTA
OUAGADOUGOU
Bobo Dioulasso
Black Volta
White Volta
DAHOMEY
Parakou
Porto Novo
PORTUGUESE GUINEA
ARQUIPÉLAGO DOS BIJAGÓS
Bissau
GUINEA
Conakry
CONAKRY
FREETOWN
SIERRA LEONE
IVORY COAST
Bouaké
GHANA
Lake Volta
Kumasi
Volta Dam
Cotonou
LIBERIA
MONROVIA
ABIDJAN
ACCRA
Sekondi
Takoradi
Tema
LOME
Cape Palmas
SIERRA LEONE BASIN
Gulf of Guinea
GUINEA BASIN
ROMANCHE GAP
MERIDIAN OF GREENWICH
PUNTA ARENAS-STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR 6,352
PUNTA ARENAS-D'ENTRECASTEAUX 6,986
BELEM-STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR 3,295
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-RE D'ENTRECASTEAUX 5,746-STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR 5,082
NEW YORK-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 6,903
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-PANAMA 6487-STRAITS OF FLORIDA 6,770
STRAITS OF FLORIDA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 6,793
Ascension (UK)
Saint Helena (UK)
ILHAS MARTIM VAZ (ISLANDS) (Brazil)
Ilha da Trindade (Island)



LGERIA
LIBYA
LIBYAN DESERT
EGYPT
CAIRO
JORDAN
AN NAFŪD (DESERT)
RED SEA
SAHARA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
Lake Chad
SUDAN
KHARTOUM
Omdurman
White Nile
Blue Nile
Aswân Dam
Lake Nasser
Jabal al 'Uwaynāt
1934
Al Kufrah (Oasis)
Siwa Oasis
Nile
Wadi Halfa
Port Sudan
Asmara
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA
Dessie
Gondar
Lake Tana
Lake Rudolf
UPPER VOLTA
Niger
Benue
Logone
Chari
Fort-Lamy
Fort-Archambault
Kainji Dam
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
Ibadan
LAGOS
GHANA
Lake Volta
Volta Dam
ACCRA
Takoradi
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bangassou
Bomu
Uele
BANGUI
CAMEROON
YAOUNDÉ
Port Harcourt 4070
SANTA ISABEL
Fernando Póo
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Principe (Portugal)
São Tomé (Portugal)
Gulf of Guinea
BASIN
Oubangui
Congo
Nkandaka
Lisongoni
GABON
CONGO
ZAIRE
Cap Lopez
Angobón (Equatorial Guinea)
BRAZZAVILLE
KINSHASA
Kasai
Lukenie
Sankuru
Lomami
Lualaba
Pointe-Noire
CABINDA (Angola)
CONGO CANYON
Luluabourg
Kasanje
Luanda
Lobito
Nova Lisboa
ANGOLA (Portugal)
Quanza
Cubango
Cunene
Moçâmedes
Cape Fria
Etosha Pan
Okavango
Okavango Swamp
SOUTH WEST
AFRICA
(International Territory)
WALVISBAAI (South Africa)
Windhoek
KALAHARI DESERT
BOTSWANA
Limpopo
Zambezi
ZAMBIA
LUSAKA
Kariba Lake
Victoria Falls
Livingstone
SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UK)
Salisbury
Bulawayo
Beira
MOZAMBIQUE
QUELIMANE
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Mweru
Lake Rukwa
Lake Bangweulu
Likasi
Lubumbashi
Kitwe
Nkana
Mbeya
Tabora
BURUNDI
UGANDA
KENYA
Mount Kenya
LAKE VICTORIA
Kisumu
Kampala
Entebbe
Jinja
Mwanza
Kilimanjaro
Moshi
Mombasa
Pemba Island
Zanzibar Island
DAR ES SALAAM
Mafia Island
Tanga
Lake Turkana
Lake Rudolf
Ile Juan de Nova (Fr)
Bassas da India (Fr)
Ile Europa (Fr)
MERIDIAN OF GREENWICH



PAKISTAN
Delhi
NEW DELHI
THAR DESERT
Jodhpur
Jaipur
Gwalior
Kānpur
Lucknow
Allahābād
Varānasi
Patna
Ganges
Brahmaputra
Hyderābād
Karāchi
Sonmiani Bay
Persian Gulf
Strait of Hormuz
BAHRAIN
AL MANAMAH
QATAR
AD DAWHAH
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Gulf of Oman
Ra's al Hadd
Gulf of Kutch
Ahmadabad
Jabalpur
Calcutta
Howrah
Mahānadi
Nāgpur
Surat
Diu
Gulf of Cambay
Bombay
INDIA
Poona
Sholapur
Hyderabad
Krishna
Godāvari
Ponjim
GOA
Hubli
Bangalore
Madras
Mysore
Salem
Coimbatore
Madurai
Cochin
Alleppey
Tuticorin
Jaffna
Trincomalee
Tiruchchirappalli
Palk Strait
Gulf of Mannar
Cape Comorin
Trivandrum
COLOMBO
SRI LANKA
(CEYLON)
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
Gulf of Aden
Socotra (Socotra)
Yemen (Aden)
Cape Guardafui
LACCADIVE, MINICOY AND AMINDIVI ISLANDS (India)
ANDAMAN ISLANDS (India)
NICOBAR ISLANDS (India)
Nine Degree Channel
Eight Degree Channel
Ten Degree Channel
Preparis North Channel
Preparis South Channel
MALDIVES
MALE
SOMALI BASIN
CARLSBERG RIDGE
MID-INDIAN RIDGE
EQUATOR
CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO (UK)
Diégo Garcia
SEYCHELLES ISLANDS (UK)
AMIRANTE ISLANDS (UK)
Coetivy Island (UK)
Providence Islands (UK)
FARQUHAR GROUP (UK)
AGALEGA ISLANDS (Mauritius)
SEYCHELLES-MAURITIUS PLATEAU
Diego-Suarez
Ile Tromelin (Fr)
CARGADOS CARAJOS SHOALS (Mauritius)
Rodriques Island (Mauritius)
MADAGASCAR
MAURITIUS
MASCARENE ISLANDS
RÉUNION (Fr)
PORT SAID-BOMBAY 3,042
PORT SAID-AL BAŞRAH (BASRA) 4,337
AL BAŞRAH (BASRA)-SINGAPORE 3,912
PORT SAID-SINGAPORE (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 5,035
PORT SAID-SINGAPORE (OCTOBER-APRIL) 5,048
SINGAPORE-PORT SAID (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 5,139
FROM PORT SAID (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 4,722 (OCTOBER-APRIL) 4,685
TO PORT SAID (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 4,685 (OCTOBER-APRIL) 4,695
SWITCH OF NO GROUND
RANGOON-AL BAŞRAH (BASRA) 3,603
PORT SAID-SELAT (STRAIT) SUNDA (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 5,234
SELAT (STRAIT) SUNDA-PORT SAID (OCTOBER-APRIL) 5,214
One and Half Degree Channel
PORT SAID-SELAT (STRAIT) SUNDA (OCTOBER-APRIL) 5,305
SELAT (STRAIT) SUNDA-PORT SAID (MAY-SEPTEMBER) 5,322
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-PORT SAID 5,367
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 5,211
BOMBAY-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 4,591
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-BOMBAY 4,538
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CALCUTTA (APRIL AND OCTOBER) 5,604
CALCUTTA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE (APRIL AND OCTOBER) 5,594
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CALCUTTA (MAY-SEPT.) 5,609
CALCUTTA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE (MAY-SEPT.) 5,488
CAPE LEEUWIN-PORT SAID (MAY-SEPT.) 6,369
CAPE-CALCUTTA (NOV. MAY) 5,602
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CALCUTTA (NOV. AND MAY) 5,438



15°
30°
45°
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
MID-ATLANTIC RIDGE
MERIDIAN OF GREENWICH
CAPE BASIN
Saint Helena (UK)
ILHAS MARTIM VAZ (ISLANDS) (Brazil)
Ilha da Trindade (Island)
RIO DE JANEIRO-PANAMA 6,487-STRAITS OF FLORIDA 6,770
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 6,537
STRAITS OF FLORIDA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 6,783
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-RIO DE JANEIRO 3,323
RIO DE JANEIRO-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 3,267
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-MONTEVIDEO 3,701
Tristan da Cunha (UK)
Gough Island (UK)
MONTEVIDEO-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 3,591
DISCOVERY TABLEMOUNT
METEOR SEAMOUNTS
SPIESS SEAMOUNT
Bouvetøya Island (Norway)
SOUTH GEORGIA RISE


ANGOLA (Portugal)
ZAMBIA
Cubango
Zambezi
Kariba Lake
Okavango
Etosha Pan
Okavango Swamp
SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UK)
BOTSWANA
Windhoek
AFRICA
KALAHARI DESERT
GABORONE
Limpopo
Mafeking
PRETORIA
Johannesburg
SOUTH
Orange
Vaal
Kimberley
Bloemfontein
Orange
AFRICA
Durban
Lourenço Marques
MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL
MOZAMBIQUE PLATEAU
NATAL BASIN
MADAGASCAR PLATEAU
Ile Juan de Nova (Fr)
Ile Tromelin (Fr)
CARGADOS CARAJOS SHOALS (Mauritius)
Les Barren (Fr)
Beira
Bassas da India (Fr)
Ile Europa (Fr)
Tuléar
MADAGASCAR
Fort Dauphin
MAURITIUS
RÉUNION (Fr)
MASCARENE ISLANDS
TROPIC OF
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CALCUTTA (NOV.-MAY) 5,603
CALCUTTA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE (NOV. AND MAY) 5,430
SELAT (STRAIT) SUNDA-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
Port Elizabeth
Cape Recife
Cape Town
Hope
Saldanha Bay
Mossel Bay
Cape Agulhas
AGULHAS PLATEAU
AGULHAS BASIN
SOUTHWEST INDIAN RIDGE
PRINCE EDWARD ISLANDS (SA)
Prince Edward Island
Marion Island
ILES (ISLANDS) CROZET (Fr)
INDIAN
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CAPE


15°
30°
45°
Rodriques Island
(Mauritius)
SLANDS
F CAPRICORN
R E A S I N
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-SELAT (STRAIT SUNDA 5,164
TORRES STRAIT-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 6,933
CAPE LEEUWIN-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 5,068
D I A N O C E AN
OOD HOPE-CAPE LEEUWIN 4,849 (WINTER MONTHS)
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-TORRES STRAIT 6,854
C R O Z E T
B A S I N
Île Amsterdam
(Fr)
Île Saint-Paul
(Island) (Fr)
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE-CAPE LEEUWIN 4,660
(SUMMER MONTHS)
Île Kerguelen
(Fr)
Heard Island
(Austr)
MC DONALD ISLANDS
(Austr)
S O U T


ATLANTI


C – I N D I A N R I D G
Cape Close
Magnet Bay
Cape Kolosov
Cape Boothby
White Island
Amundsen Bay
Edward VIII Bay
Penner Glacier
Wilson Glacier
Stefansson Bay
Lange Promontory
Astrer Glacier
Wilma Glacier
KEMP COAST
Thyer Glacier
Robert Glacier
Rayner Glacier
ENDERBY LAND
ANTARCTICA
Riiser-Larsen Peninsula
Cape Omega
PRINCE OLAV COAST
PRINCE HARALD COAST
Lützow-Holm Bay
Padda Island
PRINCESS RAGNHILD COAST
2:00 PM
1400 HOURS
3:00 PM
1500 HOURS
4:00 PM
1600 HOURS
30°
45°
60°


Heard Island
(Austr)
MC DONALD ISLANDS
(Austr)
ANTARCTIC PLATEAU
SOUTH
60°
Drygalski Island
DAVIS SEA
Helen Glacier
Magnet Bay
Cape Boothby
ANTARCTIC CIRCLE
Leskov Island
WEST ICE SHELF
Cape Penck
QUEEN MARY COAST
Edward VIII Bay
Wilson Glacier
Mikhaylov Island
Philippe Glacier
Wilma Glacier
Stefansson Bay
KEMP COAST
Cape Daly
Robert Glacier
Holme Bay
Ubskiat Glacier
Cape Darnley
Prydz Bay
Barrier Bay
MAWSON COAST
LEOPOLD AND ASTRID COAST
MacKenzie Bay
LARS CHRISTENSEN COAST
AMERY ICE SHELF
INGRID CHRISTENSEN COAST
AMERICAN HIGHLANDS
4:00 PM
1600 HOURS
5:00 PM
1700 HOURS
6:00 PM
1800 HOURS
70°
60°
75°
90°
95°